Add templated headers sent to the downstream service. (#40)

* Improve refresh token handling in the background.

Resolves issue when user opens the website, allows the access token to expire, but continues browsing.
The background requests are failing with CORS errors to OIDC provider.

* fixup! Improve refresh token handling in the background.

* Abstract the token blacklisting.

.traefik.yml

@@ -4,28 +4,280 @@ type: middleware
 import: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
 
 summary: |
-  Middleware adding OIDC authentication to traefik routes. Does what it says on the tin.
-  Middleware has been tested with Auth0 and Logto. It should work with any OIDC provider.
+  Middleware adding OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication to Traefik routes.
+
+  This middleware replaces the need for forward-auth and oauth2-proxy when using Traefik as a reverse proxy.
+  It provides a complete OIDC authentication solution with features like domain restrictions,
+  role-based access control, token caching, and more.
+
+  The middleware has been tested with Auth0, Logto, Google, and other standard OIDC providers.
+  It supports various authentication scenarios including:
+
+  - Basic authentication with customizable callback and logout URLs
+  - Email domain restrictions to limit access to specific organizations
+  - Role and group-based access control
+  - Public URLs that bypass authentication
+  - Rate limiting to prevent brute force attacks
+  - Custom post-logout redirect behavior
+  - Secure session management with encrypted cookies
+  - Automatic token validation and refresh
 
 testData:
-  providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
-  clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
-  clientSecret: secret
-  callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
-  logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
-  postLogoutRedirectURI: /oidc/different-logout # If not provided it will redirect to the "/" URL
-  scopes: # If not provided, default scopes will be used (openid, email, profile)
+  # Required parameters
+  providerURL: https://accounts.google.com # Base URL of the OIDC provider
+  clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com # OAuth 2.0 client identifier
+  clientSecret: secret # OAuth 2.0 client secret
+  callbackURL: /oauth2/callback # Path where the OIDC provider will redirect after authentication
+  sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long # Key used to encrypt session data (must be at least 32 bytes)
+
+  # Optional parameters with defaults
+  logoutURL: /oauth2/logout # Path for handling logout requests (if not provided, it will be set to callbackURL + "/logout")
+  postLogoutRedirectURI: /oidc/different-logout # URL to redirect to after logout (default: "/")
+
+  scopes: # OAuth 2.0 scopes to request (default: ["openid", "email", "profile"])
     - openid
     - email
     - profile
-  allowedUserDomains: # If not provided - will rely entirely on the OIDC yes/no
-    - raczylo.com
-  allowedRolesAndGroups:
+    - roles # Include this to get role information from the provider
+
+  allowedUserDomains: # Restricts access to specific email domains (if not provided, relies on OIDC provider)
+    - company.com
+    - subsidiary.com
+
+  allowedRolesAndGroups: # Restricts access to users with specific roles or groups (if not provided, no role/group restrictions)
     - guest-endpoints
-  sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret
-  forceHTTPS: false
-  logLevel: debug # debug, info, warn, error
-  rateLimit: 100 # Simple rate limiter to prevent brute force attacks
-  excludedURLs: # Determines the list of URLs which are NOT a subject to authentication
+    - admin
+    - developer
+
+  forceHTTPS: false # Forces the use of HTTPS for all URLs (default: true for security)
+  logLevel: debug # Sets logging verbosity: debug, info, error (default: info)
+  rateLimit: 100 # Maximum number of requests per second (default: 100, minimum: 10)
+
+  excludedURLs: # Lists paths that bypass authentication
     - /login # covers /login, /login/me, /login/reminder etc.
-    - /my-public-data
+    - /public
+    - /health
+    - /metrics
+    
+  headers: # Custom headers to set with templated values from claims and tokens
+    - name: "X-User-Email"
+      value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+    - name: "X-User-ID"
+      value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"
+    - name: "Authorization"
+      value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+    - name: "X-User-Roles"
+      value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
+
+  # Advanced parameters (usually discovered automatically from provider metadata)
+  revocationURL: https://accounts.google.com/revoke # Endpoint for revoking tokens
+  oidcEndSessionURL: https://accounts.google.com/logout # Provider's end session endpoint
+  enablePKCE: false # Enables PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for additional security
+
+# Configuration documentation
+configuration:
+  providerURL:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The base URL of the OIDC provider. This is the issuer URL that will be used to discover
+      OIDC endpoints like authorization, token, and JWKS URIs.
+
+      Examples:
+      - https://accounts.google.com
+      - https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant-id/v2.0
+      - https://your-auth0-domain.auth0.com
+      - https://your-logto-instance.com/oidc
+    required: true
+
+  clientID:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The OAuth 2.0 client identifier obtained from your OIDC provider.
+      This is the public identifier for your application.
+    required: true
+
+  clientSecret:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The OAuth 2.0 client secret obtained from your OIDC provider.
+      This should be kept confidential and not exposed in client-side code.
+
+      For Kubernetes deployments, you can use the secret reference format:
+      urn:k8s:secret:namespace:secret-name:key
+    required: true
+
+  callbackURL:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The path where the OIDC provider will redirect after authentication.
+      This must match one of the redirect URIs configured in your OIDC provider.
+
+      The full redirect URI will be constructed as: 
+      [scheme]://[host][callbackURL]
+
+      Example: /oauth2/callback
+    required: true
+
+  sessionEncryptionKey:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      Key used to encrypt session data stored in cookies.
+      Must be at least 32 bytes long for security.
+
+      Example: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+    required: true
+
+  logoutURL:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The path for handling logout requests.
+      If not provided, it will be set to callbackURL + "/logout".
+
+      Example: /oauth2/logout
+    required: false
+
+  postLogoutRedirectURI:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The URL to redirect to after logout.
+      Default: "/"
+
+      Example: /logged-out-page
+    required: false
+
+  scopes:
+    type: array
+    description: |
+      The OAuth 2.0 scopes to request from the OIDC provider.
+      Default: ["openid", "profile", "email"]
+
+      Include "roles" or similar scope if you need role/group information.
+    required: false
+    items:
+      type: string
+
+  logLevel:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      Sets the logging verbosity.
+      Valid values: "debug", "info", "error"
+      Default: "info"
+    required: false
+    enum:
+      - debug
+      - info
+      - error
+
+  forceHTTPS:
+    type: boolean
+    description: |
+      Forces the use of HTTPS for all URLs.
+      This is recommended for security in production environments.
+      Default: true
+    required: false
+
+  rateLimit:
+    type: integer
+    description: |
+      Sets the maximum number of requests per second.
+      This helps prevent brute force attacks.
+      Default: 100
+      Minimum: 10
+    required: false
+
+  excludedURLs:
+    type: array
+    description: |
+      Lists paths that bypass authentication.
+      These paths will be accessible without OIDC authentication.
+
+      The middleware uses prefix matching, so "/public" will match
+      "/public", "/public/page", "/public-data", etc.
+
+      Examples: ["/health", "/metrics", "/public"]
+    required: false
+    items:
+      type: string
+
+  allowedUserDomains:
+    type: array
+    description: |
+      Restricts access to users with email addresses from specific domains.
+      If not provided, the middleware relies entirely on the OIDC provider
+      for authentication decisions.
+
+      Examples: ["company.com", "subsidiary.com"]
+    required: false
+    items:
+      type: string
+
+  allowedRolesAndGroups:
+    type: array
+    description: |
+      Restricts access to users with specific roles or groups.
+      If not provided, no role/group restrictions are applied.
+
+      The middleware checks both the "roles" and "groups" claims in the ID token.
+
+      Examples: ["admin", "developer"]
+    required: false
+    items:
+      type: string
+
+  revocationURL:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The endpoint for revoking tokens.
+      If not provided, it will be discovered from provider metadata.
+
+      Example: https://accounts.google.com/revoke
+    required: false
+
+  oidcEndSessionURL:
+    type: string
+    description: |
+      The provider's end session endpoint.
+      If not provided, it will be discovered from provider metadata.
+
+      Example: https://accounts.google.com/logout
+    required: false
+
+  enablePKCE:
+    type: boolean
+    description: |
+      Enables PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for the OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow.
+      PKCE adds an extra layer of security to protect against authorization code interception attacks.
+
+      Not all OIDC providers support PKCE, so this should only be enabled if your provider supports it.
+      If enabled, the middleware will generate and use a code verifier/challenge pair during authentication.
+
+      Default: false
+    required: false
+
+  headers:
+    type: array
+    description: |
+      Custom HTTP headers to set with templated values derived from OIDC claims and tokens.
+      Each header has a name and a value template that can access:
+      - {{.Claims.field}} - Access ID token claims (e.g., email, sub, name)
+      - {{.AccessToken}} - The raw access token string
+      - {{.IdToken}} - The raw ID token string
+      - {{.RefreshToken}} - The raw refresh token string
+
+      Templates support Go template syntax including conditionals and iteration.
+      Variable names are case-sensitive - use .Claims not .claims.
+
+      Examples:
+      - name: "X-User-Email", value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+      - name: "Authorization", value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+      - name: "X-User-Roles", value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
+    required: false
+    items:
+      type: object
+      properties:
+        name:
+          type: string
+          description: The HTTP header name to set
+        value:
+          type: string
+          description: Template string for the header value

LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2025 Lukasz Raczylo
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

README.md

@@ -1,151 +1,373 @@
-## Traefik OIDC middleware
+# Traefik OIDC Middleware
 
-This middleware is supposed to replace the need for the forward-auth and oauth2-proxy when using traefik as a reverse proxy to support the OIDC authentication.
+This middleware replaces the need for forward-auth and oauth2-proxy when using Traefik as a reverse proxy to support OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication.
 
-Middleware has been tested with Auth0 and Logto.
+## Overview
 
-### Traefik version compatibility
+The Traefik OIDC middleware provides a complete OIDC authentication solution with features like:
+- Token validation and verification
+- Session management
+- Domain restrictions
+- Role-based access control
+- Token caching and blacklisting
+- Rate limiting
+- Excluded paths (public URLs)
 
-Code follows closely the current traefik helm chart versions. If plugin fails to load - it's time to update to the latest version of the traefik helm chart.
+The middleware has been tested with Auth0 and Logto, but should work with any standard OIDC provider.
 
-### Configuration options
+## Traefik Version Compatibility
 
-Middleware currently supports following scenarios:
+This middleware follows closely the current Traefik helm chart versions. If the plugin fails to load, it's time to update to the latest version of the Traefik helm chart.
 
-* Setting custom callback and logout URLs via `callbackURL` and `logoutURL`
-* Allowing for access only from the listed domains if `allowedUserDomains` is set, otherwise it relies entirely on the OIDC provider
-* Using excluded URLs which do **NOT** require the OIDC authentication
-* Rate limiting requests to prevent the bruteforce attacks
+## Installation
 
-#### How to configure...
+### As a Traefik Plugin
 
-##### Keeping secrets secret
-
-This works ONLY in kubernetes environments. Don't forget to create secret traefik-middleware-oidc with fields ISSUER, CLIENT_ID and SECRET keys.
+1. Enable the plugin in your Traefik static configuration:
 
+```yaml
+# traefik.yml
+experimental:
+  plugins:
+    traefikoidc:
+      moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
+      version: v0.2.1  # Use the latest version
 ```
+
+2. Configure the middleware in your dynamic configuration (see examples below).
+
+### Local Development with Docker Compose
+
+For local development or testing, you can use the provided Docker Compose setup:
+
+```bash
+cd docker
+docker-compose up -d
+```
+
+This will start Traefik with the OIDC middleware and two test services.
+
+## Configuration Options
+
+The middleware supports the following configuration options:
+
+### Required Parameters
+
+| Parameter | Description | Example |
+|-----------|-------------|---------|
+| `providerURL` | The base URL of the OIDC provider | `https://accounts.google.com` |
+| `clientID` | The OAuth 2.0 client identifier | `1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com` |
+| `clientSecret` | The OAuth 2.0 client secret | `your-client-secret` |
+| `sessionEncryptionKey` | Key used to encrypt session data (must be at least 32 bytes long) | `potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long` |
+| `callbackURL` | The path where the OIDC provider will redirect after authentication | `/oauth2/callback` |
+
+### Optional Parameters
+
+| Parameter | Description | Default | Example |
+|-----------|-------------|---------|---------|
+| `logoutURL` | The path for handling logout requests | `callbackURL + "/logout"` | `/oauth2/logout` |
+| `postLogoutRedirectURI` | The URL to redirect to after logout | `/` | `/logged-out-page` |
+| `scopes` | The OAuth 2.0 scopes to request | `["openid", "profile", "email"]` | `["openid", "email", "profile", "roles"]` |
+| `logLevel` | Sets the logging verbosity | `info` | `debug`, `info`, `error` |
+| `forceHTTPS` | Forces the use of HTTPS for all URLs | `true` | `true`, `false` |
+| `rateLimit` | Sets the maximum number of requests per second | `100` | `500` |
+| `excludedURLs` | Lists paths that bypass authentication | none | `["/health", "/metrics", "/public"]` |
+| `allowedUserDomains` | Restricts access to specific email domains | none | `["company.com", "subsidiary.com"]` |
+| `allowedRolesAndGroups` | Restricts access to users with specific roles or groups | none | `["admin", "developer"]` |
+| `revocationURL` | The endpoint for revoking tokens | auto-discovered | `https://accounts.google.com/revoke` |
+| `oidcEndSessionURL` | The provider's end session endpoint | auto-discovered | `https://accounts.google.com/logout` |
+| `enablePKCE` | Enables PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for authorization code flow | `false` | `true`, `false` |
+| `refreshGracePeriodSeconds` | Seconds before token expiry to attempt proactive refresh | `60` | `120` |
+| `headers` | Custom HTTP headers with templates that can access OIDC claims and tokens | none | See "Templated Headers" section |
+
+## Usage Examples
+
+### Basic Configuration
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-basic
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+```
+
+### With Excluded URLs (Public Access Paths)
+
+```yaml
 apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
 kind: Middleware
 metadata:
   name: oidc-with-open-urls
   namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+      excludedURLs:
+        - /login        # covers /login, /login/me, /login/reminder etc.
+        - /public-data
+        - /health
+        - /metrics
+```
+
+### With Email Domain Restrictions
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-domain-restricted
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+      allowedUserDomains:
+        - company.com
+        - subsidiary.com
+```
+
+### With Role-Based Access Control
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-rbac
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+        - roles     # Include this to get role information from the provider
+      allowedRolesAndGroups:
+        - admin
+        - developer
+```
+
+### With Custom Logging and Rate Limiting
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-custom-settings
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      logLevel: debug    # Options: debug, info, error (default: info)
+      rateLimit: 500     # Requests per second (default: 100)
+      forceHTTPS: false  # Default is true for security
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+```
+
+### With Custom Post-Logout Redirect
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-custom-logout
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      postLogoutRedirectURI: /logged-out-page  # Where to redirect after logout
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+```
+
+### With Templated Headers
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-with-headers
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+        - roles
+      headers:
+        - name: "X-User-Email"
+          value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+        - name: "X-User-ID"
+          value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"
+        - name: "Authorization"
+          value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+        - name: "X-User-Roles"
+          value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
+        - name: "X-Is-Admin"
+          value: "{{if eq .Claims.role \"admin\"}}true{{else}}false{{end}}"
+```
+
+### With PKCE Enabled
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-with-pkce
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
+      clientSecret: your-client-secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
+      enablePKCE: true  # Enables PKCE for added security
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+```
+
+### Google OIDC Configuration Example
+
+This example shows a configuration specifically tailored for Google OIDC, including necessary scopes for session extension:
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-google
+  namespace: traefik
+spec:
+  plugin:
+    traefikoidc:
+      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
+      clientID: your-google-client-id.apps.googleusercontent.com # Replace with your Client ID
+      clientSecret: your-google-client-secret                     # Replace with your Client Secret
+      sessionEncryptionKey: your-secure-encryption-key-min-32-chars # Replace with your key
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback                             # Adjust if needed
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout                                 # Optional: Adjust if needed
+      scopes:
+        - openid
+        - email
+        - profile
+        - offline_access # Required for refresh tokens / long sessions with Google
+      refreshGracePeriodSeconds: 300  # Optional: Start refresh 5 min before expiry (default 60)
+      # Other optional parameters like allowedUserDomains, etc. can be added here
+```
+
+### Keeping Secrets Secret in Kubernetes
+
+For Kubernetes environments, you can reference secrets instead of hardcoding sensitive values:
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Middleware
+metadata:
+  name: oidc-with-secrets
+  namespace: traefik
 spec:
   plugin:
     traefikoidc:
       providerURL: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-middleware-oidc:ISSUER
       clientID: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-middleware-oidc:CLIENT_ID
       clientSecret: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-middleware-oidc:SECRET
-      sessionEncryptionKey: vvv
-      callbackURL: /cool-oidc/callback
-      logoutURL: /cool-oidc/logout
-      postLogoutRedirectURI: /my-website/you-have-logged-out # Optional post logout URL redirection
+      sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
+      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
       scopes:
         - openid
         - email
         - profile
-      excludedURLs: # Determines the list of URLs which are NOT a subject to authentication
-        - /login # covers /login, /login/me, /login/reminder etc.
-        - /my-public-data
 ```
 
-##### Excluded URLs with open access
+Don't forget to create the secret:
 
-```
-apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
-kind: Middleware
-metadata:
-  name: oidc-with-open-urls
-  namespace: traefik
-spec:
-  plugin:
-    traefikoidc:
-      providerURL: xxx
-      clientID: yyy
-      clientSecret: zzz
-      sessionEncryptionKey: vvv
-      callbackURL: /cool-oidc/callback
-      logoutURL: /cool-oidc/logout
-      scopes:
-        - openid
-        - email
-        - profile
-      excludedURLs: # Determines the list of URLs which are NOT a subject to authentication
-        - /login # covers /login, /login/me, /login/reminder etc.
-        - /my-public-data
+```bash
+kubectl create secret generic traefik-middleware-oidc \
+  --from-literal=ISSUER=https://accounts.google.com \
+  --from-literal=CLIENT_ID=1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com \
+  --from-literal=SECRET=your-client-secret \
+  -n traefik
 ```
 
+## Complete Docker Compose Example
 
-##### Allowed email domains
-
-Assuming that your OIDC provider allows anyone to log in, you may want to limit the access to people using emains in specific domain.
-
-```
-apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
-kind: Middleware
-metadata:
-  name: oidc-only-my-users
-  namespace: traefik
-spec:
-  plugin:
-    traefikoidc:
-      providerURL: xxx
-      clientID: yyy
-      clientSecret: zzz
-      sessionEncryptionKey: vvv
-      callbackURL: /new-oidc/callback
-      logoutURL: /new-oidc/logout
-      scopes:
-        - openid
-        - email
-        - profile
-      allowedUserDomains:
-        - raczylo.com
-```
-
-
-##### Allowed groups and roles
-
-In case of multiple roles / groups and access separation for various endpoints you will need to create multiple traefik middlewares.
-Following example allows access for users who have additional role `guest-endpoints` assigned.
-
-```
-apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
-kind: Middleware
-metadata:
-  name: oidc-guest-endpoints
-  namespace: traefik
-spec:
-  plugin:
-    traefikoidc:
-      providerURL: xxx
-      clientID: yyy
-      clientSecret: zzz
-      sessionEncryptionKey: vvv
-      callbackURL: /my-oidc/callback
-      logoutURL: /my-oidc/logout
-      scopes:
-        - openid
-        - email
-        - profile
-        - roles     # This line queries the OIDC provider for roles
-      forceHTTPS: true
-      allowedRolesAndGroups:
-        - guest-endpoints  # This line specifies the roles or groups allowed to access content
-      allowedUserDomains:
-        - raczylo.com
-```
-
-
-#### Docker compose example
-
-`docker-compose.yaml`
+Here's a complete example of using the middleware with Docker Compose:
 
 ```yaml
 version: "3.7"
 
 services:
   traefik:
-    image: traefik:v3.0.1
+    image: traefik:v3.2.1
     command:
       - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.modulename=github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
       - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.version=v0.2.1"
@@ -156,7 +378,6 @@ services:
     labels:
       - "traefik.http.routers.dash.rule=Host(`dash.localhost`)"
       - "traefik.http.routers.dash.service=api@internal"
-
     ports:
       - "80:80"
 
@@ -179,8 +400,7 @@ services:
       - traefik.http.routers.whoami.middlewares=my-plugin@file
 ```
 
-`traefik-config/traefik.yaml`
-
+`traefik-config/traefik.yml`:
 ```yaml
 log:
   level: INFO
@@ -209,7 +429,7 @@ providers:
     filename: /etc/traefik/dynamic-configuration.yml
 ```
 
-`traefik-config/dynamic-configuration.yaml`
+`traefik-config/dynamic-configuration.yml`:
 ```yaml
 http:
   middlewares:
@@ -218,20 +438,163 @@ http:
         traefikoidc:
           providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
           clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
-          clientSecret: secret
+          clientSecret: your-client-secret
           callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
           logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
-          scopes: # If not provided, default scopes will be used (openid, email, profile)
+          postLogoutRedirectURI: /logged-out-page
+          sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
+          scopes:
             - openid
             - email
             - profile
-          allowedUserDomains: # If not provided - will rely entirely on the OIDC yes/no
-            - raczylo.com
-          sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret
+          allowedUserDomains:
+            - company.com
+          allowedRolesAndGroups:
+            - admin
+            - developer
           forceHTTPS: false
-          logLevel: debug # debug, info, warn, error
-          rateLimit: 100 # Simple rate limiter to prevent brute force attacks
-          excludedURLs: # Determines the list of URLs which are NOT a subject to authentication
-            - /login # covers /login, /login/me, /login/reminder etc.
-            - /my-public-data
+          logLevel: debug
+          rateLimit: 100
+          excludedURLs:
+            - /login
+            - /public
+            - /health
+            - /metrics
+          headers:
+            - name: "X-User-Email"
+              value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+            - name: "X-User-ID"
+              value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"
+            - name: "Authorization"
+              value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+            - name: "X-User-Roles"
+              value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
 ```
+
+## Advanced Configuration
+
+### Session Management
+
+The middleware uses encrypted cookies to manage user sessions. The `sessionEncryptionKey` must be at least 32 bytes long and should be kept secret.
+
+### PKCE Support
+
+The middleware supports PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange), which is an extension to the authorization code flow to prevent authorization code interception attacks. When enabled via the `enablePKCE` option, the middleware will generate a code verifier for each authentication request and derive a code challenge from it. The code verifier is stored in the user's session and sent during the token exchange process.
+
+PKCE is recommended when:
+- Your OIDC provider supports it (most modern providers do)
+- You need an additional layer of security for the authorization code flow
+- You're concerned about potential authorization code interception attacks
+
+Note that not all OIDC providers support PKCE, so check your provider's documentation before enabling this feature.
+
+### Session Duration and Token Refresh
+
+This middleware aims to provide long-lived user sessions, typically up to 24 hours, by utilizing OIDC refresh tokens.
+
+**How it works:**
+- When a user authenticates, the middleware requests an access token and, if available, a refresh token from the OIDC provider.
+- The access token usually has a short lifespan (e.g., 1 hour).
+- Before the access token expires (controlled by `refreshGracePeriodSeconds`), the middleware uses the refresh token to obtain a new access token from the provider without requiring the user to log in again.
+- This process repeats, allowing the session to remain valid for as long as the refresh token is valid (often 24 hours or more, depending on the provider).
+
+**Provider-Specific Considerations (e.g., Google):**
+- Some providers, like Google, issue short-lived access tokens (e.g., 1 hour) and require specific configurations for long-term sessions.
+- To enable session extension beyond the initial token expiry with Google and similar providers, the middleware automatically includes the `offline_access` scope in the authentication request. This scope is necessary to obtain a refresh token.
+- For Google specifically, the middleware also adds the `prompt=consent` parameter to the initial authorization request. This ensures Google issues a refresh token, which is crucial for extending the session.
+- If a refresh attempt fails (e.g., the refresh token is revoked or expired), the user will be required to re-authenticate. The middleware includes enhanced error handling and logging for these scenarios.
+- Ensure your OIDC provider is configured to issue refresh tokens and allows their use for extending sessions. Check your provider's documentation for details on refresh token validity periods.
+
+### Token Caching and Blacklisting
+
+The middleware automatically caches validated tokens to improve performance and maintains a blacklist of revoked tokens.
+### Templated Headers
+
+The middleware supports setting custom HTTP headers with values templated from OIDC claims and tokens. This allows you to pass authentication information to downstream services in a flexible, customized format.
+
+Templates can access the following variables:
+- `{{.Claims.field}}` - Access individual claims from the ID token (e.g., `{{.Claims.email}}`, `{{.Claims.sub}}`)
+- `{{.AccessToken}}` - The raw access token string
+- `{{.IdToken}}` - The raw ID token string (same as AccessToken in most configurations)
+- `{{.RefreshToken}}` - The raw refresh token string
+
+**Example configuration:**
+```yaml
+headers:
+  - name: "X-User-Email"
+    value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+  - name: "X-User-ID"
+    value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"
+  - name: "Authorization"
+    value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+  - name: "X-User-Name"
+    value: "{{.Claims.given_name}} {{.Claims.family_name}}"
+```
+
+**Advanced template examples:**
+
+Conditional logic:
+```yaml
+headers:
+  - name: "X-Is-Admin"
+    value: "{{if eq .Claims.role \"admin\"}}true{{else}}false{{end}}"
+```
+
+Array handling:
+```yaml
+headers:
+  - name: "X-User-Roles"
+    value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
+```
+
+**Notes:**
+- Variable names are case-sensitive (use `.Claims`, not `.claims`)
+- Missing claims will result in `<no value>` in the header value
+- The middleware validates templates during startup and logs errors for invalid templates
+
+### Default Headers Set for Downstream Services
+
+
+When a user is authenticated, the middleware sets the following headers for downstream services:
+
+- `X-Forwarded-User`: The user's email address
+- `X-User-Groups`: Comma-separated list of user groups (if available)
+- `X-User-Roles`: Comma-separated list of user roles (if available)
+- `X-Auth-Request-Redirect`: The original request URI
+- `X-Auth-Request-User`: The user's email address
+- `X-Auth-Request-Token`: The user's access token
+
+### Security Headers
+
+The middleware also sets the following security headers:
+
+- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
+- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
+- `X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block`
+- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### Logging
+
+Set the `logLevel` to `debug` to get more detailed logs:
+
+```yaml
+logLevel: debug
+```
+
+### Common Issues
+
+1. **Token verification failed**: Check that your `providerURL` is correct and accessible.
+2. **Session encryption key too short**: Ensure your `sessionEncryptionKey` is at least 32 bytes long.
+3. **No matching public key found**: The JWKS endpoint might be unavailable or the token's key ID (kid) doesn't match any key in the JWKS.
+4. **Access denied: Your email domain is not allowed**: The user's email domain is not in the `allowedUserDomains` list.
+5. **Access denied: You do not have any of the allowed roles or groups**: The user doesn't have any of the roles or groups specified in `allowedRolesAndGroups`.
+6. **Google sessions expire after ~1 hour**: If using Google as the OIDC provider and sessions expire prematurely (around 1 hour instead of longer), ensure:
+   - The `offline_access` scope is included in your configuration (the middleware adds this automatically now, but verify if manually configured).
+   - Your Google Cloud OAuth consent screen is set to "External" and "Production" mode. "Testing" mode often limits refresh token validity.
+   - The fix involving automatic `offline_access` scope and `prompt=consent` for Google is active in your middleware version. Check the plugin version corresponds to when this fix was implemented. Enhanced logging around refresh token failures can provide more clues if issues persist.
+
+## Contributing
+
+Contributions are welcome! Please feel free to submit a Pull Request.

TODO.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+### TODO / wishlist
+
+- [] Improve test coverage
+- [x] Improve caching mechanism
+- [x] Add automatic release and semver generation

autocleanup.go

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import "time"
+
+// autoCleanupRoutine periodically calls the provided cleanup function.
+// It starts a ticker with the given interval and executes the cleanup function
+// on each tick. The routine stops gracefully when a signal is received on the
+// stop channel. This is typically used for background cleanup tasks like
+// expiring cache entries.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - interval: The time duration between cleanup calls.
+//   - stop: A channel used to signal the routine to stop. Receiving any value will terminate the loop.
+//   - cleanup: The function to call periodically for cleanup tasks.
+func autoCleanupRoutine(interval time.Duration, stop <-chan struct{}, cleanup func()) {
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			cleanup()
+		case <-stop:
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}

autocleanup_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestAutoCleanupRoutine(t *testing.T) {
+	var counter int32
+	cleanupFunc := func() {
+		atomic.AddInt32(&counter, 1)
+	}
+	stop := make(chan struct{})
+	go autoCleanupRoutine(50*time.Millisecond, stop, cleanupFunc)
+	time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
+	close(stop)
+
+	if atomic.LoadInt32(&counter) < 3 {
+		t.Errorf("Expected cleanup to be called at least 3 times, got %d", counter)
+	}
+}

cache.go

@@ -1,169 +1,209 @@
 package traefikoidc
 
 import (
+	"container/list"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
 
 // CacheItem represents an item stored in the cache with its associated metadata.
 type CacheItem struct {
-	// Value is the cached data of any type
+	// Value is the cached data of any type.
 	Value interface{}
 
-	// ExpiresAt is the timestamp when this item should be considered expired
-	// and removed from the cache during cleanup operations
+	// ExpiresAt is the timestamp when this item should be considered expired.
 	ExpiresAt time.Time
 }
 
+// lruEntry represents an entry in the LRU list.
+type lruEntry struct {
+	key string
+}
+
 // Cache provides a thread-safe in-memory caching mechanism with expiration support.
-// It uses a read-write mutex to ensure safe concurrent access to the cached items.
+// It implements an LRU (Least Recently Used) eviction policy using a doubly-linked list for efficiency.
 type Cache struct {
-	// items stores the cached data with string keys
+	// items stores the cached data with string keys.
 	items map[string]CacheItem
 
-	// mutex protects concurrent access to the items map
-	// Use RLock/RUnlock for reads and Lock/Unlock for writes
+	// order maintains the usage order; most recently used items are at the back.
+	order *list.List
+
+	// elems maps keys to their corresponding list elements for O(1) access.
+	elems map[string]*list.Element
+
+	// mutex protects concurrent access to the cache.
 	mutex sync.RWMutex
 
-	// maxSize is the maximum number of items allowed in the cache
+	// maxSize is the maximum number of items allowed in the cache.
 	maxSize int
-
-	// accessList maintains the order of item access for eviction
-	accessList []string
+	// autoCleanupInterval defines how often Cleanup is called automatically.
+	autoCleanupInterval time.Duration
+	// stopCleanup channel to terminate the auto cleanup goroutine.
+	stopCleanup chan struct{}
 }
 
-// DefaultMaxSize is the default maximum number of items in the cache
-const DefaultMaxSize = 1000
+// DefaultMaxSize is the default maximum number of items in the cache.
+const DefaultMaxSize = 500
 
-// NewCache creates a new empty cache instance.
-// The cache is immediately ready for use and is thread-safe.
+// NewCache creates a new empty cache instance with default settings.
+// It initializes the internal maps and list, sets the default maximum size,
+// and starts the automatic cleanup goroutine.
 func NewCache() *Cache {
-	return &Cache{
-		items:      make(map[string]CacheItem),
-		maxSize:    DefaultMaxSize,
-		accessList: make([]string, 0, DefaultMaxSize),
+	c := &Cache{
+		items:               make(map[string]CacheItem, DefaultMaxSize),
+		order:               list.New(),
+		elems:               make(map[string]*list.Element, DefaultMaxSize),
+		maxSize:             DefaultMaxSize,
+		autoCleanupInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
+		stopCleanup:         make(chan struct{}),
 	}
+	go c.startAutoCleanup()
+	return c
 }
 
-// Set adds or updates an item in the cache with the specified expiration duration.
-// Parameters:
-//   - key: Unique identifier for the cached item
-//   - value: The data to cache (can be of any type)
-//   - expiration: How long the item should remain in the cache
-// Thread-safe: Uses write locking to ensure safe concurrent access.
+// Set adds or updates an item in the cache with the specified key, value, and expiration duration.
+// If the key already exists, its value and expiration time are updated, and it's moved
+// to the most recently used position in the LRU list.
+// If the key does not exist and the cache is full, the least recently used item is evicted
+// before adding the new item.
+// The expiration duration is relative to the time Set is called.
 func (c *Cache) Set(key string, value interface{}, expiration time.Duration) {
 	c.mutex.Lock()
 	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	// If key exists, update it
+	now := time.Now()
+	expTime := now.Add(expiration)
+
+	// Update existing item.
 	if _, exists := c.items[key]; exists {
 		c.items[key] = CacheItem{
 			Value:     value,
-			ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(expiration),
+			ExpiresAt: expTime,
+		}
+		if elem, ok := c.elems[key]; ok {
+			c.order.MoveToBack(elem)
 		}
 		return
 	}
 
-	// If cache is full, remove oldest item
+	// Evict oldest item if cache is full.
 	if len(c.items) >= c.maxSize {
 		c.evictOldest()
 	}
 
-	// Add new item
+	// Add new item.
 	c.items[key] = CacheItem{
 		Value:     value,
-		ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(expiration),
+		ExpiresAt: expTime,
 	}
-	c.accessList = append(c.accessList, key)
+	elem := c.order.PushBack(lruEntry{key: key})
+	c.elems[key] = elem
 }
 
-// Get retrieves an item from the cache if it exists and hasn't expired.
-// Parameters:
-//   - key: The identifier of the item to retrieve
-// Returns:
-//   - value: The cached data (nil if not found or expired)
-//   - found: true if the item was found and is valid, false otherwise
-// Thread-safe: Uses read locking to ensure safe concurrent access.
+// Get retrieves an item from the cache by its key.
+// If the item exists and has not expired, its value and true are returned.
+// Accessing an item moves it to the most recently used position in the LRU list.
+// If the item does not exist or has expired, nil and false are returned, and the
+// expired item is removed from the cache.
 func (c *Cache) Get(key string) (interface{}, bool) {
-	c.mutex.RLock()
-	item, found := c.items[key]
-	c.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-	if !found {
-		return nil, false
-	}
-
-	if time.Now().After(item.ExpiresAt) {
-		c.mutex.Lock()
-		c.removeItem(key)
-		c.mutex.Unlock()
-		return nil, false
-	}
-
-	// Update access order
 	c.mutex.Lock()
-	c.updateAccessOrder(key)
-	c.mutex.Unlock()
+	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	item, exists := c.items[key]
+	if !exists {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	// Check for expiration.
+	if time.Now().After(item.ExpiresAt) {
+		c.removeItem(key)
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	// Move item to the back (most recently used).
+	if elem, ok := c.elems[key]; ok {
+		c.order.MoveToBack(elem)
+	}
 
 	return item.Value, true
 }
 
-// Delete removes an item from the cache if it exists.
-// If the item doesn't exist, this operation is a no-op.
-// Thread-safe: Uses write locking to ensure safe concurrent access.
+// Delete removes an item from the cache by its key.
+// If the key exists, the corresponding item is removed from the cache storage
+// and the LRU list.
 func (c *Cache) Delete(key string) {
 	c.mutex.Lock()
 	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
-	delete(c.items, key)
+
+	c.removeItem(key)
 }
 
-// Cleanup removes all expired items from the cache.
-// This should be called periodically to prevent memory leaks from
-// expired items that haven't been accessed (and thus not removed during Get operations).
-// Thread-safe: Uses write locking to ensure safe concurrent access.
+// Cleanup iterates through the cache and removes all items that have expired.
+// An item is considered expired if the current time is after its ExpiresAt timestamp.
+// This method is called automatically by the auto-cleanup goroutine, but can also
+// be called manually.
 func (c *Cache) Cleanup() {
 	c.mutex.Lock()
 	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
 
 	now := time.Now()
-	var newAccessList []string
-
-	for _, key := range c.accessList {
-		if item, exists := c.items[key]; exists && !now.After(item.ExpiresAt) {
-			newAccessList = append(newAccessList, key)
-		} else {
-			delete(c.items, key)
+	for key, item := range c.items {
+		// Remove items that are expired or within 10% of expiration
+		if now.After(item.ExpiresAt) || now.Add(time.Duration(float64(item.ExpiresAt.Sub(now))*0.1)).After(item.ExpiresAt) {
+			c.removeItem(key)
 		}
 	}
-
-	c.accessList = newAccessList
 }
 
-// evictOldest removes the least recently used item from the cache
+// evictOldest removes the least recently used (oldest) item from the cache.
+// It first attempts to find and remove an expired item from the front of the LRU list.
+// If no expired items are found at the front, it removes the absolute oldest item (front of the list).
+// This method is called internally by Set when the cache reaches its maximum size.
+// Note: This function assumes the write lock is already held.
 func (c *Cache) evictOldest() {
-	if len(c.accessList) > 0 {
-		oldest := c.accessList[0]
-		c.removeItem(oldest)
+	now := time.Now()
+	elem := c.order.Front()
+
+	// First try to find an expired item from the front
+	for elem != nil {
+		entry := elem.Value.(lruEntry)
+		if item, exists := c.items[entry.key]; exists {
+			if now.After(item.ExpiresAt) {
+				c.removeItem(entry.key)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		elem = elem.Next()
+	}
+
+	// If no expired items found, remove the oldest item
+	if elem = c.order.Front(); elem != nil {
+		entry := elem.Value.(lruEntry)
+		c.removeItem(entry.key)
 	}
 }
 
-// removeItem removes an item from both the cache and access list
+// removeItem removes an item specified by the key from the cache's internal storage (items map)
+// and its corresponding entry from the LRU list (order list and elems map).
+// Note: This function assumes the write lock is already held.
 func (c *Cache) removeItem(key string) {
 	delete(c.items, key)
-	for i, k := range c.accessList {
-		if k == key {
-			c.accessList = append(c.accessList[:i], c.accessList[i+1:]...)
-			break
-		}
+	if elem, ok := c.elems[key]; ok {
+		c.order.Remove(elem)
+		delete(c.elems, key)
 	}
 }
 
-// updateAccessOrder moves the accessed key to the end of the access list
-func (c *Cache) updateAccessOrder(key string) {
-	for i, k := range c.accessList {
-		if k == key {
-			c.accessList = append(append(c.accessList[:i], c.accessList[i+1:]...), key)
-			break
-		}
-	}
+// startAutoCleanup starts the background goroutine that automatically calls the Cleanup method
+// at the interval specified by c.autoCleanupInterval.
+// It uses the autoCleanupRoutine helper function.
+func (c *Cache) startAutoCleanup() {
+	autoCleanupRoutine(c.autoCleanupInterval, c.stopCleanup, c.Cleanup)
+}
+
+// Close stops the automatic cleanup goroutine associated with this cache instance.
+// It should be called when the cache is no longer needed to prevent resource leaks.
+func (c *Cache) Close() {
+	close(c.stopCleanup)
 }

google_session_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// MockTokenVerifier implements the TokenVerifier interface for testing
+type MockTokenVerifier struct {
+	VerifyFunc func(token string) error
+}
+
+func (m *MockTokenVerifier) VerifyToken(token string) error {
+	if m.VerifyFunc != nil {
+		return m.VerifyFunc(token)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func TestGoogleOIDCRefreshTokenHandling(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create a mocked TraefikOidc instance that simulates Google provider behavior
+	mockLogger := NewLogger("debug")
+
+	// Create a test instance with a Google-like issuer URL
+	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
+		issuerURL:          "https://accounts.google.com",
+		clientID:           "test-client-id",
+		clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
+		logger:             mockLogger,
+		scopes:             []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
+		refreshGracePeriod: 60,
+	}
+
+	// Create a session manager
+	sessionManager, _ := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, mockLogger)
+	tOidc.sessionManager = sessionManager
+
+	t.Run("Google provider detection adds required parameters", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test buildAuthURL to ensure it adds offline_access and prompt=consent for Google
+		authURL := tOidc.buildAuthURL("https://example.com/callback", "state123", "nonce123", "")
+
+		// Check that offline_access scope was added
+		if !strings.Contains(authURL, "scope=") || !strings.Contains(authURL, "offline_access") {
+			t.Errorf("offline_access scope not added to Google auth URL: %s", authURL)
+		}
+
+		// Check that prompt=consent was added
+		if !strings.Contains(authURL, "prompt=consent") {
+			t.Errorf("prompt=consent not added to Google auth URL: %s", authURL)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Non-Google provider doesn't add Google-specific params", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Create a test instance with a non-Google issuer URL
+		nonGoogleOidc := &TraefikOidc{
+			issuerURL:    "https://auth.example.com",
+			clientID:     "test-client-id",
+			clientSecret: "test-client-secret",
+			logger:       mockLogger,
+			scopes:       []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
+		}
+
+		// Test buildAuthURL without Google-specific parameters
+		authURL := nonGoogleOidc.buildAuthURL("https://example.com/callback", "state123", "nonce123", "")
+
+		// Check that prompt=consent is not automatically added
+		if strings.Contains(authURL, "prompt=consent") {
+			t.Errorf("prompt=consent added to non-Google auth URL: %s", authURL)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Session refresh with Google provider", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Create a request and response recorder
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+		rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+		// Create a session and set a refresh token
+		session, _ := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.SetEmail("test@example.com")
+		session.SetAccessToken("old-access-token")
+		session.SetRefreshToken("valid-refresh-token")
+
+		// Create a mock token exchanger that simulates Google's behavior
+		mockTokenExchanger := &MockTokenExchanger{
+			RefreshTokenFunc: func(refreshToken string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
+				// Check that the refresh token is passed correctly
+				if refreshToken != "valid-refresh-token" {
+					t.Errorf("Incorrect refresh token passed: %s", refreshToken)
+					return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token")
+				}
+
+				// Return a simulated Google token response with a new access token
+				// but without a new refresh token (Google doesn't always return a new refresh token)
+				return &TokenResponse{
+					IDToken:      "new-id-token-from-google",
+					AccessToken:  "new-access-token-from-google",
+					RefreshToken: "", // Google often doesn't return a new refresh token
+					ExpiresIn:    3600,
+				}, nil
+			},
+		}
+
+		// Set the mock token exchanger
+		tOidc.tokenExchanger = mockTokenExchanger
+
+		// Create a struct that implements the TokenVerifier interface
+		tOidc.tokenVerifier = &MockTokenVerifier{
+			VerifyFunc: func(token string) error {
+				return nil
+			},
+		}
+
+		tOidc.extractClaimsFunc = func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
+			// Return mock claims
+			return map[string]interface{}{
+				"email": "test@example.com",
+				"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
+			}, nil
+		}
+
+		// Attempt to refresh the token
+		refreshed := tOidc.refreshToken(rw, req, session)
+
+		// Verify the refresh was successful
+		if !refreshed {
+			t.Error("Token refresh failed for Google provider")
+		}
+
+		// Check that we kept the original refresh token since Google didn't provide a new one
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "valid-refresh-token" {
+			t.Errorf("Original refresh token not preserved: got %s, expected 'valid-refresh-token'",
+				session.GetRefreshToken())
+		}
+
+		// Check that the access token was updated
+		if session.GetAccessToken() != "new-id-token-from-google" {
+			t.Errorf("Access token not updated: got %s, expected 'new-id-token-from-google'",
+				session.GetAccessToken())
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// No need to redefine MockTokenExchanger - it's already defined in main_test.go

helpers.go

@@ -3,40 +3,26 @@ package traefikoidc
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/http/cookiejar"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
 	"time"
-
-	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
 )
 
-// newSessionOptions creates secure session cookie options.
-// Parameters:
-//   - isSecure: Whether to set the Secure flag on cookies
-// Returns session options configured for security with:
-//   - HttpOnly flag to prevent JavaScript access
-//   - SameSite=Lax for CSRF protection
-//   - Appropriate timeout and path settings
-func newSessionOptions(isSecure bool) *sessions.Options {
-	return &sessions.Options{
-		HttpOnly: true,
-		Secure:   isSecure,
-		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
-		MaxAge:   ConstSessionTimeout,
-		Path:     "/",
-	}
-}
-
-// generateNonce creates a cryptographically secure random nonce
-// for use in the OIDC authentication flow. The nonce is used to
-// prevent replay attacks by ensuring the token received matches
-// the authentication request.
+// generateNonce creates a cryptographically secure random string suitable for use as an OIDC nonce.
+// The nonce is used during the authentication flow to mitigate replay attacks by associating
+// the ID token with the specific authentication request.
+// It generates 32 random bytes and encodes them using base64 URL encoding.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A base64 URL encoded random string (nonce).
+//   - An error if the random byte generation fails.
 func generateNonce() (string, error) {
 	nonceBytes := make([]byte, 32)
 	_, err := rand.Read(nonceBytes)
@@ -46,6 +32,42 @@ func generateNonce() (string, error) {
 	return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(nonceBytes), nil
 }
 
+// generateCodeVerifier creates a cryptographically secure random string suitable for use as a PKCE code verifier.
+// According to RFC 7636, the verifier should be a high-entropy string between 43 and 128 characters long.
+// This function generates 32 random bytes, resulting in a 43-character base64 URL encoded string.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A base64 URL encoded random string (code verifier).
+//   - An error if the random byte generation fails.
+func generateCodeVerifier() (string, error) {
+	// Using 32 bytes (256 bits) will produce a 43 character base64url string
+	verifierBytes := make([]byte, 32)
+	_, err := rand.Read(verifierBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("could not generate code verifier: %w", err)
+	}
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(verifierBytes), nil
+}
+
+// deriveCodeChallenge computes the PKCE code challenge from a given code verifier.
+// It uses the S256 challenge method (SHA-256 hash followed by base64 URL encoding)
+// as defined in RFC 7636.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - codeVerifier: The high-entropy string generated by generateCodeVerifier.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The base64 URL encoded SHA-256 hash of the code verifier (code challenge).
+func deriveCodeChallenge(codeVerifier string) string {
+	// Calculate SHA-256 hash of the code verifier
+	hasher := sha256.New()
+	hasher.Write([]byte(codeVerifier))
+	hash := hasher.Sum(nil)
+
+	// Base64url encode the hash to get the code challenge
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash)
+}
+
 // TokenResponse represents the response from the OIDC token endpoint.
 // It contains the various tokens and metadata returned after successful
 // code exchange or token refresh operations.
@@ -66,14 +88,23 @@ type TokenResponse struct {
 	TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
 }
 
-// exchangeTokens performs the OAuth 2.0 token exchange with the OIDC provider.
-// It supports both authorization code and refresh token grant types.
+// exchangeTokens performs the OAuth 2.0 token exchange with the OIDC provider's token endpoint.
+// It handles both the "authorization_code" grant type (exchanging an authorization code for tokens)
+// and the "refresh_token" grant type (using a refresh token to obtain new tokens).
+// It includes necessary parameters like client credentials and handles PKCE verification if applicable.
+// The function follows redirects and handles potential errors during the exchange.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - ctx: Context for the HTTP request
-//   - grantType: The OAuth 2.0 grant type ("authorization_code" or "refresh_token")
-//   - codeOrToken: Either the authorization code or refresh token
-//   - redirectURL: The callback URL for authorization code grant
-func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType, codeOrToken, redirectURL string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
+//   - ctx: The context for the outgoing HTTP request.
+//   - grantType: The OAuth 2.0 grant type ("authorization_code" or "refresh_token").
+//   - codeOrToken: The authorization code (for "authorization_code" grant) or the refresh token (for "refresh_token" grant).
+//   - redirectURL: The redirect URI that was used in the initial authorization request (required for "authorization_code" grant).
+//   - codeVerifier: The PKCE code verifier (required for "authorization_code" grant if PKCE was used).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A TokenResponse containing the obtained tokens (ID, access, refresh).
+//   - An error if the token exchange fails (e.g., network error, provider error, invalid grant).
+func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, codeOrToken string, redirectURL string, codeVerifier string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
 	data := url.Values{
 		"grant_type":    {grantType},
 		"client_id":     {t.clientID},
@@ -83,17 +114,37 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType, codeOrToken
 	if grantType == "authorization_code" {
 		data.Set("code", codeOrToken)
 		data.Set("redirect_uri", redirectURL)
+
+		// Add code_verifier if PKCE is being used
+		if codeVerifier != "" {
+			data.Set("code_verifier", codeVerifier)
+		}
 	} else if grantType == "refresh_token" {
 		data.Set("refresh_token", codeOrToken)
 	}
 
+	// Create a cookie jar for this request to handle redirects with cookies
+	jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Transport: t.httpClient.Transport,
+		Timeout:   t.httpClient.Timeout,
+		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+			// Always follow redirects for OIDC endpoints
+			if len(via) >= 50 {
+				return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 50 redirects")
+			}
+			return nil
+		},
+		Jar: jar,
+	}
+
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", t.tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
 
-	resp, err := t.httpClient.Do(req)
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange tokens: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -112,11 +163,19 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType, codeOrToken
 	return &tokenResponse, nil
 }
 
-// getNewTokenWithRefreshToken obtains new tokens using a refresh token.
-// This is used to refresh access tokens before they expire.
+// getNewTokenWithRefreshToken uses a refresh token to obtain a new set of tokens (ID, access, refresh)
+// from the OIDC provider's token endpoint. It wraps the exchangeTokens function with the
+// "refresh_token" grant type.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - refreshToken: The refresh token previously obtained during authentication or a prior refresh.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A TokenResponse containing the newly obtained tokens.
+//   - An error if the refresh operation fails.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) getNewTokenWithRefreshToken(refreshToken string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
-	tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "refresh_token", refreshToken, "")
+	tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "refresh_token", refreshToken, "", "")
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -125,148 +184,17 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) getNewTokenWithRefreshToken(refreshToken string) (*TokenRe
 	return tokenResponse, nil
 }
 
-// handleExpiredToken manages token expiration by clearing the session
-// and initiating a new authentication flow.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) handleExpiredToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
-	// Clear authentication data but preserve CSRF state
-	session.SetAuthenticated(false)
-	session.SetAccessToken("")
-	session.SetRefreshToken("")
-	session.SetEmail("")
-	
-	// Save the cleared session state
-	if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save cleared session: %v", err)
-		http.Error(rw, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-	
-	t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
-}
-
-// handleCallback processes the authentication callback from the OIDC provider.
-// It validates the callback parameters, exchanges the authorization code for
-// tokens, verifies the tokens, and establishes the user's session.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, redirectURL string) {
-	session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Session error: %v", err)
-		http.Error(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	t.logger.Debugf("Handling callback, URL: %s", req.URL.String())
-
-	// Check for errors in the callback
-	if req.URL.Query().Get("error") != "" {
-		errorDescription := req.URL.Query().Get("error_description")
-		t.logger.Errorf("Authentication error: %s - %s", req.URL.Query().Get("error"), errorDescription)
-		http.Error(rw, fmt.Sprintf("Authentication error: %s", errorDescription), http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Validate CSRF state
-	state := req.URL.Query().Get("state")
-	if state == "" {
-		t.logger.Error("No state in callback")
-		http.Error(rw, "State parameter missing in callback", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	csrfToken := session.GetCSRF()
-	if csrfToken == "" {
-		t.logger.Error("CSRF token missing in session")
-		http.Error(rw, "CSRF token missing", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if state != csrfToken {
-		t.logger.Error("State parameter does not match CSRF token in session")
-		http.Error(rw, "Invalid state parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Exchange code for tokens
-	code := req.URL.Query().Get("code")
-	if code == "" {
-		t.logger.Error("No code in callback")
-		http.Error(rw, "No code in callback", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeCodeForTokenFunc(code, redirectURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to exchange code for token: %v", err)
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Verify tokens and claims
-	if err := t.verifyToken(tokenResponse.IDToken); err != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to verify id_token: %v", err)
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	claims, err := t.extractClaimsFunc(tokenResponse.IDToken)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to extract claims: %v", err)
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Verify nonce to prevent replay attacks
-	nonceClaim, ok := claims["nonce"].(string)
-	if !ok || nonceClaim == "" {
-		t.logger.Error("Nonce claim missing in id_token")
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	sessionNonce := session.GetNonce()
-	if sessionNonce == "" {
-		t.logger.Error("Nonce not found in session")
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if nonceClaim != sessionNonce {
-		t.logger.Error("Nonce claim does not match session nonce")
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Validate user's email domain
-	email, _ := claims["email"].(string)
-	if email == "" || !t.isAllowedDomain(email) {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Invalid or disallowed email: %s", email)
-		http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed: Invalid or disallowed email", http.StatusForbidden)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Update session with authentication data
-	session.SetAuthenticated(true)
-	session.SetEmail(email)
-	session.SetAccessToken(tokenResponse.IDToken)
-	session.SetRefreshToken(tokenResponse.RefreshToken)
-
-	if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
-		http.Error(rw, "Failed to save session", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Redirect to original path or root
-	redirectPath := "/"
-	if incomingPath := session.GetIncomingPath(); incomingPath != "" && incomingPath != t.redirURLPath {
-		redirectPath = incomingPath
-	}
-
-	http.Redirect(rw, req, redirectPath, http.StatusFound)
-}
-
-// extractClaims parses a JWT token and extracts its claims.
-// It handles base64url decoding and JSON parsing of the token payload.
+// extractClaims decodes the payload (claims set) part of a JWT string.
+// It splits the JWT into its three parts, base64 URL decodes the second part (payload),
+// and unmarshals the resulting JSON into a map.
+// Note: This function does *not* validate the token's signature or claims.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - tokenString: The raw JWT string.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A map representing the JSON claims extracted from the token payload.
+//   - An error if the token format is invalid, decoding fails, or JSON unmarshaling fails.
 func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
 	if len(parts) != 3 {
@@ -286,51 +214,6 @@ func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
 	return claims, nil
 }
 
-// TokenBlacklist maintains a thread-safe list of revoked tokens.
-// It stores tokens with their expiration times and automatically
-// removes expired entries during cleanup operations.
-type TokenBlacklist struct {
-	// blacklist maps token IDs to their expiration times
-	blacklist map[string]time.Time
-
-	// mutex protects concurrent access to the blacklist
-	mutex sync.RWMutex
-}
-
-// NewTokenBlacklist creates a new TokenBlacklist instance.
-func NewTokenBlacklist() *TokenBlacklist {
-	return &TokenBlacklist{
-		blacklist: make(map[string]time.Time),
-	}
-}
-
-// Add adds a token to the blacklist with an expiration time.
-func (tb *TokenBlacklist) Add(tokenID string, expiration time.Time) {
-	tb.mutex.Lock()
-	defer tb.mutex.Unlock()
-	tb.blacklist[tokenID] = expiration
-}
-
-// IsBlacklisted checks if a token is in the blacklist and not expired.
-func (tb *TokenBlacklist) IsBlacklisted(tokenID string) bool {
-	tb.mutex.RLock()
-	defer tb.mutex.RUnlock()
-	expiration, exists := tb.blacklist[tokenID]
-	return exists && time.Now().Before(expiration)
-}
-
-// Cleanup removes expired tokens from the blacklist.
-func (tb *TokenBlacklist) Cleanup() {
-	tb.mutex.Lock()
-	defer tb.mutex.Unlock()
-	now := time.Now()
-	for tokenID, expiration := range tb.blacklist {
-		if now.After(expiration) {
-			delete(tb.blacklist, tokenID)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 // TokenCache provides a caching mechanism for validated tokens.
 // It stores token claims to avoid repeated validation of the
 // same token, improving performance for frequently used tokens.
@@ -339,21 +222,36 @@ type TokenCache struct {
 	cache *Cache
 }
 
-// NewTokenCache creates a new TokenCache instance.
+// NewTokenCache creates and initializes a new TokenCache.
+// It internally creates a new generic Cache instance for storage.
 func NewTokenCache() *TokenCache {
 	return &TokenCache{
 		cache: NewCache(),
 	}
 }
 
-// Set stores a token's claims in the cache with an expiration time.
+// Set stores the claims associated with a specific token string in the cache.
+// It prefixes the token string to avoid potential collisions with other cache types
+// and sets the provided expiration duration.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The raw token string (used as the key).
+//   - claims: The map of claims associated with the token.
+//   - expiration: The duration for which the cache entry should be valid.
 func (tc *TokenCache) Set(token string, claims map[string]interface{}, expiration time.Duration) {
 	token = "t-" + token
 	tc.cache.Set(token, claims, expiration)
 }
 
-// Get retrieves a token's claims from the cache.
-// Returns the claims and a boolean indicating if the token was found.
+// Get retrieves the cached claims for a given token string.
+// It prefixes the token string before querying the underlying cache.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The raw token string to look up.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The cached claims map if found and valid.
+//   - A boolean indicating whether the token was found in the cache (true if found, false otherwise).
 func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (map[string]interface{}, bool) {
 	token = "t-" + token
 	value, found := tc.cache.Get(token)
@@ -364,29 +262,59 @@ func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (map[string]interface{}, bool) {
 	return claims, ok
 }
 
-// Delete removes a token from the cache.
+// Delete removes the cached entry for a specific token string.
+// It prefixes the token string before calling the underlying cache's Delete method.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The raw token string to remove from the cache.
 func (tc *TokenCache) Delete(token string) {
 	token = "t-" + token
 	tc.cache.Delete(token)
 }
 
-// Cleanup removes expired tokens from the cache.
+// Cleanup triggers the cleanup process for the underlying generic cache,
+// removing expired token entries.
 func (tc *TokenCache) Cleanup() {
 	tc.cache.Cleanup()
 }
 
-// exchangeCodeForToken exchanges an authorization code for tokens.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeCodeForToken(code string, redirectURL string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
+// exchangeCodeForToken is a convenience function that wraps exchangeTokens specifically
+// for the "authorization_code" grant type. It handles the conditional inclusion of the
+// PKCE code verifier based on the middleware's configuration (t.enablePKCE).
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - code: The authorization code received from the OIDC provider.
+//   - redirectURL: The redirect URI used in the initial authorization request.
+//   - codeVerifier: The PKCE code verifier stored in the session (if PKCE is enabled).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A TokenResponse containing the obtained tokens.
+//   - An error if the code exchange fails.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeCodeForToken(code string, redirectURL string, codeVerifier string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
-	tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "authorization_code", code, redirectURL)
+
+	// Only include code verifier if PKCE is enabled
+	effectiveCodeVerifier := ""
+	if t.enablePKCE && codeVerifier != "" {
+		effectiveCodeVerifier = codeVerifier
+	}
+
+	tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "authorization_code", code, redirectURL, effectiveCodeVerifier)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %w", err)
 	}
 	return tokenResponse, nil
 }
 
-// createStringMap creates a map from a slice of strings.
-// Used for efficient lookups in allowed domains and roles.
+// createStringMap converts a slice of strings into a map[string]struct{} (a set).
+// This is useful for creating efficient lookups (O(1) average time complexity)
+// for checking the presence of items like allowed domains, roles, or groups.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - keys: A slice of strings to be added to the set.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A map where the keys are the strings from the input slice and the values are empty structs.
 func createStringMap(keys []string) map[string]struct{} {
 	result := make(map[string]struct{})
 	for _, key := range keys {
@@ -395,9 +323,17 @@ func createStringMap(keys []string) map[string]struct{} {
 	return result
 }
 
-// handleLogout manages the OIDC logout process.
-// It clears the session and redirects either to the OIDC provider's
-// end session endpoint (if available) or to the configured post-logout URL.
+// handleLogout processes requests to the configured logout path.
+// It performs the following steps:
+//  1. Retrieves the current user session.
+//  2. Gets the access token (ID token hint) from the session.
+//  3. Clears all authentication-related data from the session cookies.
+//  4. Determines the final post-logout redirect URI.
+//  5. If an OIDC end_session_endpoint is configured and an ID token hint is available,
+//     it builds the OIDC logout URL and redirects the user agent to the provider for logout.
+//  6. Otherwise, it redirects the user agent directly to the post-logout redirect URI.
+//
+// It handles potential errors during session retrieval or clearing.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -439,11 +375,18 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	http.Redirect(rw, req, postLogoutRedirectURI, http.StatusFound)
 }
 
-// BuildLogoutURL constructs the OIDC end session URL with appropriate parameters.
+// BuildLogoutURL constructs the URL for redirecting the user agent to the OIDC provider's
+// end_session_endpoint, including the required id_token_hint and optional
+// post_logout_redirect_uri parameters as query arguments.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - endSessionURL: The OIDC provider's end session endpoint
-//   - idToken: The ID token to be invalidated
-//   - postLogoutRedirectURI: Where to redirect after logout completes
+//   - endSessionURL: The URL of the OIDC provider's end session endpoint.
+//   - idToken: The ID token previously issued to the user (used as id_token_hint).
+//   - postLogoutRedirectURI: The optional URI where the provider should redirect the user agent after logout.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The fully constructed logout URL string.
+//   - An error if the provided endSessionURL is invalid.
 func BuildLogoutURL(endSessionURL, idToken, postLogoutRedirectURI string) (string, error) {
 	u, err := url.Parse(endSessionURL)
 	if err != nil {

helpers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Removed tests related to the old TokenBlacklist implementation:
+// - TestTokenBlacklistSizeLimit
+// - TestTokenBlacklistExpiredCleanup
+// - TestTokenBlacklistOldestEviction
+// - TestTokenBlacklistMemoryUsage
+// - TestConcurrentTokenBlacklistOperations
+
+func TestTokenCacheMemoryUsage(t *testing.T) {
+	tc := NewTokenCache()
+	iterations := 10000
+
+	// Force initial GC
+	runtime.GC()
+
+	// Record initial memory stats
+	var m1, m2 runtime.MemStats
+	runtime.ReadMemStats(&m1)
+
+	// Simulate heavy cache usage
+	for i := 0; i < iterations; i++ {
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"sub": fmt.Sprintf("user%d", i),
+			"exp": time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
+		}
+
+		// Add to cache
+		tc.Set(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i), claims, time.Hour)
+
+		// Periodically retrieve
+		if i%100 == 0 {
+			tc.Get(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i-50))
+		}
+
+		// Periodically cleanup
+		if i%1000 == 0 {
+			tc.Cleanup()
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Force GC and wait for it to complete
+	runtime.GC()
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	runtime.ReadMemStats(&m2)
+
+	// Check memory growth (using HeapAlloc for more accurate measurement)
+	memoryGrowth := int64(m2.HeapAlloc - m1.HeapAlloc)
+	maxAllowedGrowth := int64(2 * 1024 * 1024) // 2MB max growth
+
+	if memoryGrowth > maxAllowedGrowth {
+		t.Logf("Initial HeapAlloc: %d, Final HeapAlloc: %d", m1.HeapAlloc, m2.HeapAlloc)
+		t.Errorf("Excessive cache memory growth: %d bytes", memoryGrowth)
+	}
+
+	// Verify cache size stayed within limits
+	if len(tc.cache.items) > tc.cache.maxSize {
+		t.Errorf("Cache exceeded max size: %d", len(tc.cache.items))
+	}
+}

jwk.go

@@ -1,90 +1,66 @@
 package traefikoidc
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/rsa"
-	"math/big"
-
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
 
-// JWK represents a JSON Web Key as defined in RFC 7517.
-// It contains the cryptographic key information used for token verification.
 type JWK struct {
-	// Kty is the key type (e.g., "RSA", "EC")
 	Kty string `json:"kty"`
-
-	// Kid is the unique key identifier
 	Kid string `json:"kid"`
-
-	// Use specifies the intended use of the key (e.g., "sig" for signature)
 	Use string `json:"use"`
-
-	// N is the modulus for RSA keys
-	N string `json:"n"`
-
-	// E is the exponent for RSA keys
-	E string `json:"e"`
-
-	// Alg is the algorithm intended for use with the key
+	N   string `json:"n"`
+	E   string `json:"e"`
 	Alg string `json:"alg"`
-
-	// Crv is the curve for EC keys (e.g., "P-256", "P-384", "P-521")
 	Crv string `json:"crv"`
-
-	// X is the x-coordinate for EC keys
-	X string `json:"x"`
-
-	// Y is the y-coordinate for EC keys
-	Y string `json:"y"`
+	X   string `json:"x"`
+	Y   string `json:"y"`
 }
 
-// JWKSet represents a set of JSON Web Keys as returned by the JWKS endpoint.
-// OIDC providers typically expose multiple keys to support key rotation.
 type JWKSet struct {
-	// Keys is the array of JSON Web Keys
 	Keys []JWK `json:"keys"`
 }
 
-// JWKCache provides a thread-safe caching mechanism for JWK sets.
-// It caches the keys for a configurable duration to reduce load on the OIDC provider
-// while ensuring keys are refreshed periodically to handle key rotation.
 type JWKCache struct {
-	// jwks holds the cached set of JSON Web Keys
-	jwks *JWKSet
-
-	// expiresAt is the timestamp when the cached keys should be refreshed
+	jwks      *JWKSet
 	expiresAt time.Time
-
-	// mutex protects concurrent access to the cache
-	mutex sync.RWMutex
+	mutex     sync.RWMutex
+	// CacheLifetime is configurable to determine how long the JWKS is cached.
+	CacheLifetime time.Duration
 }
 
-// JWKCacheInterface defines the interface for JWK caching operations.
-// This interface allows for different caching implementations while
-// maintaining consistent behavior in the token verification process.
 type JWKCacheInterface interface {
-	GetJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error)
+	GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error)
+	Cleanup()
 }
 
-// GetJWKS retrieves the JSON Web Key Set, either from cache or by fetching it
-// from the OIDC provider. It implements a thread-safe double-checked locking
-// pattern to prevent multiple simultaneous fetches of the same keys.
+// GetJWKS retrieves the JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) from the cache or fetches it from the provider.
+// It first checks if a valid, non-expired JWKS is present in the cache. If so, it returns the cached version.
+// Otherwise, it attempts to fetch the JWKS from the specified jwksURL using the provided httpClient.
+// If the fetch is successful, the JWKS is stored in the cache with an expiration time based on CacheLifetime
+// (defaulting to 1 hour if not set) and returned.
+// This method uses double-checked locking to minimize contention when the cache needs refreshing.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - jwksURL: The URL of the JWKS endpoint
-//   - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for fetching keys
+//   - ctx: Context for the HTTP request if fetching is required.
+//   - jwksURL: The URL of the OIDC provider's JWKS endpoint.
+//   - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for fetching the JWKS.
+//
 // Returns:
-//   - The JSON Web Key Set
-//   - An error if the keys cannot be retrieved or parsed
-func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
+//   - A pointer to the JWKSet containing the keys.
+//   - An error if fetching fails or the response cannot be decoded.
+func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
 	c.mutex.RLock()
 	if c.jwks != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
 		defer c.mutex.RUnlock()
@@ -94,32 +70,56 @@ func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, er
 
 	c.mutex.Lock()
 	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
-
 	if c.jwks != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
 		return c.jwks, nil
 	}
 
-	jwks, err := fetchJWKS(jwksURL, httpClient)
+	jwks, err := fetchJWKS(ctx, jwksURL, httpClient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
 	c.jwks = jwks
-	c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)
+	lifetime := c.CacheLifetime
+	if lifetime == 0 {
+		lifetime = 1 * time.Hour
+	}
+	c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(lifetime)
 
 	return jwks, nil
 }
 
-// fetchJWKS retrieves the JSON Web Key Set from the OIDC provider's JWKS endpoint.
-// It handles HTTP communication and JSON parsing of the response.
+// Cleanup removes the cached JWKS if it has expired.
+// This is intended to be called periodically to ensure stale JWKS data is cleared.
+func (c *JWKCache) Cleanup() {
+	c.mutex.Lock()
+	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	if c.jwks != nil && now.After(c.expiresAt) {
+		c.jwks = nil
+	}
+}
+
+// fetchJWKS retrieves the JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) from the specified URL.
+// It uses the provided context and HTTP client to make the request.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - jwksURL: The URL of the JWKS endpoint
-//   - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for the request
+//   - ctx: Context for the HTTP request.
+//   - jwksURL: The URL of the OIDC provider's JWKS endpoint.
+//   - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for the request.
+//
 // Returns:
-//   - The parsed JSON Web Key Set
-//   - An error if the request fails or the response is invalid
-func fetchJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
-	resp, err := httpClient.Get(jwksURL)
+//   - A pointer to the fetched JWKSet.
+//   - An error if the request fails, the status code is not OK, or the response body cannot be decoded.
+func fetchJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
+	// Create a request with context to enforce timeout
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", jwksURL, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create JWKS request: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -137,9 +137,16 @@ func fetchJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
 	return &jwks, nil
 }
 
-// jwkToPEM converts a JSON Web Key to PEM format for use with standard
-// cryptographic functions. It supports both RSA and EC keys, delegating
-// to the appropriate converter based on the key type.
+// jwkToPEM converts a JWK (JSON Web Key) object into PEM (Privacy-Enhanced Mail) format.
+// It selects the appropriate conversion function based on the JWK's key type ("kty").
+// Currently supports "RSA" and "EC" key types.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - jwk: A pointer to the JWK object to convert.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A byte slice containing the public key in PEM format.
+//   - An error if the key type is unsupported or conversion fails.
 func jwkToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
 	converter, ok := jwkConverters[jwk.Kty]
 	if !ok {
@@ -155,9 +162,17 @@ var jwkConverters = map[string]jwkToPEMConverter{
 	"EC":  ecJWKToPEM,
 }
 
-// rsaJWKToPEM converts an RSA JSON Web Key to PEM format.
-// It handles base64url decoding of the modulus and exponent,
-// constructs an RSA public key, and encodes it in PEM format.
+// rsaJWKToPEM converts an RSA JWK into PEM format.
+// It decodes the modulus (n) and exponent (e) from base64 URL encoding,
+// constructs an rsa.PublicKey, marshals it into PKIX format, and then
+// encodes it as a PEM block.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - jwk: A pointer to the RSA JWK object (must have "kty": "RSA").
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A byte slice containing the RSA public key in PEM format.
+//   - An error if decoding parameters fails or key marshaling fails.
 func rsaJWKToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
 	nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.N)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -189,10 +204,18 @@ func rsaJWKToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
 	return pubKeyPEM, nil
 }
 
-// ecJWKToPEM converts an EC (Elliptic Curve) JSON Web Key to PEM format.
-// It supports the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves as defined in the
-// OIDC specification, decoding the x and y coordinates and encoding
-// the resulting public key in PEM format.
+// ecJWKToPEM converts an EC (Elliptic Curve) JWK into PEM format.
+// It decodes the X and Y coordinates from base64 URL encoding, determines the
+// elliptic curve based on the "crv" parameter (P-256, P-384, P-521),
+// constructs an ecdsa.PublicKey, marshals it into PKIX format, and then
+// encodes it as a PEM block.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - jwk: A pointer to the EC JWK object (must have "kty": "EC").
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A byte slice containing the EC public key in PEM format.
+//   - An error if decoding parameters fails, the curve is unsupported, or key marshaling fails.
 func ecJWKToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
 	xBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
 	if err != nil {

jwt.go

@@ -4,43 +4,66 @@ import (
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"crypto/rsa"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
-
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
 
-// JWT represents a JSON Web Token as defined in RFC 7519.
-// It contains the three parts of a JWT: header, claims (payload),
-// and signature, along with the original token string.
-type JWT struct {
-	// Header contains the token metadata (algorithm, key ID, etc.)
-	Header map[string]interface{}
+var (
+	replayCacheMu sync.Mutex
+	replayCache   = make(map[string]time.Time)
+)
 
-	// Claims contains the token claims (subject, expiration, etc.)
-	Claims map[string]interface{}
-
-	// Signature contains the raw signature bytes
-	Signature []byte
-
-	// Token is the original JWT string
-	Token string
+// cleanupReplayCache iterates through the replay cache and removes entries
+// whose expiration time is before the current time. This function should be
+// called periodically to prevent the cache from growing indefinitely.
+// It acquires a mutex to ensure thread safety during cleanup.
+func cleanupReplayCache() {
+	now := time.Now()
+	for token, expiry := range replayCache {
+		if expiry.Before(now) {
+			delete(replayCache, token)
+		}
+	}
 }
 
-// parseJWT parses a JWT token string into a JWT struct.
-// It validates the token format and decodes the three parts
-// (header, claims, signature) using base64url decoding.
+// ClockSkewToleranceFuture defines the tolerance for future-based claims like 'exp'.
+// Allows for more leniency with expiration checks.
+var ClockSkewToleranceFuture = 2 * time.Minute
+
+// ClockSkewTolerancePast defines the tolerance for past-based claims like 'iat' and 'nbf'.
+// A smaller tolerance is typically used here to prevent accepting tokens issued too far in the future.
+var (
+	ClockSkewTolerancePast = 10 * time.Second
+	ClockSkewTolerance     = 2 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// JWT represents a JSON Web Token as defined in RFC 7519.
+type JWT struct {
+	Header    map[string]interface{}
+	Claims    map[string]interface{}
+	Signature []byte
+	Token     string
+}
+
+// parseJWT decodes a raw JWT string into its constituent parts: header, claims, and signature.
+// It splits the token string by '.', decodes each part using base64 URL decoding,
+// and unmarshals the header and claims JSON into maps. The raw signature bytes are stored.
+// It performs basic format validation (expecting 3 parts).
+// Note: This function does *not* validate the signature or the claims.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - tokenString: The raw JWT token string
+//   - tokenString: The raw JWT string.
+//
 // Returns:
-//   - A parsed JWT struct
-//   - An error if the token format is invalid or parsing fails
+//   - A pointer to a JWT struct containing the decoded parts.
+//   - An error if the token format is invalid or decoding/unmarshaling fails.
 func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
 	if len(parts) != 3 {
@@ -51,7 +74,6 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 		Token: tokenString,
 	}
 
-	// Decode and unmarshal the header
 	headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to decode header: %v", err)
@@ -60,7 +82,6 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to unmarshal header: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Decode and unmarshal the claims
 	claimsBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to decode claims: %v", err)
@@ -69,7 +90,6 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to unmarshal claims: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Decode the signature
 	signatureBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to decode signature: %v", err)
@@ -79,28 +99,30 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 	return jwt, nil
 }
 
-// Verify validates the standard JWT claims as defined in RFC 7519.
-// It checks:
-//   - issuer (iss) matches the expected issuer URL
-//   - audience (aud) includes the client ID
-//   - expiration time (exp) is in the future (with clock skew tolerance)
-//   - issued at time (iat) is in the past (with clock skew tolerance)
-//   - not before time (nbf) is in the past (with clock skew tolerance)
-//   - subject (sub) is present and not empty
-//   - algorithm matches expected value to prevent algorithm switching attacks
-// Returns an error if any validation fails.
+// Verify performs standard claim validation on the JWT according to RFC 7519.
+// It checks the following:
+// - Algorithm ('alg') is supported.
+// - Issuer ('iss') matches the expected issuerURL.
+// - Audience ('aud') contains the expected clientID.
+// - Expiration time ('exp') is in the future (within tolerance).
+// - Issued at time ('iat') is in the past (within tolerance).
+// - Not before time ('nbf'), if present, is in the past (within tolerance).
+// - Subject ('sub') claim exists and is not empty.
+// - JWT ID ('jti'), if present, is checked against a replay cache to prevent token reuse.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - issuerURL: The expected issuer URL (e.g., "https://accounts.google.com").
+//   - clientID: The expected audience value (the client ID of this application).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - nil if all standard claims are valid.
+//   - An error describing the first validation failure encountered.
 func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
-	// Debug logging of validation parameters
-	fmt.Printf("Validating token against:\nIssuer: %s\nClient ID: %s\n", issuerURL, clientID)
-	// Debug logging of token header
-	fmt.Printf("Token header: %+v\n", j.Header)
-
 	// Validate algorithm to prevent algorithm switching attacks
 	alg, ok := j.Header["alg"].(string)
 	if !ok {
 		return fmt.Errorf("missing 'alg' header")
 	}
-	// List of supported algorithms - should match those in verifySignature
 	supportedAlgs := map[string]bool{
 		"RS256": true, "RS384": true, "RS512": true,
 		"PS256": true, "PS384": true, "PS512": true,
@@ -111,9 +133,6 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
 	}
 
 	claims := j.Claims
-	
-	// Debug logging of all claims
-	fmt.Printf("Token claims: %+v\n", claims)
 
 	iss, ok := claims["iss"].(string)
 	if !ok {
@@ -147,17 +166,36 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	// Validate nbf (not before) claim if present
 	if nbf, ok := claims["nbf"].(float64); ok {
 		if err := verifyNotBefore(nbf); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Validate jti (JWT ID) claim if present
+	// Implement replay protection by checking the jti (JWT ID)
 	if jti, ok := claims["jti"].(string); ok {
-		// Could add replay detection here if needed
-		_ = jti
+		// Skip replay detection for tokens that are being verified from the cache
+		if j.Token == "" {
+			// This is a parsed JWT without the original token string,
+			// which means it's likely from a cached token verification
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		replayCacheMu.Lock()
+		cleanupReplayCache()
+		if _, exists := replayCache[jti]; exists {
+			replayCacheMu.Unlock()
+			return fmt.Errorf("token replay detected")
+		}
+		expFloat, ok := claims["exp"].(float64)
+		var expTime time.Time
+		if ok {
+			expTime = time.Unix(int64(expFloat), 0)
+		} else {
+			expTime = time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)
+		}
+		replayCache[jti] = expTime
+		replayCacheMu.Unlock()
 	}
 
 	sub, ok := claims["sub"].(string)
@@ -168,18 +206,17 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// verifyAudience validates the token's audience claim.
-// The audience can be either a single string or an array of strings.
-// For array audiences, the expected audience must match any one value.
+// verifyAudience checks if the expected audience is present in the token's 'aud' claim.
+// The 'aud' claim can be a single string or an array of strings.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - tokenAudience: The audience claim from the token
-//   - expectedAudience: The expected audience value
-// Returns an error if validation fails.
+//   - tokenAudience: The 'aud' claim value extracted from the token (can be string or []interface{}).
+//   - expectedAudience: The audience value expected for this application (client ID).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - nil if the expected audience is found.
+//   - An error if the claim type is invalid or the expected audience is not present.
 func verifyAudience(tokenAudience interface{}, expectedAudience string) error {
-	// Debug logging
-	fmt.Printf("Verifying audience:\nToken aud: %+v\nExpected: %s\n", 
-		tokenAudience, expectedAudience)
-
 	switch aud := tokenAudience.(type) {
 	case string:
 		if aud != expectedAudience {
@@ -202,159 +239,111 @@ func verifyAudience(tokenAudience interface{}, expectedAudience string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// verifyIssuer validates the token's issuer claim.
-// The issuer URL must exactly match the expected issuer.
+// verifyIssuer checks if the token's 'iss' claim matches the expected issuer URL.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - tokenIssuer: The issuer claim from the token
-//   - expectedIssuer: The expected issuer URL
-// Returns an error if validation fails.
+//   - tokenIssuer: The 'iss' claim value from the token.
+//   - expectedIssuer: The expected issuer URL configured for the OIDC provider.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - nil if the issuers match.
+//   - An error if the issuers do not match.
 func verifyIssuer(tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer string) error {
-	// Debug logging
-	fmt.Printf("Verifying issuer:\nToken iss: %s\nExpected: %s\n", 
-		tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer)
-
 	if tokenIssuer != expectedIssuer {
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid issuer (token: %s, expected: %s)",
-			tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer)
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid issuer (token: %s, expected: %s)", tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Clock skew tolerance for time-based validations
-const clockSkewTolerance = 2 * time.Minute
-
-// verifyExpiration checks if the token's expiration time has passed.
-// The expiration time is compared against the current time with clock skew tolerance.
+// verifyTimeConstraint checks time-based claims ('exp', 'iat', 'nbf') against the current time,
+// allowing for configurable clock skew. It uses different tolerances for past and future checks.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - expiration: The expiration timestamp from the token
-// Returns an error if the token has expired.
+//   - unixTime: The timestamp value from the claim (as a float64 Unix time).
+//   - claimName: The name of the claim being verified ("exp", "iat", "nbf").
+//   - future: A boolean indicating the direction of the check (true for 'exp', false for 'iat'/'nbf').
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - nil if the time constraint is met within the allowed tolerance.
+//   - An error describing the failure (e.g., "token has expired", "token used before issued").
+func verifyTimeConstraint(unixTime float64, claimName string, future bool) error {
+	claimTime := time.Unix(int64(unixTime), 0)
+	now := time.Now() // Use current time without truncation
+
+	var err error
+	if future { // 'exp' check
+		// Token is expired if Now is after (ClaimTime + FutureTolerance)
+		allowedExpiry := claimTime.Add(ClockSkewToleranceFuture)
+		if now.After(allowedExpiry) {
+			err = fmt.Errorf("token has expired (exp: %v, now: %v, allowed_until: %v)", claimTime.UTC(), now.UTC(), allowedExpiry.UTC())
+		}
+	} else { // 'iat' or 'nbf' check
+		// Token is invalid if Now is before (ClaimTime - PastTolerance)
+		allowedStart := claimTime.Add(-ClockSkewTolerancePast)
+		if now.Before(allowedStart) {
+			reason := "not yet valid"
+			if claimName == "iat" {
+				reason = "used before issued"
+			}
+			err = fmt.Errorf("token %s (%s: %v, now: %v, allowed_from: %v)", reason, claimName, claimTime.UTC(), now.UTC(), allowedStart.UTC())
+		}
+	}
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// verifyExpiration checks the 'exp' (Expiration Time) claim.
+// It calls verifyTimeConstraint with future=true.
 func verifyExpiration(expiration float64) error {
-	expirationTime := time.Unix(int64(expiration), 0)
-	// Truncate current time to seconds for consistent comparison
-	now := time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
-	skewedNow := now.Add(clockSkewTolerance)
-	
-	// Debug logging
-	fmt.Printf("Token exp: %v\nCurrent time: %v\nSkewed time: %v\nSkew: %v\n",
-		expirationTime.UTC(),
-		now.UTC(),
-		skewedNow.UTC(),
-		clockSkewTolerance)
-	
-	// Allow tokens that expire exactly now
-	if expirationTime.Equal(now) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	
-	if skewedNow.After(expirationTime) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token has expired (exp: %v, now: %v)",
-			expirationTime.UTC(), now.UTC())
-	}
-	return nil
+	return verifyTimeConstraint(expiration, "exp", true)
 }
 
-// verifyIssuedAt validates the token's issued-at time.
-// Ensures the token wasn't issued in the future, accounting for clock skew.
-// Parameters:
-//   - issuedAt: The issued-at timestamp from the token
-// Returns an error if the token was issued in the future.
+// verifyIssuedAt checks the 'iat' (Issued At) claim.
+// It calls verifyTimeConstraint with future=false.
 func verifyIssuedAt(issuedAt float64) error {
-	issuedAtTime := time.Unix(int64(issuedAt), 0)
-	// Truncate current time to seconds for consistent comparison
-	now := time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
-	skewedNow := now.Add(-clockSkewTolerance)
-	
-	// Debug logging
-	fmt.Printf("Token iat: %v\nCurrent time: %v\nSkewed time: %v\nSkew: %v\n",
-		issuedAtTime.UTC(),
-		now.UTC(),
-		skewedNow.UTC(),
-		clockSkewTolerance)
-	
-	// Allow tokens issued in the same second as current time
-	if issuedAtTime.Equal(now) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	
-	if skewedNow.Before(issuedAtTime) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token used before issued (iat: %v, now: %v)", 
-			issuedAtTime.UTC(), now.UTC())
-	}
-	return nil
+	return verifyTimeConstraint(issuedAt, "iat", false)
 }
 
-// verifyNotBefore validates the token's not-before time if present.
-// Ensures the token is not used before its valid time period, accounting for clock skew.
-// Parameters:
-//   - notBefore: The not-before timestamp from the token
-// Returns an error if the token is not yet valid.
+// verifyNotBefore checks the 'nbf' (Not Before) claim.
+// It calls verifyTimeConstraint with future=false.
 func verifyNotBefore(notBefore float64) error {
-	notBeforeTime := time.Unix(int64(notBefore), 0)
-	// Truncate current time to seconds for consistent comparison
-	now := time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
-	skewedNow := now.Add(-clockSkewTolerance)
-	
-	// Debug logging
-	fmt.Printf("Token nbf: %v\nCurrent time: %v\nSkewed time: %v\nSkew: %v\n",
-		notBeforeTime.UTC(),
-		now.UTC(),
-		skewedNow.UTC(),
-		clockSkewTolerance)
-	
-	// Allow tokens that become valid exactly now
-	if notBeforeTime.Equal(now) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	
-	if skewedNow.Before(notBeforeTime) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token not yet valid (nbf: %v, now: %v)",
-			notBeforeTime.UTC(), now.UTC())
-	}
-	return nil
+	return verifyTimeConstraint(notBefore, "nbf", false)
 }
 
-// verifySignature validates the token's cryptographic signature.
-// Supports multiple signature algorithms:
-//   - RSA: RS256, RS384, RS512 (PKCS#1 v1.5)
-//   - RSA-PSS: PS256, PS384, PS512
-//   - ECDSA: ES256, ES384, ES512
+// verifySignature validates the JWT's signature using the provided public key.
+// It parses the public key from PEM format, selects the appropriate hashing algorithm
+// based on the 'alg' parameter (SHA256/384/512), hashes the token's signing input
+// (header + "." + payload), and then verifies the signature against the hash using
+// the corresponding RSA (PKCS1v15 or PSS) or ECDSA verification method.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - tokenString: The complete JWT token string
-//   - publicKeyPEM: The PEM-encoded public key for verification
-//   - alg: The signature algorithm identifier
-// Returns an error if signature verification fails.
+//   - tokenString: The raw, complete JWT string.
+//   - publicKeyPEM: The public key corresponding to the private key used for signing, in PEM format.
+//   - alg: The algorithm specified in the JWT header (e.g., "RS256", "ES384").
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - nil if the signature is valid.
+//   - An error if the token format is invalid, decoding fails, key parsing fails,
+//     the algorithm is unsupported, or the signature verification fails.
 func verifySignature(tokenString string, publicKeyPEM []byte, alg string) error {
-	// Debug logging
-	fmt.Printf("Verifying signature with algorithm: %s\n", alg)
-	
-	// Split the token into its three parts
 	parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
 	if len(parts) != 3 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid token format")
 	}
 	signedContent := parts[0] + "." + parts[1]
-
-	// Decode the signature from the token
 	signature, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode signature: %w", err)
 	}
-
-	// Decode the PEM-encoded public key
 	block, _ := pem.Decode(publicKeyPEM)
 	if block == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse PEM block containing the public key")
 	}
-
-	// Parse the public key
 	pubKey, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse public key: %w", err)
 	}
-
-	// Determine the hash function to use based on the algorithm
 	var hashFunc crypto.Hash
-
 	switch alg {
 	case "RS256", "PS256", "ES256":
 		hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
@@ -365,27 +354,20 @@ func verifySignature(tokenString string, publicKeyPEM []byte, alg string) error
 	default:
 		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm: %s", alg)
 	}
-
-	// Hash the signed content
 	h := hashFunc.New()
 	h.Write([]byte(signedContent))
 	hashed := h.Sum(nil)
-
-	// Verify the signature based on the key type and algorithm
 	switch pubKey := pubKey.(type) {
 	case *rsa.PublicKey:
 		if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "RS") {
-			// RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
 			return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, hashed, signature)
 		} else if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "PS") {
-			// RSA PSS signature
 			return rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, hashed, signature, nil)
 		} else {
 			return fmt.Errorf("unexpected key type for algorithm %s", alg)
 		}
 	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
 		if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "ES") {
-			// ECDSA signature
 			var r, s big.Int
 			sigLen := len(signature)
 			if sigLen%2 != 0 {

metadata_cache.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type MetadataCache struct {
+	metadata            *ProviderMetadata
+	expiresAt           time.Time
+	mutex               sync.RWMutex
+	autoCleanupInterval time.Duration
+	stopCleanup         chan struct{}
+}
+
+// NewMetadataCache creates a new MetadataCache instance.
+// It initializes the cache structure and starts the background cleanup goroutine.
+func NewMetadataCache() *MetadataCache {
+	c := &MetadataCache{
+		autoCleanupInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
+		stopCleanup:         make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+	go c.startAutoCleanup()
+	return c
+}
+
+// Cleanup removes the cached provider metadata if it has expired.
+// This is called periodically by the auto-cleanup goroutine.
+func (c *MetadataCache) Cleanup() {
+	c.mutex.Lock()
+	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	if c.metadata != nil && now.After(c.expiresAt) {
+		c.metadata = nil
+	}
+}
+
+// isCacheValid checks if the cached metadata is present and has not expired.
+// Note: This function assumes the read lock is held or it's called from a context
+// where the lock is already held (like within GetMetadata after locking).
+func (c *MetadataCache) isCacheValid() bool {
+	return c.metadata != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt)
+}
+
+// GetMetadata retrieves the OIDC provider metadata.
+// It first checks the cache for valid, non-expired metadata. If found, it's returned immediately.
+// If the cache is empty or expired, it attempts to fetch the metadata from the provider's
+// well-known endpoint using discoverProviderMetadata.
+// If fetching is successful, the new metadata is cached for 1 hour.
+// If fetching fails but valid metadata exists in the cache (even if expired), the cache expiry
+// is extended by 5 minutes, and the cached data is returned to prevent thundering herd issues.
+// If fetching fails and there's no cached data, an error is returned.
+// It employs double-checked locking for thread safety and performance.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - providerURL: The base URL of the OIDC provider.
+//   - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for fetching metadata.
+//   - logger: The logger instance for recording errors or warnings.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A pointer to the ProviderMetadata struct.
+//   - An error if metadata cannot be retrieved from cache or fetched from the provider.
+func (c *MetadataCache) GetMetadata(providerURL string, httpClient *http.Client, logger *Logger) (*ProviderMetadata, error) {
+	c.mutex.RLock()
+	if c.isCacheValid() {
+		defer c.mutex.RUnlock()
+		return c.metadata, nil
+	}
+	c.mutex.RUnlock()
+
+	c.mutex.Lock()
+	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	// Double-check after acquiring write lock
+	if c.isCacheValid() {
+		return c.metadata, nil
+	}
+
+	metadata, err := discoverProviderMetadata(providerURL, httpClient, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		if c.metadata != nil {
+			// On error, extend current cache by 5 minutes to prevent thundering herd
+			c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute)
+			logger.Errorf("Failed to refresh metadata, using cached version for 5 more minutes: %v", err)
+			return c.metadata, nil
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch provider metadata: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	c.metadata = metadata
+	// Set a fixed cache lifetime (e.g., 1 hour)
+	// TODO: Consider making this configurable or respecting HTTP cache headers
+	c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)
+
+	// End of GetMetadata
+	return metadata, nil
+}
+
+// startAutoCleanup starts the background goroutine that periodically calls Cleanup
+// to remove expired metadata from the cache.
+func (c *MetadataCache) startAutoCleanup() {
+	autoCleanupRoutine(c.autoCleanupInterval, c.stopCleanup, c.Cleanup)
+}
+
+// Close stops the automatic cleanup goroutine associated with this metadata cache.
+func (c *MetadataCache) Close() {
+	close(c.stopCleanup)
+}

metadata_cache_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestIsCacheValid(t *testing.T) {
+	// Setup with a dummy ProviderMetadata.
+	pm := &ProviderMetadata{}
+	mc := &MetadataCache{
+		metadata:  pm,
+		expiresAt: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
+	}
+	if !mc.isCacheValid() {
+		t.Errorf("Expected cache to be valid")
+	}
+	mc.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
+	if mc.isCacheValid() {
+		t.Errorf("Expected cache to be invalid")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	pm := &ProviderMetadata{}
+	mc := &MetadataCache{
+		metadata:  pm,
+		expiresAt: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
+	}
+	mc.Cleanup()
+	if mc.metadata != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Expected metadata to be nil after cleanup")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGetMetadata_Cached(t *testing.T) {
+	dummyData := &ProviderMetadata{}
+	// Construct MetadataCache manually to avoid interference from auto cleanup.
+	mc := &MetadataCache{
+		metadata:            dummyData,
+		expiresAt:           time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
+		stopCleanup:         make(chan struct{}),
+		autoCleanupInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
+	}
+	// Use NewLogger to create a logger that writes errors only.
+	logger := NewLogger("error")
+	result, err := mc.GetMetadata("http://example.com", http.DefaultClient, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Expected no error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if result != dummyData {
+		t.Errorf("Expected cached metadata to be returned")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMetadataCacheAutoCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	mc := &MetadataCache{
+		autoCleanupInterval: 50 * time.Millisecond,
+		stopCleanup:         make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+	// Start auto cleanup.
+	go mc.startAutoCleanup()
+	mc.mutex.Lock()
+	mc.metadata = &ProviderMetadata{}
+	mc.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(-50 * time.Millisecond)
+	mc.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	// Wait enough time for the auto cleanup to run.
+	time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
+	mc.Close()
+	mc.mutex.RLock()
+	defer mc.mutex.RUnlock()
+	if mc.metadata != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Expected metadata to be cleared by auto cleanup")
+	}
+}
+
+type errorRoundTripper struct {
+	err error
+}
+
+func (e errorRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	return nil, e.err
+}
+
+func TestGetMetadata_FetchError(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create an HTTP client that always returns an error.
+	errorClient := &http.Client{
+		Transport: errorRoundTripper{err: fmt.Errorf("fake fetch error")},
+	}
+
+	// Case 1: Cache is empty.
+	mc := &MetadataCache{
+		stopCleanup: make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+	logger := NewLogger("error")
+	metadata, err := mc.GetMetadata("http://example.com", errorClient, logger)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("Expected error, got nil")
+	}
+	if metadata != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Expected nil metadata, got %v", metadata)
+	}
+
+	// Case 2: Cache has old metadata.
+	dummy := &ProviderMetadata{}
+	mc.metadata = dummy
+	mc.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute)
+	logger2 := NewLogger("error")
+	metadata, err = mc.GetMetadata("http://example.com", errorClient, logger2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Expected no error when cached metadata exists, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if metadata != dummy {
+		t.Errorf("Expected cached metadata to be returned")
+	}
+}

semver.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+version: 1
+force:
+  existing: true
+wording:
+  patch:
+    - patch-release
+  minor:
+    - minor-release
+  major:
+    - breaking

session.go

@@ -16,21 +16,29 @@ import (
 	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
 )
 
-// generateSecureRandomString creates a cryptographically secure random string of specified length
-func generateSecureRandomString(length int) string {
+// generateSecureRandomString creates a cryptographically secure, hex-encoded random string.
+// It reads the specified number of bytes from crypto/rand and encodes them as a hexadecimal string.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - length: The number of random bytes to generate (the resulting hex string will be twice this length).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A hex-encoded random string.
+//   - An error if reading random bytes fails.
+func generateSecureRandomString(length int) (string, error) {
 	bytes := make([]byte, length)
 	if _, err := rand.Read(bytes); err != nil {
-		panic("failed to generate random string")
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate random bytes: %w", err)
 	}
-	return hex.EncodeToString(bytes)
+	return hex.EncodeToString(bytes), nil
 }
 
 // Cookie names and configuration constants used for session management
-var (
-	// Using random prefixes to make cookie names less predictable
-	mainCookieName    = "_oidc_raczylo_m_" + generateSecureRandomString(8)
-	accessTokenCookie = "_oidc_raczylo_a_" + generateSecureRandomString(8)
-	refreshTokenCookie = "_oidc_raczylo_r_" + generateSecureRandomString(8)
+const (
+	// Using fixed prefixes for consistent cookie naming across restarts
+	mainCookieName     = "_oidc_raczylo_m"
+	accessTokenCookie  = "_oidc_raczylo_a"
+	refreshTokenCookie = "_oidc_raczylo_r"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -55,7 +63,14 @@ const (
 	minEncryptionKeyLength = 32
 )
 
-// compressToken compresses a token using gzip and base64 encodes it
+// compressToken compresses the input string using gzip and then encodes the result using standard base64 encoding.
+// If any error occurs during compression, it returns the original uncompressed token as a fallback.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The string to compress.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The base64 encoded, gzipped string, or the original string if compression fails.
 func compressToken(token string) string {
 	var b bytes.Buffer
 	gz := gzip.NewWriter(&b)
@@ -68,41 +83,49 @@ func compressToken(token string) string {
 	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b.Bytes())
 }
 
-// decompressToken decompresses a base64 encoded gzipped token
+// decompressToken decodes a standard base64 encoded string and then decompresses the result using gzip.
+// If base64 decoding or gzip decompression fails, it returns the original input string as a fallback,
+// assuming it might not have been compressed.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - compressed: The base64 encoded, gzipped string.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The decompressed original string, or the input string if decompression fails.
 func decompressToken(compressed string) string {
 	data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(compressed)
 	if err != nil {
 		return compressed // return as-is if not base64
 	}
-	
+
 	gz, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
 	if err != nil {
 		return compressed
 	}
 	defer gz.Close()
-	
+
 	decompressed, err := io.ReadAll(gz)
 	if err != nil {
 		return compressed
 	}
-	
+
 	return string(decompressed)
 }
 
 // SessionManager handles the management of multiple session cookies for OIDC authentication.
 // It provides functionality for storing and retrieving authentication state, tokens,
-// and other session-related data across multiple cookies to handle large tokens.
+// and other session-related data across multiple cookies.
 type SessionManager struct {
-	// store is the underlying session store for cookie management
+	// store is the underlying session store for cookie management.
 	store sessions.Store
 
-	// forceHTTPS enforces secure cookie attributes regardless of request scheme
+	// forceHTTPS enforces secure cookie attributes regardless of request scheme.
 	forceHTTPS bool
 
-	// logger provides structured logging capabilities
+	// logger provides structured logging capabilities.
 	logger *Logger
 
-	// sessionPool is a sync.Pool for reusing SessionData objects
+	// sessionPool is a sync.Pool for reusing SessionData objects.
 	sessionPool sync.Pool
 }
 
@@ -111,11 +134,12 @@ type SessionManager struct {
 //   - encryptionKey: Key used to encrypt session data (must be at least 32 bytes)
 //   - forceHTTPS: When true, forces secure cookie attributes regardless of request scheme
 //   - logger: Logger instance for recording session-related events
-// The manager handles session creation, storage, and cookie security settings.
-func NewSessionManager(encryptionKey string, forceHTTPS bool, logger *Logger) *SessionManager {
-	// Validate encryption key length
+//
+// Returns an error if the encryption key does not meet minimum length requirements.
+func NewSessionManager(encryptionKey string, forceHTTPS bool, logger *Logger) (*SessionManager, error) {
+	// Validate encryption key length.
 	if len(encryptionKey) < minEncryptionKeyLength {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("encryption key must be at least %d bytes long", minEncryptionKeyLength))
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("encryption key must be at least %d bytes long", minEncryptionKeyLength)
 	}
 
 	sm := &SessionManager{
@@ -124,26 +148,29 @@ func NewSessionManager(encryptionKey string, forceHTTPS bool, logger *Logger) *S
 		logger:     logger,
 	}
 
-	// Initialize session pool
+	// Initialize session pool.
 	sm.sessionPool.New = func() interface{} {
+		// Initialize SessionData with necessary fields and the mutex.
 		return &SessionData{
-			manager:           sm,
-			accessTokenChunks: make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
+			manager:            sm,
+			accessTokenChunks:  make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
 			refreshTokenChunks: make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
+			refreshMutex:       sync.Mutex{}, // Initialize the mutex
 		}
 	}
 
-	return sm
+	return sm, nil
 }
 
-// getSessionOptions returns secure session options configured for the current request.
+// getSessionOptions returns a sessions.Options struct configured with security best practices.
+// It sets HttpOnly to true, Secure based on the request scheme or forceHTTPS setting,
+// SameSite to LaxMode, MaxAge to the absoluteSessionTimeout, and Path to "/".
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - isSecure: Whether the current request is using HTTPS
-// The options ensure cookies are:
-//   - HTTP-only (not accessible via JavaScript)
-//   - Secure when using HTTPS or when forceHTTPS is enabled
-//   - Using SameSite=Lax for CSRF protection
-//   - Set with appropriate timeout and path settings
+//   - isSecure: A boolean indicating if the current request context is secure (HTTPS).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A pointer to a configured sessions.Options struct.
 func (sm *SessionManager) getSessionOptions(isSecure bool) *sessions.Options {
 	return &sessions.Options{
 		HttpOnly: true,
@@ -159,7 +186,7 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) getSessionOptions(isSecure bool) *sessions.Options {
 // and combines them into a single SessionData structure for easy access.
 // Returns an error if any session component cannot be loaded.
 func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
-	// Get session from pool
+	// Get session from pool.
 	sessionData := sm.sessionPool.Get().(*SessionData)
 	sessionData.request = r
 
@@ -170,11 +197,10 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get main session: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Check for absolute session timeout
+	// Check for absolute session timeout.
 	if createdAt, ok := sessionData.mainSession.Values["created_at"].(int64); ok {
 		if time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0)) > absoluteSessionTimeout {
-			sessionData.Clear(r, nil) // Clear expired session
-			sm.sessionPool.Put(sessionData)
+			sessionData.Clear(r, nil)
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("session expired")
 		}
 	}
@@ -191,7 +217,7 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get refresh token session: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Clear and reuse chunk maps
+	// Clear and reuse chunk maps.
 	for k := range sessionData.accessTokenChunks {
 		delete(sessionData.accessTokenChunks, k)
 	}
@@ -199,24 +225,26 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
 		delete(sessionData.refreshTokenChunks, k)
 	}
 
-	// Retrieve chunked token sessions
+	// Retrieve chunked token sessions.
 	sm.getTokenChunkSessions(r, accessTokenCookie, sessionData.accessTokenChunks)
 	sm.getTokenChunkSessions(r, refreshTokenCookie, sessionData.refreshTokenChunks)
 
 	return sessionData, nil
 }
 
-// getTokenChunkSessions retrieves all session chunks for a given token type.
+// getTokenChunkSessions retrieves all cookie chunks associated with a large token (access or refresh).
+// It iteratively attempts to load cookies named "{baseName}_0", "{baseName}_1", etc., until
+// a cookie is not found or returns an error. The loaded sessions are stored in the provided chunks map.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - r: The HTTP request
-//   - baseName: The base name for the token's session cookies
-//   - chunks: Map to store the chunks in
+//   - r: The incoming HTTP request containing the cookies.
+//   - baseName: The base name of the cookie (e.g., accessTokenCookie).
+//   - chunks: The map (typically SessionData.accessTokenChunks or SessionData.refreshTokenChunks) to populate with the found session chunks.
 func (sm *SessionManager) getTokenChunkSessions(r *http.Request, baseName string, chunks map[int]*sessions.Session) {
 	for i := 0; ; i++ {
 		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", baseName, i)
 		session, err := sm.store.Get(r, sessionName)
 		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
-			// No more sessions
 			break
 		}
 		chunks[i] = session
@@ -228,59 +256,68 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) getTokenChunkSessions(r *http.Request, baseName string
 // and potentially large access and refresh tokens that may need to be
 // split across multiple cookies due to browser size limitations.
 type SessionData struct {
-	// manager is the SessionManager that created this SessionData
+	// manager is the SessionManager that created this SessionData.
 	manager *SessionManager
 
-	// request is the current HTTP request associated with this session
+	// request is the current HTTP request associated with this session.
 	request *http.Request
 
-	// mainSession stores authentication state and basic user info
+	// mainSession stores authentication state and basic user info.
 	mainSession *sessions.Session
 
-	// accessSession stores the primary access token cookie
+	// accessSession stores the primary access token cookie.
 	accessSession *sessions.Session
 
-	// refreshSession stores the primary refresh token cookie
+	// refreshSession stores the primary refresh token cookie.
 	refreshSession *sessions.Session
 
 	// accessTokenChunks stores additional chunks of the access token
-	// when it exceeds the maximum cookie size
+	// when it exceeds the maximum cookie size.
 	accessTokenChunks map[int]*sessions.Session
 
 	// refreshTokenChunks stores additional chunks of the refresh token
-	// when it exceeds the maximum cookie size
+	// when it exceeds the maximum cookie size.
 	refreshTokenChunks map[int]*sessions.Session
+
+	// refreshMutex protects refresh token operations within this session instance.
+	refreshMutex sync.Mutex
 }
 
-// Save persists all session data to cookies in the HTTP response.
-// It saves the main session, token sessions, and any token chunks,
-// applying appropriate security options to each cookie. All cookies
-// are saved with consistent security settings based on the request scheme.
+// Save persists all parts of the session (main, access token, refresh token, and any chunks)
+// back to the client as cookies in the HTTP response. It applies secure cookie options
+// obtained via getSessionOptions based on the request's security context.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - r: The original HTTP request (used to determine security context for cookie options).
+//   - w: The HTTP response writer to which the Set-Cookie headers will be added.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - An error if saving any of the session components fails.
 func (sd *SessionData) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
 	isSecure := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Scheme, "https") || sd.manager.forceHTTPS
 
-	// Set options for all sessions
+	// Set options for all sessions.
 	options := sd.manager.getSessionOptions(isSecure)
 	sd.mainSession.Options = options
 	sd.accessSession.Options = options
 	sd.refreshSession.Options = options
 
-	// Save main session
+	// Save main session.
 	if err := sd.mainSession.Save(r, w); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save main session: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Save access token session
+	// Save access token session.
 	if err := sd.accessSession.Save(r, w); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save access token session: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Save refresh token session
+	// Save refresh token session.
 	if err := sd.refreshSession.Save(r, w); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save refresh token session: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Save access token chunks
+	// Save access token chunks.
 	for _, session := range sd.accessTokenChunks {
 		session.Options = options
 		if err := session.Save(r, w); err != nil {
@@ -288,7 +325,7 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Save refresh token chunks
+	// Save refresh token chunks.
 	for _, session := range sd.refreshTokenChunks {
 		session.Options = options
 		if err := session.Save(r, w); err != nil {
@@ -299,11 +336,21 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Clear removes all session data by expiring all cookies and clearing their values.
-// This is typically used during logout to ensure all session data is properly cleaned up.
-// It handles both main session data and any token chunks that may exist.
+// Clear removes all session data associated with this SessionData instance.
+// It clears the values map of the main, access, and refresh sessions, sets their MaxAge to -1
+// to expire the cookies immediately, and clears any associated token chunk cookies.
+// If a ResponseWriter is provided, it attempts to save the expired sessions to send the
+// expiring Set-Cookie headers. Finally, it clears internal fields and returns the SessionData
+// object to the pool.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - r: The HTTP request (required by the underlying session store).
+//   - w: The HTTP response writer (optional). If provided, expiring Set-Cookie headers will be sent.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - An error if saving the expired sessions fails (only if w is not nil).
 func (sd *SessionData) Clear(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
-	// Clear and expire all sessions
+	// Clear and expire all sessions.
 	sd.mainSession.Options.MaxAge = -1
 	sd.accessSession.Options.MaxAge = -1
 	sd.refreshSession.Options.MaxAge = -1
@@ -318,7 +365,7 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Clear(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
 		delete(sd.refreshSession.Values, k)
 	}
 
-	// Clear chunk sessions
+	// Clear chunk sessions.
 	sd.clearTokenChunks(r, sd.accessTokenChunks)
 	sd.clearTokenChunks(r, sd.refreshTokenChunks)
 
@@ -326,16 +373,22 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Clear(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
 	if w != nil {
 		err = sd.Save(r, w)
 	}
-	
-	// Return session to pool
+
+	// Clear transient per-request fields.
+	sd.request = nil
+
+	// Return session to pool.
 	sd.manager.sessionPool.Put(sd)
-	
+
 	return err
 }
 
-// clearTokenChunks removes all session chunks for a given token type.
-// It expires the cookies and removes all stored values to ensure
-// no token data remains after logout or token invalidation.
+// clearTokenChunks iterates through a map of session chunks, clears their values,
+// and sets their MaxAge to -1 to expire them. This is used internally by Clear.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - r: The HTTP request (required by the underlying session store, though not directly used here).
+//   - chunks: The map of session chunks (e.g., sd.accessTokenChunks) to clear and expire.
 func (sd *SessionData) clearTokenChunks(r *http.Request, chunks map[int]*sessions.Session) {
 	for _, session := range chunks {
 		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
@@ -345,16 +398,19 @@ func (sd *SessionData) clearTokenChunks(r *http.Request, chunks map[int]*session
 	}
 }
 
-// GetAuthenticated returns whether the current session is authenticated.
-// Returns true if the user has successfully completed OIDC authentication
-// and the session hasn't expired, false otherwise.
+// GetAuthenticated checks if the session is marked as authenticated and has not exceeded
+// the absolute session timeout.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - true if the "authenticated" flag is set to true and the session creation time is within the allowed timeout.
+//   - false otherwise.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetAuthenticated() bool {
 	auth, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["authenticated"].(bool)
 	if !auth {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	// Check session expiration
+	// Check session expiration.
 	createdAt, ok := sd.mainSession.Values["created_at"].(int64)
 	if !ok {
 		return false
@@ -362,22 +418,34 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetAuthenticated() bool {
 	return time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0)) <= absoluteSessionTimeout
 }
 
-// SetAuthenticated updates the session's authentication status and rotates session ID.
-// This should be called after successful OIDC authentication or during logout.
-// Session ID rotation helps prevent session fixation attacks.
-func (sd *SessionData) SetAuthenticated(value bool) {
+// SetAuthenticated sets the authentication status of the session.
+// If setting to true, it generates a new secure session ID for the main session
+// to prevent session fixation attacks and records the current time as the creation time.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - value: The boolean authentication status (true for authenticated, false otherwise).
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - An error if generating a new session ID fails when setting value to true.
+func (sd *SessionData) SetAuthenticated(value bool) error {
 	if value {
-		// Generate new session ID and set creation time
-		sd.mainSession.ID = generateSecureRandomString(32)
+		id, err := generateSecureRandomString(32)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate secure session id: %w", err)
+		}
+		sd.mainSession.ID = id
 		sd.mainSession.Values["created_at"] = time.Now().Unix()
 	}
 	sd.mainSession.Values["authenticated"] = value
+	return nil
 }
 
-// GetAccessToken retrieves the complete access token from the session.
-// If the token was split into chunks due to size limitations, it will
-// automatically reassemble the complete token from all chunks.
-// Returns an empty string if no token is found.
+// GetAccessToken retrieves the access token stored in the session.
+// It handles reassembling the token from multiple cookie chunks if necessary
+// and decompresses it if it was stored compressed.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The complete, decompressed access token string, or an empty string if not found.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetAccessToken() string {
 	token, _ := sd.accessSession.Values["token"].(string)
 	if token != "" {
@@ -388,7 +456,7 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetAccessToken() string {
 		return token
 	}
 
-	// Reassemble token from chunks
+	// Reassemble token from chunks.
 	if len(sd.accessTokenChunks) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
@@ -411,41 +479,31 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetAccessToken() string {
 	return token
 }
 
-// SetAccessToken stores the access token in the session.
-// If the token exceeds maxCookieSize, it is automatically compressed and split into
-// multiple cookie chunks to handle large tokens while staying within
-// browser cookie size limits. Any existing token or chunks are cleared
-// before setting the new token.
-// expireAccessTokenChunks expires any existing access token chunk cookies
-func (sd *SessionData) expireAccessTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
-	for i := 0; ; i++ {
-		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", accessTokenCookie, i)
-		session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
-		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
-			break
-		}
-		// Expire the cookie
-		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
-		session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
-		// Save expired cookie
-		if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
-			sd.manager.logger.Errorf("Failed to save expired cookie: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
+// SetAccessToken stores the provided access token in the session.
+// It first expires any existing access token chunk cookies.
+// It then compresses the token. If the compressed token fits within a single cookie (maxCookieSize),
+// it's stored directly in the primary access token session. Otherwise, the compressed token
+// is split into chunks, and each chunk is stored in a separate numbered cookie (_oidc_raczylo_a_0, _oidc_raczylo_a_1, etc.).
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The access token string to store.
 func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
-	// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token
+	// Expire any existing chunk cookies first.
+	if sd.request != nil {
+		sd.expireAccessTokenChunks(nil) // Will be saved when Save() is called.
+	}
+
+	// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token.
 	sd.accessTokenChunks = make(map[int]*sessions.Session)
 
-	// Compress token
+	// Compress token.
 	compressed := compressToken(token)
 
 	if len(compressed) <= maxCookieSize {
 		sd.accessSession.Values["token"] = compressed
 		sd.accessSession.Values["compressed"] = true
 	} else {
-		// Split compressed token into chunks
+		// Split compressed token into chunks.
 		sd.accessSession.Values["token"] = ""
 		sd.accessSession.Values["compressed"] = true
 		chunks := splitIntoChunks(compressed, maxCookieSize)
@@ -458,10 +516,12 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
 	}
 }
 
-// GetRefreshToken retrieves the complete refresh token from the session.
-// If the token was split into chunks due to size limitations, it will
-// automatically reassemble the complete token from all chunks.
-// Returns an empty string if no token is found.
+// GetRefreshToken retrieves the refresh token stored in the session.
+// It handles reassembling the token from multiple cookie chunks if necessary
+// and decompresses it if it was stored compressed.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The complete, decompressed refresh token string, or an empty string if not found.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetRefreshToken() string {
 	token, _ := sd.refreshSession.Values["token"].(string)
 	if token != "" {
@@ -472,7 +532,7 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetRefreshToken() string {
 		return token
 	}
 
-	// Reassemble token from chunks
+	// Reassemble token from chunks.
 	if len(sd.refreshTokenChunks) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
@@ -495,41 +555,31 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetRefreshToken() string {
 	return token
 }
 
-// SetRefreshToken stores the refresh token in the session.
-// If the token exceeds maxCookieSize, it is automatically compressed and split into
-// multiple cookie chunks to handle large tokens while staying within
-// browser cookie size limits. Any existing token or chunks are cleared
-// before setting the new token.
-// expireRefreshTokenChunks expires any existing refresh token chunk cookies
-func (sd *SessionData) expireRefreshTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
-	for i := 0; ; i++ {
-		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", refreshTokenCookie, i)
-		session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
-		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
-			break
-		}
-		// Expire the cookie
-		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
-		session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
-		// Save expired cookie
-		if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
-			sd.manager.logger.Errorf("Failed to save expired cookie: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
+// SetRefreshToken stores the provided refresh token in the session.
+// It first expires any existing refresh token chunk cookies.
+// It then compresses the token. If the compressed token fits within a single cookie (maxCookieSize),
+// it's stored directly in the primary refresh token session. Otherwise, the compressed token
+// is split into chunks, and each chunk is stored in a separate numbered cookie (_oidc_raczylo_r_0, _oidc_raczylo_r_1, etc.).
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The refresh token string to store.
 func (sd *SessionData) SetRefreshToken(token string) {
-	// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token
+	// Expire any existing chunk cookies first.
+	if sd.request != nil {
+		sd.expireRefreshTokenChunks(nil) // Will be saved when Save() is called.
+	}
+
+	// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token.
 	sd.refreshTokenChunks = make(map[int]*sessions.Session)
 
-	// Compress token
+	// Compress token.
 	compressed := compressToken(token)
 
 	if len(compressed) <= maxCookieSize {
 		sd.refreshSession.Values["token"] = compressed
 		sd.refreshSession.Values["compressed"] = true
 	} else {
-		// Split compressed token into chunks
+		// Split compressed token into chunks.
 		sd.refreshSession.Values["token"] = ""
 		sd.refreshSession.Values["compressed"] = true
 		chunks := splitIntoChunks(compressed, maxCookieSize)
@@ -542,12 +592,63 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetRefreshToken(token string) {
 	}
 }
 
-// splitIntoChunks splits a string into chunks of specified size.
-// This is used internally to handle large tokens that exceed cookie size limits.
+// expireAccessTokenChunks finds all existing access token chunk cookies (_oidc_raczylo_a_N)
+// associated with the current request, clears their values, and sets their MaxAge to -1.
+// If a ResponseWriter is provided, it attempts to save the expired chunk sessions to send
+// the expiring Set-Cookie headers. This is used internally when setting a new access token.
+//
 // Parameters:
-//   - s: The string to split
-//   - chunkSize: Maximum size of each chunk
-// Returns an array of string chunks, each no larger than chunkSize.
+//   - w: The HTTP response writer (optional). If provided, expiring Set-Cookie headers will be sent.
+func (sd *SessionData) expireAccessTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
+	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", accessTokenCookie, i)
+		session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
+		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
+			break
+		}
+		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
+		session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
+		if w != nil {
+			if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
+				sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired access token cookie: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// expireRefreshTokenChunks finds all existing refresh token chunk cookies (_oidc_raczylo_r_N)
+// associated with the current request, clears their values, and sets their MaxAge to -1.
+// If a ResponseWriter is provided, it attempts to save the expired chunk sessions to send
+// the expiring Set-Cookie headers. This is used internally when setting a new refresh token.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - w: The HTTP response writer (optional). If provided, expiring Set-Cookie headers will be sent.
+func (sd *SessionData) expireRefreshTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
+	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", refreshTokenCookie, i)
+		session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
+		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
+			break
+		}
+		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
+		session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
+		if w != nil {
+			if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
+				sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired refresh token cookie: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// splitIntoChunks divides a string `s` into a slice of strings, where each element
+// has a maximum length of `chunkSize`.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - s: The string to split.
+//   - chunkSize: The maximum size of each chunk.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A slice of strings representing the chunks.
 func splitIntoChunks(s string, chunkSize int) []string {
 	var chunks []string
 	for len(s) > 0 {
@@ -562,65 +663,97 @@ func splitIntoChunks(s string, chunkSize int) []string {
 	return chunks
 }
 
-// GetCSRF retrieves the CSRF token from the session.
-// This token is used to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks
-// by ensuring requests originate from the authenticated user.
-// Returns an empty string if no CSRF token is found.
+// GetCSRF retrieves the Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token stored in the main session.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The CSRF token string, or an empty string if not set.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetCSRF() string {
 	csrf, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["csrf"].(string)
 	return csrf
 }
 
-// SetCSRF stores a new CSRF token in the session.
-// This should be called when initiating authentication to generate
-// a new token for the authentication flow.
+// SetCSRF stores the provided CSRF token string in the main session.
+// This token is typically generated at the start of the authentication flow.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - token: The CSRF token to store.
 func (sd *SessionData) SetCSRF(token string) {
 	sd.mainSession.Values["csrf"] = token
 }
 
-// GetNonce retrieves the nonce value from the session.
-// The nonce is used to prevent replay attacks in the OIDC flow
-// by ensuring the token received matches the authentication request.
-// Returns an empty string if no nonce is found.
+// GetNonce retrieves the OIDC nonce value stored in the main session.
+// The nonce is used to associate an ID token with the specific authentication request.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The nonce string, or an empty string if not set.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetNonce() string {
 	nonce, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["nonce"].(string)
 	return nonce
 }
 
-// SetNonce stores a new nonce value in the session.
-// This should be called when initiating authentication to generate
-// a new nonce for the OIDC authentication flow.
+// SetNonce stores the provided OIDC nonce string in the main session.
+// This nonce is typically generated at the start of the authentication flow.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - nonce: The nonce string to store.
 func (sd *SessionData) SetNonce(nonce string) {
 	sd.mainSession.Values["nonce"] = nonce
 }
 
-// GetEmail retrieves the authenticated user's email address from the session.
-// The email is typically extracted from the OIDC ID token claims.
-// Returns an empty string if no email is found.
+// GetCodeVerifier retrieves the PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) code verifier
+// stored in the main session. This is only relevant if PKCE is enabled.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The code verifier string, or an empty string if not set or PKCE is disabled.
+func (sd *SessionData) GetCodeVerifier() string {
+	codeVerifier, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["code_verifier"].(string)
+	return codeVerifier
+}
+
+// SetCodeVerifier stores the provided PKCE code verifier string in the main session.
+// This is typically called at the start of the authentication flow if PKCE is enabled.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - codeVerifier: The PKCE code verifier string to store.
+func (sd *SessionData) SetCodeVerifier(codeVerifier string) {
+	sd.mainSession.Values["code_verifier"] = codeVerifier
+}
+
+// GetEmail retrieves the authenticated user's email address stored in the main session.
+// This is typically extracted from the ID token claims after successful authentication.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The user's email address string, or an empty string if not set.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetEmail() string {
 	email, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["email"].(string)
 	return email
 }
 
-// SetEmail stores the user's email address in the session.
-// This should be called after successful authentication when
-// processing the OIDC ID token claims.
+// SetEmail stores the provided user email address string in the main session.
+// This is typically called after successful authentication and claim extraction.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - email: The user's email address to store.
 func (sd *SessionData) SetEmail(email string) {
 	sd.mainSession.Values["email"] = email
 }
 
-// GetIncomingPath retrieves the original request path that triggered
-// the authentication flow. This is used to redirect the user back
-// to their intended destination after successful authentication.
-// Returns an empty string if no path was stored.
+// GetIncomingPath retrieves the original request URI (including query parameters)
+// that the user was trying to access before being redirected for authentication.
+// This is stored in the main session to allow redirection back after successful login.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - The original request URI string, or an empty string if not set.
 func (sd *SessionData) GetIncomingPath() string {
 	path, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["incoming_path"].(string)
 	return path
 }
 
-// SetIncomingPath stores the original request path that triggered
-// the authentication flow. This should be called before redirecting
-// to the OIDC provider to remember where to send the user afterward.
+// SetIncomingPath stores the original request URI (path and query parameters)
+// in the main session. This is typically called at the start of the authentication flow.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - path: The original request URI string (e.g., "/protected/resource?id=123").
 func (sd *SessionData) SetIncomingPath(path string) {
 	sd.mainSession.Values["incoming_path"] = path
 }

session_test.go

@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
 package traefikoidc
 
 import (
-	"math/rand"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
-	"time"
 )
 
-func init() {
-	// Initialize random seed
-	rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano())
-}
-
 // generateRandomString creates a random string of specified length
 func generateRandomString(length int) string {
 	const charset = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
 	b := make([]byte, length)
 	for i := range b {
-		b[i] = charset[rand.Intn(len(charset))]
+		num, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(charset))))
+		if err != nil {
+			// Handle error appropriately in a real application, maybe panic in test helper
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf("crypto/rand failed: %v", err))
+		}
+		b[i] = charset[num.Int64()]
 	}
 	return string(b)
 }
@@ -56,9 +57,9 @@ func TestTokenCompression(t *testing.T) {
 			if len(tt.token) > 100 {
 				compressionRatio := float64(len(compressed)) / float64(len(tt.token))
 				t.Logf("Compression ratio for %s: %.2f", tt.name, compressionRatio)
-				
+
 				if compressionRatio > 1.1 { // Allow up to 10% size increase
-					t.Errorf("Compression increased size too much: original=%d, compressed=%d, ratio=%.2f", 
+					t.Errorf("Compression increased size too much: original=%d, compressed=%d, ratio=%.2f",
 						len(tt.token), len(compressed), compressionRatio)
 				}
 			}
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ func TestCookiePrefix(t *testing.T) {
 	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
 	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
-	sm := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, NewLogger("debug"))
+	sm, _ := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, NewLogger("debug"))
 	session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
@@ -91,11 +92,11 @@ func TestCookiePrefix(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Set some data to ensure cookies are created
 	session.SetAuthenticated(true)
-	
+
 	// Expire any existing cookies
 	session.expireAccessTokenChunks(rr)
 	session.expireRefreshTokenChunks(rr)
-	
+
 	// Set new tokens
 	session.SetAccessToken("test_token")
 	session.SetRefreshToken("test_refresh_token")
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ func TestTokenRefreshCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
 	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
-	sm := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, NewLogger("debug"))
+	sm, _ := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, NewLogger("debug"))
 	session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ func TestTokenRefreshCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 	// Set a large token that will be split into chunks
 	largeToken := strings.Repeat("x", 5000)
 	session.SetAccessToken(largeToken)
-	
+
 	if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ func TestTokenRefreshCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Set a smaller token that won't need chunks
 	newSession.SetAccessToken("small_token")
-	
+
 	// Save session with new token
 	if err := newSession.Save(newReq, newRr); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to save new session: %v", err)
@@ -198,160 +199,160 @@ func TestSessionManager(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name                string
 		authenticated       bool
-		email              string
-		accessToken        string
-		refreshToken       string
+		email               string
+		accessToken         string
+		refreshToken        string
 		expectedCookieCount int
-		wantCompressed     bool // Whether tokens should be compressed
+		wantCompressed      bool // Whether tokens should be compressed
 	}{
 		{
 			name:                "Short tokens",
 			authenticated:       true,
-			email:              "test@example.com",
-			accessToken:        "shortaccesstoken",
-			refreshToken:       "shortrefreshtoken",
+			email:               "test@example.com",
+			accessToken:         "shortaccesstoken",
+			refreshToken:        "shortrefreshtoken",
 			expectedCookieCount: 3, // main, access, refresh
-			wantCompressed:     true,
+			wantCompressed:      true,
 		},
 		{
-			name:          "Long tokens exceeding 4096 bytes",
-			authenticated: true,
-			email:         "test@example.com",
-			accessToken:   strings.Repeat("x", 5000),
-			refreshToken:  strings.Repeat("y", 6000),
+			name:                "Long tokens exceeding 4096 bytes",
+			authenticated:       true,
+			email:               "test@example.com",
+			accessToken:         strings.Repeat("x", 5000),
+			refreshToken:        strings.Repeat("y", 6000),
 			expectedCookieCount: calculateExpectedCookieCount(strings.Repeat("x", 5000), strings.Repeat("y", 6000)),
-			wantCompressed:     true,
+			wantCompressed:      true,
 		},
 		{
-			name:          "REALLY long tokens, exceeding 25000 bytes",
-			authenticated: true,
-			email:         "test@example.com",
-			accessToken:   strings.Repeat("x", 25000),
-			refreshToken:  strings.Repeat("y", 25000),
+			name:                "REALLY long tokens, exceeding 25000 bytes",
+			authenticated:       true,
+			email:               "test@example.com",
+			accessToken:         strings.Repeat("x", 25000),
+			refreshToken:        strings.Repeat("y", 25000),
 			expectedCookieCount: calculateExpectedCookieCount(strings.Repeat("x", 25000), strings.Repeat("y", 25000)),
-			wantCompressed:     true,
+			wantCompressed:      true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:                "Unauthenticated session",
 			authenticated:       false,
-			email:              "",
-			accessToken:        "",
-			refreshToken:       "",
+			email:               "",
+			accessToken:         "",
+			refreshToken:        "",
 			expectedCookieCount: 3, // main, access, refresh
-			wantCompressed:     false,
+			wantCompressed:      false,
 		},
 		{
-			name:          "Random content tokens",
-			authenticated: true,
-			email:         "test@example.com",
-			accessToken:   generateRandomString(5000),
-			refreshToken:  generateRandomString(5000),
+			name:                "Random content tokens",
+			authenticated:       true,
+			email:               "test@example.com",
+			accessToken:         generateRandomString(5000),
+			refreshToken:        generateRandomString(5000),
 			expectedCookieCount: calculateExpectedCookieCount(generateRandomString(5000), generateRandomString(5000)),
-			wantCompressed:     true,
+			wantCompressed:      true,
 		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tc := range tests {
-			tc := tc // Capture range variable
-			t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-					req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-					rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		tc := tc // Capture range variable
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
-					session, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
-					if err != nil {
-							t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
-					}
+			session, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
+			}
 
-					// Set session values
-					session.SetAuthenticated(tc.authenticated)
-					session.SetEmail(tc.email)
-					
-					// Expire any existing cookies
-					session.expireAccessTokenChunks(rr)
-					session.expireRefreshTokenChunks(rr)
-					
-					// Set new tokens
-					session.SetAccessToken(tc.accessToken)
-					session.SetRefreshToken(tc.refreshToken)
+			// Set session values
+			session.SetAuthenticated(tc.authenticated)
+			session.SetEmail(tc.email)
 
-					// Save session
-					if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
-							t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
-					}
+			// Expire any existing cookies
+			session.expireAccessTokenChunks(rr)
+			session.expireRefreshTokenChunks(rr)
 
-					// Verify cookies are set and compression is used when appropriate
-					cookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
-					if len(cookies) != tc.expectedCookieCount {
-						t.Errorf("Expected %d cookies, got %d", tc.expectedCookieCount, len(cookies))
-					}
+			// Set new tokens
+			session.SetAccessToken(tc.accessToken)
+			session.SetRefreshToken(tc.refreshToken)
 
-					// Verify compression is working by checking token sizes
-					for _, cookie := range cookies {
-						if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, accessTokenCookie) {
-							// Get original and stored sizes
-							originalSize := len(tc.accessToken)
-							storedSize := len(cookie.Value)
-							
-							if originalSize > 100 && tc.wantCompressed {
-								// For large tokens, verify some compression occurred
-								compressionRatio := float64(storedSize) / float64(originalSize)
-								t.Logf("Access token compression ratio: %.2f (original: %d, stored: %d)", 
-									compressionRatio, originalSize, storedSize)
-								
-								if compressionRatio > 0.9 { // Allow some overhead, but should see compression
-									t.Errorf("Expected compression for large token in cookie %s (ratio: %.2f)", 
-										cookie.Name, compressionRatio)
-								}
-							}
-						} else if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, refreshTokenCookie) {
-							originalSize := len(tc.refreshToken)
-							storedSize := len(cookie.Value)
-							
-							if originalSize > 100 && tc.wantCompressed {
-								compressionRatio := float64(storedSize) / float64(originalSize)
-								t.Logf("Refresh token compression ratio: %.2f (original: %d, stored: %d)", 
-									compressionRatio, originalSize, storedSize)
-								
-								if compressionRatio > 0.9 {
-									t.Errorf("Expected compression for large token in cookie %s (ratio: %.2f)", 
-										cookie.Name, compressionRatio)
-								}
-							}
+			// Save session
+			if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Verify cookies are set and compression is used when appropriate
+			cookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
+			if len(cookies) != tc.expectedCookieCount {
+				t.Errorf("Expected %d cookies, got %d", tc.expectedCookieCount, len(cookies))
+			}
+
+			// Verify compression is working by checking token sizes
+			for _, cookie := range cookies {
+				if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, accessTokenCookie) {
+					// Get original and stored sizes
+					originalSize := len(tc.accessToken)
+					storedSize := len(cookie.Value)
+
+					if originalSize > 100 && tc.wantCompressed {
+						// For large tokens, verify some compression occurred
+						compressionRatio := float64(storedSize) / float64(originalSize)
+						t.Logf("Access token compression ratio: %.2f (original: %d, stored: %d)",
+							compressionRatio, originalSize, storedSize)
+
+						if compressionRatio > 0.9 { // Allow some overhead, but should see compression
+							t.Errorf("Expected compression for large token in cookie %s (ratio: %.2f)",
+								cookie.Name, compressionRatio)
 						}
 					}
+				} else if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, refreshTokenCookie) {
+					originalSize := len(tc.refreshToken)
+					storedSize := len(cookie.Value)
 
-					// Create a new request with the cookies
-					newReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-					for _, cookie := range cookies {
-							newReq.AddCookie(cookie)
-					}
+					if originalSize > 100 && tc.wantCompressed {
+						compressionRatio := float64(storedSize) / float64(originalSize)
+						t.Logf("Refresh token compression ratio: %.2f (original: %d, stored: %d)",
+							compressionRatio, originalSize, storedSize)
 
-					// Get the session again and verify values
-					newSession, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(newReq)
-					if err != nil {
-						t.Fatalf("Failed to get new session: %v", err)
+						if compressionRatio > 0.9 {
+							t.Errorf("Expected compression for large token in cookie %s (ratio: %.2f)",
+								cookie.Name, compressionRatio)
+						}
 					}
+				}
+			}
 
-					// Verify session values
-					if newSession.GetAuthenticated() != tc.authenticated {
-						t.Errorf("Authentication status not preserved")
-					}
-					if email := newSession.GetEmail(); email != tc.email {
-						t.Errorf("Expected email %s, got %s", tc.email, email)
-					}
-					if token := newSession.GetAccessToken(); token != tc.accessToken {
-						t.Errorf("Access token not preserved: got len=%d, want len=%d", len(token), len(tc.accessToken))
-					}
-					if token := newSession.GetRefreshToken(); token != tc.refreshToken {
-						t.Errorf("Refresh token not preserved: got len=%d, want len=%d", len(token), len(tc.refreshToken))
-					}
+			// Create a new request with the cookies
+			newReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+			for _, cookie := range cookies {
+				newReq.AddCookie(cookie)
+			}
 
-					// Verify session pooling by checking if the session is reused
-					session2, _ := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(newReq)
-					if session2 == newSession {
-						t.Error("Session not properly pooled")
-					}
-			})
+			// Get the session again and verify values
+			newSession, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(newReq)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to get new session: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Verify session values
+			if newSession.GetAuthenticated() != tc.authenticated {
+				t.Errorf("Authentication status not preserved")
+			}
+			if email := newSession.GetEmail(); email != tc.email {
+				t.Errorf("Expected email %s, got %s", tc.email, email)
+			}
+			if token := newSession.GetAccessToken(); token != tc.accessToken {
+				t.Errorf("Access token not preserved: got len=%d, want len=%d", len(token), len(tc.accessToken))
+			}
+			if token := newSession.GetRefreshToken(); token != tc.refreshToken {
+				t.Errorf("Refresh token not preserved: got len=%d, want len=%d", len(token), len(tc.refreshToken))
+			}
+
+			// Verify session pooling by checking if the session is reused
+			session2, _ := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(newReq)
+			if session2 == newSession {
+				t.Error("Session not properly pooled")
+			}
+		})
 	}
 }
 
@@ -362,12 +363,12 @@ func calculateExpectedCookieCount(accessToken, refreshToken string) int {
 	calculateChunks := func(token string) int {
 		// Compress token (matching the actual implementation)
 		compressed := compressToken(token)
-		
+
 		// If compressed token fits in one cookie, no additional chunks needed
 		if len(compressed) <= maxCookieSize {
 			return 0
 		}
-		
+
 		// Calculate chunks needed for compressed token
 		return len(splitIntoChunks(compressed, maxCookieSize))
 	}

settings.go

@@ -10,6 +10,18 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 )
 
+// TemplatedHeader represents a custom HTTP header with a templated value.
+// The value can contain template expressions that will be evaluated for each
+// authenticated request, such as {{.claims.email}} or {{.accessToken}}.
+type TemplatedHeader struct {
+	// Name is the HTTP header name to set (e.g., "X-Forwarded-Email")
+	Name string `json:"name"`
+
+	// Value is the template string for the header value
+	// Example: "{{.claims.email}}", "Bearer {{.accessToken}}"
+	Value string `json:"value"`
+}
+
 // Config holds the configuration for the OIDC middleware.
 // It provides all necessary settings to configure OpenID Connect authentication
 // with various providers like Auth0, Logto, or any standard OIDC provider.
@@ -22,6 +34,11 @@ type Config struct {
 	// If not provided, it will be discovered from provider metadata
 	RevocationURL string `json:"revocationURL"`
 
+	// EnablePKCE enables Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) for the authorization code flow (optional)
+	// This enhances security but might not be supported by all OIDC providers
+	// Default: false
+	EnablePKCE bool `json:"enablePKCE"`
+
 	// CallbackURL is the path where the OIDC provider will redirect after authentication (required)
 	// Example: /oauth2/callback
 	CallbackURL string `json:"callbackURL"`
@@ -79,6 +96,22 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	// HTTPClient allows customizing the HTTP client used for OIDC operations (optional)
 	HTTPClient *http.Client
+
+	// RefreshGracePeriodSeconds defines how many seconds before a token expires
+	// the plugin should attempt to refresh it proactively (optional)
+	// Default: 60
+	RefreshGracePeriodSeconds int `json:"refreshGracePeriodSeconds"`
+	// Headers defines custom HTTP headers to set with templated values (optional)
+	// Values can reference tokens and claims using Go templates with the following variables:
+	// - {{.AccessToken}} - The access token (ID token)
+	// - {{.IdToken}} - Same as AccessToken (for consistency)
+	// - {{.RefreshToken}} - The refresh token
+	// - {{.Claims.email}} - Access token claims (use proper case for claim names)
+	// Examples:
+	//
+	//	[{Name: "X-Forwarded-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"}]
+	//	[{Name: "Authorization", Value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"}]
+	Headers []TemplatedHeader `json:"headers"`
 }
 
 const (
@@ -103,20 +136,36 @@ const (
 //   - RateLimit: 100 requests per second
 //   - PostLogoutRedirectURI: "/"
 //   - ForceHTTPS: true (for security)
+//   - EnablePKCE: false (PKCE is opt-in)
+//
+// CreateConfig initializes a new Config struct with default values for optional fields.
+// It sets default scopes, log level, rate limit, enables ForceHTTPS, and sets the
+// default refresh grace period. Required fields like ProviderURL, ClientID, ClientSecret,
+// CallbackURL, and SessionEncryptionKey must be set explicitly after creation.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A pointer to a new Config struct with default settings applied.
 func CreateConfig() *Config {
 	c := &Config{
-		Scopes:     []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
-		LogLevel:   DefaultLogLevel,
-		RateLimit:  DefaultRateLimit,
-		ForceHTTPS: true, // Secure by default
+		Scopes:                    []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
+		LogLevel:                  DefaultLogLevel,
+		RateLimit:                 DefaultRateLimit,
+		ForceHTTPS:                true,  // Secure by default
+		EnablePKCE:                false, // PKCE is opt-in
+		RefreshGracePeriodSeconds: 60,    // Default grace period of 60 seconds
 	}
 
 	return c
 }
 
-// Validate performs validation checks on the Config.
-// It ensures all required fields are set and have valid values.
-// Returns an error if any validation check fails.
+// Validate checks the configuration settings for validity.
+// It ensures that required fields (ProviderURL, CallbackURL, ClientID, ClientSecret, SessionEncryptionKey)
+// are present and that URLs are well-formed (HTTPS where required). It also validates
+// the session key length, log level, rate limit, and refresh grace period.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - nil if the configuration is valid.
+//   - An error describing the first validation failure encountered.
 func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 	// Validate provider URL
 	if c.ProviderURL == "" {
@@ -190,16 +239,61 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("rateLimit must be at least %d", MinRateLimit)
 	}
 
+	// Validate refresh grace period
+	if c.RefreshGracePeriodSeconds < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refreshGracePeriodSeconds cannot be negative")
+	}
+
+	// Validate headers configuration
+	for _, header := range c.Headers {
+		if header.Name == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header name cannot be empty")
+		}
+		if header.Value == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header value template cannot be empty")
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{") || !strings.Contains(header.Value, "}}") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header value '%s' does not appear to be a valid template (missing {{ }})", header.Value)
+		}
+
+		// Provide more helpful guidance for common template errors
+		if strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{.claims") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header template '%s' appears to use lowercase 'claims' - use '{{.Claims...' instead (case sensitive)", header.Value)
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{.accessToken") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header template '%s' appears to use lowercase 'accessToken' - use '{{.AccessToken...' instead (case sensitive)", header.Value)
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{.idToken") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header template '%s' appears to use lowercase 'idToken' - use '{{.IdToken...' instead (case sensitive)", header.Value)
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{.refreshToken") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header template '%s' appears to use lowercase 'refreshToken' - use '{{.RefreshToken...' instead (case sensitive)", header.Value)
+		}
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 
-// isValidSecureURL checks if the provided string is a valid HTTPS URL
+// isValidSecureURL checks if a given string represents a valid, absolute HTTPS URL.
+// It uses url.Parse and checks for a nil error, an "https" scheme, and a non-empty host.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - s: The URL string to validate.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - true if the string is a valid HTTPS URL, false otherwise.
 func isValidSecureURL(s string) bool {
 	u, err := url.Parse(s)
 	return err == nil && u.Scheme == "https" && u.Host != ""
 }
 
-// isValidLogLevel checks if the provided log level is valid
+// isValidLogLevel checks if the provided log level string is one of the supported values ("debug", "info", "error").
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - level: The log level string to validate.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - true if the log level is valid, false otherwise.
 func isValidLogLevel(level string) bool {
 	return level == "debug" || level == "info" || level == "error"
 }
@@ -216,20 +310,27 @@ type Logger struct {
 	logDebug *log.Logger
 }
 
-// NewLogger creates a new Logger with the specified log level.
-// The log level determines which messages are output:
-//   - "debug": Outputs all messages (debug, info, error)
-//   - "info": Outputs info and error messages
-//   - "error": Outputs only error messages
-// Error messages are always written to stderr, while info and debug
-// messages are written to stdout when enabled.
+// NewLogger creates and configures a new Logger instance based on the provided log level.
+// It initializes loggers for ERROR (stderr), INFO (stdout), and DEBUG (stdout) levels,
+// enabling output based on the specified level:
+//   - "error": Only ERROR messages are output.
+//   - "info": INFO and ERROR messages are output.
+//   - "debug": DEBUG, INFO, and ERROR messages are output.
+//
+// If an invalid level is provided, it defaults to behavior similar to "error".
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - logLevel: The desired logging level ("debug", "info", or "error").
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A pointer to the configured Logger instance.
 func NewLogger(logLevel string) *Logger {
 	logError := log.New(io.Discard, "ERROR: TraefikOidcPlugin: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime)
 	logInfo := log.New(io.Discard, "INFO: TraefikOidcPlugin: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime)
 	logDebug := log.New(io.Discard, "DEBUG: TraefikOidcPlugin: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime)
 
 	logError.SetOutput(os.Stderr)
-	
+
 	if logLevel == "debug" || logLevel == "info" {
 		logInfo.SetOutput(os.Stdout)
 	}
@@ -244,51 +345,77 @@ func NewLogger(logLevel string) *Logger {
 	}
 }
 
-// Info logs an informational message.
-// These messages are intended for general operational information
-// and are written to stdout.
+// Info logs a message at the INFO level using Printf style formatting.
+// Output is directed to stdout if the configured log level is "info" or "debug".
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - format: The format string (as in fmt.Printf).
+//   - args: The arguments for the format string.
 func (l *Logger) Info(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	l.logInfo.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-// Debug logs a debug message.
-// These messages are only output when debug level logging is enabled
-// and are intended for detailed troubleshooting information.
+// Debug logs a message at the DEBUG level using Printf style formatting.
+// Output is directed to stdout only if the configured log level is "debug".
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - format: The format string (as in fmt.Printf).
+//   - args: The arguments for the format string.
 func (l *Logger) Debug(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	l.logDebug.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-// Error logs an error message.
-// These messages indicate problems that need attention and are
-// always written to stderr regardless of the log level.
+// Error logs a message at the ERROR level using Printf style formatting.
+// Output is always directed to stderr, regardless of the configured log level.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - format: The format string (as in fmt.Printf).
+//   - args: The arguments for the format string.
 func (l *Logger) Error(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	l.logError.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-// Infof logs an informational message using Printf formatting.
-// These messages are intended for general operational information
-// and are written to stdout.
+// Infof logs a message at the INFO level using Printf style formatting.
+// Equivalent to calling l.Info(format, args...).
+// Output is directed to stdout if the configured log level is "info" or "debug".
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - format: The format string (as in fmt.Printf).
+//   - args: The arguments for the format string.
 func (l *Logger) Infof(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	l.logInfo.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-// Debugf logs a debug message using Printf formatting.
-// These messages are only output when debug level logging is enabled
-// and are intended for detailed troubleshooting information.
+// Debugf logs a message at the DEBUG level using Printf style formatting.
+// Equivalent to calling l.Debug(format, args...).
+// Output is directed to stdout only if the configured log level is "debug".
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - format: The format string (as in fmt.Printf).
+//   - args: The arguments for the format string.
 func (l *Logger) Debugf(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	l.logDebug.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-// Errorf logs an error message using Printf formatting.
-// These messages indicate problems that need attention and are
-// always written to stderr regardless of the log level.
+// Errorf logs a message at the ERROR level using Printf style formatting.
+// Equivalent to calling l.Error(format, args...).
+// Output is always directed to stderr, regardless of the configured log level.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - format: The format string (as in fmt.Printf).
+//   - args: The arguments for the format string.
 func (l *Logger) Errorf(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	l.logError.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-// handleError writes an error message to both the HTTP response and the error log.
-// It ensures consistent error handling across the middleware by logging the error
-// and sending an appropriate HTTP response to the client.
+// handleError logs an error message using the provided logger and sends an HTTP error
+// response to the client with the specified message and status code.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - w: The http.ResponseWriter to send the error response to.
+//   - message: The error message string.
+//   - code: The HTTP status code for the response.
+//   - logger: The Logger instance to use for logging the error.
 func handleError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string, code int, logger *Logger) {
 	logger.Error(message)
 	http.Error(w, message, code)

templated_header_config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+)
+
+func TestTemplatedHeaderValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		header        TemplatedHeader
+		expectedError string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:          "Empty Name",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			expectedError: "header name cannot be empty",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Empty Value",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Email", Value: ""},
+			expectedError: "header value template cannot be empty",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Not a Template",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Email", Value: "static-value"},
+			expectedError: "header value 'static-value' does not appear to be a valid template (missing {{ }})",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Lowercase claims",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Email", Value: "{{.claims.email}}"},
+			expectedError: "header template '{{.claims.email}}' appears to use lowercase 'claims' - use '{{.Claims...' instead (case sensitive)",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Lowercase accessToken",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Token", Value: "Bearer {{.accessToken}}"},
+			expectedError: "header template 'Bearer {{.accessToken}}' appears to use lowercase 'accessToken' - use '{{.AccessToken...' instead (case sensitive)",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Lowercase idToken",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Token", Value: "Bearer {{.idToken}}"},
+			expectedError: "header template 'Bearer {{.idToken}}' appears to use lowercase 'idToken' - use '{{.IdToken...' instead (case sensitive)",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Lowercase refreshToken",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Refresh", Value: "Bearer {{.refreshToken}}"},
+			expectedError: "header template 'Bearer {{.refreshToken}}' appears to use lowercase 'refreshToken' - use '{{.RefreshToken...' instead (case sensitive)",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Valid Template",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "X-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			expectedError: "",
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "Valid Bearer Token Template",
+			header:        TemplatedHeader{Name: "Authorization", Value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"},
+			expectedError: "",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			config := &Config{
+				ProviderURL:          "https://provider.com",
+				CallbackURL:          "/callback",
+				ClientID:             "client-id",
+				ClientSecret:         "client-secret",
+				SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-long-enough-encryption-key",
+				RateLimit:            10, // Adding minimum required rate limit
+				Headers:              []TemplatedHeader{tc.header},
+			}
+
+			err := config.Validate()
+			if tc.expectedError == "" {
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Errorf("Expected no error, got: %v", err)
+				}
+			} else {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Errorf("Expected error: %s, got nil", tc.expectedError)
+				} else if err.Error() != tc.expectedError {
+					t.Errorf("Expected error: %s, got: %s", tc.expectedError, err.Error())
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTemplateParsingInNew(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test successful parsing of templates during middleware creation
+	tests := []struct {
+		name              string
+		headers           []TemplatedHeader
+		expectedTemplates int
+		expectError       bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "Single Valid Template",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			},
+			expectedTemplates: 1,
+			expectError:       false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Multiple Valid Templates",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-ID", Value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"},
+				{Name: "Authorization", Value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"},
+			},
+			expectedTemplates: 3,
+			expectError:       false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Invalid Template",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email"}, // Missing closing braces
+			},
+			expectedTemplates: 0,
+			expectError:       true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Mix of Valid and Invalid Templates",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{Name: "X-Invalid", Value: "{{if .Claims.admin}}Admin{{end"}, // Invalid template
+			},
+			expectedTemplates: 1,    // Only the valid template should be parsed
+			expectError:       true, // We expect an error for the invalid template, but we'll handle it
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// For testing template parsing, we'll directly try to parse the templates instead of using New()
+			// This avoids the provider discovery that would fail in tests
+			headerTemplates := make(map[string]*template.Template)
+
+			// Special handling for the mixed valid/invalid templates case
+			if tc.name == "Mix of Valid and Invalid Templates" {
+				// Process templates one at a time so we can still have valid templates
+				for _, header := range tc.headers {
+					tmpl, err := template.New(header.Name).Parse(header.Value)
+					if err != nil {
+						// We expect an error for the invalid template
+						if !tc.expectError {
+							t.Errorf("Unexpected error parsing template %s: %v", header.Name, err)
+						}
+						// Skip this template but continue processing others
+						continue
+					}
+					headerTemplates[header.Name] = tmpl
+				}
+			} else {
+				// Normal handling for other test cases
+				var parseErr error
+				for _, header := range tc.headers {
+					tmpl, err := template.New(header.Name).Parse(header.Value)
+					if err != nil {
+						parseErr = err
+						break
+					}
+					headerTemplates[header.Name] = tmpl
+				}
+
+				if tc.expectError {
+					if parseErr == nil {
+						t.Error("Expected error parsing templates but got nil")
+					}
+					return
+				}
+
+				if parseErr != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %v", parseErr)
+				}
+			}
+
+			// Check the number of parsed templates
+			if len(headerTemplates) != tc.expectedTemplates {
+				t.Errorf("Expected %d parsed templates, got %d", tc.expectedTemplates, len(headerTemplates))
+			}
+
+			// Check each template was parsed
+			for _, header := range tc.headers {
+				// Skip the known invalid templates
+				if header.Value == "{{.Claims.email" || header.Value == "{{if .Claims.admin}}Admin{{end" {
+					continue
+				}
+
+				if _, ok := headerTemplates[header.Name]; !ok {
+					t.Errorf("Template for header %s was not parsed", header.Name)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

templated_header_execution_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+)
+
+// TestTemplateExecution tests that templates are executed correctly with different types of claims
+func TestTemplateExecution(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		templateText  string
+		data          map[string]interface{}
+		expectedValue string
+		expectError   bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:         "String Claim",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.email}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"email": "user@example.com",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "user@example.com",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Number Claim",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.age}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"age": 30,
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "30",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Boolean Claim",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.admin}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"admin": true,
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "true",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Array Claim",
+			templateText: "{{index .Claims.roles 0}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"roles": []string{"admin", "user"},
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "admin",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Nested Object Claim",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.user.name}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"user": map[string]interface{}{
+						"name": "John Doe",
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "John Doe",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Access Token",
+			templateText: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"AccessToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.e30.Et9HFtf9R3GEMA0IICOfFMVXY7kkTX1wr4qCyhIf58U",
+			},
+			expectedValue: "Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.e30.Et9HFtf9R3GEMA0IICOfFMVXY7kkTX1wr4qCyhIf58U",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "ID Token",
+			templateText: "{{.IdToken}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"IdToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.e30.Et9HFtf9R3GEMA0IICOfFMVXY7kkTX1wr4qCyhIf58U",
+			},
+			expectedValue: "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.e30.Et9HFtf9R3GEMA0IICOfFMVXY7kkTX1wr4qCyhIf58U",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Refresh Token",
+			templateText: "{{.RefreshToken}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"RefreshToken": "refresh-token-value",
+			},
+			expectedValue: "refresh-token-value",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Conditional Template",
+			templateText: "{{if .Claims.admin}}Admin User{{else}}Regular User{{end}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"admin": true,
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "Admin User",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Multiple Claims",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.firstName}} {{.Claims.lastName}} <{{.Claims.email}}>",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"firstName": "John",
+					"lastName":  "Doe",
+					"email":     "john.doe@example.com",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "John Doe <john.doe@example.com>",
+			expectError:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Missing Claim",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.missing}}",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "<no value>",
+			expectError:   false, // Go templates don't error on missing values
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Invalid Template Syntax",
+			templateText: "{{.Claims.email",
+			data: map[string]interface{}{
+				"Claims": map[string]interface{}{
+					"email": "user@example.com",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "",
+			expectError:   true, // Parsing should fail
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			tmpl, err := template.New("test").Parse(tc.templateText)
+
+			if tc.expectError {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatal("Expected template parsing error, but got nil")
+				}
+				return
+			}
+
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to parse template: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			var buf bytes.Buffer
+			err = tmpl.Execute(&buf, tc.data)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to execute template: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			result := buf.String()
+			if result != tc.expectedValue {
+				t.Errorf("Expected template output %q, got %q", tc.expectedValue, result)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTemplateExecutionContext tests the specific template data context used in processAuthorizedRequest
+func TestTemplateExecutionContext(t *testing.T) {
+	// Define a test struct that matches the one used in processAuthorizedRequest
+	type templateData struct {
+		AccessToken  string
+		IdToken      string
+		RefreshToken string
+		Claims       map[string]interface{}
+	}
+
+	// Test cases
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		templateText  string
+		data          templateData
+		expectedValue string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:         "Access and ID token identity",
+			templateText: "Access: {{.AccessToken}} ID: {{.IdToken}}",
+			data: templateData{
+				AccessToken: "access-token",
+				IdToken:     "access-token", // Same as AccessToken in processAuthorizedRequest
+				Claims:      map[string]interface{}{},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "Access: access-token ID: access-token",
+		},
+		{
+			name:         "Combining tokens and claims",
+			templateText: "User: {{.Claims.sub}} Token: {{.AccessToken}}",
+			data: templateData{
+				AccessToken: "access-token",
+				IdToken:     "access-token",
+				Claims: map[string]interface{}{
+					"sub": "user123",
+				},
+			},
+			expectedValue: "User: user123 Token: access-token",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			tmpl, err := template.New("test").Parse(tc.templateText)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to parse template: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			var buf bytes.Buffer
+			err = tmpl.Execute(&buf, tc.data)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to execute template: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			result := buf.String()
+			if result != tc.expectedValue {
+				t.Errorf("Expected template output %q, got %q", tc.expectedValue, result)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

templated_header_integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
+)
+
+// TestTemplatedHeadersIntegration tests that templated headers are correctly added to requests
+// in the actual middleware flow
+func TestTemplatedHeadersIntegration(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create a TestSuite to use its helper methods and fields
+	ts := &TestSuite{t: t}
+	ts.Setup()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name               string
+		headers            []TemplatedHeader
+		sessionSetup       func(*SessionData)
+		claims             map[string]interface{}
+		expectedHeaders    map[string]string
+		interceptedHeaders map[string]string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "Basic Email Header",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			},
+			claims: map[string]interface{}{
+				"email": "user@example.com",
+			},
+			expectedHeaders: map[string]string{
+				"X-User-Email": "user@example.com",
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Multiple Headers",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-ID", Value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-Name", Value: "{{.Claims.given_name}} {{.Claims.family_name}}"},
+			},
+			claims: map[string]interface{}{
+				"email":       "user@example.com",
+				"sub":         "user123",
+				"given_name":  "John",
+				"family_name": "Doe",
+			},
+			expectedHeaders: map[string]string{
+				"X-User-Email": "user@example.com",
+				"X-User-ID":    "user123",
+				"X-User-Name":  "John Doe",
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Authorization Header with Bearer Token",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "Authorization", Value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"},
+			},
+			expectedHeaders: map[string]string{
+				// We'll update this dynamically after generating the token
+				"Authorization": "",
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Missing Claim",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.role}}"},
+			},
+			claims: map[string]interface{}{
+				"email": "user@example.com",
+				// role claim is missing
+			},
+			expectedHeaders: map[string]string{
+				"X-User-Role": "<no value>", // Go templates provide <no value> for missing fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Conditional Header",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Admin", Value: "{{if .Claims.is_admin}}true{{else}}false{{end}}"},
+			},
+			claims: map[string]interface{}{
+				"email":    "admin@example.com",
+				"is_admin": true,
+			},
+			expectedHeaders: map[string]string{
+				"X-User-Admin": "true",
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Combined Token and Claim",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Auth-Info", Value: "User={{.Claims.email}}, Token={{.AccessToken}}"},
+			},
+			claims: map[string]interface{}{
+				"email": "user@example.com",
+			},
+			expectedHeaders: map[string]string{
+				// We'll update this dynamically after generating the token
+				"X-Auth-Info": "",
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Create token with the test claims
+			token := ts.token
+			if len(tc.claims) > 0 {
+				var err error
+				claims := map[string]interface{}{
+					"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
+					"aud":   "test-client-id",
+					"exp":   float64(3000000000), // Far future timestamp
+					"iat":   float64(1000000000),
+					"nbf":   float64(1000000000),
+					"sub":   "test-subject",
+					"nonce": "test-nonce",
+					"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
+				}
+
+				// Add the test-specific claims
+				for k, v := range tc.claims {
+					claims[k] = v
+				}
+
+				token, err = createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", claims)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("Failed to create test JWT: %v", err)
+				}
+			}
+
+			// Update expectedHeaders for the token-based tests after token generation
+			if tc.name == "Authorization Header with Bearer Token" {
+				tc.expectedHeaders["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
+			}
+
+			if tc.name == "Combined Token and Claim" {
+				tc.expectedHeaders["X-Auth-Info"] = "User=user@example.com, Token=" + token
+			}
+
+			// Store intercepted headers for verification
+			interceptedHeaders := make(map[string]string)
+
+			// Create a test next handler that captures the headers
+			nextHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+				// Capture headers for verification
+				for name := range tc.expectedHeaders {
+					if value := r.Header.Get(name); value != "" {
+						interceptedHeaders[name] = value
+					}
+				}
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			})
+
+			// Instead of using New(), we'll directly create a TraefikOidc instance
+			// similar to how it's done in TestSuite.Setup()
+			tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
+				next:               nextHandler,
+				name:               "test",
+				redirURLPath:       "/callback",
+				logoutURLPath:      "/callback/logout",
+				issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
+				clientID:           "test-client-id",
+				clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
+				jwkCache:           ts.mockJWKCache,
+				jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
+				tokenBlacklist:     NewCache(),
+				tokenCache:         NewTokenCache(),
+				limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
+				logger:             NewLogger("debug"),
+				allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
+				excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
+				httpClient:         &http.Client{},
+				initComplete:       make(chan struct{}),
+				sessionManager:     ts.sessionManager,
+				extractClaimsFunc:  extractClaims,
+				headerTemplates:    make(map[string]*template.Template),
+			}
+
+			// Initialize and parse header templates
+			for _, header := range tc.headers {
+				tmpl, err := template.New(header.Name).Parse(header.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("Failed to parse header template for %s: %v", header.Name, err)
+				}
+				tOidc.headerTemplates[header.Name] = tmpl
+			}
+
+			// Close the initComplete channel to bypass the waiting
+			close(tOidc.initComplete)
+
+			// Create a test request
+			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")
+			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+			// Create a session
+			session, err := tOidc.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Setup the session with authentication data
+			session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+			session.SetEmail("user@example.com")
+			session.SetAccessToken(token)
+			session.SetRefreshToken("test-refresh-token")
+
+			if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Add session cookies to the request
+			for _, cookie := range rr.Result().Cookies() {
+				req.AddCookie(cookie)
+			}
+
+			// Reset the response recorder for the main test
+			rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+			// Process the request
+			tOidc.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+			// Check status code
+			if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Errorf("Expected status code %d, got %d", http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+			}
+
+			// Verify headers were set correctly
+			for name, expectedValue := range tc.expectedHeaders {
+				if value, exists := interceptedHeaders[name]; !exists {
+					t.Errorf("Expected header %s was not set", name)
+				} else if value != expectedValue {
+					t.Errorf("Header %s expected value %q, got %q", name, expectedValue, value)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEdgeCaseTemplatedHeaders tests edge cases for templated headers
+func TestEdgeCaseTemplatedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create a TestSuite to use its helper methods and fields
+	ts := &TestSuite{t: t}
+	ts.Setup()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name               string
+		headers            []TemplatedHeader
+		claims             map[string]interface{}
+		shouldExecuteCheck bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "Very Large Template",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{
+					Name:  "X-Large-Header",
+					Value: createLargeTemplate(500), // Template with 500 variable references
+				},
+			},
+			claims:             createLargeClaims(500), // Map with 500 claims
+			shouldExecuteCheck: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Array Claim Access",
+			headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Roles", Value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"},
+			},
+			claims: map[string]interface{}{
+				"roles": []interface{}{"admin", "user", "manager"},
+			},
+			shouldExecuteCheck: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Create token with the test claims
+			claims := map[string]interface{}{
+				"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
+				"aud":   "test-client-id",
+				"exp":   float64(3000000000), // Far future timestamp
+				"iat":   float64(1000000000),
+				"nbf":   float64(1000000000),
+				"sub":   "test-subject",
+				"nonce": "test-nonce",
+				"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
+			}
+
+			// Add the test-specific claims
+			for k, v := range tc.claims {
+				claims[k] = v
+			}
+
+			token, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", claims)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to create test JWT: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Create a test next handler
+			nextHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			})
+
+			// Instead of using New(), we'll directly create a TraefikOidc instance
+			// similar to how it's done in TestSuite.Setup()
+			tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
+				next:               nextHandler,
+				name:               "test",
+				redirURLPath:       "/callback",
+				logoutURLPath:      "/callback/logout",
+				issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
+				clientID:           "test-client-id",
+				clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
+				jwkCache:           ts.mockJWKCache,
+				jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
+				tokenBlacklist:     NewCache(),
+				tokenCache:         NewTokenCache(),
+				limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
+				logger:             NewLogger("debug"),
+				allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
+				excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
+				httpClient:         &http.Client{},
+				initComplete:       make(chan struct{}),
+				sessionManager:     ts.sessionManager,
+				extractClaimsFunc:  extractClaims,
+				headerTemplates:    make(map[string]*template.Template),
+			}
+
+			// Initialize and parse header templates
+			for _, header := range tc.headers {
+				tmpl, err := template.New(header.Name).Parse(header.Value)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("Failed to parse header template for %s: %v", header.Name, err)
+				}
+				tOidc.headerTemplates[header.Name] = tmpl
+			}
+
+			// Close the initComplete channel to bypass the waiting
+			close(tOidc.initComplete)
+
+			// Create a test request
+			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")
+			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+			// Create a session
+			session, err := tOidc.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Setup the session with authentication data
+			session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+			session.SetEmail("user@example.com")
+			session.SetAccessToken(token)
+			session.SetRefreshToken("test-refresh-token")
+
+			if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Add session cookies to the request
+			for _, cookie := range rr.Result().Cookies() {
+				req.AddCookie(cookie)
+			}
+
+			// Reset the response recorder for the main test
+			rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+			// Process the request
+			tOidc.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+			// Check status code
+			if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Errorf("Expected status code %d, got %d", http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+			}
+
+			// We are primarily checking that these edge cases don't cause panics or errors
+			// For the array test, we can verify the content
+			if tc.name == "Array Claim Access" {
+				// Check if the header was set
+				headerValue := req.Header.Get("X-Roles")
+				expectedValue := "admin,user,manager"
+				if headerValue != expectedValue {
+					t.Errorf("Expected X-Roles header to be %q, got %q", expectedValue, headerValue)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// Helper functions for edge case tests
+
+// createLargeTemplate creates a template with many variable references
+func createLargeTemplate(size int) string {
+	template := "{{with .Claims}}"
+	for i := 0; i < size; i++ {
+		if i > 0 {
+			template += ","
+		}
+		template += "{{.field" + string(rune('a'+i%26)) + string(rune('0'+i%10)) + "}}"
+	}
+	template += "{{end}}"
+	return template
+}
+
+// createLargeClaims creates a map with many claims for testing large templates
+func createLargeClaims(size int) map[string]interface{} {
+	claims := make(map[string]interface{})
+	for i := 0; i < size; i++ {
+		key := "field" + string(rune('a'+i%26)) + string(rune('0'+i%10))
+		claims[key] = "value" + string(rune('a'+i%26)) + string(rune('0'+i%10))
+	}
+	return claims
+}