Files
traefik-llmgateway/llmgateway.go
T
lukaszraczylo 4b849fd6c7 fix: force include_usage, auth event logging, credential-strip coverage
C1 (quota bypass): a client sending stream_options.include_usage=false
suppressed upstream usage reporting and escaped every token/cost budget,
since the non-streaming T12 estimate never covers a streaming response.
chatCompletion (provider_openai.go) now always forces include_usage=true
on the outgoing request, merged into a copy of the client's own
stream_options map so the caller's map is never mutated in place.
clientAskedUsage is derived from the client's own value via isTruthy, so
the usage-only chunk is still suppressed for a client that never asked
for it.

I1 (vacuous security tests): the X-Api-Key credential-strip set had zero
effective coverage — existing tests either never sent x-api-key, or
targeted anthropic, whose injectAuth overwrites x-api-key regardless of
whether the strip ran. Added one openai-passthrough and one MCP-proxy
test that authenticate via x-api-key itself and assert it arrives empty
upstream. Mutation-checked: both fail when "X-Api-Key": true is removed
from gatewayCredentialHeaders (verified, then restored).

I3 (auth-event logging): added Gateway.logAuthEvent (logger.go), called
at all six authStore.identify call sites (llmgateway.go's ServeHTTP,
routes_unified.go's handleModels). A failed attempt logs method, path,
and remote address; a success logs the resolved user's name and route.
Neither line ever includes the presented API key.

M2 (usage.estimated): runUnified now reads result.estimated and logs the
estimate explicitly when a non-streaming response's usage falls back to
the body-size heuristic, making the field genuinely read — removes the
stale //nolint:unused on limits.go's usage struct.

M8 (gosec consistency): secrets.go's file: secret path read now carries
the same "#nosec G304 -- operator-supplied file path from middleware
config" annotation as users_file.go's equivalent read.

Doc nit: mcp_a2a.go's validateTargetURLs comment now also names the
dot-only ("."/"..") rule validateConfigName enforces, not just character
set and reserved names.

Gates: go test ./... -count=1 (-race) green, gofmt -l . empty, go vet
clean, make yaegi-check OK, golangci-lint (gosec+staticcheck+unused+
errcheck+govet, global config) 0 issues.
2026-08-20 14:59:21 +01:00

336 lines
11 KiB
Go

// Package traefikllmgateway implements a Traefik Yaegi middleware plugin: a
// multi-provider LLM gateway with groups, per-user API keys, request/token/
// cost limits, and an MCP/A2A registry and proxy.
package traefikllmgateway
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
)
// Config is the plugin's dynamic configuration, populated by Traefik from
// the middleware's YAML/testData. Every limit or list field follows the
// convention: zero/empty/omitted means unlimited/all.
type Config struct {
Providers map[string]*ProviderConfig `json:"providers,omitempty"`
Groups map[string]*GroupConfig `json:"groups,omitempty"`
Pricing map[string]*ModelPricing `json:"pricing,omitempty"`
MCPServers map[string]*TargetConfig `json:"mcpServers,omitempty"`
Agents map[string]*AgentConfig `json:"agents,omitempty"`
Users *UsersConfig `json:"users,omitempty"`
Redis *RedisConfig `json:"redis,omitempty"`
PassthroughUnknown bool `json:"passthroughUnknown,omitempty"`
}
// ProviderConfig describes one upstream LLM provider.
type ProviderConfig struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
BaseURL string `json:"baseUrl,omitempty"`
APIKey string `json:"apiKey"`
DiscoveryInterval string `json:"discoveryInterval,omitempty"`
Models []string `json:"models,omitempty"`
Discovery bool `json:"discovery,omitempty"`
}
// GroupConfig describes a group's access and limits. Empty/omitted
// Providers, Models, MCPServers, Agents mean all are allowed.
type GroupConfig struct {
Limits *LimitsConfig `json:"limits,omitempty"`
Providers []string `json:"providers,omitempty"`
Models []string `json:"models,omitempty"`
MCPServers []string `json:"mcpServers,omitempty"`
Agents []string `json:"agents,omitempty"`
}
// LimitsConfig holds request/token/cost limits. Zero means unlimited.
type LimitsConfig struct {
RequestsPerMinute int64 `json:"requestsPerMinute,omitempty"`
RequestsPerDay int64 `json:"requestsPerDay,omitempty"`
TokensPerDay int64 `json:"tokensPerDay,omitempty"`
TokensPerMonth int64 `json:"tokensPerMonth,omitempty"`
CostPerDayUSD float64 `json:"costPerDayUSD,omitempty"`
CostPerMonthUSD float64 `json:"costPerMonthUSD,omitempty"`
}
// UsersConfig combines inline users with an optional file-backed source.
type UsersConfig struct {
File string `json:"file,omitempty"`
Inline []*UserConfig `json:"inline,omitempty"`
}
// UserConfig describes one API-key holder.
type UserConfig struct {
Limits *LimitsConfig `json:"limits,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Group string `json:"group"`
APIKey string `json:"apiKey"`
}
// RedisConfig configures the distributed limit-state backend.
type RedisConfig struct {
FailOpen *bool `json:"failOpen,omitempty"`
Address string `json:"address"`
Password string `json:"password,omitempty"`
DB int `json:"db,omitempty"`
}
// ModelPricing overrides the built-in per-model price table.
type ModelPricing struct {
InputPerM float64 `json:"inputPerM"`
OutputPerM float64 `json:"outputPerM"`
}
// TargetConfig is a proxied upstream target (MCP server).
type TargetConfig struct {
URL string `json:"url"`
}
// AgentConfig is a proxied A2A agent.
type AgentConfig struct {
URL string `json:"url"`
Card string `json:"card,omitempty"`
}
// CreateConfig returns a Config populated with the plugin's defaults.
func CreateConfig() *Config {
return &Config{}
}
// Gateway is the Traefik middleware handler.
type Gateway struct {
next http.Handler
cfg *Config
auth *authStore
limiter *limiter
registry *modelRegistry
adapters map[string]providerAdapter
// targetClient is the shared, connection-pooled *http.Client the
// MCP/A2A target proxy (mcp_a2a.go) issues every upstream request
// through — built once via newAdapterHTTPClient, the same constructor
// each provider adapter uses for its own client.
targetClient *http.Client
name string
}
// New creates the middleware. NOTE: no tail call — Yaegi zeroes
// multi-value tail-call returns across the reflect boundary.
func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (http.Handler, error) {
g, err := newGateway(ctx, next, config, name)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return g, nil
}
func newGateway(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (*Gateway, error) {
if config == nil || len(config.Providers) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("llmgateway: at least one provider must be configured")
}
if err := validateTargetURLs(config); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
auth, err := newAuthStore(config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
g := &Gateway{next: next, name: name, cfg: config, auth: auth}
if config.Users != nil && config.Users.File != "" {
if err = attachUsersFile(auth, config.Users.File, g); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
lim, err := newConfiguredLimiter(config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
lim.logf = g.errorf
g.limiter = lim
adapters, err := buildAdapters(config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
g.adapters = adapters
g.targetClient = newAdapterHTTPClient()
registry, err := newModelRegistry(adapters, config, g.errorf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ctx is passed through unwrapped, not re-bounded to warmFillTimeout here:
// warmFill already gives each discovery-enabled provider its own fresh
// warmFillTimeout budget per provider (registry.go). Wrapping ctx to a
// single shared warmFillTimeout here would make that per-provider budget
// a lie — provider 2..N would inherit whatever is left of the first
// provider's deadline instead of a full one. Construction's worst case is
// therefore N * warmFillTimeout (N = discovery-enabled providers), which
// is accepted.
registry.warmFill(ctx)
g.registry = registry
setPricingWarnFn(func(msg string) {
if msg == warnCapMessage {
g.logf("%s", msg)
return
}
g.logf("pricing: no price configured for model %q; cost will be recorded as 0", msg)
})
return g, nil
}
// newConfiguredLimiter builds the limiter for config, wiring config.Redis
// when set. A configured Redis block wires a respClient-backed redisStore
// behind AUTH/SELECT and resolveSecret'd credentials; otherwise the
// limiter runs on its in-process fallback alone. failOpen defaults to
// true (a Redis outage must not take the whole gateway down unless an
// operator opts into strict enforcement) unless RedisConfig.FailOpen is
// explicitly set.
func newConfiguredLimiter(config *Config) (*limiter, error) {
if config.Redis == nil {
return newLimiter(nil, true), nil
}
if config.Redis.Address == "" {
return nil, errors.New("llmgateway: redis: address must not be empty")
}
if config.Redis.DB < 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: redis: db must not be negative, got %d", config.Redis.DB)
}
password, err := resolveSecret(config.Redis.Password)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: redis: %w", err)
}
failOpen := true
if config.Redis.FailOpen != nil {
failOpen = *config.Redis.FailOpen
}
client := newRESPClient(config.Redis.Address, password, config.Redis.DB)
return newLimiter(newRedisStore(client), failOpen), nil
}
// attachUsersFile performs the synchronous initial load of a Users.File path
// and wires auth up for throttled hot reload. A failing initial load is a
// constructor error — fail fast on bad config rather than start with an
// empty file-sourced user set.
func attachUsersFile(auth *authStore, path string, log gatewayLogger) error {
// Stat before load, matching maybeReload's ordering: capturing the mtime
// before reading content means a write landing between the stat and the
// read still shows up as a further mtime change on the first post-
// startup reload check, instead of being silently lost forever — a
// stat-after-load can observe a newer mtime for content it never read.
//
// statErr is intentionally ignored here: if the stat fails, lastModTime
// stays at its zero value, so the first maybeReload call sees any real
// mtime as "changed" and reloads once more — a harmless extra reload of
// content already loaded, not a correctness problem.
info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
uf := newUsersFile(path)
initial, err := uf.load()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: cannot load initial users file %q: %w", path, err)
}
if err := auth.replaceFileUsers(initial); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: initial users file %q: %w", path, err)
}
auth.usersFile = uf
auth.log = log
if statErr == nil {
auth.lastModTime = info.ModTime()
}
auth.lastCheck = auth.nowFn()
return nil
}
// ServeHTTP is the internal router. It grows in later tasks.
func (g *Gateway) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sw := &statusTrackingWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
defer recoverPanic(sw, g)
g.auth.maybeReload()
g.registry.maybeRefresh(r.Context())
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == "/v1/models" {
g.handleModels(sw, r)
return
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPost && (r.URL.Path == "/v1/chat/completions" || r.URL.Path == "/v1/embeddings") {
u, grp, ok := g.auth.identify(r)
g.logAuthEvent(ok, authEventUserName(u), r)
if !ok {
writeOAIError(sw, http.StatusUnauthorized, "authentication_error", "invalid or missing API key")
return
}
if r.URL.Path == "/v1/chat/completions" {
g.handleChat(sw, r, u, grp)
} else {
g.handleEmbeddings(sw, r, u, grp)
}
return
}
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && (r.URL.Path == "/v1/mcp/servers" || r.URL.Path == "/v1/agents") {
u, grp, ok := g.auth.identify(r)
g.logAuthEvent(ok, authEventUserName(u), r)
if !ok {
writeOAIError(sw, http.StatusUnauthorized, "authentication_error", "invalid or missing API key")
return
}
if r.URL.Path == "/v1/mcp/servers" {
g.handleMCPServers(sw, grp)
} else {
g.handleAgents(sw, grp)
}
return
}
if name, rest, ok := targetRoute(r.URL.EscapedPath(), targetKindMCP); ok {
u, grp, authOK := g.auth.identify(r)
g.logAuthEvent(authOK, authEventUserName(u), r)
if !authOK {
writeOAIError(sw, http.StatusUnauthorized, "authentication_error", "invalid or missing API key")
return
}
g.handleTargetProxy(sw, r, u, grp, targetKindMCP, name, rest)
return
}
if name, rest, ok := targetRoute(r.URL.EscapedPath(), targetKindAgent); ok {
u, grp, authOK := g.auth.identify(r)
g.logAuthEvent(authOK, authEventUserName(u), r)
if !authOK {
writeOAIError(sw, http.StatusUnauthorized, "authentication_error", "invalid or missing API key")
return
}
g.handleTargetProxy(sw, r, u, grp, targetKindAgent, name, rest)
return
}
if providerName, rest, ok := passthroughRoute(r.URL.EscapedPath()); ok {
if _, known := g.adapters[providerName]; known {
u, grp, ok := g.auth.identify(r)
g.logAuthEvent(ok, authEventUserName(u), r)
if !ok {
writeOAIError(sw, http.StatusUnauthorized, "authentication_error", "invalid or missing API key")
return
}
g.handlePassthrough(sw, r, u, grp, providerName, rest)
return
}
}
if g.cfg.PassthroughUnknown {
g.next.ServeHTTP(sw, r)
return
}
writeOAIError(sw, http.StatusNotFound, "invalid_request_error", "unknown route")
}