logAuthEvent (logger.go) formatted r.URL.Path with %s in both the failure and success log lines. An unauthenticated client controls that path and can embed a raw newline (%0A) in it, letting a single request forge additional, attacker-chosen log lines. Switched both to %q, which escapes control characters (newlines included) while still rendering the path as a quoted string. No test changes needed: both existing tests (llmgateway_test.go) assert via strings.Contains on the bare path substring, which %q's quoted output still contains. Gates: go test ./... -count=1 green, gofmt -l . empty, go vet clean.
traefik-llmgateway
A Traefik middleware plugin that turns a Traefik instance into a multi-provider LLM gateway: one endpoint, several upstream providers, per-user API keys organised into groups, request/token/cost limits, and a registry plus authenticated proxy for in-cluster MCP servers and A2A agents.
The plugin is self-contained. It has no sidecar and no companion service.
It runs as a Yaegi-interpreted Go
module, the same way traefikoidc
does, configured per-middleware in Traefik's dynamic configuration.
Status: feature-complete, all gates green (unit tests, -race,
yaegi-check, integration). Not yet published to the Traefik Plugin
Catalog — see Development for what that needs.
What it is
- A unified, OpenAI-compatible surface (
/v1/chat/completions,/v1/embeddings,/v1/models) that translates requests and responses to and from Anthropic's and Google Gemini's own wire formats, so any OpenAI-SDK-compatible client can talk to all three providers through one API shape. - Native passthrough per provider (
/{provider}/...) for callers that want a provider's own wire format untouched, with the gateway injecting that provider's own API key and still enforcing auth and limits. - Per-user API keys, organised into groups that control which providers, models, MCP servers, and agents a user can reach, plus request/token/cost limits enforced per user and per group.
- A registry and authenticated reverse proxy for MCP servers and A2A agents, so those can sit behind the same gateway, the same auth, and the same group-based visibility rules as the LLM traffic.
flowchart LR
Req["incoming request"] --> Route{"route<br/>ServeHTTP: path+method dispatch"}
Route -->|"a recognized route:<br/>/v1/models, /v1/chat/completions,<br/>/v1/embeddings, /v1/mcp/servers,<br/>/v1/agents, /mcp/name/...,<br/>/a2a/name/..., or /providerName/...<br/>for a known provider"| Auth["auth (per branch)<br/>identify(): key digest lookup"]
Route -->|"no route matches"| Fallback["passthroughUnknown ? next : 404<br/>never calls identify()"]
Auth -->|"no match"| E401["401 authentication_error"]
Auth -->|"user, group"| Branch{"branch"}
Branch --> Models["GET /v1/models"]
Branch --> Unified["POST /v1/chat/completions<br/>POST /v1/embeddings"]
Branch --> Registry["GET /v1/mcp/servers, /v1/agents"]
Branch --> MCP["MCP/A2A proxy"]
Branch --> Passthrough["native passthrough"]
Unified --> Resolve["resolve model<br/>registry.resolve"]
Resolve -->|"unknown/denied"| E404["404 / 403"]
Resolve --> Limit1["limiter.checkAndCount"]
MCP --> Limit2["limiter.checkAndCount"]
Passthrough --> Limit3["limiter.checkAndCount"]
Limit1 -->|"over budget"| E429["429 / 503"]
Limit2 -->|"over budget"| E429
Limit3 -->|"over budget"| E429
Limit1 --> Exec["execute: translate + call adapter"]
Limit2 --> ExecProxy["execute: reverse proxy"]
Limit3 --> ExecProxy
Exec --> Account["account: usage, cost"]
Account --> Resp["respond to client"]
ExecProxy --> Resp
Models --> Resp
Registry --> Resp
Every route the plugin recognises is handled entirely inside the
middleware — next (the router's configured backing service) is only
reached when a request matches none of the plugin's routes and
passthroughUnknown is true.
Quickstart
Static configuration
The plugin is not yet in the Traefik Plugin Catalog (see
Development), so the catalog form of static configuration
(experimental.plugins.llmgateway) is not usable yet. Until then, load it
as a localPlugin,
mounting this repository's source into the Traefik container at
<plugins-local dir>/src/github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway — see
examples/docker-compose.yml for a
working, tested setup that does exactly this:
# traefik static config (traefik.yml / --experimental.localPlugins.*)
experimental:
localPlugins:
llmgateway:
moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway
Once the plugin is published, the catalog form replaces this:
experimental:
plugins:
llmgateway:
moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway
version: "v0.1.0" # substitute the tag you actually deploy
Dynamic configuration
A minimal single-provider middleware, one group, one user:
http:
middlewares:
llmgateway:
plugin:
llmgateway:
providers:
openai:
type: openai
apiKey: "env:OPENAI_API_KEY"
models: ["gpt-5-mini", "gpt-4o"]
groups:
default:
providers: [] # empty = every configured provider is allowed
users:
inline:
- name: alice
group: default
apiKey: "env:LLMGW_KEY_ALICE"
Write an "allow everything" group as
providers: [](an explicit empty list), not a bare{}. See the note at the top ofexamples/kubernetes.yaml— confirmed against Traefik's file provider, twice, with this exact plugin build: a baredefault: {}fails plugin construction withexpected a map, got 'string';default: {providers: []}loads cleanly. Not tested against the Docker/ECS label providers or the Kubernetes CRD provider — no claim either way for those. An explicit empty list means the same thing as an empty object (all values allowed), so writing it this way costs nothing even where the bug does not apply.
Attach the middleware to a router the same way as any other Traefik
middleware. The router's backing service is never actually reached unless
passthroughUnknown: true and the request matches none of the plugin's
routes — a small dummy service (traefik/whoami, or any always-up
internal service) is enough.
Call it:
curl http://llm.example.com/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $LLMGW_KEY_ALICE" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"gpt-5-mini","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
Full configuration reference
Every limit or visibility list follows one convention throughout: empty
or omitted means unlimited / all. Field names below are the exact JSON
keys the plugin's Go structs expect (llmgateway.go); Traefik's dynamic
config accepts them as YAML, which decodes to the same JSON shape.
Config (top level)
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
providers |
map[string]ProviderConfig |
— | Required, at least one entry, or the plugin refuses to construct. |
groups |
map[string]GroupConfig |
{} |
Optional. A user references one group by name; an unknown reference is a construction error. |
pricing |
map[string]ModelPricing |
{} |
Per-model USD/1M-token overrides, keyed by model id (bare or provider/model). Merged over, not replacing, the built-in table (pricing.go). |
mcpServers |
map[string]TargetConfig |
{} |
MCP server registry; see MCP/A2A. |
agents |
map[string]AgentConfig |
{} |
A2A agent registry; see MCP/A2A. |
users |
UsersConfig |
— | Inline and/or file-backed API-key holders. With none configured, every request is unauthenticated and gets 401. |
redis |
RedisConfig |
— | Distributed limit-counter backend. Omitted means in-process counters only (per-replica, approximate across multiple Traefik instances). |
passthroughUnknown |
bool |
false |
false: a request matching none of the plugin's routes gets a 404 JSON envelope. true: it falls through to the router's own backing service. |
Provider, mcpServers, and agents map keys (names) must match
^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$ and must not be v1, mcp, or a2a — those names are
reserved because they would shadow the gateway's own fixed routes
(/v1/..., /mcp/{name}/..., /a2a/{name}/...); a name that collides is
a construction error, not a silently-unreachable provider. A nil map
value under any of providers, groups, mcpServers, or agents is
also a construction error, never a panic (providers.go, mcp_a2a.go,
auth.go).
ProviderConfig
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
type |
string |
— | Required: openai, anthropic, or gemini. openai also serves any OpenAI-wire-compatible provider (Grok, DeepSeek, a local vLLM/Ollama gateway, ...) via baseUrl. |
baseUrl |
string |
Per type: https://api.openai.com, https://api.anthropic.com, https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com |
Trailing slash trimmed. |
apiKey |
string |
— | Secret form: literal, env:VAR, or file:/path — see Secret forms. An openai-type provider resolving to an empty key is a valid keyless upstream (no Authorization header sent) — useful for a local model server with no auth. anthropic and gemini reject an empty resolved key at construction. |
discoveryInterval |
string (Go duration) |
1h |
Only meaningful when discovery: true. Invalid duration string is a construction error. |
models |
[]string |
[] |
Explicit model ids this provider serves. Combined with any discovered ids. |
discovery |
bool |
false |
Pull the provider's own model-listing endpoint at startup and on discoveryInterval. A discovery failure is logged and non-fatal; construction still succeeds on models alone. |
GroupConfig
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
limits |
*LimitsConfig |
nil (unlimited) |
|
providers |
[]string |
[] (all) |
Glob-matched (path.Match) against a provider's configured name. |
models |
[]string |
[] (all) |
Glob-matched, exactly as given — no automatic provider/ prefix stripping. Both the bare and provider-prefixed forms of a model id are checked, so a pattern like gpt-* matches a client request for either gpt-5-mini or openai/gpt-5-mini. |
mcpServers |
[]string |
[] (all) |
Glob-matched against a configured MCP server name. |
agents |
[]string |
[] (all) |
Glob-matched against a configured agent name. |
LimitsConfig
All six fields default to 0 (unlimited). A negative count, or a cost
that is negative, NaN, or ±Inf, is a construction error.
| Field | Type | Window |
|---|---|---|
requestsPerMinute |
int64 |
Fixed 1-minute window, UTC. |
requestsPerDay |
int64 |
Fixed calendar-day window, UTC midnight to midnight. |
tokensPerDay |
int64 |
Fixed calendar-day window, UTC. |
tokensPerMonth |
int64 |
Fixed calendar-month window, UTC. |
costPerDayUSD |
float64 |
Fixed calendar-day window, UTC. |
costPerMonthUSD |
float64 |
Fixed calendar-month window, UTC. |
A user's own limits, when set, are checked in addition to their
group's limits, not instead of them — a request is refused the moment it
breaches whichever of the two is tighter. A user with no limits of their
own is governed purely by their group's — see
UserConfig.
UsersConfig
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
file |
string |
— | Path to a JSON users file, merged over inline and hot-reloaded — see Users file. |
inline |
[]UserConfig |
[] |
Resolved once at plugin construction. |
UserConfig
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
name |
string |
— | Required. |
group |
string |
— | Required; must reference a configured group, or construction fails. |
apiKey |
string |
— | Secret form (see Secret forms); must resolve non-empty and unique across every inline and file-sourced user. |
limits |
*LimitsConfig |
nil (governed by group's limits alone) |
When set, enforced alongside — not instead of — the group's own limits; both scopes are checked, and the request is refused by whichever is breached first. |
RedisConfig
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
address |
string |
— | Required when the redis block is present at all. host:port, RESP protocol — works against Redis, Valkey, or Dragonfly. |
password |
string |
"" (no AUTH) |
Secret form. |
db |
int |
0 |
Must be ≥ 0. Sent via SELECT on every new connection. |
failOpen |
*bool |
true |
true: a Redis error switches that operation to the in-process fallback store and logs (rate-limited to once per 30s). false: a Redis error returns 503 instead of enforcing against a non-shared fallback. |
ModelPricing
| Field | Type | Semantics |
|---|---|---|
inputPerM |
float64 |
USD per 1,000,000 input/prompt tokens. |
outputPerM |
float64 |
USD per 1,000,000 output/completion tokens. |
TargetConfig (an mcpServers entry)
| Field | Type | Semantics |
|---|---|---|
url |
string |
Required; must parse with an http or https scheme, checked at construction. |
AgentConfig (an agents entry)
| Field | Type | Default | Semantics |
|---|---|---|---|
url |
string |
— | Required; same URL validation as TargetConfig. |
card |
string |
/.well-known/agent-card.json |
Path appended to the agent's gateway-relative proxy URL for its A2A agent-card listing. |
Secret forms
Every apiKey/password field accepts one of three forms
(secrets.go):
- Literal — the value itself, used as-is. Fine for local/dev; avoid for anything real.
env:VAR— read from environment variableVARon the Traefik process. Errors if unset or empty.file:/path— read from a file, trimmed of surrounding whitespace. Errors if unreadable or the trimmed content is empty.
Provider keys, Redis's password, and inline users' keys are resolved
once, at plugin construction. A file-sourced user's apiKey is
re-resolved on every hot reload (see below), so it can use env:/file:
forms too and pick up a rotated value without a Traefik restart.
Users file format
One JSON object, one users array, mounted from a single Kubernetes
Secret (users_file.go):
{
"users": [
{"name": "alice", "group": "engineering", "apiKey": "sk-llmgw-..."},
{"name": "bob", "group": "general", "apiKey": "env:LLMGW_KEY_BOB", "limits": {"requestsPerDay": 100}}
]
}
A file user with the same name as an inline user overrides it (the
inline entry is dropped from the merged set). Hot reload polls the file's
mtime, throttled to once per 5 seconds on the request path, and is
best-effort: a reload already in progress is skipped rather than
serialising every concurrent request behind it, so a change lands within a
few request-driven checks, not necessarily on the very next one. A
reload's own error (unreadable file, malformed JSON, a user referencing an
unknown group, a duplicate key) is logged and the last good user set is
kept — a bad edit to the file never breaks already-authenticated traffic.
Model routing
- A model id in
provider/modelform resolves directly against that provider, but only when the part before the slash names an actually configured provider. Any other id — including one that merely contains a slash, such as an upstream's ownuni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731naming — is treated as a single bare id. - A bare id resolves against the first configured provider, in sorted
provider-name order, whose known model set (explicit
modelsplus any discovered ids) contains it. When more than one provider knows the same bare id, the sorted-first provider wins it and the gateway logs a collision warning once per id; every provider's copy stays reachable through the explicitprovider/modelform regardless of who won the bare id, andGET /v1/modelslists both the bare (winner's) form and everyprovider/modelform. - Authorization always requires both
group.allowsModelandgroup.allowsProviderfor the resolved provider — a model that exists but the caller's group cannot reach returns 403, distinct from a model no configured provider knows at all (404). - Discovery:
GET {baseUrl}/v1/modelsfor anopenai-type provider,GET {baseUrl}/v1/modelsforanthropic,GET {baseUrl}/v1beta/modelsforgemini. Runs once at plugin construction (bounded to 5s per provider) and again ondiscoveryIntervalin the background. A failed refresh is logged and keeps the provider's last-known discovered set — stale-while-error, never an empty list just because one refresh attempt failed.
Limits and accounting
- Counters use fixed windows, keyed by UTC calendar boundaries (the minute, the day, the month) — not a sliding window. Requests-per-minute and requests-per-day counters increment before evaluation, so every request counts toward its scopes' rate tracking even if it is ultimately refused by a different scope's limit.
- Token and cost budgets are checked against the value already accumulated from prior requests, before this request's own usage is known (usage only arrives after the upstream call completes). A request that would start already over budget is refused; a request that starts under budget but pushes the scope over it is still allowed to complete — an accepted at-most-one-request overshoot, not an exactly-enforced cap.
- Accounting parses usage from the provider's own response: OpenAI-type
usage, Anthropicusage(frommessage_start/message_delta), GeminiusageMetadata. When a non-streaming unified-route response reports no usage at all, the gateway falls back to a rough estimate —ceil(request-body-bytes / 4)counted as prompt tokens, no completion estimate — and marks itestimated. A streaming unified-route response with no usage is logged and the request itself is still counted, but no token estimate is applied. - Cost is
tokens × price, computed in integer micro-USD (1,000,000ths of a dollar) throughout to avoid float drift, from the built-in per-model table (pricing.go) or a configuredpricingoverride. An unpriced model costs 0 and logs a once-per-model warning (capped at 128 distinct unpriced model names per process lifetime, then one summary warning). The built-in table is approximate — list prices as each provider published them, recorded 2026-08, and not kept in sync automatically. Setpricingoverrides for billing-grade accuracy. - Storage:
redisconfigured wires a hand-rolled, stdlib-only RESP2 client (resp.go) — nogo-redis, which is not Yaegi-interpretable — against Redis, Valkey, or Dragonfly. Semantics are deliberately at-least-once, never under-counting: a lost reply after the server already applied anINCRBYcan cause a resend that over-counts by one request's worth on that key. This is a fail-safe trade-off (more restrictive than reality), never a fail-open one. Withoutredisconfigured, or when it errors andfailOpen: true, counters live in an in-process map — correct for one Traefik replica, only approximate across several, since each replica counts independently. Exact limits across multiple Traefik replicas require the shared Redis.
Unified vs. passthrough
Unified (/v1/...) |
Native passthrough (/{provider}/...) |
|
|---|---|---|
| Wire format | Always OpenAI-shaped in, OpenAI-shaped out. | The provider's own native format, untouched. |
| Translation | openai-type: body forwarded verbatim (model id rewritten). anthropic/gemini: full bidirectional translation, including streaming, chunk by chunk. |
None — a raw reverse proxy. |
| Model alias in the response | Translated providers (anthropic, gemini) echo back the client's exact requested model string in the response's model field, even though the upstream call used the resolved provider model id. An openai-type response is a verbatim passthrough of the upstream body, so it carries whatever model id the upstream itself returned — this asymmetry is intentional, not a bug. |
The upstream's own model field, verbatim — there is no alias to echo. |
| Embeddings | openai-type: passthrough. gemini: mapped to :embedContent/:batchEmbedContents. anthropic: 501 — Anthropic's API has no embeddings endpoint. |
Whatever the provider itself supports at that path; the gateway does not gate it. |
| Unsupported parameters | A semantically meaningful field the target provider cannot express (e.g. n > 1, logit_bias, logprobs on Anthropic) is a 400, never silently dropped. |
Not applicable — the request reaches the provider exactly as sent. |
| Non-2xx upstream response | Wrapped in the gateway's own error envelope, with the provider's own body embedded under error.upstream. |
Forwarded to the client exactly as the upstream sent it — status, headers, and body. |
MCP and A2A
- Registry (group-filtered, sorted by name):
GET /v1/mcp/servers→{"servers":[{"name","url"}]};GET /v1/agents→{"agents":[{"name","url","card"}]}. - Proxy:
/mcp/{name}/{rest...}and/a2a/{name}/{rest...}reverse-proxy{rest...}to the configured target'surl, streaming (SSE) preserved via a flush-per-write proxy. The gateway's ownAuthorization/x-api-keycredential is stripped before proxying, and — unlike native provider passthrough — no credential is injected on the way out: an MCP server or A2A agent is treated as an in-cluster target that trusts the gateway's network position, not a per-provider key the gateway holds on the caller's behalf. - Request-rate limits (
requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay) apply to target-proxy calls the same as everywhere else; token/cost metrics do not, since there is no usage to parse from an arbitrary MCP/A2A response. - Group visibility (
mcpServers/agentsglob lists) gates both the registry listing and the proxy path itself — a denied name is a 403 at the proxy, not just hidden from the listing.
Security notes
- API keys are never retained in memory as plaintext after construction —
only their SHA-256 digests. Lookup is by digest, verified with
crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompareagainst the stored digest, so matching does not leak timing information about a near-miss key. - Provider API keys are injected server-side (native passthrough's
injectAuth) and never reach the client; a client's own gateway key is stripped before any upstream or target request and never reaches a provider, MCP server, or A2A agent. - Neither kind of key is ever written to a log line — the logging helpers
(
logger.go) carry an explicit "never log key material" contract.providerHTTPError'sError()string (providers.go) separately omits the upstream response body it still holds as a struct field, so a future caller that ever formats the error bare (%v) cannot accidentally echo provider response content into a log line; today's only caller (writeProviderUpstreamError) reads that body directly and puts it in the client-facing response, never in a log. - Every authentication attempt is logged, through one shared helper
(
logAuthEvent,logger.go) called at each of the six routes that authenticate a request (llmgateway.go'sServeHTTP, androutes_unified.go'shandleModels). A failed attempt logs the request method, path, and remote address, and returns the usual 401 JSON envelope. A successful attempt logs the resolved user's name and the route. Neither line ever includes the presented API key — only the identity it resolved to, never the key material itself.
Known limitations
- Streaming is delivered buffered, not token-by-token, under the current
Traefik + Yaegi combination. The plugin's own code streams correctly
(proven by its unit tests, which drive the exact same code compiled, not
interpreted): content is always complete and correct, but a Yaegi
limitation strips the
http.Flusherinterface from thehttp.ResponseWritercrossing from Traefik's compiled dispatcher into the interpreted plugin, so no per-chunk flush actually reaches the client — the whole response arrives in one batch once the handler returns. This is a confirmed, external, still-open upstream bug (traefik/traefik#10269, labelledkind/bug/confirmedby Traefik's own maintainers; see also traefik/yaegi#1600), not a defect in this plugin, and no code-level workaround is known. The integration suite's true incremental-delivery timing assertion is gated behindINTEGRATION_STREAMING=1and skipped by default for exactly this reason — re-run it once the upstream issue is fixed. - A request rejected before it reaches a provider never consumes
request-rate quota. On the unified routes, a malformed body, a missing
modelfield, or an unknown/denied model (404/403) is rejected beforelimiter.checkAndCountruns. On native passthrough and the MCP/A2A proxy, denied provider/target access (403), an unsupportedUpgraderequest (501), and a path-traversal attempt (400) are all checked before the limiter too. Once a request does reach a provider adapter, though, a translate-time 400 (an unsupported parameter combination) or Anthropic's embeddings 501 still count toward the caller's request-rate limit — the limiter already ran by then — though neither ever bills a token or cost, since usage stays at zero either way. - Gateway-to-client responses on passthrough and MCP/A2A routes are
identity-encoded. The gateway strips a client's own
Accept-Encodingheader before forwarding to the upstream, so Go'shttp.Transportadds its ownAccept-Encoding: gzipand, per its documented contract, transparently decompresses a gzip response and strips itsContent-Encoding/Content-Lengthheaders before handing it back — the client sees plain, uncompressed bytes with noContent-Encodingheader, regardless of what it originally asked for. This covers the gzip case Go'sTransportauto-negotiates; an upstream that used a different encoding on its own initiative (never observed against OpenAI, Anthropic, or Gemini) would pass through unmodified instead.
Kubernetes
See examples/kubernetes.yaml for a complete,
YAML-validated example manifest that kubectl apply -f applies cleanly
once Traefik's CRDs (Middleware, IngressRoute) are installed in the
cluster: a Secret holding the users file, a Middleware custom resource
carrying the plugin's own configuration (validated against the real Config
struct — every field in that example round-trips through New()
cleanly), a dummy backing Deployment/Service (Traefik requires a real
router backend even though this middleware never actually reaches it —
see Quickstart), an IngressRoute wiring it all to a
host, and a Traefik Helm values snippet for loading the plugin and
wiring provider keys in from Secrets via environment variables.
The short version:
- Provider keys and the Redis password live in
env:VARform inside theMiddleware, sourced from KubernetesSecrets mounted as environment variables on the Traefik pod — never as literals in the CR. - The users file lives in its own
Secret, mounted as a volume, referenced byusers.filein theMiddlewarespec. Editing thatSecret(and letting it propagate to the mounted file, or restarting the pod if your cluster's kubelet doesn't syncSecretvolumes fast enough for your needs) updates the live user set within the 5-second reload window — no Traefik restart required. - Point
redis.addressat your cluster's existing Redis/Valkey/Dragonfly rather than standing up a dedicated instance for this plugin — the distributed limiter is a client, not a datastore.
Development
make test # go test ./... -count=1
make lint # gofmt -l . && go vet ./...
make yaegi-check # interprets the plugin with Yaegi, exercises .traefik.yml's testData
make integration # docker-compose: real Traefik, real Redis, mock providers; brings the
# stack up, waits for it, runs the suite, always tears it down after
make integration-keep # same run, but leaves the stack up afterward for debugging —
# tear it down yourself with `make integration-down` when done
Also run before committing (not wired into make lint, since it needs a
separate binary): golangci-lint run ./... and
golangci-lint run --enable=gosec ./... (gosec applies to _test.go
files too), plus fieldalignment ./...
(golang.org/x/tools/go/analysis/passes/fieldalignment).
All are 0-issues on this repository as of this commit.
The plugin ships stdlib-only (no third-party dependencies at all, see
go.mod) — a hard constraint of Yaegi interpretation, not a style
preference. resp.go is the clearest example: a hand-rolled,
~400-line RESP2 client instead of go-redis, which the design doc records
as unsuitable for Yaegi interpretation
(docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-19-traefik-llmgateway-design.md, §7).
Catalog submission
.traefik.yml is in place, with a basePkg override
(traefikllmgateway) required because Traefik's Yaegi middleware loader
otherwise binds the interpreted package under
strings.ReplaceAll(path.Base(import), "-", "_") — traefik_llmgateway
— which does not match this package's actual package traefikllmgateway
declaration. This was discovered running the plugin in real Traefik for
the first time; see the comment in .traefik.yml itself. The Plugin
Catalog's own analyzer (piceus) has not yet been run against this
repository — whether it accepts the same basePkg override the same
way real Traefik does is unverified until actual submission.
License
MIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Lukasz Raczylo.