feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)

Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-29 00:57:56 +01:00
parent 3c8b3eb46c
commit e39d6a0f0d
80 changed files with 6383 additions and 661 deletions
+198 -11
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
// Package ghsa implements a vulnerability scanner backed by the GitHub
// Security Advisory Database.
package ghsa
import (
@@ -6,6 +8,8 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -105,7 +109,7 @@ func (s *Scanner) Health(ctx context.Context) error {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("github advisory database not accessible: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
// Accept any 2xx or 403 (rate limit) as healthy
// Rate limits are expected without a GitHub token and shouldn't fail health checks
@@ -136,9 +140,13 @@ func (s *Scanner) mapRegistryToEcosystem(registry string) string {
// queryAdvisories queries GitHub Advisory Database for a package
func (s *Scanner) queryAdvisories(ctx context.Context, ecosystem, packageName string) ([]GHSAAdvisory, error) {
url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.github.com/advisories?ecosystem=%s&affects=%s&per_page=100", ecosystem, packageName)
endpoint := fmt.Sprintf(
"https://api.github.com/advisories?ecosystem=%s&affects=%s&per_page=100",
url.QueryEscape(ecosystem),
url.QueryEscape(packageName),
)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", endpoint, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
}
@@ -152,7 +160,7 @@ func (s *Scanner) queryAdvisories(ctx context.Context, ecosystem, packageName st
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query advisories: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
@@ -167,15 +175,194 @@ func (s *Scanner) queryAdvisories(ctx context.Context, ecosystem, packageName st
return advisories, nil
}
// filterAffectedAdvisories filters advisories that affect the given version
// filterAffectedAdvisories filters advisories that affect the given version.
// Each advisory may have multiple GHSAVulnerability entries; if any of them
// applies to our installed version (per its vulnerable_version_range), the
// advisory is considered affecting.
//
// Fail-closed: if the version or any range cannot be parsed, the advisory is
// included. We err on the side of reporting a possible vulnerability rather
// than silently dropping it.
func (s *Scanner) filterAffectedAdvisories(advisories []GHSAAdvisory, version string) []GHSAAdvisory {
// Check if this version is affected
// GitHub API already filters by package, but we need to check version ranges
// For now, we'll include all advisories that match the package
// A more sophisticated implementation would parse version ranges
affected := append([]GHSAAdvisory(nil), advisories...)
if version == "" {
// Without a target version, conservatively include everything.
return append([]GHSAAdvisory(nil), advisories...)
}
return affected
out := make([]GHSAAdvisory, 0, len(advisories))
for _, adv := range advisories {
if advisoryAffectsVersion(adv, version) {
out = append(out, adv)
}
}
return out
}
// advisoryAffectsVersion reports whether the given installed version falls
// within any of the advisory's vulnerable version ranges.
func advisoryAffectsVersion(adv GHSAAdvisory, version string) bool {
// If the advisory carries no per-vuln range info, conservatively include.
if len(adv.Vulnerabilities) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, v := range adv.Vulnerabilities {
rangeExpr := strings.TrimSpace(v.VulnerableVersions)
if rangeExpr == "" {
// No range — assume affected.
return true
}
matched, ok := versionInRange(version, rangeExpr)
if !ok {
// Parse error → fail-closed: include.
log.Debug().
Str("ghsa_id", adv.GHSAID).
Str("range", rangeExpr).
Str("version", version).
Msg("Could not parse GHSA vulnerable_version_range, including advisory")
return true
}
if matched {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// versionInRange reports whether version satisfies expr. Returns (matched, ok)
// where ok=false signals a parse error. Supported forms (comma separated AND):
//
// "= X"
// "< X"
// "<= X"
// "> X"
// ">= X"
// ">= X, < Y"
//
// All clauses must be satisfied for the range to match.
func versionInRange(version, expr string) (bool, bool) {
clauses := strings.Split(expr, ",")
for _, c := range clauses {
c = strings.TrimSpace(c)
if c == "" {
continue
}
op, bound, ok := splitOpAndVersion(c)
if !ok {
return false, false
}
cmp, ok := compareVersions(version, bound)
if !ok {
return false, false
}
switch op {
case "=", "==":
if cmp != 0 {
return false, true
}
case "<":
if cmp >= 0 {
return false, true
}
case "<=":
if cmp > 0 {
return false, true
}
case ">":
if cmp <= 0 {
return false, true
}
case ">=":
if cmp < 0 {
return false, true
}
default:
return false, false
}
}
return true, true
}
// splitOpAndVersion parses "<op> <version>" pairs (e.g. ">= 1.2.3").
func splitOpAndVersion(clause string) (op, ver string, ok bool) {
clause = strings.TrimSpace(clause)
// Longer operators first to avoid prefix shadowing.
for _, candidate := range []string{">=", "<=", "==", "=", ">", "<"} {
if strings.HasPrefix(clause, candidate) {
rest := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(clause, candidate))
if rest == "" {
return "", "", false
}
return candidate, rest, true
}
}
return "", "", false
}
// compareVersions compares two dot-separated version strings.
// Returns (cmp, ok). Numeric segments are compared numerically.
// A pre-release suffix (anything after '-' or '+') is treated as lower-priority
// than the same version without one, matching common semver intuition for
// the cases we expect from the GitHub Advisory Database.
func compareVersions(a, b string) (int, bool) {
aBase, aPre := splitPreRelease(a)
bBase, bPre := splitPreRelease(b)
aParts := strings.Split(aBase, ".")
bParts := strings.Split(bBase, ".")
n := len(aParts)
if len(bParts) > n {
n = len(bParts)
}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
var av, bv int
var err error
if i < len(aParts) {
av, err = strconv.Atoi(aParts[i])
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
}
if i < len(bParts) {
bv, err = strconv.Atoi(bParts[i])
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
}
if av != bv {
if av < bv {
return -1, true
}
return 1, true
}
}
// Bases equal; compare pre-release. No pre-release > has pre-release.
switch {
case aPre == "" && bPre == "":
return 0, true
case aPre == "" && bPre != "":
return 1, true
case aPre != "" && bPre == "":
return -1, true
default:
return strings.Compare(aPre, bPre), true
}
}
// splitPreRelease separates "1.2.3-rc1" into ("1.2.3", "rc1"). Build metadata
// after '+' is stripped (per semver).
func splitPreRelease(v string) (base, pre string) {
v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
v = strings.TrimPrefix(v, "v")
if i := strings.Index(v, "+"); i >= 0 {
v = v[:i]
}
if i := strings.Index(v, "-"); i >= 0 {
return v[:i], v[i+1:]
}
return v, ""
}
// emptyResult returns an empty scan result
+160
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
package ghsa
import (
"testing"
)
func TestVersionInRange(t *testing.T) {
// matched: whether the version satisfies the range expression.
// ok: whether the parser/comparator could evaluate the inputs.
cases := []struct {
name string
version string
expr string
matched bool
ok bool
}{
{"single LT match", "1.2.3", "< 2.0.0", true, true},
{"single LT no match", "2.5.0", "< 2.0.0", false, true},
{"single GTE match", "2.5.0", ">= 2.0.0", true, true},
{"single GTE no match", "1.0.0", ">= 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range hit", "1.5.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", true, true},
{"range below", "0.9.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range above", "2.0.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range upper bound exclusive", "2.0.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range lower bound inclusive", "1.0.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", true, true},
{"equality match", "1.2.3", "= 1.2.3", true, true},
{"equality miss", "1.2.4", "= 1.2.3", false, true},
{"with v prefix on bound", "1.2.3", ">= v1.0.0", true, true},
{"shorter version coerces", "1.0", ">= 1.0.0", true, true},
{"pre-release lower than release", "1.0.0-rc1", ">= 1.0.0", false, true},
{"pre-release greater than older", "1.0.0-rc1", ">= 0.9.0", true, true},
{"malformed operator", "1.0.0", "~ 1.0.0", false, false},
{"malformed version", "abc", ">= 1.0.0", false, false},
{"empty bound after op", "1.0.0", ">=", false, false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
matched, ok := versionInRange(tc.version, tc.expr)
if matched != tc.matched || ok != tc.ok {
t.Fatalf("versionInRange(%q, %q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)",
tc.version, tc.expr, matched, ok, tc.matched, tc.ok)
}
})
}
}
func TestAdvisoryAffectsVersion(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
version string
adv GHSAAdvisory
want bool
}{
{
name: "advisory with no vulnerabilities is conservatively included",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{GHSAID: "GHSA-xxxx", Vulnerabilities: nil},
version: "1.0.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "matching range marks advisory as affecting",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-aaaa",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0"},
},
},
version: "1.5.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "non-matching range excludes advisory",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-bbbb",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 2.0.0"},
},
},
version: "1.0.0",
want: false,
},
{
name: "any matching range across multiple vulns is affecting",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-cccc",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: "< 0.5.0"},
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 1.0.0, < 1.2.0"},
},
},
version: "1.1.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "empty range falls back to affecting (fail-closed)",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-dddd",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{{VulnerableVersions: ""}},
},
version: "1.0.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "unparseable range falls back to affecting (fail-closed)",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-eeee",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{{VulnerableVersions: "~> 1.0"}},
},
version: "1.0.0",
want: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := advisoryAffectsVersion(tc.adv, tc.version)
if got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("advisoryAffectsVersion(%q) = %v, want %v",
tc.version, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestFilterAffectedAdvisoriesEmptyVersion(t *testing.T) {
// Without a target version we can't compare ranges, so all advisories
// are conservatively included.
s := &Scanner{}
in := []GHSAAdvisory{
{GHSAID: "A", Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{{VulnerableVersions: ">= 2.0.0"}}},
{GHSAID: "B"},
}
out := s.filterAffectedAdvisories(in, "")
if len(out) != len(in) {
t.Fatalf("expected all advisories with empty version, got %d/%d", len(out), len(in))
}
}
func TestFilterAffectedAdvisoriesFiltersByRange(t *testing.T) {
s := &Scanner{}
in := []GHSAAdvisory{
{ // matches
GHSAID: "MATCH",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0"},
},
},
{ // does not match
GHSAID: "MISS",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 3.0.0"},
},
},
}
out := s.filterAffectedAdvisories(in, "1.5.0")
if len(out) != 1 || out[0].GHSAID != "MATCH" {
t.Fatalf("expected only MATCH, got %+v", out)
}
}