Files
gohoarder/pkg/scanner/ghsa/ghsa.go
T
lukaszraczylo e39d6a0f0d feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
2026-07-10 09:37:55 +01:00

477 lines
13 KiB
Go

// Package ghsa implements a vulnerability scanner backed by the GitHub
// Security Advisory Database.
package ghsa
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/config"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/metadata"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/uuid"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// ScannerName is the name of this scanner
const ScannerName = "github-advisory-database"
// Scanner implements the GitHub Advisory Database vulnerability scanner
type Scanner struct {
httpClient *http.Client
config config.GHSAConfig
}
// New creates a new GitHub Advisory Database scanner
func New(cfg config.GHSAConfig) *Scanner {
return &Scanner{
config: cfg,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
},
}
}
// Name returns the scanner name
func (s *Scanner) Name() string {
return ScannerName
}
// Scan scans a package using GitHub Advisory Database API
func (s *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version string, filePath string) (*metadata.ScanResult, error) {
log.Info().
Str("scanner", ScannerName).
Str("package", packageName).
Str("version", version).
Str("registry", registry).
Msg("Starting GitHub Advisory Database scan")
// Map registry to GitHub ecosystem
ecosystem := s.mapRegistryToEcosystem(registry)
if ecosystem == "" {
return &metadata.ScanResult{
ID: uuid.New().String(),
Registry: registry,
PackageName: packageName,
PackageVersion: version,
Scanner: ScannerName,
ScannedAt: time.Now(),
Status: metadata.ScanStatusClean,
VulnerabilityCount: 0,
Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
Details: map[string]interface{}{
"skipped": fmt.Sprintf("GitHub Advisory Database does not support registry: %s", registry),
},
}, nil
}
// Query GitHub Advisory Database
advisories, err := s.queryAdvisories(ctx, ecosystem, packageName)
if err != nil {
log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to query GitHub Advisory Database")
return s.emptyResult(registry, packageName, version), nil
}
// Filter advisories that affect this version
affectedAdvisories := s.filterAffectedAdvisories(advisories, version)
// Convert to our format
result := s.convertResult(affectedAdvisories, registry, packageName, version)
log.Info().
Str("scanner", ScannerName).
Str("package", packageName).
Int("vulnerabilities", result.VulnerabilityCount).
Msg("GitHub Advisory Database scan completed")
return result, nil
}
// Health checks if GitHub API is accessible
func (s *Scanner) Health(ctx context.Context) error {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://api.github.com/advisories", nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
if s.config.Token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.config.Token)
}
resp, err := s.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("github advisory database not accessible: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
// Accept any 2xx or 403 (rate limit) as healthy
// Rate limits are expected without a GitHub token and shouldn't fail health checks
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
return nil
}
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
log.Debug().Msg("GitHub API rate limited (expected without token)")
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("github api returned status: %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
// mapRegistryToEcosystem maps our registry names to GitHub ecosystem names
func (s *Scanner) mapRegistryToEcosystem(registry string) string {
mapping := map[string]string{
"npm": "npm",
"pypi": "pip",
"go": "go",
"maven": "maven",
"nuget": "nuget",
"cargo": "cargo",
"pub": "pub",
}
return mapping[strings.ToLower(registry)]
}
// queryAdvisories queries GitHub Advisory Database for a package
func (s *Scanner) queryAdvisories(ctx context.Context, ecosystem, packageName string) ([]GHSAAdvisory, error) {
endpoint := fmt.Sprintf(
"https://api.github.com/advisories?ecosystem=%s&affects=%s&per_page=100",
url.QueryEscape(ecosystem),
url.QueryEscape(packageName),
)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", endpoint, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
if s.config.Token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.config.Token)
}
resp, err := s.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query advisories: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // #nosec G104 -- Cleanup, error not critical
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("github api returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
}
var advisories []GHSAAdvisory
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&advisories); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode response: %w", err)
}
return advisories, nil
}
// filterAffectedAdvisories filters advisories that affect the given version.
// Each advisory may have multiple GHSAVulnerability entries; if any of them
// applies to our installed version (per its vulnerable_version_range), the
// advisory is considered affecting.
//
// Fail-closed: if the version or any range cannot be parsed, the advisory is
// included. We err on the side of reporting a possible vulnerability rather
// than silently dropping it.
func (s *Scanner) filterAffectedAdvisories(advisories []GHSAAdvisory, version string) []GHSAAdvisory {
if version == "" {
// Without a target version, conservatively include everything.
return append([]GHSAAdvisory(nil), advisories...)
}
out := make([]GHSAAdvisory, 0, len(advisories))
for _, adv := range advisories {
if advisoryAffectsVersion(adv, version) {
out = append(out, adv)
}
}
return out
}
// advisoryAffectsVersion reports whether the given installed version falls
// within any of the advisory's vulnerable version ranges.
func advisoryAffectsVersion(adv GHSAAdvisory, version string) bool {
// If the advisory carries no per-vuln range info, conservatively include.
if len(adv.Vulnerabilities) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, v := range adv.Vulnerabilities {
rangeExpr := strings.TrimSpace(v.VulnerableVersions)
if rangeExpr == "" {
// No range — assume affected.
return true
}
matched, ok := versionInRange(version, rangeExpr)
if !ok {
// Parse error → fail-closed: include.
log.Debug().
Str("ghsa_id", adv.GHSAID).
Str("range", rangeExpr).
Str("version", version).
Msg("Could not parse GHSA vulnerable_version_range, including advisory")
return true
}
if matched {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// versionInRange reports whether version satisfies expr. Returns (matched, ok)
// where ok=false signals a parse error. Supported forms (comma separated AND):
//
// "= X"
// "< X"
// "<= X"
// "> X"
// ">= X"
// ">= X, < Y"
//
// All clauses must be satisfied for the range to match.
func versionInRange(version, expr string) (bool, bool) {
clauses := strings.Split(expr, ",")
for _, c := range clauses {
c = strings.TrimSpace(c)
if c == "" {
continue
}
op, bound, ok := splitOpAndVersion(c)
if !ok {
return false, false
}
cmp, ok := compareVersions(version, bound)
if !ok {
return false, false
}
switch op {
case "=", "==":
if cmp != 0 {
return false, true
}
case "<":
if cmp >= 0 {
return false, true
}
case "<=":
if cmp > 0 {
return false, true
}
case ">":
if cmp <= 0 {
return false, true
}
case ">=":
if cmp < 0 {
return false, true
}
default:
return false, false
}
}
return true, true
}
// splitOpAndVersion parses "<op> <version>" pairs (e.g. ">= 1.2.3").
func splitOpAndVersion(clause string) (op, ver string, ok bool) {
clause = strings.TrimSpace(clause)
// Longer operators first to avoid prefix shadowing.
for _, candidate := range []string{">=", "<=", "==", "=", ">", "<"} {
if strings.HasPrefix(clause, candidate) {
rest := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(clause, candidate))
if rest == "" {
return "", "", false
}
return candidate, rest, true
}
}
return "", "", false
}
// compareVersions compares two dot-separated version strings.
// Returns (cmp, ok). Numeric segments are compared numerically.
// A pre-release suffix (anything after '-' or '+') is treated as lower-priority
// than the same version without one, matching common semver intuition for
// the cases we expect from the GitHub Advisory Database.
func compareVersions(a, b string) (int, bool) {
aBase, aPre := splitPreRelease(a)
bBase, bPre := splitPreRelease(b)
aParts := strings.Split(aBase, ".")
bParts := strings.Split(bBase, ".")
n := len(aParts)
if len(bParts) > n {
n = len(bParts)
}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
var av, bv int
var err error
if i < len(aParts) {
av, err = strconv.Atoi(aParts[i])
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
}
if i < len(bParts) {
bv, err = strconv.Atoi(bParts[i])
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
}
if av != bv {
if av < bv {
return -1, true
}
return 1, true
}
}
// Bases equal; compare pre-release. No pre-release > has pre-release.
switch {
case aPre == "" && bPre == "":
return 0, true
case aPre == "" && bPre != "":
return 1, true
case aPre != "" && bPre == "":
return -1, true
default:
return strings.Compare(aPre, bPre), true
}
}
// splitPreRelease separates "1.2.3-rc1" into ("1.2.3", "rc1"). Build metadata
// after '+' is stripped (per semver).
func splitPreRelease(v string) (base, pre string) {
v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
v = strings.TrimPrefix(v, "v")
if i := strings.Index(v, "+"); i >= 0 {
v = v[:i]
}
if i := strings.Index(v, "-"); i >= 0 {
return v[:i], v[i+1:]
}
return v, ""
}
// emptyResult returns an empty scan result
func (s *Scanner) emptyResult(registry, packageName, version string) *metadata.ScanResult {
return &metadata.ScanResult{
ID: uuid.New().String(),
Registry: registry,
PackageName: packageName,
PackageVersion: version,
Scanner: ScannerName,
ScannedAt: time.Now(),
Status: metadata.ScanStatusClean,
VulnerabilityCount: 0,
Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
Details: map[string]interface{}{},
}
}
// convertResult converts GitHub Advisory Database results to our ScanResult format
func (s *Scanner) convertResult(advisories []GHSAAdvisory, registry, packageName, version string) *metadata.ScanResult {
vulnerabilities := make([]metadata.Vulnerability, 0)
severityCounts := make(map[string]int)
for _, advisory := range advisories {
// Normalize severity
normalizedSeverity := metadata.NormalizeSeverity(advisory.Severity)
severityCounts[normalizedSeverity]++
// Extract references
refs := make([]string, 0)
if advisory.HTMLURL != "" {
refs = append(refs, advisory.HTMLURL)
}
for _, ref := range advisory.References {
if ref.URL != "" {
refs = append(refs, ref.URL)
}
}
// Get fixed versions
fixedIn := ""
for _, vuln := range advisory.Vulnerabilities {
if vuln.FirstPatchedVersion != nil && vuln.FirstPatchedVersion.Identifier != "" {
fixedIn = vuln.FirstPatchedVersion.Identifier
break
}
}
vulnerabilities = append(vulnerabilities, metadata.Vulnerability{
ID: advisory.GHSAID,
Severity: normalizedSeverity,
Title: advisory.Summary,
Description: advisory.Description,
References: refs,
FixedIn: fixedIn,
})
}
status := metadata.ScanStatusClean
if len(vulnerabilities) > 0 {
status = metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable
}
return &metadata.ScanResult{
ID: uuid.New().String(),
Registry: registry,
PackageName: packageName,
PackageVersion: version,
Scanner: ScannerName,
ScannedAt: time.Now(),
Status: status,
VulnerabilityCount: len(vulnerabilities),
Vulnerabilities: vulnerabilities,
Details: map[string]interface{}{
"severity_counts": severityCounts,
},
}
}
// GHSAAdvisory represents a GitHub Security Advisory
type GHSAAdvisory struct {
GHSAID string `json:"ghsa_id"`
CVEID string `json:"cve_id"`
Summary string `json:"summary"`
Description string `json:"description"`
Severity string `json:"severity"`
HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"`
PublishedAt string `json:"published_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
References []GHSAReference `json:"references"`
Vulnerabilities []GHSAVulnerability `json:"vulnerabilities"`
}
type GHSAReference struct {
URL string `json:"url"`
}
type GHSAVulnerability struct {
FirstPatchedVersion *GHSAPatchVersion `json:"first_patched_version"`
Package GHSAPackage `json:"package"`
VulnerableVersions string `json:"vulnerable_version_range"`
}
type GHSAPackage struct {
Ecosystem string `json:"ecosystem"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
type GHSAPatchVersion struct {
Identifier string `json:"identifier"`
}