Files
gohoarder/pkg/scanner/ghsa/ghsa_test.go
T
lukaszraczylo e39d6a0f0d feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).
2026-07-10 09:37:55 +01:00

161 lines
4.5 KiB
Go

package ghsa
import (
"testing"
)
func TestVersionInRange(t *testing.T) {
// matched: whether the version satisfies the range expression.
// ok: whether the parser/comparator could evaluate the inputs.
cases := []struct {
name string
version string
expr string
matched bool
ok bool
}{
{"single LT match", "1.2.3", "< 2.0.0", true, true},
{"single LT no match", "2.5.0", "< 2.0.0", false, true},
{"single GTE match", "2.5.0", ">= 2.0.0", true, true},
{"single GTE no match", "1.0.0", ">= 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range hit", "1.5.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", true, true},
{"range below", "0.9.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range above", "2.0.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range upper bound exclusive", "2.0.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", false, true},
{"range lower bound inclusive", "1.0.0", ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0", true, true},
{"equality match", "1.2.3", "= 1.2.3", true, true},
{"equality miss", "1.2.4", "= 1.2.3", false, true},
{"with v prefix on bound", "1.2.3", ">= v1.0.0", true, true},
{"shorter version coerces", "1.0", ">= 1.0.0", true, true},
{"pre-release lower than release", "1.0.0-rc1", ">= 1.0.0", false, true},
{"pre-release greater than older", "1.0.0-rc1", ">= 0.9.0", true, true},
{"malformed operator", "1.0.0", "~ 1.0.0", false, false},
{"malformed version", "abc", ">= 1.0.0", false, false},
{"empty bound after op", "1.0.0", ">=", false, false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
matched, ok := versionInRange(tc.version, tc.expr)
if matched != tc.matched || ok != tc.ok {
t.Fatalf("versionInRange(%q, %q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)",
tc.version, tc.expr, matched, ok, tc.matched, tc.ok)
}
})
}
}
func TestAdvisoryAffectsVersion(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
version string
adv GHSAAdvisory
want bool
}{
{
name: "advisory with no vulnerabilities is conservatively included",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{GHSAID: "GHSA-xxxx", Vulnerabilities: nil},
version: "1.0.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "matching range marks advisory as affecting",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-aaaa",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0"},
},
},
version: "1.5.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "non-matching range excludes advisory",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-bbbb",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 2.0.0"},
},
},
version: "1.0.0",
want: false,
},
{
name: "any matching range across multiple vulns is affecting",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-cccc",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: "< 0.5.0"},
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 1.0.0, < 1.2.0"},
},
},
version: "1.1.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "empty range falls back to affecting (fail-closed)",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-dddd",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{{VulnerableVersions: ""}},
},
version: "1.0.0",
want: true,
},
{
name: "unparseable range falls back to affecting (fail-closed)",
adv: GHSAAdvisory{
GHSAID: "GHSA-eeee",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{{VulnerableVersions: "~> 1.0"}},
},
version: "1.0.0",
want: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := advisoryAffectsVersion(tc.adv, tc.version)
if got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("advisoryAffectsVersion(%q) = %v, want %v",
tc.version, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestFilterAffectedAdvisoriesEmptyVersion(t *testing.T) {
// Without a target version we can't compare ranges, so all advisories
// are conservatively included.
s := &Scanner{}
in := []GHSAAdvisory{
{GHSAID: "A", Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{{VulnerableVersions: ">= 2.0.0"}}},
{GHSAID: "B"},
}
out := s.filterAffectedAdvisories(in, "")
if len(out) != len(in) {
t.Fatalf("expected all advisories with empty version, got %d/%d", len(out), len(in))
}
}
func TestFilterAffectedAdvisoriesFiltersByRange(t *testing.T) {
s := &Scanner{}
in := []GHSAAdvisory{
{ // matches
GHSAID: "MATCH",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0"},
},
},
{ // does not match
GHSAID: "MISS",
Vulnerabilities: []GHSAVulnerability{
{VulnerableVersions: ">= 3.0.0"},
},
},
}
out := s.filterAffectedAdvisories(in, "1.5.0")
if len(out) != 1 || out[0].GHSAID != "MATCH" {
t.Fatalf("expected only MATCH, got %+v", out)
}
}