lukaszraczylo bfd702a447 fix(jwk): keep parsed JWKS in local cache only (#134) (#136)
Under yaegi (Traefik's plugin runtime) json.Marshal exposes unexported
struct fields with an X-prefixed name. parsedJWKS{ keys map[string]
crypto.PublicKey } therefore round-tripped through Redis as
{"Xkeys":{"<kid>":{"N":<huge>,"E":65537}}} — *rsa.PublicKey.N is a
*big.Int that marshals to a JSON number hundreds of digits long. On
read, json.Unmarshal into interface{} parses numbers as float64, which
cannot represent that range:

  Failed to deserialize value for key .../discovery/v2.0/keys:parsed:
  json: cannot unmarshal number 2251513...
    into Go value of type float64

Auth still worked (the JWKCache rebuilt the keys in memory on every
miss) but the error log spammed every request.

Two structural problems were behind it:

* parsedJWKS holds crypto.PublicKey interface values that aren't
  meaningfully JSON-serializable. Even on compiled Go (where the
  unexported field marshals to {}), the post-roundtrip type assertion
  v.(*parsedJWKS) silently failed and the cache was useless.
* The same pattern applied to *JWKSet — the struct shape survived JSON
  but the type assertion still failed, defeating the cache for every
  call that went through Redis.

Both keys now use the new UniversalCache.SetLocal/GetLocal pair, which
skips the configured distributed backend entirely. JWK rotation is rare
and a per-replica HTTP fetch on cold cache is cheap, so cross-replica
coherence buys nothing for these entries.

Stale Redis entries written by previous versions are simply ignored —
the new code never reads under those keys, and Redis TTL retires them.

Includes regression coverage for the Azure round-trip, the
poisoned-stale-data scenario, and the SetLocal/GetLocal isolation
contract.

patch-release
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Traefik OIDC Middleware

OpenID Connect authentication middleware for Traefik. Replaces forward-auth + oauth2-proxy. Auto-detects all major OIDC providers, validates ID tokens, manages sessions, and forwards user identity to downstream services.

Documentation

Provider support

Provider OIDC Refresh Auto-detected by
Google Full Yes accounts.google.com
Azure AD Full Yes login.microsoftonline.com, sts.windows.net
Auth0 Full Yes *.auth0.com
Okta Full Yes *.okta.com, *.oktapreview.com, *.okta-emea.com
Keycloak Full Yes host containing keycloak, or /realms/ in path (covers KC <17 /auth/realms/ and 17+ /realms/)
AWS Cognito Full Yes cognito-idp.*.amazonaws.com
GitLab Full Yes gitlab.com
GitHub OAuth 2.0 only — no ID token, no refresh No github.com
Generic Full Yes any RFC-compliant .well-known/openid-configuration

Authentication and claim extraction use the ID token. Ensure your provider includes required claims (email, roles, groups) in the ID token, not just the access token or UserInfo endpoint.

Install

Enable the plugin in Traefik's static configuration:

# traefik.yml
experimental:
  plugins:
    traefikoidc:
      moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
      version: v0.7.10

Then attach the middleware in your dynamic configuration (see Quickstart below).

This middleware tracks the current Traefik helm chart release. If it fails to load, update Traefik first.

Verify release signatures

Release checksums are signed with cosign keyless signing:

cosign verify-blob \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/.*" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --bundle "traefikoidc_v<version>_checksums.txt.sigstore.json" \
  traefikoidc_v<version>_checksums.txt

Quickstart

apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
  name: oidc-auth
  namespace: traefik
spec:
  plugin:
    traefikoidc:
      providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
      clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
      clientSecret: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-oidc:CLIENT_SECRET
      sessionEncryptionKey: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-oidc:SESSION_KEY
      callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
      logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
      postLogoutRedirectURI: /
      # forceHTTPS defaults to true (secure-by-default). Only set false if you
      # serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP for local dev.
      allowedUserDomains: [company.com]
      allowedRolesAndGroups: [admin, developer]
      excludedURLs: [/health, /metrics]

More example configs in examples/.

Required parameters

Parameter Description
providerURL Issuer URL (used for OIDC discovery).
clientID OAuth 2.0 client ID.
clientSecret OAuth 2.0 client secret. Supports urn:k8s:secret:ns:name:key.
sessionEncryptionKey Cookie encryption key, min 32 bytes.
callbackURL Callback path, e.g. /oauth2/callback.

Common optional parameters

Full reference in docs/CONFIGURATION.md.

Parameter Default Purpose
forceHTTPS true Forces https:// in redirect URIs. Leave at default behind any TLS-terminating LB (AWS ALB, GCP LB, Azure App Gateway). Set false only for plaintext HTTP local dev.
logoutURL callbackURL + "/logout" RP-initiated logout path.
postLogoutRedirectURI / Where to send users after logout.
scopes appended to openid profile email Extra OAuth scopes. Set overrideScopes: true to replace defaults.
excludedURLs none Prefix-matched paths that bypass auth.
allowedUserDomains none Restrict to email domains.
allowedUsers none Restrict to specific addresses (or claim values when userIdentifierClaim != email).
allowedRolesAndGroups none Require any of these roles/groups from ID-token claims.
roleClaimName / groupClaimName roles / groups For namespaced claims (Auth0).
userIdentifierClaim email Use sub, oid, upn, or preferred_username for users without email.
enablePKCE false PKCE on the auth code flow.
cookieDomain auto Set explicitly for multi-subdomain setups (.example.com).
cookiePrefix _oidc_raczylo_ Unique prefix per middleware instance to isolate sessions.
sessionMaxAge 86400 Session lifetime in seconds.
refreshGracePeriodSeconds 60 Proactively refresh tokens this many seconds before expiry.
maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds 21600 Heuristic max stored refresh-token lifetime (6h). Past this, the plugin treats the RT as expired without contacting the IdP — returns 401 to AJAX, full re-auth on navigations. Set 0 to disable. Tune to match your IdP's RT TTL.
rateLimit 100 Requests/sec. Min 10.
logLevel info debug, info, error.
audience clientID Custom access-token audience (Auth0 custom APIs).
strictAudienceValidation false Reject mismatched audiences. Set true in production.
allowOpaqueTokens / requireTokenIntrospection false Accept opaque access tokens via RFC 7662.
disableReplayDetection false Disable JTI cache. Use Redis instead for multi-replica.
allowPrivateIPAddresses false Permit private-IP providerURL (internal Keycloak, etc.).
minimalHeaders false Reduce forwarded headers (mitigates HTTP 431).
stripAuthCookies false Strip OIDC cookies from backend hop (mitigates HTTP 431).
caCertPath / caCertPEM none Trust an internal CA for the provider's TLS.
insecureSkipVerify false Local dev only. Disables TLS verification, logs a security warning.
enableBackchannelLogout / backchannelLogoutURL false / none OIDC Back-Channel Logout (server-to-server).
enableFrontchannelLogout / frontchannelLogoutURL false / none OIDC Front-Channel Logout (iframe).
redis disabled See docs/REDIS.md.
dynamicClientRegistration disabled See docs/DCR.md.

Production gotchas

TLS termination at a load balancer

forceHTTPS defaults to true, so redirect URIs always use https://. This is the right default behind AWS ALB, GCP LB, Azure App Gateway, or any LB that terminates TLS — X-Forwarded-Proto is unreliable (ALB may overwrite it).

Only set forceHTTPS: false when you actually serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP (local dev). See issue #82.

Multi-replica deployments

Each replica keeps its own in-memory JTI cache → false positive "token replay detected" when the same token hits different replicas. Two options:

  1. Set disableReplayDetection: true (loses replay protection).
  2. Enable Redis for shared state (recommended) — see docs/REDIS.md.

For IdP-initiated logout (back/front-channel) in multi-replica setups, Redis is required so a logout on one instance invalidates sessions on the others.

Multiple middleware instances on the same host

Each instance must use a unique cookiePrefix and sessionEncryptionKey, otherwise a session minted by one instance can grant access through another. See issue #87.

SSE and WebSocket endpoints

Browser clients cannot follow an OIDC 302 redirect on an SSE stream or a WebSocket upgrade. The middleware handles this automatically:

  • SSE (Accept: text/event-stream) and WebSocket (Upgrade: websocket) requests skip the OIDC redirect.
  • They are not unauthenticated — a valid encrypted session cookie is required, otherwise the request is rejected. The session must already exist (i.e. the user logged in via a normal HTTP page first).
  • X-Forwarded-User is forwarded from the session.
  • Validation is cookie-only (no JWK fetch), so streaming keeps working during brief IdP outages.

No configuration needed — this is implicit behavior.

HTTP 431 from backends

Either the ID token or the chunked OIDC cookies overflow your backend's header buffer. Combine these as needed:

minimalHeaders: true     # drop X-Auth-Request-Token et al.
stripAuthCookies: true   # strip _oidc_raczylo_* cookies on the backend hop

Cookies remain in the browser; only the Traefik→backend hop is affected. See #64, #122.

Internal CA for the provider

If the provider's TLS cert is signed by a private CA (self-hosted GitLab, internal Keycloak, ADFS):

caCertPath: /etc/ssl/certs/internal-ca.pem
# or, inline:
caCertPEM: |
  -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
  ...
  -----END CERTIFICATE-----

Both can be combined. An unparseable bundle fails the plugin at startup. See #125.

Environment variable names containing API

Traefik reserves TRAEFIK_API_*. User vars whose name contains API (e.g. OIDC_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_API) make the plugin fail with invalid handler type: <nil>. Rename to anything without the literal API substring. See #98.

Templated headers

Forward identity to backends via Go templates over ID-token claims and tokens:

headers:
  - name: X-User-Email
    value: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}"
  - name: Authorization
    value: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}"
  - name: X-User-Roles
    value: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}"

Available bindings: .Claims.<field>, .AccessToken, .IdToken, .RefreshToken. Names are case-sensitive (.Claims, not .claims).

Escape with quadruple braces. If you see can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool, Traefik's YAML parser ate your {{ }}. The fix that actually works is {{{{ }}}} — the YAML pass turns it into {{ }} for the Go template engine. Other escaping tricks (literal blocks, single quotes) do not work reliably.

Default downstream headers

When a request is authenticated, the middleware sets:

Header Notes
X-Forwarded-User User's email (always).
X-User-Groups Comma-separated.
X-User-Roles Comma-separated.
X-Auth-Request-User User's email.
X-Auth-Request-Redirect Original request URI.
X-Auth-Request-Token Full ID token — the largest header; suppressed by minimalHeaders.

Plus security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, X-XSS-Protection, Referrer-Policy) controlled by the securityHeaders section — see docs/CONFIGURATION.md.

Common errors

Symptom Cause
Token verification failed Wrong/unreachable providerURL, or clock skew.
Session encryption key too short sessionEncryptionKey is < 32 bytes.
No matching public key found JWKS endpoint down, or kid mismatch.
Access denied: Your email domain is not allowed User's domain not in allowedUserDomains.
Access denied: You do not have any of the allowed roles or groups Claims missing or not in allowedRolesAndGroups.
can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool Template not escaped — use {{{{ }}}}.
tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority Internal CA — set caCertPath / caCertPEM.
invalid handler type: <nil> Env var name contains API — rename it.
false positive replay detected Multi-replica without Redis — see Multi-replica deployments.
Google sessions expire after ~1h Consent screen still in "Testing" mode. Do not add offline_access — Google rejects it; the middleware sets access_type=offline automatically.

Provider-specific issues (Keycloak mappers, Azure AD group overage, Auth0 namespaced claims, Cognito regions, GitLab self-hosted) live in docs/PROVIDERS.md.

Set logLevel: debug to surface detail.

License

See LICENSE.

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