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The plugin catalog analyzer failed v1.0.28 with "invalid handler type: <nil>" (#151). Two defects combined. The analyzer feeds .traefik.yml testData to New() verbatim. The header values used quadruple braces on a false premise: no configuration path collapses them. Template validation rejected them, so New() failed. The testData now carries plain, valid templates. New() also returned failures through a multi-value tail call (return NewWithContext(...)). Yaegi v0.16.1 zeroes both results of that statement on the error path. The analyzer therefore saw (nil, nil) and reported the opaque handler-type message instead of the real validation error. New() now splits the return explicitly. Construction failures surface as real error messages under yaegi and in Traefik logs. The regression tests pin both fixes. README and CONFIGURATION.md now give correct escaping guidance: plain double braces everywhere; file provider users escape with a raw string. Quadruple braces do not work anywhere. Fixes #151.
109 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
109 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
displayName: Traefik OIDC
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type: middleware
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import: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
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summary: |
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OpenID Connect authentication middleware for Traefik. Replaces forward-auth
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+ oauth2-proxy with a single plugin that auto-detects all major OIDC
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providers (Google, Azure AD, Auth0, Okta, Keycloak, AWS Cognito, GitLab,
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generic) and OAuth 2.0 for GitHub.
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Features: ID-token validation with auto-discovery, session encryption,
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proactive token refresh, RBAC via roles/groups claims, domain restriction,
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templated downstream headers, security headers (CSP, HSTS, CORS), rate
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limiting, PKCE, opaque-token introspection (RFC 7662), back/front-channel
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logout, Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), and Redis-backed shared
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state for multi-replica deployments.
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Full documentation: https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
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testData:
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# Required
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providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
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clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
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clientSecret: your-client-secret
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# Alternative: RFC 7523 private_key_jwt client authentication (Entra ID,
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# Okta, Auth0, Keycloak). Replaces clientSecret with a signed JWT assertion.
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# See README "Client authentication via private key JWT".
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# clientAuthMethod: private_key_jwt
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# clientAssertionKeyID: my-key-2026
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# clientAssertionAlg: RS256 # default; or PS256/384/512, ES256/384/512
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# # File path option:
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# clientAssertionKeyPath: /etc/traefik/oidc/client-key.pem
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# # Or inline PEM (PKCS#8 / PKCS#1 / SEC1):
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# clientAssertionPrivateKey: |
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# -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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# MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDexampleexample
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# -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
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callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
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# Common production knobs
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logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
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postLogoutRedirectURI: /
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forceHTTPS: true # default; only set false for plaintext HTTP local dev
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logLevel: info
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rateLimit: 100
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# Access control
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allowedUserDomains:
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- company.com
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allowedRolesAndGroups:
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- admin
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- developer
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excludedURLs:
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- /health
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- /metrics
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# Scopes are appended to the defaults ["openid", "profile", "email"]
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scopes:
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- roles
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# Templated headers forwarded to backends. Values are Go templates and must
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# be written with plain double braces — the catalog analyzer feeds them to
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# the plugin verbatim (issue #151; quadruple braces do NOT get collapsed).
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# Only when your dynamic config file is rendered by Traefik's file-provider
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# Go templating do the braces need escaping there, e.g.
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# value: "{{`{{.Claims.email}}`}}"
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# (see README "Templated headers").
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headers:
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- name: X-User-Email
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value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
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- name: Authorization
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value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
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# Security headers (default profile is enabled out of the box)
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securityHeaders:
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enabled: true
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profile: default
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# Optional: Redis for multi-replica deployments. See docs/REDIS.md.
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# redis:
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# enabled: true
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# address: redis:6379
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# password: urn:k8s:secret:redis:password
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# cacheMode: hybrid
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# Optional: bearer-token authentication for M2M (machine-to-machine) API
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# clients. Default off. When enabled, requests presenting
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# "Authorization: Bearer <jwt>" are validated against the configured OIDC
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# provider (signature/issuer/audience/exp) and forwarded without creating
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# a cookie session. The bearer path REJECTS ID tokens, requires a non-
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# default audience, and never trusts the `email` claim as the identifier.
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# See docs/BEARER_AUTH.md for the full threat model.
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#
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# enableBearerAuth: true # opt-in
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# audience: https://api.example.com # REQUIRED when bearer is enabled
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# bearerIdentifierClaim: sub # default; used as X-Forwarded-User. `email` is rejected.
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# stripAuthorizationHeader: true # default; drops the raw token before forwarding
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# bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate: true # default; RFC 6750 hint on 401s
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# bearerOverridesCookie: false # default; cookie wins when both are present
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# requireTokenIntrospection: false # opt-in; calls RFC 7662 introspection per request
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# maxTokenAgeSeconds: 86400 # 24h cap on iat (rejects clock-skew/forever tokens)
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# maxIdentifierLength: 256 # cap on the sanitised principal identifier
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# bearerFailureThreshold: 20 # consecutive 401s/IP that trip the throttle
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# bearerFailureWindowSeconds: 60 # rolling window over which 401s are counted
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# bearerFailurePenaltySeconds: 60 # 429 + Retry-After duration after threshold trips
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