Files
traefikoidc/docs/CONFIGURATION.md
T
lukaszraczylo 68c150eba4 fix(cache/redis): honor enableTLS for Redis backend (#133)
The redis.enableTLS / redis.tlsSkipVerify settings were accepted by the
config layer but silently dropped before reaching the connection pool, so
the plugin always dialed Redis in plaintext. This blocked TLS-only Redis
deployments such as AWS ElastiCache with in-transit encryption.

- Add EnableTLS, TLSSkipVerify, TLSServerName to backends.Config and
  PoolConfig and forward them through universal_cache_singleton ->
  backends.Config -> PoolConfig.
- In the connection pool, dial via tls.Dialer.DialContext (TLS 1.2
  minimum) with SNI defaulting to the host part of the configured
  Address when TLSServerName is empty, so ElastiCache cluster endpoints
  validate out of the box. Plain dial path now also propagates ctx.
- Add regression tests covering successful TLS negotiation with skip-
  verify, rejection of self-signed certs without skip-verify, rejection
  of plain TCP servers when EnableTLS=true, and unaffected plaintext
  behavior.
- Document maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds (added in 1b6c861) and the implicit
  SSE / WebSocket auth bypass (added in 684a990) in README.md,
  docs/CONFIGURATION.md and docs/index.html.
- Add the missing redis.tlsSkipVerify row to docs/index.html and clarify
  the redis.enableTLS description.

patch-release
2026-05-07 12:24:13 +01:00

518 lines
14 KiB
Markdown

# Configuration Reference
Complete reference for all Traefik OIDC middleware configuration options.
## Table of Contents
- [Required Parameters](#required-parameters)
- [Optional Parameters](#optional-parameters)
- [Security Options](#security-options)
- [Session Management](#session-management)
- [Access Control](#access-control)
- [Headers Configuration](#headers-configuration)
- [Security Headers](#security-headers)
- [Scope Configuration](#scope-configuration)
- [Advanced Options](#advanced-options)
---
## Required Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Description | Example |
|-----------|------|-------------|---------|
| `providerURL` | string | Base URL of the OIDC provider | `https://accounts.google.com` |
| `clientID` | string | OAuth 2.0 client identifier | `1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com` |
| `clientSecret` | string | OAuth 2.0 client secret | `your-client-secret` |
| `sessionEncryptionKey` | string | Key for encrypting session data (min 32 bytes) | `your-32-byte-encryption-key-here` |
| `callbackURL` | string | Path where provider redirects after authentication | `/oauth2/callback` |
### Basic Configuration Example
```yaml
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: oidc-auth
spec:
plugin:
traefikoidc:
providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
clientID: your-client-id.apps.googleusercontent.com
clientSecret: your-client-secret
sessionEncryptionKey: your-32-byte-encryption-key-here
callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
```
---
## Optional Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `logoutURL` | string | `callbackURL + "/logout"` | Path for logout requests |
| `postLogoutRedirectURI` | string | `/` | Redirect URL after logout |
| `logLevel` | string | `info` | Logging verbosity (`debug`, `info`, `error`) |
| `forceHTTPS` | bool | `true` | Force HTTPS for redirect URIs (set `false` only for plaintext HTTP local dev) |
| `rateLimit` | int | `100` | Maximum requests per second |
| `excludedURLs` | []string | none | Paths that bypass authentication |
| `revocationURL` | string | auto-discovered | Token revocation endpoint |
| `oidcEndSessionURL` | string | auto-discovered | Provider's end session endpoint |
| `enablePKCE` | bool | `false` | Enable PKCE for authorization code flow |
| `minimalHeaders` | bool | `false` | Reduce forwarded headers |
### TLS Termination at Load Balancer
`forceHTTPS` defaults to `true`, so redirect URIs always use `https://`. This is
the correct default behind any TLS-terminating load balancer (AWS ALB, Google
Cloud LB, Azure App Gateway) — `X-Forwarded-Proto` cannot be trusted (ALB may
overwrite it).
Set `forceHTTPS: false` only when you serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP (local
dev). Otherwise leave it at default.
### Streaming Endpoints (SSE and WebSocket)
The middleware automatically bypasses the OIDC redirect for two request kinds
that browsers cannot follow a 302 on:
| Bypass | Triggered by |
|--------|--------------|
| Server-Sent Events (SSE) | `Accept: text/event-stream` |
| WebSocket upgrade | `Upgrade: websocket` + `Connection: upgrade` (RFC 6455) |
These requests do **not** require any explicit configuration — they are
handled implicitly. However, the bypass is **not** unauthenticated:
- A valid, encrypted session cookie is required. Requests without one are
rejected (the connection cannot proceed to the backend).
- The session cookie is sealed with `sessionEncryptionKey`, so the
`authenticated` flag cannot be forged.
- Validation is cookie-only — no JWK fetch / signature verification — so
streaming endpoints keep working when the OIDC provider is briefly
unavailable.
- The user identifier from the session is forwarded as `X-Forwarded-User`
(and `X-Auth-Request-User` unless `minimalHeaders: true`).
For browser clients, the user must complete the normal OIDC flow on a
regular HTTP page first; the resulting session cookie is then reused on the
SSE / WebSocket connection.
---
## Security Options
### Audience Validation
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `audience` | string | `clientID` | Expected audience for access token validation |
| `strictAudienceValidation` | bool | `false` | Reject sessions with audience mismatch |
| `allowOpaqueTokens` | bool | `false` | Enable opaque token support via RFC 7662 |
| `requireTokenIntrospection` | bool | `false` | Require introspection for opaque tokens |
#### Production Security Configuration
```yaml
audience: "https://my-api.example.com"
strictAudienceValidation: true
```
#### Opaque Token Support
```yaml
allowOpaqueTokens: true
requireTokenIntrospection: true
strictAudienceValidation: true
```
### Other Security Options
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `disableReplayDetection` | bool | `false` | Disable JTI-based replay attack detection |
| `allowPrivateIPAddresses` | bool | `false` | Allow private IPs in provider URLs |
---
## Session Management
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `sessionMaxAge` | int | `86400` (24h) | Maximum session age in seconds |
| `refreshGracePeriodSeconds` | int | `60` | Seconds before expiry to attempt refresh |
| `maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds` | int | `21600` | Heuristic max age (in seconds) of a stored refresh token. Once exceeded, requests treat the RT as expired up front (returns 401 to AJAX, triggers full re-auth on navigations) instead of grant-spamming the IdP with `invalid_grant` retries. IdPs do not advertise RT TTL on the wire, so this is intentionally a conservative heuristic — tune to match your provider. Set `0` to disable. Default `21600` (6h). |
| `cookieDomain` | string | auto-detected | Domain for session cookies |
| `cookiePrefix` | string | `_oidc_raczylo_` | Prefix for cookie names |
### Multi-Subdomain Setup
```yaml
cookieDomain: .example.com # Share cookies across subdomains
```
### Multiple Middleware Instances
When running multiple middleware instances with different authorization requirements, use unique prefixes:
```yaml
# User authentication middleware
---
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: oidc-userauth
spec:
plugin:
traefikoidc:
cookiePrefix: "_oidc_userauth_"
sessionEncryptionKey: user-encryption-key-min-32-bytes
# ... other config
---
# Admin authentication middleware
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: oidc-adminauth
spec:
plugin:
traefikoidc:
cookiePrefix: "_oidc_adminauth_"
sessionEncryptionKey: admin-encryption-key-min-32-bytes
allowedUsers:
- admin@example.com
# ... other config
```
### Extended Session Duration
```yaml
sessionMaxAge: 604800 # 7 days
# Common values:
# 3600 - 1 hour (high security)
# 86400 - 1 day (default)
# 259200 - 3 days
# 604800 - 7 days
# 2592000 - 30 days
```
---
## Access Control
### User Restrictions
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|------|-------------|
| `allowedUserDomains` | []string | Restrict to specific email domains |
| `allowedUsers` | []string | Specific email addresses allowed |
| `allowedRolesAndGroups` | []string | Required roles or groups |
| `roleClaimName` | string | JWT claim for roles (default: `roles`) |
| `groupClaimName` | string | JWT claim for groups (default: `groups`) |
| `userIdentifierClaim` | string | Claim for user ID (default: `email`) |
### Domain Restriction
```yaml
allowedUserDomains:
- company.com
- subsidiary.com
```
### Specific User Access
```yaml
allowedUsers:
- user@example.com
- contractor@external.org
```
### Role-Based Access Control
```yaml
allowedRolesAndGroups:
- admin
- developer
roleClaimName: "https://myapp.com/roles" # For namespaced claims (Auth0)
```
### Access Control Logic
- If only `allowedUsers` is set: Only specified emails can access
- If only `allowedUserDomains` is set: Only specified domains can access
- If both are set: Access granted if email is in `allowedUsers` OR domain is in `allowedUserDomains`
- If neither is set: Any authenticated user can access
### Users Without Email (Azure AD)
For Azure AD service accounts or users without email:
```yaml
userIdentifierClaim: sub # Options: sub, oid, upn, preferred_username
allowedUsers:
- "abc12345-6789-0abc-def0-123456789abc" # User object ID
```
---
## Headers Configuration
### Default Headers
The middleware sets these headers for downstream services:
| Header | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `X-Forwarded-User` | User's email address |
| `X-User-Groups` | Comma-separated user groups |
| `X-User-Roles` | Comma-separated user roles |
| `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` | Original request URI |
| `X-Auth-Request-User` | User's email address |
| `X-Auth-Request-Token` | User's ID token |
### Minimal Headers Mode
For "431 Request Header Fields Too Large" errors:
```yaml
minimalHeaders: true # Only forwards X-Forwarded-User
```
### Custom Templated Headers
```yaml
headers:
- name: "X-User-Email"
value: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}"
- name: "X-User-ID"
value: "{{{{.Claims.sub}}}}"
- name: "Authorization"
value: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}"
- name: "X-User-Roles"
value: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}"
```
**Template Variables:**
- `{{.Claims.field}}` - ID token claims
- `{{.AccessToken}}` - Raw access token
- `{{.IdToken}}` - Raw ID token
- `{{.RefreshToken}}` - Raw refresh token
**Important:** Use double curly braces (`{{{{` and `}}}}`) to escape templates in YAML.
---
## Security Headers
### Security Profiles
| Profile | Use Case | Security Level |
|---------|----------|----------------|
| `default` | Standard web apps | High |
| `strict` | Maximum security | Very High |
| `development` | Local development | Medium |
| `api` | API endpoints | High |
| `custom` | Custom requirements | Configurable |
### Basic Configuration
```yaml
securityHeaders:
enabled: true
profile: "default"
```
### API with CORS
```yaml
securityHeaders:
enabled: true
profile: "api"
corsEnabled: true
corsAllowedOrigins:
- "https://your-frontend.com"
- "https://*.example.com"
corsAllowCredentials: true
```
### Custom Security Configuration
```yaml
securityHeaders:
enabled: true
profile: "custom"
# Content Security Policy
contentSecurityPolicy: "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'"
# HSTS
strictTransportSecurity: true
strictTransportSecurityMaxAge: 31536000
strictTransportSecuritySubdomains: true
strictTransportSecurityPreload: true
# Frame and Content Protection
frameOptions: "DENY"
contentTypeOptions: "nosniff"
xssProtection: "1; mode=block"
referrerPolicy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
# CORS
corsEnabled: true
corsAllowedOrigins: ["https://app.example.com"]
corsAllowedMethods: ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"]
corsAllowedHeaders: ["Authorization", "Content-Type"]
corsAllowCredentials: true
corsMaxAge: 86400
# Custom Headers
customHeaders:
X-Custom-Header: "value"
# Server Identification
disableServerHeader: true
disablePoweredByHeader: true
```
### CORS Origin Patterns
```yaml
corsAllowedOrigins:
- "https://example.com" # Exact match
- "https://*.example.com" # Subdomain wildcard
- "http://localhost:*" # Port wildcard (development)
```
---
## Scope Configuration
### Default Behavior (Append Mode)
```yaml
scopes:
- roles
- custom_scope
# Result: ["openid", "profile", "email", "roles", "custom_scope"]
```
### Override Mode
```yaml
overrideScopes: true
scopes:
- openid
- profile
- custom_scope
# Result: ["openid", "profile", "custom_scope"]
```
---
## Advanced Options
### Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)
Dynamic Client Registration allows the middleware to automatically register itself with the OIDC provider, eliminating the need to manually create client credentials.
**Basic Configuration (Single Instance):**
```yaml
dynamicClientRegistration:
enabled: true
initialAccessToken: "your-token" # Optional, if provider requires it
persistCredentials: true
credentialsFile: "/tmp/oidc-credentials.json"
clientMetadata:
redirect_uris:
- "https://your-app.com/oauth2/callback"
client_name: "My Application"
application_type: "web"
grant_types:
- "authorization_code"
- "refresh_token"
```
**Multi-Replica Deployment (Kubernetes):**
For Kubernetes deployments with multiple replicas, use Redis storage to share credentials across all instances and prevent registration race conditions:
```yaml
dynamicClientRegistration:
enabled: true
persistCredentials: true
storageBackend: "redis" # Share credentials via Redis
redisKeyPrefix: "myapp:dcr:" # Optional custom prefix
clientMetadata:
redirect_uris:
- "https://your-app.com/oauth2/callback"
client_name: "My Application"
redis:
enabled: true
address: "redis:6379"
cacheMode: "redis"
```
**Storage Backend Options:**
| Backend | Description | Use Case |
|---------|-------------|----------|
| `file` | Store credentials in local file | Single instance deployments |
| `redis` | Store credentials in Redis | Multi-replica Kubernetes deployments |
| `auto` | Use Redis if available, fallback to file | Flexible deployments (default) |
### Multi-Replica Deployment
Without Redis, disable replay detection:
```yaml
disableReplayDetection: true
```
With Redis (recommended):
```yaml
redis:
enabled: true
address: "redis:6379"
cacheMode: "hybrid"
```
See [REDIS.md](REDIS.md) for complete Redis configuration.
---
## Kubernetes Secrets
Reference secrets instead of hardcoding sensitive values:
```yaml
providerURL: urn:k8s:secret:oidc-secret:ISSUER
clientID: urn:k8s:secret:oidc-secret:CLIENT_ID
clientSecret: urn:k8s:secret:oidc-secret:SECRET
```
Create the secret:
```bash
kubectl create secret generic oidc-secret \
--from-literal=ISSUER=https://accounts.google.com \
--from-literal=CLIENT_ID=your-client-id \
--from-literal=SECRET=your-client-secret \
-n traefik
```
---
## Environment Variable Naming
**Important:** Avoid using "API" as a substring in environment variable names when using `${VAR}` syntax in Traefik configuration. Traefik reserves `TRAEFIK_API_*` variables and the substring may cause conflicts.
```yaml
# Bad - may cause issues
sessionEncryptionKey: ${OIDC_SECRET_API}
# Good
sessionEncryptionKey: ${OIDC_SECRET_SVC}
```