Files
traefikoidc/auth/auth_handler.go
T
lukaszraczylo bbcde3ef9c feat: Add allowPrivateIPAddresses config option for internal networks
Adds a new configuration option `allowPrivateIPAddresses` that allows
OIDC provider URLs to use private IP addresses (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x,
192.168.x.x). This is useful for internal deployments where Keycloak or
other OIDC providers run on private networks without DNS resolution.

Security considerations:
- Loopback addresses (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1) remain blocked
- Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x) remain blocked
- Default is false (secure by default)

Fixes #97
2025-12-08 12:34:36 +00:00

414 lines
13 KiB
Go

// Package auth provides authentication-related functionality for the OIDC middleware.
package auth
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// ScopeFilter interface for filtering OAuth scopes based on provider capabilities
type ScopeFilter interface {
FilterSupportedScopes(requestedScopes, supportedScopes []string, providerURL string) []string
}
// Handler provides core authentication functionality for OIDC flows
type Handler struct {
logger Logger
enablePKCE bool
isGoogleProv func() bool
isAzureProv func() bool
clientID string
authURL string
issuerURL string
scopes []string
overrideScopes bool
scopeFilter ScopeFilter // NEW
scopesSupported []string // NEW - from provider metadata
allowPrivateIPAddresses bool // Allow private IP addresses in URLs (for internal networks)
}
// Logger interface for dependency injection
type Logger interface {
Debugf(format string, args ...interface{})
Errorf(format string, args ...interface{})
}
// NewAuthHandler creates a new Handler instance
func NewAuthHandler(logger Logger, enablePKCE bool, isGoogleProv, isAzureProv func() bool,
clientID, authURL, issuerURL string, scopes []string, overrideScopes bool,
scopeFilter ScopeFilter, scopesSupported []string, allowPrivateIPAddresses bool) *Handler {
return &Handler{
logger: logger,
enablePKCE: enablePKCE,
isGoogleProv: isGoogleProv,
isAzureProv: isAzureProv,
clientID: clientID,
authURL: authURL,
issuerURL: issuerURL,
scopes: scopes,
overrideScopes: overrideScopes,
scopeFilter: scopeFilter,
scopesSupported: scopesSupported,
allowPrivateIPAddresses: allowPrivateIPAddresses,
}
}
// InitiateAuthentication initiates the OIDC authentication flow.
// It generates CSRF tokens, nonce, PKCE parameters (if enabled), clears the session,
// stores authentication state, and redirects the user to the OIDC provider.
func (h *Handler) InitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
session SessionData, redirectURL string,
generateNonce, generateCodeVerifier, deriveCodeChallenge func() (string, error)) {
h.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
const maxRedirects = 5
redirectCount := session.GetRedirectCount()
if redirectCount >= maxRedirects {
h.logger.Errorf("Maximum redirect limit (%d) exceeded, possible redirect loop detected", maxRedirects)
session.ResetRedirectCount()
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed: Too many redirects", http.StatusLoopDetected)
return
}
session.IncrementRedirectCount()
csrfToken := uuid.NewString()
nonce, err := generateNonce()
if err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Failed to generate nonce: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Failed to generate nonce", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Generate PKCE code verifier and challenge if PKCE is enabled
var codeVerifier, codeChallenge string
if h.enablePKCE {
codeVerifier, err = generateCodeVerifier()
if err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Failed to generate code verifier: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Failed to generate code verifier", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
codeChallenge, err = deriveCodeChallenge()
if err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Failed to generate code challenge: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Failed to generate code challenge", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
h.logger.Debugf("PKCE enabled, generated code challenge")
}
session.SetAuthenticated(false)
session.SetEmail("")
session.SetAccessToken("")
session.SetRefreshToken("")
session.SetIDToken("")
session.SetNonce("")
session.SetCodeVerifier("")
session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
session.SetNonce(nonce)
if h.enablePKCE {
session.SetCodeVerifier(codeVerifier)
}
session.SetIncomingPath(req.URL.RequestURI())
h.logger.Debugf("Storing incoming path: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
session.MarkDirty()
if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session before redirecting to provider: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Failed to save session", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
h.logger.Debugf("Session saved before redirect. CSRF: %s, Nonce: %s",
csrfToken, nonce)
authURL := h.BuildAuthURL(redirectURL, csrfToken, nonce, codeChallenge)
h.logger.Debugf("Redirecting user to OIDC provider: %s", authURL)
http.Redirect(rw, req, authURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// BuildAuthURL constructs the OIDC provider authorization URL.
// It builds the URL with all necessary parameters including client_id, scopes,
// PKCE parameters, and provider-specific parameters for Google and Azure.
func (h *Handler) BuildAuthURL(redirectURL, state, nonce, codeChallenge string) string {
params := url.Values{}
params.Set("client_id", h.clientID)
params.Set("response_type", "code")
params.Set("redirect_uri", redirectURL)
params.Set("state", state)
params.Set("nonce", nonce)
if h.enablePKCE && codeChallenge != "" {
params.Set("code_challenge", codeChallenge)
params.Set("code_challenge_method", "S256")
}
scopes := make([]string, len(h.scopes))
copy(scopes, h.scopes)
// Apply discovery-based scope filtering if available
if h.scopeFilter != nil && len(h.scopesSupported) > 0 {
scopes = h.scopeFilter.FilterSupportedScopes(scopes, h.scopesSupported, h.issuerURL)
h.logger.Debugf("AuthHandler.BuildAuthURL: After discovery filtering: %v", scopes)
}
// Apply provider-specific modifications
scopes, params = h.applyProviderSpecificConfig(scopes, params)
// Final filtering pass to remove anything the provider doesn't support
if h.scopeFilter != nil && len(h.scopesSupported) > 0 {
scopes = h.scopeFilter.FilterSupportedScopes(scopes, h.scopesSupported, h.issuerURL)
h.logger.Debugf("AuthHandler.BuildAuthURL: After final filtering: %v", scopes)
}
if len(scopes) > 0 {
finalScopeString := strings.Join(scopes, " ")
params.Set("scope", finalScopeString)
h.logger.Debugf("AuthHandler.BuildAuthURL: Final scope string being sent to OIDC provider: %s", finalScopeString)
}
return h.buildURLWithParams(h.authURL, params)
}
// applyProviderSpecificConfig applies provider-specific scope and parameter modifications
func (h *Handler) applyProviderSpecificConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
switch {
case h.isGoogleProv():
return h.applyGoogleConfig(scopes, params)
case h.isAzureProv():
return h.applyAzureConfig(scopes, params)
default:
return h.applyStandardProviderConfig(scopes, params)
}
}
// applyGoogleConfig applies Google-specific configuration
func (h *Handler) applyGoogleConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
// Google: Remove offline_access if present, add access_type=offline
filteredScopes := make([]string, 0, len(scopes))
for _, scope := range scopes {
if scope != "offline_access" {
filteredScopes = append(filteredScopes, scope)
}
}
params.Set("access_type", "offline")
h.logger.Debugf("Google OIDC provider detected, added access_type=offline")
params.Set("prompt", "consent")
h.logger.Debugf("Google OIDC provider detected, added prompt=consent to ensure refresh tokens")
return filteredScopes, params
}
// applyAzureConfig applies Azure AD-specific configuration
func (h *Handler) applyAzureConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
params.Set("response_mode", "query")
h.logger.Debugf("Azure AD provider detected, added response_mode=query")
if h.shouldAddOfflineAccess(scopes) {
scopes = append(scopes, "offline_access")
h.logger.Debugf("Azure AD provider: Added offline_access scope (overrideScopes: %t, user scopes count: %d)",
h.overrideScopes, len(h.scopes))
} else {
h.logger.Debugf("Azure AD provider: User is overriding scopes (count: %d), offline_access not automatically added.",
len(h.scopes))
}
return scopes, params
}
// applyStandardProviderConfig applies configuration for standard OIDC providers
func (h *Handler) applyStandardProviderConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
if h.shouldAddOfflineAccess(scopes) {
scopes = append(scopes, "offline_access")
h.logger.Debugf("Standard provider: Added offline_access scope (overrideScopes: %t, user scopes count: %d)",
h.overrideScopes, len(h.scopes))
} else {
h.logger.Debugf("Standard provider: User is overriding scopes (count: %d), offline_access not automatically added.",
len(h.scopes))
}
return scopes, params
}
// shouldAddOfflineAccess determines if offline_access scope should be added
func (h *Handler) shouldAddOfflineAccess(scopes []string) bool {
if h.overrideScopes && len(h.scopes) > 0 {
return false
}
for _, scope := range scopes {
if scope == "offline_access" {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// buildURLWithParams constructs a URL by combining a base URL with query parameters.
// It handles both relative and absolute URLs, validates URL security,
// and properly encodes query parameters.
func (h *Handler) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) string {
if baseURL != "" {
if strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
if err := h.validateURL(baseURL); err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
return ""
}
}
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
issuerURLParsed, err := url.Parse(h.issuerURL)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Could not parse issuerURL: %s. Error: %v", h.issuerURL, err)
return ""
}
baseURLParsed, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Could not parse baseURL: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err)
return ""
}
resolvedURL := issuerURLParsed.ResolveReference(baseURLParsed)
if err := h.validateURL(resolvedURL.String()); err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Resolved URL validation failed for %s: %v", resolvedURL.String(), err)
return ""
}
resolvedURL.RawQuery = params.Encode()
return resolvedURL.String()
}
u, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
if err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Could not parse absolute baseURL: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err)
return ""
}
if err := h.validateParsedURL(u); err != nil {
h.logger.Errorf("Parsed URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
return ""
}
u.RawQuery = params.Encode()
return u.String()
}
// validateURL performs security validation on URLs to prevent SSRF attacks.
// It checks for allowed schemes, validates hosts, and prevents access to private networks.
func (h *Handler) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
if urlStr == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("empty URL")
}
u, err := url.Parse(urlStr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL format: %w", err)
}
return h.validateParsedURL(u)
}
// validateParsedURL validates a parsed URL structure for security.
// It checks schemes, hosts, and paths to prevent malicious URLs.
func (h *Handler) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
allowedSchemes := map[string]bool{
"https": true,
"http": true,
}
if !allowedSchemes[u.Scheme] {
return fmt.Errorf("disallowed URL scheme: %s", u.Scheme)
}
if u.Scheme == "http" {
h.logger.Debugf("Warning: Using HTTP scheme for URL: %s", u.String())
}
if u.Host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("missing host in URL")
}
if err := h.validateHost(u.Host); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid host: %w", err)
}
if strings.Contains(u.Path, "..") {
return fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected in URL path")
}
return nil
}
// validateHost validates a hostname for security and reachability.
// It prevents access to private networks and localhost addresses.
// When allowPrivateIPAddresses is enabled, private IP checks are skipped.
func (h *Handler) validateHost(host string) error {
if host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("empty host")
}
// Strip port if present
if strings.Contains(host, ":") {
var err error
host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid host:port format: %w", err)
}
}
// Check for localhost variations (always blocked, even with allowPrivateIPAddresses)
localhostVariations := []string{
"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0",
}
for _, localhost := range localhostVariations {
if strings.EqualFold(host, localhost) {
return fmt.Errorf("localhost access not allowed: %s", host)
}
}
// Try to parse as IP address
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
if ip.IsLoopback() {
return fmt.Errorf("loopback IP not allowed: %s", host)
}
// Skip private IP check if allowPrivateIPAddresses is enabled
if !h.allowPrivateIPAddresses && ip.IsPrivate() {
return fmt.Errorf("private IP not allowed: %s", host)
}
if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
return fmt.Errorf("link-local IP not allowed: %s", host)
}
if ip.IsMulticast() {
return fmt.Errorf("multicast IP not allowed: %s", host)
}
}
return nil
}
// SessionData interface for dependency injection
type SessionData interface {
GetRedirectCount() int
ResetRedirectCount()
IncrementRedirectCount()
SetAuthenticated(bool)
SetEmail(string)
SetAccessToken(string)
SetRefreshToken(string)
SetIDToken(string)
SetNonce(string)
SetCodeVerifier(string)
SetCSRF(string)
SetIncomingPath(string)
MarkDirty()
Save(req *http.Request, rw http.ResponseWriter) error
}