mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc.git
synced 2026-06-05 22:44:17 +00:00
bbcde3ef9c
Adds a new configuration option `allowPrivateIPAddresses` that allows OIDC provider URLs to use private IP addresses (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x). This is useful for internal deployments where Keycloak or other OIDC providers run on private networks without DNS resolution. Security considerations: - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1) remain blocked - Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x) remain blocked - Default is false (secure by default) Fixes #97
414 lines
13 KiB
Go
414 lines
13 KiB
Go
// Package auth provides authentication-related functionality for the OIDC middleware.
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package auth
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// ScopeFilter interface for filtering OAuth scopes based on provider capabilities
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type ScopeFilter interface {
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FilterSupportedScopes(requestedScopes, supportedScopes []string, providerURL string) []string
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}
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// Handler provides core authentication functionality for OIDC flows
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type Handler struct {
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logger Logger
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enablePKCE bool
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isGoogleProv func() bool
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isAzureProv func() bool
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clientID string
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authURL string
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issuerURL string
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scopes []string
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overrideScopes bool
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scopeFilter ScopeFilter // NEW
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scopesSupported []string // NEW - from provider metadata
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allowPrivateIPAddresses bool // Allow private IP addresses in URLs (for internal networks)
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}
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// Logger interface for dependency injection
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type Logger interface {
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Debugf(format string, args ...interface{})
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Errorf(format string, args ...interface{})
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}
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// NewAuthHandler creates a new Handler instance
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func NewAuthHandler(logger Logger, enablePKCE bool, isGoogleProv, isAzureProv func() bool,
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clientID, authURL, issuerURL string, scopes []string, overrideScopes bool,
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scopeFilter ScopeFilter, scopesSupported []string, allowPrivateIPAddresses bool) *Handler {
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return &Handler{
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logger: logger,
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enablePKCE: enablePKCE,
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isGoogleProv: isGoogleProv,
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isAzureProv: isAzureProv,
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clientID: clientID,
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authURL: authURL,
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issuerURL: issuerURL,
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scopes: scopes,
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overrideScopes: overrideScopes,
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scopeFilter: scopeFilter,
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scopesSupported: scopesSupported,
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allowPrivateIPAddresses: allowPrivateIPAddresses,
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}
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}
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// InitiateAuthentication initiates the OIDC authentication flow.
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// It generates CSRF tokens, nonce, PKCE parameters (if enabled), clears the session,
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// stores authentication state, and redirects the user to the OIDC provider.
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func (h *Handler) InitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
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session SessionData, redirectURL string,
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generateNonce, generateCodeVerifier, deriveCodeChallenge func() (string, error)) {
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h.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
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const maxRedirects = 5
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redirectCount := session.GetRedirectCount()
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if redirectCount >= maxRedirects {
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h.logger.Errorf("Maximum redirect limit (%d) exceeded, possible redirect loop detected", maxRedirects)
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session.ResetRedirectCount()
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http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed: Too many redirects", http.StatusLoopDetected)
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return
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}
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session.IncrementRedirectCount()
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csrfToken := uuid.NewString()
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nonce, err := generateNonce()
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Failed to generate nonce: %v", err)
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http.Error(rw, "Failed to generate nonce", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// Generate PKCE code verifier and challenge if PKCE is enabled
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var codeVerifier, codeChallenge string
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if h.enablePKCE {
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codeVerifier, err = generateCodeVerifier()
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Failed to generate code verifier: %v", err)
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http.Error(rw, "Failed to generate code verifier", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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codeChallenge, err = deriveCodeChallenge()
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Failed to generate code challenge: %v", err)
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http.Error(rw, "Failed to generate code challenge", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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h.logger.Debugf("PKCE enabled, generated code challenge")
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}
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session.SetAuthenticated(false)
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session.SetEmail("")
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session.SetAccessToken("")
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session.SetRefreshToken("")
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session.SetIDToken("")
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session.SetNonce("")
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session.SetCodeVerifier("")
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session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
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session.SetNonce(nonce)
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if h.enablePKCE {
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session.SetCodeVerifier(codeVerifier)
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}
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session.SetIncomingPath(req.URL.RequestURI())
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h.logger.Debugf("Storing incoming path: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
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session.MarkDirty()
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if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session before redirecting to provider: %v", err)
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http.Error(rw, "Failed to save session", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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h.logger.Debugf("Session saved before redirect. CSRF: %s, Nonce: %s",
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csrfToken, nonce)
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authURL := h.BuildAuthURL(redirectURL, csrfToken, nonce, codeChallenge)
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h.logger.Debugf("Redirecting user to OIDC provider: %s", authURL)
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http.Redirect(rw, req, authURL, http.StatusFound)
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}
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// BuildAuthURL constructs the OIDC provider authorization URL.
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// It builds the URL with all necessary parameters including client_id, scopes,
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// PKCE parameters, and provider-specific parameters for Google and Azure.
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func (h *Handler) BuildAuthURL(redirectURL, state, nonce, codeChallenge string) string {
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params := url.Values{}
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params.Set("client_id", h.clientID)
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params.Set("response_type", "code")
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params.Set("redirect_uri", redirectURL)
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params.Set("state", state)
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params.Set("nonce", nonce)
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if h.enablePKCE && codeChallenge != "" {
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params.Set("code_challenge", codeChallenge)
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params.Set("code_challenge_method", "S256")
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}
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scopes := make([]string, len(h.scopes))
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copy(scopes, h.scopes)
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// Apply discovery-based scope filtering if available
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if h.scopeFilter != nil && len(h.scopesSupported) > 0 {
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scopes = h.scopeFilter.FilterSupportedScopes(scopes, h.scopesSupported, h.issuerURL)
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h.logger.Debugf("AuthHandler.BuildAuthURL: After discovery filtering: %v", scopes)
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}
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// Apply provider-specific modifications
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scopes, params = h.applyProviderSpecificConfig(scopes, params)
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// Final filtering pass to remove anything the provider doesn't support
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if h.scopeFilter != nil && len(h.scopesSupported) > 0 {
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scopes = h.scopeFilter.FilterSupportedScopes(scopes, h.scopesSupported, h.issuerURL)
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h.logger.Debugf("AuthHandler.BuildAuthURL: After final filtering: %v", scopes)
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}
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if len(scopes) > 0 {
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finalScopeString := strings.Join(scopes, " ")
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params.Set("scope", finalScopeString)
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h.logger.Debugf("AuthHandler.BuildAuthURL: Final scope string being sent to OIDC provider: %s", finalScopeString)
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}
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return h.buildURLWithParams(h.authURL, params)
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}
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// applyProviderSpecificConfig applies provider-specific scope and parameter modifications
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func (h *Handler) applyProviderSpecificConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
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switch {
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case h.isGoogleProv():
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return h.applyGoogleConfig(scopes, params)
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case h.isAzureProv():
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return h.applyAzureConfig(scopes, params)
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default:
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return h.applyStandardProviderConfig(scopes, params)
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}
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}
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// applyGoogleConfig applies Google-specific configuration
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func (h *Handler) applyGoogleConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
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// Google: Remove offline_access if present, add access_type=offline
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filteredScopes := make([]string, 0, len(scopes))
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for _, scope := range scopes {
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if scope != "offline_access" {
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filteredScopes = append(filteredScopes, scope)
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}
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}
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params.Set("access_type", "offline")
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h.logger.Debugf("Google OIDC provider detected, added access_type=offline")
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params.Set("prompt", "consent")
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h.logger.Debugf("Google OIDC provider detected, added prompt=consent to ensure refresh tokens")
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return filteredScopes, params
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}
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// applyAzureConfig applies Azure AD-specific configuration
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func (h *Handler) applyAzureConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
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params.Set("response_mode", "query")
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h.logger.Debugf("Azure AD provider detected, added response_mode=query")
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if h.shouldAddOfflineAccess(scopes) {
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scopes = append(scopes, "offline_access")
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h.logger.Debugf("Azure AD provider: Added offline_access scope (overrideScopes: %t, user scopes count: %d)",
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h.overrideScopes, len(h.scopes))
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} else {
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h.logger.Debugf("Azure AD provider: User is overriding scopes (count: %d), offline_access not automatically added.",
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len(h.scopes))
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}
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return scopes, params
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}
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// applyStandardProviderConfig applies configuration for standard OIDC providers
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func (h *Handler) applyStandardProviderConfig(scopes []string, params url.Values) ([]string, url.Values) {
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if h.shouldAddOfflineAccess(scopes) {
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scopes = append(scopes, "offline_access")
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h.logger.Debugf("Standard provider: Added offline_access scope (overrideScopes: %t, user scopes count: %d)",
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h.overrideScopes, len(h.scopes))
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} else {
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h.logger.Debugf("Standard provider: User is overriding scopes (count: %d), offline_access not automatically added.",
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len(h.scopes))
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}
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return scopes, params
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}
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// shouldAddOfflineAccess determines if offline_access scope should be added
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func (h *Handler) shouldAddOfflineAccess(scopes []string) bool {
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if h.overrideScopes && len(h.scopes) > 0 {
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return false
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}
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for _, scope := range scopes {
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if scope == "offline_access" {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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// buildURLWithParams constructs a URL by combining a base URL with query parameters.
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// It handles both relative and absolute URLs, validates URL security,
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// and properly encodes query parameters.
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func (h *Handler) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) string {
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if baseURL != "" {
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if strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
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if err := h.validateURL(baseURL); err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
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return ""
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}
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}
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
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issuerURLParsed, err := url.Parse(h.issuerURL)
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Could not parse issuerURL: %s. Error: %v", h.issuerURL, err)
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return ""
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}
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baseURLParsed, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Could not parse baseURL: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err)
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return ""
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}
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resolvedURL := issuerURLParsed.ResolveReference(baseURLParsed)
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if err := h.validateURL(resolvedURL.String()); err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Resolved URL validation failed for %s: %v", resolvedURL.String(), err)
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return ""
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}
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resolvedURL.RawQuery = params.Encode()
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return resolvedURL.String()
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Could not parse absolute baseURL: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err)
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return ""
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}
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if err := h.validateParsedURL(u); err != nil {
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h.logger.Errorf("Parsed URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
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return ""
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}
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u.RawQuery = params.Encode()
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return u.String()
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}
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// validateURL performs security validation on URLs to prevent SSRF attacks.
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// It checks for allowed schemes, validates hosts, and prevents access to private networks.
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func (h *Handler) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
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if urlStr == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("empty URL")
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(urlStr)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL format: %w", err)
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}
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return h.validateParsedURL(u)
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}
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// validateParsedURL validates a parsed URL structure for security.
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// It checks schemes, hosts, and paths to prevent malicious URLs.
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func (h *Handler) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
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allowedSchemes := map[string]bool{
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"https": true,
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"http": true,
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}
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if !allowedSchemes[u.Scheme] {
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return fmt.Errorf("disallowed URL scheme: %s", u.Scheme)
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}
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if u.Scheme == "http" {
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h.logger.Debugf("Warning: Using HTTP scheme for URL: %s", u.String())
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}
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if u.Host == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("missing host in URL")
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}
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if err := h.validateHost(u.Host); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid host: %w", err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(u.Path, "..") {
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return fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected in URL path")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateHost validates a hostname for security and reachability.
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// It prevents access to private networks and localhost addresses.
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// When allowPrivateIPAddresses is enabled, private IP checks are skipped.
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func (h *Handler) validateHost(host string) error {
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if host == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("empty host")
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}
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// Strip port if present
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if strings.Contains(host, ":") {
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var err error
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host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(host)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid host:port format: %w", err)
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}
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}
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// Check for localhost variations (always blocked, even with allowPrivateIPAddresses)
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localhostVariations := []string{
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"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0",
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}
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for _, localhost := range localhostVariations {
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if strings.EqualFold(host, localhost) {
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return fmt.Errorf("localhost access not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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}
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// Try to parse as IP address
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if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
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if ip.IsLoopback() {
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return fmt.Errorf("loopback IP not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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// Skip private IP check if allowPrivateIPAddresses is enabled
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if !h.allowPrivateIPAddresses && ip.IsPrivate() {
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return fmt.Errorf("private IP not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
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return fmt.Errorf("link-local IP not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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if ip.IsMulticast() {
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return fmt.Errorf("multicast IP not allowed: %s", host)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// SessionData interface for dependency injection
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type SessionData interface {
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GetRedirectCount() int
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ResetRedirectCount()
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IncrementRedirectCount()
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SetAuthenticated(bool)
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SetEmail(string)
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SetAccessToken(string)
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SetRefreshToken(string)
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SetIDToken(string)
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SetNonce(string)
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SetCodeVerifier(string)
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SetCSRF(string)
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SetIncomingPath(string)
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MarkDirty()
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Save(req *http.Request, rw http.ResponseWriter) error
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}
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