mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc.git
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- implement documented OIDC_* env fallbacks; hold metadataMu for clientAssertion write - re-register client when client_secret expires; require secret for confidential - add opt-in per-source external auth rate limiting (PerSourceLoginRateLimit)
121 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
121 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
package traefikoidc
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import (
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/time/rate"
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)
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// perSourceAuthEntry is one source's throttling state, retained briefly
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// after last use then evicted so a handful of spoofed X-Forwarded-For
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// values can't grow the map unboundedly.
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type perSourceAuthEntry struct {
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limiter *rate.Limiter
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lastSeen time.Time
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}
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// perSourceAuthLimiter rate-limits OIDC authentication events per client
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// source (external IP). Internal (private / loopback / link-local /
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// unspecified) sources are trusted and never throttled, so a reverse
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// proxy or in-cluster caller is unbounded while a single external host
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// roughly generating many authorize callbacks or login initiations can't
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// degrade the shared token-origin token bucket for every user (R185).
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type perSourceAuthLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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limit rate.Limit
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burst int
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entries map[string]*perSourceAuthEntry
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lastSweep time.Time
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}
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func newPerSourceAuthLimiter(perMinute int) *perSourceAuthLimiter {
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if perMinute <= 0 {
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return nil // disabled
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}
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return &perSourceAuthLimiter{
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limit: rate.Limit(float64(perMinute) / 60.0),
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burst: perMinute,
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entries: make(map[string]*perSourceAuthEntry),
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lastSweep: time.Now(),
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}
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}
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// allow reports whether the request's source may proceed (true = allowed).
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func (l *perSourceAuthLimiter) allow(req *http.Request) bool {
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ip := sourceIP(req)
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if ip == "" {
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return true // cannot determine source; do not block
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}
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if isInternalSource(ip) {
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// Trusted source (loopback / RFC 1918 / ULA / link-local /
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// unspecified): a reverse proxy or in-cluster caller, never
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// throttled.
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return true
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}
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now := time.Now()
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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if now.Sub(l.lastSweep) >= time.Minute {
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l.sweep(now)
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}
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e := l.entries[ip]
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if e == nil {
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e = &perSourceAuthEntry{limiter: rate.NewLimiter(l.limit, l.burst)}
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l.entries[ip] = e
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}
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e.lastSeen = now
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return e.limiter.Allow()
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}
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// sweep evicts entries idle for over 10 minutes to bound memory.
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func (l *perSourceAuthLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
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for k, e := range l.entries {
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if now.Sub(e.lastSeen) > 10*time.Minute {
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delete(l.entries, k)
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}
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}
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l.lastSweep = now
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}
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// sourceIP returns the client source IP, preferring the first
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// X-Forwarded-For value (original client in a proxy chain behind Traefik)
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// with RemoteAddr as fallback. Returns "" if none is parseable.
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func sourceIP(req *http.Request) string {
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if req == nil {
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return ""
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}
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if xff := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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if i := strings.IndexByte(xff, ','); i >= 0 {
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xff = xff[:i]
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}
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if ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(xff)); ip != nil {
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return ip.String()
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}
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}
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if req.RemoteAddr != "" {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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host = req.RemoteAddr
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}
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if ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(host)); ip != nil {
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return ip.String()
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}
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}
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return ""
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}
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// isInternalSource reports whether ip is loopback, private (RFC 1918 /
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// ULA), link-local, or unspecified — i.e. a trusted in-cluster source.
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func isInternalSource(ip string) bool {
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p := net.ParseIP(ip)
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if p == nil {
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return false
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}
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return p.IsLoopback() || p.IsPrivate() || p.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
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p.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || p.IsUnspecified()
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}
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