Files
traefikoidc/review_r70_refresh_save_fail_test.go
T

81 lines
2.7 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// TestRefresh_SaveFailureClearsRotatedTokens regresses the refresh path
// leaving a half-rotated session when the post-refresh Save fails: the
// IdP had already consumed the old refresh token (rotation), but the old
// code only flipped authenticated to false and kept the new rotated
// tokens in memory — so the in-memory session carried a fresh refresh
// token while flagged unauthenticated. The Save-failure branch must clear
// the rotated tokens (mirroring the SetAuthenticated-error branch).
func TestRefresh_SaveFailureClearsRotatedTokens(t *testing.T) {
sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager(
"test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long!!", false, "", "", 0, NewLogger("error"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session manager: %v", err)
}
defer sessionManager.Shutdown()
claims := map[string]any{"email": "[email protected]", "exp": float64(9999999999)}
tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
logger: NewLogger("error"),
userIdentifierClaim: "email",
sessionManager: sessionManager,
tokenExchanger: &EnhancedMockTokenExchanger{
RefreshResponse: &TokenResponse{
AccessToken: "new-access-token",
RefreshToken: "new-refresh-token",
IDToken: "new-id-token",
ExpiresIn: 3600,
},
},
tokenVerifier: &EnhancedMockTokenVerifier{Err: nil},
extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]any, error) { return claims, nil },
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get session: %v", err)
}
defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
session.SetRefreshToken("initial-refresh-token")
// Bloat the session with incompressible data so the combined-cookie
// Save overflows maxCombinedChunks (10) and fails deterministically.
bloat := make([]byte, 4000)
_, _ = rand.Read(bloat)
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
session.mainSession.Values[fmt.Sprintf("bulk%d", i)] = string(bloat)
}
refreshed := tOidc.refreshToken(rw, req, session)
if refreshed {
t.Fatal("expected refresh to fail when the session Save fails")
}
if session.GetAuthenticated() {
t.Error("session must not be authenticated after a failed refresh Save")
}
// Rotated tokens must not linger in memory (half-rotated state).
if got := session.GetRefreshToken(); got != "" {
t.Errorf("refresh token not cleared after failed Save, got %q", got)
}
if got := session.GetAccessToken(); got != "" {
t.Errorf("access token not cleared after failed Save, got %q", got)
}
if got := session.GetIDToken(); got != "" {
t.Errorf("id token not cleared after failed Save, got %q", got)
}
}