chore(release): v1.0.42

.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+version: 2
+updates:
+  # Maintain dependencies for GitHub Actions
+  - package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
+    directory: "/"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+      day: "monday"
+      time: "09:00"
+    open-pull-requests-limit: 5
+    commit-message:
+      prefix: "chore(deps)"
+      include: "scope"
+    labels:
+      - "dependencies"
+      - "github-actions"
+    reviewers:
+      - "lukaszraczylo"
+
+  # Maintain Go module dependencies
+  - package-ecosystem: "gomod"
+    directory: "/"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+      day: "monday"
+      time: "09:00"
+    open-pull-requests-limit: 10
+    commit-message:
+      prefix: "chore(deps)"
+      include: "scope"
+    labels:
+      - "dependencies"
+      - "go"
+    reviewers:
+      - "lukaszraczylo"
+    # Group patch updates together
+    groups:
+      patch-updates:
+        patterns:
+          - "*"
+        update-types:
+          - "patch"
+      minor-updates:
+        patterns:
+          - "*"
+        update-types:
+          - "minor"
+    # Ignore certain dependencies if needed
+    ignore:
+      # Example: ignore specific versions
+      # - dependency-name: "github.com/example/package"
+      #   versions: ["1.x", "2.x"]

.traefik.yml

@@ -72,13 +72,6 @@ testData:
       value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
     - name: Authorization
       value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
-    # Object/array claim as one JSON header; the claim must be whitelisted.
-    - name: X-Tenant
-      value: '{{get .Claims "tenant" | toJson}}'
-
-  # Extends the built-in claim whitelist for templated headers.
-  allowedClaims:
-    - tenant
 
   # Security headers (default profile is enabled out of the box)
   securityHeaders:

README.md

@@ -441,34 +441,8 @@ headers:
 Rendering the whole context (`{{.}}`, `{{$}}`), the whole claims map
 (`{{.Claims}}`), or any non-listed claim is rejected — this prevents a template
 from accidentally forwarding raw tokens or unlisted claims. `range`/`with` must
-target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims.groups}}`); `get`, `default`
-and `toJson` are the only functions allowed.
-
-### Forwarding an object claim as JSON
-
-`toJson` serializes a claim (object, array or scalar) to compact JSON, so a
-backend can parse the whole claim itself instead of the middleware flattening
-it into one header per key:
-
-```yaml
-allowedClaims:
-  - tenant
-headers:
-  - name: X-Tenant
-    value: '{{get .Claims "tenant" | toJson}}'   # {"id":"t-1","plan":"pro"}
-  - name: X-Groups
-    value: "{{toJson .Claims.groups}}"           # ["admin","users"]
-```
-
-- The claim must be on the whitelist (built-in or `allowedClaims`).
-  `{{toJson .Claims}}`, `{{toJson .}}` and non-listed claims are rejected.
-- An absent or empty claim skips the header instead of sending `""`.
-- Control characters are JSON-escaped, so a claim cannot inject extra header
-  lines.
-- A rendered value over 8192 bytes, or one with bidi-override characters, is
-  dropped. The oversize case is logged at error level (header name only, never
-  the value); keep the claim small, since proxies commonly cap headers at
-  8-16 KB.
+target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims.groups}}`); `get`/`default`
+are the only functions allowed.
 
 > **File-provider users: escape the braces.** Traefik's file provider runs
 > every dynamic configuration file through Go templating before the plugin

bearer_auth.go

@@ -223,9 +223,6 @@ func headerInjectionRuneReason(r rune) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
-// headerReasonTooLong is the headerValueReason result for an over-long value.
-const headerReasonTooLong = "exceeds max length"
-
 // headerValueReason reports why value is unsafe to forward as a free-form HTTP
 // header value, or "" if acceptable. It rejects values over maxLen (maxLen<=0
 // disables the check) and values containing control or bidi-override runes, but
@@ -233,7 +230,7 @@ const headerReasonTooLong = "exceeds max length"
 // never includes the value, so it is safe to log.
 func headerValueReason(value string, maxLen int) string {
 	if maxLen > 0 && len(value) > maxLen {
-		return headerReasonTooLong
+		return "exceeds max length"
 	}
 	for _, r := range value {
 		if reason := headerInjectionRuneReason(r); reason != "" {
@@ -371,11 +368,6 @@ func enforceIatAge(claims map[string]interface{}, maxAge time.Duration) *bearerE
 	if time.Since(iat) > maxAge {
 		return newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token iat outside age bound")
 	}
-	// The opaque introspection path never runs jwt.Verify, so a future iat
-	// would otherwise defeat the age bound for the token's whole lifetime.
-	if time.Until(iat) > ClockSkewToleranceFuture {
-		return newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token iat in the future")
-	}
 	return nil
 }
 

cmd/yaegicheck/main.go

@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ func main() {
 	runCheck("middleware-erraborthandler-aborts-under-yaegi", checkErrAbortHandlerAbortsUnderYaegi)
 	runCheck("fix17-setifabsent-claims-once", checkSetIfAbsentUnderYaegi)
 	runCheck("issue162-websocket-forwards-header-templates", checkIssue162WebSocketHeaderTemplates)
-	runCheck("tojson-header-template", checkToJsonHeaderTemplate)
 	runCheck("streaming-refresh-revoked-grant-rejected", checkStreamingRefreshRevokedGrant)
 	fmt.Println("OK: all yaegi regression checks passed")
 }
@@ -808,99 +807,6 @@ func checkIssue162WebSocketHeaderTemplates() (string, error) {
 	return "", nil
 }
 
-// checkToJsonHeaderTemplate pins the toJson template helper under the
-// interpreter: its (string, error) closure, json.Marshal of an object claim,
-// the nil/absent-claim skip and the validator's rejection of a whole-claims dump.
-func checkToJsonHeaderTemplate() (string, error) {
-	discovery := servers.NewOIDCServer(nil)
-	defer discovery.Close()
-
-	cfg := oidc.CreateConfig()
-	cfg.ProviderURL = discovery.URL
-	cfg.ClientID = "yaegi-check-tojson-client"
-	cfg.ClientSecret = "yaegi-check-tojson-secret"
-	cfg.CallbackURL = "/oauth2/callback"
-	cfg.SessionEncryptionKey = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
-	cfg.AllowedClaims = []string{"tenant"}
-	cfg.Headers = []oidc.TemplatedHeader{
-		{Name: "X-Tenant", Value: `{{ get .Claims "tenant" | toJson }}`},
-		{Name: "X-Groups", Value: "{{ toJson .Claims.groups }}"},
-		{Name: "X-Missing", Value: "{{ toJson .Claims.department }}"},
-	}
-	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("toJson headers must validate: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	bad := oidc.CreateConfig()
-	*bad = *cfg
-	bad.Headers = []oidc.TemplatedHeader{{Name: "X-All", Value: "{{ toJson .Claims }}"}}
-	if err := bad.Validate(); err == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("toJson of the whole claims map must fail validation")
-	}
-
-	var seen http.Header
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		seen = r.Header.Clone()
-	})
-	h, err := oidc.New(context.Background(), next, cfg, "yaegi-check-tojson")
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("New: %w", err)
-	}
-	if closer, ok := h.(interface{ Close() error }); ok {
-		defer closer.Close()
-	}
-
-	sm, err := oidc.NewSessionManager(cfg.SessionEncryptionKey, cfg.ForceHTTPS, cfg.CookieDomain, cfg.CookiePrefix, time.Duration(cfg.SessionMaxAge)*time.Second, oidc.NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("NewSessionManager: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	setupReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/ws", nil)
-	session, err := sm.GetSession(setupReq)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("GetSession: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := session.SetAuthenticated(true); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("SetAuthenticated: %w", err)
-	}
-	session.SetUserIdentifier("[email protected]")
-	b64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString
-	sig := make([]byte, 32)
-	for i := range sig {
-		sig[i] = byte(i + 1)
-	}
-	session.SetIDToken(b64([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`)) + "." + b64([]byte(`{"tenant":{"id":"t-1","plan":"pro"},"groups":["a","b"]}`)) + "." + b64(sig))
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	if err := session.Save(setupReq, rec); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("session.Save: %w", err)
-	}
-	session.ReturnToPool()
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/ws", nil)
-	for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
-		req.AddCookie(c)
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
-	req.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	h.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if seen == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("next was not reached (status %d)", rw.Code)
-	}
-	if got, want := seen.Get("X-Tenant"), `{"id":"t-1","plan":"pro"}`; got != want {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("X-Tenant = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	if got, want := seen.Get("X-Groups"), `["a","b"]`; got != want {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("X-Groups = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	if got := seen.Get("X-Missing"); got != "" {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("X-Missing = %q, want header skipped", got)
-	}
-	return "", nil
-}
-
 // checkStreamingRefreshRevokedGrant drives streamingRefresh under the
 // interpreter through the real RefreshCoordinator and token exchanger: an
 // expired session whose refresh the IdP answers with invalid_grant must get

docs/CONFIGURATION.md

@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ be emitted — the standard OIDC claims plus common provider claims (`email`,
 `phone_number`, `email_verified`, `updated_at`; the authoritative list is
 `safeClaimsFields` in `template_validation.go`). Rejected: rendering the whole
 context (`{{.}}`, `{{$}}`) or the whole claims map (`{{.Claims}}`), any claim not
-on the list, functions other than `get`/`default`/`toJson`, and `range`/`with` that do not
+on the list, functions other than `get`/`default`, and `range`/`with` that do not
 target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims}}` is rejected; `{{range
 .Claims.groups}}` is allowed).
 
@@ -592,21 +592,6 @@ Listed names apply to both direct access (`{{.Claims.employee_id}}`) and
 claim (e.g. `realm_access.roles`) are already accessible without listing them
 individually.
 
-**`toJson`** forwards an object or array claim as one JSON header:
-
-```yaml
-allowedClaims:
-  - tenant
-headers:
-  - name: "X-Tenant"
-    value: "{{get .Claims \"tenant\" | toJson}}"
-```
-
-It only serializes values the template can already reach, so the whitelist
-still applies; `{{toJson .Claims}}` is rejected. Control characters are
-JSON-escaped, and values over 8192 bytes or with bidi-override characters are
-dropped; an oversize value is logged at error level (header name only).
-
 ---
 
 ## Security Headers

hunt_20261015_regression_test.go

@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-func TestEnhanceSessionSecurity_CaseVariantForwardedHostStaysHostScoped(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		xfh  string
-	}{
-		{name: "exact-case parent", xfh: "corp.example.com"},
-		{name: "upper-case parent", xfh: "CORP.example.com"},
-		{name: "mixed-case parent", xfh: "Corp.Example.COM"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			sm := createTestSessionManager(t)
-			t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sm.Shutdown() })
-			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.corp.example.com/", nil)
-			req.Host = "app.corp.example.com"
-			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", tc.xfh)
-			opts := sm.EnhanceSessionSecurity(nil, req)
-			if opts.Domain != "app.corp.example.com" {
-				t.Fatalf("Domain = %q, want host-scoped app.corp.example.com", opts.Domain)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	t.Run("case-variant forwarded host equal to serving host is kept", func(t *testing.T) {
-		sm := createTestSessionManager(t)
-		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sm.Shutdown() })
-		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://internal.svc/", nil)
-		req.Host = "internal.svc"
-		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "App.Example.com")
-		opts := sm.EnhanceSessionSecurity(nil, req)
-		if opts.Domain != "app.example.com" {
-			t.Fatalf("Domain = %q, want app.example.com", opts.Domain)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func TestEnforceIatAge_RejectsFutureIat(t *testing.T) {
-	const maxAge = 24 * time.Hour
-	now := time.Now()
-	cases := []struct {
-		name    string
-		iat     time.Time
-		wantErr bool
-	}{
-		{name: "now", iat: now},
-		{name: "within future skew", iat: now.Add(ClockSkewToleranceFuture / 2)},
-		{name: "one hour ahead", iat: now.Add(time.Hour), wantErr: true},
-		{name: "just beyond skew", iat: now.Add(ClockSkewToleranceFuture + 10*time.Second), wantErr: true},
-		{name: "older than max age", iat: now.Add(-48 * time.Hour), wantErr: true},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := enforceIatAge(map[string]interface{}{"iat": float64(tc.iat.Unix())}, maxAge)
-			if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
-				t.Fatalf("enforceIatAge err = %v, wantErr %v", err, tc.wantErr)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestJWKCache_CooldownServesParsedEntryWithoutReparse(t *testing.T) {
-	priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("keygen: %v", err)
-	}
-	c := NewJWKCache()
-	url := fmt.Sprintf("https://jwks.invalid/%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
-	// The raw set is empty, so only the pre-parsed entry can satisfy the lookup.
-	_ = c.cache.SetLocal(url, &JWKSet{}, time.Hour)
-	_ = c.cache.SetLocal(url+parsedKeysSuffix, &parsedJWKS{keys: map[string]crypto.PublicKey{"k1": &priv.PublicKey}}, time.Hour)
-	c.lastSignatureRefresh[url] = time.Now()
-
-	got, err := c.getPublicKeyFresh(context.Background(), url, "k1", http.DefaultClient)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("getPublicKeyFresh: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got != crypto.PublicKey(&priv.PublicKey) {
-		t.Fatal("cooldown branch did not serve the cached parsed key")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFrontchannelLogout_FloodCannotEvictSignedMarkers(t *testing.T) {
-	cache := &CacheInterfaceWrapper{cache: NewUniversalCache(UniversalCacheConfig{
-		Type:             CacheTypeSession,
-		MaxSize:          5000,
-		DefaultTTL:       sessionInvalidationTTL,
-		Logger:           NewLogger("error"),
-		SkipAutoCleanup:  true,
-		MonotonicMarkers: true,
-	})}
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                   NewLogger("error"),
-		enableFrontchannelLogout: true,
-		sessionInvalidationCache: cache,
-		issuerURL:                "https://idp.example.com",
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cache.cache.Close() })
-
-	if err := oidc.invalidateSession("", "real-subject"); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("invalidateSession: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := oidc.checkAndMarkLogoutJTIProcessed("real-jti", time.Now().Unix()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("mark jti: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	for i := 0; i < 6000; i++ {
-		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, fmt.Sprintf("/fc?iss=https://idp.example.com&sid=flood-%d", i), nil)
-		rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-		oidc.handleFrontchannelLogout(rw, req)
-		if rw.Code != http.StatusOK {
-			t.Fatalf("flood request %d: status %d", i, rw.Code)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if _, ok := cache.Get(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sub", "real-subject")); !ok {
-		t.Error("backchannel sub marker evicted by front-channel flood")
-	}
-	if err := oidc.checkAndMarkLogoutJTIProcessed("real-jti", time.Now().Unix()); err == nil {
-		t.Error("jti replay marker evicted by front-channel flood: replay accepted")
-	}
-	held := 0
-	for i := 0; i < 6000; i++ {
-		if _, ok := cache.Get(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", fmt.Sprintf("flood-%d", i))); ok {
-			held++
-		}
-	}
-	if held > maxFrontchannelMarkers {
-		t.Errorf("front-channel markers held = %d, want <= %d", held, maxFrontchannelMarkers)
-	}
-	if _, ok := cache.Get(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", "flood-5999")); !ok {
-		t.Error("most recent front-channel marker must remain")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestMarkerQuota_Admit(t *testing.T) {
-	var q markerQuota
-	if got := q.admit("a", 2); got != "" {
-		t.Errorf("admit a = %q, want none", got)
-	}
-	if got := q.admit("a", 2); got != "" {
-		t.Errorf("re-admit a = %q, want none", got)
-	}
-	if got := q.admit("b", 2); got != "" {
-		t.Errorf("admit b = %q, want none", got)
-	}
-	if got := q.admit("c", 2); got != "a" {
-		t.Errorf("admit c evicted %q, want a", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestServeHTTP_InitWaitQueueFullFailsFast(t *testing.T) {
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                       NewLogger("error"),
-		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
-		sessionManager:               createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted:          1,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
-	}
-	oidc.initWaiters = maxInitWaiters
-
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	start := time.Now()
-	oidc.ServeHTTP(rw, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil))
-
-	if rw.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
-		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 503", rw.Code)
-	}
-	if rw.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
-		t.Error("missing Retry-After header")
-	}
-	if time.Since(start) > 5*time.Second {
-		t.Errorf("rejected after %v, want immediate", time.Since(start))
-	}
-	if oidc.initWaiters != maxInitWaiters {
-		t.Errorf("initWaiters = %d, want unchanged %d", oidc.initWaiters, maxInitWaiters)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestServeHTTP_InitWaiterReleasedOnCancel(t *testing.T) {
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                       NewLogger("error"),
-		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
-		sessionManager:               createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted:          1,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
-	}
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	cancel()
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil).WithContext(ctx)
-	oidc.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
-	if oidc.initWaiters != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("initWaiters = %d after canceled wait, want 0", oidc.initWaiters)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCleanupOldCookies_CapsDeletionHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long!!", false, "cookie.example.com", "testpref", 0, newNoOpLogger())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session manager: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sm.Shutdown() })
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	req.Host = "a.b.example.com"
-	for i := 0; i < 180; i++ {
-		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: fmt.Sprintf("testpref_%d", i), Value: "x"})
-	}
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	sm.CleanupOldCookies(rw, req)
-
-	got := len(rw.Result().Cookies())
-	if got == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("expected deletion cookies for the first wave")
-	}
-	if limit := maxCleanupCookies * 4; got > limit {
-		t.Fatalf("deletion Set-Cookie headers = %d, want <= %d", got, limit)
-	}
-	for _, c := range rw.Result().Cookies() {
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(c.Name, "testpref_") {
-			t.Errorf("unexpected deletion cookie %q", c.Name)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/recovery/circuit_breaker.go

@@ -93,16 +93,8 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) ExecuteWithContext(ctx context.Context, fn func() erro
 		return fmt.Errorf("circuit breaker is open")
 	}
 
-	// A panicking fn must still settle the breaker, otherwise a half-open
-	// probe slot leaks until the next open->half-open transition.
-	panicked := true
-	defer func() {
-		if panicked {
-			cb.recordFailure()
-		}
-	}()
+	// Execute the function
 	err := fn()
-	panicked = false
 
 	if err != nil {
 		cb.recordFailure()

internal/recovery/hunt_20261015_regression_test.go

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-package recovery
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-func TestCircuitBreaker_PanickingProbeReleasesHalfOpenSlot(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		FailureThreshold: 1,
-		SuccessThreshold: 1,
-		Timeout:          20 * time.Millisecond,
-		MaxRequests:      1,
-	}, &mockLogger{})
-
-	_ = cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { return errors.New("fail") })
-	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
-
-	func() {
-		defer func() {
-			if recover() == nil {
-				t.Error("panic must still propagate to the caller")
-			}
-		}()
-		_ = cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { panic("boom") })
-	}()
-
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("state after panicking probe = %s, want open", cb.GetState())
-	}
-	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
-	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { return nil }); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("probe after next timeout rejected: %v", err)
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerClosed {
-		t.Fatalf("state = %s, want closed", cb.GetState())
-	}
-}

jwk.go

@@ -389,13 +389,6 @@ func (c *JWKCache) getPublicKeyFresh(ctx context.Context, jwksURL, kid string, h
 
 	if withinCooldown {
 		// Serve the cached keyset; do not fetch upstream again.
-		if v, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL + parsedKeysSuffix); found {
-			if pj, ok := v.(*parsedJWKS); ok {
-				if k, ok := pj.keys[kid]; ok {
-					return k, nil
-				}
-			}
-		}
 		if cached, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL); found {
 			if jwks, ok := cached.(*JWKSet); ok {
 				if k, ok := buildParsedJWKS(jwks).keys[kid]; ok {

logout.go

@@ -51,43 +51,8 @@ const (
 	// sessionInvalidationTTL is how long to remember invalidated sessions
 	// Should be at least as long as your session max age
 	sessionInvalidationTTL = 25 * time.Hour
-
-	// maxFrontchannelMarkers caps the sid markers the unauthenticated
-	// front-channel endpoint may keep in the shared invalidation cache, so
-	// a flood cannot LRU-evict signed backchannel and jti replay markers.
-	maxFrontchannelMarkers = 1000
 )
 
-// markerQuota is a FIFO of cache keys written on behalf of one untrusted
-// source. The zero value is ready to use.
-type markerQuota struct {
-	set  map[string]struct{}
-	keys []string
-	mu   sync.Mutex
-}
-
-// admit records key and returns the oldest key to drop once more than limit
-// keys are held, or "" when none must go. Re-admitting a held key is a no-op.
-func (q *markerQuota) admit(key string, limit int) string {
-	q.mu.Lock()
-	defer q.mu.Unlock()
-	if q.set == nil {
-		q.set = make(map[string]struct{})
-	}
-	if _, ok := q.set[key]; ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	q.set[key] = struct{}{}
-	q.keys = append(q.keys, key)
-	if len(q.keys) <= limit {
-		return ""
-	}
-	oldest := q.keys[0]
-	q.keys = q.keys[1:]
-	delete(q.set, oldest)
-	return oldest
-}
-
 // LogoutTokenClaims represents the claims in an OIDC logout token
 // as defined in OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0
 type LogoutTokenClaims struct {
@@ -226,10 +191,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleFrontchannelLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http
 		return
 	}
 
-	if evicted := t.frontchannelMarkers.admit(t.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", sid), maxFrontchannelMarkers); evicted != "" {
-		t.sessionInvalidationCache.Delete(evicted)
-	}
-
 	t.logger.Infof("Front-channel logout: successfully invalidated session (sid=%s)", sid)
 
 	// Return a minimal HTML response that's suitable for iframe loading

main.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
@@ -86,10 +85,8 @@ var defaultExcludedURLs = map[string]struct{}{
 
 // headerTemplateFuncMap returns the function map available to custom header
 // value templates, gated by the effective claims whitelist (built-in +
-// config.AllowedClaims). It exposes exactly three helpers:
+// config.AllowedClaims). It exposes exactly two helpers:
 //   - default: substitute a fallback when a value is nil/empty.
-//   - toJson: serialize a value (e.g. an object claim) to compact JSON; nil and
-//     "" yield "" so an absent claim skips the header instead of sending `""`.
 //   - get: safe map access RESTRICTED to whitelisted claim keys, so it cannot be
 //     used to read a non-whitelisted claim, a raw token, or the whole data map
 //     (issue #149 review). This is the sole runtime enforcement of the claims
@@ -105,16 +102,6 @@ func headerTemplateFuncMap(allowedClaims map[string]bool) template.FuncMap {
 			}
 			return val
 		},
-		"toJson": func(val interface{}) (string, error) {
-			if val == nil || val == "" {
-				return "", nil
-			}
-			b, err := json.Marshal(val)
-			if err != nil {
-				return "", err
-			}
-			return string(b), nil
-		},
 		"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
 			if !allowedClaims[key] {
 				return ""

middleware.go

@@ -158,15 +158,6 @@ func (w *optionsPreflightWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
 	return len(b), nil
 }
 
-const (
-	// maxInitWaiters bounds requests parked on initComplete so a boot-time
-	// flood with the IdP down cannot hold unbounded connections for 30s each.
-	maxInitWaiters = 512
-	// initWaitRetryAfter is the Retry-After value (seconds) sent when the
-	// init-wait queue is full.
-	initWaitRetryAfter = "5"
-)
-
 // bypassReason describes why a request is being forwarded without OIDC auth.
 // It is only used for logging and to decide whether extra side-effects
 // (propagating the user header from an existing session) should run.
@@ -710,13 +701,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	// Log waiting for initialization to help diagnose hanging requests
 	t.logger.Debug("Waiting for OIDC provider initialization...")
 
-	if atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, 1) > maxInitWaiters {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
-		rw.Header().Set("Retry-After", initWaitRetryAfter)
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "OIDC provider initialization in progress - please try again later", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
-		return
-	}
-
 	// time.NewTimer + Stop avoids leaking a goroutine+channel for 30s on every
 	// request when initComplete fires quickly (would happen with time.After).
 	initTimer := time.NewTimer(30 * time.Second)
@@ -724,7 +708,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 
 	select {
 	case <-t.initComplete:
-		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
 		// Read issuerURL via atomic snapshot when available — replaces the
 		// metadataMu.RLock that previously fired on every non-bypass request.
 		// Under Yaegi each RLock acquisition costs 1-5ms of interpreter
@@ -761,12 +744,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 			return
 		}
 	case <-req.Context().Done():
-		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
 		t.logger.Debug("Request canceled while waiting for OIDC initialization")
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Request canceled", http.StatusRequestTimeout)
 		return
 	case <-initTimer.C:
-		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
 		t.logger.Error("Timeout waiting for OIDC initialization")
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Timeout waiting for OIDC provider initialization - please try again later", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
 		return
@@ -1390,11 +1371,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) applyHeaderTemplates(req *http.Request, p *principal) {
 		// forwarding a tainted value. Do not log the value (it commonly
 		// carries the access token); log only name + reason.
 		if reason := headerValueReason(headerValue, headerTemplateMaxLen); reason != "" {
-			if reason == headerReasonTooLong {
-				t.logger.Errorf("Dropping templated header %s: rendered value exceeds %d bytes", headerName, headerTemplateMaxLen)
-			} else {
-				t.logger.Debugf("Dropping templated header %s: value failed sanitization (%s)", headerName, reason)
-			}
+			t.logger.Debugf("Dropping templated header %s: value failed sanitization (%s)", headerName, reason)
 			continue
 		}
 		req.Header.Set(headerName, headerValue)

session.go

@@ -116,10 +116,6 @@ const (
 	defaultCookiePrefix  = "_oidc_raczylo_"
 )
 
-// maxCleanupCookies bounds the cookie names CleanupOldCookies emits deletion
-// headers for per response (up to 4 Set-Cookie headers each).
-const maxCleanupCookies = 32
-
 const (
 	// maxCookieSize is the maximum raw data size per chunk before securecookie encoding.
 	//
@@ -941,9 +937,6 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) EnhanceSessionSecurity(options *sessions.Options, r *h
 			// service). Keep it unless it is a strict parent of the serving
 			// host, which would scope the token-bearing cookie to sibling
 			// subdomains — then fall back to the serving host.
-			// DNS names and the cookie Domain attribute are case-insensitive.
-			host = strings.ToLower(host)
-			fh = strings.ToLower(fh)
 			if !strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+fh) {
 				host = fh
 			}
@@ -1031,7 +1024,6 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) CleanupOldCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	}
 
 	processedCookies := make(map[string]bool)
-	deletedCookies := 0
 
 	for _, cookie := range cookies {
 		// Check if cookie belongs to this middleware instance using the configured prefix
@@ -1045,8 +1037,7 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) CleanupOldCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 			shouldCleanup := currentDomain != "" && !sm.cleanupDone
 			sm.cleanupMutex.RUnlock()
 
-			if shouldCleanup && deletedCookies < maxCleanupCookies {
-				deletedCookies++
+			if shouldCleanup {
 				for _, domain := range domainsToClean {
 					if domain == currentDomain || domain == "."+currentDomain || "."+domain == currentDomain {
 						continue

template_validation.go

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var allowedRootTokenFields = map[string]bool{
 var validateTemplateParseFuncs = map[string]any{
 	"get":     struct{}{},
 	"default": struct{}{},
-	"toJson":  struct{}{},
 }
 
 // claimsWhitelist returns the effective set of claim field names a header
@@ -184,14 +183,12 @@ func (v *templateValidator) validateCommand(cmd *parse.CommandNode, dotIsRoot bo
 	return nil
 }
 
-// validateFunctionCall allows only get/default/toJson. get's map argument must be a
+// validateFunctionCall allows only get/default. get's map argument must be a
 // claims reference (never the root) and default's arguments are validated as
 // values; the runtime get additionally enforces the key whitelist.
 func (v *templateValidator) validateFunctionCall(name string, args []parse.Node, dotIsRoot bool) error {
 	switch name {
-	case "default", "toJson":
-		// toJson only serializes what its (validated) arguments or piped input
-		// already expose; it cannot reach anything a direct reference could not.
+	case "default":
 		for _, arg := range args {
 			if err := v.validateValue(arg, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
 				return err

tojson_template_test.go

@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"text/template"
-)
-
-// renderHeaderTemplate runs tmplStr through the same validator, funcMap and
-// applyHeaderTemplates path production uses. validateErr is the static-validation
-// error; got is the forwarded header value ("" when absent or dropped).
-func renderHeaderTemplate(t *testing.T, tmplStr string, extraClaims []string, claims map[string]interface{}) (got string, validateErr error) {
-	t.Helper()
-	allowed := claimsWhitelist(extraClaims)
-	if err := validateTemplateSecure(tmplStr, allowed); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	tmpl, err := template.New("X-Test").Funcs(headerTemplateFuncMap(allowed)).Option("missingkey=zero").Parse(tmplStr)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("validated template failed to parse: %v", err)
-	}
-	o := &TraefikOidc{logger: NewLogger("error"), headerTemplates: map[string]*template.Template{"X-Test": tmpl}}
-	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-	o.applyHeaderTemplates(req, &principal{Claims: claims, AccessToken: "AT-SECRET", IDToken: "IDT-SECRET", RefreshToken: "RT-SECRET"})
-	return req.Header.Get("X-Test"), nil
-}
-
-func TestToJson_ObjectClaimRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{
-		"tenant": map[string]interface{}{"id": "t-1", "plan": "pro", "flags": []interface{}{"a", "b"}, "n": 3.0, "ok": true, "nil": nil},
-	}
-	for _, tmpl := range []string{
-		`{{ get .Claims "tenant" | toJson }}`,
-		`{{ toJson (get .Claims "tenant") }}`,
-		`{{ toJson .Claims.tenant }}`,
-		`{{ with .Claims.tenant }}{{ toJson . }}{{ end }}`,
-		`{{ $t := .Claims.tenant }}{{ toJson $t }}`,
-		`{{ toJson $.Claims.tenant }}`,
-	} {
-		got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, tmpl, []string{"tenant"}, claims)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: unexpected validation error: %v", tmpl, err)
-		}
-		var back map[string]interface{}
-		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(got), &back); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: output %q is not valid JSON: %v", tmpl, got, err)
-		}
-		if back["id"] != "t-1" || back["plan"] != "pro" || back["n"] != 3.0 || back["ok"] != true {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: round trip mismatch: %q", tmpl, got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestToJson_ValueTypes(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{
-		"groups": []interface{}{"admin", "users"},
-		"email":  "[email protected]",
-		"exp":    1700000000.0,
-		"role":   "",
-	}
-	cases := []struct{ name, tmpl, want string }{
-		{"array", `{{ toJson .Claims.groups }}`, `["admin","users"]`},
-		{"string", `{{ toJson .Claims.email }}`, `"[email protected]"`},
-		{"number", `{{ toJson .Claims.exp }}`, `1700000000`},
-		{"missing claim skips header", `{{ toJson .Claims.department }}`, ``},
-		{"missing via get skips header", `{{ get .Claims "department" | toJson }}`, ``},
-		{"empty string skips header", `{{ toJson .Claims.role }}`, ``},
-		{"literal string", `{{ toJson "x" }}`, `"x"`},
-		{"literal number", `{{ toJson 5 }}`, `5`},
-		{"composes with surrounding text", `v={{ toJson .Claims.groups }};`, `v=["admin","users"];`},
-	}
-	for _, c := range cases {
-		got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, c.tmpl, nil, claims)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: unexpected validation error: %v", c.name, err)
-		}
-		if got != c.want {
-			t.Errorf("%s: got %q want %q", c.name, got, c.want)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestToJson_EmptyAndNilContainers(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{
-		"realm_access": map[string]interface{}{},
-		"groups":       []interface{}{},
-	}
-	if got, _ := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ toJson .Claims.realm_access }}`, nil, claims); got != `{}` {
-		t.Errorf("empty object: got %q", got)
-	}
-	if got, _ := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ toJson .Claims.groups }}`, nil, claims); got != `[]` {
-		t.Errorf("empty array: got %q", got)
-	}
-	if got, _ := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ toJson .Claims.groups }}`, nil, nil); got != `` {
-		t.Errorf("nil claims: got %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestToJson_UnmarshalableValueDropsHeader(t *testing.T) {
-	fn := headerTemplateFuncMap(nil)["toJson"].(func(interface{}) (string, error))
-	if _, err := fn(make(chan int)); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for unmarshalable value")
-	}
-	// A non-finite float is the only way a claim map could carry one in.
-	if _, err := fn(map[string]interface{}{"x": func() {}}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for func value")
-	}
-}
-
-// Security: toJson must not widen what a template can reach.
-func TestToJson_SecurityBoundary(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{
-		"email":  "[email protected]",
-		"secret": "NOT-WHITELISTED",
-		"tenant": map[string]interface{}{"id": "t"},
-	}
-	rejected := []string{
-		`{{ toJson . }}`,
-		`{{ toJson $ }}`,
-		`{{ toJson .Claims }}`,
-		`{{ toJson $.Claims }}`,
-		`{{ .Claims | toJson }}`,
-		`{{ toJson .Claims.secret }}`,
-		`{{ toJson $.Claims.secret }}`,
-		`{{ toJson .AccessToken }}{{ toJson .Claims }}`,
-		`{{ get .Claims "secret" | toJson }}`,
-		`{{ toJson (get . "AccessToken") }}`,
-		`{{ get . "Claims" | toJson }}`,
-		`{{ with .Claims }}{{ toJson . }}{{ end }}`,
-		`{{ range .Claims }}{{ toJson . }}{{ end }}`,
-		`{{ toJson (index .Claims "secret") }}`,
-		`{{ toJson (printf "%v" .Claims) }}`,
-		`{{ toJson (call .Claims) }}`,
-		`{{ tojson .Claims.email }}`,
-		`{{ toJSON .Claims.email }}`,
-		`{{ toJson | js }}`,
-	}
-	for _, tmpl := range rejected {
-		if got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, tmpl, nil, claims); err == nil {
-			t.Errorf("%s: must be rejected by validation, rendered %q", tmpl, got)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Dynamic key: static validation cannot see it, the runtime whitelist must.
-	dyn := `{{ get .Claims .Claims.email | toJson }}`
-	if got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, dyn, nil, map[string]interface{}{"email": "secret", "secret": "LEAK"}); err != nil || strings.Contains(got, "LEAK") {
-		t.Errorf("dynamic key leaked a non-whitelisted claim: err=%v got=%q", err, got)
-	}
-}
-
-// Security: tokens and the claims map never appear in output, even from a
-// validated template that serializes a whitelisted claim.
-func TestToJson_NoTokenLeak(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{"tenant": map[string]interface{}{"id": "t"}}
-	got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ toJson .Claims.tenant }}`, []string{"tenant"}, claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	for _, s := range []string{"AT-SECRET", "IDT-SECRET", "RT-SECRET"} {
-		if strings.Contains(got, s) {
-			t.Fatalf("token %s leaked into %q", s, got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Security: a non-whitelisted claim stays unreachable until the operator opts
-// in via allowedClaims, with or without toJson.
-func TestToJson_RequiresAllowedClaims(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{"tenant": map[string]interface{}{"id": "t"}}
-	if _, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ toJson .Claims.tenant }}`, nil, claims); err == nil {
-		t.Error("direct reference to non-whitelisted claim must be rejected")
-	}
-	got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ get .Claims "tenant" | toJson }}`, nil, claims)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Errorf("literal get key outside whitelist must be rejected, rendered %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// Security: hostile claim content must not produce header injection.
-func TestToJson_HeaderInjectionHardening(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name  string
-		value interface{}
-		// forwarded reports whether the header is expected to reach upstream.
-		forwarded bool
-	}{
-		{"CRLF is escaped to \\r\\n", map[string]interface{}{"x": "a\r\nX-Evil: 1"}, true},
-		{"NUL and control chars escaped", map[string]interface{}{"x": "a\x00\x07b"}, true},
-		{"LS/PS escaped", map[string]interface{}{"x": "a

b"}, true},
-		{"HTML chars escaped", map[string]interface{}{"x": "<script>&"}, true},
-		{"quote and backslash escaped", map[string]interface{}{"x": `"\`}, true},
-		{"bidi override dropped by sanitizer", map[string]interface{}{"x": "a\u202Eb"}, false},
-		{"bidi isolate dropped by sanitizer", map[string]interface{}{"x": "a\u2066b"}, false},
-		{"oversize dropped by sanitizer", map[string]interface{}{"x": strings.Repeat("A", headerTemplateMaxLen)}, false},
-	}
-	for _, c := range cases {
-		got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ toJson .Claims.realm_access }}`, nil, map[string]interface{}{"realm_access": c.value})
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: %v", c.name, err)
-		}
-		if !c.forwarded {
-			if got != "" {
-				t.Errorf("%s: tainted value must be dropped, got %d bytes", c.name, len(got))
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-		if got == "" {
-			t.Errorf("%s: safe escaped JSON must be forwarded", c.name)
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, r := range got {
-			if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f || r == 0x2028 || r == 0x2029 {
-				t.Errorf("%s: raw control rune %U in %q", c.name, r, got)
-			}
-		}
-		if strings.ContainsAny(got, "<>&") {
-			t.Errorf("%s: unescaped HTML char in %q", c.name, got)
-		}
-		var back map[string]interface{}
-		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(got), &back); err != nil {
-			t.Errorf("%s: not valid JSON: %v", c.name, err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Default-preserving: existing templates are unaffected and toJson is not
-// available to anything but validated header templates.
-func TestToJson_ExistingTemplatesUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{"email": "[email protected]", "groups": []interface{}{"x", "y"}}
-	got, err := renderHeaderTemplate(t, `{{ .Claims.email }}|{{range $i, $e := .Claims.groups}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}|{{ default "d" .Claims.role }}`, nil, claims)
-	if err != nil || got != "[email protected]|x,y|d" {
-		t.Fatalf("got %q err=%v", got, err)
-	}
-	if _, ok := headerTemplateFuncMap(nil)["toJson"]; !ok {
-		t.Fatal("toJson missing from func map")
-	}
-	for _, name := range []string{"env", "expandenv", "printf", "call", "index", "js"} {
-		if _, ok := headerTemplateFuncMap(nil)[name]; ok {
-			t.Errorf("%s must not be exposed", name)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestToJson_ConfigValidate(t *testing.T) {
-	cfg := issue149BaseConfig()
-	cfg.AllowedClaims = []string{"tenant"}
-	cfg.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{{Name: "X-Tenant", Value: `{{ get .Claims "tenant" | toJson }}`}}
-	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("toJson header must validate: %v", err)
-	}
-	cfg.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{{Name: "X-All", Value: `{{ toJson .Claims }}`}}
-	if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("toJson of whole Claims must fail validation")
-	}
-}
-
-// Oversize output is operator-actionable, so it logs at error level (name and
-// size limit only, never the value); other sanitizer drops stay at debug.
-func TestToJson_OversizeLogsError(t *testing.T) {
-	run := func(claim map[string]interface{}) string {
-		var buf strings.Builder
-		logger := NewLogger("debug")
-		logger.logError.SetOutput(&buf)
-		tmpl := template.Must(template.New("X-Test").Funcs(headerTemplateFuncMap(nil)).Parse(`{{ toJson .Claims.realm_access }}`))
-		o := &TraefikOidc{logger: logger, headerTemplates: map[string]*template.Template{"X-Test": tmpl}}
-		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-		o.applyHeaderTemplates(req, &principal{Claims: map[string]interface{}{"realm_access": claim}})
-		if req.Header.Get("X-Test") != "" {
-			t.Fatal("tainted header must be dropped")
-		}
-		return buf.String()
-	}
-	big := strings.Repeat("S3CRET", headerTemplateMaxLen)
-	out := run(map[string]interface{}{"x": big})
-	if !strings.Contains(out, "X-Test") || !strings.Contains(out, "exceeds") {
-		t.Errorf("oversize must log an error naming the header, got %q", out)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(out, "S3CRET") {
-		t.Error("error log must not contain the value")
-	}
-	if out := run(map[string]interface{}{"x": "a\u202Eb"}); out != "" {
-		t.Errorf("non-length sanitizer drop must not log at error level, got %q", out)
-	}
-}

types.go

@@ -111,9 +111,6 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	// recovery attempt. Stored atomically so the hot ServeHTTP path can
 	// throttle retries without acquiring metadataRetryMutex on every request.
 	lastMetadataRetryNano int64
-	// initWaiters counts requests parked on initComplete; bounded by
-	// maxInitWaiters so a boot-time flood cannot hold unbounded connections.
-	initWaiters int32
 	// firstRequestStarted is 0 until the very first non-health request fires
 	// the background-task bootstrap; then it flips to 1 via CAS. Replaces the
 	// firstRequestMutex + firstRequestReceived combo which previously took
@@ -227,7 +224,6 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	dcrMu                     sync.Mutex
 	shutdownOnce              sync.Once
 	sessionInvalidationCache  CacheInterface
-	frontchannelMarkers       markerQuota
 	refreshResultCache        CacheInterface
 	minimalHeaders            bool
 	stripAuthCookies          bool

version.go

@@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ const devPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"
 // from build info at runtime (debug.ReadBuildInfo sees Traefik's build graph,
 // not the interpreted plugin). This build-stamped constant is therefore the
 // single source of truth for the version reported by anonymous usage telemetry.
-const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.45"
+const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.42"