test(oidcgate): integration test with real middleware against mock IdP (#142)

- Add 'oidcgate' build entry (linux/darwin × amd64/arm64) to goreleaser.
- Add per-OS/arch tar.gz archives for the daemon binary.
- Add dockers + docker_manifests entries publishing
  ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:vX.Y.Z (release tag), :vX.Y, :vX, :latest
  as multi-arch manifests (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64).
- Add cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile (distroless static, nonroot user).
- Sign images with cosign keyless (docker_signs).
- Preserve existing source-only Traefik plugin archive via meta:true.
- Update README to advertise the published image.

.github/workflows/pr.yaml

@@ -18,43 +18,6 @@ jobs:
   pr-checks:
     uses: lukaszraczylo/shared-actions/.github/workflows/go-pr.yaml@main
     with:
-      go-version: "1.26.x"
+      go-version: "1.24.11"
       coverage-threshold: 70
     secrets: inherit
-
-  yaegi-validate:
-    name: Yaegi interpreter compatibility
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v7
-
-      - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v7
-        with:
-          go-version: "1.26.x"
-
-      # Pinned to the yaegi version Traefik v3.7.1 vendors (Makefile
-      # YAEGI_VERSION), so this tests the real interpreter a release runs
-      # under, not a newer one that may tolerate more.
-      - name: Install yaegi
-        run: go install github.com/traefik/yaegi/cmd/[email protected]
-
-      # yaegi resolves the plugin's own import path
-      # (github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc) through GOPATH/src, same as
-      # `make yaegi-validate` does locally.
-      - name: Symlink checkout into GOPATH
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p "$(go env GOPATH)/src/github.com/lukaszraczylo"
-          ln -sfn "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" "$(go env GOPATH)/src/github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
-
-      # Runs cmd/yaegicheck under the real interpreter: imports the plugin
-      # package, exercises CreateConfig + New, and drives every yaegi-only
-      # regression check (errors.As-on-an-interpreted-target panics,
-      # SSE Flush across the interpreter boundary, etc.) that native
-      # `go build`/`go test` cannot see.
-      - name: Run yaegi regression checks
-        run: DO_NOT_TRACK=1 GOFLAGS=-mod=vendor yaegi run ./cmd/yaegicheck/main.go

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ jobs:
   release:
     uses: lukaszraczylo/shared-actions/.github/workflows/go-release.yaml@main
     with:
-      go-version: "1.26.x"
+      go-version: "1.24.11"
     secrets: inherit

.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 docker/
-.claude/
+.claude/*.out
 *.test
 .leann/

.goreleaser.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,41 @@
 version: 2
 
-# Traefik plugins are source-only - no binary builds
-# Traefik loads plugins via Yaegi interpreter at runtime
+# Two release artefacts:
+#
+# 1. The Traefik plugin: source-only — Traefik loads it via the Yaegi
+#    interpreter from the source tarball published on GitHub releases.
+# 2. oidcgate: a standalone forward-auth daemon built from cmd/oidcgate.
+#    Shipped as both per-OS/arch binary archives AND a multi-arch Docker
+#    image at ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate, tagged to match the release.
+
 builds:
-  - skip: true
+  - id: oidcgate
+    main: ./cmd/oidcgate
+    binary: oidcgate
+    env:
+      - CGO_ENABLED=0
+    goos:
+      - linux
+      - darwin
+    goarch:
+      - amd64
+      - arm64
+    flags:
+      - -trimpath
+      - -buildvcs=false
+    ldflags:
+      - -s -w
+      - -X main.version={{.Version}}
+      - -X main.commit={{.ShortCommit}}
+      - -X main.date={{.Date}}
+    mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
 
-# Create source archive for GitHub releases
 archives:
-  - formats: [tar.gz]
+  # Source archive for the Traefik plugin path. meta:true → no binary
+  # builds attached; everything comes from `files:` below.
+  - id: source-plugin
+    meta: true
+    formats: [tar.gz]
     name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_v{{ .Version }}_source"
     files:
       - "*.go"
@@ -25,6 +53,93 @@ archives:
       - "!regression/**"
       - "!examples/**"
       - "!docs/**"
+      - "!cmd/**"
+
+  # Per-OS/arch binary archives for the oidcgate daemon.
+  - id: oidcgate
+    ids: [oidcgate]
+    formats: [tar.gz]
+    name_template: "oidcgate_v{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
+    files:
+      - LICENSE*
+      - README*
+      - src: docs/OIDCGATE.md
+        dst: docs/
+      - src: examples/oidcgate.yaml
+        dst: examples/
+
+# Build a Docker image per (linux, arch) combo. Tag suffixes are
+# combined into a single multi-arch manifest list below via
+# docker_manifests, so end users pull a single tag.
+dockers:
+  - id: oidcgate-amd64
+    ids: [oidcgate]
+    goos: linux
+    goarch: amd64
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+    use: buildx
+    dockerfile: cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile
+    build_flag_templates:
+      - "--pull"
+      - "--platform=linux/amd64"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.title=oidcgate"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.description=Standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon for nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.version={{ .Version }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.revision={{ .FullCommit }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.created={{ .Date }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.source=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.url=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.documentation=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/blob/main/docs/OIDCGATE.md"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.licenses=MIT"
+
+  - id: oidcgate-arm64
+    ids: [oidcgate]
+    goos: linux
+    goarch: arm64
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    use: buildx
+    dockerfile: cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile
+    build_flag_templates:
+      - "--pull"
+      - "--platform=linux/arm64"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.title=oidcgate"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.description=Standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon for nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.version={{ .Version }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.revision={{ .FullCommit }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.created={{ .Date }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.source=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.url=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.documentation=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/blob/main/docs/OIDCGATE.md"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.licenses=MIT"
+
+# Multi-arch manifests — these are what users actually pull.
+# Tags match the release tag (vX.Y.Z) exactly, plus a few convenience tags.
+docker_manifests:
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:v{{ .Version }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:v{{ .Major }}.{{ .Minor }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    skip_push: auto
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:v{{ .Major }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    skip_push: auto
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:latest"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    skip_push: auto
 
 checksum:
   name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_v{{ .Version }}_checksums.txt"
@@ -58,3 +173,13 @@ signs:
       - "--yes"
     artifacts: checksum
     output: true
+
+# Sign the Docker images and manifests with cosign keyless.
+docker_signs:
+  - cmd: cosign
+    artifacts: all
+    args:
+      - sign
+      - "${artifact}@${digest}"
+      - "--yes"
+    output: true

.traefik.yml

@@ -60,18 +60,14 @@ testData:
   scopes:
     - roles
 
-  # Templated headers forwarded to backends. Values are Go templates and must
-  # be written with plain double braces — the catalog analyzer feeds them to
-  # the plugin verbatim (issue #151; quadruple braces do NOT get collapsed).
-  # Only when your dynamic config file is rendered by Traefik's file-provider
-  # Go templating do the braces need escaping there, e.g.
-  #   value: "{{`{{.Claims.email}}`}}"
-  # (see README "Templated headers").
+  # Templated headers forwarded to backends.
+  # NOTE: use quadruple braces — the YAML parser collapses {{{{ → {{ so the
+  # Go template engine receives the correct expression.
   headers:
     - name: X-User-Email
-      value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+      value: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}"
     - name: Authorization
-      value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+      value: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}"
 
   # Security headers (default profile is enabled out of the box)
   securityHeaders:
@@ -100,15 +96,9 @@ testData:
   # bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate: true       # default; RFC 6750 hint on 401s
   # bearerOverridesCookie: false          # default; cookie wins when both are present
   # requireTokenIntrospection: false      # opt-in; calls RFC 7662 introspection per request
-  # introspectionURL: https://idp.example.com/oauth/introspect  # manual override; set when discovery omits introspection_endpoint
   # maxTokenAgeSeconds: 86400             # 24h cap on iat (rejects clock-skew/forever tokens)
   # maxIdentifierLength: 256              # cap on the sanitised principal identifier
   # bearerFailureThreshold: 20            # consecutive 401s/IP that trip the throttle
   # bearerFailureWindowSeconds: 60        # rolling window over which 401s are counted
   # bearerFailurePenaltySeconds: 60       # 429 + Retry-After duration after threshold trips
 
-  # Optional: RFC 8707 resource indicator, alternative to `audience` for
-  # supporting IdPs. See docs/RFC8707.md for exact request behavior and
-  # provider support.
-  # resource: https://api.example.com
-

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-All notable changes to this project are documented in this file.
-
-The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
-
-## [Unreleased]
-
-### Added
-
-- **`allowUnauthenticatedPreflight` (default `false`).** Every `OPTIONS`
-  request needs authentication by default, as in the last release. Set the
-  option to `true` to let a genuine CORS preflight reach the backend
-  without a session. Only an `OPTIONS` request that carries both `Origin`
-  and `Access-Control-Request-Method` bypasses authentication, and the
-  plugin discards the backend's response body for it, because a browser
-  never reads a preflight body (`settings.go`, `middleware.go`, FIX-02).
-  See the option table in [CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md).
-
-- **`streamingRefresh` (default `false`).** SSE and WebSocket requests do
-  not check the token expiry, so a session stays usable for streaming until
-  the session cookie expires. Set the option to `true` to refresh an expired
-  token on these requests. If the IdP rejects the refresh with
-  `invalid_grant`, the request gets `401`. If the IdP cannot be reached, the
-  request is forwarded as before. The request waits for the full refresh, so
-  a rotated refresh token is never lost (`middleware.go`).
-
-### Changed
-
-- **Opaque bearer tokens when all three bearer flags are set.** A deployment
-  that sets `enableBearerAuth`, `requireTokenIntrospection` and
-  `allowOpaqueTokens` now accepts opaque bearer tokens after RFC 7662
-  introspection. The last release rejected every non-JWT bearer token. The
-  plugin binds an accepted opaque token to the client through `client_id` or
-  `aud`. It also applies the identifier, token-age, logout, revocation and
-  `nbf` checks (`bearer_auth.go`).
-
-- **Sessions created before this upgrade can omit `post_logout_redirect_uri`
-  on their first logout.** The plugin now builds that parameter only from the
-  redirect-URI origin recorded at login, never from the logout request's
-  host. Older sessions have no recorded origin, so those users stay on the
-  IdP's logout page once (`helpers.go`).
-
-- **Shutdown waits up to 5 seconds for a token refresh in progress.** On
-  shutdown, for example a Traefik reload, the refresh coordinator lets a
-  refresh that already reached the IdP deliver its tokens, then returns
-  (`shutdownRefreshDrainTimeout`, `refresh_coordinator.go`). A refresh that
-  has not started does not start after shutdown.
-
-- **A panic after the request reaches the backend now aborts the
-  connection.** The plugin re-panics it, for example the reverse proxy's
-  `http.ErrAbortHandler` when an upstream drops the connection mid-body. Go's
-  HTTP server then aborts the connection. Before, the plugin recovered the
-  panic, so a truncated response could reach the client as a complete 200. A
-  panic before the request reaches the backend still returns 500
-  (`middleware.go`).
-
-- **private_key_jwt now rejects RSA signing keys under 2048 bits.**
-  `validateAlgKeyMatch` stops `New()` with an error when a configured
-  `private_key_jwt` RS\*/PS\* key is smaller than 2048 bits (RFC 7518 §3.3).
-  A smaller key signs locally, but a conformant IdP rejects it at token
-  exchange with `invalid_client`, so the plugin now fails at construction
-  instead of at every runtime exchange. There is no override: deployments
-  using an RSA key under 2048 bits must generate a 2048-bit-or-larger key
-  before upgrading. The rejection returns a matchable `ErrRSAKeyTooSmall`
-  sentinel (`client_assertion.go`).
-
-- **A discovered `http://` endpoint is now dropped when `providerURL` is
-  `https://`.** `validateDiscoveredEndpoint` refuses to accept an
-  authorization, token, jwks_uri, revocation, end_session, introspection, or
-  registration endpoint served over plaintext HTTP when the operator
-  configured an HTTPS provider (R146): using it as-is would send a client
-  secret or token over an unauthenticated channel. There is no configuration
-  flag to disable this check. A dropped endpoint logs an `ERROR` line; a
-  dropped `token`, `jwks_uri`, or `authorization` endpoint — the three
-  every login needs — additionally logs a `SECURITY:`-prefixed line naming
-  the endpoint, the dropped URL, and the fact that there is no override, so
-  the failure is diagnosable instead of surfacing only as a broken login.
-  See [Discovered Endpoint
-  Validation](docs/CONFIGURATION.md#discovered-endpoint-validation)
-  (`url_helpers.go`, `main.go`).
-
-- **Blacklist entries in Redis use the `blacklist:` key prefix.** The
-  blacklist cache now has its own cache type (`CacheTypeBlacklist`), so its
-  Redis keys move from the shared `token:` prefix to `blacklist:` (R128).
-  A cached token entry and a revocation marker for the same raw token can
-  no longer overwrite each other. For one release, a blacklist miss also
-  reads the legacy `token:<key>` entry and treats it as revoked only when
-  the stored value is boolean `true` (`checkLegacyBlacklistMarker` in
-  `universal_cache.go`, FIX-16). The fallback works in one direction only:
-  during a rolling deploy, a replica that runs the previous version does
-  not see revocations that an upgraded replica writes under `blacklist:`.
-  A blacklist miss checks the legacy `token:` entry at most once per key in
-  each 30 seconds, so the fallback adds little Redis traffic.
-
-- **Claim validation accepts four previously-rejected or silently-dropped
-  claim shapes.** Each change below is intentional, matches a production
-  change, and is pinned by an existing regression test.
-  - `iat` (issued-at) is optional in `jwt.Verify`, per RFC 7519 §4.1.6. A
-    token that omits it is validated on `iss`/`aud`/`exp`/`nbf` alone,
-    instead of being rejected (`jwt.go`, R126). The lenient-audience
-    access-token path (`accessTokenUnexpired` in `token_validation_rs.go`)
-    applies the same rule, because both paths call `verifyTimeClaims`
-    (`jwt.go`, FIX-27). Bearer-token auth still rejects a token with no
-    `iat`: it returns `"missing iat claim"` (`enforceIatAge` in
-    `bearer_auth.go`), because `maxTokenAgeSeconds` always applies — `0`
-    falls back to a 24h default (`main.go`).
-  - A numeric `sub` (bearer-auth identifier) claim is stringified instead of
-    rejected, so an IdP that emits a numeric subject still authenticates
-    (`bearer_auth.go` `resolveBearerIdentifier`, R102).
-  - A `groups`/`roles` claim that is neither a string nor an array (for
-    example a bare number or `null`) is treated as an empty list instead of
-    failing claim extraction outright, so a malformed claim on one side does
-    not suppress a valid claim on the other (`token_manager.go`
-    `extractGroupsAndRolesFromClaims`, R96).
-  - A numeric element inside a `groups`/`roles` array is stringified into
-    the list instead of being silently dropped, so a numeric group ID
-    survives extraction and can match an `allowedRolesAndGroups` entry
-    (`token_manager.go` `stringListFromClaim`, `utilities.go`
-    `claimScalarString`, R105).
-
-### Fixed
-
-- SSE and WebSocket requests now get the configured `headers`, as normal
-  requests do. The last release sent only `X-Forwarded-User` on these
-  requests, so a backend that checks a shared-secret header answered `401`
-  on WebSocket upgrades. The same requests now also honor back-channel and
-  front-channel logout (`middleware.go`, #162).
-- The opaque bearer path rejects a token that `RevokeToken` added to the
-  blacklist, for example at logout. It also rejects an opaque token whose
-  `nbf` is in the future (`bearer_auth.go`).
-- The backchannel-logout replay check treats a Redis error reply such as
-  `READONLY`, `OOM` or `MISCONF` as a failure, not as an unknown outcome. A
-  replayed logout token is now rejected while Redis refuses writes
-  (`internal/cache/backends/redis.go`).
-- After a failed cache write, a replica no longer ignores a newer value that
-  another replica wrote, such as a later logout. The preference for the local
-  value expires after 5 seconds (`backendStaleMarkTTL`, `universal_cache.go`).
-- The token circuit breaker treats HTTP 408 from the token endpoint as a
-  transient failure, the same as 429 (`error_recovery.go`).
-- With `allowUnauthenticatedPreflight` enabled, a preflight response no longer
-  carries a stale `Content-Length` when the backend writes a body without
-  calling `WriteHeader` (`middleware.go`).
-- A dropped `http://` revocation, end-session or introspection endpoint logs
-  the `SECURITY:` line when its override (`revocationURL`, `oidcEndSessionURL`
-  or `introspectionURL`) is not configured (`main.go`).

Makefile

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-# traefikoidc — Makefile
-# Run `make help` for available targets.
-
-GO            ?= go
-GOPATH        := $(shell $(GO) env GOPATH)
-# Pin to the yaegi version bundled by the deployed Traefik so yaegi-validate
-# tests the real interpreter, not a newer one that may support more. Traefik
-# v3.7.1 vendors yaegi v0.16.1 (Go ~1.22 stdlib surface). Bump when Traefik is.
-YAEGI_VERSION ?= v0.16.1
-TEST_TIMEOUT  ?= 480s
-
-.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
-
-.PHONY: help
-help: ## Show this help
-	@grep -hE '^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+:.*## ' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | awk 'BEGIN{FS=":.*## "}{printf "  \033[36m%-16s\033[0m %s\n", $$1, $$2}'
-
-.PHONY: build
-build: ## Compile all packages (native toolchain)
-	$(GO) build ./...
-
-.PHONY: fmt
-fmt: ## Format sources with gofmt
-	gofmt -w $$(git ls-files '*.go' | grep -v '^vendor/')
-
-.PHONY: vet
-vet: ## Run go vet
-	$(GO) vet ./...
-
-.PHONY: lint
-lint: ## Run golangci-lint if available
-	@if command -v golangci-lint >/dev/null 2>&1; then golangci-lint run ./...; else echo "golangci-lint not installed; skipping"; fi
-
-.PHONY: staticcheck
-staticcheck: ## Run staticcheck (matches the CI "Static Analysis" job; catches U1000 unused, etc.)
-	@command -v staticcheck >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ">> installing staticcheck"; $(GO) install honnef.co/go/tools/cmd/staticcheck@latest; }
-	@GOFLAGS=-buildvcs=false $$(command -v staticcheck || echo "$(GOPATH)/bin/staticcheck") ./...
-
-.PHONY: test
-test: ## Run the test suite (race detector on: several regression pins, e.g. R44/R77/R111, only fail under -race)
-	$(GO) test -race ./... -count=1 -timeout $(TEST_TIMEOUT)
-
-.PHONY: vendor
-vendor: ## Refresh and vendor dependencies
-	$(GO) mod tidy && $(GO) mod vendor
-
-# yaegi-validate interprets the plugin under the yaegi interpreter the same way
-# Traefik loads it. Native `go build`/`go test` use the standard compiler and do
-# NOT catch yaegi-only incompatibilities (unsupported stdlib symbols, reflection
-# edge cases). This target does. Importing the package forces yaegi to interpret
-# every file in it plus its vendored deps; CreateConfig + New exercise the
-# instantiation path. Pin YAEGI_VERSION to match Traefik's bundled yaegi if you
-# need exact parity.
-.PHONY: yaegi-validate
-yaegi-validate: ## Verify the plugin loads under Traefik's yaegi interpreter
-	@command -v yaegi >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ">> installing yaegi@$(YAEGI_VERSION)"; $(GO) install github.com/traefik/yaegi/cmd/yaegi@$(YAEGI_VERSION); }
-	@echo ">> interpreting plugin under yaegi (as Traefik does)"
-	@DO_NOT_TRACK=1 GOFLAGS=-mod=vendor $$(command -v yaegi || echo "$(GOPATH)/bin/yaegi") run ./cmd/yaegicheck/main.go
-
-.PHONY: check
-check: vet staticcheck test yaegi-validate ## vet + staticcheck + tests + yaegi load validation

README.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ experimental:
   plugins:
     traefikoidc:
       moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
-      version: v1.0.29
+      version: v0.7.10
 ```
 
 Then attach the middleware in your dynamic configuration (see
@@ -64,6 +64,28 @@ cosign verify-blob \
   traefikoidc_v<version>_checksums.txt
 ```
 
+## Standalone binary (oidcgate)
+
+If you don't run Traefik, `oidcgate` exposes the same middleware as a
+forward-auth daemon for nginx, Caddy, Traefik ForwardAuth, HAProxy, and
+Envoy. See [`docs/OIDCGATE.md`](docs/OIDCGATE.md).
+
+```bash
+# From source
+go build -o oidcgate ./cmd/oidcgate
+./oidcgate --config examples/oidcgate.yaml
+
+# Or pull the released image (multi-arch: linux/amd64, linux/arm64)
+docker run --rm \
+  -v /path/to/config.yaml:/etc/oidcgate/config.yaml:ro \
+  -p 8080:8080 \
+  ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:latest
+```
+
+Each tagged release publishes a Docker image at
+`ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:vX.Y.Z` (matching the release tag), plus
+floating `:vX.Y`, `:vX`, and `:latest` aliases.
+
 ## Quickstart
 
 ```yaml
@@ -111,8 +133,7 @@ Full reference in [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md).
 | `logoutURL` | `callbackURL + "/logout"` | RP-initiated logout path. |
 | `postLogoutRedirectURI` | `/` | Where to send users after logout. |
 | `scopes` | appended to `openid profile email` | Extra OAuth scopes. Set `overrideScopes: true` to replace defaults. |
-| `extraAuthParams` | none | Map of extra query parameters appended to the authorization request (e.g. `screen_hint: signup`, `login_hint`, `ui_locales`, `prompt`). Plugin-managed params (`client_id`, `state`, `nonce`, `redirect_uri`, `code_challenge`, `scope`, `response_type`, …) cannot be overridden. |
-| `excludedURLs` | none | Paths that bypass auth, matched at a path-segment or file-extension boundary (e.g. `/public` matches `/public`, `/public/sub` and `/public.json`, but **not** `/publicsecret`). |
+| `excludedURLs` | none | Prefix-matched paths that bypass auth. |
 | `allowedUserDomains` | none | Restrict to email domains. |
 | `allowedUsers` | none | Restrict to specific addresses (or claim values when `userIdentifierClaim != email`). |
 | `allowedRolesAndGroups` | none | Require any of these roles/groups from ID-token claims. |
@@ -121,25 +142,16 @@ Full reference in [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md).
 | `enablePKCE` | `false` | PKCE on the auth code flow. |
 | `cookieDomain` | auto | Set explicitly for multi-subdomain setups (`.example.com`). |
 | `cookiePrefix` | `_oidc_raczylo_` | Unique prefix per middleware instance to isolate sessions. |
-| `cookiePath` | `/` | Restrict cookies to a path prefix. Set to the middleware's path (e.g. `/app`) to prevent the browser from sending OIDC cookies to unprotected paths, avoiding 431 "Request Header Or Cookie Too Large" errors on mixed-use domains. |
 | `sessionMaxAge` | `86400` | Session lifetime in seconds. |
 | `refreshGracePeriodSeconds` | `60` | Proactively refresh tokens this many seconds before expiry. |
 | `maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds` | `21600` | Heuristic max stored refresh-token lifetime (6h). Past this, the plugin treats the RT as expired without contacting the IdP — returns 401 to AJAX, full re-auth on navigations. Set `0` to disable. Tune to match your IdP's RT TTL. |
 | `rateLimit` | `100` | Requests/sec. Min `10`. |
-| `perSourceLoginRateLimit` | `0` (off) | Throttle OIDC auth events (authorization-code callback + login initiation) per external client source, auth events per minute. Keys and classifies the source by RemoteAddr only, never `X-Forwarded-For`, so a client cannot spoof it. Internal/loopback sources (proxies, in-cluster) are never throttled. `0` disables. RemoteAddr is the TCP peer. Behind a load balancer or CDN, the limiter keys on the proxy address: a private address is never throttled, and a public address puts every client in one shared bucket. |
 | `logLevel` | `info` | `debug`, `info`, `error`. |
-| `audience` | `clientID`, or `resource` if set | Custom access-token audience (Auth0 custom APIs). |
-| `resource` | none | RFC 8707 resource indicator, alternative to `audience` for supporting IdPs (see [docs/RFC8707.md](docs/RFC8707.md)). |
+| `audience` | `clientID` | Custom access-token audience (Auth0 custom APIs). |
 | `strictAudienceValidation` | `false` | Reject mismatched audiences. **Set `true` in production.** |
 | `allowOpaqueTokens` / `requireTokenIntrospection` | `false` | Accept opaque access tokens via RFC 7662. |
-| `revocationURL` / `oidcEndSessionURL` / `introspectionURL` | `""` | Override the discovered revocation / end-session / introspection endpoints; take precedence when discovery omits them. |
-| `maxIdentifierLength` | `256` | Bound the post-sanitisation length of the bearer identity header (`X-Forwarded-User`). |
-| `bearerFailureWindowSeconds` | `60` | Rolling window (s) over which per-IP bearer 401s are counted toward the throttle. |
-| `bearerFailurePenaltySeconds` | `60` | Seconds an IP is kept in the 429 penalty box after the bearer failure threshold. |
 | `disableReplayDetection` | `false` | Disable JTI cache. Use Redis instead for multi-replica. |
 | `allowPrivateIPAddresses` | `false` | Permit private-IP `providerURL` (internal Keycloak, etc.). |
-| `allowUnauthenticatedPreflight` | `false` | Bypass auth for a genuine CORS preflight (`OPTIONS` + `Origin` + `Access-Control-Request-Method`); the response body is still discarded. Default requires auth for every `OPTIONS` request, preflight or not. |
-| `streamingRefresh` | `false` | Refresh an expired session on SSE/WebSocket requests. Reject the request when the IdP revokes the grant. |
 | `minimalHeaders` | `false` | Reduce forwarded headers (mitigates HTTP 431). |
 | `stripAuthCookies` | `false` | Strip OIDC cookies from backend hop (mitigates HTTP 431). |
 | `caCertPath` / `caCertPEM` | none | Trust an internal CA for the provider's TLS. |
@@ -156,38 +168,6 @@ Full reference in [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md).
 
 ## Production gotchas
 
-### Upgrading from an earlier release
-
-- **Sessions are re-issued once.** Session cookies are now AES-256 encrypted
-  (previously signed only) and their cryptographic lifetime tracks
-  `sessionMaxAge` (previously a fixed 30 days). Existing cookies become invalid
-  on upgrade, so users re-authenticate one time.
-- **A rollback to v1.0.25 or earlier also invalidates sessions.** Those
-  releases cannot read the encrypted cookies that v1.0.26 and later issue.
-  They log `securecookie: the value is not valid` and `No state in
-  callback`, and the browser loops through the login. After a rollback, tell
-  users to delete
-  the `_oidc_raczylo_*` cookies (or the cookies with your `cookiePrefix`)
-  for the affected hosts. The cookies are `HttpOnly`, so users must delete
-  them in the browser site-data settings.
-- **Invalid configuration now fails closed at startup** instead of being
-  silently accepted: a `sessionEncryptionKey` shorter than 32 bytes, a
-  `rateLimit` below 10, a missing `callbackURL`, or a non-HTTPS remote
-  `providerURL` are rejected. Plaintext HTTP is permitted only for loopback
-  hosts (local development).
-- **A `private_key_jwt` RSA key under 2048 bits now fails startup** instead
-  of signing locally and failing `invalid_client` at every token exchange
-  (RFC 7518 §3.3). Generate a 2048-bit-or-larger key before upgrading. No
-  override exists.
-- **A discovered `http://` endpoint under an `https://` `providerURL` is now
-  dropped**, not used as-is: the plugin refuses to send a client secret or
-  token over plaintext HTTP even when the IdP's own discovery document
-  advertises it that way. A dropped `token`, `jwks_uri`, or `authorization`
-  endpoint breaks login; a `SECURITY:`-tagged log line names the endpoint.
-  See [Discovered Endpoint
-  Validation](docs/CONFIGURATION.md#discovered-endpoint-validation). No
-  override exists.
-
 ### TLS termination at a load balancer
 
 `forceHTTPS` defaults to `true`, so redirect URIs always use `https://`. This is
@@ -207,8 +187,6 @@ detected" when the same token hits different replicas. Two options:
 
 For IdP-initiated logout (back/front-channel) in multi-replica setups, Redis is
 **required** so a logout on one instance invalidates sessions on the others.
-Front-channel logout requests must include a matching `iss` query parameter;
-requests that omit it are rejected with `400`.
 
 ### Multiple middleware instances on the same host
 
@@ -264,10 +242,9 @@ Hardening built in by default:
   `Authorization: Bearer` header arrive on the same request, the cookie path
   runs (safer against browser/extension/proxy bearer injection). Set
   `bearerOverridesCookie: true` for the AWS/GCP/Kubernetes convention.
-- **Revocation enforced.** No access-token JTI is recorded for replay;
-  `RevokeToken` (called from logout) blacklists the raw token (and a JWT's
-  `jti`), and both the JWT and the opaque bearer path reject a blacklisted
-  token.
+- **Replay protection preserved.** The bearer path skips the JTI **Set**
+  (so the same token can be reused) but the **Get** stays active —
+  `RevokeToken` still terminates a bearer token immediately.
 - **Excluded URLs strip Authorization.** When `enableBearerAuth=true`,
   excluded paths (e.g. `/health`, `/metrics`) get the `Authorization` header
   removed before forwarding so the token can't leak into public endpoint
@@ -313,17 +290,9 @@ WebSocket upgrade. The middleware handles this automatically:
 - They are **not** unauthenticated — a valid encrypted session cookie is
   required, otherwise the request is rejected. The session must already exist
   (i.e. the user logged in via a normal HTTP page first).
-- `X-Forwarded-User` and the configured `headers` are forwarded from the
-  session. Header templates render from the claims in the session cookie.
+- `X-Forwarded-User` is forwarded from the session.
 - Validation is cookie-only (no JWK fetch), so streaming keeps working during
-  brief IdP outages. Back-channel and front-channel logout still apply: a
-  session that the IdP logged out is rejected.
-- By default, the token expiry is not checked, so a session stays usable
-  for streaming until the session cookie expires. Set `streamingRefresh: true`
-  to refresh an expired token on the request. If the IdP rejects the refresh
-  (`invalid_grant`), the request gets `401`. If the IdP cannot be reached,
-  the request is forwarded as before. On a WebSocket upgrade, the refreshed
-  session cookie arrives on the `101 Switching Protocols` response.
+  brief IdP outages.
 
 No configuration needed — this is implicit behavior.
 
@@ -410,50 +379,21 @@ Forward identity to backends via Go templates over ID-token claims and tokens:
 ```yaml
 headers:
   - name: X-User-Email
-    value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+    value: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}"
   - name: Authorization
-    value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+    value: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}"
   - name: X-User-Roles
-    value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
+    value: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}"
 ```
 
-Available bindings: `.Claims.<field>`, `.AccessToken`, `.IdToken`
-(or `.IDToken`), `.RefreshToken`. Names are case-sensitive (`.Claims`, not
-`.claims`).
+Available bindings: `.Claims.<field>`, `.AccessToken`, `.IdToken`,
+`.RefreshToken`. Names are case-sensitive (`.Claims`, not `.claims`).
 
-Header templates are validated at startup (a failing template stops the
-middleware from loading). Only a fixed set of claim fields may be emitted —
-standard OIDC claims plus common provider claims (`email`, `name`,
-`given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `sub`, `groups`, `roles`,
-`realm_access`, `resource_access`, `oid`, `tid`, `upn`, `hd`, `picture`,
-`locale`, `email_verified`, and a few more; see `safeClaimsFields` in
-`template_validation.go`). To emit a claim not on that list, add it to
-`allowedClaims`:
-
-```yaml
-allowedClaims:
-  - employee_id
-headers:
-  - name: X-Employee-Id
-    value: "{{.Claims.employee_id}}"
-```
-
-Rendering the whole context (`{{.}}`, `{{$}}`), the whole claims map
-(`{{.Claims}}`), or any non-listed claim is rejected — this prevents a template
-from accidentally forwarding raw tokens or unlisted claims. `range`/`with` must
-target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims.groups}}`); `get`/`default`
-are the only functions allowed.
-
-> **File-provider users: escape the braces.** Traefik's file provider runs
-> every dynamic configuration file through Go templating before the plugin
-> sees it. Plain `{{.AccessToken}}` then fails with
-> `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool`. Wrap the expression in a
-> raw string so the file provider emits it literally:
-> ``value: "{{`{{.Claims.email}}`}}"``. All other providers (Kubernetes CRD,
-> Docker labels, Consul, ...) pass the value through untouched — use the plain
-> form there. Quadruple braces (`{{{{ }}}}`) do not work anywhere: the file
-> provider fails to parse them, and every other path hands them to the plugin
-> verbatim, where template validation rejects them (issues #149, #151).
+> **Escape with quadruple braces.** If you see
+> `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool`, Traefik's YAML parser ate
+> your `{{ }}`. The fix that actually works is `{{{{ }}}}` — the YAML pass
+> turns it into `{{ }}` for the Go template engine. Other escaping tricks
+> (literal blocks, single quotes) do not work reliably.
 
 ## Default downstream headers
 
@@ -481,7 +421,7 @@ section — see [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md#security-headers).
 | `No matching public key found` | JWKS endpoint down, or `kid` mismatch. |
 | `Access denied: Your email domain is not allowed` | User's domain not in `allowedUserDomains`. |
 | `Access denied: You do not have any of the allowed roles or groups` | Claims missing or not in `allowedRolesAndGroups`. |
-| `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool` | File provider templated your header value — escape it: ``"{{`{{.AccessToken}}`}}"`` (see "Templated headers"). |
+| `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool` | Template not escaped — use `{{{{ }}}}`. |
 | `tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority` | Internal CA — set `caCertPath` / `caCertPEM`. |
 | `invalid handler type: <nil>` | Env var name contains `API` — rename it. |
 | `false positive replay detected` | Multi-replica without Redis — see [Multi-replica deployments](#multi-replica-deployments). |
@@ -493,19 +433,6 @@ namespaced claims, Cognito regions, GitLab self-hosted) live in
 
 Set `logLevel: debug` to surface detail.
 
-## Telemetry
-
-On first plugin instantiation this middleware sends a single anonymous
-adoption ping — project name, version, timestamp; no identifiers, no
-request data, no token contents. Fire-and-forget with a 2-second timeout;
-cannot block plugin load or panic.
-
-Local source: [`telemetry.go`](./telemetry.go). Disclosure mirrors
-**[oss-telemetry — Disabling telemetry](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry#disabling-telemetry)**.
-
-Quick opt-out: set any of `DO_NOT_TRACK=1`, `OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1`,
-or `TRAEFIKOIDC_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`.
-
 ## License
 
 See [LICENSE](LICENSE).

access_token_unexpired_iat_optional_test.go

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-27 regression test.
-//
-// accessTokenUnexpired (the lenient-audience-path time-claims re-check)
-// returned false whenever iat was absent, even though 8640451 made iat
-// OPTIONAL in jwt.Verify itself (R126: "Hard-requiring it here also
-// rejected otherwise-valid access ... tokens whose provider omits iat").
-// The two paths had drifted onto different contracts for the same claim.
-// A lenient (wrong-audience) access token without iat, in a session with
-// no ID token to corroborate it, was always forced to refresh or
-// re-authenticate, while the identical token with a matching audience
-// authenticated fine via the main jwt.Verify path.
-//
-// Fail-on-old: a syntactically valid, unexpired token with no iat is
-// rejected by accessTokenUnexpired (returns false).
-func TestAccessTokenUnexpired_IatOptional(t *testing.T) {
-	tm := &TraefikOidc{}
-	now := time.Now()
-
-	noIat := makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{
-		"exp": float64(now.Add(time.Hour).Unix()),
-		// intentionally no "iat", matching jwt.Verify's R126 contract
-	})
-	if !tm.accessTokenUnexpired(noIat) {
-		t.Error("a token with a valid exp and no iat must be accepted, matching jwt.Verify's iat-optional contract (R126/FIX-27)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAccessTokenUnexpired_IatStillBoundedWhenPresent is the positive
-// control: an iat far in the future (used-before-issued) must still be
-// rejected when iat IS present — the fix makes iat optional, not ignored.
-func TestAccessTokenUnexpired_IatStillBoundedWhenPresent(t *testing.T) {
-	tm := &TraefikOidc{}
-	now := time.Now()
-
-	futureIat := makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{
-		"exp": float64(now.Add(time.Hour).Unix()),
-		"iat": float64(now.Add(time.Hour).Unix()), // far in the future
-	})
-	if tm.accessTokenUnexpired(futureIat) {
-		t.Error("a present iat far in the future (used-before-issued) must still be rejected")
-	}
-}

audience_test.go

@@ -288,10 +288,6 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario1WithCustomAudience(t *testing.T) {
 
 	customAudience := "https://my-api.example.com"
 	ts.tOidc.audience = customAudience
-	// buildAuthURL sources the outbound `audience` param from
-	// explicitAudience, not audience (see url_helpers.go); an explicitly
-	// configured custom audience must set both to behave like production.
-	ts.tOidc.explicitAudience = customAudience
 
 	// Create ID token with aud = client_id (OIDC standard)
 	idToken, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
@@ -326,12 +322,16 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario1WithCustomAudience(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Verify ID token validates against client_id
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(idToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("ID token validation failed (should validate against client_id): %v", err)
 	}
 
 	// Verify access token validates against custom audience
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(accessToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("Access token validation failed (should validate against custom audience): %v", err)
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario2DefaultAudience(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Verify ID token validates
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(idToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("ID token validation failed: %v", err)
@@ -402,6 +404,8 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario2DefaultAudience(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Access token won't have client_id in aud, so it will fail validation
 	// This is expected for scenario 2 - the session validation relies on ID token
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(accessToken)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Logf("Access token validation passed (unexpected but OK if client_id is in aud array)")
@@ -452,6 +456,8 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario3OpaqueAccessToken(t *testing.T) {
 	opaqueAccessToken := "opaque_access_token_random_string_12345"
 
 	// Verify ID token validates
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(idToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("ID token validation failed: %v", err)
@@ -478,8 +484,7 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario3OpaqueAccessToken(t *testing.T) {
 	session.SetAccessToken(opaqueAccessToken)
 	session.SetIDToken(idToken)
 
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokensRS(rs)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokens(session)
 	if !authenticated || needsRefresh || expired {
 		t.Errorf("Session with opaque access token and valid ID token should be authenticated. Got: auth=%v, refresh=%v, expired=%v",
 			authenticated, needsRefresh, expired)
@@ -514,6 +519,8 @@ func TestAuth0AudienceArrayValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Should validate successfully - custom audience is in the array
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(accessToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("Access token with audience array should validate when custom audience is present: %v", err)
@@ -546,6 +553,8 @@ func TestAuth0MismatchedAudience(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Should fail validation - audience doesn't match
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(accessToken)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Error("Access token with wrong audience should fail validation")
@@ -614,8 +623,7 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario2StrictMode(t *testing.T) {
 	session.SetRefreshToken("test-refresh-token") // Add refresh token so it can attempt refresh
 
 	// In strict mode, this should FAIL (no fallback to ID token)
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokensRS(rs)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokens(session)
 	if authenticated {
 		t.Errorf("Strict mode: Session with wrong access token audience should be rejected, but got authenticated=true")
 	}
@@ -655,6 +663,8 @@ func TestIDTokenAlwaysValidatesAgainstClientID(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Should validate successfully - ID tokens are checked against client_id
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(idToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("ID token should validate against client_id even when custom audience is configured: %v", err)
@@ -676,6 +686,8 @@ func TestIDTokenAlwaysValidatesAgainstClientID(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Should fail - ID tokens must have client_id as audience
+	cleanupReplayCache()
+	initReplayCache()
 	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(wrongIDToken)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Error("ID token with custom audience (not client_id) should fail validation")

auth_flow.go

@@ -1,37 +1,12 @@
 package traefikoidc
 
 import (
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
 
-// redactAuthorizeURLForLog removes the remaining security-sensitive query
-// values from the provider authorize URL before it is logged. It builds on
-// redactCallbackURL (url_helpers.go, R153), which strips "code" and
-// "state" but was written for the callback URL and does not know about
-// the nonce or PKCE code_challenge the authorize URL also carries — so
-// logging redactCallbackURL(authURL) alone would still leak the nonce
-// (FIX-29 correction of the R153 claim).
-func redactAuthorizeURLForLog(rawURL string) string {
-	redacted := redactCallbackURL(rawURL)
-	u, err := url.Parse(redacted)
-	if err != nil {
-		return redacted
-	}
-	q := u.Query()
-	for _, k := range []string{"nonce", "code_challenge"} {
-		if q.Get(k) != "" {
-			q.Set(k, "[REDACTED]")
-		}
-	}
-	u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
-	return u.String()
-}
-
 // validateRedirectCount checks if redirect limit is exceeded and handles the error
 func (t *TraefikOidc) validateRedirectCount(session *SessionData, rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error {
 	const maxRedirects = 5
@@ -39,16 +14,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateRedirectCount(session *SessionData, rw http.Respon
 	if redirectCount >= maxRedirects {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Maximum redirect limit (%d) exceeded, possible redirect loop detected", maxRedirects)
 		session.ResetRedirectCount()
-		// Persist the reset so the NEXT request starts at 0 and can
-		// attempt auth again. Without Save, the reset only touched the
-		// in-memory session value (dirty flag set but never flushed): the
-		// cookie still carried the old count, so every subsequent
-		// request re-observed redirect_count==max and the user was
-		// hard-locked on 508 for the whole session with no recovery
-		// (R123).
-		if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
-			t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session after redirect reset: %v", err)
-		}
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Too many redirects", http.StatusLoopDetected)
 		return fmt.Errorf("redirect limit exceeded")
 	}
@@ -103,33 +68,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) prepareSessionForAuthentication(session *SessionData, csrf
 //   - req: The HTTP request initiating authentication.
 //   - session: The session data to prepare for authentication.
 //   - redirectURL: The pre-calculated callback URL (redirect_uri) for this middleware instance.
-//
-// rateLimitPerSourceAuth applies the (optional) per-external-source auth
-// throttle at an OIDC gate. Returns true if the request was already
-// answered with 429 and the caller must return. No-op when the limiter is
-// disabled (PerSourceLoginRateLimit <= 0) or the source is internal.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) rateLimitPerSourceAuth(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) bool {
-	if t.perSourceLimiter == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	if t.perSourceLimiter.allow(req) {
-		return false
-	}
-	rw.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
-	t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Too many authentication attempts, please try again shortly", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
-	return true
-}
-
 func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
-	t.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
-
-	// Per-external-source throttle on login initiation: a single host
-	// flooding the route with auth starts shouldn't be able to spin up an
-	// unbounded number of IdP round-trips or wear the shared token-origin
-	// bucket down for everyone (R185).
-	if t.rateLimitPerSourceAuth(rw, req) {
-		return
-	}
+	t.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", t.originalRequestURI(req))
 
 	// Check and handle redirect limits
 	if err := t.validateRedirectCount(session, rw, req); err != nil {
@@ -157,41 +97,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Build the provider authorize URL BEFORE mutating the session. A URL-
-	// build failure must not clear a valid existing session, and must not
-	// emit an empty-Location redirect (browsers reload the current page,
-	// re-entering this flow and bumping the redirect count until the hard
-	// 508). Fail closed with an explicit status instead (R142).
-	authURL := t.buildAuthURL(redirectURL, csrfToken, nonce, codeChallenge)
-	if authURL == "" {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to build provider authorize URL; aborting login flow")
-		http.Error(rw, "Failed to build provider authorize URL", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// When dynamic client registration is enabled but has not yet produced a
-	// client_id (registration pending or failed), forging an authorize URL
-	// with client_id="" would send the user to the provider on a broken
-	// flow. Fail with a clear status instead of redirecting. This guard
-	// must run BEFORE prepareSessionForAuthentication re-seeds the session:
-	// re-seeding (and the save that follows) would otherwise mutate and
-	// persist the session even though we are about to answer 503 with no
-	// redirect — discarding any existing session state for no reason (R163).
-	// Snapshot clientID under metadataMu: DCR rewrites it at runtime (R137).
-	clientID, _, _, _, _ := t.clientCredentials()
-	if t.dcrConfig != nil && t.dcrConfig.Enabled && clientID == "" {
-		t.logger.Errorf("OIDC dynamic client registration has not produced a client_id; refusing to redirect to provider")
-		http.Error(rw, "Identity provider registration pending", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
-		return
-	}
-
 	// Clear existing session data and set new authentication state
-	t.prepareSessionForAuthentication(session, csrfToken, nonce, codeVerifier, req.URL.RequestURI())
-
-	// Persist the redirect_uri so the callback reuses the exact value sent
-	// to the IdP, instead of rebuilding it from the (client-affectable)
-	// callback request's X-Forwarded-Host (R136).
-	session.SetRedirectURL(redirectURL)
+	t.prepareSessionForAuthentication(session, csrfToken, nonce, codeVerifier, t.originalRequestURI(req))
 
 	session.MarkDirty()
 
@@ -201,17 +108,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
 		return
 	}
 
-	// CSRF/state and nonce are single-use security credentials; do not log
-	// them in the clear (FIX-29 correction of the R153 redaction claim).
-	t.logger.Debug("Session saved before redirect")
+	t.logger.Debugf("Session saved before redirect. CSRF: %s, Nonce: %s",
+		csrfToken, nonce)
 
-	t.logger.Debugf("Redirecting user to OIDC provider: %s", redactAuthorizeURLForLog(authURL))
+	authURL := t.buildAuthURL(redirectURL, csrfToken, nonce, codeChallenge)
+	t.logger.Debugf("Redirecting user to OIDC provider: %s", authURL)
 
-	// 302s into the IdP must not be heuristically cacheable (RFC 7234):
-	// a stale, cached redirect could replay the pre-re-authentication URL.
-	// Every other auth response sets no-store; these redirects were missed
-	// (R147).
-	rw.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 	http.Redirect(rw, req, authURL, http.StatusFound)
 }
 
@@ -222,31 +124,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
 //   - rw: The HTTP response writer.
 //   - req: The callback request containing authorization code and state.
 //   - redirectURL: The fully qualified callback URL (used in the token exchange request).
-//
-// clearOneTimeAuthState clears the one-time CSRF/nonce/PKCE-verifier after a
-// callback that consumed the authorization code but then failed, and persists
-// the cleared state. Without it the failed session stays in a pending-auth
-// state and a retried callback would re-exchange a fresh code before failing
-// again. Mirrors the cleanup on the exchange-failure / empty-access-token
-// paths (R134).
-func (t *TraefikOidc) clearOneTimeAuthState(session *SessionData, req *http.Request, rw http.ResponseWriter) {
-	session.SetCSRF("")
-	session.SetNonce("")
-	session.SetCodeVerifier("")
-	if saveErr := session.Save(req, rw); saveErr != nil {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session after callback failure: %v", saveErr)
-	}
-}
-
 func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, redirectURL string) {
-	// Per-external-source throttle on the authorization-code callback: this
-	// is where the one-time code exchange (server round-trip + token
-	// cache write) happens, so a single source can't brute-force
-	// repeated code exchanges or drown the shared limiter (R185).
-	if t.rateLimitPerSourceAuth(rw, req) {
-		return
-	}
-
 	session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Session error during callback: %v", err)
@@ -255,28 +133,15 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 	}
 	defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
 
-	t.logger.Debugf("Handling callback, URL: %s", redactCallbackURL(req.URL.String()))
+	t.logger.Debugf("Handling callback, URL: %s", req.URL.String())
 
 	if req.URL.Query().Get("error") != "" {
 		errorDescription := req.URL.Query().Get("error_description")
 		if errorDescription == "" {
 			errorDescription = req.URL.Query().Get("error")
 		}
-		// error / error_description are attacker-controlled query params.
-		// Sanitize before logging and before echoing back to the client:
-		// an embedded newline would inject a forged line into (especially
-		// structured) logs, and unbounded length would bloat the log and
-		// the error response (R145).
-		sanitizeErr := func(s string) string {
-			s = strings.NewReplacer("\n", " ", "\r", " ").Replace(s)
-			const maxErrLen = 512
-			if len(s) > maxErrLen {
-				s = s[:maxErrLen]
-			}
-			return s
-		}
-		t.logger.Errorf("Authentication error from provider during callback: %s - %s", sanitizeErr(req.URL.Query().Get("error")), sanitizeErr(errorDescription))
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, fmt.Sprintf("Authentication error from provider: %s", sanitizeErr(errorDescription)), http.StatusBadRequest)
+		t.logger.Errorf("Authentication error from provider during callback: %s - %s", req.URL.Query().Get("error"), errorDescription)
+		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, fmt.Sprintf("Authentication error from provider: %s", errorDescription), http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -290,7 +155,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 	csrfToken := session.GetCSRF()
 	if csrfToken == "" {
 		t.logger.Errorf("CSRF token missing in session during callback. Authenticated: %v, Request URL: %s",
-			session.GetAuthenticated(), redactCallbackURL(req.URL.String()))
+			session.GetAuthenticated(), req.URL.String())
 
 		cookie, err := req.Cookie("_oidc_raczylo_m")
 		if err != nil {
@@ -303,7 +168,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !constantTimeStringCompare(state, csrfToken) {
+	if state != csrfToken {
 		t.logger.Error("State parameter does not match CSRF token in session during callback")
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Invalid state parameter (CSRF mismatch)", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
@@ -317,55 +182,16 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 	}
 
 	codeVerifier := session.GetCodeVerifier()
-	if t.enablePKCE && codeVerifier == "" {
-		t.logger.Error("PKCE is enabled but code verifier is missing from session during callback")
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: PKCE verifier missing", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Use the redirect_uri persisted at initiate time (must match what was
-	// sent to the IdP's authorize endpoint). Fall back to the rebuilt one
-	// only for pre-existing sessions that predate R136 (R136).
-	if stored := session.GetRedirectURL(); stored != "" {
-		redirectURL = stored
-	}
 
 	tokenResponse, err := t.tokenExchanger.ExchangeCodeForToken(req.Context(), "authorization_code", code, redirectURL, codeVerifier)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to exchange code for token during callback: %v", err)
-		// Invalidate the one-time auth state and persist it so a
-		// partially-failed flow cannot be continued: the authorization code
-		// may still be unconsumed at the provider, so a replayed callback
-		// must re-authenticate rather than revalidate a stale
-		// state/nonce/code_verifier. Mirrors the cleanup on success.
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Could not exchange code for token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
 
-	if tokenResponse.AccessToken == "" {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Token endpoint returned no access token during callback")
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Token endpoint returned no access token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
 	if err = t.verifyToken(tokenResponse.IDToken); err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to verify id_token during callback: %v", err)
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
-		if errors.Is(err, ErrRateLimitExceeded) {
-			// Rate-limit exhaustion must be a 429, not a generic 500: a
-			// single source's burst currently degrades every user's
-			// callback to "server error" (R179). No Retry-After: by this
-			// point clearOneTimeAuthState has already destroyed the
-			// csrf/nonce/code_verifier and the authorization code has
-			// already been redeemed at the IdP, so a client that honors
-			// Retry-After and retries this exact callback URL is
-			// guaranteed to hit "CSRF token missing in session" instead
-			// of a successful retry (FIX-32). The user must restart login.
-			t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Too many requests, please retry", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
-			return
-		}
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Could not verify ID token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
@@ -373,7 +199,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 	claims, err := t.extractClaimsFunc(tokenResponse.IDToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to extract claims during callback: %v", err)
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Could not extract claims from token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
@@ -381,57 +206,41 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 	nonceClaim, ok := claims["nonce"].(string)
 	if !ok || nonceClaim == "" {
 		t.logger.Error("Nonce claim missing in id_token during callback")
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Nonce missing in token", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Nonce missing in token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
 
 	sessionNonce := session.GetNonce()
 	if sessionNonce == "" {
 		t.logger.Error("Nonce not found in session during callback")
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Nonce missing in session", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Nonce missing in session", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !constantTimeStringCompare(nonceClaim, sessionNonce) {
+	if nonceClaim != sessionNonce {
 		t.logger.Error("Nonce claim does not match session nonce during callback")
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Nonce mismatch", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Nonce mismatch", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
 
 	// Extract user identifier from the configured claim (defaults to "email" for backward compatibility)
-	userIdentifier, _ := claimScalarString(claims[t.userIdentifierClaim])
+	userIdentifier, _ := claims[t.userIdentifierClaim].(string)
 	if userIdentifier == "" {
 		// Try "sub" as fallback since it's required by OIDC spec
 		if t.userIdentifierClaim != "sub" {
-			userIdentifier, _ = claimScalarString(claims["sub"])
+			userIdentifier, _ = claims["sub"].(string)
 		}
 		if userIdentifier == "" {
 			t.logger.Errorf("User identifier claim '%s' missing or empty in token during callback", t.userIdentifierClaim)
-			t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
 			t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: User identifier missing in token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
 		t.logger.Debugf("Configured claim '%s' not found, using 'sub' claim as fallback", t.userIdentifierClaim)
 	}
 
-	// Validate user authorization. When the identity is an email, require the
-	// IdP not to have explicitly flagged it as unverified — an unverified
-	// address must not satisfy an email/domain allowlist (see
-	// emailIdentityPermitted).
-	if !emailIdentityPermitted(userIdentifier, claims) {
-		t.logger.Errorf("User email not verified during callback, rejecting email-based authorization: %s", userIdentifier)
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
-		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: Email not verified", http.StatusForbidden)
-		return
-	}
-
 	// Validate user authorization
 	if !t.isAllowedUser(userIdentifier) {
 		t.logger.Errorf("User not authorized during callback: %s", userIdentifier)
-		t.clearOneTimeAuthState(session, req, rw)
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication failed: User not authorized", http.StatusForbidden)
 		return
 	}
@@ -454,10 +263,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 
 	redirectPath := "/"
 	if incomingPath := session.GetIncomingPath(); incomingPath != "" && incomingPath != t.redirURLPath {
-		// Neutralize open-redirect payloads (e.g. //evil.com, /\evil.com) stored
-		// from the original request target before using it as the post-login
-		// redirect target. normalizeLogoutPath forces a host-relative path.
-		redirectPath = normalizeLogoutPath(incomingPath)
+		redirectPath = incomingPath
 	}
 	session.SetIncomingPath("")
 
@@ -468,8 +274,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 	}
 
 	t.logger.Debugf("Callback successful, redirecting to %s", redirectPath)
-	// no-store so the post-auth redirect isn't cached and replayed (R147).
-	rw.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 	http.Redirect(rw, req, redirectPath, http.StatusFound)
 }
 
@@ -501,6 +305,28 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleExpiredToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Reque
 	t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
 }
 
+// isUserAuthenticated determines the authentication status and refresh requirements.
+// It delegates to provider-specific validation methods that handle different token types
+// and expiration behaviors.
+// Parameters:
+//   - session: The session data containing authentication tokens.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - authenticated (bool): True if the user has valid tokens.
+//   - needsRefresh (bool): True if tokens are valid but nearing expiration.
+//   - expired (bool): True if the session is unauthenticated, the token is missing,
+//     or the token verification failed for reasons other than nearing/actual expiration.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) isUserAuthenticated(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, bool) {
+	if t.isAzureProvider() {
+		return t.validateAzureTokens(session)
+	} else if t.isGoogleProvider() {
+		return t.validateGoogleTokens(session)
+	}
+	// Auth0 and other providers can now use standard validation
+	// which handles opaque tokens generically
+	return t.validateStandardTokens(session)
+}
+
 // isAjaxRequest determines if this is an AJAX request that should receive 401 instead of redirect
 func (t *TraefikOidc) isAjaxRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
 	xhr := req.Header.Get("X-Requested-With")

auth_flow_behaviour_test.go

@@ -957,10 +957,8 @@ func (s *AuthFlowBehaviourSuite) TestHandleCallback_NonceMismatch() {
 	// Call handleCallback
 	s.tOidc.handleCallback(rw2, req2, "https://example.com/callback")
 
-	// R161: nonce mismatch is a client-side authorization-request
-	// integrity failure (same class as state/CSRF mismatch), so it returns
-	// 400, not 500.
-	s.Equal(http.StatusBadRequest, rw2.Code)
+	// Should return internal server error due to nonce mismatch
+	s.Equal(http.StatusInternalServerError, rw2.Code)
 }
 
 // TestHandleCallback_UserNotAuthorized tests callback when user is not authorized

autocleanup.go

@@ -28,12 +28,6 @@ type BackgroundTask struct {
 	stopped    int32 // 1 = stopped, 0 = not stopped
 	started    int32 // 1 = started, 0 = not started
 	doneClosed int32 // 1 = doneChan closed, 0 = not closed
-	// startRefused is set when Start's circuit-breaker or concurrency-limit
-	// early-return fires (FIX-19). started stays 0 and stopped stays 0 in
-	// that case, which is indistinguishable from "registered but Start has
-	// not been called yet" — RegisterBackgroundTask needs the distinction to
-	// know this task's slot is actually free to reuse.
-	startRefused int32 // 1 = a Start call was refused, 0 = never refused
 }
 
 // NewBackgroundTask creates a new background task with the specified configuration.
@@ -52,12 +46,6 @@ func NewBackgroundTask(name string, interval time.Duration, taskFunc func(), log
 	if len(wg) > 0 {
 		externalWG = wg[0]
 	}
-	// run() uses time.NewTicker(interval), which panics for d <= 0 inside
-	// the started goroutine (autocleanup.go:186), crashing the whole
-	// process on a misconfigured interval. Normalize here (R149).
-	if interval <= 0 {
-		interval = time.Minute
-	}
 	return &BackgroundTask{
 		name:       name,
 		interval:   interval,
@@ -93,7 +81,6 @@ func (bt *BackgroundTask) Start() {
 			if bt.logger != nil {
 				bt.logger.Debugf("Cannot start task %s: %v (circuit breaker protection working as expected)", bt.name, err)
 			}
-			atomic.StoreInt32(&bt.startRefused, 1)
 			// Close doneChan since the task won't run
 			if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&bt.doneClosed, 0, 1) {
 				close(bt.doneChan)
@@ -101,21 +88,8 @@ func (bt *BackgroundTask) Start() {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Reserve the task slot immediately when starting. OnTaskStart
-		// is the authoritative concurrency gate (R165): it returns false
-		// if maxConcurrent is already reached, in which case this task
-		// must not launch run() (its slot was not taken).
-		if !registry.cb.OnTaskStart(bt.name) {
-			if bt.logger != nil {
-				bt.logger.Debugf("Cannot start task %s: concurrency limit reached, slot not acquired", bt.name)
-			}
-			atomic.StoreInt32(&bt.startRefused, 1)
-			// Close doneChan since the task won't run
-			if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&bt.doneClosed, 0, 1) {
-				close(bt.doneChan)
-			}
-			return
-		}
+		// Reserve the task slot immediately when starting
+		registry.cb.OnTaskStart(bt.name)
 
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&bt.started, 1)
 		bt.internalWG.Add(1)
@@ -140,14 +114,6 @@ func (bt *BackgroundTask) Stop() {
 			if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&bt.doneClosed, 0, 1) {
 				close(bt.doneChan)
 			}
-			// Also close stopChan (R117): a concurrent Start may be in-flight
-			// and about to launch run(). Signaling stopChan lets it exit at
-			// the next stop check instead of leaking the goroutine and its
-			// circuit-breaker slot (taken by OnTaskStart but never released).
-			func() {
-				defer func() { _ = recover() }() // safe if already closed
-				close(bt.stopChan)
-			}()
 			return
 		}
 
@@ -168,35 +134,16 @@ func (bt *BackgroundTask) Stop() {
 		// This avoids the race condition with WaitGroup
 		select {
 		case <-bt.doneChan:
-			// Normal completion: the goroutine has returned, so it is safe
-			// to wait on the WaitGroup.
-			bt.internalWG.Wait()
+			// Normal completion
 		case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
-			// The task goroutine is still running (its taskFunc is blocked or
-			// long-lived). Do NOT wait on the WaitGroup here — that would
-			// block Stop() (and shutdown) for as long as the task runs.
-			// Return now; the goroutine is reaped when it completes.
 			if bt.logger != nil {
 				bt.logger.Errorf("Timeout waiting for background task %s to stop", bt.name)
 			}
 		}
-	})
-}
 
-// safeRunTask executes the task function, recovering from any panic so that a
-// single panicking run does not permanently kill the background goroutine and its
-// periodic loop. Under yaegi (where this plugin runs) unexpected panics are more
-// likely, and a silently-dead background task (metadata refresh, autocleanup,
-// memory monitor) would otherwise stop forever with no log or restart.
-func (bt *BackgroundTask) safeRunTask() {
-	defer func() {
-		if r := recover(); r != nil {
-			if bt.logger != nil {
-				bt.logger.Errorf("Background task %s panicked (recovered): %v", bt.name, r)
-			}
-		}
-	}()
-	bt.taskFunc()
+		// Wait for the internal WaitGroup synchronously after doneChan signals
+		bt.internalWG.Wait()
+	})
 }
 
 // run is the main loop for the background task.
@@ -240,7 +187,7 @@ func (bt *BackgroundTask) run() {
 		}
 		return
 	default:
-		bt.safeRunTask()
+		bt.taskFunc()
 	}
 
 	for {
@@ -259,7 +206,7 @@ func (bt *BackgroundTask) run() {
 				}
 				return
 			default:
-				bt.safeRunTask()
+				bt.taskFunc()
 			}
 		case <-bt.stopChan:
 			if bt.logger != nil {
@@ -382,30 +329,9 @@ func (cb *TaskCircuitBreaker) CanCreateTask(taskName string) error {
 	}
 }
 
-// OnTaskStart records a task starting execution. It atomically reserves a
-// concurrency slot and returns whether one was available. The reservation
-// is fundamental (R165): CanCreateTask's limit check is only advisory —
-// it is also called by RegisterTask without starting the task — so a
-// check-then-act TOCTOU meant two concurrently starting tasks could both
-// read current < limit and then both start, letting live tasks exceed
-// maxConcurrent and defeating the DoS backstop. OnTaskStart is the
-// single commit point, so it enforces maxConcurrent here via a CAS loop:
-// only maxConcurrent tasks can hold slots at once. BackgroundTask.Start
-// aborts (without launching run) when this returns false.
-func (cb *TaskCircuitBreaker) OnTaskStart(taskName string) bool {
-	max := atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.maxConcurrent)
-	for {
-		current := atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.concurrentTasks)
-		if current >= max {
-			if cb.logger != nil {
-				cb.logger.Debug("Concurrent task limit reached, refusing slot for: %s", taskName)
-			}
-			return false
-		}
-		if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&cb.concurrentTasks, current, current+1) {
-			break
-		}
-	}
+// OnTaskStart records a task starting execution
+func (cb *TaskCircuitBreaker) OnTaskStart(taskName string) {
+	atomic.AddInt32(&cb.concurrentTasks, 1)
 	cb.tasksMu.Lock()
 	cb.activeTasks[taskName] = struct{}{}
 	cb.tasksMu.Unlock()
@@ -416,7 +342,6 @@ func (cb *TaskCircuitBreaker) OnTaskStart(taskName string) bool {
 		cb.logger.Debug("Task started, concurrent count: %d, task: %s",
 			atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.concurrentTasks), taskName)
 	}
-	return true
 }
 
 // OnTaskComplete records a task completing execution
@@ -538,13 +463,10 @@ func (tr *TaskRegistry) RegisterTask(name string, task *BackgroundTask) error {
 	tr.mu.Lock()
 	defer tr.mu.Unlock()
 
+	// Task execution tracking is now handled in the run() method
+
 	tr.tasks[name] = task
-	// Execution tracking (the circuit-breaker concurrent count) is handled by
-	// Start()/run(): Start() reserves a slot via OnTaskStart and run() releases
-	// it via OnTaskComplete. Do NOT also OnTaskSuccess here — that would
-	// double-count every registered task (+1 on register, +1 on Start, -1 on
-	// stop), leaking one slot per task and eventually blocking all background
-	// task creation at the concurrency limit.
+	tr.cb.OnTaskSuccess(name)
 
 	if tr.logger != nil {
 		tr.logger.Debug("Registered background task: %s", name)
@@ -577,18 +499,9 @@ func (tr *TaskRegistry) GetTask(name string) (*BackgroundTask, bool) {
 	return task, exists
 }
 
-// StopAllTasks stops all registered background tasks.
-//
-// Tasks can live in two places: those registered directly via
-// TaskRegistry.RegisterTask (stored in tr.tasks) and process-global
-// singletons created via TaskRegistry.CreateSingletonTask, which delegate to
-// GetResourceManager().RegisterBackgroundTask and store the task in the
-// ResourceManager's registry (see CreateSingletonTask below) — NOT in
-// tr.tasks. Stop both so neither a direct task nor a singleton task leaks its
-// ticker goroutine past the last Close.
+// StopAllTasks stops all registered background tasks
 func (tr *TaskRegistry) StopAllTasks() {
-	// First, stop tasks registered directly in this registry.
-	// Copy the tasks map to avoid deadlock with GetTaskCount().
+	// First, copy the tasks map to avoid deadlock with GetTaskCount()
 	tr.mu.Lock()
 	tasksCopy := make(map[string]*BackgroundTask, len(tr.tasks))
 	for name, task := range tr.tasks {
@@ -598,15 +511,13 @@ func (tr *TaskRegistry) StopAllTasks() {
 	tr.tasks = make(map[string]*BackgroundTask)
 	tr.mu.Unlock()
 
-	for _, task := range tasksCopy {
+	// Now stop all tasks without holding the lock
+	for name, task := range tasksCopy {
 		task.Stop()
+		if tr.logger != nil {
+			tr.logger.Debug("Stopped background task during shutdown: %s", name)
+		}
 	}
-
-	// Then stop process-global singleton tasks, which live in the
-	// ResourceManager's registry, not in tr.tasks (otherwise the singleton
-	// task teardown would be a silent no-op and leak every singleton task's
-	// ticker goroutine past the last Close).
-	GetResourceManager().StopAllTasks()
 }
 
 // GetTaskCount returns the number of active tasks
@@ -810,14 +721,9 @@ func (mm *TaskMemoryMonitor) checkForMemoryIssues(stats TaskMemoryStats) {
 	historyLen := len(mm.statsHistory)
 	if historyLen >= 2 {
 		prev := mm.statsHistory[historyLen-2]
-		// Guard against div-by-zero (prev.HeapAlloc == 0) which would make
-		// heapGrowth == +Inf and fire a spurious "memory leak" alert for a
-		// first-ever measurement (R103).
-		if prev.HeapAlloc > 0 {
-			heapGrowth := float64(stats.HeapAlloc) / float64(prev.HeapAlloc)
-			if heapGrowth > 2.0 && stats.NumGC == prev.NumGC {
-				mm.logger.Infof("Potential memory leak: heap grew %.2fx without GC", heapGrowth)
-			}
+		heapGrowth := float64(stats.HeapAlloc) / float64(prev.HeapAlloc)
+		if heapGrowth > 2.0 && stats.NumGC == prev.NumGC {
+			mm.logger.Infof("Potential memory leak: heap grew %.2fx without GC", heapGrowth)
 		}
 	}
 	mm.mu.RUnlock()

azure_oidc_test.go

@@ -262,17 +262,16 @@ func TestAzureOIDCRegression(t *testing.T) {
 		defer func() { tOidc.tokenVerifier = originalTokenVerifier }()
 
 		// Test that CSRF is preserved during Azure validation failures
-		rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
-		authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := tOidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
+		authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := tOidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
 
-		// Should not be authenticated due to validation failure, and with no
-		// refresh token and no tokens to probe, should not claim an expiry
-		// state (matches the standard path: unauthenticated, no refresh).
+		// Should not be authenticated due to validation failure
 		if authenticated {
 			t.Error("Should not be authenticated when token validation fails")
 		}
-		if needsRefresh || expired {
-			t.Error("With no refresh token and no tokens to probe, should be (false,false,false)")
+
+		// Should be marked as expired since no tokens work
+		if !expired && !needsRefresh {
+			t.Error("Should be marked as needing refresh or expired when validation fails")
 		}
 
 		// Verify CSRF token is still preserved in session
@@ -454,8 +453,7 @@ func TestValidateGoogleTokens(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			session := tt.setupSession()
 
-			rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
-			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateGoogleTokensRS(rs)
+			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateGoogleTokens(session)
 
 			if auth != tt.expectedAuth {
 				t.Errorf("Expected authenticated=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectedAuth, auth, tt.description)
@@ -639,8 +637,7 @@ func TestIsUserAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
 			defer func() { ts.tOidc.issuerURL = originalIssuer }()
 
 			session := tt.setupSession()
-			rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
-			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.isUserAuthenticatedRS(rs)
+			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.isUserAuthenticated(session)
 
 			if auth != tt.expectedAuth {
 				t.Errorf("Expected authenticated=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectedAuth, auth, tt.description)
@@ -691,7 +688,7 @@ func TestValidateAzureTokensEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
 				return session
 			},
 			expectedAuth:    false,
-			expectedRefresh: false,
+			expectedRefresh: true,
 			expectedExpired: false,
 			description:     "Unauthenticated Azure session without refresh token",
 		},
@@ -725,10 +722,10 @@ func TestValidateAzureTokensEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
 				session.SetAccessToken("opaque_access_token_longer_than_minimum") // Not JWT format but long enough
 				return session
 			},
-			expectedAuth:    false,
+			expectedAuth:    true,
 			expectedRefresh: false,
-			expectedExpired: true,
-			description:     "Azure session with opaque access token but NO ID token fails closed (no unverified auth, R99)",
+			expectedExpired: false,
+			description:     "Azure session with opaque access token",
 		},
 		{
 			name: "AuthenticatedWithBothTokensInvalid",
@@ -765,8 +762,7 @@ func TestValidateAzureTokensEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			session := tt.setupSession()
 
-			rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
-			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
+			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
 
 			if auth != tt.expectedAuth {
 				t.Errorf("Expected authenticated=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectedAuth, auth, tt.description)

bearer_auth.go

@@ -12,13 +12,8 @@
 //   - iat upper-age cap bounds clock-skew / forever-token abuse.
 //   - Multi-audience tokens require matching azp.
 //   - Per-IP 401 throttle returns 429 + Retry-After after a threshold.
-//   - No path writes an access-token JTI to a replay cache (FIX-17 removed
-//     that writer; the only JTI replay tracking left is for backchannel
-//     logout tokens, logout.go checkAndMarkLogoutJTIProcessed). RevokeToken
-//     (called from logout) still blacklists the raw token and, for a JWT,
-//     its jti; both the JWT and opaque-introspection bearer paths check
-//     that blacklist before accepting a token, so revocation stays
-//     effective without replay-detection overhead.
+//   - JTI Set is suppressed (skipReplayMarking) but JTI Get stays — revoked
+//     tokens (RevokeToken adds to blacklist) are still rejected.
 //   - Identifier is read from BearerIdentifierClaim (default "sub"), never
 //     from UserIdentifierClaim, to avoid the unverified-email spoofing path.
 //   - Identifier is sanitized: length cap, control chars, bidi-override,
@@ -98,10 +93,6 @@ const (
 type bearerError struct {
 	kind   bearerErrorKind
 	reason string
-	// retryAfter carries the actual remaining penalty when known (e.g. the
-	// per-IP penalty box), so writeBearerError emits the true value instead
-	// of the full configured penalty.
-	retryAfter time.Duration
 }
 
 func (e *bearerError) Error() string { return e.reason }
@@ -119,32 +110,6 @@ type joseHeader struct {
 	Typ string `json:"typ"`
 }
 
-// joseHeaderWellFormed reports whether token is structurally a JWT: exactly
-// two dot-separated segments whose header decodes as a JSON JOSE header.
-// It intentionally applies NO alg/kid policy (unlike parseBearerJOSEHeader)
-// so the JWT-vs-opaque routing gate classifies purely on structure: a
-// structurally-valid JWT with a disallowed alg stays on the JWT path
-// (where local policy rejects it), while an opaque token whose two dots
-// are coincidental falls through to opaque introspection (R166).
-func joseHeaderWellFormed(token string) bool {
-	dot := strings.IndexByte(token, '.')
-	if dot <= 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-	if strings.Count(token[dot+1:], ".") != 1 {
-		return false
-	}
-	raw, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token[:dot])
-	if err != nil {
-		raw, err = base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(token[:dot])
-		if err != nil {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	var hdr joseHeader
-	return json.Unmarshal(raw, &hdr) == nil
-}
-
 // parseBearerJOSEHeader decodes the first JWT segment for early alg/kid pinning.
 // Does not touch the payload or signature — those are the verifier's job.
 // Returns nil on success; *bearerError on rejection so the handler can map
@@ -184,97 +149,6 @@ func parseBearerJOSEHeader(token string) *bearerError {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// headerClaimRuneReason reports why a rune is unsafe to inject into a request
-// header value, or "" if the rune is acceptable. Shared core of the bearer-path
-// identifier sanitizer and the cookie-path header claim sanitizer: rejects
-// control chars (CRLF/header injection), Unicode bidi-override runes (RTL
-// spoofing of admin UI / SIEM), and the delimiters , ; = plus the bracketing
-// characters " { } — each of these in a group name / identifier would break a
-// downstream comma-joined list or a naive CSV/JSON-style parser consuming the
-// header (a comma would inject extra entries into a comma-joined header).
-func headerClaimRuneReason(r rune) string {
-	if reason := headerInjectionRuneReason(r); reason != "" {
-		return reason
-	}
-	// The , ; = delimiters and the " { } bracketing chars are only unsafe for
-	// values placed into delimited or list contexts (a comma-joined header, or
-	// an identifier downstreams may split). They are valid in arbitrary single
-	// header values, so this stricter check is used for the cookie-path
-	// identifier and the group/role list, NOT for free-form templated header
-	// output (see headerValueReason).
-	if r == ',' || r == ';' || r == '=' || r == '"' || r == '{' || r == '}' {
-		return "delimiter or bracketing character"
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-// headerInjectionRuneReason reports why a rune is unsafe in ANY HTTP header
-// value, or "" if acceptable. Rejects control characters (CR/LF header
-// injection) and Unicode bidi-override runes (RTL spoofing of admin UIs/SIEMs).
-// Unlike headerClaimRuneReason it does NOT reject , ; = which are legitimate in
-// free-form header values (e.g. an opaque "Authorization: Bearer <token>").
-func headerInjectionRuneReason(r rune) string {
-	if unicode.IsControl(r) {
-		return "control character"
-	}
-	if (r >= 0x202A && r <= 0x202E) || (r >= 0x2066 && r <= 0x2069) {
-		return "bidi-override character"
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-// headerValueReason reports why value is unsafe to forward as a free-form HTTP
-// header value, or "" if acceptable. It rejects values over maxLen (maxLen<=0
-// disables the check) and values containing control or bidi-override runes, but
-// permits , ; = (valid in header values). Empty is allowed. The reason string
-// never includes the value, so it is safe to log.
-func headerValueReason(value string, maxLen int) string {
-	if maxLen > 0 && len(value) > maxLen {
-		return "exceeds max length"
-	}
-	for _, r := range value {
-		if reason := headerInjectionRuneReason(r); reason != "" {
-			return reason
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-// headerClaimValueReason reports why value is unsafe to inject into a
-// downstream request header, or "" if it is acceptable. It rejects empty
-// values, values exceeding maxLen (maxLen<=0 disables the length check), and
-// values containing any rune rejected by headerClaimRuneReason. The reason
-// string is safe to log (it never includes the value itself).
-func headerClaimValueReason(value string, maxLen int) string {
-	if value == "" {
-		return "empty value"
-	}
-	if maxLen > 0 && len(value) > maxLen {
-		return "exceeds max length"
-	}
-	for _, r := range value {
-		if reason := headerClaimRuneReason(r); reason != "" {
-			return reason
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-// sanitizeHeaderClaimValue validates a claim-derived value before it is
-// injected into a downstream request header. It trims surrounding whitespace
-// and fails closed (ok=false) on empty values, values exceeding maxLen
-// (maxLen<=0 disables the length check), or values containing any rune rejected
-// by headerClaimRuneReason. Used by the cookie/session path, which — unlike the
-// bearer path — does not otherwise sanitize the principal identifier or the
-// group/role strings joined into X-User-Groups / X-User-Roles.
-func sanitizeHeaderClaimValue(raw string, maxLen int) (string, bool) {
-	value := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
-	if headerClaimValueReason(value, maxLen) != "" {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	return value, true
-}
-
 // sanitizeBearerIdentifier validates and trims a principal identifier before
 // it is injected into request headers. Layered defense: net/http will reject
 // CRLF on the wire too, but rejecting early gives clearer error logs and
@@ -289,8 +163,15 @@ func sanitizeBearerIdentifier(raw string, maxLen int) (string, *bearerError) {
 		return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, "identifier exceeds max length")
 	}
 	for _, r := range identifier {
-		if reason := headerClaimRuneReason(r); reason != "" {
-			return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, "identifier contains "+reason)
+		if unicode.IsControl(r) {
+			return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, "identifier contains control character")
+		}
+		// Unicode bidi-override range (RTL spoofing of admin UI / SIEM).
+		if (r >= 0x202A && r <= 0x202E) || (r >= 0x2066 && r <= 0x2069) {
+			return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, "identifier contains bidi-override character")
+		}
+		if r == ',' || r == ';' || r == '=' {
+			return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, "identifier contains delimiter character")
 		}
 	}
 	return identifier, nil
@@ -308,12 +189,11 @@ func resolveBearerIdentifier(claims map[string]interface{}, claimName string) (s
 	if !ok {
 		return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, fmt.Sprintf("missing claim %q", claimName))
 	}
-	// Accept scalar numbers (e.g. a numeric sub) by stringifying them,
-	// so a numeric identifier claim doesn't 401 a valid principal.
-	if s, isScalar := claimScalarString(raw); isScalar {
-		return s, nil
+	str, ok := raw.(string)
+	if !ok {
+		return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, fmt.Sprintf("claim %q not a string", claimName))
 	}
-	return "", newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidIdentifier, fmt.Sprintf("claim %q is not a scalar string or number", claimName))
+	return str, nil
 }
 
 // enforceMultiAudienceAzp implements the spec hardening: when aud is a
@@ -354,14 +234,7 @@ func enforceIatAge(claims map[string]interface{}, maxAge time.Duration) *bearerE
 	}
 	iatRaw, ok := claims["iat"].(float64)
 	if !ok {
-		// iat is OPTIONAL per RFC 7519 §4.1.6, and jwt.Verify validates it
-		// only when present (R126) — this branch IS reachable. maxAge is NOT
-		// an operator opt-in: New() (main.go's config-default closure) always
-		// sets maxTokenAge > 0 — 0/unset becomes 24h — so this branch rejects
-		// every iat-less bearer JWT in production, not just when an operator
-		// has explicitly configured maxTokenAgeSeconds. A token with no iat
-		// has nothing to bound its age against, so fail closed rather than
-		// silently skip the check.
+		// jwt.Verify already requires iat; this branch shouldn't be reached.
 		return newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "missing iat claim")
 	}
 	iat := time.Unix(int64(iatRaw), 0)
@@ -396,20 +269,6 @@ type bearerFailureTracker struct {
 	threshold int
 	window    time.Duration
 	penalty   time.Duration
-	// nextSweepAt is the map size recordFailure next scans the map at. A
-	// static per-call gate (len > defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold) made
-	// EVERY recordFailure call re-scan the entire map once a flood of
-	// distinct source IPs crossed the threshold, turning attacker-controlled
-	// traffic into O(n^2) work under b.mu while blocked() (called on every
-	// bearer request) waits on the same lock (FIX-28). nextSweepAt doubles
-	// after each sweep (bounded below by defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold),
-	// amortizing the scan so its frequency grows logarithmically with the
-	// flood size instead of linearly.
-	nextSweepAt int
-	// sweepPasses counts how many times recordFailure has run the full-map
-	// staleness scan. Exposed for tests to confirm the amortization actually
-	// bounds scan frequency.
-	sweepPasses int
 }
 
 type bearerFailureEntry struct {
@@ -418,10 +277,6 @@ type bearerFailureEntry struct {
 	count          int
 }
 
-// defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold is the map size above which recordFailure
-// sweeps stale entries, bounding memory under a flood of distinct source IPs.
-const defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold = 1024
-
 func newBearerFailureTracker(threshold int, window, penalty time.Duration) *bearerFailureTracker {
 	if threshold <= 0 {
 		threshold = 20
@@ -433,11 +288,10 @@ func newBearerFailureTracker(threshold int, window, penalty time.Duration) *bear
 		penalty = 60 * time.Second
 	}
 	return &bearerFailureTracker{
-		entries:     make(map[string]*bearerFailureEntry),
-		threshold:   threshold,
-		window:      window,
-		penalty:     penalty,
-		nextSweepAt: defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold,
+		entries:   make(map[string]*bearerFailureEntry),
+		threshold: threshold,
+		window:    window,
+		penalty:   penalty,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -469,43 +323,6 @@ func (b *bearerFailureTracker) recordFailure(ip string) {
 	b.mu.Lock()
 	defer b.mu.Unlock()
 	now := time.Now()
-	// Bound per-IP map growth (R117): entries for source IPs that fail once
-	// and never return were never removed. Sweep stale entries (no active
-	// penalty box, too old to matter) once the map grows past a nominal
-	// size, keeping steady-state memory bounded.
-	//
-	// An entry that has not tripped the penalty box yet has a ZERO
-	// penaltyUntil, which is always Before(cutoff) — so checking only
-	// e.penaltyUntil.Before(cutoff) discarded every in-progress (not yet
-	// tripped) counter on every sweep, regardless of how recently it
-	// started. Once the map passed the threshold, a source whose failures
-	// interleaved with sweeps could never accumulate enough to trip (FIX-28).
-	// Only remove an entry once it is BOTH untripped-or-expired AND outside
-	// the counting window, so a fresh, still-accumulating counter survives.
-	//
-	// The sweep itself is gated on b.nextSweepAt, not the static threshold:
-	// a flood of distinct, still-fresh source IPs (attacker-controlled) that
-	// crosses defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold and stays above it made every
-	// subsequent recordFailure call re-scan the whole map for nothing (the
-	// predicate above finds nothing to delete while entries stay fresh),
-	// which is O(n) work under b.mu on every call — O(n^2) to fill the map —
-	// while blocked() waits on the same mutex on every bearer request
-	// (FIX-28). nextSweepAt doubles after each sweep so the scan frequency
-	// grows logarithmically with the flood size instead of on every call.
-	if len(b.entries) > b.nextSweepAt {
-		cutoff := now.Add(-(b.window + b.penalty))
-		for k, e := range b.entries {
-			if e.penaltyUntil.Before(cutoff) && now.Sub(e.firstFailureAt) > b.window {
-				delete(b.entries, k)
-			}
-		}
-		b.sweepPasses++
-		next := 2 * len(b.entries)
-		if next < defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold {
-			next = defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold
-		}
-		b.nextSweepAt = next
-	}
 	e, ok := b.entries[ip]
 	if !ok || now.Sub(e.firstFailureAt) > b.window {
 		e = &bearerFailureEntry{firstFailureAt: now}
@@ -525,17 +342,7 @@ func (b *bearerFailureTracker) recordSuccess(ip string) {
 	}
 	b.mu.Lock()
 	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	e, ok := b.entries[ip]
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-	// Preserve an active penalty so a single success cannot wipe an in-effect
-	// lockout; only reset the counter when no penalty is active or it has expired.
-	now := time.Now()
-	if e.penaltyUntil.IsZero() || now.After(e.penaltyUntil) {
-		e.count = 0
-		e.firstFailureAt = now
-	}
+	delete(b.entries, ip)
 }
 
 // clientIPForBearer returns the source IP used to key the failure tracker.
@@ -622,10 +429,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) writeBearerError(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request
 	case bearerErrThrottled:
 		status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
 		body = "Too Many Requests"
-		retryAfter = err.retryAfter
-		if retryAfter <= 0 {
-			retryAfter = t.bearerFailurePenalty
-		}
+		retryAfter = t.bearerFailurePenalty
 	case bearerErrIntrospectionUnavailable:
 		status = http.StatusServiceUnavailable
 		body = "Service Unavailable"
@@ -640,10 +444,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) writeBearerError(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request
 	if retryAfter > 0 {
 		rw.Header().Set("Retry-After", fmt.Sprintf("%d", int(retryAfter.Seconds())))
 	}
-	// Auth-rejection responses must never be cached (R101 contract): a
-	// cached 429/401 could be replayed to a client well after the
-	// penalty box expired or the session recovered.
-	rw.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 	rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
 	rw.WriteHeader(status)
 	_, _ = rw.Write([]byte(body)) // Safe to ignore: best-effort error body write
@@ -662,11 +462,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleBearerRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Requ
 	ip := clientIPForBearer(req)
 
 	if blocked, retryAfter := t.bearerFailureTracker.blocked(ip); blocked {
-		// Carry the actual remaining penalty (diverges from the configured
-		// default on clock-skew, partial-window expiry) so writeBearerError
-		// emits the true Retry-After rather than the full penalty.
 		throttled := newBearerError(bearerErrThrottled, "ip in penalty box")
-		throttled.retryAfter = retryAfter
+		// Preserve the actual retry-after even if it diverged from the
+		// configured default (clock-skew, partial-window expiry).
+		if retryAfter > 0 {
+			rw.Header().Set("Retry-After", fmt.Sprintf("%d", int(retryAfter.Seconds())))
+		}
 		t.writeBearerError(rw, req, throttled)
 		return
 	}
@@ -682,51 +483,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleBearerRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Requ
 		t.writeBearerError(rw, req, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token exceeds max length"))
 		return
 	}
-	// Determine whether this is genuinely a JWT. RFC 7662 token
-	// introspection covers opaque access tokens; when the operator
-	// requires live introspection (requireTokenIntrospection, whose
-	// documented purpose is exactly opaque-token support via
-	// client_secret_basic), introspect the opaque token on the bearer
-	// path instead of rejecting it — the session path already does
-	// (validateOpaqueToken). Previously the JWT-shape gate ran before
-	// the introspection branch, so every opaque token got a 401 even
-	// with introspection on (R159).
-	//
-	// A token is only treated as a JWT when it has exactly two dots AND
-	// its header actually parses as a JOSE header. Dot count alone is
-	// insufficient: an opaque token that coincidentally contains exactly
-	// two dots used to be routed onto the JWT path and rejected even
-	// under requireTokenIntrospection (header parse would fail) — it must
-	// instead be introspected like any other opaque token (R166).
-	isJWT := joseHeaderWellFormed(token)
-	if !isJWT {
-		if t.requireTokenIntrospection {
-			p, bErr := t.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection(token)
-			if bErr != nil {
-				if bErr.kind != bearerErrIntrospectionUnavailable {
-					t.bearerFailureTracker.recordFailure(ip)
-				}
-				t.writeBearerError(rw, req, bErr)
-				return
-			}
-			t.bearerFailureTracker.recordSuccess(ip)
-			if t.logger != nil {
-				t.logger.Debugf("bearer auth success (introspected opaque): identifier_hash=%s path=%s",
-					hashIdentifierForLog(p.Identifier), req.URL.Path)
-			}
-			t.forwardAuthorized(rw, req, p)
-			return
-		}
+	if strings.Count(token, ".") != 2 {
 		t.bearerFailureTracker.recordFailure(ip)
-		t.writeBearerError(rw, req, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token is not a valid JWT"))
+		t.writeBearerError(rw, req, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token is not a 3-segment JWT"))
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Structurally a JWT: enforce the alg/kid policy EARLY (before the
-	// cached fast-path in buildPrincipalFromBearerToken can short-circuit
-	// on a prior positive verdict). Without this pin an alg=none or
-	// oversized-kid token that had been cached as verified would sail
-	// through without re-checking.
 	if bErr := parseBearerJOSEHeader(token); bErr != nil {
 		t.bearerFailureTracker.recordFailure(ip)
 		t.writeBearerError(rw, req, bErr)
@@ -735,13 +497,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleBearerRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Requ
 
 	p, bErr := t.buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token)
 	if bErr != nil {
-		// Count only authentication failures (401/403) toward the per-IP
-		// throttle. An introspection outage (503) is infrastructure, not a
-		// client failure; recording it would trip a 429 penalty that a
-		// single success can't clear even after the endpoint recovers.
-		if bErr.kind != bearerErrIntrospectionUnavailable {
-			t.bearerFailureTracker.recordFailure(ip)
-		}
+		t.bearerFailureTracker.recordFailure(ip)
 		t.writeBearerError(rw, req, bErr)
 		return
 	}
@@ -758,7 +514,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleBearerRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Requ
 // described in spec §7.3 and returns a principal ready for forwardAuthorized.
 // Returns a typed *bearerError on failure so the caller can map to status.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token string) (*principal, *bearerError) {
-	if err := t.verifyTokenWithOpts(token); err != nil {
+	if err := t.verifyTokenWithOpts(token, verifyOpts{skipReplayMarking: true}); err != nil {
 		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token verification failed: "+err.Error())
 	}
 
@@ -782,9 +538,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token string) (*principal, *
 		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token_use=id rejected")
 	}
 
-	// Snapshot clientID under metadataMu: DCR rewrites it at runtime (R137).
-	clientID, _, _, _, _ := t.clientCredentials()
-	if bErr := enforceMultiAudienceAzp(claims, clientID); bErr != nil {
+	if bErr := enforceMultiAudienceAzp(claims, t.clientID); bErr != nil {
 		return nil, bErr
 	}
 	if bErr := enforceIatAge(claims, t.maxTokenAge); bErr != nil {
@@ -797,40 +551,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token string) (*principal, *
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Honor IdP-initiated (backchannel/front-channel) logout. The cookie
-	// path re-checks sessionInvalidationCache on every request; the bearer
-	// path previously did not, so a still-cryptographically-valid access
-	// token for a logged-out subject kept returning 200 (and, with
-	// requireTokenIntrospection, a cached positive verdict extended the
-	// stale window). Reject here, mirroring the cookie path: use the
-	// token's iat as its creation time so a token issued before the
-	// logout is invalidated, while a legitimately freshly-issued token
-	// (iat after logout) still passes (R146). iat is OPTIONAL per RFC 7519
-	// §4.1.6 and jwt.Verify no longer requires it (R126), so an iat-less
-	// token DOES reach here now. Falling back to time.Now() made such a
-	// token always look newer than any logout, so IdP-initiated logout
-	// never revoked it — reintroducing the R98 defect the cookie path's
-	// own fallback (sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation) avoids by using the
-	// zero time instead: fail closed rather than open (FIX-24). In
-	// production this branch is mostly defense in depth: enforceIatAge
-	// above already rejects an iat-less token before reaching here whenever
-	// maxTokenAge > 0. New() always sets it so: config.MaxTokenAgeSeconds
-	// <= 0 (unset, or an operator explicitly configuring 0) maps to a 24h
-	// default (main.go:359-364), it is never mapped to "disabled" — there
-	// is no config value that makes maxTokenAge 0. This fallback protects
-	// an iat-less token's logout check only in the case New()'s mapping
-	// doesn't reach: a test that constructs TraefikOidc with maxTokenAge=0
-	// directly, bypassing New().
-	subjectForInvalidation, _ := claims["sub"].(string)
-	sidForInvalidation, _ := claims["sid"].(string)
-	var createdAt time.Time
-	if iat, ok := claims["iat"].(float64); ok {
-		createdAt = time.Unix(int64(iat), 0)
-	}
-	if t.isSessionInvalidated(sidForInvalidation, subjectForInvalidation, createdAt) {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "session has been invalidated (logout)")
-	}
-
 	rawIdentifier, bErr := resolveBearerIdentifier(claims, t.bearerIdentifierClaim)
 	if bErr != nil {
 		return nil, bErr
@@ -841,7 +561,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token string) (*principal, *
 	}
 
 	subject, _ := claims["sub"].(string)
-	clientID, _ = claims["azp"].(string)
+	clientID, _ := claims["azp"].(string)
 	if clientID == "" {
 		clientID, _ = claims["client_id"].(string)
 	}
@@ -856,178 +576,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token string) (*principal, *
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection authenticates a bearer access
-// token that has no JWT shape by live RFC 7662 introspection, and builds
-// a principal whose identifier is the introspected subject. It mirrors
-// introspectOnBearerPath's classification (active, token_type, expiry,
-// audience) and binds the compliant subject. Only used on the bearer
-// path when requireTokenIntrospection is enabled (R159).
-//
-// Unlike a JWT bearer token — whose signature, aud and azp are already
-// bound to this client by jwt.Verify/enforceMultiAudienceAzp before this
-// function's counterpart ever runs — an opaque token has no local
-// verification at all; introspection is the only gate. So this function
-// re-applies every JWT-path gate the introspection branch used to skip
-// (R159 gap): allowOpaqueTokens, client binding, bearerIdentifierClaim +
-// sanitizeBearerIdentifier, maxTokenAge, isSessionInvalidated, the local
-// tokenBlacklist (raw token and jti) and nbf.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection(token string) (*principal, *bearerError) {
-	if !t.allowOpaqueTokens {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "opaque tokens are not enabled (set allowOpaqueTokens to true)")
-	}
-
-	// Same local-revocation gate the JWT path applies first
-	// (verifyTokenWithOpts, token_manager.go:71-75): handleLogout calls
-	// RevokeToken on the session's access token specifically so a token
-	// captured before logout cannot be reused (helpers.go). Without this
-	// check here, a captured opaque bearer token kept authenticating as the
-	// revoked subject for as long as the IdP still reported it active —
-	// provider-side revocation is best-effort (RevokeTokenWithProvider logs
-	// and continues on failure) and is not configured for most deployments.
-	if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-		if b, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(token); exists && b != nil {
-			return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "token has been revoked")
-		}
-	}
-
-	resp, err := t.introspectToken(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		// Any introspection transport/HTTP error — including a 4xx, which
-		// per RFC 7662 s2.3 means OUR OWN client credentials were rejected,
-		// not that the presented token is bad — is an availability problem,
-		// not a verdict on the token. Only a 200 response with active=false
-		// is (FIX-13, supersedes R156's blanket 4xx-as-invalid mapping).
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrIntrospectionUnavailable, "introspection failed: "+err.Error())
-	}
-	if !resp.Active {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection reports token inactive")
-	}
-	// Mirror introspectOnBearerPath (R149): reject a definite non-access
-	// token_type (e.g. refresh_token); accept "access_token" and "Bearer".
-	if resp.TokenType != "" && resp.TokenType != "access_token" && resp.TokenType != "Bearer" {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection token_type is not a bearer access token")
-	}
-	if resp.Exp > 0 && time.Now().After(time.Unix(resp.Exp, 0)) {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection reports token expired")
-	}
-	// Mirrors the session path's strict nbf comparison in
-	// validateOpaqueToken (token_introspection.go:258-263): no clock-skew
-	// tolerance. This is NOT the same check the JWT path applies — its
-	// verifyNotBefore (jwt.go:281, via verifyTimeConstraint) allows
-	// ClockSkewTolerancePast (jwt.go:23, 10s) before failing. RFC 7662
-	// s2.2 defines nbf with the same semantics as RFC 7519's nbf claim.
-	if resp.Nbf > 0 && time.Now().Before(time.Unix(resp.Nbf, 0)) {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection reports token not yet valid (nbf)")
-	}
-	// Same jti-blacklist gate the JWT path applies on a cached-token hit
-	// (token_manager.go:90-96): RevokeToken blacklists a JWT's jti too, and
-	// an IdP may echo that same jti in an opaque token's introspection
-	// response (e.g. a rotated token sharing the revoked JTI). Gated on
-	// disableReplayDetection like the JWT path, so an operator who has
-	// disabled replay/JTI tracking is not surprised by this new check.
-	if resp.Jti != "" && !t.disableReplayDetection && t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-		if b, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(resp.Jti); exists && b != nil {
-			return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "token replay detected (jti blacklisted)")
-		}
-	}
-	clientID, _, _, audience, _ := t.clientCredentials()
-	if audience != "" && audience != clientID {
-		// A distinct API audience is configured: the introspection response
-		// MUST carry a matching audience.
-		if resp.Aud == nil || verifyAudience(resp.Aud, audience) != nil {
-			return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection audience mismatch")
-		}
-	} else {
-		// audience == clientID (the common single-app default): RFC 7662
-		// s2.2 leaves client scoping to the authorization server's own
-		// policy, so without an explicit check here an opaque token issued
-		// to a completely different client at the same IdP would still
-		// report active=true and pass. Bind it to this client via either
-		// client_id or aud (client_id is RFC-optional).
-		clientBound := resp.ClientID == clientID ||
-			(resp.Aud != nil && verifyAudience(resp.Aud, clientID) == nil)
-		if !clientBound {
-			return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection client_id/audience does not match this client")
-		}
-	}
-
-	// maxTokenAge bound on iat, via the SAME enforceIatAge the JWT path
-	// uses (not a hand-rolled duplicate): RFC 7662 iat is optional, but
-	// New() always sets maxTokenAge > 0 (0/unset becomes 24h,
-	// main.go's config-default closure), so a response with no iat gives
-	// nothing to bound the token's age against and must fail closed —
-	// exactly like enforceIatAge already does for a JWT with no iat
-	// (R126/FIX-27 made iat optional on the JWT path too, and that path
-	// fails closed rather than silently skipping the bound).
-	iatClaims := map[string]interface{}{}
-	if resp.Iat > 0 {
-		iatClaims["iat"] = float64(resp.Iat)
-	}
-	if bErr := enforceIatAge(iatClaims, t.maxTokenAge); bErr != nil {
-		return nil, bErr
-	}
-
-	// Honor IdP-initiated (backchannel/front-channel) logout, mirroring the
-	// JWT bearer path (R146). RFC 7662 does not define sid, but some
-	// providers return it anyway (FIX-03): when the response carries one,
-	// check it exactly like the JWT path does, so a sid-only (front-channel)
-	// logout — front-channel logout always records by sid only, and so does
-	// a backchannel logout token that carries only sid — can revoke an
-	// opaque token too, not just a backchannel logout recorded by sub. iat
-	// absent -> zero time (fail closed, same as the JWT path's FIX-24
-	// contract), so a token whose age cannot be bounded is treated as
-	// pre-dating any logout rather than as freshly issued.
-	var createdAt time.Time
-	if resp.Iat > 0 {
-		createdAt = time.Unix(resp.Iat, 0)
-	}
-	if t.isSessionInvalidated(resp.Sid, resp.Sub, createdAt) {
-		return nil, newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "session has been invalidated (logout)")
-	}
-
-	// Populate every non-empty IntrospectionResponse member the RFC 7662
-	// response can carry, not just sub/username, so bearerIdentifierClaim
-	// can resolve the identifier from any of them (FIX-03) — mirroring how
-	// the JWT bearer path resolves against the full decoded claim set.
-	claims := map[string]interface{}{}
-	if resp.Sub != "" {
-		claims["sub"] = resp.Sub
-	}
-	if resp.Username != "" {
-		claims["username"] = resp.Username
-	}
-	if resp.ClientID != "" {
-		claims["client_id"] = resp.ClientID
-	}
-	if resp.Scope != "" {
-		claims["scope"] = resp.Scope
-	}
-	if resp.Iss != "" {
-		claims["iss"] = resp.Iss
-	}
-	if resp.Jti != "" {
-		claims["jti"] = resp.Jti
-	}
-	if resp.Aud != nil {
-		claims["aud"] = resp.Aud
-	}
-	rawIdentifier, bErr := resolveBearerIdentifier(claims, t.bearerIdentifierClaim)
-	if bErr != nil {
-		return nil, bErr
-	}
-	identifier, bErr := sanitizeBearerIdentifier(rawIdentifier, t.maxIdentifierLength)
-	if bErr != nil {
-		return nil, bErr
-	}
-	return &principal{
-		Claims:      claims,
-		Identifier:  identifier,
-		Subject:     resp.Sub,
-		AccessToken: token,
-		Source:      sourceBearer,
-	}, nil
-}
-
 // introspectOnBearerPath calls the existing RFC 7662 introspector when the
 // operator demands real-time revocation. Distinguishes "token revoked" (401)
 // from "endpoint unavailable" (503) so transient infra failures don't look
@@ -1035,57 +583,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection(token string) (*prin
 func (t *TraefikOidc) introspectOnBearerPath(token string) *bearerError {
 	resp, err := t.introspectToken(token)
 	if err != nil {
-		// Any introspection transport/HTTP error is an availability
-		// problem, never a verdict on the token: RFC 7662 s2.3 defines a
-		// 401/403 from the introspection endpoint as OUR OWN client
-		// credentials being rejected (e.g. a rotated client_secret), and
-		// 408/429 as the endpoint throttling or timing out. Only a 200
-		// response with active=false is a definite "not active" (s2.2).
-		// (FIX-13, supersedes R156's blanket 4xx-as-invalid mapping — a
-		// misconfigured or throttled endpoint must not turn every valid
-		// token into a 401.)
 		return newBearerError(bearerErrIntrospectionUnavailable, "introspection failed: "+err.Error())
 	}
 	if !resp.Active {
 		return newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection reports token inactive")
 	}
-	// Mirror the session path (validateOpaqueToken): an opaque-or-any
-	// token whose RFC 7662 token_type classifies it as a refresh token
-	// must not be honored as a bearer access token (R149). Only reject on
-	// a definite non-access match; compliant providers may omit it. RFC
-	// 7662's token_type is the RFC 6749 token type, whose value for an
-	// access token is "Bearer" (RFC 6750) — accept both spellings
-	// providers use (R156).
-	if resp.TokenType != "" && resp.TokenType != "access_token" && resp.TokenType != "Bearer" {
-		return newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection token_type is not a bearer access token")
-	}
-	// Mirror the session path (validateOpaqueToken): an active but
-	// already-expired result must not pass. The positive-only cache is
-	// capped by time-until-exp when Exp is present, but a provider
-	// returning active=1 past exp would otherwise let the token pass on
-	// the bearer path while the identical token is rejected on the
-	// session path.
-	if resp.Exp > 0 {
-		expTime := time.Unix(resp.Exp, 0)
-		if time.Now().After(expTime) {
-			return newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection reports token expired")
-		}
-	}
-	// Mirror the session path (validateOpaqueToken): when a distinct API
-	// audience is configured (audience != clientID), the introspection
-	// response MUST carry a matching audience. Fail closed on a missing or
-	// mismatched aud, otherwise a token minted for a different audience
-	// would pass the bearer path while the identical token is rejected on
-	// the session path. aud may be a single string or an array (RFC 7662).
-	// (R143)
-	clientID, _, _, audience, _ := t.clientCredentials()
-	if audience != "" && audience != clientID {
-		if resp.Aud == nil {
-			return newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection reports no audience")
-		}
-		if err := verifyAudience(resp.Aud, audience); err != nil {
-			return newBearerError(bearerErrTokenInactive, "introspection audience mismatch")
-		}
-	}
 	return nil
 }

bearer_auth_fuzz_test.go

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import "testing"
-
-// FuzzParseBearerJOSEHeader verifies the attacker-controlled JWT header parser
-// never panics on arbitrary input (no slice OOB, no unbounded alloc, no
-// JSON-engine surprise) regardless of token contents.
-func FuzzParseBearerJOSEHeader(f *testing.F) {
-	seeds := []string{
-		"",
-		"...",
-		"abc.def.ghi",
-		"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImtpZDEifQ.sig.sig", // alg=RS256 kid=kid1
-		"::",
-		"snapshot=",
-		"a,b.zzz",
-	}
-	for _, s := range seeds {
-		f.Add(s)
-	}
-	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, token string) {
-		parseBearerJOSEHeader(token) // must not panic
-	})
-}
-
-// FuzzSanitizeBearerIdentifier verifies the identifier sanitizer never panics on
-// arbitrary strings and always returns either a clean value or a *bearerError.
-func FuzzSanitizeBearerIdentifier(f *testing.F) {
-	seeds := []string{
-		"",
-		"alice",
-		"user,group=admin",
-		"a\u202eb\u202c",
-		"\t \n",
-		"verylongidentifier-padding-padding-padding-padding",
-	}
-	for _, s := range seeds {
-		f.Add(s)
-	}
-	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, raw string) {
-		id, berr := sanitizeBearerIdentifier(raw, 256)
-		if berr == nil && id == "" {
-			t.Fatalf("sanitize ok but empty identifier for %q", raw)
-		}
-	})
-}

bearer_auth_test.go

@@ -67,31 +67,31 @@ func makeBearerOIDC(t *testing.T, next http.Handler) *TraefikOidc {
 	t.Helper()
 	sm := createTestSessionManager(t)
 	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		next:                         next,
-		logger:                       NewLogger("error"),
-		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
-		sessionManager:               sm,
-		firstRequestStarted:          1,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
-		issuerURL:                    "https://issuer.example.com",
-		audience:                     "https://api.example.com",
-		clientID:                     "https://api.example.com",
-		tokenCache:                   NewTokenCache(),
-		excludedURLs:                 map[string]struct{}{"/favicon.ico": {}},
-		allowedRolesAndGroups:        map[string]struct{}{},
-		limiter:                      rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 1000),
-		ctx:                          context.Background(),
-		enableBearerAuth:             true,
-		stripAuthorizationHeader:     true,
-		bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate:    true,
-		bearerOverridesCookie:        false,
-		bearerIdentifierClaim:        "sub",
-		maxIdentifierLength:          256,
-		maxTokenAge:                  24 * time.Hour,
-		bearerFailureThreshold:       20,
-		bearerFailureWindow:          60 * time.Second,
-		bearerFailurePenalty:         60 * time.Second,
-		bearerFailureTracker:         newBearerFailureTracker(20, 60*time.Second, 60*time.Second),
+		next:                      next,
+		logger:                    NewLogger("error"),
+		initComplete:              make(chan struct{}),
+		sessionManager:            sm,
+		firstRequestReceived:      true,
+		metadataRefreshStarted:    true,
+		issuerURL:                 "https://issuer.example.com",
+		audience:                  "https://api.example.com",
+		clientID:                  "https://api.example.com",
+		tokenCache:                NewTokenCache(),
+		excludedURLs:              map[string]struct{}{"/favicon.ico": {}},
+		allowedRolesAndGroups:     map[string]struct{}{},
+		limiter:                   rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 1000),
+		ctx:                       context.Background(),
+		enableBearerAuth:          true,
+		stripAuthorizationHeader:  true,
+		bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate: true,
+		bearerOverridesCookie:     false,
+		bearerIdentifierClaim:     "sub",
+		maxIdentifierLength:       256,
+		maxTokenAge:               24 * time.Hour,
+		bearerFailureThreshold:    20,
+		bearerFailureWindow:       60 * time.Second,
+		bearerFailurePenalty:      60 * time.Second,
+		bearerFailureTracker:      newBearerFailureTracker(20, 60*time.Second, 60*time.Second),
 	}
 	oidc.extractClaimsFunc = extractClaims
 	close(oidc.initComplete)
@@ -222,8 +222,7 @@ func TestResolveBearerIdentifier(t *testing.T) {
 		{name: "explicit sub", claims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": "abc"}, claim: "sub", want: "abc"},
 		{name: "custom client_id claim", claims: map[string]interface{}{"client_id": "svc"}, claim: "client_id", want: "svc"},
 		{name: "missing claim", claims: map[string]interface{}{"other": "x"}, claim: "sub", wantErr: true},
-		{name: "numeric claim", claims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": 123}, claim: "sub", want: "123"}, // R102: scalar numbers stringified, not rejected
-		{name: "object claim", claims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": map[string]interface{}{"a": 1}}, claim: "sub", wantErr: true},
+		{name: "non-string claim", claims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": 123}, claim: "sub", wantErr: true},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -304,33 +303,15 @@ func TestBearerFailureTracker(t *testing.T) {
 	if b, retry := tr.blocked(ip); !b || retry <= 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected blocked with positive retry, got=%v retry=%v", b, retry)
 	}
-	// A success while a penalty is active must NOT wipe the in-effect lockout
-	// (otherwise a single success could clear an attacker's penalty).
+	// Success clears the counter.
 	tr.recordSuccess(ip)
-	if b, _ := tr.blocked(ip); !b {
-		t.Fatalf("expected still blocked after success while penalty active")
+	if b, _ := tr.blocked(ip); b {
+		t.Fatalf("expected unblocked after success")
 	}
 	// Other IPs are unaffected.
 	if b, _ := tr.blocked("10.0.0.2"); b {
 		t.Fatalf("unrelated IP should not be blocked")
 	}
-
-	// With an expired penalty, a success resets the counter so a subsequent
-	// sub-threshold failure does not immediately re-block.
-	tr2 := newBearerFailureTracker(3, 60*time.Second, 1*time.Millisecond)
-	const ip2 = "10.0.0.3"
-	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
-		tr2.recordFailure(ip2)
-	}
-	time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) // let the short penalty expire
-	if b, _ := tr2.blocked(ip2); b {
-		t.Fatalf("expected unblocked after penalty expiry")
-	}
-	tr2.recordSuccess(ip2) // resets count since penalty has passed
-	tr2.recordFailure(ip2) // single failure, well below threshold
-	if b, _ := tr2.blocked(ip2); b {
-		t.Fatalf("expected unblocked: counter should have reset after success")
-	}
 }
 
 // =============================================================================
@@ -616,43 +597,6 @@ func TestServeHTTP_Bearer_ThrottleTrips429(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestServeHTTP_Bearer_Introspection503_NotThrottleFailure(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		t.Fatalf("next must not run: introspection 503 should reject request")
-	})
-	oidc := makeBearerOIDC(t, next)
-	oidc.requireTokenIntrospection = true
-	// Unreachable introspection endpoint -> every request returns 503.
-	oidc.introspectionURL = "http://127.0.0.1:1/"
-	oidc.httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 500 * time.Millisecond}
-	oidc.bearerFailureTracker = newBearerFailureTracker(3, 60*time.Second, 60*time.Second)
-
-	claims := defaultBearerClaims()
-	token := makeBearerJWT(t, defaultBearerHeader(), claims)
-	seedVerified(t, oidc, token, claims)
-
-	send := func() *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
-		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/work", nil)
-		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.7:1234"
-		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
-		rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-		oidc.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-		return rw
-	}
-
-	// Four requests during an introspection outage. Each is a 503 and the
-	// per-IP failure count must stay at 0 so the threshold (3) never trips.
-	// On OLD code each 503 was counted as a throttle failure, so the 4th
-	// request would come back 429 (penalty box) instead of 503.
-	for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
-		rw := send()
-		if rw.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
-			t.Fatalf("iteration %d: status=%d, want %d", i, rw.Code, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestServeHTTP_Bearer_ExcludedURLStripsAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var capturedAuth string
@@ -838,24 +782,6 @@ func TestStartupValidation_BearerRequiresAudience(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestStartupValidation_BearerAcceptsResourceInPlaceOfAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-	cfg := CreateConfig()
-	cfg.ProviderURL = "https://issuer.example.com"
-	cfg.ClientID = "id"
-	cfg.ClientSecret = "secret"
-	cfg.CallbackURL = "/oauth/callback"
-	cfg.SessionEncryptionKey = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
-	cfg.EnableBearerAuth = true
-	cfg.Audience = ""
-	cfg.Resource = "https://api.example.com"
-	mw, err := New(context.Background(), http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {}), cfg, "bearer-test")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected Resource to satisfy the bearer-auth audience requirement, got %v", err)
-	}
-	defer mw.(*TraefikOidc).Close()
-}
-
 func TestStartupValidation_BearerRejectsEmailIdentifier(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cfg := CreateConfig()

bearer_failure_tracker_sweep_test.go

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-28 regression tests.
-//
-// R117's map-growth sweep in recordFailure deleted every entry whose
-// penaltyUntil was before the cutoff. An entry that has not tripped the
-// penalty box yet has a ZERO penaltyUntil, which is always before any
-// cutoff — so once the map passed defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold, every
-// accumulating (not-yet-tripped) counter was discarded regardless of how
-// recently it started, no matter how recent firstFailureAt was. A source
-// whose failures interleave with sweeps could never reach the threshold.
-
-// TestBearerFailureTracker_SweepDoesNotDiscardFreshCounters guards the
-// exact scenario from the finding: threshold 3, 2 failures for a target
-// IP, then 1025 other IPs failing once each (crossing the sweep
-// threshold), then a 3rd failure for the target IP. The target's count
-// must survive the sweep and trip the penalty box.
-// Fail-on-old: the sweep discards the target's in-progress counter, so the
-// 3rd failure restarts it at count=1 and blocked() reports false.
-func TestBearerFailureTracker_SweepDoesNotDiscardFreshCounters(t *testing.T) {
-	b := newBearerFailureTracker(3, 60*time.Second, 60*time.Second)
-
-	b.recordFailure("target-ip")
-	b.recordFailure("target-ip")
-
-	// Push the map past defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold with distinct,
-	// equally-fresh IPs so recordFailure's sweep branch runs.
-	for i := 0; i < defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold+1; i++ {
-		b.recordFailure(fmt.Sprintf("other-ip-%d", i))
-	}
-
-	b.recordFailure("target-ip")
-
-	blocked, _ := b.blocked("target-ip")
-	if !blocked {
-		t.Fatal("a source whose failures are recent (within the window) must not lose its count to the map-growth sweep, and must trip the penalty box on its 3rd failure")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerFailureTracker_SweepRemovesTrulyStaleEntries is the positive
-// control: an entry that is BOTH untripped AND outside the window (a
-// source that failed once, long ago, and never returned) must still be
-// swept once the map grows past the threshold — otherwise the fix would
-// defeat the sweep's original memory-bound purpose entirely.
-func TestBearerFailureTracker_SweepRemovesTrulyStaleEntries(t *testing.T) {
-	b := newBearerFailureTracker(20, 60*time.Second, 60*time.Second)
-
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	b.entries["stale-ip"] = &bearerFailureEntry{
-		firstFailureAt: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), // well outside the 60s window
-		count:          1,
-		// penaltyUntil left zero: never tripped.
-	}
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-
-	for i := 0; i < defaultBearerEntrySweepThreshold+1; i++ {
-		b.recordFailure(fmt.Sprintf("filler-ip-%d", i))
-	}
-
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	_, stillPresent := b.entries["stale-ip"]
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-	if stillPresent {
-		t.Fatal("an untripped entry whose firstFailureAt is outside the window must still be swept once the map grows past the threshold")
-	}
-}

bearer_logout_iat_fallback_test.go

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-24 regression test.
-//
-// buildPrincipalFromBearerToken derived the IdP-logout-invalidation
-// "createdAt" from the token's iat claim, falling back to time.Now() when
-// iat was absent. Since 8640451 made iat OPTIONAL in jwt.Verify (R126), an
-// access token without iat now reaches this check. time.Now() makes such a
-// token always look newer than any logout event (isSessionInvalidated only
-// matches when invalidationTime >= createdAt), so IdP-initiated
-// (backchannel) logout never revokes it — reintroducing the R98 defect the
-// cookie path already fixed by falling back to zero time instead.
-//
-// Fail-on-old: a bearer token without iat, for a sid invalidated by
-// backchannel logout, still authenticates (200) after the logout.
-func TestBearerLogoutInvalidation_NoIatFallsClosedNotOpen(t *testing.T) {
-	cache := NewCache()
-	defer cache.Close()
-
-	oidc := makeBearerOIDC(t, nil)
-	oidc.sessionInvalidationCache = cache
-	// Disable the unrelated maxTokenAge/enforceIatAge bound (a DIFFERENT
-	// check that also rejects a missing iat, and that New() always turns on
-	// in production — 0/unset becomes 24h, main.go:357-362 — this override
-	// only exists because this test constructs *TraefikOidc directly,
-	// bypassing New()) so this test isolates the isSessionInvalidated
-	// createdAt fallback under test. That fallback is what actually matters
-	// once maxTokenAge is 0: with maxTokenAge > 0 (the production default),
-	// enforceIatAge rejects an iat-less token before this logout check is
-	// even reached.
-	oidc.maxTokenAge = 0
-
-	claims := defaultBearerClaims()
-	delete(claims, "iat") // provider omits iat (now legal per R126)
-	claims["sub"] = "user-1"
-	claims["sid"] = "session-1"
-
-	token := makeBearerJWT(t, defaultBearerHeader(), claims)
-	seedVerified(t, oidc, token, claims)
-
-	// Backchannel logout invalidates the session a full hour before this
-	// request (set directly rather than via invalidateSession's real-clock
-	// Unix() call, so the comparison is deterministic regardless of
-	// test-execution timing rather than depending on two time.Now() calls
-	// landing in the same second). The buggy time.Now() fallback for
-	// createdAt makes the token look newer than this invalidation
-	// (invalidationTime.Before(createdAt) == true -> NOT invalidated); the
-	// fix's zero-time fallback is never after any invalidation timestamp.
-	invalidatedAt := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour).Unix()
-	cache.Set(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", "session-1"), invalidatedAt, time.Hour)
-
-	_, bErr := oidc.buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(token)
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("a bearer token without iat, whose sid was invalidated by backchannel logout, must be rejected (fail closed), not authenticated as if issued after the logout")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerLogoutInvalidation_WithIatStillHonored is the positive control:
-// a token WITH iat issued before the logout must still be invalidated (the
-// existing R146 behavior), and one issued after must still pass.
-func TestBearerLogoutInvalidation_WithIatStillHonored(t *testing.T) {
-	cache := NewCache()
-	defer cache.Close()
-
-	oidc := makeBearerOIDC(t, nil)
-	oidc.sessionInvalidationCache = cache
-
-	if err := oidc.invalidateSession("session-2", ""); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("invalidateSession: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Issued well before the logout above.
-	staleClaims := defaultBearerClaims()
-	staleClaims["sub"] = "user-2"
-	staleClaims["sid"] = "session-2"
-	staleClaims["iat"] = float64(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour).Unix())
-	staleToken := makeBearerJWT(t, defaultBearerHeader(), staleClaims)
-	seedVerified(t, oidc, staleToken, staleClaims)
-
-	if _, bErr := oidc.buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(staleToken); bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("a token issued before the logout must still be invalidated")
-	}
-
-	// Freshly issued after the logout, for an unrelated sid.
-	freshClaims := defaultBearerClaims()
-	freshClaims["sub"] = "user-3"
-	freshClaims["sid"] = "session-3"
-	freshClaims["iat"] = float64(time.Now().Unix())
-	freshToken := makeBearerJWT(t, defaultBearerHeader(), freshClaims)
-	seedVerified(t, oidc, freshToken, freshClaims)
-
-	if _, bErr := oidc.buildPrincipalFromBearerToken(freshToken); bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("a freshly issued token for an uninvalidated sid must pass, got: %v", bErr)
-	}
-}

bearer_opaque_binding_test.go

@@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-03 regression tests.
-//
-// R159 sent every opaque (non-JWT) bearer token to
-// buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection whenever requireTokenIntrospection
-// was enabled, with none of the JWT-path gates: allowOpaqueTokens was never
-// checked, the introspected client_id/audience was never bound to this
-// client when the operator left audience==clientID (the common default),
-// and IdP-initiated logout (isSessionInvalidated) was never consulted. Any
-// introspected active=true token from the same IdP therefore authenticated,
-// including one issued to a completely different client.
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_RequiresAllowOpaqueTokens guards the
-// allowOpaqueTokens gate: with it left at its default (false), an opaque
-// bearer token must be rejected even when requireTokenIntrospection is on
-// and the introspection endpoint reports the token active.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_RequiresAllowOpaqueTokens(t *testing.T) {
-	active := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: active},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         false, // default
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("opaque bearer token must be rejected when allowOpaqueTokens is false, even with requireTokenIntrospection on")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_RejectsForeignClient guards the client
-// binding: when audience==clientID (no distinct API audience configured),
-// an introspected token whose client_id names another client, and whose
-// aud does not contain this client either, must be rejected.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_RejectsForeignClient(t *testing.T) {
-	foreign := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "other-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: foreign},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an introspected token issued to a different client_id must be rejected")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_AcceptsOwnClientViaClientID is the positive
-// control: client_id matching this client must still authenticate.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_AcceptsOwnClientViaClientID(t *testing.T) {
-	own := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: own},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-	}
-	p, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("a token issued to this client_id must be accepted, got: %v", bErr)
-	}
-	if p.Identifier != "user-1" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected identifier %q, got %q", "user-1", p.Identifier)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_AcceptsOwnClientViaAud is the positive
-// control for providers that omit client_id from the introspection
-// response but carry it in aud instead (RFC 7662 leaves client_id
-// optional).
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_AcceptsOwnClientViaAud(t *testing.T) {
-	own := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", Aud: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: own},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("a token whose aud contains this client_id must be accepted, got: %v", bErr)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_InvalidatedSessionRejected guards the
-// IdP-initiated-logout check: a subject invalidated via backchannel logout
-// must be rejected even though the introspected token itself reports
-// active=true. The introspection response carries no sid (RFC 7662 does
-// not define one), so this checks invalidation by sub, mirroring the JWT
-// bearer path's isSessionInvalidated(sid, sub, createdAt) call with an
-// empty sid.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_InvalidatedSessionRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	cache := NewCache()
-	defer cache.Close()
-
-	own := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: own},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		sessionInvalidationCache:  cache,
-	}
-	if err := tObj.invalidateSession("", "user-1"); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("invalidateSession: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an introspected token for a subject invalidated by backchannel logout must be rejected")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_NotYetInvalidatedAccepted is the positive
-// control: a subject with no invalidation entry must still authenticate.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_NotYetInvalidatedAccepted(t *testing.T) {
-	cache := NewCache()
-	defer cache.Close()
-
-	own := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: own},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		sessionInvalidationCache:  cache,
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("a subject with no invalidation entry must authenticate, got: %v", bErr)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_UsesBearerIdentifierClaim guards that the
-// identifier is resolved through bearerIdentifierClaim + sanitizeBearerIdentifier
-// like the JWT bearer path, instead of always preferring sub.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_UsesBearerIdentifierClaim(t *testing.T) {
-	own := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", Username: "svc-account", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: own},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		bearerIdentifierClaim:     "username",
-	}
-	p, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", bErr)
-	}
-	if p.Identifier != "svc-account" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected identifier from configured claim %q, got %q", "username", p.Identifier)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_MaxTokenAgeEnforced guards that maxTokenAge
-// bounds the introspected token's iat like enforceIatAge does for the JWT
-// path, when the AS returns one.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_MaxTokenAgeEnforced(t *testing.T) {
-	stale := &IntrospectionResponse{
-		Active:   true,
-		Sub:      "user-1",
-		ClientID: "my-client",
-		Iat:      time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-	}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: stale},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		maxTokenAge:               time.Hour,
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an introspected token whose iat is older than maxTokenAge must be rejected")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_MissingIatRejectedWithMaxTokenAge guards
-// that an opaque token whose introspection response carries no iat is
-// bound by maxTokenAge exactly like enforceIatAge binds the JWT path: when
-// maxTokenAge > 0 (New() always sets it so — 0/unset becomes 24h,
-// main.go's config-default closure), a missing iat gives nothing to bound
-// the token's age against, so it must fail closed rather than bypass the
-// age check entirely.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_MissingIatRejectedWithMaxTokenAge(t *testing.T) {
-	noIat := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client"} // Iat left zero
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: noIat},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		maxTokenAge:               24 * time.Hour,
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an introspected opaque token with no iat must be rejected when maxTokenAge is set, matching enforceIatAge's fail-closed contract on the JWT path")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_SidOnlyLogoutRejected guards front-channel
-// (sid-only) logout reaching an opaque bearer token. isSessionInvalidated
-// used to be called with a hardcoded empty sid, so a logout recorded only
-// by sid (front-channel logout always records this way; so does a
-// back-channel logout token carrying only sid) never revoked an opaque
-// token even when the introspection response itself carried a sid.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_SidOnlyLogoutRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	cache := NewCache()
-	defer cache.Close()
-
-	withSid := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client", Sid: "session-1"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: withSid},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		sessionInvalidationCache:  cache,
-	}
-	if err := tObj.invalidateSession("session-1", ""); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("invalidateSession: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an introspected token whose sid was invalidated by a sid-only (front-channel) logout must be rejected, when the introspection response carries that sid")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_RevokedTokenRejected guards the local
-// revocation blacklist: the JWT bearer path rejects a raw token that
-// RevokeToken blacklisted (verifyTokenWithOpts, token_manager.go:71-75), and
-// handleLogout calls RevokeToken on the session's access token specifically
-// so "a token captured before logout ... cannot be reused" (helpers.go).
-// buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection never consulted t.tokenBlacklist, so
-// a captured opaque bearer token kept authenticating as the victim after
-// logout for as long as the IdP still reported it active.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_RevokedTokenRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	blacklist := NewCache()
-	defer blacklist.Close()
-
-	active := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "victim", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: active},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		tokenBlacklist:            blacklist,
-		tokenCache:                NewTokenCache(),
-	}
-	defer tObj.tokenCache.Close()
-
-	const token = "opaque-victim-token"
-	tObj.RevokeToken(token)
-
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection(token)
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an opaque bearer token blacklisted by RevokeToken (logout) must be rejected, even though introspection still reports it active")
-	}
-	if bErr.kind != bearerErrTokenInactive {
-		t.Fatalf("want bearerErrTokenInactive (401), got kind %v", bErr.kind)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_BlacklistedJtiRejected guards the jti side
-// of the same gate: when the introspection response carries a jti and that
-// jti is blacklisted (e.g. the IdP echoes the same jti it minted for a JWT
-// RevokeToken already blacklisted by jti), the opaque path must reject it
-// too, unless disableReplayDetection is set — mirroring the JWT path's
-// tokenCache-hit jti check (token_manager.go:90-96).
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_BlacklistedJtiRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	blacklist := NewCache()
-	defer blacklist.Close()
-	blacklist.Set("revoked-jti-1", true, time.Hour)
-
-	withJti := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "victim", ClientID: "my-client", Jti: "revoked-jti-1"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: withJti},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		tokenBlacklist:            blacklist,
-	}
-
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an opaque bearer token whose introspection jti is blacklisted must be rejected")
-	}
-	if bErr.kind != bearerErrTokenInactive {
-		t.Fatalf("want bearerErrTokenInactive (401), got kind %v", bErr.kind)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_BlacklistedJtiIgnoredWhenReplayDetectionDisabled
-// guards the disableReplayDetection escape hatch on the jti-blacklist gate
-// (bearer_auth.go:928): an operator who has turned off replay/JTI tracking
-// must not be surprised by this gate rejecting an otherwise-valid token
-// whose jti happens to collide with a blacklisted one. The raw token itself
-// is NOT blacklisted here — only its jti is — so this isolates the jti
-// branch from the raw-token blacklist check covered by
-// _RevokedTokenRejected above.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_BlacklistedJtiIgnoredWhenReplayDetectionDisabled(t *testing.T) {
-	blacklist := NewCache()
-	defer blacklist.Close()
-	blacklist.Set("revoked-jti-1", true, time.Hour)
-
-	withJti := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client", Jti: "revoked-jti-1"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: withJti},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		tokenBlacklist:            blacklist,
-		disableReplayDetection:    true,
-	}
-
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("a blacklisted jti must be ignored when disableReplayDetection is true, got: %v", bErr)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_NbfFutureRejected guards the not-before
-// check the JWT path applies through verifyTimeClaims and the session path
-// applies through validateOpaqueToken (token_introspection.go:258-263): an
-// introspection response reporting a future nbf must be rejected on the
-// bearer path too.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_NbfFutureRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	notYetValid := &IntrospectionResponse{
-		Active:   true,
-		Sub:      "user-1",
-		ClientID: "my-client",
-		Nbf:      time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
-	}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: notYetValid},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-	}
-	_, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an introspected token with nbf in the future must be rejected")
-	}
-	if bErr.kind != bearerErrTokenInactive {
-		t.Fatalf("want bearerErrTokenInactive (401), got kind %v", bErr.kind)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_UsesClientIDClaim guards that
-// bearerIdentifierClaim can resolve against any IntrospectionResponse
-// member, not just sub/username — client_id, scope, iss, jti and aud must
-// all be available too.
-func TestBearerOpaqueIntrospection_UsesClientIDClaim(t *testing.T) {
-	own := &IntrospectionResponse{Active: true, Sub: "user-1", ClientID: "my-client"}
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                    newNoOpLogger(),
-		introspectionCache:        &stubIntrospectionCache{v: own},
-		requireTokenIntrospection: true,
-		allowOpaqueTokens:         true,
-		clientID:                  "my-client",
-		bearerIdentifierClaim:     "client_id",
-	}
-	p, bErr := tObj.buildPrincipalFromOpaqueIntrospection("opaque-token")
-	if bErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", bErr)
-	}
-	if p.Identifier != "my-client" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected identifier from configured claim %q, got %q", "client_id", p.Identifier)
-	}
-}

cache_bench_test.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package traefikoidc
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
+	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -160,3 +161,81 @@ func BenchmarkLRUStrategy_EstimateSize(b *testing.B) {
 		strategy.EstimateSize(item)
 	}
 }
+
+// =============================================================================
+// SHARDED CACHE BENCHMARKS
+// =============================================================================
+
+func BenchmarkShardedCache(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("Set", func(b *testing.B) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(64, 100000)
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("key-%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+	})
+
+	b.Run("Get", func(b *testing.B) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(64, 100000)
+		for i := 0; i < 10000; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("key-%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+		b.ResetTimer()
+		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+			cache.Get(fmt.Sprintf("key-%d", i%10000))
+		}
+	})
+
+	b.Run("ParallelSetGet", func(b *testing.B) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(64, 100000)
+		b.RunParallel(func(pb *testing.PB) {
+			i := 0
+			for pb.Next() {
+				key := fmt.Sprintf("key-%d", i)
+				cache.Set(key, i, 5*time.Minute)
+				cache.Get(key)
+				i++
+			}
+		})
+	})
+}
+
+// BenchmarkShardedVsGlobalMutex compares sharded cache with global mutex approach
+func BenchmarkShardedVsGlobalMutex(b *testing.B) {
+	b.Run("ShardedCache64", func(b *testing.B) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(64, 100000)
+		b.RunParallel(func(pb *testing.PB) {
+			i := 0
+			for pb.Next() {
+				key := fmt.Sprintf("jti-%d", i%10000)
+				if !cache.Exists(key) {
+					cache.Set(key, true, 5*time.Minute)
+				}
+				i++
+			}
+		})
+	})
+
+	b.Run("GlobalMutexCache", func(b *testing.B) {
+		var mu sync.RWMutex
+		data := make(map[string]bool)
+
+		b.RunParallel(func(pb *testing.PB) {
+			i := 0
+			for pb.Next() {
+				key := fmt.Sprintf("jti-%d", i%10000)
+
+				mu.RLock()
+				_, exists := data[key]
+				mu.RUnlock()
+
+				if !exists {
+					mu.Lock()
+					data[key] = true
+					mu.Unlock()
+				}
+				i++
+			}
+		})
+	})
+}

cache_manager.go

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
+const (
+	defaultBlacklistDuration = 24 * time.Hour
+)
+
 // CacheManager manages all caching components using the universal cache
 type CacheManager struct {
 	manager *UniversalCacheManager
@@ -12,9 +16,8 @@ type CacheManager struct {
 }
 
 var (
-	globalCacheManagerInstance    *CacheManager
-	cacheManagerInitOnce          sync.Once
-	cacheManagerActiveFingerprint string
+	globalCacheManagerInstance *CacheManager
+	cacheManagerInitOnce       sync.Once
 )
 
 // GetGlobalCacheManager returns a singleton CacheManager instance.
@@ -26,9 +29,7 @@ func GetGlobalCacheManager(wg *sync.WaitGroup) *CacheManager {
 
 // GetGlobalCacheManagerWithConfig returns a singleton CacheManager instance with optional Redis configuration
 func GetGlobalCacheManagerWithConfig(wg *sync.WaitGroup, config *Config) *CacheManager {
-	fp := redisFingerprint(config)
 	cacheManagerInitOnce.Do(func() {
-		cacheManagerActiveFingerprint = fp
 		var redisConfig *RedisConfig
 		var logger *Logger
 
@@ -54,27 +55,9 @@ func GetGlobalCacheManagerWithConfig(wg *sync.WaitGroup, config *Config) *CacheM
 			manager: GetUniversalCacheManagerWithConfig(logger, redisConfig),
 		}
 	})
-	// Warn loudly if a later instance asks for a DIFFERENT explicit Redis
-	// backend than the one that won initialization: the cache manager is a
-	// process-global singleton shared across plugin instances (yaegi), so this
-	// instance's divergent configuration is silently ignored, which would
-	// otherwise collapse cache/state isolation between routes (rank 9).
-	if fp != "" && cacheManagerActiveFingerprint != "" && fp != cacheManagerActiveFingerprint {
-		NewLogger(config.LogLevel).Errorf("cache manager already initialized with Redis backend %q; this instance's Redis backend %q is IGNORED (process-global singleton). Use a single consistent cache configuration across all routes.", cacheManagerActiveFingerprint, fp)
-	}
 	return globalCacheManagerInstance
 }
 
-// redisFingerprint returns a stable identifier for an explicitly-enabled Redis
-// backend (address + key prefix), or "" when Redis is not explicitly enabled.
-// Used to detect divergent cache configurations across plugin instances.
-func redisFingerprint(config *Config) string {
-	if config == nil || config.Redis == nil || !config.Redis.Enabled {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return config.Redis.Address + "|" + config.Redis.KeyPrefix
-}
-
 // GetSharedTokenBlacklist returns the shared token blacklist cache
 func (cm *CacheManager) GetSharedTokenBlacklist() CacheInterface {
 	cm.mu.RLock()
@@ -103,7 +86,7 @@ func (cm *CacheManager) GetSharedMetadataCache() *MetadataCache {
 func (cm *CacheManager) GetSharedJWKCache() JWKCacheInterface {
 	cm.mu.RLock()
 	defer cm.mu.RUnlock()
-	return &JWKCache{cache: cm.manager.GetJWKCache(), lastForceRefresh: make(map[string]time.Time)}
+	return &JWKCache{cache: cm.manager.GetJWKCache()}
 }
 
 // GetSharedIntrospectionCache returns the shared token introspection cache
@@ -169,13 +152,6 @@ func (c *CacheInterfaceWrapper) Get(key string) (interface{}, bool) {
 	return c.cache.Get(key)
 }
 
-// SetIfAbsent atomically stores a value only if the key is not already
-// present. See UniversalCache.SetIfAbsent and AtomicSetIfAbsentCache
-// (FIX-17).
-func (c *CacheInterfaceWrapper) SetIfAbsent(key string, value interface{}, ttl time.Duration) (bool, error) {
-	return c.cache.SetIfAbsent(key, value, ttl)
-}
-
 // Delete removes a key
 func (c *CacheInterfaceWrapper) Delete(key string) {
 	c.cache.Delete(key)

cache_test.go

@@ -178,11 +178,6 @@ func TestCacheInterfaceWrapper_Clear(t *testing.T) {
 	cm := getTestCacheManager(t)
 	cache := cm.GetSharedTokenBlacklist()
 
-	// The shared token blacklist is process-global across tests; under shuffled
-	// execution a prior test may have left items behind. Clear first so the
-	// size assertions are stable regardless of test order.
-	cache.Clear()
-
 	cache.Set("key1", "value1", time.Hour)
 	cache.Set("key2", "value2", time.Hour)
 
@@ -470,6 +465,314 @@ func TestConcurrentCacheAccess(t *testing.T) {
 	wg.Wait()
 }
 
+// =============================================================================
+// SHARDED CACHE TESTS
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestShardedCacheBasicOperations(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("SetAndGet", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		cache.Set("key1", "value1", 5*time.Minute)
+		cache.Set("key2", 42, 5*time.Minute)
+		cache.Set("key3", true, 5*time.Minute)
+
+		val1, ok := cache.Get("key1")
+		if !ok || val1 != "value1" {
+			t.Errorf("Expected 'value1', got %v, ok=%v", val1, ok)
+		}
+
+		val2, ok := cache.Get("key2")
+		if !ok || val2 != 42 {
+			t.Errorf("Expected 42, got %v, ok=%v", val2, ok)
+		}
+
+		val3, ok := cache.Get("key3")
+		if !ok || val3 != true {
+			t.Errorf("Expected true, got %v, ok=%v", val3, ok)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("GetNonExistent", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		val, ok := cache.Get("nonexistent")
+		if ok || val != nil {
+			t.Errorf("Expected nil/false for nonexistent key, got %v/%v", val, ok)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Delete", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		cache.Set("key1", "value1", 5*time.Minute)
+		cache.Delete("key1")
+
+		val, ok := cache.Get("key1")
+		if ok || val != nil {
+			t.Errorf("Expected nil/false after delete, got %v/%v", val, ok)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Exists", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		cache.Set("key1", "value1", 5*time.Minute)
+
+		if !cache.Exists("key1") {
+			t.Error("Expected Exists to return true for existing key")
+		}
+
+		if cache.Exists("nonexistent") {
+			t.Error("Expected Exists to return false for nonexistent key")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Size", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		if cache.Size() != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("Expected size 0, got %d", cache.Size())
+		}
+
+		for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("key%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+
+		if cache.Size() != 100 {
+			t.Errorf("Expected size 100, got %d", cache.Size())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Clear", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("key%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+
+		cache.Clear()
+
+		if cache.Size() != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("Expected size 0 after clear, got %d", cache.Size())
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestShardedCacheExpiration(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("ItemExpires", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		cache.Set("key1", "value1", 50*time.Millisecond)
+
+		if !cache.Exists("key1") {
+			t.Error("Item should exist immediately after set")
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		if cache.Exists("key1") {
+			t.Error("Item should have expired")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("CleanupRemovesExpired", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("expired%d", i), i, 10*time.Millisecond)
+		}
+
+		for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("valid%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		cache.Cleanup()
+
+		for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
+			if cache.Exists(fmt.Sprintf("expired%d", i)) {
+				t.Errorf("Expired item %d should not exist after cleanup", i)
+			}
+		}
+
+		for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
+			if !cache.Exists(fmt.Sprintf("valid%d", i)) {
+				t.Errorf("Valid item %d should still exist after cleanup", i)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("ZeroTTLNeverExpires", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 1000)
+
+		cache.Set("permanent", "value", 0)
+
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		if !cache.Exists("permanent") {
+			t.Error("Item with 0 TTL should never expire")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestShardedCacheConcurrency(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("ConcurrentSetGet", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(64, 10000)
+		const numGoroutines = 100
+		const numOperations = 1000
+
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+		var errors int32
+
+		for i := 0; i < numGoroutines; i++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func(id int) {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				for j := 0; j < numOperations; j++ {
+					key := fmt.Sprintf("key-%d-%d", id, j)
+					cache.Set(key, j, 5*time.Minute)
+				}
+			}(i)
+		}
+
+		for i := 0; i < numGoroutines; i++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func(id int) {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				for j := 0; j < numOperations; j++ {
+					key := fmt.Sprintf("key-%d-%d", id, j)
+					cache.Get(key)
+				}
+			}(i)
+		}
+
+		wg.Wait()
+
+		if atomic.LoadInt32(&errors) > 0 {
+			t.Errorf("Encountered %d errors during concurrent access", errors)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("ConcurrentMixedOperations", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(64, 10000)
+		const numGoroutines = 50
+		const numOperations = 500
+
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+		for i := 0; i < numGoroutines; i++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func(id int) {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				for j := 0; j < numOperations; j++ {
+					key := fmt.Sprintf("key-%d", j%100)
+					switch j % 4 {
+					case 0:
+						cache.Set(key, j, 5*time.Minute)
+					case 1:
+						cache.Get(key)
+					case 2:
+						cache.Exists(key)
+					case 3:
+						cache.Delete(key)
+					}
+				}
+			}(i)
+		}
+
+		wg.Wait()
+	})
+
+	t.Run("NoConcurrentPanics", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(32, 5000)
+		const numGoroutines = 100
+
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+		for i := 0; i < numGoroutines; i++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func(id int) {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				defer func() {
+					if r := recover(); r != nil {
+						t.Errorf("Panic in goroutine %d: %v", id, r)
+					}
+				}()
+
+				for j := 0; j < 100; j++ {
+					cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("k%d", j), j, time.Millisecond)
+					cache.Get(fmt.Sprintf("k%d", j))
+					cache.Cleanup()
+				}
+			}(i)
+		}
+
+		wg.Wait()
+	})
+}
+
+func TestShardedCacheEviction(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("EvictsWhenFull", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(4, 100)
+
+		for i := 0; i < 600; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("key%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+
+		size := cache.Size()
+		if size >= 600 {
+			t.Errorf("Expected eviction to reduce size below 600, got %d", size)
+		}
+		t.Logf("Cache size after adding 600 items: %d", size)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("EvictsExpiredFirst", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(4, 100)
+
+		for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("expired%d", i), i, 1*time.Millisecond)
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("valid%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+
+		validCount := 0
+		for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+			if cache.Exists(fmt.Sprintf("valid%d", i)) {
+				validCount++
+			}
+		}
+
+		if validCount < 80 {
+			t.Errorf("Expected at least 80 valid items, got %d", validCount)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestShardedCacheShardDistribution(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("EvenDistribution", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cache := NewShardedCache(16, 16000)
+
+		for i := 0; i < 10000; i++ {
+			cache.Set(fmt.Sprintf("key-%d", i), i, 5*time.Minute)
+		}
+
+		stats := cache.ShardStats()
+
+		average := 10000 / 16
+		for i, count := range stats {
+			if count > average*3 || count < average/3 {
+				t.Errorf("Shard %d has uneven distribution: %d items (expected ~%d)", i, count, average)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // CACHE COMPATIBILITY TESTS
 // =============================================================================

cache_test_helpers_test.go

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Shared CacheInterface / cache-backend test doubles for round-regression
-// tests.
-//
-// Moved here for FIX-41: NewMemoryBackendForTest, mapCache/newMapCache and
-// serializingCache were each declared inside a single round file (review_r124,
-// review_r146, review_r159) but consumed by other round files, so deleting or
-// renaming the declaring file silently broke the consumer. Every
-// review_rNN*_test.go file must depend only on shared helpers like this one,
-// never on another round file.
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"github.com/alicebob/miniredis/v2"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/cache/backends"
-)
-
-// NewMemoryBackendForTest returns a cache backend backed by an in-process
-// miniredis instance, for white-box tests that need a real CacheBackend
-// without depending on a live Redis server. internal/cache's in-memory
-// backend was removed as unreachable dead code (FIX-43); RedisBackend
-// against miniredis is the project's standard lightweight substitute.
-//
-// The miniredis server is registered against t.Cleanup so it (and its
-// listener goroutine) is closed when t ends. Callers still defer
-// backend.Close() to close the RedisBackend connection pool.
-func NewMemoryBackendForTest(t *testing.T) (backends.CacheBackend, error) {
-	t.Helper()
-	mr, err := miniredis.Run()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(mr.Close)
-	return backends.NewRedisBackend(backends.DefaultRedisConfig(mr.Addr()))
-}
-
-// mapCache is a minimal thread-safe CacheInterface for seeding caches in
-// bearer-invalidation tests.
-type mapCache struct {
-	mu sync.Mutex
-	m  map[string]any
-}
-
-func newMapCache() *mapCache { return &mapCache{m: map[string]any{}} }
-func (c *mapCache) Set(key string, value any, ttl time.Duration) {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	c.m[key] = value
-	c.mu.Unlock()
-}
-func (c *mapCache) Get(key string) (any, bool) {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-	v, ok := c.m[key]
-	return v, ok
-}
-func (c *mapCache) Delete(key string)        { c.mu.Lock(); delete(c.m, key); c.mu.Unlock() }
-func (c *mapCache) SetMaxSize(size int)      {}
-func (c *mapCache) Size() int                { return 0 }
-func (c *mapCache) Clear()                   {}
-func (c *mapCache) Cleanup()                 {}
-func (c *mapCache) Close()                   {}
-func (c *mapCache) GetStats() map[string]any { return nil }
-
-// serializingCache simulates a UniversalCache backed by a serializing
-// store (e.g. Redis): Set JSON-round-trips the value, so Get returns a
-// generic map, never the original concrete type. This is exactly what
-// production sees on the distributed path.
-type serializingCache struct {
-	m map[string]interface{}
-}
-
-func (c *serializingCache) Set(key string, value any, ttl time.Duration) {
-	b, _ := json.Marshal(value)
-	var v interface{}
-	_ = json.Unmarshal(b, &v)
-	c.m[key] = v
-}
-func (c *serializingCache) Get(key string) (any, bool) {
-	v, ok := c.m[key]
-	return v, ok
-}
-func (c *serializingCache) Delete(key string)        { delete(c.m, key) }
-func (c *serializingCache) SetMaxSize(int)           {}
-func (c *serializingCache) Size() int                { return len(c.m) }
-func (c *serializingCache) Clear()                   { c.m = map[string]interface{}{} }
-func (c *serializingCache) Cleanup()                 {}
-func (c *serializingCache) Close()                   {}
-func (c *serializingCache) GetStats() map[string]any { return nil }

client_assertion.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package traefikoidc
 import (
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/rsa"
 	"crypto/sha256"
@@ -13,7 +12,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
@@ -21,13 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-// ErrRSAKeyTooSmall is returned (wrapped) by validateAlgKeyMatch when a
-// private_key_jwt RS*/PS* signing key is smaller than the RFC 7518 §3.3
-// minimum of 2048 bits. A named sentinel lets callers detect this specific
-// rejection with errors.Is instead of matching the formatted message text
-// (FIX-42; see CHANGELOG.md).
-var ErrRSAKeyTooSmall = errors.New("RSA key too small for RS*/PS* signing (RFC 7518 §3.3 requires >= 2048 bits)")
-
 // isSupportedClientAssertionAlg reports whether alg is a recognized JWS
 // algorithm for private_key_jwt (RFC 7523 §2.2).
 func isSupportedClientAssertionAlg(alg string) bool {
@@ -103,43 +94,13 @@ func NewClientAssertionSigner(pemBytes []byte, alg, kid string) (*ClientAssertio
 func validateAlgKeyMatch(alg string, key crypto.PrivateKey) error {
 	switch alg[0] {
 	case 'R', 'P': // RS* or PS*
-		rsaKey, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
-		if !ok {
+		if _, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey); !ok {
 			return fmt.Errorf("alg %q requires an RSA key, got %T", alg, key)
 		}
-		// RFC 7518 §3.3: RS*/PS* MUST use a key of 2048 bits or larger.
-		// A smaller key signs locally but conformant IdPs (Entra, Okta,
-		// Keycloak) reject it, so every exchange/refresh/revocation fails
-		// invalid_client at runtime — better to fail at construction
-		// (R135).
-		if rsaKey.N.BitLen() < 2048 {
-			return fmt.Errorf("alg %q requires an RSA key of at least 2048 bits, got %d: %w", alg, rsaKey.N.BitLen(), ErrRSAKeyTooSmall)
-		}
 	case 'E': // ES*
-		ecKey, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
-		if !ok {
+		if _, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey); !ok {
 			return fmt.Errorf("alg %q requires an EC key, got %T", alg, key)
 		}
-		// ES* maps 1:1 to a NIST curve (ES256→P-256, ES384→P-384,
-		// ES512→P-521). A key on the wrong curve would otherwise pass this
-		// check yet always produce a signature the IdP rejects.
-		if want := ecdsaAlgorithmCurve(alg); want != nil && ecKey.Curve != want {
-			return fmt.Errorf("alg %q requires a key on curve %s, got %s", alg, want.Params().Name, ecKey.Curve.Params().Name)
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// ecdsaAlgorithmCurve returns the NIST curve required by an ES* algorithm, or
-// nil for any non-ES algorithm.
-func ecdsaAlgorithmCurve(alg string) elliptic.Curve {
-	switch alg {
-	case "ES256":
-		return elliptic.P256()
-	case "ES384":
-		return elliptic.P384()
-	case "ES512":
-		return elliptic.P521()
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -159,14 +120,6 @@ func (s *ClientAssertionSigner) Sign(audience, clientID string) (string, error)
 
 	now := nowFn()
 
-	// RFC 7523 §3: aud must be the token (or introspection/revocation)
-	// endpoint URL. An empty audience yields a client_assertion with
-	// "aud":"" that the IdP will reject, so fail fast with a clear
-	// error rather than minting a useless token (R150).
-	if audience == "" {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("client assertion audience must not be empty")
-	}
-
 	// 16 random bytes as lowercase hex for jti uniqueness.
 	jtiBytes := make([]byte, 16)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rander, jtiBytes); err != nil {
@@ -337,3 +290,6 @@ func buildClientAssertionSignerFromConfig(config *Config) (*ClientAssertionSigne
 
 	return NewClientAssertionSigner(pemBytes, alg, config.ClientAssertionKeyID)
 }
+
+
+

cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
+#
+# This Dockerfile is consumed by GoReleaser. The binary is built outside
+# the Docker context (by goreleaser's Go cross-compile) and placed in the
+# build context as ./oidcgate before `docker buildx build` runs.
+#
+# To build locally without goreleaser:
+#   go build -o oidcgate ./cmd/oidcgate
+#   docker build -f cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile -t oidcgate:dev .
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot
+
+ARG TARGETOS
+ARG TARGETARCH
+
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="oidcgate"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="Standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon for nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/blob/main/docs/OIDCGATE.md"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
+
+COPY oidcgate /usr/local/bin/oidcgate
+
+EXPOSE 8080
+
+USER nonroot:nonroot
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/oidcgate"]
+CMD ["--config", "/etc/oidcgate/config.yaml"]

cmd/oidcgate/config.go

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
+)
+
+// Config is the top-level oidcgate configuration. The OIDC subtree maps 1:1
+// onto traefikoidc.Config; the few extra fields configure the daemon itself.
+type Config struct {
+	Listen    string             `json:"listen"`
+	AuthPath  string             `json:"authPath"`
+	StartPath string             `json:"startPath"`
+	OIDC      traefikoidc.Config `json:"-"`
+}
+
+// envScalarFields lists Config field names (within OIDC and top-level)
+// that may be overridden via OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE> environment
+// variables. Only scalar strings/ints/bools are supported; nested structs
+// (Redis, SecurityHeaders, DynamicClientRegistration) stay YAML-only.
+var envScalarFields = []string{
+	"Listen", "AuthPath", "StartPath",
+	"ProviderURL", "ClientID", "ClientSecret", "Audience",
+	"CallbackURL", "LogoutURL", "PostLogoutRedirectURI",
+	"SessionEncryptionKey", "CookiePrefix", "CookieDomain",
+	"LogLevel", "RevocationURL", "OIDCEndSessionURL",
+	"UserIdentifierClaim", "GroupClaimName", "RoleClaimName",
+	"ClientAuthMethod", "ClientAssertionPrivateKey",
+	"ClientAssertionKeyPath", "ClientAssertionKeyID", "ClientAssertionAlg",
+	"CACertPath", "CACertPEM",
+}
+
+// Load reads YAML from path, applies env-var overrides, fills defaults,
+// and forces TrustForwardedURI=true so the library honors X-Forwarded-Uri.
+func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
+	// Clean the operator-supplied path to satisfy gosec G304 (file inclusion
+	// via variable). filepath.Clean strips traversal sequences and normalises
+	// the path; this is canonical mitigation for config files supplied via a
+	// CLI flag — the operator runs the daemon, so the input is trusted, but
+	// gosec's static analysis still flags variable paths without the cleanup.
+	clean := filepath.Clean(path)
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(clean) // #nosec G304 -- operator-supplied config path, cleaned above
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read config: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Pass 1: YAML → generic map.
+	var raw map[string]any
+	if err := yaml.Unmarshal(data, &raw); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("yaml parse: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Split the top-level oidcgate-specific keys away from the OIDC subtree.
+	listen, _ := raw["listen"].(string)
+	authPath, _ := raw["authPath"].(string)
+	startPath, _ := raw["startPath"].(string)
+	delete(raw, "listen")
+	delete(raw, "authPath")
+	delete(raw, "startPath")
+
+	// Pass 2: remaining map → JSON → traefikoidc.Config (uses existing json tags).
+	jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("yaml→json: %w", err)
+	}
+	var oidcCfg traefikoidc.Config
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(jsonBytes, &oidcCfg); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc config parse: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen:    listen,
+		AuthPath:  authPath,
+		StartPath: startPath,
+		OIDC:      oidcCfg,
+	}
+
+	applyEnvOverrides(cfg)
+	applyDefaults(cfg)
+
+	if cfg.Listen == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: missing required 'listen' (or OIDCGATE_LISTEN env var)")
+	}
+
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL, "/") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: callbackURL must be a path starting with '/', got %q", cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL, "/") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: logoutURL must be a path starting with '/', got %q", cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL)
+	}
+
+	reserved := []string{
+		sentinelPath,
+		cfg.AuthPath,
+		cfg.StartPath,
+		cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL,
+		cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL,
+	}
+	for _, ex := range cfg.OIDC.ExcludedURLs {
+		for _, r := range reserved {
+			if r != "" && strings.HasPrefix(r, ex) {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: excludedURL %q would bypass reserved oidcgate path %q", ex, r)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Force standalone semantics: trust X-Forwarded-Uri.
+	cfg.OIDC.TrustForwardedURI = true
+	return cfg, nil
+}
+
+// applyEnvOverrides walks the allow-listed scalar fields and replaces any
+// non-empty OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE> env var. Field name "ClientID"
+// becomes "OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ID"; "SessionEncryptionKey" becomes
+// "OIDCGATE_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY".
+func applyEnvOverrides(cfg *Config) {
+	for _, field := range envScalarFields {
+		env := os.Getenv("OIDCGATE_" + camelToSnakeUpper(field))
+		if env == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		setScalarField(cfg, field, env)
+	}
+}
+
+func setScalarField(cfg *Config, field, value string) {
+	switch field {
+	case "Listen":
+		cfg.Listen = value
+	case "AuthPath":
+		cfg.AuthPath = value
+	case "StartPath":
+		cfg.StartPath = value
+	case "ProviderURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.ProviderURL = value
+	case "ClientID":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientID = value
+	case "ClientSecret":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret = value
+	case "Audience":
+		cfg.OIDC.Audience = value
+	case "CallbackURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL = value
+	case "LogoutURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL = value
+	case "PostLogoutRedirectURI":
+		cfg.OIDC.PostLogoutRedirectURI = value
+	case "SessionEncryptionKey":
+		cfg.OIDC.SessionEncryptionKey = value
+	case "CookiePrefix":
+		cfg.OIDC.CookiePrefix = value
+	case "CookieDomain":
+		cfg.OIDC.CookieDomain = value
+	case "LogLevel":
+		cfg.OIDC.LogLevel = value
+	case "RevocationURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.RevocationURL = value
+	case "OIDCEndSessionURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.OIDCEndSessionURL = value
+	case "UserIdentifierClaim":
+		cfg.OIDC.UserIdentifierClaim = value
+	case "GroupClaimName":
+		cfg.OIDC.GroupClaimName = value
+	case "RoleClaimName":
+		cfg.OIDC.RoleClaimName = value
+	case "ClientAuthMethod":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAuthMethod = value
+	case "ClientAssertionPrivateKey":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionPrivateKey = value
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyPath":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyPath = value
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyID":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyID = value
+	case "ClientAssertionAlg":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionAlg = value
+	case "CACertPath":
+		cfg.OIDC.CACertPath = value
+	case "CACertPEM":
+		cfg.OIDC.CACertPEM = value
+	}
+}
+
+func applyDefaults(cfg *Config) {
+	if cfg.AuthPath == "" {
+		cfg.AuthPath = "/oauth2/auth"
+	}
+	if cfg.StartPath == "" {
+		cfg.StartPath = "/oauth2/start"
+	}
+}
+
+// camelToSnakeUpper turns "ClientSecret" into "CLIENT_SECRET",
+// "SessionEncryptionKey" into "SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY", etc.
+// Multi-letter acronyms keep their grouping: "OIDCEndSessionURL" →
+// "OIDC_END_SESSION_URL", "CACertPEM" → "CA_CERT_PEM".
+func camelToSnakeUpper(s string) string {
+	runes := []rune(s)
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for i, r := range runes {
+		if i > 0 && isUpper(r) {
+			prev := runes[i-1]
+			next := rune(0)
+			if i+1 < len(runes) {
+				next = runes[i+1]
+			}
+			if !isUpper(prev) || (next != 0 && !isUpper(next)) {
+				b.WriteByte('_')
+			}
+		}
+		b.WriteRune(unicode.ToUpper(r))
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func isUpper(r rune) bool { return r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z' }

cmd/oidcgate/config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// minimalYAML is a base config accepted by Load with no surprises.
+const minimalYAML = `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`
+
+func writeConfig(t *testing.T, content string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return path
+}
+
+func TestLoad_YAMLRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":9090"
+authPath: "/auth"
+startPath: "/start"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Listen != ":9090" {
+		t.Errorf("listen: want :9090, got %q", cfg.Listen)
+	}
+	if cfg.AuthPath != "/auth" {
+		t.Errorf("authPath: want /auth, got %q", cfg.AuthPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.StartPath != "/start" {
+		t.Errorf("startPath: want /start, got %q", cfg.StartPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.ClientID != "abc" {
+		t.Errorf("clientID: want abc, got %q", cfg.OIDC.ClientID)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret != "secret" {
+		t.Errorf("clientSecret: want secret, got %q", cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret)
+	}
+	if !cfg.OIDC.TrustForwardedURI {
+		t.Errorf("TrustForwardedURI should be forced true by Load")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_EnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "from-file"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("OIDCGATE_CLIENT_SECRET", "from-env")
+	t.Setenv("OIDCGATE_LISTEN", ":9999")
+
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret != "from-env" {
+		t.Errorf("env override (clientSecret): want from-env, got %q", cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret)
+	}
+	if cfg.Listen != ":9999" {
+		t.Errorf("env override (listen): want :9999, got %q", cfg.Listen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_Defaults(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.AuthPath != "/oauth2/auth" {
+		t.Errorf("AuthPath default: want /oauth2/auth, got %q", cfg.AuthPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.StartPath != "/oauth2/start" {
+		t.Errorf("StartPath default: want /oauth2/start, got %q", cfg.StartPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_MissingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := Load("/nonexistent/config.yaml"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for missing file")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_NestedStructRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+redis:
+  address: "redis:6379"
+  password: "redispw"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.Redis == nil {
+		t.Fatal("redis block should populate cfg.OIDC.Redis")
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.Redis.Address != "redis:6379" {
+		t.Errorf("redis address: want redis:6379, got %q", cfg.OIDC.Redis.Address)
+	}
+}
+
+// Fix 5: callbackURL / logoutURL must start with "/"
+func TestLoad_RejectsAbsoluteCallbackURL(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "https://app.example.com/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("callbackURL with absolute URL must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_RejectsAbsoluteLogoutURL(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "https://app.example.com/oauth2/logout"
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("logoutURL with absolute URL must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+// Fix 2: excludedURLs must not prefix reserved paths
+func TestLoad_RejectsExcludedURLPrefixingReservedPath(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+excludedURLs: ["/"]
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("excludedURLs: ['/'] must be rejected (bypasses all reserved paths)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_AllowsNonOverlappingExcludedURL(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, minimalYAML+`excludedURLs: ["/public"]
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("non-overlapping excludedURL must be accepted: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Fix 3: env override coverage — every envScalarFields entry must have a
+// matching case in setScalarField. isAllZeroForField detects drift.
+func TestEnvOverrideCoverage(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, field := range envScalarFields {
+		field := field
+		t.Run(field, func(t *testing.T) {
+			probe := "/safe/probe-" + field
+			if field == "SessionEncryptionKey" {
+				probe = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
+			}
+			if field == "LogLevel" {
+				probe = "debug"
+			}
+			if field == "ClientAuthMethod" {
+				probe = "client_secret_post"
+			}
+			if field == "ClientAssertionAlg" {
+				probe = "RS256"
+			}
+
+			var fresh Config
+			setScalarField(&fresh, field, probe)
+			if isAllZeroForField(&fresh, field, probe) {
+				t.Fatalf("envScalarFields includes %q but setScalarField has no matching case (drift)", field)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// isAllZeroForField returns true when setScalarField did NOT set the expected
+// field — i.e., the switch is missing a case for `field`.
+func isAllZeroForField(cfg *Config, field, probe string) bool {
+	switch field {
+	case "Listen":
+		return cfg.Listen != probe
+	case "AuthPath":
+		return cfg.AuthPath != probe
+	case "StartPath":
+		return cfg.StartPath != probe
+	case "ProviderURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ProviderURL != probe
+	case "ClientID":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientID != probe
+	case "ClientSecret":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret != probe
+	case "Audience":
+		return cfg.OIDC.Audience != probe
+	case "CallbackURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL != probe
+	case "LogoutURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL != probe
+	case "PostLogoutRedirectURI":
+		return cfg.OIDC.PostLogoutRedirectURI != probe
+	case "SessionEncryptionKey":
+		return cfg.OIDC.SessionEncryptionKey != probe
+	case "CookiePrefix":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CookiePrefix != probe
+	case "CookieDomain":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CookieDomain != probe
+	case "LogLevel":
+		return cfg.OIDC.LogLevel != probe
+	case "RevocationURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.RevocationURL != probe
+	case "OIDCEndSessionURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.OIDCEndSessionURL != probe
+	case "UserIdentifierClaim":
+		return cfg.OIDC.UserIdentifierClaim != probe
+	case "GroupClaimName":
+		return cfg.OIDC.GroupClaimName != probe
+	case "RoleClaimName":
+		return cfg.OIDC.RoleClaimName != probe
+	case "ClientAuthMethod":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAuthMethod != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionPrivateKey":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionPrivateKey != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyPath":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyPath != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyID":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyID != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionAlg":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionAlg != probe
+	case "CACertPath":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CACertPath != probe
+	case "CACertPEM":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CACertPEM != probe
+	}
+	return true // unknown field → drift
+}

cmd/oidcgate/endpoints.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package main
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// sentinelPath is the synthetic request path used when delegating /oauth2/auth
+// and /oauth2/start into the traefikoidc middleware. It must NOT collide with
+// callbackURL, logoutURL, /health*, or any plausible excludedURLs entry —
+// the underscores and double-prefixing make accidental matches near-impossible.
+const sentinelPath = "/__oidcgate_protected__"
+
+// newAuthHandler builds the /oauth2/auth (silent probe) handler.
+// Rewrites the request path to sentinelPath, wraps the ResponseWriter to
+// convert the middleware's 302→IdP into 401, and delegates.
+func newAuthHandler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		ic := newAuthInterceptor(rw)
+		defer ic.Finalize()
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, sentinelPath)
+		next.ServeHTTP(ic, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// newStartHandler builds the /oauth2/start (visible sign-in) handler.
+// Rewrites the path to sentinelPath, forwards any ?rd= query as
+// X-Forwarded-Uri so the middleware (with TrustForwardedURI=true) captures
+// the right post-login redirect target, then delegates. The middleware's
+// natural 302→IdP flows through unchanged.
+func newStartHandler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, sentinelPath)
+		// Precedence: explicit ?rd= wins over an ambient upstream
+		// X-Forwarded-Uri so /oauth2/start?rd=/dashboard does not get
+		// silently overridden by the proxy's current-URL forwarding.
+		if rd := req.URL.Query().Get("rd"); rd != "" {
+			r2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", rd)
+		}
+		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// newCallbackHandler builds the IdP callback endpoint.
+// Rewrites the request path to the configured callbackURL so the middleware's
+// path-match at the top of ServeHTTP triggers the callback flow.
+func newCallbackHandler(next http.Handler, callbackURL string) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, callbackURL)
+		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// newLogoutHandler builds the logout endpoint.
+// Rewrites the request path to the configured logoutURL so the middleware's
+// path-match at the top of ServeHTTP triggers the logout flow.
+func newLogoutHandler(next http.Handler, logoutURL string) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, logoutURL)
+		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// cloneAndRewrite returns a clone of req with URL.Path set to newPath.
+// req.Clone deep-copies URL via net/http's cloneURL, so mutating
+// r2.URL.Path does not affect the original req. RawQuery, Host,
+// Fragment, RawPath are preserved unchanged.
+func cloneAndRewrite(req *http.Request, newPath string) *http.Request {
+	r2 := req.Clone(req.Context())
+	r2.URL.Path = newPath
+	return r2
+}

cmd/oidcgate/endpoints_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// stubMiddleware lets us test endpoint wiring without spinning up a full
+// traefikoidc instance. Each test injects the behavior it wants.
+type stubMiddleware struct {
+	calls []stubCall
+	fn    func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request)
+}
+
+type stubCall struct {
+	path   string
+	header http.Header
+}
+
+func (s *stubMiddleware) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+	s.calls = append(s.calls, stubCall{path: req.URL.Path, header: req.Header.Clone()})
+	if s.fn != nil {
+		s.fn(rw, req)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuth_RewritesToSentinel_AndConverts302To401(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			rw.Header().Set("Location", "https://idp.example/authorize?state=abc")
+			rw.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "_oidc_state=abc; Path=/")
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newAuthHandler(stub)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/protected/page")
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if len(stub.calls) != 1 || stub.calls[0].path != sentinelPath {
+		t.Fatalf("middleware path: want %q, got %v", sentinelPath, stub.calls)
+	}
+	if rec.Header().Get("X-Auth-Redirect") == "" {
+		t.Error("X-Auth-Redirect should carry Location")
+	}
+	if got := stub.calls[0].header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); got != "/protected/page" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Uri must pass through to middleware: want /protected/page, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuth_AuthenticatedReturnsHeadersAnd200(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			// Middleware would stamp X-Forwarded-User on req then call next.
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+			newSuccessHandler().ServeHTTP(rw, req)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newAuthHandler(stub)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-User mirrored: want alice, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStart_DelegatesWithSentinel_NoInterception(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			rw.Header().Set("Location", "https://idp.example/authorize")
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newStartHandler(stub)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/back", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("start: 302 must flow through, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if stub.calls[0].path != sentinelPath {
+		t.Fatalf("start path rewrite: want %q, got %q", sentinelPath, stub.calls[0].path)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStart_ForwardsRdAsXForwardedURI(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound) },
+	}
+	h := newStartHandler(stub)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/back/here", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if got := stub.calls[0].header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); got != "/back/here" {
+		t.Fatalf("?rd should become X-Forwarded-Uri: want /back/here, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStart_RdQueryWinsOverUpstreamHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound) },
+	}
+	h := newStartHandler(stub)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/explicit", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/ambient")
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if got := stub.calls[0].header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); got != "/explicit" {
+		t.Fatalf("?rd= must win over upstream X-Forwarded-Uri: want /explicit, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallback_RewritesToConfiguredCallbackURL(t *testing.T) {
+	var seenPath, seenQuery string
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			seenPath = req.URL.Path
+			seenQuery = req.URL.RawQuery
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newCallbackHandler(stub, "/oauth2/callback")
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/callback?code=abc&state=xyz", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if seenPath != "/oauth2/callback" {
+		t.Fatalf("callback path: want /oauth2/callback, got %q", seenPath)
+	}
+	if seenQuery != "code=abc&state=xyz" {
+		t.Fatalf("callback query must survive rewrite: want code=abc&state=xyz, got %q", seenQuery)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLogout_RewritesToConfiguredLogoutURL(t *testing.T) {
+	var seenPath string
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			seenPath = req.URL.Path
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newLogoutHandler(stub, "/oauth2/logout")
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/oauth2/logout", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if seenPath != "/oauth2/logout" {
+		t.Fatalf("logout path: want /oauth2/logout, got %q", seenPath)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/health.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package main
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// readyReporter is satisfied by *traefikoidc.TraefikOidc via its Ready() method.
+type readyReporter interface {
+	Ready() bool
+}
+
+func newHealthzHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func newReadyzHandler(r readyReporter) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		if r.Ready() {
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			return
+		}
+		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	})
+}

cmd/oidcgate/health_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type readyStub struct{ ready bool }
+
+func (r *readyStub) Ready() bool { return r.ready }
+
+func TestHealthz_Always200(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHealthzHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("healthz: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReadyz_503BeforeDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newReadyzHandler(&readyStub{ready: false})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("readyz pre-discovery: want 503, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReadyz_200AfterDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newReadyzHandler(&readyStub{ready: true})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("readyz post-discovery: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/helpers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package main
+
+import "github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+
+type traefikoidcConfigStub struct {
+	callbackURL string
+	logoutURL   string
+}
+
+func (s traefikoidcConfigStub) AsOIDC() traefikoidc.Config {
+	return traefikoidc.Config{
+		CallbackURL: s.callbackURL,
+		LogoutURL:   s.logoutURL,
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+)
+
+// fakeProviderHost is a synthetic hostname used in place of the httptest.Server's
+// 127.0.0.1 address. traefikoidc's URL validator blocks loopback IPs
+// unconditionally; a non-loopback hostname passes the check. The custom HTTP
+// client returned by mockHTTPClient rewires all dials for this host to the
+// actual test-server port, so the mock IdP still receives every request.
+const fakeProviderHost = "test-oidc-provider.local"
+
+// mockHTTPClient returns an *http.Client whose dialer transparently redirects
+// connections to fakeProviderHost to the real httptest.Server address.
+func mockHTTPClient(realAddr string) *http.Client {
+	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+			if err != nil {
+				return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+			}
+			if host == fakeProviderHost {
+				addr = realAddr
+			}
+			return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+		},
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport}
+}
+
+// newMockIdP returns an httptest.Server that serves the minimal OIDC
+// discovery surface required by traefikoidc.NewWithContext to bootstrap
+// — discovery doc + an empty JWKS. All URLs in the discovery doc use
+// fakeProviderHost so they pass the middleware's URL security validator.
+func newMockIdP(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	fakeBase := "http://" + fakeProviderHost
+	mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		discovery := map[string]any{
+			"issuer":                                fakeBase,
+			"authorization_endpoint":                fakeBase + "/authorize",
+			"token_endpoint":                        fakeBase + "/token",
+			"jwks_uri":                              fakeBase + "/jwks",
+			"response_types_supported":              []string{"code"},
+			"subject_types_supported":               []string{"public"},
+			"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
+		}
+		rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(discovery)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = rw.Write([]byte(`{"keys":[]}`))
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return srv
+}
+
+// buildTestConfig produces a Config that points at the fake provider hostname
+// (which the custom HTTP client redirects to the real mock server) and uses
+// a known-good SessionEncryptionKey + safe path defaults.
+func buildTestConfig(srv *httptest.Server) *Config {
+	// realAddr is HOST:PORT of the httptest server (e.g. "127.0.0.1:56789").
+	realAddr := srv.Listener.Addr().String()
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen:    "127.0.0.1:0", // unused — we drive the mux directly via httptest
+		AuthPath:  "/oauth2/auth",
+		StartPath: "/oauth2/start",
+		OIDC: traefikoidc.Config{
+			ProviderURL:          "http://" + fakeProviderHost,
+			ClientID:             "test-client",
+			ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
+			SessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
+			CallbackURL:          "/oauth2/callback",
+			LogoutURL:            "/oauth2/logout",
+			TrustForwardedURI:    true,
+			EnablePKCE:           true,
+			HTTPClient:           mockHTTPClient(realAddr),
+		},
+	}
+	return cfg
+}
+
+// buildIntegrationStack builds the same wiring main.go builds: real
+// middleware constructed against the mock IdP, success handler as next,
+// mux on top.
+func buildIntegrationStack(t *testing.T, idp *httptest.Server) (http.Handler, *traefikoidc.TraefikOidc) {
+	t.Helper()
+	cfg := buildTestConfig(idp)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+	mw, err := traefikoidc.NewWithContext(ctx, &cfg.OIDC, newSuccessHandler(), "oidcgate-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewWithContext: %v", err)
+	}
+	mux := buildMux(cfg, mw, mw)
+	return mux, mw
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_UnauthenticatedAuthReturns401WithRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, _ := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil)
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 401, got %d (body=%q)", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	loc := rec.Header().Get("X-Auth-Redirect")
+	if loc == "" {
+		t.Fatal("X-Auth-Redirect should carry the IdP authorize URL")
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "http://"+fakeProviderHost+"/authorize") {
+		t.Errorf("X-Auth-Redirect should point at the mock IdP authorize endpoint, got %q", loc)
+	}
+	if cookies := rec.Header().Values("Set-Cookie"); len(cookies) == 0 {
+		t.Error("expected at least one Set-Cookie (state/PKCE/nonce) on 401")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_StartRedirectsToIdPWithStateAndPKCE(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, _ := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/dashboard", nil)
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 302, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	loc := rec.Header().Get("Location")
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "http://"+fakeProviderHost+"/authorize") {
+		t.Fatalf("Location: want prefix http://%s/authorize, got %q", fakeProviderHost, loc)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "state=") {
+		t.Errorf("Location should include state= param, got %q", loc)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "code_challenge=") {
+		t.Errorf("Location should include code_challenge= param (PKCE), got %q", loc)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_HealthzAlways200(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, _ := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("healthz: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_ReadyzBecomes200AfterDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, mw := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+
+	// Hit /oauth2/auth once to trigger metadata discovery (the middleware
+	// performs discovery lazily on first request).
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil))
+
+	// Poll Ready() until true or timeout.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if mw.Ready() {
+			break
+		}
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	if !mw.Ready() {
+		t.Fatal("middleware should be Ready() within 3s after first request triggered discovery")
+	}
+
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("readyz post-discovery: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/interceptor.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package main
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// authInterceptor wraps a ResponseWriter for the /oauth2/auth endpoint.
+// The traefikoidc middleware emits an HTTP 302 to the IdP authorize URL
+// when a request is unauthenticated, but nginx auth_request and similar
+// silent-probe contracts cannot follow redirects. authInterceptor buffers
+// the header/body and, at Finalize() time:
+//
+//   - if status was a redirect class (302, 303, 307, 308), rewrites it
+//     to 401, moves the original Location header to X-Auth-Redirect
+//     (advisory), strips Location, preserves Set-Cookie headers (state,
+//     PKCE, nonce — the browser will carry them into the next request),
+//     and writes an empty body.
+//   - otherwise: passes through verbatim.
+type authInterceptor struct {
+	inner       http.ResponseWriter
+	headers     http.Header
+	status      int
+	body        []byte
+	wroteHeader bool
+	finalized   bool
+}
+
+func newAuthInterceptor(inner http.ResponseWriter) *authInterceptor {
+	return &authInterceptor{
+		inner:   inner,
+		headers: http.Header{},
+		status:  http.StatusOK,
+	}
+}
+
+func (w *authInterceptor) Header() http.Header { return w.headers }
+
+func (w *authInterceptor) WriteHeader(status int) {
+	if w.wroteHeader {
+		return
+	}
+	w.status = status
+	w.wroteHeader = true
+}
+
+func (w *authInterceptor) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { //nolint:unparam // signature mandated by http.ResponseWriter
+	if !w.wroteHeader {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	w.body = append(w.body, b...)
+	return len(b), nil
+}
+
+// Finalize flushes the buffered response, applying the 302/303 → 401 rewrite.
+// Must be called exactly once after the wrapped handler returns.
+func (w *authInterceptor) Finalize() {
+	if w.finalized {
+		return
+	}
+	w.finalized = true
+	switch w.status {
+	case http.StatusFound, http.StatusSeeOther, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, http.StatusPermanentRedirect:
+		// Move Location → X-Auth-Redirect, strip Location, force 401, drop body.
+		if loc := w.headers.Get("Location"); loc != "" {
+			w.headers.Set("X-Auth-Redirect", loc)
+			w.headers.Del("Location")
+		}
+		copyHeaders(w.inner.Header(), w.headers)
+		w.inner.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	copyHeaders(w.inner.Header(), w.headers)
+	w.inner.WriteHeader(w.status)
+	if len(w.body) > 0 {
+		_, _ = w.inner.Write(w.body)
+	}
+}
+
+func copyHeaders(dst, src http.Header) {
+	for k, vs := range src {
+		for _, v := range vs {
+			dst.Add(k, v)
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/interceptor_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestInterceptor_302BecomesNot401(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "https://idp.example/authorize?state=abc")
+	w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "_oidc_state=abc; Path=/; HttpOnly")
+	w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "_oidc_pkce=xyz; Path=/; HttpOnly")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+	_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ignored body"))
+
+	w.Finalize()
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Auth-Redirect"); got != "https://idp.example/authorize?state=abc" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Auth-Redirect: want preserved Location, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Location"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("Location must be stripped on 401, got %q", got)
+	}
+	cookies := rec.Header().Values("Set-Cookie")
+	if len(cookies) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("Set-Cookie count: want 2, got %d (%v)", len(cookies), cookies)
+	}
+	if body := strings.TrimSpace(rec.Body.String()); body != "" {
+		t.Errorf("body must be empty on 401, got %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_NonRedirectPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+
+	w.Header().Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
+
+	w.Finalize()
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-User: want preserved, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "ok") {
+		t.Errorf("body: want 'ok' preserved, got %q", rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_303SeeOtherAlsoIntercepted(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusSeeOther)
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("303 should be intercepted to 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_307TemporaryRedirectIntercepted(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("307 should be intercepted to 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_308PermanentRedirectIntercepted(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusPermanentRedirect)
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("308 should be intercepted to 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_DoubleFinalizeIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	w.Finalize()
+	// Second call must not panic, must not change anything observable.
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("double Finalize must not change status, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("double Finalize must not duplicate headers, got %q", got)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"flag"
+	"log"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"syscall"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	configPath := flag.String("config", "/etc/oidcgate/config.yaml", "Path to YAML config file")
+	flag.Parse()
+
+	cfg, err := Load(*configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("oidcgate: load config: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	success := newSuccessHandler()
+	middleware, err := traefikoidc.NewWithContext(ctx, &cfg.OIDC, success, "oidcgate")
+	if err != nil {
+		cancel()
+		log.Fatalf("oidcgate: build middleware: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	mux := buildMux(cfg, middleware, middleware)
+	srv := buildServer(cfg, mux)
+
+	go func() {
+		sigs := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
+		signal.Notify(sigs, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
+		<-sigs
+		log.Println("oidcgate: shutdown signal received")
+		if err := shutdown(srv); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("oidcgate: shutdown error: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	log.Printf("oidcgate: listening on %s", cfg.Listen)
+	if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+		cancel()
+		log.Fatalf("oidcgate: serve: %v", err)
+	}
+	log.Println("oidcgate: stopped")
+}

cmd/oidcgate/server.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// buildMux wires all six routes onto a single ServeMux:
+//
+//	/healthz, /readyz, AuthPath, StartPath, OIDC.CallbackURL, OIDC.LogoutURL.
+//
+// The same `middleware` instance is delegated to by all four OIDC routes;
+// the synthetic success handler is wired into the middleware at construction
+// time (in main.go) so it doesn't appear here.
+func buildMux(cfg *Config, middleware http.Handler, ready readyReporter) *http.ServeMux {
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.Handle("/healthz", newHealthzHandler())
+	mux.Handle("/readyz", newReadyzHandler(ready))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.AuthPath, newAuthHandler(middleware))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.StartPath, newStartHandler(middleware))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL, newCallbackHandler(middleware, cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL, newLogoutHandler(middleware, cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL))
+	return mux
+}
+
+// buildServer wraps the mux in an http.Server with sensible timeouts.
+func buildServer(cfg *Config, mux http.Handler) *http.Server { //nolint:unused // consumed by main.go in Task 9
+	return &http.Server{
+		Addr:              cfg.Listen,
+		Handler:           mux,
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
+		WriteTimeout:      30 * time.Second,
+		IdleTimeout:       120 * time.Second,
+	}
+}
+
+// shutdown gracefully stops the server with a 15s deadline.
+func shutdown(srv *http.Server) error { //nolint:unused // consumed by main.go in Task 9
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	return srv.Shutdown(ctx)
+}

cmd/oidcgate/server_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestMux_RoutesAllEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) },
+	}
+	mux := buildMux(&Config{
+		Listen:    ":0",
+		AuthPath:  "/oauth2/auth",
+		StartPath: "/oauth2/start",
+		OIDC: traefikoidcConfigStub{
+			callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback",
+			logoutURL:   "/oauth2/logout",
+		}.AsOIDC(),
+	}, stub, &readyStub{ready: true})
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		path   string
+		method string
+		want   int
+	}{
+		{"/healthz", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/readyz", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/auth", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/start", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/callback", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/logout", http.MethodPost, http.StatusOK},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(c.method, c.path, nil))
+		if rec.Code != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s: want %d, got %d", c.method, c.path, c.want, rec.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/success.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// mirrorAllowedHeaders is the set of NON-X-prefixed request headers that the
+// success handler copies onto the response. The traefikoidc middleware sets
+// "Authorization: Bearer ..." via the templated-header feature when operators
+// configure it, and proxies need that to flow upstream.
+var mirrorAllowedHeaders = map[string]struct{}{
+	"Authorization": {},
+}
+
+// successHandler is the http.Handler installed as the middleware's `next`.
+// When the middleware reaches this handler the request is authenticated; we
+// mirror the X-* (and a small allow-list of non-X-*) headers the middleware
+// stamped onto req.Header back onto the response so upstream proxies can
+// capture them via auth_request_set / authResponseHeaders / copy_headers,
+// then write 200 with an empty body.
+func newSuccessHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		for name, values := range req.Header {
+			if !shouldMirror(name) {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, v := range values {
+				rw.Header().Add(name, v)
+			}
+		}
+		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func shouldMirror(name string) bool {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(name, "X-") {
+		return true
+	}
+	canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)
+	_, ok := mirrorAllowedHeaders[canonical]
+	return ok
+}

cmd/oidcgate/success_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_Writes200(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_MirrorsForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "[email protected]")
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Email", "[email protected]")
+	req.Header.Set("X-Custom-Templated", "value")
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token-from-template")
+	req.Header.Set("Cookie", "session=should-NOT-mirror")
+
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-User: want mirrored, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-Email"); got != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Email: want mirrored, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Custom-Templated"); got != "value" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Custom-Templated: want mirrored (X- prefix), got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer token-from-template" {
+		t.Errorf("Authorization: want mirrored (templated bearer), got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Cookie"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("Cookie must NOT be mirrored, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if body := strings.TrimSpace(rec.Body.String()); body != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("body: want empty, got %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_MultiValueHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	req.Header.Add("X-Role", "admin")
+	req.Header.Add("X-Role", "editor")
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	got := rec.Header()["X-Role"]
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "admin" || got[1] != "editor" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Role multi-value: want [admin editor], got %v", got)
+	}
+}

concurrent_servehttp_test.go

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestConcurrentServeHTTP_SharedInstance drives the full request path
-// (bootstraps, auth-bypass evaluation, session lookup, redirect) across many
-// goroutines against ONE shared plugin instance. Traefik runs the middleware
-// concurrently for every request on a router, so this is the production
-// concurrency shape. Holds under -race only if the request path touches
-// shared mutable state via atomics/locks, never plain field writes.
-func TestConcurrentServeHTTP_SharedInstance(t *testing.T) {
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	})
-
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		next:                         next,
-		logger:                       NewLogger("debug"),
-		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
-		sessionManager:               createTestSessionManager(t),
-		issuerURL:                    "https://provider.example.com",
-		redirURLPath:                 "/callback",
-		logoutURLPath:                "/logout",
-		clientID:                     "test-client",
-		audience:                     "test-client",
-		authURL:                      "https://provider.example.com/auth",
-		firstRequestStarted:          0, // let exactly one goroutine win the bootstrap CAS
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 0,
-	}
-	close(oidc.initComplete)
-
-	const goroutines = 40
-	const perGoroutine = 5
-
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	wg.Add(goroutines)
-	for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ {
-		go func() {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			for i := 0; i < perGoroutine; i++ {
-				req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/api/g%d/", g), nil)
-				w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-				oidc.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-				// Unauthenticated request must bounce to the IdP (3xx), not
-				// forward to the backend (200) or error.
-				if w.Code < 300 || w.Code >= 400 {
-					t.Errorf("expected auth redirect (3xx), got %d", w.Code)
-				}
-			}
-		}()
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-}
-
-// TestConcurrentServeHTTP_ExcludedBypass drives the auth-bypass path
-// concurrently (shouldBypassAuth read-path) on a shared instance.
-func TestConcurrentServeHTTP_ExcludedBypass(t *testing.T) {
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	})
-
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		next:                         next,
-		logger:                       NewLogger("debug"),
-		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
-		sessionManager:               createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted:          1,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
-		authURL:                      "https://provider.example.com/auth",
-	}
-	close(oidc.initComplete)
-
-	const goroutines = 40
-	const perGoroutine = 5
-
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	wg.Add(goroutines)
-	for g := 0; g < goroutines; g++ {
-		go func() {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			for i := 0; i < perGoroutine; i++ {
-				req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
-				w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-				oidc.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-			}
-		}()
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-}

config_marshalling.go

@@ -7,32 +7,10 @@ import (
 // REDACTED is the placeholder value for sensitive information
 const REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
 
-// marshalDCR builds the JSON/YAML-safe representation of the dynamic
-// client registration config, redacting the initial access token.
-func marshalDCR(d *DynamicClientRegistrationConfig) map[string]interface{} {
-	if d == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	m := make(map[string]interface{})
-	m["enabled"] = d.Enabled
-	m["persistCredentials"] = d.PersistCredentials
-	m["storageBackend"] = d.StorageBackend
-	m["initialAccessToken"] = REDACTED
-	m["registrationEndpoint"] = d.RegistrationEndpoint
-	m["credentialsFile"] = d.CredentialsFile
-	m["redisKeyPrefix"] = d.RedisKeyPrefix
-	return m
-}
-
-// configToMap builds the JSON/YAML-safe map representation of Config. Both
-// MarshalJSON and MarshalYAML share it so the (hand-maintained for yaegi
-// compatibility) field/redaction list cannot drift between the two
-// encoders — previously the list silently dropped entire config areas
-// (dynamicClientRegistration, securityHeaders, audience, overrideScopes,
-// enablePKCE, allowOpaqueTokens, requireTokenIntrospection,
-// strictAudienceValidation, extraAuthParams, client assertion settings)
-// and never redacted their embedded secrets (R150).
-func (c Config) configToMap() map[string]interface{} {
+// MarshalJSON implements custom JSON marshaling to redact sensitive fields
+// Rewritten without type aliases for yaegi compatibility
+func (c Config) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+	// Build a map manually to avoid type alias issues with yaegi
 	result := make(map[string]interface{})
 
 	// Copy public fields
@@ -50,66 +28,11 @@ func (c Config) configToMap() map[string]interface{} {
 	result["allowedUsers"] = c.AllowedUsers
 	result["allowedRolesAndGroups"] = c.AllowedRolesAndGroups
 
-	// Fields that the legacy hand-written list dropped (R150): important
-	// non-secret config that must survive any JSON/YAML round-trip.
-	result["audience"] = c.Audience
-	result["resource"] = c.Resource
-	result["cookiePrefix"] = c.CookiePrefix
-	result["cookieDomain"] = c.CookieDomain
-	result["userIdentifierClaim"] = c.UserIdentifierClaim
-	result["groupClaimName"] = c.GroupClaimName
-	result["roleClaimName"] = c.RoleClaimName
-	result["oidcEndSessionURL"] = c.OIDCEndSessionURL
-	result["revocationURL"] = c.RevocationURL
-	result["introspectionURL"] = c.IntrospectionURL
-	result["headers"] = c.Headers
-	result["allowedClaims"] = c.AllowedClaims
-	result["extraAuthParams"] = c.ExtraAuthParams
-	result["refreshGracePeriodSeconds"] = c.RefreshGracePeriodSeconds
-	result["maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds"] = c.MaxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds
-	result["sessionMaxAge"] = c.SessionMaxAge
-	result["overrideScopes"] = c.OverrideScopes
-	result["disableReplayDetection"] = c.DisableReplayDetection
-	result["requireTokenIntrospection"] = c.RequireTokenIntrospection
-	result["allowOpaqueTokens"] = c.AllowOpaqueTokens
-	result["strictAudienceValidation"] = c.StrictAudienceValidation
-	result["enablePKCE"] = c.EnablePKCE
-	result["allowPrivateIPAddresses"] = c.AllowPrivateIPAddresses
-	result["allowUnauthenticatedPreflight"] = c.AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight
-	result["streamingRefresh"] = c.StreamingRefresh
-	result["minimalHeaders"] = c.MinimalHeaders
-	result["stripAuthCookies"] = c.StripAuthCookies
-	result["cookiePath"] = c.CookiePath
-	result["enableBackchannelLogout"] = c.EnableBackchannelLogout
-	result["enableFrontchannelLogout"] = c.EnableFrontchannelLogout
-	result["backchannelLogoutURL"] = c.BackchannelLogoutURL
-	result["frontchannelLogoutURL"] = c.FrontchannelLogoutURL
-	result["caCertPath"] = c.CACertPath
-	result["caCertPEM"] = c.CACertPEM
-	result["insecureSkipVerify"] = c.InsecureSkipVerify
-	result["clientAuthMethod"] = c.ClientAuthMethod
-	result["clientAssertionKeyID"] = c.ClientAssertionKeyID
-	result["clientAssertionAlg"] = c.ClientAssertionAlg
-	result["clientAssertionKeyPath"] = c.ClientAssertionKeyPath
-	result["perSourceLoginRateLimit"] = c.PerSourceLoginRateLimit
-	result["enableBearerAuth"] = c.EnableBearerAuth
-	result["bearerIdentifierClaim"] = c.BearerIdentifierClaim
-	result["stripAuthorizationHeader"] = c.StripAuthorizationHeader
-	result["bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate"] = c.BearerEmitWWWAuthenticate
-	result["bearerOverridesCookie"] = c.BearerOverridesCookie
-	result["maxTokenAgeSeconds"] = c.MaxTokenAgeSeconds
-	result["maxIdentifierLength"] = c.MaxIdentifierLength
-	result["bearerFailureThreshold"] = c.BearerFailureThreshold
-	result["bearerFailureWindowSeconds"] = c.BearerFailureWindowSeconds
-	result["bearerFailurePenaltySeconds"] = c.BearerFailurePenaltySeconds
-
-	// Redact sensitive fields (existing secrets plus the previously-leaked
-	// client assertion private key, R150).
+	// Redact sensitive fields
 	result["clientSecret"] = REDACTED
 	result["sessionEncryptionKey"] = REDACTED
-	result["clientAssertionPrivateKey"] = REDACTED
 
-	// Handle Redis config (redacts password)
+	// Handle Redis config
 	if c.Redis != nil {
 		redisMap := make(map[string]interface{})
 		redisMap["enabled"] = c.Redis.Enabled
@@ -121,29 +44,47 @@ func (c Config) configToMap() map[string]interface{} {
 		result["redis"] = redisMap
 	}
 
-	// Handle dynamic client registration (redacts the initial access token)
-	if c.DynamicClientRegistration != nil {
-		result["dynamicClientRegistration"] = marshalDCR(c.DynamicClientRegistration)
-	}
-
-	// Handle security headers
-	if c.SecurityHeaders != nil {
-		result["securityHeaders"] = c.SecurityHeaders
-	}
-
-	return result
-}
-
-// MarshalJSON implements custom JSON marshaling to redact sensitive fields
-// Rewritten without type aliases for yaegi compatibility
-func (c Config) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
-	return json.Marshal(c.configToMap())
+	return json.Marshal(result)
 }
 
 // MarshalYAML implements custom YAML marshaling to redact sensitive fields
 // Rewritten without type aliases for yaegi compatibility
 func (c Config) MarshalYAML() (interface{}, error) {
-	return c.configToMap(), nil
+	// Build a map manually to avoid type alias issues with yaegi
+	result := make(map[string]interface{})
+
+	// Copy public fields
+	result["providerURL"] = c.ProviderURL
+	result["clientID"] = c.ClientID
+	result["callbackURL"] = c.CallbackURL
+	result["logoutURL"] = c.LogoutURL
+	result["postLogoutRedirectURI"] = c.PostLogoutRedirectURI
+	result["scopes"] = c.Scopes
+	result["forceHTTPS"] = c.ForceHTTPS
+	result["logLevel"] = c.LogLevel
+	result["rateLimit"] = c.RateLimit
+	result["excludedURLs"] = c.ExcludedURLs
+	result["allowedUserDomains"] = c.AllowedUserDomains
+	result["allowedUsers"] = c.AllowedUsers
+	result["allowedRolesAndGroups"] = c.AllowedRolesAndGroups
+
+	// Redact sensitive fields
+	result["clientSecret"] = REDACTED
+	result["sessionEncryptionKey"] = REDACTED
+
+	// Handle Redis config
+	if c.Redis != nil {
+		redisMap := make(map[string]interface{})
+		redisMap["enabled"] = c.Redis.Enabled
+		redisMap["address"] = c.Redis.Address
+		redisMap["password"] = REDACTED
+		redisMap["db"] = c.Redis.DB
+		redisMap["poolSize"] = c.Redis.PoolSize
+		redisMap["cacheMode"] = c.Redis.CacheMode
+		result["redis"] = redisMap
+	}
+
+	return result, nil
 }
 
 // MarshalJSON for RedisConfig to redact sensitive fields

config_marshalling_test.go

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"reflect"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestConfigToMap_IncludesAllJSONFields pins FIX-40: configToMap is the
-// single field/redaction list shared by MarshalJSON and MarshalYAML (R150),
-// so every json-tagged Config field must appear as a configToMap key or the
-// marshaled/logged config silently drops it again. Fields tagged
-// `json:"-"` are intentionally excluded from marshaling and are skipped.
-func TestConfigToMap_IncludesAllJSONFields(t *testing.T) {
-	// Non-nil pointer fields so their conditional branches in configToMap
-	// run and populate a map key, matching how a real, non-empty Config is
-	// built.
-	cfg := Config{
-		Redis:                     &RedisConfig{},
-		DynamicClientRegistration: &DynamicClientRegistrationConfig{},
-		SecurityHeaders:           &SecurityHeadersConfig{},
-	}
-	result := cfg.configToMap()
-
-	typ := reflect.TypeOf(Config{})
-	var missing []string
-	for i := 0; i < typ.NumField(); i++ {
-		tag := typ.Field(i).Tag.Get("json")
-		if tag == "" || tag == "-" {
-			continue
-		}
-		name := strings.Split(tag, ",")[0]
-		if name == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, ok := result[name]; !ok {
-			missing = append(missing, name)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(missing) > 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("configToMap is missing json-tagged Config fields: %v", missing)
-	}
-}

config_test_helpers_test.go

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Shared Config-fixture helpers for round-regression tests.
-//
-// Moved here for FIX-41: r134ValidConfig was declared inside review_r134_test.go
-// but consumed by review_r135_test.go, so deleting or renaming the declaring
-// file silently broke the consumer. Every review_rNN*_test.go file must
-// depend only on shared helpers like this one, never on another round file.
-
-// r134ValidConfig returns a minimal Config that passes Validate(), for tests
-// that mutate one field and assert the resulting accept/reject outcome.
-func r134ValidConfig() *Config {
-	return &Config{
-		ProviderURL:          "https://provider.example.com",
-		CallbackURL:          "/callback",
-		ClientID:             "test-client",
-		ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
-		SessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
-		RateLimit:            CreateConfig().RateLimit,
-	}
-}

cookie_cleanup_path_test.go

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestCleanupOldCookies_UsesConfiguredCookiePath pins the fix for cookie
-// cleanup under cookiePath. Session cookies are written at the configured
-// cookiePath (EnhanceSessionSecurity), but CleanupOldCookies wrote its
-// deletion cookies at a hardcoded "/". A browser deletes a cookie only when
-// name, domain and path all match, so the cleanup removed nothing when
-// cookiePath was set.
-func TestCleanupOldCookies_UsesConfiguredCookiePath(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name       string
-		cookiePath string
-		wantPath   string
-	}{
-		{name: "configured path", cookiePath: "/app", wantPath: "/app"},
-		{name: "default path", cookiePath: "", wantPath: "/"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			sm, err := NewSessionManager(
-				"test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long!!",
-				false, "app.example.com", "testpref", 0,
-				newNoOpLogger(),
-			)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("session manager: %v", err)
-			}
-			defer sm.Shutdown()
-			sm.cookiePath = tc.cookiePath
-
-			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/app/page", nil)
-			req.Host = "app.example.com"
-			req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "testpref_sess", Value: "x"})
-			rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-			sm.CleanupOldCookies(rw, req)
-
-			deleted := rw.Result().Cookies()
-			if len(deleted) == 0 {
-				t.Fatal("expected deletion cookies for the other domains")
-			}
-			for _, c := range deleted {
-				if c.Path != tc.wantPath {
-					t.Errorf("deletion cookie %s for domain %s has Path %q, want %q", c.Name, c.Domain, c.Path, tc.wantPath)
-				}
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

coverage_boost_final_test.go

@@ -41,6 +41,24 @@ func TestLRUStrategy_OnRemove_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 	strategy.OnRemove("")
 }
 
+// =============================================================================
+// JWT REPLAY CACHE TESTS
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestGetReplayCacheStats_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test the function - it should return valid stats
+	size, maxSize := getReplayCacheStats()
+
+	if maxSize != 10000 {
+		t.Errorf("Expected maxSize to be 10000, got %d", maxSize)
+	}
+
+	// Size should be >= 0
+	if size < 0 {
+		t.Errorf("Expected size to be >= 0, got %d", size)
+	}
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // PROFILING MANAGER TESTS
 // =============================================================================
@@ -260,6 +278,82 @@ func TestHTTPClientProfiler_Methods_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// =============================================================================
+// SECURITY MONITORING TESTS
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestSecurityMonitor_StopCleanupRoutine_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := NewLogger("info")
+	config := SecurityMonitorConfig{
+		MaxFailuresPerIP:       5,
+		FailureWindowMinutes:   15,
+		BlockDurationMinutes:   30,
+		RapidFailureThreshold:  3,
+		CleanupIntervalMinutes: 60,
+		RetentionHours:         24,
+		EnablePatternDetection: true,
+		EnableDetailedLogging:  false,
+		LogSuspiciousOnly:      false,
+	}
+
+	sm := NewSecurityMonitor(config, logger)
+	if sm == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil SecurityMonitor")
+	}
+
+	// Start cleanup routine first (lowercase method)
+	sm.startCleanupRoutine()
+
+	// Give it a moment to start
+	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	// Stop cleanup routine (public method)
+	sm.StopCleanupRoutine()
+
+	// Stop again should be safe
+	sm.StopCleanupRoutine()
+}
+
+func TestSecurityMonitor_MultipleHandlers_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := NewLogger("info")
+	config := SecurityMonitorConfig{
+		MaxFailuresPerIP:       5,
+		FailureWindowMinutes:   15,
+		BlockDurationMinutes:   30,
+		RapidFailureThreshold:  3,
+		CleanupIntervalMinutes: 60,
+		RetentionHours:         24,
+	}
+
+	sm := NewSecurityMonitor(config, logger)
+
+	// Create handler
+	handler := &LoggingSecurityEventHandler{logger: logger}
+
+	// Register handler using AddEventHandler
+	sm.AddEventHandler(handler)
+
+	// Record a failure to trigger events
+	sm.RecordAuthenticationFailure("192.168.1.100", "test-agent", "/test", "test_failure", nil)
+}
+
+func TestLoggingSecurityEventHandler_HandleSecurityEvent_AllSeverities_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := NewLogger("debug")
+	handler := &LoggingSecurityEventHandler{logger: logger}
+
+	// Severity is a string in this implementation
+	events := []SecurityEvent{
+		{Type: "test", Severity: "low", Message: "low severity"},
+		{Type: "test", Severity: "medium", Message: "medium severity"},
+		{Type: "test", Severity: "high", Message: "high severity"},
+		{Type: "test", Severity: "critical", Message: "critical severity"},
+	}
+
+	for _, event := range events {
+		handler.HandleSecurityEvent(event)
+	}
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // SESSION MANAGER TESTS
 // =============================================================================
@@ -732,53 +826,11 @@ func TestValidateTemplateSecure_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 			template:    "{{.Unknown}}",
 			shouldError: true,
 		},
-		// Issue #148: whitespace after {{ and before }} must be tolerated
-		{
-			name:        "get with leading space (issue #148)",
-			template:    "{{ get .Claims \"email\" }}",
-			shouldError: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "get with multiple leading spaces",
-			template:    "{{  get .Claims \"email\"}}",
-			shouldError: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "default with spaces",
-			template:    "{{ default \"unknown\" .Claims.email }}",
-			shouldError: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "claims with spaces",
-			template:    "{{ .Claims.email }}",
-			shouldError: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "access token with spaces",
-			template:    "{{ .AccessToken }}",
-			shouldError: false,
-		},
-		// Issue #148: space must NOT let dangerous patterns bypass detection
-		{
-			name:        "range with leading space stays blocked",
-			template:    "{{ range .Items }}{{.}}{{end}}",
-			shouldError: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "call with leading space stays blocked",
-			template:    "{{ call .Func }}",
-			shouldError: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:        "disallowed claim with spaces stays blocked",
-			template:    "{{ .Claims.password }}",
-			shouldError: true,
-		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTemplateSecure(tt.template, nil)
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tt.template)
 			if tt.shouldError && err == nil {
 				t.Errorf("Expected error for template: %s", tt.template)
 			}

custom_claims_test.go

@@ -151,11 +151,9 @@ func TestCustomClaimNames_MalformedRoleClaim(t *testing.T) {
 	// Configure custom claim names
 	ts.tOidc.roleClaimName = "custom_roles"
 
-	// Create token with malformed role claim (non-string, non-array scalar).
-	// A single-string role claim is now accepted as a 1-element list, so
-	// "malformed" here means a scalar that is neither.
+	// Create token with malformed role claim (not an array)
 	claims := map[string]interface{}{
-		"custom_roles": 12345,
+		"custom_roles": "this-should-be-an-array",
 	}
 
 	token, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", claims)
@@ -163,12 +161,15 @@ func TestCustomClaimNames_MalformedRoleClaim(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	groups, roles, err := ts.tOidc.extractGroupsAndRoles(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Expected no error for malformed role claim, got %v", err)
+	_, _, err = ts.tOidc.extractGroupsAndRoles(token)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("Expected error for malformed role claim, got nil")
 	}
-	if len(groups) != 0 || len(roles) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("Expected empty groups and roles for a malformed (numeric) role claim, got groups=%v roles=%v", groups, roles)
+
+	// Check error message contains the custom claim name
+	expectedError := "custom_roles claim is not an array"
+	if err.Error() != expectedError {
+		t.Errorf("Expected error '%s', got '%s'", expectedError, err.Error())
 	}
 }
 
@@ -190,12 +191,15 @@ func TestCustomClaimNames_MalformedGroupClaim(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	groups, roles, err := ts.tOidc.extractGroupsAndRoles(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Expected no error for malformed group claim, got %v", err)
+	_, _, err = ts.tOidc.extractGroupsAndRoles(token)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("Expected error for malformed group claim, got nil")
 	}
-	if len(groups) != 0 || len(roles) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("Expected empty groups and roles for a malformed (numeric) group claim, got groups=%v roles=%v", groups, roles)
+
+	// Check error message contains the custom claim name
+	expectedError := "custom_groups claim is not an array"
+	if err.Error() != expectedError {
+		t.Errorf("Expected error '%s', got '%s'", expectedError, err.Error())
 	}
 }
 
@@ -324,10 +328,9 @@ func TestCustomClaimNames_NonStringInRoleArray(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Unexpected error: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// String elements kept, numeric scalars stringified (R105, matching R102
-	// numeric-tolerance), only non-scalars (here: bool) dropped.
-	if !stringSliceEqual(roles, []string{"role1", "12345", "role2"}) {
-		t.Errorf("Expected roles [role1 12345 role2], got %v", roles)
+	// Should only extract string elements
+	if !stringSliceEqual(roles, []string{"role1", "role2"}) {
+		t.Errorf("Expected roles [role1 role2], got %v", roles)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -354,9 +357,8 @@ func TestCustomClaimNames_NonStringInGroupArray(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Unexpected error: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// String elements kept, numeric scalars stringified (R105); only
-	// non-scalars (here: nil) dropped.
-	if !stringSliceEqual(groups, []string{"group1", "group2", "3.14"}) {
-		t.Errorf("Expected groups [group1 group2 3.14], got %v", groups)
+	// Should only extract string elements
+	if !stringSliceEqual(groups, []string{"group1", "group2"}) {
+		t.Errorf("Expected groups [group1 group2], got %v", groups)
 	}
 }

docs/AUTH0_AUDIENCE_GUIDE.md

@@ -298,20 +298,13 @@ strictAudienceValidation: true
    ```
    Look for `introspection_endpoint`
 
-2. **Configure the endpoint manually:**
-   ```yaml
-   introspectionURL: https://YOUR_DOMAIN/oauth/introspect
-   ```
-   Set this when Auth0 omits `introspection_endpoint` from discovery. The
-   manual value takes precedence over the discovered value.
-
-3. **Disable required introspection (less secure):**
+2. **Disable required introspection (less secure):**
    ```yaml
    allowOpaqueTokens: true
    requireTokenIntrospection: false  # Falls back to ID token
    ```
 
-4. **Use JWT access tokens instead** (recommended)
+3. **Use JWT access tokens instead** (recommended)
 
 ---
 

docs/BEARER_AUTH.md

@@ -133,10 +133,7 @@ treats every one of these as a first-class concern.
 |---|---|---|
 | Default state | `enableBearerAuth=false` | Bearer is opt-in; existing deployments observe no change. |
 | Audience | **Mandatory.** Startup fails if `audience` is empty when bearer is enabled. | Eliminates the "token issued for service B accepted by service A" confusion attack. |
-| Token format | JWT by default. An opaque (non-JWT) token is accepted only when both `requireTokenIntrospection=true` and `allowOpaqueTokens=true`. | JWTs carry their own signature, audience and issuer; an opaque token has no local verification, so introspection must be turned on explicitly for both purposes before one is trusted. |
-| Opaque token client binding | When `audience` equals `clientID` (the common single-app case), the introspection response must carry a matching `client_id`, or an `aud` that contains `clientID`. | RFC 7662 §2.2 leaves client scoping to the authorization server's own policy. Without this check, any active token from the same IdP — including one issued to a different client — would authenticate. |
-| Opaque token `iat` requirement | The introspection response for an opaque token must carry `iat`. A response with no `iat` is always rejected: `maxTokenAgeSeconds` has no "disabled" value — `0` or unset maps to a 24h default (see the config-reference row below) — so the age bound is always in effect. | Mirrors `enforceIatAge` on the JWT path: with an age bound configured, a token with nothing to bound its age against must fail closed, not skip the check. |
-| Opaque token logout scope | A `sid`-only (front-channel) logout revokes an opaque bearer token only when the introspection response itself carries a `sid`. RFC 7662 does not define `sid`; when the IdP's response omits it, only a `sub`-based (backchannel) logout reaches the opaque token. | The middleware can only match invalidation against fields the introspection response actually returns. |
+| Token format | JWT only (3 segments, JOSE-encoded). Opaque tokens are not accepted on the bearer path. | Matches the validation pipeline; opaque tokens require introspection only and bypass JWT-specific defences. |
 | `alg` allowlist | Hard-pinned asymmetric: `RS256/384/512`, `PS256/384/512`, `ES256/384/512`. Checked **before** any JWKS fetch. | Denies `alg=none` and `alg=HS*` probes; prevents attacker noise from amplifying into JWKS round-trips. |
 | `kid` hardening | Max 256 bytes; charset `[A-Za-z0-9._\-=]`. Checked **before** JWKS fetch. | Prevents cache-key explosion / pathological-`kid` JWKS amplification. |
 | Token type | ID tokens are explicitly rejected (`nonce` claim, `typ: at+jwt`, `token_use=id`, scope/aud heuristics — reuses the existing `detectTokenType` helper). | ID tokens are not API credentials; treating them as such is classic token confusion. |
@@ -144,12 +141,12 @@ treats every one of these as a first-class concern.
 | `iat` upper-age | Rejects tokens older than `maxTokenAgeSeconds` (default 24h). | Bounds clock-manipulation / forever-token abuse, even if `exp` is far in the future. |
 | Identifier claim | `bearerIdentifierClaim` (default `"sub"`). Resolved value drives `X-Forwarded-User`. | Decoupled from the cookie path's `UserIdentifierClaim` (default `email`) so the M2M flow can never accidentally trust an unverified email. |
 | Identifier sanitisation | Length cap (`maxIdentifierLength`, default 256). Rejects control chars, Unicode bidi-overrides (U+202A–U+202E, U+2066–U+2069), and the delimiters `, ; =`. | Defence in depth against downstream header injection / log injection / admin-UI spoofing. |
-| JTI replay marking | No request path writes an access-token JTI to a replay cache (the only JTI replay check left is for backchannel logout tokens). Revocation still works without it: `RevokeToken` (called from logout) blacklists the raw token and, for a JWT, its `jti`; both the JWT and the opaque bearer path check that blacklist — raw token always, plus `jti` when the introspection response carries one — before accepting the token. | Revocation without replay-detection overhead: a legitimately reused, non-revoked bearer token is never falsely flagged as a replay. |
+| JTI replay marking | Bearer path skips the JTI **Set** (so the same token can be reused until `exp`) but the **Get** stays active. | Allows legitimate bearer reuse without false-positive replay detection; revoked tokens (added to the blacklist by `RevokeToken`) still fail immediately. |
 | Mixed bearer + cookie | **Cookie wins by default.** Flip to bearer-wins with `bearerOverridesCookie=true`. | Safer against browser/extension/proxy bearer injection scenarios. The cookie is the authoritative authenticator when present. |
 | `Authorization` strip | `stripAuthorizationHeader=true` by default. | Keeps the raw token out of downstream services and their logs. |
 | Excluded URLs | `Authorization` is stripped on excluded paths when `enableBearerAuth=true`. | Prevents bearer leakage into public health/metrics endpoint logs and prevents recon via excluded paths. |
 | Per-IP throttle | After `bearerFailureThreshold` consecutive 401s from one source IP within `bearerFailureWindowSeconds`, further bearer requests from that IP return `429 Too Many Requests` + `Retry-After` for `bearerFailurePenaltySeconds`. | Limits offline-guessing-style attacks and protects the shared rate-limiter / JWKS endpoint. |
-| Optional introspection | `requireTokenIntrospection=true` calls RFC 7662 introspection on every cache miss. Introspection result is cached briefly. Only an HTTP 200 response with `active=false` returns `401`; any other endpoint failure (network error, or any other status including 401/403/408/429) returns `503`. | RFC 7662 §2.3 defines a 401/403 from the introspection endpoint as the resource's own client credentials being rejected, not a statement about the presented token, so it must never be read as "token revoked". |
+| Optional introspection | `requireTokenIntrospection=true` calls RFC 7662 introspection on every cache miss. Introspection result is cached briefly. Endpoint failure returns `503` (distinguishes infra outage from credential rejection). | Real-time revocation for high-assurance environments. Adds per-request IdP latency. |
 | Response shape | `401 Unauthorized` with generic body. `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_token"` per RFC 6750 §3 (toggleable via `bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate`). `403` for roles/groups denial. `429` for throttle. `503` for introspection-endpoint outage. | Auditable from spec to code; reason categories never leak into the response body. |
 | Logging | Failure reason + identifier hash (SHA-256 truncated to 8 hex chars) logged at debug. Raw tokens are never logged. | Audit trail without secrets-in-logs. |
 
@@ -163,13 +160,12 @@ treats every one of these as a first-class concern.
 | `stripAuthorizationHeader` | `true` | Remove the `Authorization` header before forwarding to the backend. Disable only when a downstream needs to re-verify the bearer. |
 | `bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate` | `true` | Include `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="..."` on 401 responses (RFC 6750 §3). Disable to reduce recon signal. |
 | `bearerOverridesCookie` | `false` | Cookie wins when both are present (default). Set `true` for the AWS/GCP/Kubernetes bearer-wins convention. |
-| `maxTokenAgeSeconds` | `86400` | Upper bound on `iat` claim age. `0` and unset both map to the 24h default — there is no value that disables the check. A JWT or opaque-introspection response with no `iat` is rejected once this bound is in effect, which it always is. |
+| `maxTokenAgeSeconds` | `86400` | Upper bound on `iat` claim age (24h). Set `0` to disable the check (not recommended). |
 | `maxIdentifierLength` | `256` | Length cap for the post-sanitisation identifier. |
 | `bearerFailureThreshold` | `20` | Consecutive 401s from one IP that trip the throttle. |
 | `bearerFailureWindowSeconds` | `60` | Rolling window over which 401s are counted. |
 | `bearerFailurePenaltySeconds` | `60` | Duration of the 429 penalty box after the threshold trips. |
 | `requireTokenIntrospection` | `false` | Call RFC 7662 introspection on every cache miss. Adds per-request IdP latency. |
-| `allowOpaqueTokens` | `false` | Accept an opaque (non-JWT) bearer token, introspected via `requireTokenIntrospection`. Both flags are required together; this flag alone has no effect on the bearer path. |
 
 ## What the bearer path does NOT do
 
@@ -177,11 +173,8 @@ treats every one of these as a first-class concern.
   iteration. Browser SPAs that want to attach a bearer to fetch calls work
   if your backend treats them as machine clients, but the spec defaults are
   tuned for service-to-service traffic.
-- **Opaque access tokens by default.** Tokens must be JWTs unless both
-  `requireTokenIntrospection=true` and `allowOpaqueTokens=true` are set. For a
-  JWT, introspection stays a revocation overlay on top of local verification,
-  not a substitute for it; an opaque token has no local verification, so
-  introspection is its only check.
+- **Opaque access tokens.** Tokens must be JWTs. Introspection is a
+  revocation overlay on top of JWT verification, not a substitute for it.
 - **`email_verified` enforcement.** The bearer path rejects `email` as the
   identifier claim at startup precisely because `email_verified` is not
   enforced in this iteration. Adding human-user bearer support is a
@@ -203,11 +196,6 @@ treats every one of these as a first-class concern.
 - **Enable `requireTokenIntrospection`** if your IdP supports it and
   revocation latency matters. Bearer-path introspection caches results for
   a short window per token.
-- **Also set `allowOpaqueTokens=true`** if your clients present opaque
-  (non-JWT) access tokens. `requireTokenIntrospection` alone does not admit
-  an opaque token; both flags are required together. Confirm your IdP's
-  introspection response carries `client_id` or `aud` so the client-binding
-  check above can pass.
 - **Monitor 429s.** Sustained 429 traffic indicates either a buggy client
   loop or an active credential-stuffing attempt. The throttle is your
   primary signal for both.
@@ -234,8 +222,8 @@ treats every one of these as a first-class concern.
 | Multi-audience token without matching `azp` | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
 | Detected as ID token | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
 | JTI blacklisted (revoked) | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
-| Introspection returns HTTP 200 with `active=false` | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
-| Introspection endpoint HTTP failure (network error, or any non-200 status including 401/403/408/429) | 503 | `Service Unavailable` | (none) |
+| Introspection reports `active=false` | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
+| Introspection endpoint failure | 503 | `Service Unavailable` | (none) |
 | Identifier claim missing / empty | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
 | Identifier fails sanitisation | 401 | `Unauthorized` | `Bearer error="invalid_token"` |
 | Per-IP failure threshold tripped | 429 | `Too Many Requests` | (none); `Retry-After: <bearerFailurePenaltySeconds>` |

docs/CONFIGURATION.md

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Complete reference for all Traefik OIDC middleware configuration options.
 - [Security Headers](#security-headers)
 - [Scope Configuration](#scope-configuration)
 - [Advanced Options](#advanced-options)
+- [Standalone binary (oidcgate)](#standalone-binary-oidcgate)
 
 ---
 
@@ -96,11 +97,6 @@ For each token / revocation request the plugin builds a JWS with:
 
 When `clientAuthMethod: private_key_jwt`, `clientSecret` is optional.
 
-With `clientAssertionAlg` set to `RS256`, `RS384`, `RS512`, `PS256`, `PS384`,
-or `PS512`, the RSA key must be 2048 bits or larger (RFC 7518 §3.3). The
-plugin rejects a smaller key at startup instead of at every token exchange.
-There is no override for this check.
-
 **Example — inline PEM:**
 
 ```yaml
@@ -183,10 +179,9 @@ clientSecret: your-client-secret
 | `logLevel` | string | `info` | Logging verbosity (`debug`, `info`, `error`) |
 | `forceHTTPS` | bool | `true` | Force HTTPS for redirect URIs (set `false` only for plaintext HTTP local dev) |
 | `rateLimit` | int | `100` | Maximum requests per second |
-| `excludedURLs` | []string | none | Paths that bypass authentication, matched at a path-segment or file-extension boundary |
-| `revocationURL` | string | auto-discovered | Token revocation endpoint. Takes precedence over the discovered value. See [Logout Behavior](#logout-behavior) for what happens at logout when this is set. |
-| `oidcEndSessionURL` | string | auto-discovered | Provider's end session endpoint. Takes precedence over the discovered value. |
-| `introspectionURL` | string | auto-discovered | RFC 7662 token introspection endpoint. Set this when your IdP omits `introspection_endpoint` from discovery. Takes precedence over the discovered value. |
+| `excludedURLs` | []string | none | Paths that bypass authentication |
+| `revocationURL` | string | auto-discovered | Token revocation endpoint |
+| `oidcEndSessionURL` | string | auto-discovered | Provider's end session endpoint |
 | `enablePKCE` | bool | `false` | Enable PKCE for authorization code flow |
 | `minimalHeaders` | bool | `false` | Reduce forwarded headers |
 | `clientAuthMethod` | string | `client_secret_post` | Client authentication method at token/revocation endpoints. One of `client_secret_post`, `client_secret_basic`, `private_key_jwt`. See [Client Authentication](#client-authentication). |
@@ -194,41 +189,6 @@ clientSecret: your-client-secret
 | `clientAssertionKeyPath` | string | none | Path to PEM private key on disk for `private_key_jwt`. Mutually exclusive with `clientAssertionPrivateKey`. |
 | `clientAssertionKeyID` | string | none | `kid` header for `private_key_jwt` assertions. Required when `clientAuthMethod: private_key_jwt`. |
 | `clientAssertionAlg` | string | `RS256` | Signing algorithm for `private_key_jwt`. One of `RS256/384/512`, `PS256/384/512`, `ES256/384/512`. |
-| `extraAuthParams` | map | none | Extra query parameters appended to the authorization request (e.g. re-selective prompt). |
-| `perSourceLoginRateLimit` | int | `0` (off) | Throttle OIDC auth events (callback + login initiation) per external client source, in auth events per minute. Keys and classifies the source by RemoteAddr only, never `X-Forwarded-For`, so a client cannot spoof it. Internal/loopback sources are never throttled. RemoteAddr is the TCP peer. Behind a load balancer or CDN, the limiter keys on the proxy address: a private address is never throttled, and a public address puts every client in one shared bucket. |
-| `stripAuthCookies` | bool | `false` | Strip OIDC session cookies from the hop to the backend (mitigates HTTP 431). |
-| `enableBackchannelLogout` | bool | `false` | Enable OIDC back-channel logout (IdP-initiated, server-to-server). |
-| `backchannelLogoutURL` | string | derived | Back-channel logout endpoint path. |
-| `enableFrontchannelLogout` | bool | `false` | Enable OIDC front-channel logout (browser iframe logout). |
-| `frontchannelLogoutURL` | string | derived | Front-channel logout endpoint path. |
-| `caCertPath` / `caCertPEM` | string | none | Custom CA bundle for OIDC TLS verification (filesystem path, or inline PEM). Mutually exclusive with `insecureSkipVerify`. |
-| `insecureSkipVerify` | bool | `false` | Disable TLS verification for the OIDC client (load balancer / mTLS edge). Emits a loud warning at startup. |
-
-### Logout Behavior
-
-A request to `logoutURL` clears the session, redirects the browser, and
-also revokes the session's tokens.
-
-1. The plugin blacklists the access, ID, and refresh tokens locally, so this
-   instance rejects them immediately.
-2. If `revocationURL` is set or discovered, the plugin also revokes the
-   access token and the refresh token at the provider (RFC 7009). Each
-   revocation call times out after 3 seconds. The two calls run one after
-   the other, so together they can delay the logout redirect by up to about
-   6 seconds. A revocation failure logs at error level and does not stop
-   the redirect. Deployments with no revocation endpoint log nothing for
-   this step.
-3. The plugin redirects to `oidcEndSessionURL` (RP-initiated logout) only
-   when `oidcEndSessionURL` is set or discovered and the session still
-   holds an ID token. Otherwise it redirects to `postLogoutRedirectURI`.
-4. When the plugin uses `oidcEndSessionURL`, it also sends
-   `post_logout_redirect_uri`. An absolute `postLogoutRedirectURI` value is
-   sent unchanged. A relative value, or the default `/`, is joined to the
-   origin of the redirect URI recorded at login. The plugin does not use
-   the logout request's `Host` header for this, because a client can spoof
-   it. The plugin omits the parameter only for a session created before
-   that origin was recorded. The provider then decides where to send the
-   user.
 
 ### TLS Termination at Load Balancer
 
@@ -275,8 +235,7 @@ SSE / WebSocket connection.
 
 | Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
 |-----------|------|---------|-------------|
-| `audience` | string | `clientID`, or `resource` if set | Expected audience for access token validation |
-| `resource` | string | none | RFC 8707 resource indicator, alternative to `audience` for supporting IdPs — see [docs/RFC8707.md](RFC8707.md) |
+| `audience` | string | `clientID` | Expected audience for access token validation |
 | `strictAudienceValidation` | bool | `false` | Reject sessions with audience mismatch |
 | `allowOpaqueTokens` | bool | `false` | Enable opaque token support via RFC 7662 |
 | `requireTokenIntrospection` | bool | `false` | Require introspection for opaque tokens |
@@ -288,16 +247,6 @@ audience: "https://my-api.example.com"
 strictAudienceValidation: true
 ```
 
-#### RFC 8707 Resource Indicators
-
-```yaml
-resource: "https://api.example.com"
-```
-
-Alternative to `audience` for IdPs that implement [RFC 8707](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707).
-See [docs/RFC8707.md](RFC8707.md) for exactly what request is made, why only a single
-resource is supported, and current per-provider support.
-
 #### Opaque Token Support
 
 ```yaml
@@ -312,57 +261,6 @@ strictAudienceValidation: true
 |-----------|------|---------|-------------|
 | `disableReplayDetection` | bool | `false` | Disable JTI-based replay attack detection |
 | `allowPrivateIPAddresses` | bool | `false` | Allow private IPs in provider URLs |
-| `allowUnauthenticatedPreflight` | bool | `false` | Bypass auth for a genuine CORS preflight (`OPTIONS` with `Origin` + `Access-Control-Request-Method`); response body is still discarded. Default requires auth for every `OPTIONS` request. |
-| `streamingRefresh` | bool | `false` | Refresh an expired session on SSE/WebSocket requests. Reject the request with `401` when the IdP revokes the grant (`invalid_grant`). Forward it as before when the IdP cannot be reached. |
-
-### Discovered Endpoint Validation
-
-When `providerURL` is `https://`, the plugin drops any endpoint the
-`.well-known/openid-configuration` document advertises as plain `http://`
-(authorization, token, jwks_uri, revocation, end_session, introspection,
-registration). A dropped credential-bearing endpoint would otherwise send
-the client secret or a token over an unauthenticated channel. There is no
-configuration flag to disable this check.
-
-A dropped endpoint logs an `ERROR`-level line naming it, and a dropped
-`token`, `jwks_uri`, or `authorization` endpoint — the three logins cannot
-function without — additionally logs a `SECURITY:`-prefixed line, because a
-blank endpoint otherwise fails every login with no other signal:
-
-```
-SECURITY: dropped the discovered token endpoint "http://idp.example.com/token": it is plaintext http while providerURL "https://idp.example.com" is https, and this check has no override; requests needing the token endpoint will fail until the provider serves it over https
-```
-
-The `revocationURL`, `oidcEndSessionURL` and `introspectionURL` config
-fields can supply those three endpoints directly, and when you set one of
-them, a plaintext-`http://` drop of the matching discovered endpoint does
-not break anything — the override replaces the endpoint right after
-sanitize runs and the `SECURITY:` line does not fire for it.
-
-Leave the override unset, though, and a drop is exactly as terminal as it is
-for `token`, `jwks_uri` and `authorization`: RP-initiated logout falls back
-to a local-only redirect (the IdP session stays alive), provider-side
-revocation is skipped, or `requireTokenIntrospection` breaks — all with no
-signal beyond the generic `ERROR` line. So `revocation`, `end_session` and
-`introspection` log the same `SECURITY:` line too, whenever the matching
-override is not set. `registration` never logs the `SECURITY:` line, under
-any configuration — it is not covered by this check. Dynamic Client
-Registration reads its own, separate override
-(`dynamicClientRegistration.registrationEndpoint`), independently of this
-discovery step, but only when you set it: leave it unset and a
-plaintext-`http://` drop of the discovered registration endpoint makes
-Dynamic Client Registration fail with only the generic `ERROR` line above —
-no `SECURITY:`-tagged signal, unlike `revocation`, `end_session` and
-`introspection`.
-
-`token`, `jwks_uri` and `authorization` log the `SECURITY:` line
-unconditionally — these three have no config field that can supply them at
-all, so a drop always breaks login regardless of any other setting.
-
-If your IdP's discovery document ever advertises an `http://` endpoint under
-an `https://` `providerURL`, fix the discovery document (for example, a
-TLS-terminating proxy in front of the IdP that does not forward
-`X-Forwarded-Proto`) rather than relying on the plugin to relax the check.
 
 ### Bearer-token (M2M) authentication
 
@@ -378,7 +276,7 @@ guidance.
 | `stripAuthorizationHeader` | bool | `true` | Strip `Authorization` from forwarded requests after successful bearer auth. |
 | `bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate` | bool | `true` | Emit RFC 6750 `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="..."` hints on 401. |
 | `bearerOverridesCookie` | bool | `false` | Cookie wins when both bearer and cookie are present (default). Set true for bearer-wins. |
-| `maxTokenAgeSeconds` | int64 | `86400` | Upper bound on `iat` claim age (24h). `0` and unset both map to the 24h default; no value disables the check, and a bearer token or opaque-introspection response without `iat` is rejected. |
+| `maxTokenAgeSeconds` | int64 | `86400` | Upper bound on `iat` claim age (24h). 0 disables the check. |
 | `maxIdentifierLength` | int | `256` | Length cap on the sanitised principal identifier. |
 | `bearerFailureThreshold` | int | `20` | Consecutive 401s from one source IP that trip the throttle. |
 | `bearerFailureWindowSeconds` | int | `60` | Rolling window for counting 401s. |
@@ -395,7 +293,6 @@ guidance.
 | `maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds` | int | `21600` | Heuristic max age (in seconds) of a stored refresh token. Once exceeded, requests treat the RT as expired up front (returns 401 to AJAX, triggers full re-auth on navigations) instead of grant-spamming the IdP with `invalid_grant` retries. IdPs do not advertise RT TTL on the wire, so this is intentionally a conservative heuristic — tune to match your provider. Set `0` to disable. Default `21600` (6h). |
 | `cookieDomain` | string | auto-detected | Domain for session cookies |
 | `cookiePrefix` | string | `_oidc_raczylo_` | Prefix for cookie names |
-| `cookiePath` | string | `/` | Path prefix for session cookies. Set it to the middleware's path (for example `/app`) so the browser does not send OIDC cookies to unprotected paths (avoids HTTP 431). |
 
 ### Multi-Subdomain Setup
 
@@ -535,62 +432,22 @@ minimalHeaders: true  # Only forwards X-Forwarded-User
 ```yaml
 headers:
   - name: "X-User-Email"
-    value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+    value: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}"
   - name: "X-User-ID"
-    value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"
+    value: "{{{{.Claims.sub}}}}"
   - name: "Authorization"
-    value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
+    value: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}"
   - name: "X-User-Roles"
-    value: "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}"
+    value: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}"
 ```
 
 **Template Variables:**
-- `{{.Claims.field}}` - ID token claims (only whitelisted fields; see below)
+- `{{.Claims.field}}` - ID token claims
 - `{{.AccessToken}}` - Raw access token
-- `{{.IdToken}}` / `{{.IDToken}}` - Raw ID token (both spellings work)
+- `{{.IdToken}}` - Raw ID token
 - `{{.RefreshToken}}` - Raw refresh token
 
-**Important — file provider only:** Traefik's file provider runs every dynamic
-configuration file through Go templating before the plugin sees it, so plain
-`{{ }}` fails there with `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool`.
-Escape with a raw string: ``value: "{{`{{.Claims.email}}`}}"``. All other
-providers (Kubernetes CRD, Docker labels, Consul, ...) pass the value through
-untouched — use the plain form shown above. Do not use quadruple braces
-(`{{{{ }}}}`); no configuration path collapses them, and template validation
-rejects them (issues #149, #151).
-
-**Validation and the claims whitelist.** Header templates are parsed and
-validated when the middleware loads; an invalid or disallowed template stops the
-middleware from starting (the route then returns Traefik's
-`invalid handler type: <nil>`). To prevent a template from accidentally
-forwarding raw tokens or sensitive claims, only a fixed set of claim fields may
-be emitted — the standard OIDC claims plus common provider claims (`email`,
-`name`, `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `sub`, `groups`,
-`roles`, `internal_role`, `role`, `department`, `organization`, `realm_access`,
-`resource_access`, `oid`, `tid`, `upn`, `hd`, `picture`, `locale`, `zoneinfo`,
-`phone_number`, `email_verified`, `updated_at`; the authoritative list is
-`safeClaimsFields` in `template_validation.go`). Rejected: rendering the whole
-context (`{{.}}`, `{{$}}`) or the whole claims map (`{{.Claims}}`), any claim not
-on the list, functions other than `get`/`default`, and `range`/`with` that do not
-target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims}}` is rejected; `{{range
-.Claims.groups}}` is allowed).
-
-**`allowedClaims`** extends the whitelist for claims your provider issues that
-are not built in:
-
-```yaml
-allowedClaims:
-  - employee_id
-  - cost_center
-headers:
-  - name: "X-Employee-Id"
-    value: "{{.Claims.employee_id}}"
-```
-
-Listed names apply to both direct access (`{{.Claims.employee_id}}`) and
-`get` (`{{get .Claims "employee_id"}}`). Subfields of a whitelisted map-valued
-claim (e.g. `realm_access.roles`) are already accessible without listing them
-individually.
+**Important:** Use double curly braces (`{{{{` and `}}}}`) to escape templates in YAML.
 
 ---
 
@@ -808,3 +665,19 @@ sessionEncryptionKey: ${OIDC_SECRET_API}
 # Good
 sessionEncryptionKey: ${OIDC_SECRET_SVC}
 ```
+
+---
+
+## Standalone binary (oidcgate)
+
+If you don't run Traefik, the same configuration shape documented above
+works for the [`oidcgate`](OIDCGATE.md) standalone forward-auth daemon
+under `cmd/oidcgate`. Three extra top-level keys (`listen`, `authPath`,
+`startPath`) configure the daemon itself; everything else maps 1:1 onto
+the `traefikoidc.Config` fields documented in this reference.
+
+See [`docs/OIDCGATE.md`](OIDCGATE.md) for the full daemon guide including
+nginx, Caddy, Traefik ForwardAuth, HAProxy and Envoy wiring snippets,
+the `OIDCGATE_*` environment-variable inventory, the security posture
+(X-Forwarded-Uri sanitisation, excludedURLs guardrail), and how to layer
+M2M [bearer-token auth](BEARER_AUTH.md) on the same daemon.

docs/OIDCGATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+# oidcgate — standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon
+
+`oidcgate` is a single binary that exposes the same OIDC middleware that
+powers the Traefik plugin as a forward-auth daemon for nginx, Caddy,
+Traefik ForwardAuth, HAProxy, and Envoy `ext_authz_http`.
+
+## Table of contents
+
+- [Build](#build)
+- [Run](#run)
+- [Configuration](#configuration)
+  - [YAML file](#yaml-file)
+  - [Environment-variable overrides](#environment-variable-overrides)
+- [Endpoints](#endpoints)
+- [Reverse-proxy snippets](#reverse-proxy-snippets)
+  - [nginx (`auth_request`)](#nginx-auth_request)
+  - [Caddy (`forward_auth`)](#caddy-forward_auth)
+  - [Traefik (`ForwardAuth`)](#traefik-forwardauth)
+  - [HAProxy](#haproxy)
+  - [Envoy (`ext_authz_http`)](#envoy-ext_authz_http)
+- [Security posture](#security-posture)
+- [Bearer-token (M2M) auth on the same daemon](#bearer-token-m2m-auth-on-the-same-daemon)
+- [Operational guidance](#operational-guidance)
+- [Debugging](#debugging)
+
+## Build
+
+```bash
+go build -o oidcgate ./cmd/oidcgate
+```
+
+## Run
+
+```bash
+./oidcgate --config /etc/oidcgate/config.yaml
+```
+
+The daemon parses `--config`, loads YAML, applies any `OIDCGATE_*` env-var
+overrides, validates the result, and binds to `listen`. On SIGINT/SIGTERM it
+calls `http.Server.Shutdown` with a 15s deadline, draining in-flight requests.
+
+## Configuration
+
+### YAML file
+
+The OIDC subtree of the config maps 1:1 onto the [`traefikoidc.Config`](CONFIGURATION.md)
+struct — every field documented under "Configuration Reference" works here
+verbatim. Three extra top-level keys configure the daemon itself:
+
+| Key | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `listen` | _required_ | TCP address (e.g. `:8080`, `127.0.0.1:8080`). |
+| `authPath` | `/oauth2/auth` | Silent-probe endpoint (used by nginx `auth_request`). |
+| `startPath` | `/oauth2/start` | Visible sign-in endpoint. |
+
+Minimal example (see [`examples/oidcgate.yaml`](../examples/oidcgate.yaml)):
+
+```yaml
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://accounts.google.com"
+clientID: "your-client-id"
+clientSecret: "your-client-secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+```
+
+Nested structs (`redis:`, `securityHeaders:`, `dynamicClientRegistration:`)
+round-trip cleanly through YAML — same shape as in `.traefik.yml`.
+
+### Environment-variable overrides
+
+Any of the following scalar fields can be overridden at runtime by an
+`OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE>` environment variable. The env var wins over
+the YAML value when set and non-empty. Intended for secret injection
+(K8s `valueFrom.secretKeyRef`, systemd `EnvironmentFile=`, etc.).
+
+| YAML key | Env var |
+|---|---|
+| `listen` | `OIDCGATE_LISTEN` |
+| `authPath` | `OIDCGATE_AUTH_PATH` |
+| `startPath` | `OIDCGATE_START_PATH` |
+| `providerURL` | `OIDCGATE_PROVIDER_URL` |
+| `clientID` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ID` |
+| `clientSecret` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_SECRET` |
+| `audience` | `OIDCGATE_AUDIENCE` |
+| `callbackURL` | `OIDCGATE_CALLBACK_URL` |
+| `logoutURL` | `OIDCGATE_LOGOUT_URL` |
+| `postLogoutRedirectURI` | `OIDCGATE_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI` |
+| `sessionEncryptionKey` | `OIDCGATE_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY` |
+| `cookiePrefix` | `OIDCGATE_COOKIE_PREFIX` |
+| `cookieDomain` | `OIDCGATE_COOKIE_DOMAIN` |
+| `logLevel` | `OIDCGATE_LOG_LEVEL` |
+| `revocationURL` | `OIDCGATE_REVOCATION_URL` |
+| `oidcEndSessionURL` | `OIDCGATE_OIDC_END_SESSION_URL` |
+| `userIdentifierClaim` | `OIDCGATE_USER_IDENTIFIER_CLAIM` |
+| `groupClaimName` | `OIDCGATE_GROUP_CLAIM_NAME` |
+| `roleClaimName` | `OIDCGATE_ROLE_CLAIM_NAME` |
+| `clientAuthMethod` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_AUTH_METHOD` |
+| `clientAssertionPrivateKey` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_PRIVATE_KEY` |
+| `clientAssertionKeyPath` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_KEY_PATH` |
+| `clientAssertionKeyID` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_KEY_ID` |
+| `clientAssertionAlg` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_ALG` |
+| `caCertPath` | `OIDCGATE_CA_CERT_PATH` |
+| `caCertPEM` | `OIDCGATE_CA_CERT_PEM` |
+
+Nested-struct fields (Redis, security headers, DCR) are YAML-only — set
+them in the config file, not via env.
+
+## Endpoints
+
+| Path | Method | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/oauth2/auth` | GET | Silent probe — `200` if authenticated, `401` if not. Never returns `302`; the middleware's redirect-to-IdP is rewritten in-flight to `401` with the original `Location` carried as `X-Auth-Redirect`. |
+| `/oauth2/start` | GET | Visible sign-in — `302` to the IdP authorize URL. Accepts `?rd=<safe-path>` (or honours `X-Forwarded-Uri`) for the post-login redirect target. |
+| `/oauth2/callback` | GET | IdP `code`+`state` exchange. Path is configurable via `callbackURL`. |
+| `/oauth2/logout` | GET/POST | Terminates the session. Path is configurable via `logoutURL`. Honours `oidcEndSessionURL` for RP-initiated logout. |
+| `/healthz` | GET | Liveness — `200` while the process is alive. |
+| `/readyz` | GET | Readiness — `200` once the OIDC discovery document has been fetched, otherwise `503`. |
+
+## Reverse-proxy snippets
+
+### nginx (`auth_request`)
+
+```nginx
+location = /oauth2/auth {
+    internal;
+    proxy_pass              http://oidcgate:8080;
+    proxy_pass_request_body off;
+    proxy_set_header        Content-Length "";
+    proxy_set_header        X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
+    proxy_set_header        X-Forwarded-Host $host;
+    proxy_set_header        X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+}
+location @oidc_signin {
+    return 302 /oauth2/start?rd=$scheme://$host$request_uri;
+}
+location /oauth2/ {
+    proxy_pass       http://oidcgate:8080;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host  $host;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+}
+location / {
+    auth_request           /oauth2/auth;
+    error_page             401 = @oidc_signin;
+    auth_request_set       $user  $upstream_http_x_forwarded_user;
+    auth_request_set       $email $upstream_http_x_forwarded_email;
+    proxy_set_header       X-Forwarded-User  $user;
+    proxy_set_header       X-Forwarded-Email $email;
+    proxy_pass             http://backend;
+}
+```
+
+### Caddy (`forward_auth`)
+
+```caddyfile
+example.com {
+    forward_auth oidcgate:8080 {
+        uri /oauth2/auth
+        copy_headers X-Forwarded-User X-Forwarded-Email
+        @denied status 401
+        handle_response @denied {
+            redir /oauth2/start?rd={http.request.uri} 302
+        }
+    }
+    handle /oauth2/* {
+        reverse_proxy oidcgate:8080
+    }
+    reverse_proxy backend:3000
+}
+```
+
+### Traefik (`ForwardAuth`)
+
+```yaml
+http:
+  middlewares:
+    oidcgate:
+      forwardAuth:
+        address: "http://oidcgate:8080/oauth2/auth"
+        authResponseHeaders:
+          - X-Forwarded-User
+          - X-Forwarded-Email
+```
+
+Traefik can follow the `X-Auth-Redirect` value via a chained `redirectScheme`
+middleware, or you can configure the upstream router to redirect `401` →
+`/oauth2/start` directly.
+
+### HAProxy
+
+```haproxy
+frontend fe_https
+    bind *:443 ssl crt /etc/haproxy/certs/site.pem
+    http-request set-var(req.orig_uri) path
+    http-request send-spoe-group oidc auth-check  # or use lua/SPOE; simplest is the lua snippet below
+
+    # The simpler pattern: dispatch /oauth2/* to oidcgate, everything else
+    # goes through a Lua filter that issues a sub-request to /oauth2/auth.
+    acl is_oidc_endpoint path_beg /oauth2/
+    use_backend be_oidcgate if is_oidc_endpoint
+    default_backend be_app
+
+backend be_oidcgate
+    server oidcgate1 oidcgate:8080
+
+backend be_app
+    server app1 backend:3000
+```
+
+HAProxy does not have a first-class `auth_request` equivalent in pure
+config — the canonical patterns are SPOE (Stream Processing Offload Engine),
+a Lua filter that issues `/oauth2/auth` and reads the response, or a
+sidecar that does the dance. Reach for SPOE for high-throughput
+production; Lua is simpler for low-volume.
+
+### Envoy (`ext_authz_http`)
+
+```yaml
+http_filters:
+  - name: envoy.filters.http.ext_authz
+    typed_config:
+      "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.ext_authz.v3.ExtAuthz
+      transport_api_version: V3
+      http_service:
+        server_uri:
+          uri: http://oidcgate:8080
+          cluster: oidcgate
+          timeout: 2s
+        path_prefix: /oauth2/auth
+        authorization_request:
+          allowed_headers:
+            patterns:
+              - exact: cookie
+              - exact: authorization
+              - prefix: x-forwarded-
+        authorization_response:
+          allowed_upstream_headers:
+            patterns:
+              - exact: x-forwarded-user
+              - exact: x-forwarded-email
+          allowed_client_headers:
+            patterns:
+              - exact: x-auth-redirect
+              - exact: set-cookie
+```
+
+On `401`, the `X-Auth-Redirect` header is surfaced to the downstream client
+via `allowed_client_headers`. A small Envoy `router` filter or
+`local_reply_config` rule can convert that into a browser-facing `302`
+redirect to `/oauth2/start`.
+
+## Security posture
+
+- **`X-Forwarded-Uri` is sanitised.** The daemon forces
+  `TrustForwardedURI=true` so the middleware honours `X-Forwarded-Uri` for
+  the post-login redirect target. To prevent open redirects (CWE-601),
+  the value is rejected unless it is a safe same-origin path: must start
+  with `/`, must NOT start with `//` (protocol-relative), and must have
+  no scheme or host after parsing. Absolute URLs or anything that could
+  redirect off-origin falls through to `req.URL.RequestURI()`.
+
+- **`excludedURLs` cannot bypass the daemon's own paths.** At config
+  load, the loader rejects any `excludedURLs` entry that is a prefix of
+  `authPath`, `startPath`, `callbackURL`, `logoutURL`, or the internal
+  sentinel path. A misconfiguration like `excludedURLs: ["/"]` (common
+  "allow all then add auth selectively" mistake) is rejected at startup
+  with a descriptive error.
+
+- **`callbackURL` and `logoutURL` must be paths.** Absolute URLs are
+  rejected at config load — both because `http.ServeMux.Handle` panics
+  on non-`/` patterns and because the middleware's path-match would
+  silently fail.
+
+- **`listen` is required.** Empty or missing `listen` is rejected at
+  startup rather than failing later at `net.Listen`.
+
+- **Secrets via env vars.** `clientSecret` and `sessionEncryptionKey`
+  can be supplied via env vars instead of YAML so they don't end up on
+  disk if you use a secret manager.
+
+## Bearer-token (M2M) auth on the same daemon
+
+oidcgate uses the full `traefikoidc.Config` shape, so the bearer-token
+M2M auth path documented in [`BEARER_AUTH.md`](BEARER_AUTH.md) works
+out of the box. Add to your YAML:
+
+```yaml
+enableBearerAuth: true
+audience: "https://api.example.com"
+bearerIdentifierClaim: "sub"
+# stripAuthorizationHeader: true   # default
+# bearerOverridesCookie: false     # default — cookie wins on collision
+```
+
+With this set, the daemon accepts both:
+- Browser users hitting `/oauth2/auth` → cookie session flow.
+- API clients calling the protected backend with `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`
+  → bearer validation, principal headers, no session.
+
+The bearer path doesn't go through `/oauth2/auth` separately — it's
+applied by the middleware on every request the daemon sees, before the
+cookie session check. See [BEARER_AUTH.md](BEARER_AUTH.md) for the full
+threat model, identifier sanitisation rules, and failure-response
+matrix.
+
+## Operational guidance
+
+- **Run behind a fronting proxy on a private network.** The daemon does
+  not terminate TLS. Put it on a localhost socket or a private subnet
+  reachable only from your nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy.
+- **`/healthz` and `/readyz` are unauthenticated** — correct for
+  Kubernetes liveness/readiness probes, but **do not expose them past a
+  load balancer**. Restrict via an ACL: nginx `allow 10.0.0.0/8; deny
+  all;`, Caddy `@health remote_ip 10.0.0.0/8`, k8s NetworkPolicy, or
+  your CNI of choice.
+- **Multi-replica deployments** need a shared session store. Enable the
+  `redis:` block in the config (see [`docs/REDIS.md`](REDIS.md)) so
+  sessions survive a hop between replicas.
+- **No built-in Prometheus metrics yet.** If you need request-level
+  visibility, take it from your fronting proxy's access logs — both
+  nginx and Envoy can tag `auth_request` / `ext_authz` outcomes.
+- **Logs are minimal by default.** Set `logLevel: debug` while
+  bringing up a new deployment; raise to `info` (default) or higher
+  once stable. Debug logs include path-match decisions and metadata
+  refresh outcomes.
+- **Graceful shutdown is 15s.** SIGINT or SIGTERM triggers
+  `http.Server.Shutdown(ctx)` with a 15-second deadline; in-flight
+  requests are allowed to complete. If your orchestrator's grace
+  period is shorter, requests can be cut mid-flight.
+
+## Debugging
+
+- **Requests appear as `/__oidcgate_protected__` in middleware debug
+  logs.** This is the internal sentinel path used when `/oauth2/auth`
+  and `/oauth2/start` delegate into the traefikoidc middleware. The
+  upstream client never sees it; it only shows up in the middleware's
+  own `Debugf` output when `logLevel: debug` is set.
+
+- **`/oauth2/auth` returns `401` with `X-Auth-Redirect` header on
+  unauthenticated requests.** This is the deliberate translation of the
+  middleware's `302` to make nginx `auth_request` work. The browser is
+  redirected via the fronting proxy's `error_page 401 = @oidc_signin;`
+  pattern, not by following the daemon's response directly.
+
+- **`/readyz` stays `503` after startup.** The middleware fetches the
+  OIDC discovery document lazily on first request, so `/readyz` returns
+  `503` until at least one request has triggered metadata discovery.
+  Hit `/oauth2/auth` once after startup to warm it up — many K8s
+  setups achieve the same effect because the liveness probe already
+  goes through the proxy chain.
+
+- **Cookie/session diagnostics.** With `logLevel: debug` the middleware
+  logs which session manager was selected (in-memory vs Redis), whether
+  cookies decrypted successfully, and the JWT validation outcome.
+
+- **Open-redirect rejections are silent.** When the daemon ignores an
+  unsafe `X-Forwarded-Uri` value, it falls back to `req.URL.RequestURI()`
+  without logging. This is intentional (no recon signal) — if a user
+  reports "I keep landing on the wrong page after login", inspect
+  whether the upstream proxy is forwarding a non-canonical
+  `X-Forwarded-Uri` value.

docs/RFC8707.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# RFC 8707 Resource Indicators
-
-`resource` ([Config.Resource](../settings.go)) is an alternative to `audience` for IdPs that
-implement [RFC 8707](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707). See
-[docs/CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md#audience-validation) for the config reference; this
-document covers exactly what request is made and which providers support it.
-
-## What the plugin sends
-
-- One `resource` parameter on the authorization request (`buildAuthURL`), added before
-  `extraAuthParams` so an operator-configured `resource` key there cannot override or
-  duplicate it.
-- The same `resource` parameter on both the `authorization_code` and `refresh_token` grants
-  (`exchangeTokens`), per RFC 8707 §2.2 — so a refreshed token keeps the same audience binding
-  as the original grant.
-
-Only a single resource is supported, not a list. RFC 8707 allows a server to accept multiple
-`resource` values and scope the issued token to a subset of them, but no provider found to
-support the parameter at all handles that usefully: one provider tested rejects a request
-naming more than one resource with HTTP 400 `invalid_target`; node-oidc-provider accepts
-multiple resources but issues an opaque access token bound to none of them. A single value
-avoids both failure modes.
-
-## Relationship to `audience`
-
-`resource` and `audience` both feed the same access-token audience check —
-`strictAudienceValidation` applies identically to either — but they produce different requests
-on the wire:
-
-- `audience`, when explicitly configured, is sent as a non-standard `audience` request
-  parameter (see [docs/AUTH0\_AUDIENCE\_GUIDE.md](AUTH0_AUDIENCE_GUIDE.md)).
-- `resource` is sent as the RFC 8707 `resource` parameter instead.
-- If `resource` is set and `audience` is not, the expected-audience check defaults to the
-  resource value, but this is validation-only: it does not cause an `audience` parameter to be
-  sent. Setting both is allowed — e.g. as a hedge against a provider that ignores `resource` —
-  in which case both parameters are sent.
-
-## Provider support
-
-Verified 2026-09-02 (Zitadel reverified separately against a live instance). RFC 8707 requires
-a server that does not support `resource` to *ignore* it, but not every implementation does —
-verify against your specific provider and version before relying on it.
-
-| Provider | Support | Notes |
-|---|---|---|
-| node-oidc-provider | Supported | Via its `resourceIndicators` feature. |
-| Zitadel | Ignored, not rejected | `oidc.AuthRequest` has no `resource` field; confirmed against a live instance — `/oauth/v2/authorize` returns the same `302` with or without `resource`, including a spec-invalid value. |
-| Authentik | Rejected | Returns `invalid_target` ("Resource indicators are not supported"). |
-| Keycloak | Not supported (through 26.6) | Its own guidance is an audience mapper plus `scope` instead ([keycloak/keycloak#41526](https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/issues/41526)). |
-| Ory Hydra / Fosite | Not implemented | Uses its own non-standard `audience` request parameter instead. |
-| Azure AD / Entra ID v2.0 (MSAL) | Reported to reject | When combined with v2-style `scope`, rather than ignoring it ([writeup](https://www.groff.dev/blog/azure-entra-id-mcp-server-authentication-incompatibilities)). Do not enable against an Entra ID v2 tenant without confirming. The v1.0 endpoint has a separate, pre-RFC `resource` parameter with similar but not identical semantics. |
-| Auth0 | Not verified | Documents a Resource Parameter Compatibility Profile mapping `resource` → `audience` ([Auth0 docs](https://auth0.com/ai/docs/mcp/guides/resource-param-compatibility-profile)). |
-| AWS Cognito | Not verified | Announced Oct 2025 for user-pool authorization-code/implicit grants ([announcement](https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2025/10/amazon-cognito-resource-indicators-protection-oauth-2-0-resources)). |
-| Okta, Google, GitLab | Unverified | No confirming documentation found either way. |

docs/index.html

@@ -735,14 +735,9 @@ spec:
                                     </tr>
                                     <tr class="border-b border-gray-100 dark:border-gray-800">
                                         <td class="py-2 px-3"><code class="bg-gray-200 dark:bg-gray-700 px-1 rounded">audience</code></td>
-                                        <td class="py-2 px-3">clientID, or <code class="bg-gray-200 dark:bg-gray-700 px-1 rounded">resource</code> if set</td>
+                                        <td class="py-2 px-3">clientID</td>
                                         <td class="py-2 px-3">Custom audience for access token validation</td>
                                     </tr>
-                                    <tr class="border-b border-gray-100 dark:border-gray-800">
-                                        <td class="py-2 px-3"><code class="bg-gray-200 dark:bg-gray-700 px-1 rounded">resource</code></td>
-                                        <td class="py-2 px-3">none</td>
-                                        <td class="py-2 px-3">RFC 8707 resource indicator, alternative to <code class="bg-gray-200 dark:bg-gray-700 px-1 rounded">audience</code> for supporting IdPs — see docs/RFC8707.md.</td>
-                                    </tr>
                                     <tr class="border-b border-gray-100 dark:border-gray-800">
                                         <td class="py-2 px-3"><code class="bg-gray-200 dark:bg-gray-700 px-1 rounded">strictAudienceValidation</code></td>
                                         <td class="py-2 px-3">false</td>

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-19-oidcgate-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+# oidcgate — Standalone OIDC Forward-Auth Daemon (Tier 1)
+
+**Date:** 2026-05-19
+**Status:** Design approved, pending implementation plan
+**Scope:** Tier 1 only — forward-auth daemon. No reverse-proxy mode, no TLS termination, no metrics, no multi-tenancy.
+
+## Goal
+
+Provide a standalone Go binary that exposes the existing `traefikoidc` OIDC middleware as a forward-auth daemon callable from nginx (`auth_request`), Caddy (`forward_auth`), Traefik (`ForwardAuth`), HAProxy, and Envoy (`ext_authz_http`). The library's public surface is **additive only**: no existing exported function signature changes; one optional `Config` field (`TrustForwardedURI`) and one new read-only accessor on `*TraefikOidc` are added. Existing Traefik plugin users see no behavior change unless they opt in to the new field.
+
+## Non-Goals
+
+- Reverse-proxy mode (Tier 2 — separate effort if requested).
+- TLS termination inside the daemon.
+- Built-in Prometheus metrics.
+- Multi-tenant routing (one binary serves one OIDC client config).
+- oauth2-proxy CLI/flag compatibility.
+- Docker image or goreleaser publishing as part of Tier 1.
+
+## Architecture
+
+### File layout
+
+```
+github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc          (library, unchanged)
+├── main.go                                    (existing New/NewWithContext)
+├── middleware.go                              (existing ServeHTTP + ~10 LoC patch)
+└── cmd/
+    └── oidcgate/
+        ├── main.go                            (entrypoint, flags, signal handling)
+        ├── config.go                          (YAML loader + env-var override walker)
+        ├── server.go                          (http.ServeMux wiring, listen loop)
+        ├── endpoints.go                       (auth/start/callback/logout handlers)
+        ├── success.go                         (synthetic success handler used as `next`)
+        ├── interceptor.go                     (302→401 response-writer for /oauth2/auth)
+        ├── health.go                          (/healthz, /readyz)
+        ├── config_test.go
+        ├── endpoints_test.go
+        └── interceptor_test.go
+```
+
+### Process model
+
+Single binary, single `*TraefikOidc` instance built at boot from YAML config, served on one listener port. Health endpoints on the same listener. Graceful shutdown on `SIGINT`/`SIGTERM` via `srv.Shutdown(ctx)` with a 15s deadline, after which context cancellation propagates into the existing goroutine manager.
+
+## Endpoint Contract
+
+All four endpoints share the listener. Paths are configurable; defaults shown.
+
+| Endpoint | Default path | Method | Contract |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **Auth probe** | `/oauth2/auth` | GET | Silent. `200 OK` + injected headers on success. `401` on failure (never `302`). Consumed by nginx `auth_request`, Traefik ForwardAuth, Caddy `forward_auth`, Envoy ext_authz_http. |
+| **Sign-in** | `/oauth2/start` | GET | Always `302` to IdP `authorize` URL with `state`+`nonce`+PKCE. Reads target URL from `?rd=` query or `X-Forwarded-Uri` header. Hit by the browser after a `401` from `/oauth2/auth`. |
+| **Callback** | `config.callbackURL` | GET | IdP `code`+`state` exchange. Existing `auth_flow.go` logic runs unchanged. On success → `302` to original URL. |
+| **Logout** | `config.logoutURL` | GET/POST | Existing `logout.go` handler. Terminates session. Honors `oidcEndSessionURL` if configured. |
+
+### Wiring (how each endpoint delegates)
+
+All four handlers feed `(*TraefikOidc).ServeHTTP` after rewriting `req.URL.Path`:
+
+- `/oauth2/callback` → rewrite to `config.callbackURL`, delegate. Middleware path-match at `middleware.go` triggers callback flow.
+- `/oauth2/logout` → rewrite to `config.logoutURL`, delegate. Middleware logout path-match at the top of `ServeHTTP` triggers.
+- `/oauth2/start` → rewrite `req.URL.Path` to the sentinel `/__oidcgate_protected__`, delegate. Middleware sees an unauthenticated GET on a protected path, emits the `302` to IdP. The redirect flows through naturally.
+- `/oauth2/auth` → rewrite `req.URL.Path` to `/__oidcgate_protected__`, wrap `ResponseWriter` with an interceptor (see below), delegate.
+
+The sentinel path `/__oidcgate_protected__` is chosen because it cannot collide with `callbackURL` / `logoutURL` / `/health*` path matches inside `ServeHTTP` and is not a likely user-configured `excludedURLs` entry. It is internal-only: clients never see it.
+
+### Synthetic `next` handler
+
+The middleware calls `t.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)` at four sites (`middleware.go:174,185,187,592`) when the request is authenticated and should be forwarded. The daemon supplies a `next` that:
+
+1. Writes `200 OK`.
+2. Mirrors any `X-Forwarded-*` and templated headers that the middleware set on `req.Header` (e.g. `X-Forwarded-User` at `middleware.go:101,512`) onto the **response** headers, so proxies can capture them via `auth_request_set` / `authResponseHeaders`.
+3. Writes empty body.
+
+### 302 → 401 interceptor (`/oauth2/auth` only)
+
+nginx `auth_request` cannot follow `302`s. For the silent endpoint, the daemon wraps the `ResponseWriter` such that:
+
+- If the middleware writes status `302` (the IdP-redirect branch), the interceptor rewrites it to `401`.
+- `Location` header from the swallowed `302` is preserved as `X-Auth-Redirect` on the `401` response (advisory; some proxies may surface it).
+- `Set-Cookie` headers (state, PKCE, nonce) are preserved verbatim so the browser carries them into the subsequent `/oauth2/start` request.
+- For any non-`302` status, the interceptor is a passthrough.
+
+`/oauth2/start` does **not** wrap; the middleware's natural `302` flows through to the browser.
+
+## Configuration
+
+### Source
+
+- **File:** `--config /etc/oidcgate/config.yaml` (path overridable via flag).
+- **Format:** YAML, unmarshalled into the existing `traefikoidc.Config` struct (`settings.go:39`) via `yaml.v3` (already a dependency in `go.mod`).
+- **Migration from Traefik:** copy the `plugin.traefikoidc:` subtree out of `.traefik.yml` and add the daemon-specific top-level keys below.
+- **Env-var overrides** (secrets in particular): after YAML unmarshal, walk the config struct. Any scalar string/int/bool field with a non-empty `OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE_FIELD>` env-var replaces the YAML value. Nested structs (`Redis`, `SecurityHeaders`, `DynamicClientRegistration`) stay YAML-only.
+
+### Top-level oidcgate-specific keys
+
+```yaml
+listen: ":8080"            # required, listener address
+authPath: "/oauth2/auth"   # optional, default shown
+startPath: "/oauth2/start" # optional, default shown
+# all other keys = existing traefikoidc.Config fields
+```
+
+### Validation
+
+The existing validation inside `traefikoidc.NewWithContext` (`main.go:97`) runs unchanged. On any returned error, the daemon logs the error and exits non-zero.
+
+## Library-Side Patches
+
+Two additive changes, both default-off / read-only:
+
+1. **`settings.go` + `middleware.go` (~10 LoC):** add `Config.TrustForwardedURI bool` (default `false`). When `true`, the post-login-redirect target captured during the "unauthenticated GET → 302 to IdP" branch is sourced from `req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri")` if non-empty, instead of from `req.URL`. The daemon sets `TrustForwardedURI = true` at config build time. Default-off preserves current Traefik plugin behavior exactly.
+
+2. **`main.go` (~5 LoC):** add `func (t *TraefikOidc) Ready() bool` returning `true` once at least one successful OIDC metadata discovery fetch has populated the metadata cache. Read-only; no behavior change for existing consumers.
+
+## Lifecycle
+
+```
+parse flags
+  → load YAML
+  → apply env-var overrides
+  → build synthetic success handler
+  → call traefikoidc.New(ctx, success, cfg, "oidcgate")  (validation happens here)
+  → build mux (auth, start, callback, logout, healthz, readyz)
+  → http.Server.ListenAndServe on cfg.listen
+  → wait for SIGINT/SIGTERM
+  → srv.Shutdown(15s ctx)
+  → ctx cancel propagates to goroutine manager
+  → exit 0
+```
+
+`/readyz` returns `200` only once `traefikoidc.New` has returned without error **and** the first OIDC metadata discovery fetch has succeeded. Implementation: add a read-only accessor `func (t *TraefikOidc) Ready() bool` that returns `true` once the metadata cache has at least one successful discovery fetch. The daemon's `/readyz` handler calls this and returns `200` / `503` accordingly.
+
+`/healthz` returns `200` as long as the process is alive.
+
+## Testing
+
+- `config_test.go` — YAML round-trip; env-var override precedence; validation pass-through.
+- `endpoints_test.go` — `httptest.NewServer`-based scenarios:
+  - `/oauth2/auth` with no session → `401`.
+  - `/oauth2/auth` with valid session → `200` + `X-Forwarded-User` mirrored on response.
+  - `/oauth2/start` → `302` with valid IdP `authorize` URL incl. `state` and PKCE.
+  - `/oauth2/callback` → completes exchange, sets session, redirects to original URL.
+  - `/oauth2/logout` → clears session cookie.
+- `interceptor_test.go` — middleware-emitted `302` becomes `401`; `Location` → `X-Auth-Redirect`; `Set-Cookie` preserved.
+- Reuse existing mock IdP from `enhanced_mocks_test.go`. No new mock infra.
+
+## Risks & Mitigations
+
+| Risk | Mitigation |
+|---|---|
+| Interceptor swallows a legitimate `302` from the middleware that isn't the IdP redirect. | Inspect: only intercept when `Location` matches `t.providerURL`'s authorize endpoint or when it points off-host. Test coverage in `interceptor_test.go`. |
+| Library-side patch breaks current Traefik users. | New `TrustForwardedURI` defaults to `false`; existing path untouched when unset. |
+| Env-var walker overreaches into nested structs. | Restrict to top-level scalar fields; document explicitly; nested structs stay YAML-only. |
+| Path-rewrite trick hits a middleware path-comparison we didn't anticipate. | All four `t.next.ServeHTTP` sites verified at `middleware.go:174,185,187,592`. Endpoint tests exercise each path. |
+
+## Out of Scope (Tier 2 candidates)
+
+- Reverse-proxy mode (`httputil.ReverseProxy` as the configured `next`).
+- TLS termination (`tls.Config`, ACME).
+- Prometheus metrics endpoint.
+- Multi-tenant routing.
+- oauth2-proxy flag/env compatibility.
+- Goreleaser binaries, Docker image, systemd unit.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. `go build ./cmd/oidcgate` produces a working binary.
+2. Existing test suite (`go test ./...`) still passes — zero regressions in the library.
+3. New endpoint tests pass for all four endpoints against the mock IdP.
+4. `oidcgate --config example.yaml` boots, serves `/healthz`, performs end-to-end OIDC flow against a real IdP (manual smoke test against e.g. a local Keycloak).
+5. README section documents nginx, Caddy, and Traefik wiring examples.

dynamic_client_registration.go

@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -54,7 +52,6 @@ type DynamicClientRegistrar struct {
 	registrationResponse *ClientRegistrationResponse
 	store                DCRCredentialsStore // Storage backend for credentials
 	providerURL          string
-	scopes               []string // Runtime auth/scopes from the operator config (merged)
 	mu                   sync.RWMutex
 }
 
@@ -106,19 +103,6 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) SetStore(store DCRCredentialsStore) {
 	r.store = store
 }
 
-// EffectiveTokenEndpointAuthMethod returns the token-endpoint auth method that
-// was (or will be) advertised to the IdP during registration:
-// ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod if set, else client_secret_post
-// (RFC 7591 confidential-client default). The IdP provisions the client
-// according to this method, so the runtime must authenticate to the token
-// endpoint with the SAME method or every exchange fails (R157).
-func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) EffectiveTokenEndpointAuthMethod() string {
-	if r.config != nil && r.config.ClientMetadata != nil && r.config.ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod != "" {
-		return r.config.ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod
-	}
-	return "client_secret_post"
-}
-
 // RegisterClient performs dynamic client registration with the OIDC provider
 // It first attempts to load existing credentials from storage if persistence is enabled,
 // then registers a new client if no valid credentials exist.
@@ -157,10 +141,8 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) RegisterClient(ctx context.Context, registratio
 
 	// Validate the endpoint URL
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "https://") {
-		// Allow http only for loopback/development endpoints. Use a
-		// host-boundary check (not a prefix) so e.g.
-		// http://localhost.evil.com isn't treated as localhost.
-		if !isLoopbackRegistrationEndpoint(endpoint) {
+		// Allow http only for localhost/development
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "http://localhost") && !strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "http://127.0.0.1") {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("registration endpoint must use HTTPS for security")
 		}
 		r.logger.Infof("Warning: using insecure HTTP for registration endpoint (development only): %s", endpoint)
@@ -221,19 +203,6 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) RegisterClient(ctx context.Context, registratio
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("registration response missing client_id")
 	}
 
-	// The plugin's runtime client-auth default is client_secret_post
-	// (settings.go Config.Validate); RFC 7591 registers a confidential
-	// client. For a secret-based auth method the response must carry a
-	// client_secret, otherwise every token exchange fails. Adopting a
-	// secret-less client would silently break all auth.
-	authMethod := "client_secret_post"
-	if r.config != nil && r.config.ClientMetadata != nil && r.config.ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod != "" {
-		authMethod = r.config.ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod
-	}
-	if (authMethod == "client_secret_post" || authMethod == "client_secret_basic") && regResp.ClientSecret == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("registration response missing client_secret for auth method %q", authMethod)
-	}
-
 	r.logger.Infof("Successfully registered client with ID: %s", regResp.ClientID)
 
 	// Cache the response
@@ -264,41 +233,11 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) buildRegistrationRequest() ([]byte, error) {
 
 	// Required: redirect_uris
 	if len(metadata.RedirectURIs) > 0 {
-		// Reject malformed or wrong-scheme entries before they reach the IdP:
-		// RFC 7591 expects absolute http/https redirect URIs, and an invalid
-		// one sent to the IdP would corrupt the registered callback.
-		for _, uri := range metadata.RedirectURIs {
-			parsed, perr := url.ParseRequestURI(uri)
-			if perr != nil || (parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https") || parsed.Host == "" {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("redirect_uri %q must be an absolute http(s) URL", uri)
-			}
-		}
 		reqData["redirect_uris"] = metadata.RedirectURIs
 	} else {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("redirect_uris is required for client registration")
 	}
 
-	// Validate the optional URI metadata fields with the same absolute
-	// http(s) rule as redirect_uris. A relative or non-http(s) value
-	// (e.g. a malformed jwks_uri on a private_key_jwt client) would be
-	// forwarded to the IdP and make the registered client unverifiable at
-	// runtime (R141).
-	for _, field := range []struct{ val, name string }{
-		{metadata.LogoURI, "logo_uri"},
-		{metadata.ClientURI, "client_uri"},
-		{metadata.PolicyURI, "policy_uri"},
-		{metadata.TOSURI, "tos_uri"},
-		{metadata.JWKSURI, "jwks_uri"},
-	} {
-		if field.val == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		parsed, perr := url.ParseRequestURI(field.val)
-		if perr != nil || (parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https") || parsed.Host == "" {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s %q must be an absolute http(s) URL", field.name, field.val)
-		}
-	}
-
 	// Optional fields - only include if set
 	if len(metadata.ResponseTypes) > 0 {
 		reqData["response_types"] = metadata.ResponseTypes
@@ -353,10 +292,8 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) buildRegistrationRequest() ([]byte, error) {
 	if metadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod != "" {
 		reqData["token_endpoint_auth_method"] = metadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod
 	} else {
-		// Default must match the plugin's runtime client-auth default
-		// (client_secret_post, settings.go Config.Validate) so an IdP that
-		// enforces the registered method does not reject the token exchange.
-		reqData["token_endpoint_auth_method"] = "client_secret_post"
+		// Default to client_secret_basic for confidential clients
+		reqData["token_endpoint_auth_method"] = "client_secret_basic"
 	}
 
 	if metadata.DefaultMaxAge > 0 {
@@ -373,13 +310,6 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) buildRegistrationRequest() ([]byte, error) {
 
 	if metadata.Scope != "" {
 		reqData["scope"] = metadata.Scope
-	} else if len(r.scopes) > 0 {
-		// Register with the union of runtime auth scopes when the operator
-		// gave no explicit registration scope. IdPs that only grant
-		// registered/advertised scopes (Keycloak offline_access, Auth0)
-		// otherwise register a client whose later token/refresh grant is
-		// rejected with invalid_scope, breaking refresh (R124).
-		reqData["scope"] = strings.Join(deduplicateScopes(r.scopes), " ")
 	}
 
 	return json.Marshal(reqData)
@@ -398,19 +328,6 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) areCredentialsValid(resp *ClientRegistrationRes
 		return false
 	}
 
-	// For a secret-based auth method the response must carry a client_secret,
-	// mirroring the fresh-registration check (RegisterClient). A stored
-	// record with a client_id but empty secret would otherwise be accepted
-	// and installed as t.clientSecret="", breaking every token exchange
-	// (R124).
-	authMethod := "client_secret_post"
-	if r.config != nil && r.config.ClientMetadata != nil && r.config.ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod != "" {
-		authMethod = r.config.ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod
-	}
-	if (authMethod == "client_secret_post" || authMethod == "client_secret_basic") && resp.ClientSecret == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-
 	// Check if secret has expired
 	if resp.ClientSecretExpiresAt > 0 {
 		expiresAt := time.Unix(resp.ClientSecretExpiresAt, 0)
@@ -453,11 +370,26 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) saveCredentialsToStore(ctx context.Context, res
 	return r.saveCredentials(resp)
 }
 
+// deleteCredentialsFromStore removes credentials from the configured storage backend
+// Falls back to legacy file-based deletion if no store is configured
+func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) deleteCredentialsFromStore(ctx context.Context) error {
+	// Use store if available
+	if r.store != nil {
+		return r.store.Delete(ctx, r.providerURL)
+	}
+	// Fallback to legacy file-based deletion
+	filePath := r.credentialsFilePath()
+	if err := os.Remove(filePath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // saveCredentials persists client credentials to a file (legacy method)
 func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) saveCredentials(resp *ClientRegistrationResponse) error {
 	filePath := r.credentialsFilePath()
 
-	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(resp, "", "  ") // #nosec G117 -- the registration response, including client_secret, is the credential this function persists
+	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(resp, "", "  ")
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal credentials: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -492,20 +424,186 @@ func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) loadCredentials() (*ClientRegistrationResponse,
 	return &resp, nil
 }
 
-// isLoopbackRegistrationEndpoint reports whether the (plaintext) registration
-// endpoint targets a loopback host, matching the hostname boundary (not a
-// string prefix) so http://localhost.evil.com is not treated as localhost.
-func isLoopbackRegistrationEndpoint(endpoint string) bool {
-	u, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
-	if err != nil || !u.IsAbs() {
-		return false
+// UpdateClientRegistration updates an existing client registration using RFC 7592
+// This requires the registration_client_uri and registration_access_token from the original registration
+func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) UpdateClientRegistration(ctx context.Context) (*ClientRegistrationResponse, error) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	cachedResp := r.registrationResponse
+	r.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	if cachedResp == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no existing registration to update")
 	}
-	host := u.Hostname()
-	if host == "localhost" {
-		return true
+
+	if cachedResp.RegistrationClientURI == "" || cachedResp.RegistrationAccessToken == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("registration management not supported: missing registration_client_uri or registration_access_token")
 	}
-	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback() {
-		return true
+
+	// Build update request
+	reqBody, err := r.buildRegistrationRequest()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to build update request: %w", err)
 	}
-	return false
+
+	// Create HTTP request
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPut, cachedResp.RegistrationClientURI, bytes.NewReader(reqBody))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create update request: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+cachedResp.RegistrationAccessToken)
+
+	// Execute request
+	resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update request failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	// Read response body
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read update response: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Handle error responses
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		var regError ClientRegistrationError
+		if jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(body, &regError); jsonErr == nil && regError.Error != "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("update failed: %s - %s", regError.Error, regError.ErrorDescription)
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
+	}
+
+	// Parse successful response
+	var regResp ClientRegistrationResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &regResp); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse update response: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Update cache
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	r.registrationResponse = &regResp
+	r.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Persist updated credentials if enabled
+	if r.config.PersistCredentials {
+		if err := r.saveCredentialsToStore(ctx, &regResp); err != nil {
+			r.logger.Errorf("Failed to persist updated credentials: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	r.logger.Infof("Successfully updated client registration for client ID: %s", regResp.ClientID)
+	return &regResp, nil
+}
+
+// ReadClientRegistration reads the current client registration using RFC 7592
+func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) ReadClientRegistration(ctx context.Context) (*ClientRegistrationResponse, error) {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	cachedResp := r.registrationResponse
+	r.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	if cachedResp == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no existing registration to read")
+	}
+
+	if cachedResp.RegistrationClientURI == "" || cachedResp.RegistrationAccessToken == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("registration management not supported: missing registration_client_uri or registration_access_token")
+	}
+
+	// Create HTTP request
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, cachedResp.RegistrationClientURI, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create read request: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+cachedResp.RegistrationAccessToken)
+
+	// Execute request
+	resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read request failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	// Read response body
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read response: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Handle error responses
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		var regError ClientRegistrationError
+		if jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(body, &regError); jsonErr == nil && regError.Error != "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("read failed: %s - %s", regError.Error, regError.ErrorDescription)
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
+	}
+
+	// Parse successful response
+	var regResp ClientRegistrationResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &regResp); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse read response: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return &regResp, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteClientRegistration deletes the client registration using RFC 7592
+func (r *DynamicClientRegistrar) DeleteClientRegistration(ctx context.Context) error {
+	r.mu.RLock()
+	cachedResp := r.registrationResponse
+	r.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	if cachedResp == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no existing registration to delete")
+	}
+
+	if cachedResp.RegistrationClientURI == "" || cachedResp.RegistrationAccessToken == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("registration management not supported: missing registration_client_uri or registration_access_token")
+	}
+
+	// Create HTTP request
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodDelete, cachedResp.RegistrationClientURI, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to create delete request: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+cachedResp.RegistrationAccessToken)
+
+	// Execute request
+	resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("delete request failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	// Handle error responses (204 No Content is success)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
+		var regError ClientRegistrationError
+		if jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(body, &regError); jsonErr == nil && regError.Error != "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("delete failed: %s - %s", regError.Error, regError.ErrorDescription)
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("delete failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
+	}
+
+	// Clear cache
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	r.registrationResponse = nil
+	r.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Remove credentials from storage if persistence is enabled
+	if r.config.PersistCredentials {
+		if err := r.deleteCredentialsFromStore(ctx); err != nil {
+			r.logger.Errorf("Failed to remove credentials from storage: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	r.logger.Info("Successfully deleted client registration")
+	return nil
 }

dynamic_client_registration_test.go

@@ -541,7 +541,6 @@ func TestCredentialsValidation(t *testing.T) {
 			name: "valid non-expiring credentials",
 			response: &ClientRegistrationResponse{
 				ClientID:              "test-client-id",
-				ClientSecret:          "test-client-secret",
 				ClientSecretExpiresAt: 0, // Never expires
 			},
 			expected: true,
@@ -550,7 +549,6 @@ func TestCredentialsValidation(t *testing.T) {
 			name: "valid future-expiring credentials",
 			response: &ClientRegistrationResponse{
 				ClientID:              "test-client-id",
-				ClientSecret:          "test-client-secret",
 				ClientSecretExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
 			},
 			expected: true,
@@ -600,7 +598,7 @@ func TestBuildRegistrationRequest(t *testing.T) {
 				"redirect_uris":              []interface{}{"https://example.com/callback"},
 				"response_types":             []interface{}{"code"},
 				"grant_types":                []interface{}{"authorization_code", "refresh_token"},
-				"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_post",
+				"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
 			},
 			expectError: false,
 		},
@@ -737,6 +735,258 @@ func TestDCRConfigDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestUpdateClientRegistration tests the RFC 7592 client update functionality
+func TestUpdateClientRegistration(t *testing.T) {
+	updateCalled := false
+
+	server := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
+			updateCalled = true
+
+			// Verify authorization header
+			if r.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
+				t.Error("Missing Authorization header for update")
+			}
+
+			resp := ClientRegistrationResponse{
+				ClientID:                "updated-client-id",
+				ClientSecret:            "updated-client-secret",
+				RegistrationAccessToken: "new-access-token",
+				RegistrationClientURI:   r.URL.String(),
+			}
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
+		}
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	dcrConfig := &DynamicClientRegistrationConfig{
+		Enabled: true,
+		ClientMetadata: &ClientRegistrationMetadata{
+			RedirectURIs: []string{"https://example.com/callback"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	registrar := NewDynamicClientRegistrar(
+		server.Client(),
+		NewLogger("DEBUG"),
+		dcrConfig,
+		server.URL,
+	)
+
+	// Set up cached response with management credentials
+	registrar.mu.Lock()
+	registrar.registrationResponse = &ClientRegistrationResponse{
+		ClientID:                "original-client-id",
+		ClientSecret:            "original-client-secret",
+		RegistrationAccessToken: "access-token",
+		RegistrationClientURI:   server.URL + "/register/client123",
+	}
+	registrar.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Perform update
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	resp, err := registrar.UpdateClientRegistration(ctx)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Update failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if !updateCalled {
+		t.Error("Update endpoint was not called")
+	}
+
+	if resp.ClientID != "updated-client-id" {
+		t.Errorf("Updated ClientID mismatch: got %s", resp.ClientID)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDeleteClientRegistration tests the RFC 7592 client deletion functionality
+func TestDeleteClientRegistration(t *testing.T) {
+	deleteCalled := false
+
+	server := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method == http.MethodDelete {
+			deleteCalled = true
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+		}
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	tempDir := t.TempDir()
+	credentialsFile := filepath.Join(tempDir, "credentials.json")
+
+	// Create a credentials file to test deletion
+	os.WriteFile(credentialsFile, []byte(`{"client_id":"test"}`), 0600)
+
+	dcrConfig := &DynamicClientRegistrationConfig{
+		Enabled:            true,
+		PersistCredentials: true,
+		CredentialsFile:    credentialsFile,
+	}
+
+	registrar := NewDynamicClientRegistrar(
+		server.Client(),
+		NewLogger("DEBUG"),
+		dcrConfig,
+		server.URL,
+	)
+
+	// Set up cached response with management credentials
+	registrar.mu.Lock()
+	registrar.registrationResponse = &ClientRegistrationResponse{
+		ClientID:                "test-client-id",
+		RegistrationAccessToken: "access-token",
+		RegistrationClientURI:   server.URL + "/register/client123",
+	}
+	registrar.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Perform delete
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	err := registrar.DeleteClientRegistration(ctx)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Delete failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if !deleteCalled {
+		t.Error("Delete endpoint was not called")
+	}
+
+	// Verify cache is cleared
+	if registrar.GetCachedResponse() != nil {
+		t.Error("Cached response should be cleared after deletion")
+	}
+
+	// Verify credentials file is deleted
+	if _, err := os.Stat(credentialsFile); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Error("Credentials file should be deleted")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestReadClientRegistration tests the RFC 7592 client read functionality
+func TestReadClientRegistration(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method == http.MethodGet {
+			resp := ClientRegistrationResponse{
+				ClientID:        "read-client-id",
+				ClientSecret:    "read-client-secret",
+				RedirectURIs:    []string{"https://example.com/callback"},
+				ResponseTypes:   []string{"code"},
+				GrantTypes:      []string{"authorization_code"},
+				ApplicationType: "web",
+			}
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
+		}
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	dcrConfig := &DynamicClientRegistrationConfig{Enabled: true}
+
+	registrar := NewDynamicClientRegistrar(
+		server.Client(),
+		NewLogger("DEBUG"),
+		dcrConfig,
+		server.URL,
+	)
+
+	// Set up cached response with management credentials
+	registrar.mu.Lock()
+	registrar.registrationResponse = &ClientRegistrationResponse{
+		ClientID:                "original-client-id",
+		RegistrationAccessToken: "access-token",
+		RegistrationClientURI:   server.URL + "/register/client123",
+	}
+	registrar.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Read registration
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	resp, err := registrar.ReadClientRegistration(ctx)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Read failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if resp.ClientID != "read-client-id" {
+		t.Errorf("Read ClientID mismatch: got %s", resp.ClientID)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOperationsWithoutCachedResponse tests error handling when no cached response exists
+func TestOperationsWithoutCachedResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	dcrConfig := &DynamicClientRegistrationConfig{Enabled: true}
+
+	registrar := NewDynamicClientRegistrar(
+		&http.Client{},
+		NewLogger("DEBUG"),
+		dcrConfig,
+		"https://example.com",
+	)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Test Update without cached response
+	_, err := registrar.UpdateClientRegistration(ctx)
+	if err == nil || !stringContains(err.Error(), "no existing registration") {
+		t.Errorf("Update should fail without cached response: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Test Read without cached response
+	_, err = registrar.ReadClientRegistration(ctx)
+	if err == nil || !stringContains(err.Error(), "no existing registration") {
+		t.Errorf("Read should fail without cached response: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Test Delete without cached response
+	err = registrar.DeleteClientRegistration(ctx)
+	if err == nil || !stringContains(err.Error(), "no existing registration") {
+		t.Errorf("Delete should fail without cached response: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOperationsWithoutManagementCredentials tests error handling without management URIs
+func TestOperationsWithoutManagementCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	dcrConfig := &DynamicClientRegistrationConfig{Enabled: true}
+
+	registrar := NewDynamicClientRegistrar(
+		&http.Client{},
+		NewLogger("DEBUG"),
+		dcrConfig,
+		"https://example.com",
+	)
+
+	// Set up cached response WITHOUT management credentials
+	registrar.mu.Lock()
+	registrar.registrationResponse = &ClientRegistrationResponse{
+		ClientID: "test-client-id",
+		// Missing RegistrationAccessToken and RegistrationClientURI
+	}
+	registrar.mu.Unlock()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Test Update without management credentials
+	_, err := registrar.UpdateClientRegistration(ctx)
+	if err == nil || !stringContains(err.Error(), "registration management not supported") {
+		t.Errorf("Update should fail without management credentials: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Test Read without management credentials
+	_, err = registrar.ReadClientRegistration(ctx)
+	if err == nil || !stringContains(err.Error(), "registration management not supported") {
+		t.Errorf("Read should fail without management credentials: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Test Delete without management credentials
+	err = registrar.DeleteClientRegistration(ctx)
+	if err == nil || !stringContains(err.Error(), "registration management not supported") {
+		t.Errorf("Delete should fail without management credentials: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // stringContains is a helper function to check if a string contains a substring
 func stringContains(s, substr string) bool {
 	return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(s) > 0 && stringContainsHelper(s, substr))

enhanced_mocks_test.go

@@ -67,10 +67,6 @@ func (m *EnhancedMockJWKCache) GetPublicKey(ctx context.Context, jwksURL, kid st
 	return nil, fmt.Errorf("no matching public key found for kid: %s", kid)
 }
 
-func (m *EnhancedMockJWKCache) getPublicKeyFresh(ctx context.Context, jwksURL, kid string, httpClient *http.Client) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return m.GetPublicKey(ctx, jwksURL, kid, httpClient)
-}
-
 func (m *EnhancedMockJWKCache) Cleanup() {
 	atomic.AddInt32(&m.CleanupCalls, 1)
 	m.mu.Lock()

error_recovery.go

@@ -191,23 +191,12 @@ type CircuitBreaker struct {
 	maxFailures int
 	// timeout is how long to wait before allowing requests in half-open state
 	timeout time.Duration
-	// resetTimeout is how long to stay in half-open (after the open timeout)
-	// before a successful response fully closes the circuit
+	// resetTimeout is how long to wait before transitioning from open to half-open
 	resetTimeout time.Duration
 	// state tracks the current circuit breaker state
 	state CircuitBreakerState
 	// failures counts consecutive failures
 	failures int64
-	// halfOpenSince is when the circuit entered half-open; used to enforce
-	// resetTimeout before a success can fully close it
-	halfOpenSince time.Time
-	// openedAt is when the circuit last transitioned into the Open state
-	// (Closed->Open or HalfOpen->Open, set in recordFailure). allowRequest
-	// and IsAvailable gate the Open->HalfOpen transition on openedAt instead
-	// of the promoted lastFailureTime, so a request rejected while already
-	// open cannot re-arm the open timer and keep the circuit open forever
-	// under steady traffic (FIX-01).
-	openedAt time.Time
 }
 
 // CircuitBreakerConfig holds configuration parameters for circuit breakers.
@@ -250,32 +239,12 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) ExecuteWithContext(ctx context.Context, fn func() erro
 	cb.RecordRequest()
 
 	if !cb.allowRequest() {
-		// A request rejected while the circuit is open is an admission
-		// outcome, not a never-started request: count it in total_failures
-		// so GetBaseMetrics' success_rate (successes/total_requests)
-		// reflects actual admission (R180). This intentionally bypasses the
-		// promoted BaseRecoveryMechanism.RecordFailure(), which also sets
-		// lastFailureTime -- allowRequest's Open->HalfOpen timer used to
-		// read that same field, so every rejection re-armed it and the
-		// circuit never left Open under steady traffic (FIX-01). The open
-		// timer now runs off cb.openedAt instead, set only on a genuine
-		// Closed->Open or HalfOpen->Open transition in recordFailure.
-		atomic.AddInt64(&cb.totalFailures, 1)
 		return fmt.Errorf("circuit breaker is open")
 	}
 
 	err := fn()
 	if err != nil {
-		// A terminal client error (HTTPError 4xx other than 429) reflects a
-		// per-user problem such as invalid_grant, not a downstream-service
-		// failure. It must not trip the state machine: in particular it
-		// must not reopen a half-open circuit, or the 15s/30s half-open
-		// hold (resetTimeout) extends an outage on any single per-user
-		// error (FIX-09). It is still recorded in the base metrics below,
-		// since it is a real error returned to the caller.
-		if !isTerminalClientError(err) {
-			cb.recordFailure()
-		}
+		cb.recordFailure()
 		cb.RecordFailure()
 		return err
 	}
@@ -285,37 +254,6 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) ExecuteWithContext(ctx context.Context, fn func() erro
 	return nil
 }
 
-// isTerminalClientError reports whether err is an HTTPError whose status
-// code is a client error (4xx) other than 429 Too Many Requests or 408
-// Request Timeout. Such errors indicate the request itself was rejected by
-// the far end (for example a replayed authorization code), not that the far
-// end is unhealthy, so the circuit breaker's failure-counting state machine
-// ignores them (FIX-09). 429 and 408 are excluded because they are the
-// service itself signaling it is overloaded or slow, a genuine health
-// signal, not a per-request rejection — the same classification FIX-13
-// applies in token_validation_rs.go and bearer_auth.go, and that
-// internal/recovery/base.go and metrics.go apply via their retryable-status
-// checks.
-//
-// This uses a plain type assertion, not errors.As. Under yaegi v0.16.1 (the
-// interpreter Traefik uses to load this plugin, pinned in Makefile:9),
-// errors.As(err, &target) panics with "errors: *target must be interface
-// or implement error" whenever target's pointed-to type (*HTTPError here)
-// is itself interpreted, regardless of err's own concrete type. This
-// function runs on every fn() error in ExecuteWithContext, on the
-// default-on token-exchange/refresh path, so that panic reaches production
-// (FIX-09). The production error also reaches the breaker unwrapped
-// (helpers.go returns *HTTPError directly), so a type assertion is
-// sufficient and needs no Unwrap chain walk.
-func isTerminalClientError(err error) bool {
-	httpErr, ok := err.(*HTTPError)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return httpErr.StatusCode >= 400 && httpErr.StatusCode < 500 &&
-		httpErr.StatusCode != 429 && httpErr.StatusCode != 408
-}
-
 // Execute executes a function through the circuit breaker without context.
 // This is provided for backward compatibility with existing code.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Execute(fn func() error) error {
@@ -335,9 +273,8 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) allowRequest() bool {
 		return true
 
 	case CircuitBreakerOpen:
-		if now.Sub(cb.openedAt) > cb.timeout {
+		if now.Sub(cb.lastFailureTime) > cb.timeout {
 			cb.state = CircuitBreakerHalfOpen
-			cb.halfOpenSince = now
 			cb.logger.Infof("Circuit breaker transitioning to half-open state")
 			return true
 		}
@@ -363,13 +300,11 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) recordFailure() {
 	case CircuitBreakerClosed:
 		if cb.failures >= int64(cb.maxFailures) {
 			cb.state = CircuitBreakerOpen
-			cb.openedAt = time.Now()
 			cb.LogError("Circuit breaker opened after %d failures", cb.failures)
 		}
 
 	case CircuitBreakerHalfOpen:
 		cb.state = CircuitBreakerOpen
-		cb.openedAt = time.Now()
 		cb.LogError("Circuit breaker returned to open state after failure in half-open")
 	}
 }
@@ -382,15 +317,6 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) recordSuccess() {
 
 	switch cb.state {
 	case CircuitBreakerHalfOpen:
-		// Honor resetTimeout: do not fully close until the circuit has been
-		// in half-open for at least resetTimeout. This provides the
-		// documented open -> half-open -> (reset cooldown) -> closed
-		// hysteresis instead of closing on the very first half-open
-		// success, which would let a stray success immediately reopen
-		// (bounce). While in half-open requests are still allowed as probes.
-		if time.Since(cb.halfOpenSince) < cb.resetTimeout {
-			return
-		}
 		cb.failures = 0
 		cb.state = CircuitBreakerClosed
 		cb.LogInfo("Circuit breaker closed after successful request in half-open state")
@@ -422,24 +348,7 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Reset() {
 // IsAvailable returns whether the circuit breaker is currently allowing requests.
 // This provides a quick way to check if the service is available.
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) IsAvailable() bool {
-	cb.mutex.Lock()
-	defer cb.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	switch cb.state {
-	case CircuitBreakerClosed:
-		return true
-	case CircuitBreakerHalfOpen:
-		return true
-	case CircuitBreakerOpen:
-		// Read-only availability probe: report that a request would be
-		// admitted only after the open timeout has elapsed, but do NOT
-		// transition to half-open — IsAvailable must not take a permit or
-		// mutate circuit state. Real traffic admission is gated by
-		// allowRequest (triggerRequest) which performs the transition.
-		return time.Since(cb.openedAt) > cb.timeout
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
+	return cb.allowRequest()
 }
 
 // GetMetrics returns comprehensive metrics about the circuit breaker.
@@ -598,157 +507,12 @@ func (re *RetryExecutor) ExecuteWithContext(ctx context.Context, fn func() error
 }
 
 // Execute runs the given function with retry logic (for backward compatibility)
-// Execute runs a function with retry logic (backward compatibility).
+// Execute executes a function with retry logic (backward compatibility).
 // This method provides the same functionality as ExecuteWithContext.
 func (re *RetryExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, fn func() error) error {
 	return re.ExecuteWithContext(ctx, fn)
 }
 
-// singleUseRetryableErrors are error fragments that prove the request was NEVER
-// sent to the server (dial/connect failures). Retrying those is safe.
-var singleUseRetryableErrors = []string{
-	"connection refused",
-	"network unreachable",
-	"no route to host",
-	"temporary failure",
-}
-
-// isNeverSentError reports whether err proves a single-use request was never
-// sent to the server, so retrying it cannot re-present already-consumed
-// input (an authorization code or a rotated refresh token).
-//
-// A *HTTPError means a response WAS received: the request definitely
-// reached the endpoint, regardless of what its body says. Before this
-// check, ExecuteSingleUseWithContext substring-matched singleUseRetryableErrors
-// against the raw error text, and helpers.go's token-endpoint HTTPError
-// carries up to 10 KiB of the response body in its Message -- an IdP 500
-// whose body happened to mention "connection refused" was retried, re-
-// sending a consumed code or a rotated refresh token (FIX-14).
-//
-// A *net.OpError is NOT proof by itself: Go's net package uses that same
-// type for a "dial" failure before any request reaches the wire, but also
-// for a "read" or "write" failure AFTER the connection is already
-// established, when the request may already have reached the IdP. Only Op
-// "dial" (a failed connect) or "proxyconnect" (net/http's failed CONNECT to
-// an HTTP proxy) prove the request never went out, so the fragment match is
-// scoped to those two.
-func isNeverSentError(err error) bool {
-	// Plain type assertion, not errors.As: under yaegi v0.16.1 (the
-	// interpreter Traefik uses to load this plugin, pinned in Makefile:9),
-	// errors.As(err, &target) panics with "errors: *target must be
-	// interface or implement error" whenever target's pointed-to type
-	// (*HTTPError here) is itself interpreted, regardless of err's own
-	// concrete type. ExecuteSingleUseWithContext calls this on every fn()
-	// error, on the default-on authorization-code-exchange/refresh path,
-	// so that panic reaches production (FIX-14). The production error
-	// reaches here unwrapped (helpers.go returns *HTTPError directly), so
-	// a type assertion is sufficient and needs no Unwrap chain walk.
-	if _, ok := err.(*HTTPError); ok {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// errors.As against the compiled *net.OpError type is yaegi-safe: the
-	// panic above is specific to an interpreted target type, and
-	// *net.OpError is a native stdlib type.
-	var opErr *net.OpError
-	if errors.As(err, &opErr) && (opErr.Op == "dial" || opErr.Op == "proxyconnect") {
-		return isSubstringMatch(opErr.Error(), singleUseRetryableErrors)
-	}
-
-	return false
-}
-
-// ExecuteSingleUseWithContext retries only on errors that prove the request was
-// never sent (connect/dial failures). It intentionally does NOT retry on
-// "timeout": for a single-use operation such as the authorization-code
-// exchange, a timeout may mean the provider already consumed the one-time code,
-// so re-sending it would surface invalid_grant permanently even though the
-// first attempt succeeded.
-func (re *RetryExecutor) ExecuteSingleUseWithContext(ctx context.Context, fn func() error) error {
-	re.RecordRequest()
-	var lastErr error
-
-	for attempt := 1; attempt <= re.config.MaxAttempts; attempt++ {
-		err := fn()
-		if err == nil {
-			if attempt > 1 {
-				re.LogInfo("Operation succeeded after %d attempts", attempt)
-			}
-			re.RecordSuccess()
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		lastErr = err
-
-		if !isNeverSentError(err) {
-			re.RecordFailure()
-			return err
-		}
-
-		if attempt == re.config.MaxAttempts {
-			re.RecordFailure()
-			break
-		}
-
-		delay := re.calculateDelay(attempt)
-		if attempt == 1 || attempt%3 == 0 {
-			re.LogDebug("Retrying single-use operation after %v (attempt %d/%d): %v",
-				delay, attempt, re.config.MaxAttempts, err)
-		}
-
-		select {
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			re.RecordFailure()
-			return ctx.Err()
-		case <-time.After(delay):
-		}
-	}
-
-	finalErr := fmt.Errorf("operation failed after %d attempts: %w", re.config.MaxAttempts, lastErr)
-	return finalErr
-}
-
-// isSubstringMatch reports whether s contains any of the given fragments.
-func isSubstringMatch(s string, fragments []string) bool {
-	lower := strings.ToLower(s)
-	for _, frag := range fragments {
-		if strings.Contains(lower, frag) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// asHTTPError reports whether err is, or (via a chain of Unwrap() error
-// methods) wraps, an *HTTPError. It exists because errors.As cannot be used
-// here: under yaegi v0.16.1 (the interpreter Traefik uses to load this
-// plugin, pinned in Makefile:9), errors.As(err, &target) panics with
-// "errors: *target must be interface or implement error" whenever target's
-// pointed-to type is itself interpreted, and *HTTPError is declared in this
-// plugin so it is always interpreted at runtime — regardless of err's own
-// concrete type (see isTerminalClientError above for the same hazard on a
-// path that does not need the Unwrap walk).
-//
-// This manually reimplements errors.As's single-chain Unwrap() walk using
-// only type assertions and errors.Unwrap, both yaegi-safe, so native
-// classification is byte-for-byte identical to errors.As (see
-// TestIsRetryableError_WrappedTransient). The one place native and yaegi
-// genuinely diverge: an interpreted *HTTPError wrapped with
-// fmt.Errorf("...%w", e) is found by this walk in native Go but NOT under
-// yaegi (an interpreter quirk with wrapped interpreted-type targets,
-// verified this session) — so every producer feeding isRetryableError must
-// keep returning an *HTTPError unwrapped (exchangeTokens already does; see
-// helpers.go).
-func asHTTPError(err error) (*HTTPError, bool) {
-	for err != nil {
-		if httpErr, ok := err.(*HTTPError); ok {
-			return httpErr, true
-		}
-		err = errors.Unwrap(err)
-	}
-	return nil, false
-}
-
 // isRetryableError checks if an error should trigger a retry
 // isRetryableError determines if an error should trigger a retry attempt.
 // Checks error message against configured retryable error patterns.
@@ -759,17 +523,6 @@ func (re *RetryExecutor) isRetryableError(err error) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	// A terminal HTTP error (a real status that is neither 5xx nor 429)
-	// must be classified by its status BEFORE any message-substring scan.
-	// Otherwise a 4xx whose provider message merely contains a
-	// retryable-looking word — e.g. "certificate"/"tls" (isCertificateError),
-	// "EOF" (isEOFError), or a generic "timeout" — would be reclassified
-	// retryable and retried to MaxAttempts on a permanent error, repeating
-	// the failing request (R123, R157).
-	if statusHTTP, ok := asHTTPError(err); ok && statusHTTP.StatusCode != 0 && statusHTTP.StatusCode < 500 && statusHTTP.StatusCode != 429 {
-		return false
-	}
-
 	// Check for Traefik default certificate error (startup race condition)
 	// See: https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/90
 	if isTraefikDefaultCertError(err) {
@@ -786,20 +539,19 @@ func (re *RetryExecutor) isRetryableError(err error) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	errStr := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
+	errStr := err.Error()
 
 	for _, retryableErr := range re.config.RetryableErrors {
-		if contains(errStr, strings.ToLower(retryableErr)) {
+		if contains(errStr, retryableErr) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
 
-	var netErr net.Error
-	if errors.As(err, &netErr) {
+	if netErr, ok := err.(net.Error); ok {
 		if netErr.Timeout() {
 			return true
 		}
-		errStr := strings.ToLower(netErr.Error())
+		errStr := netErr.Error()
 		temporaryPatterns := []string{
 			"connection refused",
 			"connection reset",
@@ -816,19 +568,8 @@ func (re *RetryExecutor) isRetryableError(err error) bool {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// asHTTPError (not errors.As) so retry classification survives error
-	// wrapping: a transient or 5xx/429 error returned as fmt.Errorf("...:
-	// %w", err) from an upstream layer must still be retried. Direct type
-	// assertions on the top-level error silently misclassified wrapped
-	// transient errors as permanent, giving up before any retry (R111).
-	// errors.As itself cannot be used under yaegi -- see asHTTPError's doc
-	// comment.
-	if httpErr, ok := asHTTPError(err); ok {
-		status := httpErr.StatusCode
-		// A 0 StatusCode means the producer used HTTPError purely as a
-		// message carrier (no real HTTP status). Treat it as unknown
-		// (non-retryable) rather than spuriously matching 5xx (R118).
-		return status != 0 && (status >= 500 || status == 429)
+	if httpErr, ok := err.(*HTTPError); ok {
+		return httpErr.StatusCode >= 500 || httpErr.StatusCode == 429
 	}
 
 	return false
@@ -1021,10 +762,6 @@ type GracefulDegradation struct {
 	config           GracefulDegradationConfig
 	mutex            sync.RWMutex
 	shutdownOnce     sync.Once
-	// beforeSharedTaskStop is a test seam, nil in production. Close calls it
-	// after deciding this is the last live instance and before stopping the
-	// shared health-check task.
-	beforeSharedTaskStop func()
 }
 
 // GracefulDegradationConfig holds configuration for graceful degradation behavior.
@@ -1051,53 +788,6 @@ func DefaultGracefulDegradationConfig() GracefulDegradationConfig {
 // NewGracefulDegradation creates a new graceful degradation manager
 // NewGracefulDegradation creates a new graceful degradation mechanism.
 // Initializes fallback and health check maps and starts background health monitoring.
-// gdInstances tracks live GracefulDegradation instances so the single shared
-// health-check task can run every instance's health checks (not just the first)
-// and so the task is only stopped when the last instance closes.
-var gdInstances = struct {
-	sync.RWMutex
-	set map[*GracefulDegradation]struct{}
-}{set: make(map[*GracefulDegradation]struct{})}
-
-// globalHealthCheckMu serializes the global pass. globalPerformHealthChecks
-// runs from more than one goroutine — the shared singleton task's run loop
-// AND the once-guarded StartBackgroundTask path both drive it — so without
-// this, any health check registered via the public RegisterHealthCheck
-// API would be invoked concurrently (a latent production race, and the
-// source of an intermittent full-suite race in tests). Serializing the
-// whole pass keeps registered health checks single-threaded (R189).
-var globalHealthCheckMu sync.Mutex
-
-// gdLifecycleMu serializes GracefulDegradation registration with the
-// last-instance check and shared-task stop in Close. Without it, an instance
-// created after Close decided it was the last one, but before the stop, adopted
-// the still-running task, and the stop then killed the task that the new live
-// instance relies on. With it, a new instance either counts toward the
-// last-instance check or registers after the stop, and its routine replaces
-// the stopped task. The health-check pass never takes this lock, so Close can
-// hold it while BackgroundTask.Stop waits for an in-progress pass.
-var gdLifecycleMu sync.Mutex
-
-// globalPerformHealthChecks runs the health check pass for every live
-// GracefulDegradation instance. The shared singleton task calls this, so a
-// health check registered on ANY instance is exercised, and closing one
-// instance does not stall recovery for the others.
-func globalPerformHealthChecks() {
-	globalHealthCheckMu.Lock()
-	defer globalHealthCheckMu.Unlock()
-
-	gdInstances.RLock()
-	instances := make([]*GracefulDegradation, 0, len(gdInstances.set))
-	for gd := range gdInstances.set {
-		instances = append(instances, gd)
-	}
-	gdInstances.RUnlock()
-
-	for _, gd := range instances {
-		gd.performHealthChecks()
-	}
-}
-
 func NewGracefulDegradation(config GracefulDegradationConfig, logger *Logger) *GracefulDegradation {
 	gd := &GracefulDegradation{
 		BaseRecoveryMechanism: NewBaseRecoveryMechanism("graceful-degradation", logger),
@@ -1108,22 +798,6 @@ func NewGracefulDegradation(config GracefulDegradationConfig, logger *Logger) *G
 	}
 
 	gd.stopChan = make(chan struct{})
-
-	// Register synchronously, before the health-check goroutine starts
-	// (FIX-18). Registration used to happen only inside startHealthCheckRoutine,
-	// which runs in its own goroutine, so a Close() called immediately after
-	// NewGracefulDegradation returned could race ahead of it: Close's
-	// gdInstances.delete would find nothing to remove, and the goroutine's
-	// later add would then register an already-closed gd permanently.
-	// startHealthCheckRoutine no longer touches gdInstances at all — this is
-	// now the ONLY place a GracefulDegradation is added to the set, so there
-	// is no second, racing registration left to worry about.
-	gdLifecycleMu.Lock()
-	gdInstances.Lock()
-	gdInstances.set[gd] = struct{}{}
-	gdInstances.Unlock()
-	gdLifecycleMu.Unlock()
-
 	go gd.startHealthCheckRoutine()
 
 	return gd
@@ -1185,9 +859,8 @@ func (gd *GracefulDegradation) ExecuteWithFallback(serviceName string, primary f
 
 // isServiceDegraded checks if a service is currently degraded
 func (gd *GracefulDegradation) isServiceDegraded(serviceName string) bool {
-	// Uses a write lock because the recovery-timeout branch deletes from the map.
-	gd.mutex.Lock()
-	defer gd.mutex.Unlock()
+	gd.mutex.RLock()
+	defer gd.mutex.RUnlock()
 
 	degradedTime, exists := gd.degradedServices[serviceName]
 	if !exists {
@@ -1228,54 +901,25 @@ func (gd *GracefulDegradation) executeFallback(serviceName string) (interface{},
 	return fallback()
 }
 
-// startHealthCheckRoutine starts the background health check routine.
-//
-// FIX-18: this runs in its own goroutine, started by NewGracefulDegradation
-// right after it registers gd in gdInstances. A Close() called immediately
-// after NewGracefulDegradation returns can race ahead of this goroutine
-// getting scheduled at all. Take gd.mutex up front and re-check gd.stopChan
-// before doing anything else: if Close() already closed it, this goroutine
-// must not create (or adopt) the shared health-check task for an
-// already-closed instance — that would leak the process-global task
-// forever, since nothing would ever be left registered to stop it.
+// startHealthCheckRoutine starts the background health check routine
 func (gd *GracefulDegradation) startHealthCheckRoutine() {
-	gd.mutex.Lock()
-
-	select {
-	case <-gd.stopChan:
-		// Close() already ran before this goroutine got scheduled. Do not
-		// register or start the shared task on behalf of a closed instance.
-		gd.mutex.Unlock()
-		return
-	default:
-	}
-
-	// Use the singleton task registry so multiple GracefulDegradation
-	// instances share one health-check goroutine. The task function is the
-	// global pass over every live instance, not this instance's own health
-	// checks — otherwise only the first instance's checks would run.
-	//
-	// gd.mutex stays held through CreateSingletonTask and the healthCheckTask
-	// assignment below: CreateSingletonTask only touches the global task
-	// registry (a different lock), never gd.mutex, so this cannot deadlock,
-	// and it keeps the stopChan check and the assignment atomic with respect
-	// to a concurrent Close().
+	// Use singleton task registry to prevent multiple instances
 	registry := GetGlobalTaskRegistry()
 
 	task, err := registry.CreateSingletonTask(
 		"graceful-degradation-health-check",
 		gd.config.HealthCheckInterval,
-		globalPerformHealthChecks,
+		gd.performHealthChecks,
 		gd.BaseRecoveryMechanism.logger,
 		nil, // No specific wait group
 	)
 
 	if err != nil {
-		gd.mutex.Unlock()
 		gd.BaseRecoveryMechanism.logger.Errorf("Failed to create health check task: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
 
+	gd.mutex.Lock()
 	gd.healthCheckTask = task
 	gd.mutex.Unlock()
 
@@ -1327,58 +971,25 @@ func (gd *GracefulDegradation) Reset() {
 	gd.LogInfo("Graceful degradation state has been reset")
 }
 
-// Close shuts down the graceful degradation system and cleans up resources.
+// Close shuts down the graceful degradation system and cleans up resources
 func (gd *GracefulDegradation) Close() {
 	gd.shutdownOnce.Do(func() {
-		// Signal shutdown under gd.mutex. startHealthCheckRoutine checks
-		// stopChan and creates or adopts the shared task under the same
-		// lock, so an in-flight routine finishes before this instance
-		// unregisters below. Without the lock, a routine that passed its
-		// check could reach the task registry after the last Close stopped
-		// the task, and RegisterBackgroundTask would start a fresh task
-		// that no live instance can stop. Release the lock before the stop:
-		// BackgroundTask.Stop waits for a health-check pass that takes gd.mutex.
-		gd.mutex.Lock()
+		// Signal shutdown
 		select {
 		case <-gd.stopChan:
 			// Already closed
 		default:
 			close(gd.stopChan)
 		}
+
+		// Stop health check task
+		gd.mutex.Lock()
+		task := gd.healthCheckTask
 		gd.mutex.Unlock()
 
-		// Stop the shared health-check task only when this was the last live
-		// instance. The task is process-global and shared by every
-		// GracefulDegradation instance; stopping it on any one instance's
-		// close would kill health checks / recovery for all surviving
-		// instances (mirror of the singleton-token-cleanup lastInstance gate).
-		// Hold gdLifecycleMu across the last-instance check and the stop, so a
-		// concurrent NewGracefulDegradation cannot register in between and
-		// adopt a task that is about to stop.
-		gdLifecycleMu.Lock()
-		defer gdLifecycleMu.Unlock()
-
-		gdInstances.Lock()
-		delete(gdInstances.set, gd)
-		lastInstance := len(gdInstances.set) == 0
-		gdInstances.Unlock()
-
-		if lastInstance {
-			if gd.beforeSharedTaskStop != nil {
-				gd.beforeSharedTaskStop()
-			}
-			// Stop by name through the resource manager rather than reading
-			// this instance's own gd.healthCheckTask field: with two or more
-			// GracefulDegradation instances, the shared task can already be
-			// running — created by a SIBLING instance's startHealthCheckRoutine
-			// goroutine — while THIS instance's own goroutine has not yet run
-			// and populated its local healthCheckTask field. Reading that
-			// still-nil local field here would skip the stop and leak the
-			// task forever even though this genuinely is the last instance.
-			// StopBackgroundTask looks up the registry's current entry
-			// directly, so it is correct regardless of which instance's
-			// goroutine happened to create the task (FIX-18).
-			_ = GetResourceManager().StopBackgroundTask("graceful-degradation-health-check")
+		if task != nil {
+			task.Stop()
+			// Don't set to nil to avoid race conditions
 		}
 
 		gd.logger.Debug("GracefulDegradation shut down successfully")
@@ -1438,21 +1049,6 @@ func NewErrorRecoveryManager(logger *Logger) *ErrorRecoveryManager {
 	}
 }
 
-// Close shuts down the resources owned by this ErrorRecoveryManager,
-// currently its GracefulDegradation instance (which unregisters from
-// gdInstances and, if this was the last live instance, stops the shared
-// health-check task). Safe to call multiple times; safe on a nil receiver.
-// FIX-18: every caller that constructs an ErrorRecoveryManager must call
-// Close, or its GracefulDegradation leaks in gdInstances forever.
-func (erm *ErrorRecoveryManager) Close() {
-	if erm == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if erm.gracefulDegradation != nil {
-		erm.gracefulDegradation.Close()
-	}
-}
-
 // GetCircuitBreaker gets or creates a circuit breaker for a service
 // GetCircuitBreaker returns the circuit breaker for a specific service.
 // Creates a new circuit breaker if one doesn't exist for the service.
@@ -1475,14 +1071,8 @@ func (erm *ErrorRecoveryManager) GetCircuitBreaker(serviceName string) *CircuitB
 func (erm *ErrorRecoveryManager) ExecuteWithRecovery(ctx context.Context, serviceName string, fn func() error) error {
 	cb := erm.GetCircuitBreaker(serviceName)
 
-	// Retry INNER, circuit OUTER (matching TokenResilienceManager and the
-	// documented R106 compositing rule). Wrapping cb around the whole retry
-	// run means one logical call counts as a single circuit failure even
-	// when it was retried internally; the previous nesting (cb inside the
-	// retry loop) recorded each retry attempt as a separate failure and
-	// could open the circuit after only one flaky-but-retryable call (R144).
-	return cb.ExecuteWithContext(ctx, func() error {
-		return erm.retryExecutor.Execute(ctx, fn)
+	return erm.retryExecutor.Execute(ctx, func() error {
+		return cb.Execute(fn)
 	})
 }
 

error_recovery_408_transient_test.go

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestIsTerminalClientError408IsTransient pins that HTTP 408 Request Timeout
-// is treated as a transient, service-health signal by isTerminalClientError,
-// not as a terminal per-request client error. A token endpoint (or a proxy
-// in front of it) returns 408 when the upstream is slow, which is the same
-// reasoning FIX-13 already applies in token_validation_rs.go's classifier
-// and bearer_auth.go, and that internal/recovery/base.go and metrics.go
-// apply via their RetryableStatusCodes/isRetryable checks. isTerminalClientError
-// must classify 408 the same way, or a burst of token-endpoint 408s never
-// opens the refresh circuit breaker.
-//
-// Fail-on-old: isTerminalClientError excluded only 429, so it reported 408
-// as terminal.
-func TestIsTerminalClientError408IsTransient(t *testing.T) {
-	err := &HTTPError{StatusCode: 408, Message: "request timeout"}
-	if isTerminalClientError(err) {
-		t.Fatal("408 Request Timeout must be treated as transient (like 429), not a terminal client error")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenRequestTimeoutReopens pins the same contract at
-// the circuit-breaker level: a 408 probe result must still reopen a
-// half-open breaker, exactly like the existing 429 case
-// (TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenRateLimitReopens in error_recovery_fix09_test.go).
-//
-// Fail-on-old: with 408 misclassified as terminal, recordFailure's HalfOpen
-// exemption for terminal client errors (FIX-09) swallowed it and the breaker
-// stayed HalfOpen instead of reopening.
-func TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenRequestTimeoutReopens(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := newFix09HalfOpenBreaker(t)
-
-	err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: 408, Message: "request timeout"}
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the probe's own error to be returned to the caller")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("a 408 must still reopen a half-open circuit like 429, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-}

error_recovery_fix01_test.go

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerOpenRejectionsDoNotExtendOpenWindow is a regression test
-// for FIX-01.
-//
-// Before the fix, ExecuteWithContext called the promoted
-// BaseRecoveryMechanism.RecordFailure() on every request rejected while the
-// circuit is open. RecordFailure sets lastFailureTime, the same field
-// allowRequest reads as the Open -> HalfOpen timer. Every rejection then
-// re-armed the timer, so under steady traffic shorter than Timeout the
-// breaker never left Open (see error_recovery.go:253,288 pre-fix).
-//
-// Fail-on-old: with a request every 10ms and Timeout 50ms, no request is
-// ever admitted within the 500ms budget, because each rejection pushes the
-// open window forward by another Timeout.
-func TestCircuitBreakerOpenRejectionsDoNotExtendOpenWindow(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		MaxFailures:  1,
-		Timeout:      50 * time.Millisecond,
-		ResetTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	// Trip the breaker open with a single real failure.
-	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return errors.New("boom")
-	}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the tripping call to return its own error")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("expected circuit to be open after the tripping failure, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
-	admitted := false
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		callErr := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-			return nil
-		})
-		if callErr == nil {
-			admitted = true
-			break
-		}
-		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-
-	if !admitted {
-		t.Fatal("expected a probe to be admitted once Timeout elapsed with no real failure in between; open-circuit rejections must not re-arm the open timer")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerOpenRejectionStillCountedInMetrics pins the R180 intent
-// alongside FIX-01: an open-circuit rejection is still an admission outcome
-// and must still increment total_failures, even though it may no longer
-// touch the open timer.
-func TestCircuitBreakerOpenRejectionStillCountedInMetrics(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		MaxFailures:  1,
-		Timeout:      time.Hour,
-		ResetTimeout: time.Hour,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return errors.New("boom")
-	}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the tripping call to return its own error")
-	}
-
-	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		t.Fatal("fn must not be called while the circuit is open")
-		return nil
-	}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the rejected call to return an error")
-	}
-
-	metrics := cb.GetBaseMetrics()
-	totalFailures := metrics["total_failures"].(int64)
-	if totalFailures != 2 {
-		t.Errorf("total_failures = %d, want 2 (1 real failure + 1 open rejection)", totalFailures)
-	}
-}

error_recovery_fix09_test.go

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"net"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// newFix09HalfOpenBreaker builds a breaker, trips it with one real (non
-// client) failure, and waits past Timeout so the next ExecuteWithContext
-// call performs the Open -> HalfOpen probe transition itself.
-func newFix09HalfOpenBreaker(t *testing.T) *CircuitBreaker {
-	t.Helper()
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		MaxFailures:  1,
-		Timeout:      100 * time.Millisecond,
-		ResetTimeout: 50 * time.Millisecond,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: 500, Message: "downstream unavailable"}
-	}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the tripping call to return its own error")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("setup: expected circuit open after the tripping failure, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) // past Timeout: next call probes half-open
-	return cb
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenTerminalClientErrorStaysHalfOpen is a regression
-// test for FIX-09. A terminal client error (HTTPError 4xx other than 429,
-// e.g. invalid_grant from a replayed code) reflects a per-user problem, not
-// a downstream-service failure, so it must not reopen a half-open breaker.
-//
-// Fail-on-old: recordFailure's HalfOpen case reopened unconditionally on
-// any fn() error, so the circuit is Open (not HalfOpen) right after this
-// probe.
-func TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenTerminalClientErrorStaysHalfOpen(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := newFix09HalfOpenBreaker(t)
-
-	err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: 400, Message: "invalid_grant"}
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the probe's own error to be returned to the caller")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerHalfOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("a terminal client 4xx must not reopen a half-open circuit, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-
-	// Past resetTimeout relative to the half-open entry: a subsequent
-	// success must still be able to fully close the circuit.
-	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-
-	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { return nil }); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected the closing probe to succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerClosed {
-		t.Fatalf("expected circuit to close after a half-open success following the ignored client error, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenRateLimitReopens pins that HTTP 429 (the
-// service itself signaling it is overloaded) still reopens a half-open
-// circuit, unlike an ordinary terminal client 4xx.
-func TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenRateLimitReopens(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := newFix09HalfOpenBreaker(t)
-
-	err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: 429, Message: "rate limited"}
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the probe's own error to be returned to the caller")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("a 429 must still reopen a half-open circuit, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenNetworkErrorReopens pins that a genuine network
-// error still reopens a half-open circuit.
-func TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenNetworkErrorReopens(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := newFix09HalfOpenBreaker(t)
-
-	err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: errors.New("connection refused")}
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the probe's own error to be returned to the caller")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("a network error must still reopen a half-open circuit, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerClosedTerminalClientErrorStaysClosed pins FIX-09's
-// scope choice: the terminal-client-error exemption applies to the Closed
-// state too, not only half-open, so a per-user invalid_grant never trips
-// the breaker at all. A following genuine 5xx still opens it normally.
-func TestCircuitBreakerClosedTerminalClientErrorStaysClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		MaxFailures:  1,
-		Timeout:      100 * time.Millisecond,
-		ResetTimeout: 50 * time.Millisecond,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: 400, Message: "invalid_grant"}
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the probe's own error to be returned to the caller")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerClosed {
-		t.Fatalf("a terminal client 4xx must not trip a closed circuit, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-
-	err = cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		return &HTTPError{StatusCode: 500, Message: "downstream unavailable"}
-	})
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the tripping call to return its own error")
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("a genuine 5xx must still open a closed circuit, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-}

error_recovery_fix14_test.go

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"net"
-	"syscall"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestExecuteSingleUseWithContextNeverRetriesAfterHTTPResponse is a
-// regression test for FIX-14.
-//
-// helpers.go's token-endpoint exchange returns a *HTTPError whose Message
-// carries up to 10 KiB of the raw response body once a non-200 status is
-// received (helpers.go:192-195). Before the fix, ExecuteSingleUseWithContext
-// matched singleUseRetryableErrors as a plain substring of err.Error(), so
-// an IdP 500 whose body happens to mention "connection refused" (e.g. the
-// IdP's own downstream error) was retried up to MaxAttempts times even
-// though the request had definitely already reached the server. For a
-// single-use operation (authorization-code exchange, refresh) re-sending
-// consumed input causes invalid_grant or refresh-token-family revocation.
-//
-// Fail-on-old: fn is called 3 times (MaxAttempts) instead of once.
-func TestExecuteSingleUseWithContextNeverRetriesAfterHTTPResponse(t *testing.T) {
-	re := NewRetryExecutor(RetryConfig{
-		MaxAttempts:   3,
-		InitialDelay:  1,
-		MaxDelay:      1,
-		BackoffFactor: 1,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	calls := 0
-	err := re.ExecuteSingleUseWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		calls++
-		return &HTTPError{
-			StatusCode: 500,
-			Message:    "token endpoint returned status 500: {\"error\":\"server_error\",\"detail\":\"upstream: connection refused\"}",
-		}
-	})
-
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the HTTPError to be returned")
-	}
-	if calls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("fn called %d times, want 1: an HTTP response proves the request was already sent and must never be retried for a single-use operation", calls)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestExecuteSingleUseWithContextStillRetriesRealDialError guards against
-// over-broadening the FIX-14 fix: a genuine dial/connect failure -- proof
-// the request never reached the server -- must still be retried.
-func TestExecuteSingleUseWithContextStillRetriesRealDialError(t *testing.T) {
-	re := NewRetryExecutor(RetryConfig{
-		MaxAttempts:   3,
-		InitialDelay:  1,
-		MaxDelay:      1,
-		BackoffFactor: 1,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	calls := 0
-	err := re.ExecuteSingleUseWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		calls++
-		if calls == 1 {
-			return &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: errors.New("connection refused")}
-		}
-		return nil
-	})
-
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected the retried call to succeed, got: %v", err)
-	}
-	if calls != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("fn called %d times, want 2: a real dial error must still be retried", calls)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestExecuteSingleUseWithContextNeverRetriesPostSendOpError pins FIX-14's
-// minor finding: isNeverSentError must match a *net.OpError only for Op
-// "dial" or "proxyconnect" (proof the request never reached the far end).
-// A "read"/"write" OpError happens after the connection is already
-// established, when the single-use request may already have reached the
-// IdP, and must not be retried.
-func TestExecuteSingleUseWithContextNeverRetriesPostSendOpError(t *testing.T) {
-	re := NewRetryExecutor(RetryConfig{
-		MaxAttempts:   3,
-		InitialDelay:  1,
-		MaxDelay:      1,
-		BackoffFactor: 1,
-	}, NewLogger("error"))
-
-	calls := 0
-	err := re.ExecuteSingleUseWithContext(context.Background(), func() error {
-		calls++
-		return &net.OpError{Op: "read", Net: "tcp", Err: syscall.EHOSTUNREACH}
-	})
-
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected the OpError to be returned")
-	}
-	if calls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("fn called %d times, want 1: a post-send (read/write) OpError must not be retried for a single-use operation", calls)
-	}
-}

error_recovery_test.go

@@ -89,50 +89,18 @@ func TestCircuitBreakerHalfOpenTransition(t *testing.T) {
 
 	time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
 
-	// First request after the open timeout probes half-open. A single success
-	// does NOT immediately close: the circuit stays half-open until
-	// resetTimeout has elapsed (reset-cooldown hysteresis).
-	if err := cb.Execute(func() error { return nil }); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("Request should be allowed in half-open state, got: %v", err)
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerHalfOpen {
-		t.Errorf("Circuit should stay half-open during reset cooldown, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
+	allowed := false
+	_ = cb.Execute(func() error {
+		allowed = true
+		return nil
+	})
+
+	if !allowed {
+		t.Error("Request should be allowed in half-open state")
 	}
 
-	// After resetTimeout elapses, a successful request fully closes it.
-	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-	if err := cb.Execute(func() error { return nil }); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("Request should be allowed, got: %v", err)
-	}
 	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerClosed {
-		t.Errorf("Circuit should be closed after successful request following reset cooldown, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestCircuitBreakerResetTimeoutEnforced is a regression test for the dead
-// resetTimeout config field: it must be consulted before a half-open success
-// can fully close the circuit. This failed on the old code where resetTimeout
-// was set but never read, so a single half-open success closed the circuit
-// immediately regardless of the configured reset cooldown.
-func TestCircuitBreakerResetTimeoutEnforced(t *testing.T) {
-	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		MaxFailures:  1,
-		Timeout:      50 * time.Millisecond,
-		ResetTimeout: time.Minute,
-	}, nil)
-
-	_ = cb.Execute(func() error { return errors.New("fail") })
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Fatal("circuit should be open after failure")
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(70 * time.Millisecond) // past the open timeout -> half-open
-
-	if err := cb.Execute(func() error { return nil }); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("request should be allowed in half-open state, got: %v", err)
-	}
-	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerHalfOpen {
-		t.Fatalf("circuit must remain half-open until resetTimeout elapses, got %v", circuitBreakerStateToString(cb.GetState()))
+		t.Errorf("Circuit should be closed after successful half-open request, got %v", cb.GetState())
 	}
 }
 
@@ -275,13 +243,7 @@ func TestCircuitBreakerIsAvailable(t *testing.T) {
 	time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
 
 	if !cb.IsAvailable() {
-		t.Error("Circuit should report availability once the open timeout has elapsed")
-	}
-	// R94: IsAvailable is a read-only probe and must not mutate circuit
-	// state. Merely checking availability must NOT transition the circuit
-	// to half-open (that is the job of real request admission).
-	if got := cb.GetState(); got != CircuitBreakerOpen {
-		t.Errorf("IsAvailable must not change circuit state; expected Open, got %v", got)
+		t.Error("Circuit should be available in half-open state")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1135,7 +1097,6 @@ func TestBaseRecoveryMechanism_LogMethods(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestErrorRecoveryManagerCreation(t *testing.T) {
 	erm := NewErrorRecoveryManager(nil)
-	t.Cleanup(erm.Close)
 
 	if erm == nil {
 		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil error recovery manager")
@@ -1152,7 +1113,6 @@ func TestErrorRecoveryManagerCreation(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestErrorRecoveryManagerGetCircuitBreaker(t *testing.T) {
 	erm := NewErrorRecoveryManager(nil)
-	t.Cleanup(erm.Close)
 
 	cb1 := erm.GetCircuitBreaker("service1")
 	cb2 := erm.GetCircuitBreaker("service1")
@@ -1173,7 +1133,6 @@ func TestErrorRecoveryManagerGetCircuitBreaker(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestErrorRecoveryManagerExecuteWithRecovery(t *testing.T) {
 	erm := NewErrorRecoveryManager(nil)
-	t.Cleanup(erm.Close)
 
 	success := false
 	err := erm.ExecuteWithRecovery(context.Background(), "test-service", func() error {
@@ -1192,7 +1151,6 @@ func TestErrorRecoveryManagerExecuteWithRecovery(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestErrorRecoveryManagerMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 	erm := NewErrorRecoveryManager(nil)
-	t.Cleanup(erm.Close)
 
 	_ = erm.GetCircuitBreaker("service1")
 	_ = erm.GetCircuitBreaker("service2")
@@ -1212,7 +1170,6 @@ func TestErrorRecoveryManagerMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 func TestErrorRecoveryManagerIntegration(t *testing.T) {
 	logger := GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
 	erm := NewErrorRecoveryManager(logger)
-	t.Cleanup(erm.Close)
 
 	t.Run("circuit breaker and retry integration", func(t *testing.T) {
 		cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
@@ -1314,12 +1271,9 @@ func TestGracefulDegradationRegisterHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
 	defer gd.Close()
 
 	t.Run("register health check", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var healthy atomic.Bool
-		healthy.Store(true)
-		// The health check runs on a background goroutine (performHealthChecks at
-		// the configured interval); a plain captured bool would be a data race.
+		healthy := true
 		healthCheck := func() bool {
-			return healthy.Load()
+			return healthy
 		}
 
 		gd.RegisterHealthCheck("service1", healthCheck)
@@ -1327,7 +1281,7 @@ func TestGracefulDegradationRegisterHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
 		gd.markServiceDegraded("service1")
 		assert.True(t, gd.isServiceDegraded("service1"))
 
-		healthy.Store(true)
+		healthy = true
 		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
 	})
 }
@@ -1553,13 +1507,6 @@ func TestGracefulDegradationHealthChecks(t *testing.T) {
 		config := DefaultGracefulDegradationConfig()
 		gd := NewGracefulDegradation(config, logger)
 		defer gd.Close()
-		// The shared health-check task runs this gd's checks in the background
-		// (globalPerformHealthChecks). Hold its pass lock so that pass cannot
-		// run the check concurrently with the direct call below or change the
-		// degraded state between the assertions. The deferred Unlock runs
-		// before the deferred Close, so Close never waits on a blocked pass.
-		globalHealthCheckMu.Lock()
-		defer globalHealthCheckMu.Unlock()
 
 		healthCheckCalled := false
 		gd.RegisterHealthCheck("test-service", func() bool {
@@ -1582,9 +1529,6 @@ func TestGracefulDegradationHealthChecks(t *testing.T) {
 		config := DefaultGracefulDegradationConfig()
 		gd := NewGracefulDegradation(config, logger)
 		defer gd.Close()
-		// Keep the shared background pass out of this subtest (see above).
-		globalHealthCheckMu.Lock()
-		defer globalHealthCheckMu.Unlock()
 
 		gd.RegisterHealthCheck("failing-service", func() bool {
 			return false
@@ -1665,12 +1609,9 @@ func TestGracefulDegradationFullScenario(t *testing.T) {
 		return "fallback data", nil
 	})
 
-	var serviceHealthy atomic.Bool
-	serviceHealthy.Store(false)
-	// Health checks run on a background goroutine (performHealthChecks at the
-	// configured interval); a plain captured bool is a data race.
+	serviceHealthy := false
 	gd.RegisterHealthCheck("critical-service", func() bool {
-		return serviceHealthy.Load()
+		return serviceHealthy
 	})
 
 	result1, err1 := gd.ExecuteWithFallback("critical-service", func() (interface{}, error) {
@@ -1693,7 +1634,7 @@ func TestGracefulDegradationFullScenario(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NoError(t, err3)
 	assert.Equal(t, "fallback data", result3)
 
-	serviceHealthy.Store(true)
+	serviceHealthy = true
 	time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
 
 	metrics := gd.GetMetrics()

examples/complete-traefik-config.yaml

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ experimental:
   plugins:
     traefikoidc:
       moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
-      version: v1.0.29
+      version: v0.8.0
 
 log:
   level: INFO
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ services:
       - "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
       - "--entrypoints.websecure.address=:443"
       - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.modulename=github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
-      - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.version=v1.0.29"
+      - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.version=v0.8.0"
     ports:
       - "80:80"
       - "443:443"
@@ -445,22 +445,22 @@ spec:
 # you can set these. NOTE: Plugin configuration takes precedence!
 
 # Docker Compose env file (.env)
-# ----- (below is an example .env file, NOT YAML — shown for reference) -----
+---
 # OIDC Configuration
-# OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your-client-id
-# OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret
-# OIDC_PROVIDER_URL=https://auth.example.com
+OIDC_CLIENT_ID=your-client-id
+OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret
+OIDC_PROVIDER_URL=https://auth.example.com
 
 # Redis Configuration (fallback)
-# REDIS_ENABLED=true
-# REDIS_ADDRESS=redis:6379
-# REDIS_PASSWORD=yourredispassword
-# REDIS_DB=0
-# REDIS_KEY_PREFIX=traefikoidc:
-# REDIS_CACHE_MODE=hybrid
-# REDIS_POOL_SIZE=20
-# REDIS_ENABLE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER=true
-# REDIS_ENABLE_HEALTH_CHECK=true
+REDIS_ENABLED=true
+REDIS_ADDRESS=redis:6379
+REDIS_PASSWORD=yourredispassword
+REDIS_DB=0
+REDIS_KEY_PREFIX=traefikoidc:
+REDIS_CACHE_MODE=hybrid
+REDIS_POOL_SIZE=20
+REDIS_ENABLE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER=true
+REDIS_ENABLE_HEALTH_CHECK=true
 
 
 # ============================================================================

examples/oidcgate.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Minimal oidcgate config. See docs/OIDCGATE.md for full reference.
+listen: ":8080"
+authPath: "/oauth2/auth"
+startPath: "/oauth2/start"
+
+providerURL: "https://accounts.google.com"
+clientID: "REPLACE_ME.apps.googleusercontent.com"
+clientSecret: "REPLACE_ME"            # OR set OIDCGATE_CLIENT_SECRET
+sessionEncryptionKey: "REPLACE_WITH_64_HEX_BYTES" # OR OIDCGATE_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+postLogoutRedirectURI: "/"
+
+# allowedUserDomains: [company.com]
+# excludedURLs: [/health, /metrics]

examples/redis-config.yaml

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ experimental:
   plugins:
     traefikoidc:
       moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
-      version: v1.0.29
+      version: v0.8.0
 
 # Dynamic configuration (dynamic.yml or labels)
 http:

fix02_options_bypass_test.go

@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Regression tests for FIX-02 (review-2026-09-10 finding at
-// middleware.go:105): shouldBypassAuth bypassed OIDC auth for ANY request
-// whose method is OPTIONS, not only genuine CORS preflights. A real
-// preflight always carries both an Origin header and an
-// Access-Control-Request-Method header; the R124 fix checked only the
-// method, so an unauthenticated `OPTIONS <protected-path>` with neither
-// header reached the backend unauthenticated (reproduced against
-// http.FileServer: 200 with the protected file's body).
-//
-// TestServeHTTP_ForgedPreflightDoesNotLeakBody hardens the residual gap a
-// follow-up review found in that fix: the Origin +
-// Access-Control-Request-Method check only rules out an accidental bare
-// OPTIONS request, not a deliberate attacker, since any non-browser client
-// can set both headers itself. bypassReasonOptions still forwarded to next
-// with no session check, so a forged preflight against http.FileServer
-// still returned the protected file's body.
-//
-// A later maintainer decision (the AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight config
-// option, settings.go) restored the released default: every OPTIONS request
-// -- genuine preflight or not -- needs auth unless the operator opts in.
-// Every test below that exercises the bypass path (positive or negative)
-// sets allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true so it keeps testing the
-// Origin+Access-Control-Request-Method gate itself rather than the flag
-// gate placed in front of it. The default-off case is pinned separately by
-// TestServeHTTP_DefaultConfigGenuinePreflightRequiresAuth in
-// fix02b_allow_unauthenticated_preflight_test.go.
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// TestShouldBypassAuth_BareOptionsDoesNotBypass pins the negative case: a
-// bare OPTIONS request carrying neither Origin nor
-// Access-Control-Request-Method is not a CORS preflight and must go
-// through the normal auth pipeline like any other method.
-func TestShouldBypassAuth_BareOptionsDoesNotBypass(t *testing.T) {
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{logger: GetSingletonNoOpLogger(), allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true}
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "/api/resource", nil)
-
-	if bypass, reason := tObj.shouldBypassAuth(req); bypass {
-		t.Fatalf("bare OPTIONS (no Origin, no Access-Control-Request-Method) must not bypass auth, got bypass reason %q", reason)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestShouldBypassAuth_OptionsWithOnlyOriginDoesNotBypass pins a partial
-// case: Origin alone (e.g. a plain cross-origin GET, not a preflight) must
-// not bypass either -- both headers are required.
-func TestShouldBypassAuth_OptionsWithOnlyOriginDoesNotBypass(t *testing.T) {
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{logger: GetSingletonNoOpLogger(), allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true}
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "/api/resource", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-
-	if bypass, reason := tObj.shouldBypassAuth(req); bypass {
-		t.Fatalf("OPTIONS with only Origin set must not bypass auth, got bypass reason %q", reason)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestShouldBypassAuth_GenuinePreflightBypasses pins the positive case: a
-// real CORS preflight (Origin + Access-Control-Request-Method) must still
-// bypass auth, so a browser's actual preflight keeps working.
-func TestShouldBypassAuth_GenuinePreflightBypasses(t *testing.T) {
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{logger: GetSingletonNoOpLogger(), allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true}
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "/api/resource", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", "GET")
-
-	bypass, reason := tObj.shouldBypassAuth(req)
-	if !bypass {
-		t.Fatal("a genuine CORS preflight (Origin + Access-Control-Request-Method) must bypass auth")
-	}
-	if reason != bypassReasonOptions {
-		t.Fatalf("preflight bypass reason = %q, want %q", reason, bypassReasonOptions)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_UnauthenticatedBareOptionsDoesNotReachBackend is the
-// end-to-end reproduction from the finding: an unauthenticated OPTIONS
-// request against a protected path, with no session cookie and no CORS
-// headers, must not reach the next handler. Mirrors the reviewer's
-// http.FileServer repro that returned the protected file's body.
-func TestServeHTTP_UnauthenticatedBareOptionsDoesNotReachBackend(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	nextCalled := false
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		nextCalled = true
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL"))
-	})
-
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                        GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:                          "test",
-		next:                          next,
-		sessionManager:                sm,
-		redirURLPath:                  "/callback",
-		authURL:                       "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-		issuerURL:                     "https://idp.example.com",
-		clientID:                      "test-client-id",
-		scopes:                        []string{"openid"},
-		initComplete:                  initComplete,
-		allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true,
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://app.example.com/secret.txt", nil)
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if nextCalled {
-		t.Fatalf("unauthenticated bare OPTIONS must not reach the backend, but next handler ran (status=%d body=%q)", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-	if rw.Code == http.StatusOK && strings.Contains(rw.Body.String(), "TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL") {
-		t.Fatalf("protected content leaked through an unauthenticated OPTIONS request: status=%d body=%q", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_GenuinePreflightReachesBackend confirms the fix does not
-// regress the R124 behavior it builds on: a real CORS preflight for the
-// same protected path must still reach the backend unconditionally.
-func TestServeHTTP_GenuinePreflightReachesBackend(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	nextCalled := false
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		nextCalled = true
-		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
-	})
-
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                        GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:                          "test",
-		next:                          next,
-		sessionManager:                sm,
-		redirURLPath:                  "/callback",
-		authURL:                       "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-		issuerURL:                     "https://idp.example.com",
-		clientID:                      "test-client-id",
-		scopes:                        []string{"openid"},
-		initComplete:                  initComplete,
-		allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true,
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://app.example.com/secret.txt", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", "GET")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if !nextCalled {
-		t.Fatalf("a genuine CORS preflight must still reach the backend, got status=%d body=%q", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_ForgedPreflightDoesNotLeakBody reproduces the finding's own
-// exploit: a non-browser client sends an OPTIONS request carrying BOTH
-// Origin and Access-Control-Request-Method (indistinguishable from a real
-// preflight to shouldBypassAuth) against a protected path, with no session
-// cookie. It must not receive the backend's response body, even though the
-// request still forwards unauthenticated so a real browser preflight keeps
-// getting its CORS headers answered.
-func TestServeHTTP_ForgedPreflightDoesNotLeakBody(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt"), []byte("TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("WriteFile: %v", err)
-	}
-	next := http.FileServer(http.Dir(dir))
-
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                        GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:                          "test",
-		next:                          next,
-		sessionManager:                sm,
-		redirURLPath:                  "/callback",
-		authURL:                       "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-		issuerURL:                     "https://idp.example.com",
-		clientID:                      "test-client-id",
-		scopes:                        []string{"openid"},
-		initComplete:                  initComplete,
-		allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true,
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://app.example.com/secret.txt", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
-	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", "GET")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if strings.Contains(rw.Body.String(), "TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL") {
-		t.Fatalf("forged preflight leaked protected content: status=%d body=%q", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-}

fix02b_allow_unauthenticated_preflight_test.go

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Regression tests for the FIX-02 maintainer decision: the released
-// behavior required authentication for every OPTIONS request by default.
-// FIX-02 (fix02_options_bypass_test.go) narrowed an accidental
-// unconditional OPTIONS bypass down to genuine CORS preflights (Origin +
-// Access-Control-Request-Method), but that still left every preflight
-// unauthenticated by default -- a behavior change from the release. This
-// file pins the maintainer decision to restore released behavior: the
-// preflight bypass now only applies when the operator opts in via
-// AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight (default false). With the flag off, OPTIONS
-// goes through the normal auth pipeline like any other method.
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// TestServeHTTP_DefaultConfigGenuinePreflightRequiresAuth pins the default
-// (AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight=false) behavior: even a genuine CORS
-// preflight (Origin + Access-Control-Request-Method) must NOT reach the
-// backend without a session -- it goes through the normal auth pipeline
-// (redirect or 401) exactly like any other unauthenticated request. This is
-// the released behavior FIX-02 must restore by default.
-func TestServeHTTP_DefaultConfigGenuinePreflightRequiresAuth(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	nextCalled := false
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		nextCalled = true
-		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
-	})
-
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:         GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:           "test",
-		next:           next,
-		sessionManager: sm,
-		redirURLPath:   "/callback",
-		authURL:        "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-		issuerURL:      "https://idp.example.com",
-		clientID:       "test-client-id",
-		scopes:         []string{"openid"},
-		initComplete:   initComplete,
-		// AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight left at its zero value (false):
-		// default config must not bypass auth for OPTIONS.
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://app.example.com/secret.txt", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", "GET")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if nextCalled {
-		t.Fatalf("default config (allowUnauthenticatedPreflight=false) must send a genuine OPTIONS preflight through the normal auth pipeline, but the backend was called unconditionally: status=%d body=%q", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-	if rw.Code == http.StatusNoContent {
-		t.Fatalf("default config must not answer the preflight bypass response (204 from next); got status=%d", rw.Code)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight_GenuinePreflightBypassesBodyDiscarded
-// pins the opt-in behavior: with AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight=true, a
-// genuine CORS preflight still bypasses auth (so real browser preflights
-// keep working) and the optionsPreflightWriter still discards the body
-// (FIX-02's forged-preflight hardening keeps applying when the flag is on).
-func TestServeHTTP_AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight_GenuinePreflightBypassesBodyDiscarded(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt"), []byte("TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("WriteFile: %v", err)
-	}
-	next := http.FileServer(http.Dir(dir))
-
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                        GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:                          "test",
-		next:                          next,
-		sessionManager:                sm,
-		redirURLPath:                  "/callback",
-		authURL:                       "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-		issuerURL:                     "https://idp.example.com",
-		clientID:                      "test-client-id",
-		scopes:                        []string{"openid"},
-		initComplete:                  initComplete,
-		allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true,
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://app.example.com/secret.txt", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://app.example.com")
-	req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", "GET")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if strings.Contains(rw.Body.String(), "TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL") {
-		t.Fatalf("allowUnauthenticatedPreflight=true must still discard the preflight response body: status=%d body=%q", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight_BareOptionsStillRequiresAuth
-// pins that the flag only widens the genuine-preflight gate -- a bare
-// OPTIONS request (no Origin, no Access-Control-Request-Method) still needs
-// auth even with AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight=true.
-func TestServeHTTP_AllowUnauthenticatedPreflight_BareOptionsStillRequiresAuth(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	nextCalled := false
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		nextCalled = true
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("TOP-SECRET-PAYROLL"))
-	})
-
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:                        GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:                          "test",
-		next:                          next,
-		sessionManager:                sm,
-		redirURLPath:                  "/callback",
-		authURL:                       "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-		issuerURL:                     "https://idp.example.com",
-		clientID:                      "test-client-id",
-		scopes:                        []string{"openid"},
-		initComplete:                  initComplete,
-		allowUnauthenticatedPreflight: true,
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "https://app.example.com/secret.txt", nil)
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if nextCalled {
-		t.Fatalf("allowUnauthenticatedPreflight=true must not bypass auth for a bare OPTIONS request (no Origin/Access-Control-Request-Method), but the backend was called: status=%d body=%q", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-}

fix05_session_chunk_replace_test.go

@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Regression tests for FIX-05 (review-2026-09-10 finding at session.go:2409,
-// session.go:3099): SetRefreshToken/SetIDToken re-Get the gorilla-registry-
-// cached chunk *sessions.Session objects for the NEW token, fill them, and
-// only THEN call the expire helper for the OLD chunks. Because gorilla's
-// Registry.Get returns the SAME cached object per cookie name for a given
-// request, the "expire old" pass re-Gets those identical objects and wipes
-// session.Values on every non-new one -- erasing the NEW chunk data this
-// call just wrote. A session loaded from existing (legacy) chunk cookies
-// whose replacement token also needs chunking loses the new token entirely.
-//
-// Adapted from the throwaway repro at
-// .claude/review-2026-09-10/repro/zz_g1_chunkwipe_test.go and
-// zz_g1_chunkwipe_id_test.go (TestG1ChunkWipeRefresh / TestG1ChunkWipeAccessControl
-// / TestG1ChunkWipeIDToken), renamed to describe the behavior they pin.
-
-import (
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// randChunkTestToken returns a random URL-safe token of n raw bytes, large
-// enough (with maxCookieSize=1400) to force the chunked storage path.
-func randChunkTestToken(t *testing.T, n int) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	b := make([]byte, n)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
-}
-
-// randChunkTestJWT returns a structurally valid (3-dot-separated) JWT whose
-// payload is padded past maxCookieSize, so SetIDToken takes the chunked path.
-func randChunkTestJWT(t *testing.T) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	enc := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString
-	header := enc([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT","kid":"k"}`))
-	now := time.Now().Unix()
-	payload := enc([]byte(fmt.Sprintf(
-		`{"iss":"https://idp","sub":"u","aud":"c","iat":%d,"exp":%d,"pad":"%s"}`,
-		now, now+3600, randChunkTestToken(t, 3000),
-	)))
-	return header + "." + payload + "." + randChunkTestToken(t, 256)
-}
-
-// mergeSetCookiesIntoJar copies a response's Set-Cookie headers into jar,
-// dropping any cookie the response expired (MaxAge < 0), so the next request
-// carries forward only what a real browser would still hold.
-func mergeSetCookiesIntoJar(jar map[string]*http.Cookie, rr *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
-	for _, c := range rr.Result().Cookies() {
-		if c.MaxAge < 0 {
-			delete(jar, c.Name)
-			continue
-		}
-		jar[c.Name] = c
-	}
-}
-
-// newRequestWithJarCookies builds a request carrying every cookie currently
-// held in jar, simulating a browser replaying its cookie jar on the next
-// request to the same session.
-func newRequestWithJarCookies(jar map[string]*http.Cookie) *http.Request {
-	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.example.com/", nil)
-	for _, c := range jar {
-		r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: c.Name, Value: c.Value})
-	}
-	return r
-}
-
-// runChunkedTokenReplaceRegression drives three requests against one
-// SessionManager: request 1 stores a large (chunked) token A and saves it,
-// request 2 loads the cookies A produced and replaces the token with a
-// different large (chunked) token B, request 3 loads the cookies B produced
-// and must read back B, not A and not empty.
-func runChunkedTokenReplaceRegression(
-	t *testing.T,
-	set func(*SessionData, string),
-	get func(*SessionData) string,
-	tokA, tokB string,
-) {
-	t.Helper()
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	jar := map[string]*http.Cookie{}
-
-	r1 := newRequestWithJarCookies(jar)
-	s1, err := sm.GetSession(r1)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetSession (request 1): %v", err)
-	}
-	set(s1, tokA)
-	rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	if err := s1.Save(r1, rr1); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Save (request 1): %v", err)
-	}
-	s1.returnToPoolSafely()
-	mergeSetCookiesIntoJar(jar, rr1)
-
-	r2 := newRequestWithJarCookies(jar)
-	s2, err := sm.GetSession(r2)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetSession (request 2): %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := get(s2); got != tokA {
-		t.Fatalf("request 2 must load token A written by request 1 before replacing it: got len=%d, want tokA", len(got))
-	}
-	set(s2, tokB)
-	if got := get(s2); got != tokB {
-		t.Fatalf("in-memory read immediately after replacing the chunked token must return the NEW token: got len=%d (isA=%v), want tokB", len(got), got == tokA)
-	}
-	rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	if err := s2.Save(r2, rr2); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Save (request 2): %v", err)
-	}
-	s2.returnToPoolSafely()
-	mergeSetCookiesIntoJar(jar, rr2)
-
-	r3 := newRequestWithJarCookies(jar)
-	s3, err := sm.GetSession(r3)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetSession (request 3): %v", err)
-	}
-	defer s3.returnToPoolSafely()
-	got := get(s3)
-	if got != tokB {
-		t.Fatalf("after replacing a chunked token loaded from cookies: got len=%d (isTokA=%v), want tokB (the user would be silently signed out)", len(got), got == tokA)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSessionData_SetRefreshToken_ReplacesChunkedTokenLoadedFromCookies pins
-// FIX-05 (session.go:2409): replacing a chunked refresh token that was
-// loaded from existing chunk cookies must not wipe the newly written chunks.
-func TestSessionData_SetRefreshToken_ReplacesChunkedTokenLoadedFromCookies(t *testing.T) {
-	tokA := randChunkTestToken(t, 4500)
-	tokB := randChunkTestToken(t, 4500)
-	runChunkedTokenReplaceRegression(
-		t,
-		func(s *SessionData, v string) { s.SetRefreshToken(v) },
-		func(s *SessionData) string { return s.GetRefreshToken() },
-		tokA, tokB,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestSessionData_SetIDToken_ReplacesChunkedTokenLoadedFromCookies pins
-// FIX-05 (session.go:3099): the same bug in SetIDToken, using structurally
-// valid JWTs since SetIDToken rejects non-JWT-shaped input.
-func TestSessionData_SetIDToken_ReplacesChunkedTokenLoadedFromCookies(t *testing.T) {
-	tokA := randChunkTestJWT(t)
-	tokB := randChunkTestJWT(t)
-	runChunkedTokenReplaceRegression(
-		t,
-		func(s *SessionData, v string) { s.SetIDToken(v) },
-		func(s *SessionData) string { return s.GetIDToken() },
-		tokA, tokB,
-	)
-}
-
-// TestSessionData_SetAccessToken_ReplacesChunkedTokenLoadedFromCookies is the
-// control: SetAccessToken already uses the expire-then-fill order (it was
-// unaffected by the R154 regression) and must stay green both before and
-// after FIX-05, proving the fix does not depend on a shared helper bug.
-func TestSessionData_SetAccessToken_ReplacesChunkedTokenLoadedFromCookies(t *testing.T) {
-	tokA := randChunkTestToken(t, 4500)
-	tokB := randChunkTestToken(t, 4500)
-	runChunkedTokenReplaceRegression(
-		t,
-		func(s *SessionData, v string) { s.SetAccessToken(v) },
-		func(s *SessionData) string { return s.GetAccessToken() },
-		tokA, tokB,
-	)
-}

fix06_downstream_writer_test.go

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Regression tests for FIX-06 (review-2026-09-10 finding at
-// middleware.go:309, high severity): ServeHTTP wraps the response writer
-// in *trackingWriter for panic-commit tracking (rw = tw) and then hands
-// that SAME wrapped writer to every t.next.ServeHTTP call, including the
-// SSE/WebSocket bypass and the authenticated forwarding path. Traefik runs
-// this plugin interpreted under yaegi v0.16.1, and yaegi's stdlib
-// interop layer composes a boundary wrapper only for ResponseWriter+
-// Hijacker crossing into compiled code -- not for Flusher or Unwrap. So
-// Traefik's compiled ReverseProxy calling
-// http.NewResponseController(rw).Flush() on the interpreted trackingWriter
-// gets "feature not supported" in production, even though trackingWriter
-// declares Flush/Unwrap and native tests (which never cross an
-// interpreter boundary) pass. See checkSSEFlushReachesNext in cmd/yaegicheck/main.go (run by
-// `make yaegi-validate`) for the interop reproduction.
-//
-// The fix hands t.next.ServeHTTP the ORIGINAL writer ServeHTTP received
-// (trackingWriter.Unwrap()), never the wrapper, on every forwarding path.
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// nextWriterSpy is a minimal next handler that records whether the
-// http.ResponseWriter it was handed is (or, transitively, still wraps) a
-// *trackingWriter, so a test can assert the downstream writer is the real
-// one Traefik would give a compiled ReverseProxy -- not the interpreted
-// wrapper.
-func nextWriterSpy(called *bool, sawTrackingWriter *bool) http.Handler {
-	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		*called = true
-		if _, ok := w.(*trackingWriter); ok {
-			*sawTrackingWriter = true
-		}
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	})
-}
-
-// authenticatedRequestWithCookie builds a request carrying a saved,
-// authenticated session cookie for user, so the SSE/WebSocket bypass's
-// cookie-only auth check (applyBypassUserHeaders) admits it.
-func authenticatedRequestWithCookie(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager, user string) *http.Request {
-	t.Helper()
-	setupReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.example.com/stream", nil)
-	session, err := sm.GetSession(setupReq)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetSession: %v", err)
-	}
-	session.SetAuthenticated(true)
-	session.SetUserIdentifier(user)
-	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	if err := session.Save(setupReq, rr); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err)
-	}
-	session.returnToPoolSafely()
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.example.com/stream", nil)
-	for _, c := range rr.Result().Cookies() {
-		req.AddCookie(c)
-	}
-	return req
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_SSEBypass_NextReceivesUnwrappedWriter pins FIX-06 on the
-// SSE bypass path.
-func TestServeHTTP_SSEBypass_NextReceivesUnwrappedWriter(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	var called, sawTrackingWriter bool
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:         GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:           "test",
-		next:           nextWriterSpy(&called, &sawTrackingWriter),
-		sessionManager: sm,
-		initComplete:   initComplete,
-	}
-
-	req := authenticatedRequestWithCookie(t, sm, "[email protected]")
-	req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/event-stream")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if !called {
-		t.Fatalf("next handler was not invoked (status=%d body=%q); the authenticated SSE bypass must forward", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-	if sawTrackingWriter {
-		t.Fatal("next handler received the interpreted trackingWriter on the SSE bypass path, not the original ResponseWriter")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestServeHTTP_WebSocketBypass_NextReceivesUnwrappedWriter pins FIX-06 on
-// the WebSocket upgrade bypass path.
-func TestServeHTTP_WebSocketBypass_NextReceivesUnwrappedWriter(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	var called, sawTrackingWriter bool
-	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	close(initComplete)
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:         GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		name:           "test",
-		next:           nextWriterSpy(&called, &sawTrackingWriter),
-		sessionManager: sm,
-		initComplete:   initComplete,
-	}
-
-	req := authenticatedRequestWithCookie(t, sm, "[email protected]")
-	req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
-	req.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-	tObj.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
-
-	if !called {
-		t.Fatalf("next handler was not invoked (status=%d body=%q); the authenticated WebSocket bypass must forward", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
-	}
-	if sawTrackingWriter {
-		t.Fatal("next handler received the interpreted trackingWriter on the WebSocket bypass path, not the original ResponseWriter")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestForwardAuthorized_NextReceivesUnwrappedWriter pins FIX-06 on the
-// authenticated forwarding path (forwardAuthorized is ServeHTTP's and
-// bearer_auth.go's shared tail call to t.next.ServeHTTP). ServeHTTP always
-// calls forwardAuthorized with rw already wrapped in *trackingWriter (see
-// middleware.go:309); reproduce that shape directly here.
-func TestForwardAuthorized_NextReceivesUnwrappedWriter(t *testing.T) {
-	var called, sawTrackingWriter bool
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger: GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
-		next:   nextWriterSpy(&called, &sawTrackingWriter),
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	tw := &trackingWriter{ResponseWriter: rec}
-	p := &principal{Identifier: "[email protected]"}
-
-	oidc.forwardAuthorized(tw, req, p)
-
-	if !called {
-		t.Fatal("next handler was not invoked")
-	}
-	if sawTrackingWriter {
-		t.Fatal("next handler received the interpreted trackingWriter on the authenticated path, not the original ResponseWriter")
-	}
-}

fix10_session_pool_aba_test.go

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Regression test for FIX-10 (review-2026-09-10 finding at session.go:1784,
-// middleware.go:566/789/883): a request-scoped deferred pool-return has no
-// way to tell a stale holder from the current owner (ABA on the pool-return
-// CAS). ServeHTTP acquires a session and defers its return; deep in the call
-// chain, session.Clear() returns the SAME object to the pool and the
-// handler re-acquires it under a fresh GetSession/newSession call. If a
-// concurrent request pops that pooled object before the ORIGINAL deferred
-// return fires, the stale return's CompareAndSwap(true, false) still
-// succeeds against the new owner, incorrectly releasing (and Reset()ting) a
-// session another request is actively using.
-//
-// Adapted from the throwaway repro at
-// .claude/review-2026-09-10/repro/zz_g1_aba_test.go (TestG1StaleDeferABA),
-// renamed to describe the behavior it pins and rewritten against the
-// generation-gated return the fix introduces (ownerGeneration /
-// returnToPoolIfOwner) instead of the raw returnToPoolSafely the bug lived
-// in -- a caller must adopt the new API for the fix to apply, so the test
-// exercises the same call the fixed middleware.go ServeHTTP now makes.
-//
-// The ABA reuse step (does the pool hand the SAME object back to a second
-// GetSession after Clear) is itself an unspecified sync.Pool implementation
-// detail, not part of the contract this fix establishes. Rather than depend
-// on that timing (flaky: it did not reproduce on every run), this test
-// drives the two field mutations GetSession/newSession make on every real
-// handout -- inUse.Store(true) then generation.Add(1) -- directly on the
-// SAME object Clear() just returned, deterministically recreating "a new
-// owner acquired this exact object" regardless of pool internals.
-
-import (
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// TestSessionPoolReturn_StaleGenerationDoesNotReleaseNewOwner reproduces the
-// ABA sequence: request A acquires session O and captures its ownership
-// generation (mirrors ServeHTTP's defer registration at middleware.go:566).
-// O is cleared and returned to the pool (mirrors session.Clear at
-// middleware.go:774/868); a new owner then claims the SAME object the way
-// GetSession/newSession do (mirrors the re-acquire at
-// middleware.go:781/875) and starts using it. A's stale deferred return
-// then fires (mirrors ServeHTTP's defer running at function exit) and must
-// be a no-op against the new owner's live ownership.
-func TestSessionPoolReturn_StaleGenerationDoesNotReleaseNewOwner(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	r1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://app.example.com/", nil)
-	o, err := sm.GetSession(r1)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetSession (request A): %v", err)
-	}
-	// ServeHTTP captures the generation right after acquiring, then defers
-	// a generation-gated return instead of an unconditional one.
-	staleGen := o.ownerGeneration()
-
-	if err := o.Clear(r1, httptest.NewRecorder()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Clear: %v", err)
-	}
-	if o.inUse.Load() {
-		t.Fatalf("Clear must return the object to the pool (inUse still true)")
-	}
-
-	// A new owner claims the exact same object: this is the sequence
-	// GetSession/newSession run on every real handout -- generation,
-	// sessionOwner, then inUse (session.go:1076-1078, 1108-1110) --
-	// reproduced directly so the test does not depend on sync.Pool's
-	// unspecified reuse timing. sessionOwner must be set to the new
-	// generation, not left at 0: a stale returnToPoolIfOwner call gates on
-	// sessionOwner, so leaving it 0 would make the object look already-free
-	// rather than owned by someone else, which is what this test needs to
-	// tell apart.
-	o.sessionOwner.Store(o.generation.Add(1))
-	o.inUse.Store(true)
-	o.SetUserIdentifier("bob")
-
-	if staleGen == o.ownerGeneration() {
-		t.Fatalf("test setup bug: new owner's generation (%d) must differ from the captured stale generation (%d)", o.ownerGeneration(), staleGen)
-	}
-
-	// A's stale deferred return fires at ServeHTTP exit, after the new
-	// owner has already claimed and started using the same object.
-	o.returnToPoolIfOwner(staleGen)
-
-	if !o.inUse.Load() {
-		t.Fatalf("stale deferred return (captured generation %d) released a session owned by another holder (current generation %d)", staleGen, o.ownerGeneration())
-	}
-	if o.GetUserIdentifier() != "bob" {
-		t.Fatalf("stale deferred return corrupted the new owner's session data: got user %q, want \"bob\"", o.GetUserIdentifier())
-	}
-
-	o.returnToPoolSafely()
-}
-
-// TestSessionPoolReturn_CurrentGenerationStillReturns is the control: a
-// non-stale generation-gated return (the common case -- no Clear+reacquire
-// happened) must still return the object to the pool, so the fix does not
-// leak sessions on the ordinary path.
-func TestSessionPoolReturn_CurrentGenerationStillReturns(t *testing.T) {
-	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer sm.Shutdown()
-
-	r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://app.example.com/", nil)
-	s, err := sm.GetSession(r)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetSession: %v", err)
-	}
-	gen := s.ownerGeneration()
-
-	s.returnToPoolIfOwner(gen)
-
-	if s.inUse.Load() {
-		t.Fatalf("returnToPoolIfOwner with the current generation must return the object to the pool (inUse still true)")
-	}
-}

fix18_gd_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-18: main.go wires up TWO GracefulDegradation instances per plugin
-// instance — one directly via NewErrorRecoveryManager (t.errorRecoveryManager)
-// and one nested inside NewTokenResilienceManager's own ErrorRecoveryManager
-// (t.tokenResilienceManager). Production Close() only ever closed the first
-// one (t.errorRecoveryManager.gracefulDegradation.Close()), so the second gd
-// leaked forever in the package-level gdInstances registry and the shared
-// "graceful-degradation-health-check" task's last-instance stop gate
-// (len(gdInstances.set)==0) never fired.
-//
-// gdInstancesLen (below) reads the size of the package-level gdInstances set.
-// The test asserts on the DELTA around creating and closing both managers, so
-// it stays correct regardless of what other tests in this package leave
-// registered.
-func TestFix18_ClosingBothManagersEmptiesGDInstances(t *testing.T) {
-	logger := GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
-
-	before := gdInstancesLen()
-
-	erm := NewErrorRecoveryManager(logger)
-	trm := NewTokenResilienceManager(DefaultTokenResilienceConfig(), logger)
-
-	afterNew := gdInstancesLen()
-	if afterNew != before+2 {
-		t.Fatalf("precondition: wiring one plugin instance must create exactly 2 GracefulDegradation instances (one direct, one nested in TokenResilienceManager); got delta %d", afterNew-before)
-	}
-
-	// Let each instance's async health-check goroutine (started by
-	// NewGracefulDegradation) settle — either it assigns the shared task, or
-	// it observes an already-closed instance and bails — before closing.
-	// This makes the Close() calls below exercise the real "task already
-	// assigned, stop it by name" path deterministically on every run instead
-	// of sometimes racing the goroutine (FIX-18 review, item 4).
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, erm.gracefulDegradation)
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, trm.errorRecoveryManager.gracefulDegradation)
-
-	// Close every gd this wiring created. Before FIX-18, only erm's gd had a
-	// Close path reachable from TraefikOidc.Close (via
-	// t.errorRecoveryManager.gracefulDegradation.Close()); trm's own gd had
-	// no Close method to call at all.
-	erm.Close()
-	trm.Close()
-
-	afterClose := gdInstancesLen()
-	if afterClose != before {
-		t.Fatalf("gdInstances leaked %d entries after closing every gd this wiring created (afterClose delta=%d, want 0) — TokenResilienceManager's own GracefulDegradation was never closed", afterClose-before, afterClose-before)
-	}
-
-	// Only assert the shared health-check task itself stopped when this test
-	// is known to be the sole registrant (before==0): the task is a
-	// process-global singleton shared by every GracefulDegradation created
-	// anywhere in the suite, so this assertion would be flaky under a
-	// nonzero baseline left by another test.
-	if before == 0 && GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning("graceful-degradation-health-check") {
-		t.Fatal("graceful-degradation-health-check task must stop once gdInstances is empty (last-instance stop gate)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFix18_TraefikOidcCloseEmptiesGDInstances pins the FIX-18 major-finding
-// gap left by the test above: calling erm.Close()/trm.Close() directly stays
-// green even if the real (*TraefikOidc).Close() is reverted to skip one of
-// them (utilities.go's t.errorRecoveryManager.Close() /
-// t.tokenResilienceManager.Close() calls). This test wires both managers on
-// a TraefikOidc exactly as NewWithContext does (main.go's
-// t.errorRecoveryManager = NewErrorRecoveryManager(...) followed by
-// t.tokenResilienceManager = NewTokenResilienceManager(...)) and drives the
-// real Close(), so it only passes when Close() actually reaches both.
-func TestFix18_TraefikOidcCloseEmptiesGDInstances(t *testing.T) {
-	logger := GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
-	before := gdInstancesLen()
-
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{logger: logger}
-	oidc.errorRecoveryManager = NewErrorRecoveryManager(logger)
-	oidc.tokenResilienceManager = NewTokenResilienceManager(DefaultTokenResilienceConfig(), logger)
-
-	afterNew := gdInstancesLen()
-	if afterNew != before+2 {
-		t.Fatalf("precondition: wiring one plugin instance must create exactly 2 GracefulDegradation instances; got delta %d", afterNew-before)
-	}
-
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, oidc.errorRecoveryManager.gracefulDegradation)
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, oidc.tokenResilienceManager.errorRecoveryManager.gracefulDegradation)
-
-	// Keep a sentinel instance alive across Close() so this test's Close()
-	// call is never the last live instance: this test only asserts on
-	// gdInstances, but Close()'s "am I last" decision (stopIfLastInstance)
-	// also stops process-global singleton tasks — singleton-token-cleanup
-	// and, via GetGlobalTaskRegistry().StopAllTasks(), every other
-	// registered singleton (e.g. memory-monitor) — that this test does not
-	// own and must not stop out from under the rest of the suite.
-	registerLiveInstance()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { unregisterLiveInstance() })
-
-	// Balance Close()'s own unregisterLiveInstance() call: New() always
-	// registers before it returns an instance for Close() to eventually
-	// unregister, and this test's synthetic instance must too, or it skews
-	// the process-global liveInstanceCount permanently negative for every
-	// other test that runs afterward in the same binary (FIX-35 territory,
-	// but liveInstanceCount is shared package state regardless of which
-	// finding a given test targets).
-	registerLiveInstance()
-
-	if err := oidc.Close(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Close returned an error: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	after := gdInstancesLen()
-	if after != before {
-		t.Fatalf("gdInstances leaked %d entries after TraefikOidc.Close (delta=%d, want 0) — Close must close both t.errorRecoveryManager and t.tokenResilienceManager", after-before, after-before)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFix18_CloseImmediatelyAfterNewDoesNotReRegister pins the exact race the
-// FIX-18 review's scratch probe found: NewGracefulDegradation followed
-// immediately by Close(), before the async health-check goroutine has had a
-// chance to run. The old startHealthCheckRoutine re-added gd to gdInstances
-// from inside that goroutine (after Close had already deleted it), permanently
-// re-registering an already-closed instance and restarting the shared
-// health-check task for it with nothing left able to ever stop it again.
-func TestFix18_CloseImmediatelyAfterNewDoesNotReRegister(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Cleanup(snapshotAndClearGdInstancesForTest())
-
-	cfg := DefaultGracefulDegradationConfig()
-	gd := NewGracefulDegradation(cfg, GetSingletonNoOpLogger())
-	gd.Close()
-
-	// Give the async health-check goroutine every opportunity to run and,
-	// under the bug, re-register the closed instance.
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(200 * time.Millisecond)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		gdInstances.RLock()
-		n := len(gdInstances.set)
-		gdInstances.RUnlock()
-		if n != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("closed instance was re-registered: gdInstances has %d entries, want 0", n)
-		}
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFix18_NewWithContextClosesManagersOnEarlyError pins the FIX-18 minor
-// finding: NewWithContext creates t.errorRecoveryManager and
-// t.tokenResilienceManager, then returns an error from a later validation
-// step (here, an invalid private_key_jwt key) without ever closing either
-// one — leaking their GracefulDegradation instances in gdInstances forever.
-func TestFix18_NewWithContextClosesManagersOnEarlyError(t *testing.T) {
-	before := gdInstancesLen()
-
-	cfg := &Config{
-		ProviderURL:               "https://accounts.google.com",
-		ClientID:                  "test-client",
-		ClientSecret:              "test-secret",
-		CallbackURL:               "/callback",
-		SessionEncryptionKey:      "this-is-a-valid-session-key-32b!",
-		RateLimit:                 100,
-		ClientAuthMethod:          "private_key_jwt",
-		ClientAssertionKeyID:      "test-kid",
-		ClientAssertionPrivateKey: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nnot-valid-base64-content!!!\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
-	}
-
-	plugin, err := NewWithContext(context.Background(), cfg, nil, "fix18-bad-key")
-	if err == nil {
-		if plugin != nil {
-			plugin.Close()
-		}
-		t.Fatal("expected NewWithContext to fail on an invalid private_key_jwt key")
-	}
-	if plugin != nil {
-		t.Fatal("NewWithContext must return a nil instance on error")
-	}
-
-	after := gdInstancesLen()
-	if after != before {
-		t.Fatalf("NewWithContext's error path leaked %d GracefulDegradation instance(s) in gdInstances (before=%d after=%d) — the errorRecoveryManager and tokenResilienceManager created just before the failure were never closed", after-before, before, after)
-	}
-}
-
-// healthRoutineSettled reports whether startHealthCheckRoutine has finished
-// making its one-time decision for this instance: either it assigned a
-// health-check task, or it observed stopChan already closed and returned
-// without assigning one (in which case it never will, since it runs at most
-// once). Tests use this to wait for the async goroutine NewGracefulDegradation
-// starts to settle before asserting on shared state, instead of depending on
-// goroutine-scheduling timing.
-//
-// Test-only: moved out of error_recovery.go (production code) because its
-// only caller is waitForHealthRoutineSettled below, following the pattern
-// FIX-39 established for resetGlobalTransportPoolForTest
-// (internal/pool/export_test.go) — a test-only helper has no business being
-// compiled into the production binary.
-func (gd *GracefulDegradation) healthRoutineSettled() bool {
-	gd.mutex.RLock()
-	defer gd.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-	if gd.healthCheckTask != nil {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	select {
-	case <-gd.stopChan:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-// waitForHealthRoutineSettled polls until gd's async startHealthCheckRoutine
-// goroutine has settled (see GracefulDegradation.healthRoutineSettled).
-func waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t *testing.T, gd *GracefulDegradation) {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		if gd.healthRoutineSettled() {
-			return
-		}
-		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	t.Fatal("health-check goroutine did not settle (task assigned or instance already closed) in time")
-}
-
-// gdInstancesLen reads the current size of the package-level gdInstances set
-// under its own lock.
-func gdInstancesLen() int {
-	gdInstances.RLock()
-	defer gdInstances.RUnlock()
-	return len(gdInstances.set)
-}
-
-// snapshotAndClearGdInstancesForTest captures the current contents of the
-// package-level gdInstances registry and replaces it with a fresh empty set,
-// mirroring resetGdInstancesForTest (review_r34_regression_test.go). Unlike
-// that helper, it returns a restore func the caller registers with
-// t.Cleanup: a bare reset with no restore permanently discards whatever
-// GracefulDegradation instances other tests in the same binary had
-// registered before this test ran, instead of only clearing for the
-// duration of this test.
-func snapshotAndClearGdInstancesForTest() func() {
-	gdInstances.Lock()
-	saved := gdInstances.set
-	gdInstances.set = make(map[*GracefulDegradation]struct{})
-	gdInstances.Unlock()
-
-	return func() {
-		gdInstances.Lock()
-		gdInstances.set = saved
-		gdInstances.Unlock()
-	}
-}

fix19_singleton_task_orphan_test.go

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-19: RegisterBackgroundTask replaced a registered-but-not-yet-started
-// task (started==0, stopped==0) unconditionally. CreateSingletonTask runs
-// Register -> IsTaskRunning -> StartBackgroundTask without holding tasksMu
-// across the three calls (autocleanup.go:612-632), so a second concurrent
-// caller can land in RegisterBackgroundTask in the window before the first
-// caller's own Start() call runs.
-//
-// This test reproduces that exact interleaving deterministically, without
-// real goroutines, by issuing the calls in the documented race order:
-//
-//  1. Caller A registers the task (T1).
-//  2. Caller A reads its handle from the registry (mirrors
-//     CreateSingletonTask's internal StartBackgroundTask lookup) but has not
-//     called Start() on it yet.
-//  3. Caller B registers the SAME name before A calls Start() — at head this
-//     replaces the map entry with a fresh task (T2).
-//  4. Caller A calls Start() on the handle it read in step 2.
-//  5. Caller B starts whatever is now registered under the name.
-//
-// At head this starts two independent tickers (T1 wrapping count1, T2
-// wrapping count2). Only the object actually stored in the registry (T2) is
-// reachable from StopAllTasks, so T1 becomes an orphan that keeps running
-// forever past Close/StopAllTasks. After the fix, step 3's register call
-// keeps the existing (still-pending) T1 instead of replacing it, so there is
-// only ever one task, and count2 (which would wrap a second, orphaned task)
-// never starts at all.
-func TestFix19_RegisterBackgroundTaskKeepsPendingTaskNoOrphan(t *testing.T) {
-	rm := GetResourceManager()
-	name := "fix19-" + t.Name()
-
-	var count1, count2 int32
-
-	// Step 1: caller A registers T1.
-	if err := rm.RegisterBackgroundTask(name, 5*time.Millisecond, func() {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&count1, 1)
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("first RegisterBackgroundTask: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Step 2: caller A reads its handle, but has not started it yet.
-	rm.tasksMu.RLock()
-	aTask := rm.tasks[name]
-	rm.tasksMu.RUnlock()
-	if aTask == nil {
-		t.Fatal("task not present in registry after first RegisterBackgroundTask")
-	}
-
-	// Step 3: caller B registers the same name before A calls Start().
-	if err := rm.RegisterBackgroundTask(name, 5*time.Millisecond, func() {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&count2, 1)
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("second RegisterBackgroundTask: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Step 4: caller A starts the handle it read in step 2.
-	aTask.Start()
-
-	// Step 5: caller B starts whatever is now registered under the name.
-	if err := rm.StartBackgroundTask(name); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("StartBackgroundTask: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Let both tickers (or, after the fix, the single ticker) tick a few
-	// times before stopping.
-	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-
-	// Stop only the named task this test created, not rm.StopAllTasks(): the
-	// ResourceManager is a process-global singleton, and StopAllTasks stops
-	// every task registered on it, including unrelated singletons (e.g.
-	// memory-monitor, singleton-token-cleanup) that other tests in the same
-	// binary may have started and still expect running.
-	if err := rm.StopBackgroundTask(name); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("StopBackgroundTask(%q): %v", name, err)
-	}
-
-	// Snapshot count1 right after the stop, then again after another window
-	// long enough for several more ticks. A well-stopped task's counter must
-	// not move between the two snapshots.
-	afterStop1 := atomic.LoadInt32(&count1)
-	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
-	final1 := atomic.LoadInt32(&count1)
-
-	if final1 != afterStop1 {
-		t.Fatalf("task wrapping count1 kept running after StopBackgroundTask (orphan escaped registry): %d -> %d", afterStop1, final1)
-	}
-	if afterStop1 == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("precondition: task wrapping count1 never ran at all")
-	}
-
-	// count2 must never have run: after the fix, the second
-	// RegisterBackgroundTask call keeps the existing pending task instead of
-	// constructing and starting a second one.
-	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&count2); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("second RegisterBackgroundTask call must not create and start a second task while the first is still pending; count2=%d", got)
-	}
-
-	// Cleanup: make sure the task this test created cannot keep running past
-	// the test even if an assertion above already failed it.
-	aTask.Stop()
-	rm.tasksMu.RLock()
-	bTask := rm.tasks[name]
-	rm.tasksMu.RUnlock()
-	if bTask != nil {
-		bTask.Stop()
-	}
-}

fix26_scheme_downgrade_test.go

@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"io"
-	"log"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// fix26CapturingLogger builds a *Logger whose Errorf output lands in buf
-// while Info/Debug are discarded, so a test can assert on exactly what
-// reaches the error stream without touching the process-wide os.Stderr.
-func fix26CapturingLogger(buf *bytes.Buffer) *Logger {
-	return &Logger{
-		logError: log.New(buf, "", 0),
-		logInfo:  log.New(io.Discard, "", 0),
-		logDebug: log.New(io.Discard, "", 0),
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_HTTPTokenEndpointUnderHTTPSProviderFailsLoudly
-// pins FIX-26. validateDiscoveredEndpoint already drops (R146) a discovered
-// http endpoint when providerURL is https, and the pre-existing "Ignoring
-// discovered ..." ERROR line already names the endpoint, the URL, and the
-// scheme-downgrade reason (it wraps ErrDiscoveredEndpointSchemeDowngrade).
-// What was missing was a way to tell that rejection apart, at a glance, from
-// every other validation rejection (SSRF block, malformed URL, path
-// traversal, ...) for the three endpoints login cannot function without. The
-// fix adds one additional, distinctly-tagged SECURITY line — naming the
-// endpoint and stating there is no config override — for exactly those
-// three (jwks_uri, authorization, token); the other four discovered
-// endpoints (revocation, end_session, introspection, registration) keep
-// only the generic line, since three of them (revocationURL,
-// oidcEndSessionURL, introspectionURL) have an operator override that
-// replaces them right after sanitize runs.
-func TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_HTTPTokenEndpointUnderHTTPSProviderFailsLoudly(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:      fix26CapturingLogger(&buf),
-		providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-	}
-
-	tObj.updateMetadataEndpoints(&ProviderMetadata{
-		TokenURL: "http://provider.example.com/token",
-	})
-
-	if tObj.tokenURL != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("an http token endpoint under an https provider must still be dropped, got %q", tObj.tokenURL)
-	}
-
-	logged := buf.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(logged, "SECURITY:") {
-		t.Fatalf("dropping an endpoint for the https-pin reason must log a SECURITY-tagged line, got:\n%s", logged)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(logged, "token") {
-		t.Fatalf("the SECURITY line must name the dropped endpoint (token), got:\n%s", logged)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(logged, "http://provider.example.com/token") {
-		t.Fatalf("the SECURITY line must name the dropped URL, got:\n%s", logged)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(logged, "no override") {
-		t.Fatalf("the SECURITY line must state that this check has no override, got:\n%s", logged)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_AllHTTPSCriticalEndpointsNoSecurityLog is the
-// negative case: well-formed https endpoints (jwks_uri, authorization,
-// token) must not trip the new SECURITY line.
-func TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_AllHTTPSCriticalEndpointsNoSecurityLog(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:      fix26CapturingLogger(&buf),
-		providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-	}
-
-	tObj.updateMetadataEndpoints(&ProviderMetadata{
-		JWKSURL:  "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-		AuthURL:  "https://provider.example.com/auth",
-		TokenURL: "https://provider.example.com/token",
-	})
-
-	if tObj.tokenURL != "https://provider.example.com/token" {
-		t.Fatalf("an https token endpoint must be accepted, got %q", tObj.tokenURL)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(buf.String(), "SECURITY:") {
-		t.Fatalf("accepted https endpoints must not log a SECURITY line, got:\n%s", buf.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_HTTPJWKSAndAuthEndpointsFailLoudly extends the
-// pin to the other two endpoints login cannot function without: jwks_uri
-// (signature verification) and authorization (the redirect target). Each
-// must independently trigger its own named SECURITY line.
-func TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_HTTPJWKSAndAuthEndpointsFailLoudly(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		field    string
-		endpoint string
-	}{
-		{field: "jwks_uri", endpoint: "http://provider.example.com/jwks"},
-		{field: "authorization", endpoint: "http://provider.example.com/auth"},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.field, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var buf bytes.Buffer
-			tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-				logger:      fix26CapturingLogger(&buf),
-				providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-			}
-			md := &ProviderMetadata{}
-			switch tc.field {
-			case "jwks_uri":
-				md.JWKSURL = tc.endpoint
-			case "authorization":
-				md.AuthURL = tc.endpoint
-			}
-			tObj.updateMetadataEndpoints(md)
-
-			logged := buf.String()
-			if !strings.Contains(logged, "SECURITY:") {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: dropping the endpoint must log a SECURITY-tagged line, got:\n%s", tc.field, logged)
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(logged, tc.field) {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: the SECURITY line must name the endpoint, got:\n%s", tc.field, logged)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_RegistrationNeverLogsSecurityLine pins that
-// the registration endpoint never trips the SECURITY-tagged line. It is the
-// one discovered endpoint of the four (end_session, revocation,
-// introspection, registration) with no config*URL field checked inside
-// updateMetadataEndpoints at all: RegisterClient reads dcrConfig.
-// RegistrationEndpoint directly (main.go, outside this function) whenever
-// it is set, so a dropped discovered value here is orthogonal to whether
-// that separate override exists.
-func TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_RegistrationNeverLogsSecurityLine(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-		logger:      fix26CapturingLogger(&buf),
-		providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-	}
-
-	tObj.updateMetadataEndpoints(&ProviderMetadata{
-		RegistrationURL: "http://provider.example.com/register",
-	})
-
-	logged := buf.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(logged, "Ignoring discovered registration") {
-		t.Fatalf("registration must still be dropped with the generic line, got:\n%s", logged)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(logged, "SECURITY:") {
-		t.Fatalf("registration must never log a SECURITY line, got:\n%s", logged)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_NonCriticalEndpointsWithoutOverrideLogSecurityLine
-// pins the re-review fix at main.go:658 (low severity): a scheme-downgrade
-// drop of end_session, revocation or introspection is exactly as terminal
-// as a drop of jwks_uri/authorization/token WHEN the operator has not set
-// the matching override (oidcEndSessionURL / revocationURL /
-// introspectionURL) -- logout falls back to a local-only redirect, provider
-// revocation is skipped, or requireTokenIntrospection breaks, all silently
-// except for the generic "Ignoring discovered" line. The old
-// discoveredEndpointHasNoOverride was static and always answered false for
-// these three regardless of whether an override was actually configured, so
-// the SECURITY line never fired for them even with no override at all. It
-// must now fire exactly when the corresponding override is empty.
-func TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_NonCriticalEndpointsWithoutOverrideLogSecurityLine(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		field    string
-		endpoint string
-	}{
-		{field: "end_session", endpoint: "http://provider.example.com/logout"},
-		{field: "revocation", endpoint: "http://provider.example.com/revoke"},
-		{field: "introspection", endpoint: "http://provider.example.com/introspect"},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.field, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var buf bytes.Buffer
-			// Deliberately no configEndSessionURL/configRevocationURL/
-			// configIntrospectionURL set: the operator configured no
-			// override for any of these three.
-			tObj := &TraefikOidc{
-				logger:      fix26CapturingLogger(&buf),
-				providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-			}
-			md := &ProviderMetadata{}
-			switch tc.field {
-			case "end_session":
-				md.EndSessionURL = tc.endpoint
-			case "revocation":
-				md.RevokeURL = tc.endpoint
-			case "introspection":
-				md.IntrospectionURL = tc.endpoint
-			}
-			tObj.updateMetadataEndpoints(md)
-
-			logged := buf.String()
-			if !strings.Contains(logged, "Ignoring discovered "+tc.field) {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: the endpoint must still be dropped with the generic line, got:\n%s", tc.field, logged)
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(logged, "SECURITY:") {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: dropping it with no configured override must log a SECURITY-tagged line, got:\n%s", tc.field, logged)
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(logged, "no override") {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: the SECURITY line must state that this check has no override, got:\n%s", tc.field, logged)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_ConfigOverrideReplacesDroppedEndpoint pins the
-// second half of the same finding, table-driven over all three endpoints
-// that carry an override: setting the operator override for an endpoint
-// discovery drops for the scheme-downgrade reason means the endpoint does
-// not stay empty — the override runs right after sanitize and replaces it,
-// so a "requests needing this endpoint will fail" style claim would be
-// false for these three. Only end_session was pinned before; a regression
-// that stopped applying configRevocationURL or configIntrospectionURL
-// specifically would have left every test green (re-review finding at
-// fix26_scheme_downgrade_test.go:218).
-func TestUpdateMetadataEndpoints_ConfigOverrideReplacesDroppedEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		field        string
-		droppedURL   string
-		overrideURL  string
-		buildMD      func(dropped string) *ProviderMetadata
-		buildTObj    func(logger *Logger, override string) *TraefikOidc
-		resultingURL func(tObj *TraefikOidc) string
-	}{
-		{
-			field:       "end_session",
-			droppedURL:  "http://provider.example.com/logout",
-			overrideURL: "https://provider.example.com/logout-override",
-			buildMD: func(dropped string) *ProviderMetadata {
-				return &ProviderMetadata{EndSessionURL: dropped}
-			},
-			buildTObj: func(logger *Logger, override string) *TraefikOidc {
-				return &TraefikOidc{
-					logger:              logger,
-					providerURL:         "https://provider.example.com",
-					configEndSessionURL: override,
-				}
-			},
-			resultingURL: func(tObj *TraefikOidc) string { return tObj.endSessionURL },
-		},
-		{
-			field:       "revocation",
-			droppedURL:  "http://provider.example.com/revoke",
-			overrideURL: "https://provider.example.com/revoke-override",
-			buildMD: func(dropped string) *ProviderMetadata {
-				return &ProviderMetadata{RevokeURL: dropped}
-			},
-			buildTObj: func(logger *Logger, override string) *TraefikOidc {
-				return &TraefikOidc{
-					logger:              logger,
-					providerURL:         "https://provider.example.com",
-					configRevocationURL: override,
-				}
-			},
-			resultingURL: func(tObj *TraefikOidc) string { return tObj.revocationURL },
-		},
-		{
-			field:       "introspection",
-			droppedURL:  "http://provider.example.com/introspect",
-			overrideURL: "https://provider.example.com/introspect-override",
-			buildMD: func(dropped string) *ProviderMetadata {
-				return &ProviderMetadata{IntrospectionURL: dropped}
-			},
-			buildTObj: func(logger *Logger, override string) *TraefikOidc {
-				return &TraefikOidc{
-					logger:                 logger,
-					providerURL:            "https://provider.example.com",
-					configIntrospectionURL: override,
-				}
-			},
-			resultingURL: func(tObj *TraefikOidc) string { return tObj.introspectionURL },
-		},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.field, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var buf bytes.Buffer
-			tObj := tc.buildTObj(fix26CapturingLogger(&buf), tc.overrideURL)
-
-			tObj.updateMetadataEndpoints(tc.buildMD(tc.droppedURL))
-
-			if got := tc.resultingURL(tObj); got != tc.overrideURL {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: the configured override must replace the dropped discovered endpoint, got %q, want %q", tc.field, got, tc.overrideURL)
-			}
-			if strings.Contains(buf.String(), "SECURITY:") {
-				t.Fatalf("%s: has a config override, so no SECURITY line applies, got:\n%s", tc.field, buf.String())
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

fix34_idtoken_header_test.go

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Regression test for FIX-34 (review-2026-09-10 finding at
-// middleware.go:1169, low severity): forwardAuthorized truncated an
-// oversized ID token to headerTemplateMaxLen (8192) bytes and still
-// forwarded it in X-Auth-Request-Token. A truncated JWT is structurally
-// invalid; a downstream that verifies the signature rejects it (fail
-// closed, fine), but one that merely base64-decodes claims without
-// verifying reads a corrupted, silently-wrong value. The header must be
-// dropped instead, matching the fail-closed pattern already used elsewhere
-// in forwardAuthorized (X-Forwarded-User / X-Auth-Request-User on a failed
-// sanitization).
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestForwardAuthorized_OversizedIDTokenDropsHeaderInsteadOfTruncating pins
-// FIX-34: an ID token longer than headerTemplateMaxLen must not appear in
-// X-Auth-Request-Token at all, truncated or otherwise.
-func TestForwardAuthorized_OversizedIDTokenDropsHeaderInsteadOfTruncating(t *testing.T) {
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		next:   http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {}),
-		logger: NewLogger("error"),
-		// minimalHeaders defaults false: the X-Auth-Request-* block (where
-		// X-Auth-Request-Token is set) only runs when it is false.
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	oversizedIDToken := strings.Repeat("a", headerTemplateMaxLen+1)
-	p := &principal{
-		Identifier: "user",
-		IDToken:    oversizedIDToken,
-	}
-	oidc.forwardAuthorized(rw, req, p)
-
-	if got := req.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-Token"); got != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("X-Auth-Request-Token must be dropped (not truncated) for an oversized ID token; got %d bytes, want header absent", len(got))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestForwardAuthorized_IDTokenWithinLimitStillForwarded is the control: an
-// ID token at or under the header budget must still be forwarded
-// unmodified, so the fix does not regress the common case.
-func TestForwardAuthorized_IDTokenWithinLimitStillForwarded(t *testing.T) {
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		next:   http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {}),
-		logger: NewLogger("error"),
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
-	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	idToken := "header.payload.signature"
-	p := &principal{
-		Identifier: "user",
-		IDToken:    idToken,
-	}
-	oidc.forwardAuthorized(rw, req, p)
-
-	if got := req.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-Token"); got != idToken {
-		t.Fatalf("X-Auth-Request-Token = %q, want the unmodified ID token %q", got, idToken)
-	}
-}

fix35_lifecycle_race_test.go

@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// FIX-35: Close() decided "am I the last live instance" once, early in its
-// shutdown sequence (unregisterLiveInstance()'s return value), then reused
-// that stale boolean much later to decide whether to stop process-global
-// singleton tasks (memory-monitor, singleton-token-cleanup,
-// singleton-metadata-refresh-*). Session/cache teardown happens in between,
-// taking real time. A concurrently-created new instance (an overlapping
-// Traefik reload) can register and adopt those same singletons in that
-// window; the old instance's stale decision then stops them anyway, and the
-// new instance runs with no memory monitor, token cleanup, or health checks
-// until the next reload.
-//
-// TestFix35_ConcurrentNewKeepsSingletonAliveAcrossOldClose drives the REAL
-// (*TraefikOidc).Close() through this exact window via closeTestHook, rather
-// than re-implementing Close's stop decision inline: a test that never calls
-// Close itself stays green even if the production fix (utilities.go's fresh,
-// lock-guarded re-check; main.go's registerLiveInstance-before-adoption
-// ordering) is reverted, which is a much weaker regression pin.
-//
-// It establishes its own liveInstanceCount baseline (save, zero, restore via
-// t.Cleanup) instead of assuming the package-global counter is already 0.
-// Without that, a live instance left registered by an earlier test in the
-// same run (any order under -shuffle) makes the pre-FIX-35 stale "was last"
-// decision already false on its own, so this test cannot tell a reverted fix
-// from a working one — it passes either way.
-func TestFix35_ConcurrentNewKeepsSingletonAliveAcrossOldClose(t *testing.T) {
-	// Save whether memory-monitor was already running before ResetGlobalMemoryMonitor
-	// below stops it, and restore that state afterward (registered first, so
-	// it runs LAST among this function's cleanups, after ResetGlobalMemoryMonitor
-	// has already torn the singleton down) — otherwise this test permanently
-	// destroys memory-monitor for every other test that runs afterward in the
-	// same binary, regardless of what state it found the process in.
-	wasMemoryMonitorRunning := GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning("memory-monitor")
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		if wasMemoryMonitorRunning {
-			GetGlobalMemoryMonitor().StartMonitoring(context.Background(), time.Second)
-		}
-	})
-
-	ResetGlobalMemoryMonitor()
-	t.Cleanup(ResetGlobalMemoryMonitor)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { closeTestHook = nil })
-
-	baseline := resetLiveInstanceCountForTest()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { restoreLiveInstanceCountForTest(baseline) })
-
-	// --- Old instance: already live, has adopted the memory-monitor singleton
-	// (mirrors main.go's registerLiveInstance() followed by
-	// memoryMonitor.StartMonitoring()).
-	registerLiveInstance()
-	mm := GetGlobalMemoryMonitor()
-	oldCtx, oldCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer oldCancel()
-	mm.StartMonitoring(oldCtx, time.Second)
-	if !GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning("memory-monitor") {
-		t.Fatal("precondition: memory-monitor must be running after StartMonitoring")
-	}
-
-	// --- Simulate the concurrent New(): a new instance registers and adopts
-	// the memory-monitor singleton in the window between the old instance's
-	// unregisterLiveInstance() and its gated singleton stops. closeTestHook
-	// fires from inside the real Close(), at exactly that point.
-	newCtx, newCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer newCancel()
-	closeTestHook = func() {
-		registerLiveInstance()
-		mm.StartMonitoring(newCtx, time.Second) // adopts: already running, so this is a no-op start.
-	}
-	// Undo the hook's registerLiveInstance for the new instance and actually
-	// stop the task so it does not outlive this test. Runs via t.Cleanup
-	// (LIFO, before the baseline restore above) so it still executes even if
-	// an assertion below fails the test early.
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		unregisterLiveInstance()
-		_ = GetResourceManager().StopBackgroundTask("memory-monitor")
-	})
-
-	// --- Drive the real Close() on an instance built the same way New()
-	// builds one for this purpose: registered live, nothing else set (every
-	// other field Close touches is nil-guarded).
-	oldInstance := &TraefikOidc{logger: GetSingletonNoOpLogger()}
-	if err := oldInstance.Close(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Close returned an error: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	if !GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning("memory-monitor") {
-		t.Fatal("memory-monitor must keep running: a new instance registered and adopted it before Close's last-instance decision")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFix35_StopIfLastInstanceHoldsLockAcrossCheckAndStop pins the FIX-35
-// review's major finding: a separate fresh-read check only wraps the counter
-// read. Used as `if check() { stop() }`, liveInstanceMu is
-// released as soon as the check returns, before stop() (which can block for
-// real time — BackgroundTask.Stop waits up to 5s per task) ever runs. A
-// concurrent registerLiveInstance() can land in that gap and have its
-// just-adopted singleton killed by a stop decision made before it
-// registered.
-//
-// stopIfLastInstance closes that window by holding liveInstanceMu across
-// both the check and the stop call. This test proves the lock is genuinely
-// held for the stop's full duration: while a slow stop callback is running,
-// a concurrent registerLiveInstance() must not be able to complete.
-func TestFix35_StopIfLastInstanceHoldsLockAcrossCheckAndStop(t *testing.T) {
-	baseline := resetLiveInstanceCountForTest()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { restoreLiveInstanceCountForTest(baseline) })
-
-	stopStarted := make(chan struct{})
-	releaseStop := make(chan struct{})
-	stopDone := make(chan struct{})
-
-	go func() {
-		stopIfLastInstance(func() {
-			close(stopStarted)
-			<-releaseStop // hold the "stop" open, simulating BackgroundTask.Stop's wait.
-		})
-		close(stopDone)
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-stopStarted:
-	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("stopIfLastInstance never invoked its stop callback at baseline (count 0)")
-	}
-
-	registerDone := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		registerLiveInstance()
-		close(registerDone)
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-registerDone:
-		t.Fatal("registerLiveInstance completed while the stop callback was still running — liveInstanceMu was not held across the stop, reopening the check-then-stop window")
-	case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
-		// Expected: still blocked on liveInstanceMu.
-	}
-
-	close(releaseStop)
-
-	select {
-	case <-registerDone:
-	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("registerLiveInstance did not complete after the stop callback released liveInstanceMu")
-	}
-	<-stopDone
-
-	unregisterLiveInstance() // balance the registerLiveInstance above
-}
-
-// resetLiveInstanceCountForTest establishes a clean baseline (0) for the
-// package-level liveInstanceCount so a test's last-instance decisions are not
-// skewed by instances registered-and-never-unregistered by earlier tests in
-// the same process. Test-only; mirrors resetGdInstancesForTest. Returns the
-// value liveInstanceCount held before the reset so the caller can restore it
-// via t.Cleanup (restoreLiveInstanceCountForTest) instead of permanently
-// clobbering a nonzero baseline left by another test in the same run.
-func resetLiveInstanceCountForTest() int32 {
-	liveInstanceMu.Lock()
-	defer liveInstanceMu.Unlock()
-	previous := liveInstanceCount
-	liveInstanceCount = 0
-	return previous
-}
-
-// restoreLiveInstanceCountForTest sets the package-level liveInstanceCount
-// back to a value captured by resetLiveInstanceCountForTest. Test-only.
-func restoreLiveInstanceCountForTest(previous int32) {
-	liveInstanceMu.Lock()
-	defer liveInstanceMu.Unlock()
-	liveInstanceCount = previous
-}

fix42_rsa_key_min_bits_test.go

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"errors"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestValidateAlgKeyMatch_RejectsRSAKeyUnder2048Bits pins FIX-42: the
-// RFC 7518 §3.3 minimum key-size rejection that 8640451 added to
-// validateAlgKeyMatch (client_assertion.go:107) for private_key_jwt RS*/PS*
-// signing keys, undocumented in that commit. FIX-25's sibling decision keeps
-// the rejection as-is and records it in CHANGELOG.md; this test pins the
-// contract with a named, matchable sentinel error so the rejection survives
-// refactors and callers can detect it with errors.Is instead of matching a
-// log string.
-func TestValidateAlgKeyMatch_RejectsRSAKeyUnder2048Bits(t *testing.T) {
-	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 1024)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("failed to generate 1024-bit test RSA key: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	err = validateAlgKeyMatch("RS256", key)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("a 1024-bit RSA key must be rejected for RS256, got nil error")
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrRSAKeyTooSmall) {
-		t.Fatalf("error must wrap ErrRSAKeyTooSmall so callers can match it with errors.Is, got: %v", err)
-	}
-	const wantSubstring = "requires an RSA key of at least 2048 bits"
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), wantSubstring) {
-		t.Fatalf("error message must state the requirement (%q), got: %v", wantSubstring, err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidateAlgKeyMatch_Accepts2048BitRSAKey is the boundary/positive
-// case: a key at exactly the 2048-bit floor must be accepted.
-func TestValidateAlgKeyMatch_Accepts2048BitRSAKey(t *testing.T) {
-	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("failed to generate 2048-bit test RSA key: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := validateAlgKeyMatch("RS256", key); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("a 2048-bit RSA key must be accepted for RS256, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}

forwarded_uri.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// originalRequestURI returns the request URI that should be used as the
+// post-login redirect target. When TrustForwardedURI is enabled and the
+// X-Forwarded-Uri header carries a safe same-origin path, that header
+// wins. Otherwise (or if the header is missing/unsafe), falls back to
+// req.URL.RequestURI() — the path the request reached the proxy with.
+//
+// "Safe" means: starts with "/", does NOT start with "//" (protocol-relative
+// URLs can change host), and has no scheme or host after parsing. This
+// prevents an attacker-controllable header from triggering an open redirect
+// via http.Redirect later in the auth flow.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) originalRequestURI(req *http.Request) string {
+	if t.trustForwardedURI {
+		if v := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); v != "" && isSafeRedirectTarget(v) {
+			return v
+		}
+	}
+	return req.URL.RequestURI()
+}
+
+func isSafeRedirectTarget(v string) bool {
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(v, "/") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "//") {
+		return false
+	}
+	u, err := url.Parse(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return u.Host == "" && u.Scheme == ""
+}

forwarded_uri_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_DefaultOff(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: false}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected?x=1", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/spoofed")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected?x=1" {
+		t.Fatalf("default-off: want /protected?x=1, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_TrustEnabled(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected?x=1", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/real?y=2")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/real?y=2" {
+		t.Fatalf("trust-on with header: want /real?y=2, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_TrustEnabledNoHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("trust-on no header: want /protected, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_RejectsAbsoluteURL(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "https://evil.example/phish")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("absolute URL must be rejected, want /protected fallback, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_RejectsProtocolRelative(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "//evil.example/phish")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("protocol-relative URL must be rejected, want /protected fallback, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_AcceptsSafePathWithQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/safe?x=1&y=2")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/safe?x=1&y=2" {
+		t.Fatalf("safe path with query must be accepted, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_RejectsBareHostnameNoSlash(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "evil.example/phish")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("non-/ prefix must be rejected, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+

gd_concurrent_create_during_last_close_test.go

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// TestSharedHealthTaskSurvivesCreateDuringLastClose pins the create-versus-
-// last-close race on the shared graceful-degradation health-check task.
-//
-// Close() decides it is the last live instance and then stops the shared task.
-// A GracefulDegradation created between that decision and the stop used to
-// register at once, and its health routine adopted the still-running task.
-// The stop then killed the task that the new, live instance relies on, and
-// nothing restarted it.
-//
-// The test pauses the last instance's Close() between the decision and the
-// stop (beforeSharedTaskStop), creates a new instance, and then lets the stop
-// run. The new instance is live, so the shared task must be running at the end.
-func TestSharedHealthTaskSurvivesCreateDuringLastClose(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Cleanup(snapshotAndClearGdInstancesForTest())
-
-	cfg := DefaultGracefulDegradationConfig()
-	cfg.HealthCheckInterval = time.Hour
-	logger := GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
-
-	gdA := NewGracefulDegradation(cfg, logger)
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, gdA)
-	if !GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning(gdHealthTaskName) {
-		t.Fatal("precondition: shared health-check task must run while gdA is live")
-	}
-
-	parked := make(chan struct{})
-	release := make(chan struct{})
-	gdA.beforeSharedTaskStop = func() {
-		close(parked)
-		<-release
-	}
-
-	closed := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		gdA.Close()
-		close(closed)
-	}()
-	select {
-	case <-parked:
-	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("gdA.Close did not reach the shared-task stop")
-	}
-
-	created := make(chan *GracefulDegradation, 1)
-	go func() { created <- NewGracefulDegradation(cfg, logger) }()
-
-	// Without serialization, gdB registers at once and its routine adopts the
-	// still-running task before gdA stops it. With serialization, gdB waits
-	// behind gdA's stop; the bound only limits how long the test waits then.
-	var gdB *GracefulDegradation
-	select {
-	case gdB = <-created:
-		waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, gdB)
-	case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
-	}
-
-	close(release)
-	select {
-	case <-closed:
-	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("gdA.Close did not return")
-	}
-	if gdB == nil {
-		select {
-		case gdB = <-created:
-		case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
-			t.Fatal("NewGracefulDegradation did not return after gdA.Close")
-		}
-	}
-	defer gdB.Close()
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, gdB)
-
-	if !GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning(gdHealthTaskName) {
-		t.Fatal("shared health-check task is stopped although gdB is still live")
-	}
-}

gd_health_task_close_race_test.go

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-const gdHealthTaskName = "graceful-degradation-health-check"
-
-// TestSharedHealthTaskNotRestartedAfterLastClose pins the stop-versus-start
-// race behind the flaky TestSharedHealthTaskSurvivesOtherInstanceClose.
-//
-// startHealthCheckRoutine checks gd.stopChan under gd.mutex and then creates
-// or adopts the shared health-check task. Close() used to close stopChan
-// without gd.mutex, so a routine that had already passed its check could
-// reach the task registry AFTER the last Close() stopped the task.
-// RegisterBackgroundTask replaces a stopped task with a fresh one, so the
-// routine restarted the shared task with no live instance left to stop it.
-//
-// The test parks gd2's routine right after its stopChan check by holding the
-// task-registry mutex (Close never takes it), closes both instances, and then
-// releases the routine. The shared task must stay stopped.
-func TestSharedHealthTaskNotRestartedAfterLastClose(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Cleanup(snapshotAndClearGdInstancesForTest())
-
-	cfg := DefaultGracefulDegradationConfig()
-	cfg.HealthCheckInterval = time.Hour
-	logger := GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
-
-	gd1 := NewGracefulDegradation(cfg, logger)
-	defer gd1.Close()
-	waitForHealthRoutineSettled(t, gd1)
-	if !GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning(gdHealthTaskName) {
-		t.Fatal("precondition: shared health-check task must run while gd1 is live")
-	}
-
-	globalTaskRegistryMutex.Lock()
-	registryLocked := true
-	releaseRegistry := func() {
-		if registryLocked {
-			registryLocked = false
-			globalTaskRegistryMutex.Unlock()
-		}
-	}
-	defer releaseRegistry()
-
-	gd2 := NewGracefulDegradation(cfg, logger)
-	defer gd2.Close()
-	waitForGoroutineParkedIn(t, "(*GracefulDegradation).startHealthCheckRoutine", "traefikoidc.GetGlobalTaskRegistry")
-
-	gd1.Close()
-
-	closed := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		gd2.Close()
-		close(closed)
-	}()
-
-	// Release the parked routine once the last Close() has stopped the task.
-	// A Close() that waits for the in-flight routine keeps the task running,
-	// so the bound only limits how long this test waits in that case.
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(200 * time.Millisecond)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) && GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning(gdHealthTaskName) {
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	releaseRegistry()
-
-	select {
-	case <-closed:
-	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("gd2.Close did not return")
-	}
-
-	// gd2's routine holds gd2.mutex until it has created or adopted a task,
-	// so taking the lock waits for the routine to finish.
-	gd2.mutex.RLock()
-	routineTask := gd2.healthCheckTask
-	gd2.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-	if routineTask != nil && atomic.LoadInt32(&routineTask.stopped) == 0 {
-		routineTask.Stop()
-		t.Error("gd2's health routine holds a running task after the last GracefulDegradation closed")
-	}
-	if GetResourceManager().IsTaskRunning(gdHealthTaskName) {
-		_ = GetResourceManager().StopBackgroundTask(gdHealthTaskName)
-		t.Error("shared health-check task was restarted after the last GracefulDegradation closed")
-	}
-}
-
-// waitForGoroutineParkedIn polls all goroutine stacks until one stack contains
-// every given frame substring.
-func waitForGoroutineParkedIn(t *testing.T, frames ...string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		if goroutineStackContains(frames...) {
-			return
-		}
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("no goroutine parked in %v", frames)
-}
-
-func goroutineStackContains(frames ...string) bool {
-	buf := make([]byte, 1<<20)
-	for {
-		n := runtime.Stack(buf, true)
-		if n < len(buf) {
-			buf = buf[:n]
-			break
-		}
-		buf = make([]byte, 2*len(buf))
-	}
-	for _, stack := range strings.Split(string(buf), "\n\n") {
-		if stackHasAllFrames(stack, frames) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func stackHasAllFrames(stack string, frames []string) bool {
-	for _, f := range frames {
-		if !strings.Contains(stack, f) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}

gd_test_helpers_test.go

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// Shared GracefulDegradation-instance-registry test helper for
-// round-regression and FIX-round tests.
-//
-// Moved here for the R4 re-review (closing the rest of FIX-41): resetGdInstancesForTest
-// was declared inside review_r34_regression_test.go but consumed by
-// fix18_gd_lifecycle_test.go, a FIX-round test file — the dependency was not
-// even confined to other round files. Every review_rNN*_test.go and
-// fixNN*_test.go file must depend only on shared helpers like this one,
-// never on another round file's private declarations.
-
-// resetGdInstancesForTest establishes a clean baseline for the process-global
-// gdInstances registry so a test's "last instance" and iteration assertions
-// are not skewed by instances created by earlier tests in the same process.
-func resetGdInstancesForTest() {
-	gdInstances.Lock()
-	gdInstances.set = make(map[*GracefulDegradation]struct{})
-	gdInstances.Unlock()
-}

go.mod

@@ -2,15 +2,9 @@ module github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
 
 go 1.24.0
 
-// Pin the toolchain to a stdlib version without the go1.26.5 CVEs
-// (GO-2026-6089 net/http ReadHeaderTimeout, GO-2026-5972 asn1 recursion,
-// GO-2026-5026 idna) reported by govulncheck (R219). Auto-downloaded.
-toolchain go1.26.6
-
 require (
 	github.com/alicebob/miniredis/v2 v2.35.0
 	github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0
-	github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3
 	github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.17.2
 	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0
 	golang.org/x/time v0.14.0

go.sum

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 h1:YCIWL56dvtr73r6715mJs5ZvhtnY73hBvEF8kX
 github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2/go.mod h1:NfCASbcHqRSY+3a8tlWJwsQap2VX5pwzwo4h3eOamfo=
 github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0 h1:XYlkq7KcpOB2ZhHBPv5WpjMIxrQosiZanfoy1HLZFzg=
 github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0/go.mod h1:ePLdVu+jbEgHH+KWw8I1z2wqd0BAdAQh/8LRvBeoNcQ=
-github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3 h1:xoDtBqeZGmXj7IteiE1M5WMuzeoqag58qEleI0Cf2Ms=
-github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3/go.mod h1:+Cn78qZo8rc3T9eZt0v3oICYRdd75wORtSidc8lNjDQ=
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
 github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.17.2 h1:P2EGsA4qVIM3Pp+aPocCJ7DguDHhqrXNhVcEp4ViluI=

goroutine_manager.go

@@ -63,14 +63,6 @@ func (m *GoroutineManager) StartGoroutine(name string, fn func(context.Context))
 			m.wg.Done()
 			m.mu.Lock()
 			managedGoroutine.running = false
-			// Prune the map entry once this goroutine has finished so that
-			// finished goroutines don't accumulate unboundedly (R157). Only
-			// delete when the current entry still IS the finishing
-			// goroutine: a concurrent Start with the same name may have
-			// already replaced it with a live one.
-			if cur, ok := m.goroutines[goroutineName]; ok && cur == managedGoroutine {
-				delete(m.goroutines, goroutineName)
-			}
 			m.mu.Unlock()
 
 			// Recover from panics

goroutine_manager_test.go

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ func TestStartGoroutine(t *testing.T) {
 
 	gm.StartGoroutine("test-goroutine", func(ctx context.Context) {
 		executed.Store(true)
-		<-ctx.Done() // keep alive so it is tracked while running
 	})
 
 	// Give goroutine time to execute
@@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ func TestStartGoroutine(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("Expected goroutine to execute")
 	}
 
-	// A live goroutine is tracked (R157: finished goroutines are pruned).
 	status := gm.GetStatus()
 	if len(status) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("Expected 1 goroutine in status, got %d", len(status))
@@ -372,9 +370,8 @@ func TestGetStatus(t *testing.T) {
 
 	status := gm.GetStatus()
 
-	// R157: finished goroutines are pruned, so only the live one remains.
-	if len(status) != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("Expected 1 live goroutine in status, got %d", len(status))
+	if len(status) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("Expected 2 goroutines in status, got %d", len(status))
 	}
 
 	if runningStatus, exists := status["running"]; exists {
@@ -397,8 +394,12 @@ func TestGetStatus(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("Expected 'running' goroutine in status")
 	}
 
-	if _, exists := status["quick"]; exists {
-		t.Error("Expected finished 'quick' goroutine to be pruned from status")
+	if quickStatus, exists := status["quick"]; exists {
+		if quickStatus.Running {
+			t.Error("Expected 'quick' goroutine to be marked as not running")
+		}
+	} else {
+		t.Error("Expected 'quick' goroutine in status")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -434,7 +435,7 @@ func TestConcurrentStartGoroutine(t *testing.T) {
 			name := "concurrent-" + string(rune('0'+id%10)) + string(rune('0'+id/10))
 			gm.StartGoroutine(name, func(ctx context.Context) {
 				counter.Add(1)
-				<-ctx.Done() // stay alive so it is still tracked (R157 prunes finished ones)
+				time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
 				counter.Add(-1)
 			})
 		}(i)

helpers.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -14,6 +13,8 @@ import (
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/utils"
 )
 
 // newUUIDv4 returns an RFC 4122 v4 UUID string (e.g.
@@ -108,13 +109,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 	data := url.Values{
 		"grant_type": {grantType},
 	}
-	// Snapshot client credentials under metadataMu: DCR rewrites clientID/
-	// clientSecret/audience at runtime (R137).
-	clientID, clientSecret, clientAuthMethod, _, clientAssertion := t.clientCredentials()
 	// client_id is sent in the body for every method except client_secret_basic,
 	// where it is carried in the Authorization header per RFC 6749 §2.3.1.
-	if clientAuthMethod != "client_secret_basic" || clientAssertion != nil {
-		data.Set("client_id", clientID)
+	if t.clientAuthMethod != "client_secret_basic" || t.clientAssertion != nil {
+		data.Set("client_id", t.clientID)
 	}
 
 	if grantType == "authorization_code" {
@@ -128,13 +126,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 		data.Set("refresh_token", codeOrToken)
 	}
 
-	// RFC 8707 §2.2: repeat the same resource indicator sent on the
-	// authorization request so refreshed tokens keep the same audience
-	// binding as the original grant.
-	if t.resource != "" {
-		data.Set("resource", t.resource)
-	}
-
 	client := t.tokenHTTPClient
 	if client == nil {
 		// Use shared transport pool to prevent memory leaks
@@ -159,29 +150,29 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 	t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
 
 	useBasicAuth := false
-	if clientAssertion != nil {
-		assertion, err := clientAssertion.Sign(tokenURL, clientID)
+	if t.clientAssertion != nil {
+		assertion, err := t.clientAssertion.Sign(tokenURL, t.clientID)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign client assertion: %w", err)
 		}
 		data.Set("client_assertion_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer")
 		data.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
-	} else if clientAuthMethod == "client_secret_basic" {
+	} else if t.clientAuthMethod == "client_secret_basic" {
 		useBasicAuth = true
 	} else {
-		data.Set("client_secret", clientSecret)
+		data.Set("client_secret", t.clientSecret)
 	}
 
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode())) //nolint:gosec // tokenURL is the operator-trusted discovery endpoint (metadataMu)
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
 	if useBasicAuth {
-		setOAuthBasicAuth(req, clientID, clientSecret)
+		setOAuthBasicAuth(req, t.clientID, t.clientSecret)
 	}
 
-	resp, err := client.Do(req) //nolint:gosec // req above targets the trusted tokenURL
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange tokens: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -193,33 +184,14 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		limitReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*10)
 		bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(limitReader) // Safe to ignore: reading error body for diagnostics
-		// Return a *HTTPError so the retry executor's isRetryableError can
-		// classify transient 5xx/429 responses and actually retry (R118).
-		// A plain error here made the 5xx/429 retry branch dead in
-		// production — every token-endpoint status was treated as permanent.
-		return nil, &HTTPError{
-			StatusCode: resp.StatusCode,
-			Message:    fmt.Sprintf("token endpoint returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes)),
-		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token endpoint returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
 	}
 
 	var tokenResponse TokenResponse
-	// Cap the decoded body so a corrupted or malicious oversized 200-body cannot
-	// drive an unbounded read/allocation. Token responses are small (a few KB).
-	if err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(&tokenResponse); err != nil {
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tokenResponse); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token response: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// RFC 6749 §5.1: a token response MUST include an access_token. A 200
-	// that omitted it is a protocol violation, not a success — treat it as an
-	// error here so no caller authenticates with a blank token (R158).
-	// Previously this seam returned success with an empty access_token and
-	// each caller had to re-check "AccessToken == \"\"", which several
-	// paths missed.
-	if tokenResponse.AccessToken == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token endpoint returned 200 without an access_token (RFC 6749 §5.1)")
-	}
-
 	return &tokenResponse, nil
 }
 
@@ -232,17 +204,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 // Returns:
 //   - *TokenResponse: New token set from the authorization server
 //   - An error if the refresh operation fails
-//
-// redactToken returns a short, stable hash of a token credential suitable for
-// debug logging without leaking the credential itself (R138).
-func redactToken(token string) string {
-	if token == "" {
-		return "(empty)"
-	}
-	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", sum[:4])
-}
-
 func (t *TraefikOidc) getNewTokenWithRefreshToken(refreshToken string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
@@ -257,8 +218,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) getNewTokenWithRefreshToken(refreshToken string) (*TokenRe
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh token: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	t.logger.Debugf("Refresh token response: token_type=%s expires_in=%d access_token=%s",
-		tokenResponse.TokenType, tokenResponse.ExpiresIn, redactToken(tokenResponse.AccessToken))
+	t.logger.Debugf("Token response: %+v", tokenResponse)
 	return tokenResponse, nil
 }
 
@@ -420,14 +380,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	idToken := session.GetIDToken()
-	accessToken := session.GetAccessToken()
-	refreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken()
-	// Capture the trusted origin BEFORE Clear wipes the session. redirect_url
-	// was persisted at authentication-initiate time (R136) and is therefore
-	// the exact scheme+host the IdP already accepted as this deployment's
-	// redirect_uri — unlike the current request's Host/X-Forwarded-Host,
-	// the browser cannot spoof it on this logout request (FIX-07).
-	trustedOrigin := trustedOriginFromRedirectURL(session.GetRedirectURL())
 
 	if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing session: %v", err)
@@ -435,74 +387,15 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Blacklist the session's tokens so a token captured before logout (e.g. a
-	// bearer mode access token) cannot be reused until its natural expiry.
-	// RevokeToken is a no-op-safe local blacklist (guards nil) and skips
-	// empty values.
-	for _, tok := range []string{accessToken, idToken, refreshToken} {
-		if tok != "" {
-			t.RevokeToken(tok)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Best-effort provider-side revocation (single logout): the local
-	// blacklist only stops reuse in-process, but a token captured before
-	// logout (e.g. a bearer-mode access token or the refresh token) stays
-	// valid at the IdP and a captured refresh token could keep minting new
-	// tokens. Revoke both access and refresh tokens at the provider when a
-	// revocation endpoint is available. Each call is bounded by
-	// revocationRequestTimeout so a slow or unreachable provider cannot
-	// hold the logout redirect open indefinitely (FIX-33). A genuine
-	// failure is logged at error level; the expected "no revocation
-	// endpoint configured" case (most deployments) stays silent so it
-	// doesn't log on every logout.
-	if accessToken != "" {
-		if err := t.RevokeTokenWithProvider(accessToken, "access_token"); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, ErrRevocationEndpointNotConfigured) {
-			t.logger.Errorf("Provider-side revocation failed for access_token: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-	if refreshToken != "" {
-		if err := t.RevokeTokenWithProvider(refreshToken, "refresh_token"); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, ErrRevocationEndpointNotConfigured) {
-			t.logger.Errorf("Provider-side revocation failed for refresh_token: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
+	host := utils.DetermineHost(req)
+	scheme := utils.DetermineScheme(req, t.forceHTTPS)
+	baseURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", scheme, host)
 
 	postLogoutRedirectURI := t.postLogoutRedirectURI
-	// localRedirect is used when there is no provider end-session endpoint and
-	// the plugin redirects the browser itself. It must never be an absolute URL
-	// derived from the request host (X-Forwarded-Host is client-controllable and
-	// would be an open redirect); use a host-relative path, or the operator's
-	// own configured absolute URL, instead.
-	//
-	// The post_logout_redirect_uri we hand to the IdP has the same constraint:
-	// deriving it from baseURL (scheme://client-controlled host) lets an
-	// attacker's X-Forwarded-Host steer the browser to an arbitrary origin
-	// after logout (open redirect through the IdP). So we build it from
-	// trustedOrigin (the redirect_uri origin the IdP already accepted at
-	// login, R136) instead; when no trusted origin was recorded (pre-R136
-	// session, or logout without a completed login), BuildLogoutURL omits
-	// the parameter entirely rather than guessing (FIX-07 corrects R68,
-	// which dropped the parameter unconditionally for every non-absolute
-	// config value, including the documented default of '/').
-	localRedirect := "/"
-	switch {
-	case strings.HasPrefix(postLogoutRedirectURI, "http"):
-		// Operator configured an explicit absolute URL: already a trusted
-		// origin on its own, independent of trustedOrigin.
-		localRedirect = postLogoutRedirectURI
-	case postLogoutRedirectURI == "":
-		postLogoutRedirectURI = "" // no trusted origin below leaves it empty
-		if trustedOrigin != "" {
-			postLogoutRedirectURI = trustedOrigin + "/"
-		}
-	default:
-		// Relative operator-configured path: trusted for the plugin's own
-		// redirect, rebuilt against the trusted origin for the IdP.
-		localRedirect = normalizeLogoutPath(postLogoutRedirectURI)
-		postLogoutRedirectURI = ""
-		if trustedOrigin != "" {
-			postLogoutRedirectURI = trustedOrigin + localRedirect
-		}
+	if postLogoutRedirectURI == "" {
+		postLogoutRedirectURI = fmt.Sprintf("%s/", baseURL)
+	} else if !strings.HasPrefix(postLogoutRedirectURI, "http") {
+		postLogoutRedirectURI = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", baseURL, postLogoutRedirectURI)
 	}
 
 	// Read endSessionURL with RLock
@@ -517,34 +410,11 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 			http.Error(rw, "Logout error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
-		// Logout redirects must never be cached: a heuristic-caching proxy
-		// replaying the 302 would re-trigger logout for an already
-		// logged-out session (R147 cache-directive contract).
-		rw.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 		http.Redirect(rw, req, logoutURL, http.StatusFound)
 		return
 	}
 
-	rw.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-	http.Redirect(rw, req, localRedirect, http.StatusFound)
-}
-
-// trustedOriginFromRedirectURL extracts "scheme://host" from the redirect_uri
-// persisted at authentication-initiate time (R136), for reuse as the trusted
-// origin when building post_logout_redirect_uri (FIX-07). That redirect_uri
-// was already accepted by the IdP as this deployment's own callback, so its
-// origin is safe to reuse — unlike the current request's Host/
-// X-Forwarded-Host, which the browser controls. Returns "" when redirectURL
-// is empty or is not an absolute http(s) URL.
-func trustedOriginFromRedirectURL(redirectURL string) string {
-	if redirectURL == "" {
-		return ""
-	}
-	u, err := url.Parse(redirectURL)
-	if err != nil || u.Host == "" || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
+	http.Redirect(rw, req, postLogoutRedirectURI, http.StatusFound)
 }
 
 // BuildLogoutURL constructs a logout URL for the OIDC provider's end session endpoint.

http_client_factory.go

@@ -61,23 +61,16 @@ func DefaultHTTPClientConfig() HTTPClientConfig {
 	}
 }
 
-// TokenHTTPClientConfig returns configuration optimized for token operations.
+// TokenHTTPClientConfig returns configuration optimized for token operations
 func TokenHTTPClientConfig() HTTPClientConfig {
 	config := DefaultHTTPClientConfig()
 	config.Timeout = 10 * time.Second // Shorter timeout for token operations
 	config.MaxRedirects = 50          // Token endpoints may redirect more
-	// UseCookieJar stays false (DefaultHTTPClientConfig's default). This
-	// config builds the single per-plugin-instance pooled token client
-	// (main.go, CreateTokenHTTPClient), shared by every user's token and
-	// refresh exchange. A jar on a shared client stores whatever
-	// Set-Cookie the IdP returns for one user's exchange and replays it on
-	// the next user's request to the same host - cross-user state
-	// confusion at the IdP (FIX-12; R70 had turned this on). Token/refresh
-	// calls are stateless back-channel requests and need no jar.
+	config.UseCookieJar = true        // Enable cookie jar for token operations
 	return config
 }
 
-// OIDCProviderHTTPClientConfig returns configuration optimized for OIDC provider calls.
+// OIDCProviderHTTPClientConfig returns configuration optimized for OIDC provider calls
 func OIDCProviderHTTPClientConfig() HTTPClientConfig {
 	config := DefaultHTTPClientConfig()
 	config.Timeout = 15 * time.Second         // Slightly longer for OIDC operations
@@ -85,10 +78,7 @@ func OIDCProviderHTTPClientConfig() HTTPClientConfig {
 	config.MaxIdleConnsPerHost = 25           // More connections per OIDC provider
 	config.MaxConnsPerHost = 50               // Allow more concurrent requests to OIDC provider
 	config.IdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second // Keep connections alive longer for reuse
-	// UseCookieJar stays false, for the same cross-user reason as
-	// TokenHTTPClientConfig above (FIX-12): any client built from this
-	// config through the shared transport pool is one instance shared by
-	// every user, so a jar would leak cookies between them.
+	config.UseCookieJar = true                // Enable cookie jar for session management
 	return config
 }
 
@@ -148,13 +138,10 @@ func (f *HTTPClientFactory) ValidateHTTPClientConfig(config *HTTPClientConfig) e
 	return nil
 }
 
-// applyHTTPClientDefaults fills zero-valued fields in cfg with the standard
-// conservative defaults so that a partially-populated config never yields an
-// unbounded HTTP client (zero overall Timeout or ResponseHeaderTimeout would make
-// a stalled upstream hang forever). All construction paths MUST converge on this
-// helper so behavior is identical: CreateHTTPClient and the shared transport
-// pool (CreatePooledHTTPClient / GetOrCreateTransport).
-func applyHTTPClientDefaults(config *HTTPClientConfig) {
+// CreateHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with the given configuration
+// Validates configuration parameters before creating the client
+func (f *HTTPClientFactory) CreateHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
+	// Set defaults for zero values before validation
 	if config.Timeout == 0 {
 		config.Timeout = 30 * time.Second
 	}
@@ -191,13 +178,6 @@ func applyHTTPClientDefaults(config *HTTPClientConfig) {
 	if config.ReadBufferSize == 0 {
 		config.ReadBufferSize = 4096
 	}
-}
-
-// CreateHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with the given configuration
-// Validates configuration parameters before creating the client
-func (f *HTTPClientFactory) CreateHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
-	// Set defaults for zero values before validation
-	applyHTTPClientDefaults(&config)
 
 	// Validate configuration - only fail on critical errors
 	if err := f.ValidateHTTPClientConfig(&config); err != nil {
@@ -229,8 +209,9 @@ func (f *HTTPClientFactory) CreateHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Clie
 				tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 				tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 			},
-			RootCAs:            config.RootCAs,
-			InsecureSkipVerify: config.InsecureSkipVerify, // #nosec G402 -- operator opt-in (insecureSkipVerify, default false); New logs a SECURITY WARNING
+			PreferServerCipherSuites: true,
+			RootCAs:                  config.RootCAs,
+			InsecureSkipVerify:       config.InsecureSkipVerify, //nolint:gosec // opt-in, loud warning emitted at plugin startup
 		},
 		ForceAttemptHTTP2:     config.ForceHTTP2,
 		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   config.TLSHandshakeTimeout,

http_client_factory_unit_test.go

@@ -18,10 +18,7 @@ func TestOIDCProviderHTTPClientConfigUnit(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, 25, config.MaxIdleConnsPerHost, "OIDC provider should have 25 max idle conns per host")
 	assert.Equal(t, 50, config.MaxConnsPerHost, "OIDC provider should have 50 max conns per host")
 	assert.Equal(t, 90*time.Second, config.IdleConnTimeout, "OIDC provider should have 90s idle conn timeout")
-	// UseCookieJar must stay false (FIX-12): this config feeds the shared
-	// pooled client, and a jar there would leak one user's IdP cookies to
-	// every other user of the same pooled instance.
-	assert.False(t, config.UseCookieJar, "OIDC provider pooled client must not have a shared cookie jar")
+	assert.True(t, config.UseCookieJar, "OIDC provider should have cookie jar enabled")
 }
 
 // TestCreateDefaultClientUnit tests CreateDefaultClient function
@@ -41,9 +38,7 @@ func TestCreateTokenClientUnit(t *testing.T) {
 
 	require.NotNil(t, client)
 	assert.NotNil(t, client.Transport, "client should have transport")
-	// No jar (FIX-12): TokenHTTPClientConfig's UseCookieJar stays false so
-	// a client built from it never carries cross-request cookie state.
-	assert.Nil(t, client.Jar, "token client must not have a cookie jar")
+	assert.NotNil(t, client.Jar, "token client should have cookie jar")
 	assert.Equal(t, 10*time.Second, client.Timeout, "token client should have 10s timeout")
 }
 

http_client_jar_test.go

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestPooledTokenClient_DoesNotShareCookieJarAcrossRequests regresses
-// FIX-12: R70 gave CreatePooledHTTPClient's client a cookie jar whenever
-// UseCookieJar is set, and TokenHTTPClientConfig (used to build the single
-// per-plugin-instance tokenHTTPClient, main.go) set UseCookieJar: true. That
-// one client, and its one jar, is shared by every user's token/refresh
-// exchange. An IdP Set-Cookie on user A's exchange was stored in the shared
-// jar and replayed on user B's next token request to the same host -
-// cross-user state confusion at the IdP. Token/refresh calls are stateless
-// back-channel requests and must never carry a cross-request jar.
-func TestPooledTokenClient_DoesNotShareCookieJarAcrossRequests(t *testing.T) {
-	var requests int
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		requests++
-		if requests == 1 {
-			// Simulate the IdP setting a session/affinity cookie on user A's
-			// token exchange response.
-			http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: "idp_sess", Value: "alice"})
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-			return
-		}
-		// User B's request: must not carry the cookie set on user A's call.
-		if c, err := r.Cookie("idp_sess"); err == nil {
-			t.Errorf("request %d carried leaked cookie idp_sess=%s from an earlier request", requests, c.Value)
-		}
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-	defer srv.Close()
-
-	client := CreatePooledHTTPClient(TokenHTTPClientConfig())
-
-	// Request 1 (user A): receives and would store the IdP's Set-Cookie if
-	// the client has a jar.
-	resp1, err := client.Get(srv.URL)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("request 1: %v", err)
-	}
-	resp1.Body.Close()
-
-	// Request 2 (user B, same pooled client, same host): must be a clean
-	// request with no cookie carried over from request 1.
-	resp2, err := client.Get(srv.URL)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("request 2: %v", err)
-	}
-	resp2.Body.Close()
-
-	if requests != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 2 requests reaching the server, got %d", requests)
-	}
-}

http_client_pool.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/http/cookiejar"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
@@ -27,10 +26,6 @@ type sharedTransport struct {
 	lastUsed  time.Time
 	transport *http.Transport
 	refCount  int
-	// tlsKey identifies the TLS trust settings (CA pool + InsecureSkipVerify)
-	// this transport was built with, so the at-limit fallback only reuses a
-	// transport whose TLS configuration matches the caller's.
-	tlsKey string
 }
 
 var (
@@ -58,44 +53,20 @@ func GetGlobalTransportPool() *SharedTransportPool {
 
 // GetOrCreateTransport gets or creates a shared transport with the given config
 func (p *SharedTransportPool) GetOrCreateTransport(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Transport {
-	// Apply the same zero-value defaults as CreateHTTPClient so a partially
-	// populated config never yields an unbounded client/transport, and so the
-	// pool cache key reflects normalized values (configKey). Bounded here,
-	// before the client-count gate, so both the gate and the key see
-	// normalized timeouts.
-	applyHTTPClientDefaults(&config)
-	// SECURITY FIX: Check client limit before creating new transport.
+	// SECURITY FIX: Check client limit before creating new transport
 	if atomic.LoadInt32(&p.clientCount) >= p.maxClients {
-		// At the client limit: only reuse a transport that was built for the
-		// SAME config (same TLS trust store). refCount is mutated under the
-		// write lock to avoid a data race, and a transport created for a
-		// different configuration is never handed back — doing so could apply
-		// the wrong (possibly verification-disabled) TLS settings to a request.
-		want := tlsConfigKey(config)
-		p.mu.Lock()
-		defer p.mu.Unlock()
+		// Return existing transport if limit reached
+		p.mu.RLock()
+		defer p.mu.RUnlock()
 		for _, shared := range p.transports {
-			if shared != nil && shared.transport != nil && shared.tlsKey == want {
+			if shared != nil && shared.transport != nil {
 				shared.refCount++
 				shared.lastUsed = time.Now()
 				return shared.transport
 			}
 		}
-		// No TLS-compatible transport available. Returning nil would make the
-		// caller fall back to http.DefaultTransport, silently dropping the
-		// configured RootCAs / InsecureSkipVerify — custom-CA TLS would
-		// break and self-signed skip-verify would be lost (R95). Build and
-		// return the correctly-configured transport instead; honoring TLS
-		// settings takes precedence over the soft client cap.
-		t := newSharedTransport(config)
-		p.transports[p.configKey(config)] = &sharedTransport{
-			transport: t,
-			refCount:  1,
-			lastUsed:  time.Now(),
-			tlsKey:    want,
-		}
-		atomic.AddInt32(&p.clientCount, 1)
-		return t
+		// If no transport available, return nil (caller should handle)
+		return nil
 	}
 
 	p.mu.Lock()
@@ -112,26 +83,8 @@ func (p *SharedTransportPool) GetOrCreateTransport(config HTTPClientConfig) *htt
 	// Increment client count
 	atomic.AddInt32(&p.clientCount, 1)
 
-	transport := newSharedTransport(config)
-
-	p.transports[key] = &sharedTransport{
-		transport: transport,
-		refCount:  1,
-		lastUsed:  time.Now(),
-		tlsKey:    tlsConfigKey(config),
-	}
-
-	return transport
-}
-
-// newSharedTransport builds a properly-configured *http.Transport from the
-// given config, enforcing TLS 1.2+ and secure cipher suites. Shared by the
-// normal acquisition path and the at-cap fallback so the TLS settings are
-// NEVER silently dropped (the at-cap fallback previously returned nil,
-// making the caller fall back to http.DefaultTransport and lose the
-// configured RootCAs / InsecureSkipVerify — R95).
-func newSharedTransport(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Transport {
-	return &http.Transport{
+	// Create new transport with conservative limits
+	transport := &http.Transport{
 		Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment,
 		DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
 			dialer := &net.Dialer{
@@ -150,22 +103,31 @@ func newSharedTransport(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Transport {
 				tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 				tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 			},
-			RootCAs:            config.RootCAs,
-			InsecureSkipVerify: config.InsecureSkipVerify, // #nosec G402 -- operator opt-in (insecureSkipVerify, default false); New logs a SECURITY WARNING
+			PreferServerCipherSuites: true,
+			RootCAs:                  config.RootCAs,
+			InsecureSkipVerify:       config.InsecureSkipVerify, //nolint:gosec // opt-in, loud warning emitted at plugin startup
 		},
 		ForceAttemptHTTP2:     config.ForceHTTP2,
 		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   config.TLSHandshakeTimeout,
 		ExpectContinueTimeout: config.ExpectContinueTimeout,
-		MaxIdleConns:          config.MaxIdleConns,
-		MaxIdleConnsPerHost:   config.MaxIdleConnsPerHost,
-		IdleConnTimeout:       config.IdleConnTimeout,
+		MaxIdleConns:          10,               // SECURITY FIX: Further reduced
+		MaxIdleConnsPerHost:   2,                // SECURITY FIX: Limited connections
+		IdleConnTimeout:       30 * time.Second, // Reduced from 5 minutes
 		DisableKeepAlives:     config.DisableKeepAlives,
-		MaxConnsPerHost:       config.MaxConnsPerHost,
+		MaxConnsPerHost:       5, // SECURITY FIX: Strict limit
 		ResponseHeaderTimeout: config.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
 		DisableCompression:    config.DisableCompression,
 		WriteBufferSize:       config.WriteBufferSize,
 		ReadBufferSize:        config.ReadBufferSize,
 	}
+
+	p.transports[key] = &sharedTransport{
+		transport: transport,
+		refCount:  1,
+		lastUsed:  time.Now(),
+	}
+
+	return transport
 }
 
 // ReleaseTransport decrements the reference count for a transport
@@ -245,82 +207,41 @@ func (p *SharedTransportPool) performCleanup() {
 
 // configKey generates a unique key for a config
 func (p *SharedTransportPool) configKey(config HTTPClientConfig) string {
-	// Pool transports by every parameter the built *http.Transport actually
-	// consumes. RootCAs and InsecureSkipVerify MUST be part of the key:
+	// Pool transports by the parameters that change TLS or connection
+	// behavior. RootCAs and InsecureSkipVerify MUST be part of the key:
 	// otherwise a middleware configured with a custom CA would share a
 	// transport with one using the system store, silently bypassing its
-	// CA configuration. The remaining fields affect connection behavior
-	// (HTTP version, compression, keep-alives, timeouts, buffer sizes,
-	// dial settings); omitting them would hand a caller a transport built
-	// with different settings than it requested (e.g. wrong compression).
+	// CA configuration.
 	skip := "0"
 	if config.InsecureSkipVerify {
 		skip = "1"
 	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%d|%d|%p|%s|%d|%d|%d|%v|%v|%v|%d|%d|%d|%d|%d|%d",
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%d|%d|%p|%s",
 		config.MaxConnsPerHost,
 		config.MaxIdleConnsPerHost,
 		config.RootCAs,
 		skip,
-		config.DialTimeout,
-		config.KeepAlive,
-		config.TLSHandshakeTimeout,
-		config.ForceHTTP2,
-		config.DisableKeepAlives,
-		config.DisableCompression,
-		config.ResponseHeaderTimeout,
-		config.ExpectContinueTimeout,
-		config.WriteBufferSize,
-		config.ReadBufferSize,
-		config.IdleConnTimeout,
-		config.MaxIdleConns,
 	)
 }
 
-// tlsConfigKey identifies only the TLS trust settings of a config — the CA pool
-// and the InsecureSkipVerify flag. Two configs with the same tlsConfigKey are
-// safe to serve from the same transport even if other (non-TLS) parameters such
-// as connection limits differ; configs with different TLS settings are not.
-func tlsConfigKey(config HTTPClientConfig) string {
-	skip := "0"
-	if config.InsecureSkipVerify {
-		skip = "1"
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%p|%s", config.RootCAs, skip)
-}
-
-// Cleanup closes all transports, resets the pool, and restarts the cleanup
-// goroutine so the (singleton) pool remains fully usable afterwards. Prior
-// to R125, Cleanup canceled the cleanup goroutine but never restarted it
-// and left clientCount unreset: a reused singleton then had a permanently
-// dead cleaner (idle conns never pruned) and a stale count (the soft
-// maxClients cap keyed off it was wrong after reuse).
+// Cleanup closes all transports and stops the cleanup goroutine
 func (p *SharedTransportPool) Cleanup() {
 	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Stop the cleanup goroutine
+	if p.cancel != nil {
+		p.cancel()
+	}
+
 	for _, shared := range p.transports {
-		if shared != nil && shared.transport != nil {
-			shared.transport.CloseIdleConnections()
-		}
+		shared.transport.CloseIdleConnections()
 	}
 	p.transports = make(map[string]*sharedTransport)
-	atomic.StoreInt32(&p.clientCount, 0)
-	oldCancel := p.cancel
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	p.ctx = ctx
-	p.cancel = cancel
-	p.mu.Unlock()
-
-	if oldCancel != nil {
-		oldCancel()
-	}
-	go p.cleanupIdleTransports(ctx)
 }
 
 // CreatePooledHTTPClient creates an HTTP client using the shared transport pool
 func CreatePooledHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
-	// Apply the same zero-value defaults as CreateHTTPClient so a partially
-	// populated config still gets a bounded overall request Timeout.
-	applyHTTPClientDefaults(&config)
 	pool := GetGlobalTransportPool()
 	transport := pool.GetOrCreateTransport(config)
 
@@ -329,18 +250,6 @@ func CreatePooledHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
 		Transport: transport,
 	}
 
-	// Attach a jar only for callers that opt in via UseCookieJar, matching
-	// CreateHTTPClient (http_client_factory.go). TokenHTTPClientConfig and
-	// OIDCProviderHTTPClientConfig deliberately leave UseCookieJar false:
-	// a client built through this pool from either config is one instance
-	// shared across every user, so a jar would leak one user's cookies
-	// (e.g. Set-Cookie on a token/refresh response) into another user's
-	// requests to the same host (FIX-12).
-	if config.UseCookieJar {
-		jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil) // Safe to ignore: nil options rarely fail
-		client.Jar = jar
-	}
-
 	// Configure redirect policy
 	maxRedirects := config.MaxRedirects
 	if maxRedirects == 0 {

http_client_pool_test.go

@@ -63,17 +63,9 @@ func TestSharedTransportPoolGetOrCreateTransport(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 
 		config := DefaultHTTPClientConfig()
-		config.InsecureSkipVerify = true //nolint:gosec // distinct TLS config to miss the tlsKey cache
 		transport := pool.GetOrCreateTransport(config)
 
-		// R95: at the client limit with no TLS-compatible transport, we must
-		// still return a correctly-configured transport (never nil, which
-		// previously fell back to http.DefaultTransport and dropped TLS
-		// settings).
-		require.NotNil(t, transport, "at-cap transport must not be nil")
-		if transport.TLSClientConfig == nil || !transport.TLSClientConfig.InsecureSkipVerify {
-			t.Fatal("at-cap transport must preserve the requested TLS settings")
-		}
+		assert.Nil(t, transport, "should return nil when at client limit")
 	})
 
 	t.Run("client limit with existing transport", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -264,7 +256,7 @@ func TestSharedTransportPoolCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Len(t, pool.transports, 0, "all transports should be removed")
 	})
 
-	t.Run("cleanup cancels the old context and stays reusable", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("cleanup cancels context", func(t *testing.T) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 		pool := &SharedTransportPool{
 			transports:  make(map[string]*sharedTransport),
@@ -278,16 +270,10 @@ func TestSharedTransportPoolCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 		pool.Cleanup()
 
 		select {
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			// The previous cleanup context was canceled (goroutine stopped).
+		case <-pool.ctx.Done():
+			// Context was canceled
 		case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
-			t.Error("the previous cleanup context should be canceled")
-		}
-
-		// R125: Cleanup must leave the pool fully reusable — a fresh
-		// context is installed and new transports can still be acquired.
-		if tr := pool.GetOrCreateTransport(DefaultHTTPClientConfig()); tr == nil {
-			t.Error("pool must remain usable after Cleanup")
+			t.Error("context should be canceled")
 		}
 	})
 
@@ -703,58 +689,3 @@ func TestSharedTransportPoolEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, int32(0), finalCount, "client count should decrement on cleanup")
 	})
 }
-
-// TestSharedTransportPoolAppliesConfigLimits is a regression test: the pooled
-// transport must apply the configured connection limits (MaxConnsPerHost,
-// MaxIdleConnsPerHost, MaxIdleConns, IdleConnTimeout) rather than hardcoded
-// constants. Previously GetOrCreateTransport built the transport with fixed
-// values (5/2/10/30s) while configKey still incorporated these config fields,
-// so the config was valid, keyed, and validated but silently ignored
-// (dead config) — e.g. OIDCProviderHTTPClientConfig's tuning had no effect.
-func TestSharedTransportPoolAppliesConfigLimits(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer cancel()
-
-	pool := &SharedTransportPool{
-		transports:  make(map[string]*sharedTransport),
-		maxConns:    20,
-		clientCount: 0,
-		maxClients:  5,
-		ctx:         ctx,
-		cancel:      cancel,
-	}
-
-	config := DefaultHTTPClientConfig()
-	config.MaxConnsPerHost = 37
-	config.MaxIdleConnsPerHost = 13
-	config.MaxIdleConns = 41
-	config.IdleConnTimeout = 7 * time.Second
-
-	transport := pool.GetOrCreateTransport(config)
-	require.NotNil(t, transport)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, 37, transport.MaxConnsPerHost, "MaxConnsPerHost must come from config")
-	assert.Equal(t, 13, transport.MaxIdleConnsPerHost, "MaxIdleConnsPerHost must come from config")
-	assert.Equal(t, 41, transport.MaxIdleConns, "MaxIdleConns must come from config")
-	assert.Equal(t, 7*time.Second, transport.IdleConnTimeout, "IdleConnTimeout must come from config")
-}
-
-// TestCreatePooledHTTPClient_CookieJarOption regresses a config no-effect:
-// CreatePooledHTTPClient ignored config.UseCookieJar, so pooled token/OIDC
-// clients dropped the cookie jar that the non-pooled CreateHTTPClient
-// honors (queue cookies from auth-server token/refresh responses were
-// never stored or re-sent).
-func TestCreatePooledHTTPClient_CookieJarOption(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("enabled", func(t *testing.T) {
-		client := CreatePooledHTTPClient(HTTPClientConfig{UseCookieJar: true})
-		if client.Jar == nil {
-			t.Fatal("expected a cookie jar when UseCookieJar is true")
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("disabled", func(t *testing.T) {
-		client := CreatePooledHTTPClient(HTTPClientConfig{UseCookieJar: false})
-		if client.Jar != nil {
-			t.Fatal("expected no cookie jar when UseCookieJar is false")
-		}
-	})
-}

input_validation.go

@@ -0,0 +1,727 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+)
+
+// Pre-compiled regex patterns for validation (const patterns should use MustCompile)
+var (
+	emailRegexPattern    = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$`)
+	urlRegexPattern      = regexp.MustCompile(`^https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+(?:\.[a-zA-Z]{2,})?(?::[0-9]+)?(?:/[^\s]*)?$`)
+	tokenRegexPattern    = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$`)
+	usernameRegexPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`)
+)
+
+// InputValidator provides comprehensive input validation and sanitization
+// to protect against common security vulnerabilities including SQL injection,
+// XSS, path traversal, and other injection attacks. It validates and sanitizes
+// various input types used in OIDC authentication flows.
+type InputValidator struct {
+	usernameRegex           *regexp.Regexp
+	tokenRegex              *regexp.Regexp
+	logger                  *Logger
+	urlRegex                *regexp.Regexp
+	emailRegex              *regexp.Regexp
+	sqlInjectionPatterns    []string
+	pathTraversalPatterns   []string
+	xssPatterns             []string
+	maxUsernameLength       int
+	maxURLLength            int
+	maxTokenLength          int
+	maxEmailLength          int
+	maxClaimLength          int
+	maxHeaderLength         int
+	allowPrivateIPAddresses bool // Allow private IP addresses in URL validation
+}
+
+// ValidationResult encapsulates the outcome of input validation.
+// It includes the sanitized value, detected security risks, validation
+// errors and warnings, and an overall validity status.
+type ValidationResult struct {
+	SanitizedValue string   `json:"sanitized_value,omitempty"`
+	SecurityRisk   string   `json:"security_risk,omitempty"`
+	Errors         []string `json:"errors,omitempty"`
+	Warnings       []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
+	IsValid        bool     `json:"is_valid"`
+}
+
+// InputValidationConfig defines the configuration parameters for input validation.
+// It specifies maximum lengths for various input types and controls whether
+// strict validation mode is enabled.
+type InputValidationConfig struct {
+	MaxTokenLength          int  `json:"max_token_length"`
+	MaxURLLength            int  `json:"max_url_length"`
+	MaxHeaderLength         int  `json:"max_header_length"`
+	MaxClaimLength          int  `json:"max_claim_length"`
+	MaxEmailLength          int  `json:"max_email_length"`
+	MaxUsernameLength       int  `json:"max_username_length"`
+	StrictMode              bool `json:"strict_mode"`
+	AllowPrivateIPAddresses bool `json:"allow_private_ip_addresses"` // Allow private IP addresses in URL validation
+}
+
+// DefaultInputValidationConfig returns a secure default configuration
+// for input validation with reasonable limits based on industry standards
+// and security best practices.
+func DefaultInputValidationConfig() InputValidationConfig {
+	return InputValidationConfig{
+		MaxTokenLength:    50000, // 50KB for tokens
+		MaxURLLength:      2048,  // Standard URL length limit
+		MaxHeaderLength:   8192,  // 8KB for headers
+		MaxClaimLength:    1024,  // 1KB for individual claims
+		MaxEmailLength:    254,   // RFC 5321 limit
+		MaxUsernameLength: 64,    // Reasonable username limit
+		StrictMode:        true,  // Enable strict validation by default
+	}
+}
+
+// NewInputValidator creates a new input validator with the specified configuration.
+// It uses pre-compiled regex patterns and initializes security pattern lists.
+//
+// Parameters:
+//   - config: Validation configuration with size limits and mode settings.
+//   - logger: Logger instance for recording validation events.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - A configured InputValidator instance.
+//   - An error (always nil, kept for API compatibility).
+func NewInputValidator(config InputValidationConfig, logger *Logger) (*InputValidator, error) {
+	return &InputValidator{
+		maxTokenLength:          config.MaxTokenLength,
+		maxURLLength:            config.MaxURLLength,
+		maxHeaderLength:         config.MaxHeaderLength,
+		maxClaimLength:          config.MaxClaimLength,
+		maxEmailLength:          config.MaxEmailLength,
+		maxUsernameLength:       config.MaxUsernameLength,
+		allowPrivateIPAddresses: config.AllowPrivateIPAddresses,
+		emailRegex:              emailRegexPattern,
+		urlRegex:                urlRegexPattern,
+		tokenRegex:              tokenRegexPattern,
+		usernameRegex:           usernameRegexPattern,
+		sqlInjectionPatterns: []string{
+			"'", "\"", ";", "--", "/*", "*/", "xp_", "sp_",
+			"union", "select", "insert", "update", "delete", "drop",
+			"create", "alter", "exec", "execute", "script",
+		},
+		xssPatterns: []string{
+			"<script", "</script>", "javascript:", "vbscript:",
+			"onload=", "onerror=", "onclick=", "onmouseover=",
+			"<iframe", "<object", "<embed", "<link", "<meta",
+		},
+		pathTraversalPatterns: []string{
+			"../", "..\\", "%2e%2e%2f", "%2e%2e%5c",
+			"..%2f", "..%5c", "%252e%252e%252f",
+		},
+		logger: logger,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ValidateToken validates JWT tokens and similar token strings
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateToken(token string) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	// Check for empty token
+	if token == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token cannot be empty")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check length limits
+	if len(token) > iv.maxTokenLength {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("token length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(token), iv.maxTokenLength))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for minimum reasonable length
+	if len(token) < 10 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token is too short to be valid")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for valid JWT structure (3 parts separated by dots)
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token does not have valid JWT structure (expected 3 parts)")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Validate each part is base64url encoded
+	for i, part := range parts {
+		if !iv.isValidBase64URL(part) {
+			result.IsValid = false
+			result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("token part %d is not valid base64url", i+1))
+			return result
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious patterns
+	if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(token); risk != "" {
+		result.SecurityRisk = risk
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
+	}
+
+	// Check for null bytes and control characters
+	if iv.containsNullBytes(token) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token contains null bytes")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	if iv.containsControlCharacters(token) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token contains control characters")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Validate UTF-8 encoding
+	if !utf8.ValidString(token) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token contains invalid UTF-8 sequences")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	result.SanitizedValue = token
+	return result
+}
+
+// ValidateEmail validates email addresses
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateEmail(email string) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	// Check for empty email
+	if email == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email cannot be empty")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check length limits
+	if len(email) > iv.maxEmailLength {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("email length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(email), iv.maxEmailLength))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Sanitize email (trim whitespace, convert to lowercase)
+	sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(email))
+
+	// Check regex pattern
+	if !iv.emailRegex.MatchString(sanitized) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email format is invalid")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious patterns
+	if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(sanitized); risk != "" {
+		result.SecurityRisk = risk
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
+	}
+
+	// Additional email-specific validations
+	parts := strings.Split(sanitized, "@")
+	if len(parts) != 2 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email must contain exactly one @ symbol")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	localPart, domain := parts[0], parts[1]
+
+	// Validate local part
+	if len(localPart) == 0 || len(localPart) > 64 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email local part length is invalid")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Validate domain
+	if len(domain) == 0 || len(domain) > 253 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email domain length is invalid")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for consecutive dots
+	if strings.Contains(sanitized, "..") {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email contains consecutive dots")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	result.SanitizedValue = sanitized
+	return result
+}
+
+// ValidateURL validates URLs
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateURL(urlStr string) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	// Check for empty URL
+	if urlStr == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL cannot be empty")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check length limits
+	if len(urlStr) > iv.maxURLLength {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("URL length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(urlStr), iv.maxURLLength))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Sanitize URL (trim whitespace)
+	sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(urlStr)
+
+	// Parse URL
+	parsedURL, err := url.Parse(sanitized)
+	if err != nil {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("URL parsing failed: %v", err))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check scheme
+	if parsedURL.Scheme != "https" && parsedURL.Scheme != "http" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL scheme must be http or https")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Prefer HTTPS
+	if parsedURL.Scheme == "http" {
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "HTTP URLs are less secure than HTTPS")
+	}
+
+	// Check host
+	if parsedURL.Host == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL must have a valid host")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for localhost or private IPs for security
+	// Allow localhost for HTTPS (development/testing) but warn about it
+	hostname := strings.ToLower(parsedURL.Hostname())
+	if hostname == "localhost" || hostname == "127.0.0.1" || hostname == "::1" {
+		if parsedURL.Scheme == "https" {
+			// Allow HTTPS localhost for development but warn
+			result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "localhost URLs should only be used for development/testing")
+		} else {
+			// Reject non-HTTPS localhost for security
+			result.IsValid = false
+			result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "non-HTTPS localhost URLs are not allowed for security")
+			return result
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check for private IP ranges (RFC 1918) - skip if allowPrivateIPAddresses is enabled
+	if !iv.allowPrivateIPAddresses {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "10.") ||
+			strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "192.168.") ||
+			strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "172.") {
+			// For 172.x check if it's in the 172.16.0.0/12 range
+			if strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "172.") {
+				parts := strings.Split(hostname, ".")
+				if len(parts) >= 2 {
+					if second, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1]); err == nil && second >= 16 && second <= 31 {
+						result.IsValid = false
+						result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "private IP URLs are not allowed for security")
+						return result
+					}
+				}
+			} else {
+				result.IsValid = false
+				result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "private IP URLs are not allowed for security")
+				return result
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious patterns
+	if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(sanitized); risk != "" {
+		result.SecurityRisk = risk
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
+	}
+
+	// Check for path traversal attempts
+	if iv.containsPathTraversal(sanitized) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL contains path traversal patterns")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	result.SanitizedValue = sanitized
+	return result
+}
+
+// ValidateUsername validates usernames
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateUsername(username string) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	// Check for empty username
+	if username == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "username cannot be empty")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check length limits
+	if len(username) > iv.maxUsernameLength {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("username length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(username), iv.maxUsernameLength))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check minimum length
+	if len(username) < 2 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "username must be at least 2 characters long")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Sanitize username (trim whitespace)
+	sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(username)
+
+	// Check regex pattern
+	if !iv.usernameRegex.MatchString(sanitized) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "username contains invalid characters (only letters, numbers, dots, underscores, and hyphens allowed)")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious patterns
+	if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(sanitized); risk != "" {
+		result.SecurityRisk = risk
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
+	}
+
+	result.SanitizedValue = sanitized
+	return result
+}
+
+// ValidateClaim validates individual JWT claims
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateClaim(claimName, claimValue string) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	// Check claim name
+	if claimName == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim name cannot be empty")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check claim value length
+	if len(claimValue) > iv.maxClaimLength {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("claim value length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(claimValue), iv.maxClaimLength))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for null bytes and control characters
+	if iv.containsNullBytes(claimValue) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains null bytes")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	if iv.containsControlCharacters(claimValue) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains control characters")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Validate UTF-8 encoding
+	if !utf8.ValidString(claimValue) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains invalid UTF-8 sequences")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious patterns
+	if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(claimValue); risk != "" {
+		result.SecurityRisk = risk
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for excessive unicode (emojis and special characters)
+	unicodeCount := 0
+	runeCount := 0
+	for _, r := range claimValue {
+		runeCount++
+		if r > 127 { // Non-ASCII character
+			unicodeCount++
+		}
+	}
+	// If more than 50% of the characters are unicode, consider it suspicious
+	if runeCount > 0 && unicodeCount > runeCount/2 {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains excessive unicode characters")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Specific validations based on claim name
+	switch claimName {
+	case "email":
+		emailResult := iv.ValidateEmail(claimValue)
+		if !emailResult.IsValid {
+			result.IsValid = false
+			result.Errors = append(result.Errors, emailResult.Errors...)
+		}
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, emailResult.Warnings...)
+		result.SanitizedValue = emailResult.SanitizedValue
+
+	case "iss", "aud":
+		urlResult := iv.ValidateURL(claimValue)
+		if !urlResult.IsValid {
+			// For issuer/audience, we're more lenient - just warn
+			result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("%s claim is not a valid URL: %v", claimName, urlResult.Errors))
+		}
+		result.SanitizedValue = claimValue
+
+	case "preferred_username", "username":
+		usernameResult := iv.ValidateUsername(claimValue)
+		if !usernameResult.IsValid {
+			result.IsValid = false
+			result.Errors = append(result.Errors, usernameResult.Errors...)
+		}
+		result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, usernameResult.Warnings...)
+		result.SanitizedValue = usernameResult.SanitizedValue
+
+	default:
+		// Generic string validation
+		result.SanitizedValue = strings.TrimSpace(claimValue)
+	}
+
+	return result
+}
+
+// ValidateHeader validates HTTP header values
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateHeader(headerName, headerValue string) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	// Check header name
+	if headerName == "" {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header name cannot be empty")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for control characters in header name (including CRLF)
+	if iv.containsControlCharacters(headerName) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header name contains control characters")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for CRLF injection in header name
+	if strings.Contains(headerName, "\r") || strings.Contains(headerName, "\n") {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header name contains CRLF characters (potential header injection)")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check header value length
+	if len(headerValue) > iv.maxHeaderLength {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("header value length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(headerValue), iv.maxHeaderLength))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for null bytes and control characters (except allowed ones)
+	if iv.containsNullBytes(headerValue) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains null bytes")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for CRLF injection
+	if strings.Contains(headerValue, "\r") || strings.Contains(headerValue, "\n") {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains CRLF characters (potential header injection)")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for control characters in header value
+	if iv.containsControlCharacters(headerValue) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains control characters")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Validate UTF-8 encoding
+	if !utf8.ValidString(headerValue) {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains invalid UTF-8 sequences")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious patterns
+	if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(headerValue); risk != "" {
+		result.SecurityRisk = risk
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
+		return result
+	}
+
+	result.SanitizedValue = strings.TrimSpace(headerValue)
+	return result
+}
+
+// isValidBase64URL checks if a string is valid base64url encoding
+func (iv *InputValidator) isValidBase64URL(s string) bool {
+	// Base64url uses A-Z, a-z, 0-9, -, _ and no padding
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if !((r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') ||
+			(r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '-' || r == '_') {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// containsNullBytes checks if a string contains null bytes
+func (iv *InputValidator) containsNullBytes(s string) bool {
+	return strings.Contains(s, "\x00")
+}
+
+// containsControlCharacters checks if a string contains control characters
+func (iv *InputValidator) containsControlCharacters(s string) bool {
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if unicode.IsControl(r) && r != '\t' && r != '\n' && r != '\r' {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// containsPathTraversal checks for path traversal patterns
+func (iv *InputValidator) containsPathTraversal(s string) bool {
+	lowerS := strings.ToLower(s)
+	for _, pattern := range iv.pathTraversalPatterns {
+		if strings.Contains(lowerS, pattern) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// detectSecurityRisk detects potential security risks in input
+func (iv *InputValidator) detectSecurityRisk(input string) string {
+	lowerInput := strings.ToLower(input)
+
+	// Check for SQL injection patterns
+	for _, pattern := range iv.sqlInjectionPatterns {
+		if strings.Contains(lowerInput, pattern) {
+			return "sql_injection"
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check for XSS patterns
+	for _, pattern := range iv.xssPatterns {
+		if strings.Contains(lowerInput, pattern) {
+			return "xss"
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check for path traversal
+	if iv.containsPathTraversal(input) {
+		return "path_traversal"
+	}
+
+	// Check for excessive length (potential DoS)
+	if len(input) > 10000 {
+		return "excessive_length"
+	}
+
+	// Check for suspicious character patterns
+	if iv.containsNullBytes(input) {
+		return "null_bytes"
+	}
+
+	// Check for binary data patterns
+	nonPrintableCount := 0
+	for _, r := range input {
+		if !unicode.IsPrint(r) && !unicode.IsSpace(r) {
+			nonPrintableCount++
+		}
+	}
+	if nonPrintableCount > len(input)/10 { // More than 10% non-printable
+		return "binary_data"
+	}
+
+	return ""
+}
+
+// SanitizeInput provides general input sanitization
+func (iv *InputValidator) SanitizeInput(input string, maxLength int) string {
+	// Trim whitespace
+	sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(input)
+
+	// Truncate if too long
+	if len(sanitized) > maxLength {
+		sanitized = sanitized[:maxLength]
+	}
+
+	// Remove null bytes
+	sanitized = strings.ReplaceAll(sanitized, "\x00", "")
+
+	// Remove other control characters except tab, newline, carriage return
+	var result strings.Builder
+	for _, r := range sanitized {
+		if !unicode.IsControl(r) || r == '\t' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' {
+			result.WriteRune(r)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return result.String()
+}
+
+// ValidateBoundaryValues validates numeric boundary values
+func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateBoundaryValues(value interface{}, min, max int64) ValidationResult {
+	result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
+
+	var numValue int64
+
+	switch v := value.(type) {
+	case int:
+		numValue = int64(v)
+	case int32:
+		numValue = int64(v)
+	case int64:
+		numValue = v
+	case float64:
+		numValue = int64(v)
+		if float64(numValue) != v {
+			result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "floating point value truncated to integer")
+		}
+	default:
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "value is not a numeric type")
+		return result
+	}
+
+	if numValue < min {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("value %d is below minimum %d", numValue, min))
+	}
+
+	if numValue > max {
+		result.IsValid = false
+		result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("value %d exceeds maximum %d", numValue, max))
+	}
+
+	return result
+}

input_validation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,895 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestInputValidator(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	logger := NewLogger("debug")
+	validator, err := NewInputValidator(config, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create validator: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("Valid token validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validToken := "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiYWRtaW4iOnRydWV9.EkN-DOsnsuRjRO6BxXemmJDm3HbxrbRzXglbN2S4sOkopdU4IsDxTI8jO19W_A4K8ZPJijNLis4EZsHeY559a4DFOd50_OqgHs3UjpMC6M6FNqI2J-I2NxrragtnDxGxdJUvDERDQVHzeNlVQiuqWDEeO_O-0KptafbfyuGqfQxH_6dp2_MeFpAc" // trufflehog:ignore
+
+		result := validator.ValidateToken(validToken)
+		if !result.IsValid {
+			t.Errorf("Expected valid token to pass validation, got errors: %v", result.Errors)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid token validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidTokens := []string{
+			"",              // Empty token
+			"invalid.token", // Invalid format
+			"a.b",           // Too few parts
+			"a.b.c.d",       // Too many parts
+		}
+
+		for _, token := range invalidTokens {
+			result := validator.ValidateToken(token)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid token '%s' to fail validation", token)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Valid email validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validEmails := []string{
+			"[email protected]",
+			"[email protected]",
+			"[email protected]",
+		}
+
+		for _, email := range validEmails {
+			result := validator.ValidateEmail(email)
+			if !result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid email '%s' to pass validation, got errors: %v", email, result.Errors)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid email validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidEmails := []string{
+			"",                        // Empty
+			"invalid",                 // No @ symbol
+			"@domain.com",             // No local part
+			"user@",                   // No domain
+			"user@domain",             // No TLD
+			"[email protected]", // Double dots
+		}
+
+		for _, email := range invalidEmails {
+			result := validator.ValidateEmail(email)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid email '%s' to fail validation", email)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Valid URL validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validURLs := []string{
+			"https://example.com",
+			"https://sub.domain.com/path",
+			"https://localhost:8080/callback",
+		}
+
+		for _, url := range validURLs {
+			result := validator.ValidateURL(url)
+			if !result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid URL '%s' to pass validation, got errors: %v", url, result.Errors)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid URL validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidURLs := []string{
+			"",                  // Empty
+			"not-a-url",         // Invalid format
+			"ftp://example.com", // Wrong scheme
+			"https://",          // No host
+		}
+
+		for _, url := range invalidURLs {
+			result := validator.ValidateURL(url)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid URL '%s' to fail validation", url)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Valid username validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validUsernames := []string{
+			"user123",
+			"test_user",
+			"user-name",
+		}
+
+		for _, username := range validUsernames {
+			result := validator.ValidateUsername(username)
+			if !result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid username '%s' to pass validation, got errors: %v", username, result.Errors)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid username validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidUsernames := []string{
+			"",                       // Empty
+			"a",                      // Too short
+			strings.Repeat("a", 100), // Too long
+			"user name",              // Spaces
+		}
+
+		for _, username := range invalidUsernames {
+			result := validator.ValidateUsername(username)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid username '%s' to fail validation", username)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Valid claim validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validClaims := map[string]string{
+			"sub":   "user123",
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			"name":  "John Doe",
+		}
+
+		for key, value := range validClaims {
+			result := validator.ValidateClaim(key, value)
+			if !result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid claim '%s'='%s' to pass validation, got errors: %v", key, value, result.Errors)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid claim validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidClaims := map[string]string{
+			"":         "value",                    // Empty key
+			"long_key": strings.Repeat("a", 10000), // Too long value
+		}
+
+		for key, value := range invalidClaims {
+			result := validator.ValidateClaim(key, value)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid claim '%s'='%s' to fail validation", key, value)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Valid header validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validHeaders := map[string]string{
+			"Authorization": "Bearer token123",
+			"Content-Type":  "application/json",
+			"X-Custom":      "custom-value",
+		}
+
+		for key, value := range validHeaders {
+			result := validator.ValidateHeader(key, value)
+			if !result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid header '%s'='%s' to pass validation, got errors: %v", key, value, result.Errors)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid header validation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidHeaders := map[string]string{
+			"":             "value",     // Empty key
+			"Invalid\nKey": "value",     // Control characters in key
+			"key":          "value\r\n", // Control characters in value
+		}
+
+		for key, value := range invalidHeaders {
+			result := validator.ValidateHeader(key, value)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid header '%s'='%s' to fail validation", key, value)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestSanitizeInput(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	logger := NewLogger("debug")
+	validator, err := NewInputValidator(config, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create validator: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		input    string
+		expected string
+		maxLen   int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "Normal text",
+			input:    "Hello World",
+			maxLen:   100,
+			expected: "Hello World",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "Control characters",
+			input:    "text\x00with\x01control\x02chars",
+			maxLen:   100,
+			expected: "textwithcontrolchars",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "Truncation",
+			input:    "very long text",
+			maxLen:   5,
+			expected: "very ",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.SanitizeInput(tt.input, tt.maxLen)
+			if result != tt.expected {
+				t.Errorf("Expected sanitized input '%s', got '%s'", tt.expected, result)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateBoundaryValues(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	logger := NewLogger("debug")
+	validator, err := NewInputValidator(config, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create validator: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("Valid boundary values", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validValues := []interface{}{
+			int(50),
+			int64(100),
+			float64(75.5),
+		}
+
+		for _, value := range validValues {
+			result := validator.ValidateBoundaryValues(value, 1, 1000)
+			if !result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid boundary value %v to pass validation, got errors: %v", value, result.Errors)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid boundary values", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidValues := []interface{}{
+			int(-1),
+			int64(2000),
+			"not a number",
+		}
+
+		for _, value := range invalidValues {
+			result := validator.ValidateBoundaryValues(value, 1, 1000)
+			if result.IsValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected invalid boundary value %v to fail validation", value)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestDefaultInputValidationConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+
+	if config.MaxTokenLength <= 0 {
+		t.Error("Expected positive MaxTokenLength")
+	}
+	if config.MaxEmailLength <= 0 {
+		t.Error("Expected positive MaxEmailLength")
+	}
+	if config.MaxUsernameLength <= 0 {
+		t.Error("Expected positive MaxUsernameLength")
+	}
+	if config.MaxClaimLength <= 0 {
+		t.Error("Expected positive MaxClaimLength")
+	}
+	if config.MaxHeaderLength <= 0 {
+		t.Error("Expected positive MaxHeaderLength")
+	}
+	if !config.StrictMode {
+		t.Error("Expected StrictMode to be true by default")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInputValidationHelpers(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	logger := NewLogger("debug")
+	validator, err := NewInputValidator(config, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create validator: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("isValidBase64URL", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validBase64URL := "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9"
+		if !validator.isValidBase64URL(validBase64URL) {
+			t.Error("Expected valid base64url to be recognized")
+		}
+
+		invalidBase64URL := "invalid+base64/with+padding="
+		if validator.isValidBase64URL(invalidBase64URL) {
+			t.Error("Expected invalid base64url to be rejected")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("containsNullBytes", func(t *testing.T) {
+		withNull := "text\x00with\x00null"
+		if !validator.containsNullBytes(withNull) {
+			t.Error("Expected string with null bytes to be detected")
+		}
+
+		withoutNull := "normal text"
+		if validator.containsNullBytes(withoutNull) {
+			t.Error("Expected string without null bytes to pass")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("containsControlCharacters", func(t *testing.T) {
+		withControl := "text\x01with\x02control"
+		if !validator.containsControlCharacters(withControl) {
+			t.Error("Expected string with control characters to be detected")
+		}
+
+		withoutControl := "normal text"
+		if validator.containsControlCharacters(withoutControl) {
+			t.Error("Expected string without control characters to pass")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("containsPathTraversal", func(t *testing.T) {
+		withTraversal := "../../../etc/passwd"
+		if !validator.containsPathTraversal(withTraversal) {
+			t.Error("Expected path traversal to be detected")
+		}
+
+		normalPath := "/normal/path"
+		if validator.containsPathTraversal(normalPath) {
+			t.Error("Expected normal path to pass")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("detectSecurityRisk", func(t *testing.T) {
+		riskyInputs := []string{
+			"<script>alert('xss')</script>",
+			"'; DROP TABLE users; --",
+			"javascript:alert('xss')",
+		}
+
+		for _, input := range riskyInputs {
+			if validator.detectSecurityRisk(input) == "" {
+				t.Errorf("Expected security risk to be detected in: %s", input)
+			}
+		}
+
+		safeInput := "normal safe text"
+		if validator.detectSecurityRisk(safeInput) != "" {
+			t.Error("Expected safe input to pass security check")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestInputValidationEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	logger := NewLogger("debug")
+	validator, err := NewInputValidator(config, logger)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create validator: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("Empty inputs", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Most validations should reject empty inputs
+		if result := validator.ValidateToken(""); result.IsValid {
+			t.Error("Expected empty token to be rejected")
+		}
+		if result := validator.ValidateEmail(""); result.IsValid {
+			t.Error("Expected empty email to be rejected")
+		}
+		if result := validator.ValidateURL(""); result.IsValid {
+			t.Error("Expected empty URL to be rejected")
+		}
+		if result := validator.ValidateUsername(""); result.IsValid {
+			t.Error("Expected empty username to be rejected")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Very long inputs", func(t *testing.T) {
+		longString := strings.Repeat("a", 10000)
+
+		if result := validator.ValidateEmail(longString + "@domain.com"); result.IsValid {
+			t.Error("Expected very long email to be rejected")
+		}
+		if result := validator.ValidateUsername(longString); result.IsValid {
+			t.Error("Expected very long username to be rejected")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Unicode handling", func(t *testing.T) {
+		unicodeEmail := "用户@example.com"
+		// Should handle unicode gracefully
+		validator.ValidateEmail(unicodeEmail) // Don't fail on unicode
+
+		unicodeUsername := "用户名"
+		validator.ValidateUsername(unicodeUsername) // Don't fail on unicode
+	})
+}
+
+// TestInputValidatorValidateToken tests comprehensive token validation
+func TestInputValidatorValidateToken(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	validator, _ := NewInputValidator(config, newNoOpLogger())
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		token       string
+		description string
+		expectValid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "ValidJWTToken",
+			token:       "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiZXhwIjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyLCJpYXQiOjE1MTYyMzkwMjJ9.signature", // trufflehog:ignore
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid JWT token should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "InvalidOpaqueToken",
+			token:       "opaque_access_token_that_is_long_enough_to_pass",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Opaque token (non-JWT) should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmptyToken",
+			token:       "",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Empty token should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "TokenWithNullBytes",
+			token:       "token_with_null\x00byte",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Token with null bytes should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "TokenTooLong",
+			token:       strings.Repeat("a", config.MaxTokenLength+1),
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Token exceeding max length should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "TokenWithControlCharacters",
+			token:       "token_with_control\x01character",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Token with control characters should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "TokenWithHighUnicode",
+			token:       "token_with_unicode_\uffff",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Token with high unicode characters should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "MaliciousJWTWithExtraData",
+			token:       "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.sig.malicious_extra", // trufflehog:ignore
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "JWT with extra malicious data should fail validation",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.ValidateToken(tt.token)
+
+			if result.IsValid != tt.expectValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectValid, result.IsValid, tt.description)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInputValidatorValidateEmail tests email validation edge cases
+func TestInputValidatorValidateEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	validator, _ := NewInputValidator(config, newNoOpLogger())
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		email       string
+		description string
+		expectValid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "ValidEmail",
+			email:       "[email protected]",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid email should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ValidEmailWithSubdomain",
+			email:       "[email protected]",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid email with subdomain should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmptyEmail",
+			email:       "",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Empty email should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmailWithoutAtSign",
+			email:       "userexample.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Email without @ sign should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmailWithNullBytes",
+			email:       "user@example\x00.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Email with null bytes should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmailTooLong",
+			email:       strings.Repeat("a", config.MaxEmailLength-10) + "@example.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Email exceeding max length should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmailWithControlCharacters",
+			email:       "user\[email protected]",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Email with control characters should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "MaliciousEmailWithScriptTag",
+			email:       "user<script>@example.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Email with script tag should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmailWithUnicodeCharacters",
+			email:       "üser@éxample.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Email with unicode should fail basic validation",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.ValidateEmail(tt.email)
+
+			if result.IsValid != tt.expectValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectValid, result.IsValid, tt.description)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInputValidatorValidateURL tests URL validation with security focus
+func TestInputValidatorValidateURL(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	validator, _ := NewInputValidator(config, newNoOpLogger())
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		url         string
+		description string
+		expectValid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "ValidHTTPSURL",
+			url:         "https://example.com/path",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid HTTPS URL should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ValidHTTPURL",
+			url:         "http://example.com/path",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid HTTP URL should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmptyURL",
+			url:         "",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Empty URL should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "InvalidScheme",
+			url:         "ftp://example.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "URL with invalid scheme should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "URLWithNullBytes",
+			url:         "https://example\x00.com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "URL with null bytes should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "URLTooLong",
+			url:         "https://" + strings.Repeat("a", config.MaxURLLength) + ".com",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "URL exceeding max length should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "MalformedURL",
+			url:         "https://",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Malformed URL should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "HTTPSLocalhostURL",
+			url:         "https://localhost:8080/path",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "HTTPS localhost URL should be allowed for development",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "HTTPLocalhostURL",
+			url:         "http://localhost:8080/path",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "HTTP localhost URL should fail validation for security",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "PrivateIPURL",
+			url:         "https://192.168.1.1/path",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Private IP URL should fail validation for security",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "JavaScriptURL",
+			url:         "javascript:alert(1)",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "JavaScript URL should fail validation",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.ValidateURL(tt.url)
+
+			if result.IsValid != tt.expectValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectValid, result.IsValid, tt.description)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInputValidatorValidateClaim tests claim validation with security focus
+func TestInputValidatorValidateClaim(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	validator, _ := NewInputValidator(config, newNoOpLogger())
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		claimName   string
+		claimValue  string
+		description string
+		expectValid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "ValidStringClaim",
+			claimName:   "email",
+			claimValue:  "[email protected]",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid string claim should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ValidNumberClaim",
+			claimName:   "exp",
+			claimValue:  "1516239022",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid number claim should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmptyClaimName",
+			claimName:   "",
+			claimValue:  "value",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Empty claim name should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ClaimWithNullBytes",
+			claimName:   "test",
+			claimValue:  "value\x00with_null",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Claim with null bytes should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ClaimValueTooLong",
+			claimName:   "test",
+			claimValue:  strings.Repeat("a", config.MaxClaimLength+1),
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Claim value exceeding max length should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ClaimWithControlCharacters",
+			claimName:   "test",
+			claimValue:  "value\x01with_control",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Claim with control characters should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "MaliciousClaimWithHTML",
+			claimName:   "test",
+			claimValue:  "<script>alert('xss')</script>",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Claim with HTML/script should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ClaimWithExcessiveUnicode",
+			claimName:   "test",
+			claimValue:  strings.Repeat("🚀", 100), // Many unicode chars
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Claim with excessive unicode should fail validation",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.ValidateClaim(tt.claimName, tt.claimValue)
+
+			if result.IsValid != tt.expectValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectValid, result.IsValid, tt.description)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInputValidatorValidateHeader tests HTTP header validation
+func TestInputValidatorValidateHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	validator, _ := NewInputValidator(config, newNoOpLogger())
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		headerName  string
+		headerValue string
+		description string
+		expectValid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "ValidHeader",
+			headerName:  "Authorization",
+			headerValue: "Bearer token123",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid header should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ValidContentType",
+			headerName:  "Content-Type",
+			headerValue: "application/json",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid content type header should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmptyHeaderName",
+			headerName:  "",
+			headerValue: "value",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Empty header name should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "HeaderWithNullBytes",
+			headerName:  "test",
+			headerValue: "value\x00with_null",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Header with null bytes should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "HeaderValueTooLong",
+			headerName:  "test",
+			headerValue: strings.Repeat("a", config.MaxHeaderLength+1),
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Header value exceeding max length should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "HeaderWithCRLF",
+			headerName:  "test",
+			headerValue: "value\r\nMalicious: header",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Header with CRLF should fail validation to prevent injection",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "HeaderWithControlCharacters",
+			headerName:  "test",
+			headerValue: "value\x01with_control",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Header with control characters should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "MaliciousHeaderWithHTML",
+			headerName:  "test",
+			headerValue: "<script>alert('xss')</script>",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Header with HTML/script should fail validation",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.ValidateHeader(tt.headerName, tt.headerValue)
+
+			if result.IsValid != tt.expectValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectValid, result.IsValid, tt.description)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInputValidatorValidateUsername tests username validation
+func TestInputValidatorValidateUsername(t *testing.T) {
+	config := DefaultInputValidationConfig()
+	validator, _ := NewInputValidator(config, newNoOpLogger())
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		username    string
+		description string
+		expectValid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "ValidUsername",
+			username:    "john_doe",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid username should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "ValidUsernameWithNumbers",
+			username:    "user123",
+			expectValid: true,
+			description: "Valid username with numbers should pass validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "EmptyUsername",
+			username:    "",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Empty username should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "UsernameWithNullBytes",
+			username:    "user\x00name",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Username with null bytes should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "UsernameTooLong",
+			username:    strings.Repeat("a", config.MaxUsernameLength+1),
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Username exceeding max length should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "UsernameWithSpecialChars",
+			username:    "user@name",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Username with special characters should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "UsernameWithSpaces",
+			username:    "user name",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Username with spaces should fail validation",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "UsernameWithControlCharacters",
+			username:    "user\x01name",
+			expectValid: false,
+			description: "Username with control characters should fail validation",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := validator.ValidateUsername(tt.username)
+
+			if result.IsValid != tt.expectValid {
+				t.Errorf("Expected valid=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectValid, result.IsValid, tt.description)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/cache/backends/config.go

@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@ import "time"
 type BackendType string
 
 const (
-	BackendTypeRedis BackendType = "redis"
+	BackendTypeMemory BackendType = "memory"
+	BackendTypeRedis  BackendType = "redis"
+	BackendTypeHybrid BackendType = "hybrid"
 
-	// TypeRedis is an alias for backward compatibility
-	TypeRedis BackendType = "redis"
+	// Aliases for backward compatibility
+	TypeMemory BackendType = "memory"
+	TypeRedis  BackendType = "redis"
+	TypeHybrid BackendType = "hybrid"
 )
 
 // Config provides common configuration for cache backends
@@ -35,6 +39,17 @@ type Config struct {
 	TLSSkipVerify        bool
 }
 
+// DefaultConfig returns a default configuration for in-memory caching
+func DefaultConfig() *Config {
+	return &Config{
+		Type:            BackendTypeMemory,
+		MaxSize:         1000,
+		MaxMemoryBytes:  50 * 1024 * 1024, // 50MB
+		CleanupInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
+		EnableMetrics:   true,
+	}
+}
+
 // DefaultRedisConfig returns a default configuration for Redis caching
 func DefaultRedisConfig(addr string) *Config {
 	return &Config{
@@ -49,3 +64,19 @@ func DefaultRedisConfig(addr string) *Config {
 		EnableMetrics:        true,
 	}
 }
+
+// DefaultHybridConfig returns a default configuration for hybrid caching
+func DefaultHybridConfig(redisAddr string) *Config {
+	return &Config{
+		Type: BackendTypeHybrid,
+		L1Config: &Config{
+			Type:            BackendTypeMemory,
+			MaxSize:         500,
+			MaxMemoryBytes:  10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB for L1
+			CleanupInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
+		},
+		L2Config:      DefaultRedisConfig(redisAddr),
+		AsyncWrites:   true,
+		EnableMetrics: true,
+	}
+}

internal/cache/backends/config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+//go:build !yaegi
+
+package backends
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestDefaultHybridConfig verifies the default hybrid configuration
+func TestDefaultHybridConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	redisAddr := "localhost:6379"
+
+	config := DefaultHybridConfig(redisAddr)
+
+	require.NotNil(t, config)
+
+	// Verify top-level config
+	assert.Equal(t, BackendTypeHybrid, config.Type)
+	assert.True(t, config.AsyncWrites)
+	assert.True(t, config.EnableMetrics)
+
+	// Verify L1 (memory) config
+	require.NotNil(t, config.L1Config)
+	assert.Equal(t, BackendTypeMemory, config.L1Config.Type)
+	assert.Equal(t, 500, config.L1Config.MaxSize)
+	assert.Equal(t, int64(10*1024*1024), config.L1Config.MaxMemoryBytes) // 10MB
+	assert.Equal(t, 1*time.Minute, config.L1Config.CleanupInterval)
+
+	// Verify L2 (Redis) config exists
+	require.NotNil(t, config.L2Config)
+	assert.Equal(t, BackendTypeRedis, config.L2Config.Type)
+}
+
+func TestDefaultHybridConfig_DifferentRedisAddr(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name      string
+		redisAddr string
+	}{
+		{"localhost", "localhost:6379"},
+		{"remote host", "redis.example.com:6379"},
+		{"IP address", "192.168.1.100:6379"},
+		{"custom port", "localhost:6380"},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			config := DefaultHybridConfig(tt.redisAddr)
+
+			require.NotNil(t, config)
+			assert.Equal(t, BackendTypeHybrid, config.Type)
+			assert.NotNil(t, config.L1Config)
+			assert.NotNil(t, config.L2Config)
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/cache/backends/errors.go

@@ -35,21 +35,4 @@ var (
 
 	// ErrDeserializationFailed is returned when deserialization fails
 	ErrDeserializationFailed = errors.New("deserialization failed")
-
-	// ErrSetNXUnsupported is returned by a CacheBackend wrapper's SetNX when
-	// the backend it wraps does not itself implement SetNX (FIX-17 round-2).
-	// Compared with == only: no errors.As, no fmt.Errorf %w — an interpreted
-	// value wrapped with %w loses its type under yaegi v0.16.1, and
-	// errors.As with an interpreted target type panics there.
-	ErrSetNXUnsupported = errors.New("cache backend does not support atomic SetNX")
-
-	// ErrSetNXAmbiguous is returned by RedisBackend.SetNX when the SET NX
-	// command was already written to the connection but its reply could not
-	// be read (timeout, EOF, connection reset): Redis may or may not have
-	// applied it. Unlike Set's idempotent SETEX/PSETEX, retrying SET NX
-	// blindly here would see the caller's own possible write and misreport
-	// a first-ever claim as already-claimed, so SetNX surfaces the
-	// ambiguity instead of guessing (FIX-17 round-2). Compared with == only,
-	// for the same yaegi reason as ErrSetNXUnsupported.
-	ErrSetNXAmbiguous = errors.New("SET NX outcome unknown: reply lost after the command was sent")
 )