test(oidcgate): integration test with real middleware against mock IdP (#142)

- Add 'oidcgate' build entry (linux/darwin × amd64/arm64) to goreleaser.
- Add per-OS/arch tar.gz archives for the daemon binary.
- Add dockers + docker_manifests entries publishing
  ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:vX.Y.Z (release tag), :vX.Y, :vX, :latest
  as multi-arch manifests (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64).
- Add cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile (distroless static, nonroot user).
- Sign images with cosign keyless (docker_signs).
- Preserve existing source-only Traefik plugin archive via meta:true.
- Update README to advertise the published image.

.goreleaser.yaml

@@ -1,13 +1,41 @@
 version: 2
 
-# Traefik plugins are source-only - no binary builds
+# Two release artefacts:
-# Traefik loads plugins via Yaegi interpreter at runtime
+#
+# 1. The Traefik plugin: source-only — Traefik loads it via the Yaegi
+#    interpreter from the source tarball published on GitHub releases.
+# 2. oidcgate: a standalone forward-auth daemon built from cmd/oidcgate.
+#    Shipped as both per-OS/arch binary archives AND a multi-arch Docker
+#    image at ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate, tagged to match the release.
+
 builds:
-  - skip: true
+  - id: oidcgate
+    main: ./cmd/oidcgate
+    binary: oidcgate
+    env:
+      - CGO_ENABLED=0
+    goos:
+      - linux
+      - darwin
+    goarch:
+      - amd64
+      - arm64
+    flags:
+      - -trimpath
+      - -buildvcs=false
+    ldflags:
+      - -s -w
+      - -X main.version={{.Version}}
+      - -X main.commit={{.ShortCommit}}
+      - -X main.date={{.Date}}
+    mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
 
-# Create source archive for GitHub releases
 archives:
-  - formats: [tar.gz]
+  # Source archive for the Traefik plugin path. meta:true → no binary
+  # builds attached; everything comes from `files:` below.
+  - id: source-plugin
+    meta: true
+    formats: [tar.gz]
     name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_v{{ .Version }}_source"
     files:
       - "*.go"
@@ -25,6 +53,93 @@ archives:
       - "!regression/**"
       - "!examples/**"
       - "!docs/**"
+      - "!cmd/**"
+
+  # Per-OS/arch binary archives for the oidcgate daemon.
+  - id: oidcgate
+    ids: [oidcgate]
+    formats: [tar.gz]
+    name_template: "oidcgate_v{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
+    files:
+      - LICENSE*
+      - README*
+      - src: docs/OIDCGATE.md
+        dst: docs/
+      - src: examples/oidcgate.yaml
+        dst: examples/
+
+# Build a Docker image per (linux, arch) combo. Tag suffixes are
+# combined into a single multi-arch manifest list below via
+# docker_manifests, so end users pull a single tag.
+dockers:
+  - id: oidcgate-amd64
+    ids: [oidcgate]
+    goos: linux
+    goarch: amd64
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+    use: buildx
+    dockerfile: cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile
+    build_flag_templates:
+      - "--pull"
+      - "--platform=linux/amd64"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.title=oidcgate"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.description=Standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon for nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.version={{ .Version }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.revision={{ .FullCommit }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.created={{ .Date }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.source=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.url=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.documentation=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/blob/main/docs/OIDCGATE.md"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.licenses=MIT"
+
+  - id: oidcgate-arm64
+    ids: [oidcgate]
+    goos: linux
+    goarch: arm64
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    use: buildx
+    dockerfile: cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile
+    build_flag_templates:
+      - "--pull"
+      - "--platform=linux/arm64"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.title=oidcgate"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.description=Standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon for nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.version={{ .Version }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.revision={{ .FullCommit }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.created={{ .Date }}"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.source=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.url=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.documentation=https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/blob/main/docs/OIDCGATE.md"
+      - "--label=org.opencontainers.image.licenses=MIT"
+
+# Multi-arch manifests — these are what users actually pull.
+# Tags match the release tag (vX.Y.Z) exactly, plus a few convenience tags.
+docker_manifests:
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:v{{ .Version }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:v{{ .Major }}.{{ .Minor }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    skip_push: auto
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:v{{ .Major }}"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    skip_push: auto
+  - name_template: "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:latest"
+    image_templates:
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-amd64"
+      - "ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:{{ .Version }}-arm64"
+    skip_push: auto
 
 checksum:
   name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_v{{ .Version }}_checksums.txt"
@@ -58,3 +173,13 @@ signs:
       - "--yes"
     artifacts: checksum
     output: true
+
+# Sign the Docker images and manifests with cosign keyless.
+docker_signs:
+  - cmd: cosign
+    artifacts: all
+    args:
+      - sign
+      - "${artifact}@${digest}"
+      - "--yes"
+    output: true

README.md

@@ -64,6 +64,28 @@ cosign verify-blob \
   traefikoidc_v<version>_checksums.txt
 ```
 
+## Standalone binary (oidcgate)
+
+If you don't run Traefik, `oidcgate` exposes the same middleware as a
+forward-auth daemon for nginx, Caddy, Traefik ForwardAuth, HAProxy, and
+Envoy. See [`docs/OIDCGATE.md`](docs/OIDCGATE.md).
+
+```bash
+# From source
+go build -o oidcgate ./cmd/oidcgate
+./oidcgate --config examples/oidcgate.yaml
+
+# Or pull the released image (multi-arch: linux/amd64, linux/arm64)
+docker run --rm \
+  -v /path/to/config.yaml:/etc/oidcgate/config.yaml:ro \
+  -p 8080:8080 \
+  ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:latest
+```
+
+Each tagged release publishes a Docker image at
+`ghcr.io/lukaszraczylo/oidcgate:vX.Y.Z` (matching the release tag), plus
+floating `:vX.Y`, `:vX`, and `:latest` aliases.
+
 ## Quickstart
 
 ```yaml
@@ -111,7 +133,6 @@ Full reference in [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md).
 | `logoutURL` | `callbackURL + "/logout"` | RP-initiated logout path. |
 | `postLogoutRedirectURI` | `/` | Where to send users after logout. |
 | `scopes` | appended to `openid profile email` | Extra OAuth scopes. Set `overrideScopes: true` to replace defaults. |
-| `extraAuthParams` | none | Map of extra query parameters appended to the authorization request (e.g. `screen_hint: signup`, `login_hint`, `ui_locales`, `prompt`). Plugin-managed params (`client_id`, `state`, `nonce`, `redirect_uri`, `code_challenge`, `scope`, `response_type`, …) cannot be overridden. |
 | `excludedURLs` | none | Prefix-matched paths that bypass auth. |
 | `allowedUserDomains` | none | Restrict to email domains. |
 | `allowedUsers` | none | Restrict to specific addresses (or claim values when `userIdentifierClaim != email`). |
@@ -412,19 +433,6 @@ namespaced claims, Cognito regions, GitLab self-hosted) live in
 
 Set `logLevel: debug` to surface detail.
 
-## Telemetry
-
-On first plugin instantiation this middleware sends a single anonymous
-adoption ping — project name, version, timestamp; no identifiers, no
-request data, no token contents. Fire-and-forget with a 2-second timeout;
-cannot block plugin load or panic.
-
-Local source: [`telemetry.go`](./telemetry.go). Disclosure mirrors
-**[oss-telemetry — Disabling telemetry](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry#disabling-telemetry)**.
-
-Quick opt-out: set any of `DO_NOT_TRACK=1`, `OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1`,
-or `TRAEFIKOIDC_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`.
-
 ## License
 
 See [LICENSE](LICENSE).

audience_test.go

@@ -484,8 +484,7 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario3OpaqueAccessToken(t *testing.T) {
 	session.SetAccessToken(opaqueAccessToken)
 	session.SetIDToken(idToken)
 
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokens(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokensRS(rs)
 	if !authenticated || needsRefresh || expired {
 		t.Errorf("Session with opaque access token and valid ID token should be authenticated. Got: auth=%v, refresh=%v, expired=%v",
 			authenticated, needsRefresh, expired)
@@ -624,8 +623,7 @@ func TestAuth0Scenario2StrictMode(t *testing.T) {
 	session.SetRefreshToken("test-refresh-token") // Add refresh token so it can attempt refresh
 
 	// In strict mode, this should FAIL (no fallback to ID token)
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokens(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokensRS(rs)
 	if authenticated {
 		t.Errorf("Strict mode: Session with wrong access token audience should be rejected, but got authenticated=true")
 	}

auth_flow.go

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) prepareSessionForAuthentication(session *SessionData, csrf
 //   - session: The session data to prepare for authentication.
 //   - redirectURL: The pre-calculated callback URL (redirect_uri) for this middleware instance.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
-	t.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
+	t.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", t.originalRequestURI(req))
 
 	// Check and handle redirect limits
 	if err := t.validateRedirectCount(session, rw, req); err != nil {
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
 	}
 
 	// Clear existing session data and set new authentication state
-	t.prepareSessionForAuthentication(session, csrfToken, nonce, codeVerifier, req.URL.RequestURI())
+	t.prepareSessionForAuthentication(session, csrfToken, nonce, codeVerifier, t.originalRequestURI(req))
 
 	session.MarkDirty()
 
@@ -305,6 +305,28 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleExpiredToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Reque
 	t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
 }
 
+// isUserAuthenticated determines the authentication status and refresh requirements.
+// It delegates to provider-specific validation methods that handle different token types
+// and expiration behaviors.
+// Parameters:
+//   - session: The session data containing authentication tokens.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - authenticated (bool): True if the user has valid tokens.
+//   - needsRefresh (bool): True if tokens are valid but nearing expiration.
+//   - expired (bool): True if the session is unauthenticated, the token is missing,
+//     or the token verification failed for reasons other than nearing/actual expiration.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) isUserAuthenticated(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, bool) {
+	if t.isAzureProvider() {
+		return t.validateAzureTokens(session)
+	} else if t.isGoogleProvider() {
+		return t.validateGoogleTokens(session)
+	}
+	// Auth0 and other providers can now use standard validation
+	// which handles opaque tokens generically
+	return t.validateStandardTokens(session)
+}
+
 // isAjaxRequest determines if this is an AJAX request that should receive 401 instead of redirect
 func (t *TraefikOidc) isAjaxRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
 	xhr := req.Header.Get("X-Requested-With")

azure_oidc_test.go

@@ -262,8 +262,7 @@ func TestAzureOIDCRegression(t *testing.T) {
 		defer func() { tOidc.tokenVerifier = originalTokenVerifier }()
 
 		// Test that CSRF is preserved during Azure validation failures
-		rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+		authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := tOidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
-		authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := tOidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
 
 		// Should not be authenticated due to validation failure
 		if authenticated {
@@ -454,8 +453,7 @@ func TestValidateGoogleTokens(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			session := tt.setupSession()
 
-			rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateGoogleTokens(session)
-			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateGoogleTokensRS(rs)
 
 			if auth != tt.expectedAuth {
 				t.Errorf("Expected authenticated=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectedAuth, auth, tt.description)
@@ -639,8 +637,7 @@ func TestIsUserAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
 			defer func() { ts.tOidc.issuerURL = originalIssuer }()
 
 			session := tt.setupSession()
-			rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.isUserAuthenticated(session)
-			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.isUserAuthenticatedRS(rs)
 
 			if auth != tt.expectedAuth {
 				t.Errorf("Expected authenticated=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectedAuth, auth, tt.description)
@@ -765,8 +762,7 @@ func TestValidateAzureTokensEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			session := tt.setupSession()
 
-			rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
-			auth, refresh, expired := ts.tOidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
 
 			if auth != tt.expectedAuth {
 				t.Errorf("Expected authenticated=%v, got %v. %s", tt.expectedAuth, auth, tt.description)

bearer_auth_test.go

@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ func makeBearerOIDC(t *testing.T, next http.Handler) *TraefikOidc {
 		logger:                    NewLogger("error"),
 		initComplete:              make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:            sm,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:      true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted:    true,
 		issuerURL:                 "https://issuer.example.com",
 		audience:                  "https://api.example.com",
 		clientID:                  "https://api.example.com",

cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
+#
+# This Dockerfile is consumed by GoReleaser. The binary is built outside
+# the Docker context (by goreleaser's Go cross-compile) and placed in the
+# build context as ./oidcgate before `docker buildx build` runs.
+#
+# To build locally without goreleaser:
+#   go build -o oidcgate ./cmd/oidcgate
+#   docker build -f cmd/oidcgate/Dockerfile -t oidcgate:dev .
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot
+
+ARG TARGETOS
+ARG TARGETARCH
+
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="oidcgate"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="Standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon for nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/blob/main/docs/OIDCGATE.md"
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
+
+COPY oidcgate /usr/local/bin/oidcgate
+
+EXPOSE 8080
+
+USER nonroot:nonroot
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/oidcgate"]
+CMD ["--config", "/etc/oidcgate/config.yaml"]

cmd/oidcgate/config.go

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
+)
+
+// Config is the top-level oidcgate configuration. The OIDC subtree maps 1:1
+// onto traefikoidc.Config; the few extra fields configure the daemon itself.
+type Config struct {
+	Listen    string             `json:"listen"`
+	AuthPath  string             `json:"authPath"`
+	StartPath string             `json:"startPath"`
+	OIDC      traefikoidc.Config `json:"-"`
+}
+
+// envScalarFields lists Config field names (within OIDC and top-level)
+// that may be overridden via OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE> environment
+// variables. Only scalar strings/ints/bools are supported; nested structs
+// (Redis, SecurityHeaders, DynamicClientRegistration) stay YAML-only.
+var envScalarFields = []string{
+	"Listen", "AuthPath", "StartPath",
+	"ProviderURL", "ClientID", "ClientSecret", "Audience",
+	"CallbackURL", "LogoutURL", "PostLogoutRedirectURI",
+	"SessionEncryptionKey", "CookiePrefix", "CookieDomain",
+	"LogLevel", "RevocationURL", "OIDCEndSessionURL",
+	"UserIdentifierClaim", "GroupClaimName", "RoleClaimName",
+	"ClientAuthMethod", "ClientAssertionPrivateKey",
+	"ClientAssertionKeyPath", "ClientAssertionKeyID", "ClientAssertionAlg",
+	"CACertPath", "CACertPEM",
+}
+
+// Load reads YAML from path, applies env-var overrides, fills defaults,
+// and forces TrustForwardedURI=true so the library honors X-Forwarded-Uri.
+func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
+	// Clean the operator-supplied path to satisfy gosec G304 (file inclusion
+	// via variable). filepath.Clean strips traversal sequences and normalises
+	// the path; this is canonical mitigation for config files supplied via a
+	// CLI flag — the operator runs the daemon, so the input is trusted, but
+	// gosec's static analysis still flags variable paths without the cleanup.
+	clean := filepath.Clean(path)
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(clean) // #nosec G304 -- operator-supplied config path, cleaned above
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read config: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Pass 1: YAML → generic map.
+	var raw map[string]any
+	if err := yaml.Unmarshal(data, &raw); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("yaml parse: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Split the top-level oidcgate-specific keys away from the OIDC subtree.
+	listen, _ := raw["listen"].(string)
+	authPath, _ := raw["authPath"].(string)
+	startPath, _ := raw["startPath"].(string)
+	delete(raw, "listen")
+	delete(raw, "authPath")
+	delete(raw, "startPath")
+
+	// Pass 2: remaining map → JSON → traefikoidc.Config (uses existing json tags).
+	jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("yaml→json: %w", err)
+	}
+	var oidcCfg traefikoidc.Config
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(jsonBytes, &oidcCfg); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc config parse: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen:    listen,
+		AuthPath:  authPath,
+		StartPath: startPath,
+		OIDC:      oidcCfg,
+	}
+
+	applyEnvOverrides(cfg)
+	applyDefaults(cfg)
+
+	if cfg.Listen == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: missing required 'listen' (or OIDCGATE_LISTEN env var)")
+	}
+
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL, "/") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: callbackURL must be a path starting with '/', got %q", cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL, "/") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: logoutURL must be a path starting with '/', got %q", cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL)
+	}
+
+	reserved := []string{
+		sentinelPath,
+		cfg.AuthPath,
+		cfg.StartPath,
+		cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL,
+		cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL,
+	}
+	for _, ex := range cfg.OIDC.ExcludedURLs {
+		for _, r := range reserved {
+			if r != "" && strings.HasPrefix(r, ex) {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("config: excludedURL %q would bypass reserved oidcgate path %q", ex, r)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Force standalone semantics: trust X-Forwarded-Uri.
+	cfg.OIDC.TrustForwardedURI = true
+	return cfg, nil
+}
+
+// applyEnvOverrides walks the allow-listed scalar fields and replaces any
+// non-empty OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE> env var. Field name "ClientID"
+// becomes "OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ID"; "SessionEncryptionKey" becomes
+// "OIDCGATE_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY".
+func applyEnvOverrides(cfg *Config) {
+	for _, field := range envScalarFields {
+		env := os.Getenv("OIDCGATE_" + camelToSnakeUpper(field))
+		if env == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		setScalarField(cfg, field, env)
+	}
+}
+
+func setScalarField(cfg *Config, field, value string) {
+	switch field {
+	case "Listen":
+		cfg.Listen = value
+	case "AuthPath":
+		cfg.AuthPath = value
+	case "StartPath":
+		cfg.StartPath = value
+	case "ProviderURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.ProviderURL = value
+	case "ClientID":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientID = value
+	case "ClientSecret":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret = value
+	case "Audience":
+		cfg.OIDC.Audience = value
+	case "CallbackURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL = value
+	case "LogoutURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL = value
+	case "PostLogoutRedirectURI":
+		cfg.OIDC.PostLogoutRedirectURI = value
+	case "SessionEncryptionKey":
+		cfg.OIDC.SessionEncryptionKey = value
+	case "CookiePrefix":
+		cfg.OIDC.CookiePrefix = value
+	case "CookieDomain":
+		cfg.OIDC.CookieDomain = value
+	case "LogLevel":
+		cfg.OIDC.LogLevel = value
+	case "RevocationURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.RevocationURL = value
+	case "OIDCEndSessionURL":
+		cfg.OIDC.OIDCEndSessionURL = value
+	case "UserIdentifierClaim":
+		cfg.OIDC.UserIdentifierClaim = value
+	case "GroupClaimName":
+		cfg.OIDC.GroupClaimName = value
+	case "RoleClaimName":
+		cfg.OIDC.RoleClaimName = value
+	case "ClientAuthMethod":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAuthMethod = value
+	case "ClientAssertionPrivateKey":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionPrivateKey = value
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyPath":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyPath = value
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyID":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyID = value
+	case "ClientAssertionAlg":
+		cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionAlg = value
+	case "CACertPath":
+		cfg.OIDC.CACertPath = value
+	case "CACertPEM":
+		cfg.OIDC.CACertPEM = value
+	}
+}
+
+func applyDefaults(cfg *Config) {
+	if cfg.AuthPath == "" {
+		cfg.AuthPath = "/oauth2/auth"
+	}
+	if cfg.StartPath == "" {
+		cfg.StartPath = "/oauth2/start"
+	}
+}
+
+// camelToSnakeUpper turns "ClientSecret" into "CLIENT_SECRET",
+// "SessionEncryptionKey" into "SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY", etc.
+// Multi-letter acronyms keep their grouping: "OIDCEndSessionURL" →
+// "OIDC_END_SESSION_URL", "CACertPEM" → "CA_CERT_PEM".
+func camelToSnakeUpper(s string) string {
+	runes := []rune(s)
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for i, r := range runes {
+		if i > 0 && isUpper(r) {
+			prev := runes[i-1]
+			next := rune(0)
+			if i+1 < len(runes) {
+				next = runes[i+1]
+			}
+			if !isUpper(prev) || (next != 0 && !isUpper(next)) {
+				b.WriteByte('_')
+			}
+		}
+		b.WriteRune(unicode.ToUpper(r))
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func isUpper(r rune) bool { return r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z' }

cmd/oidcgate/config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// minimalYAML is a base config accepted by Load with no surprises.
+const minimalYAML = `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`
+
+func writeConfig(t *testing.T, content string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return path
+}
+
+func TestLoad_YAMLRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":9090"
+authPath: "/auth"
+startPath: "/start"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Listen != ":9090" {
+		t.Errorf("listen: want :9090, got %q", cfg.Listen)
+	}
+	if cfg.AuthPath != "/auth" {
+		t.Errorf("authPath: want /auth, got %q", cfg.AuthPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.StartPath != "/start" {
+		t.Errorf("startPath: want /start, got %q", cfg.StartPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.ClientID != "abc" {
+		t.Errorf("clientID: want abc, got %q", cfg.OIDC.ClientID)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret != "secret" {
+		t.Errorf("clientSecret: want secret, got %q", cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret)
+	}
+	if !cfg.OIDC.TrustForwardedURI {
+		t.Errorf("TrustForwardedURI should be forced true by Load")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_EnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "from-file"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("OIDCGATE_CLIENT_SECRET", "from-env")
+	t.Setenv("OIDCGATE_LISTEN", ":9999")
+
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret != "from-env" {
+		t.Errorf("env override (clientSecret): want from-env, got %q", cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret)
+	}
+	if cfg.Listen != ":9999" {
+		t.Errorf("env override (listen): want :9999, got %q", cfg.Listen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_Defaults(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.AuthPath != "/oauth2/auth" {
+		t.Errorf("AuthPath default: want /oauth2/auth, got %q", cfg.AuthPath)
+	}
+	if cfg.StartPath != "/oauth2/start" {
+		t.Errorf("StartPath default: want /oauth2/start, got %q", cfg.StartPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_MissingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := Load("/nonexistent/config.yaml"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for missing file")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_NestedStructRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+redis:
+  address: "redis:6379"
+  password: "redispw"
+`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := Load(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.Redis == nil {
+		t.Fatal("redis block should populate cfg.OIDC.Redis")
+	}
+	if cfg.OIDC.Redis.Address != "redis:6379" {
+		t.Errorf("redis address: want redis:6379, got %q", cfg.OIDC.Redis.Address)
+	}
+}
+
+// Fix 5: callbackURL / logoutURL must start with "/"
+func TestLoad_RejectsAbsoluteCallbackURL(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "https://app.example.com/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("callbackURL with absolute URL must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_RejectsAbsoluteLogoutURL(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "https://app.example.com/oauth2/logout"
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("logoutURL with absolute URL must be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+// Fix 2: excludedURLs must not prefix reserved paths
+func TestLoad_RejectsExcludedURLPrefixingReservedPath(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, `
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://idp.example"
+clientID: "abc"
+clientSecret: "secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+excludedURLs: ["/"]
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("excludedURLs: ['/'] must be rejected (bypasses all reserved paths)")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoad_AllowsNonOverlappingExcludedURL(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, minimalYAML+`excludedURLs: ["/public"]
+`)
+	if _, err := Load(path); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("non-overlapping excludedURL must be accepted: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Fix 3: env override coverage — every envScalarFields entry must have a
+// matching case in setScalarField. isAllZeroForField detects drift.
+func TestEnvOverrideCoverage(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, field := range envScalarFields {
+		field := field
+		t.Run(field, func(t *testing.T) {
+			probe := "/safe/probe-" + field
+			if field == "SessionEncryptionKey" {
+				probe = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
+			}
+			if field == "LogLevel" {
+				probe = "debug"
+			}
+			if field == "ClientAuthMethod" {
+				probe = "client_secret_post"
+			}
+			if field == "ClientAssertionAlg" {
+				probe = "RS256"
+			}
+
+			var fresh Config
+			setScalarField(&fresh, field, probe)
+			if isAllZeroForField(&fresh, field, probe) {
+				t.Fatalf("envScalarFields includes %q but setScalarField has no matching case (drift)", field)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// isAllZeroForField returns true when setScalarField did NOT set the expected
+// field — i.e., the switch is missing a case for `field`.
+func isAllZeroForField(cfg *Config, field, probe string) bool {
+	switch field {
+	case "Listen":
+		return cfg.Listen != probe
+	case "AuthPath":
+		return cfg.AuthPath != probe
+	case "StartPath":
+		return cfg.StartPath != probe
+	case "ProviderURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ProviderURL != probe
+	case "ClientID":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientID != probe
+	case "ClientSecret":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientSecret != probe
+	case "Audience":
+		return cfg.OIDC.Audience != probe
+	case "CallbackURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL != probe
+	case "LogoutURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL != probe
+	case "PostLogoutRedirectURI":
+		return cfg.OIDC.PostLogoutRedirectURI != probe
+	case "SessionEncryptionKey":
+		return cfg.OIDC.SessionEncryptionKey != probe
+	case "CookiePrefix":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CookiePrefix != probe
+	case "CookieDomain":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CookieDomain != probe
+	case "LogLevel":
+		return cfg.OIDC.LogLevel != probe
+	case "RevocationURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.RevocationURL != probe
+	case "OIDCEndSessionURL":
+		return cfg.OIDC.OIDCEndSessionURL != probe
+	case "UserIdentifierClaim":
+		return cfg.OIDC.UserIdentifierClaim != probe
+	case "GroupClaimName":
+		return cfg.OIDC.GroupClaimName != probe
+	case "RoleClaimName":
+		return cfg.OIDC.RoleClaimName != probe
+	case "ClientAuthMethod":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAuthMethod != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionPrivateKey":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionPrivateKey != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyPath":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyPath != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionKeyID":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionKeyID != probe
+	case "ClientAssertionAlg":
+		return cfg.OIDC.ClientAssertionAlg != probe
+	case "CACertPath":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CACertPath != probe
+	case "CACertPEM":
+		return cfg.OIDC.CACertPEM != probe
+	}
+	return true // unknown field → drift
+}

cmd/oidcgate/endpoints.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package main
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// sentinelPath is the synthetic request path used when delegating /oauth2/auth
+// and /oauth2/start into the traefikoidc middleware. It must NOT collide with
+// callbackURL, logoutURL, /health*, or any plausible excludedURLs entry —
+// the underscores and double-prefixing make accidental matches near-impossible.
+const sentinelPath = "/__oidcgate_protected__"
+
+// newAuthHandler builds the /oauth2/auth (silent probe) handler.
+// Rewrites the request path to sentinelPath, wraps the ResponseWriter to
+// convert the middleware's 302→IdP into 401, and delegates.
+func newAuthHandler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		ic := newAuthInterceptor(rw)
+		defer ic.Finalize()
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, sentinelPath)
+		next.ServeHTTP(ic, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// newStartHandler builds the /oauth2/start (visible sign-in) handler.
+// Rewrites the path to sentinelPath, forwards any ?rd= query as
+// X-Forwarded-Uri so the middleware (with TrustForwardedURI=true) captures
+// the right post-login redirect target, then delegates. The middleware's
+// natural 302→IdP flows through unchanged.
+func newStartHandler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, sentinelPath)
+		// Precedence: explicit ?rd= wins over an ambient upstream
+		// X-Forwarded-Uri so /oauth2/start?rd=/dashboard does not get
+		// silently overridden by the proxy's current-URL forwarding.
+		if rd := req.URL.Query().Get("rd"); rd != "" {
+			r2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", rd)
+		}
+		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// newCallbackHandler builds the IdP callback endpoint.
+// Rewrites the request path to the configured callbackURL so the middleware's
+// path-match at the top of ServeHTTP triggers the callback flow.
+func newCallbackHandler(next http.Handler, callbackURL string) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, callbackURL)
+		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// newLogoutHandler builds the logout endpoint.
+// Rewrites the request path to the configured logoutURL so the middleware's
+// path-match at the top of ServeHTTP triggers the logout flow.
+func newLogoutHandler(next http.Handler, logoutURL string) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		r2 := cloneAndRewrite(req, logoutURL)
+		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r2)
+	})
+}
+
+// cloneAndRewrite returns a clone of req with URL.Path set to newPath.
+// req.Clone deep-copies URL via net/http's cloneURL, so mutating
+// r2.URL.Path does not affect the original req. RawQuery, Host,
+// Fragment, RawPath are preserved unchanged.
+func cloneAndRewrite(req *http.Request, newPath string) *http.Request {
+	r2 := req.Clone(req.Context())
+	r2.URL.Path = newPath
+	return r2
+}

cmd/oidcgate/endpoints_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// stubMiddleware lets us test endpoint wiring without spinning up a full
+// traefikoidc instance. Each test injects the behavior it wants.
+type stubMiddleware struct {
+	calls []stubCall
+	fn    func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request)
+}
+
+type stubCall struct {
+	path   string
+	header http.Header
+}
+
+func (s *stubMiddleware) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+	s.calls = append(s.calls, stubCall{path: req.URL.Path, header: req.Header.Clone()})
+	if s.fn != nil {
+		s.fn(rw, req)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuth_RewritesToSentinel_AndConverts302To401(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			rw.Header().Set("Location", "https://idp.example/authorize?state=abc")
+			rw.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "_oidc_state=abc; Path=/")
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newAuthHandler(stub)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/protected/page")
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if len(stub.calls) != 1 || stub.calls[0].path != sentinelPath {
+		t.Fatalf("middleware path: want %q, got %v", sentinelPath, stub.calls)
+	}
+	if rec.Header().Get("X-Auth-Redirect") == "" {
+		t.Error("X-Auth-Redirect should carry Location")
+	}
+	if got := stub.calls[0].header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); got != "/protected/page" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Uri must pass through to middleware: want /protected/page, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuth_AuthenticatedReturnsHeadersAnd200(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			// Middleware would stamp X-Forwarded-User on req then call next.
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+			newSuccessHandler().ServeHTTP(rw, req)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newAuthHandler(stub)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-User mirrored: want alice, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStart_DelegatesWithSentinel_NoInterception(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			rw.Header().Set("Location", "https://idp.example/authorize")
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newStartHandler(stub)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/back", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("start: 302 must flow through, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if stub.calls[0].path != sentinelPath {
+		t.Fatalf("start path rewrite: want %q, got %q", sentinelPath, stub.calls[0].path)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStart_ForwardsRdAsXForwardedURI(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound) },
+	}
+	h := newStartHandler(stub)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/back/here", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if got := stub.calls[0].header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); got != "/back/here" {
+		t.Fatalf("?rd should become X-Forwarded-Uri: want /back/here, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStart_RdQueryWinsOverUpstreamHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound) },
+	}
+	h := newStartHandler(stub)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/explicit", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/ambient")
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if got := stub.calls[0].header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); got != "/explicit" {
+		t.Fatalf("?rd= must win over upstream X-Forwarded-Uri: want /explicit, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCallback_RewritesToConfiguredCallbackURL(t *testing.T) {
+	var seenPath, seenQuery string
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			seenPath = req.URL.Path
+			seenQuery = req.URL.RawQuery
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newCallbackHandler(stub, "/oauth2/callback")
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/callback?code=abc&state=xyz", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if seenPath != "/oauth2/callback" {
+		t.Fatalf("callback path: want /oauth2/callback, got %q", seenPath)
+	}
+	if seenQuery != "code=abc&state=xyz" {
+		t.Fatalf("callback query must survive rewrite: want code=abc&state=xyz, got %q", seenQuery)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLogout_RewritesToConfiguredLogoutURL(t *testing.T) {
+	var seenPath string
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+			seenPath = req.URL.Path
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		},
+	}
+	h := newLogoutHandler(stub, "/oauth2/logout")
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/oauth2/logout", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if seenPath != "/oauth2/logout" {
+		t.Fatalf("logout path: want /oauth2/logout, got %q", seenPath)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/health.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package main
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// readyReporter is satisfied by *traefikoidc.TraefikOidc via its Ready() method.
+type readyReporter interface {
+	Ready() bool
+}
+
+func newHealthzHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func newReadyzHandler(r readyReporter) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		if r.Ready() {
+			rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			return
+		}
+		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	})
+}

cmd/oidcgate/health_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type readyStub struct{ ready bool }
+
+func (r *readyStub) Ready() bool { return r.ready }
+
+func TestHealthz_Always200(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHealthzHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("healthz: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReadyz_503BeforeDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newReadyzHandler(&readyStub{ready: false})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("readyz pre-discovery: want 503, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReadyz_200AfterDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newReadyzHandler(&readyStub{ready: true})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("readyz post-discovery: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/helpers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package main
+
+import "github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+
+type traefikoidcConfigStub struct {
+	callbackURL string
+	logoutURL   string
+}
+
+func (s traefikoidcConfigStub) AsOIDC() traefikoidc.Config {
+	return traefikoidc.Config{
+		CallbackURL: s.callbackURL,
+		LogoutURL:   s.logoutURL,
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+)
+
+// fakeProviderHost is a synthetic hostname used in place of the httptest.Server's
+// 127.0.0.1 address. traefikoidc's URL validator blocks loopback IPs
+// unconditionally; a non-loopback hostname passes the check. The custom HTTP
+// client returned by mockHTTPClient rewires all dials for this host to the
+// actual test-server port, so the mock IdP still receives every request.
+const fakeProviderHost = "test-oidc-provider.local"
+
+// mockHTTPClient returns an *http.Client whose dialer transparently redirects
+// connections to fakeProviderHost to the real httptest.Server address.
+func mockHTTPClient(realAddr string) *http.Client {
+	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+			if err != nil {
+				return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+			}
+			if host == fakeProviderHost {
+				addr = realAddr
+			}
+			return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+		},
+	}
+	return &http.Client{Transport: transport}
+}
+
+// newMockIdP returns an httptest.Server that serves the minimal OIDC
+// discovery surface required by traefikoidc.NewWithContext to bootstrap
+// — discovery doc + an empty JWKS. All URLs in the discovery doc use
+// fakeProviderHost so they pass the middleware's URL security validator.
+func newMockIdP(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	fakeBase := "http://" + fakeProviderHost
+	mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		discovery := map[string]any{
+			"issuer":                                fakeBase,
+			"authorization_endpoint":                fakeBase + "/authorize",
+			"token_endpoint":                        fakeBase + "/token",
+			"jwks_uri":                              fakeBase + "/jwks",
+			"response_types_supported":              []string{"code"},
+			"subject_types_supported":               []string{"public"},
+			"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
+		}
+		rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(rw).Encode(discovery)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = rw.Write([]byte(`{"keys":[]}`))
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return srv
+}
+
+// buildTestConfig produces a Config that points at the fake provider hostname
+// (which the custom HTTP client redirects to the real mock server) and uses
+// a known-good SessionEncryptionKey + safe path defaults.
+func buildTestConfig(srv *httptest.Server) *Config {
+	// realAddr is HOST:PORT of the httptest server (e.g. "127.0.0.1:56789").
+	realAddr := srv.Listener.Addr().String()
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen:    "127.0.0.1:0", // unused — we drive the mux directly via httptest
+		AuthPath:  "/oauth2/auth",
+		StartPath: "/oauth2/start",
+		OIDC: traefikoidc.Config{
+			ProviderURL:          "http://" + fakeProviderHost,
+			ClientID:             "test-client",
+			ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
+			SessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
+			CallbackURL:          "/oauth2/callback",
+			LogoutURL:            "/oauth2/logout",
+			TrustForwardedURI:    true,
+			EnablePKCE:           true,
+			HTTPClient:           mockHTTPClient(realAddr),
+		},
+	}
+	return cfg
+}
+
+// buildIntegrationStack builds the same wiring main.go builds: real
+// middleware constructed against the mock IdP, success handler as next,
+// mux on top.
+func buildIntegrationStack(t *testing.T, idp *httptest.Server) (http.Handler, *traefikoidc.TraefikOidc) {
+	t.Helper()
+	cfg := buildTestConfig(idp)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+	mw, err := traefikoidc.NewWithContext(ctx, &cfg.OIDC, newSuccessHandler(), "oidcgate-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewWithContext: %v", err)
+	}
+	mux := buildMux(cfg, mw, mw)
+	return mux, mw
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_UnauthenticatedAuthReturns401WithRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, _ := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil)
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 401, got %d (body=%q)", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	loc := rec.Header().Get("X-Auth-Redirect")
+	if loc == "" {
+		t.Fatal("X-Auth-Redirect should carry the IdP authorize URL")
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "http://"+fakeProviderHost+"/authorize") {
+		t.Errorf("X-Auth-Redirect should point at the mock IdP authorize endpoint, got %q", loc)
+	}
+	if cookies := rec.Header().Values("Set-Cookie"); len(cookies) == 0 {
+		t.Error("expected at least one Set-Cookie (state/PKCE/nonce) on 401")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_StartRedirectsToIdPWithStateAndPKCE(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, _ := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/start?rd=/dashboard", nil)
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 302, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	loc := rec.Header().Get("Location")
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(loc, "http://"+fakeProviderHost+"/authorize") {
+		t.Fatalf("Location: want prefix http://%s/authorize, got %q", fakeProviderHost, loc)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "state=") {
+		t.Errorf("Location should include state= param, got %q", loc)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(loc, "code_challenge=") {
+		t.Errorf("Location should include code_challenge= param (PKCE), got %q", loc)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_HealthzAlways200(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, _ := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("healthz: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntegration_ReadyzBecomes200AfterDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newMockIdP(t)
+	mux, mw := buildIntegrationStack(t, idp)
+
+	// Hit /oauth2/auth once to trigger metadata discovery (the middleware
+	// performs discovery lazily on first request).
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/auth", nil))
+
+	// Poll Ready() until true or timeout.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if mw.Ready() {
+			break
+		}
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	if !mw.Ready() {
+		t.Fatal("middleware should be Ready() within 3s after first request triggered discovery")
+	}
+
+	rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("readyz post-discovery: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/interceptor.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package main
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// authInterceptor wraps a ResponseWriter for the /oauth2/auth endpoint.
+// The traefikoidc middleware emits an HTTP 302 to the IdP authorize URL
+// when a request is unauthenticated, but nginx auth_request and similar
+// silent-probe contracts cannot follow redirects. authInterceptor buffers
+// the header/body and, at Finalize() time:
+//
+//   - if status was a redirect class (302, 303, 307, 308), rewrites it
+//     to 401, moves the original Location header to X-Auth-Redirect
+//     (advisory), strips Location, preserves Set-Cookie headers (state,
+//     PKCE, nonce — the browser will carry them into the next request),
+//     and writes an empty body.
+//   - otherwise: passes through verbatim.
+type authInterceptor struct {
+	inner       http.ResponseWriter
+	headers     http.Header
+	status      int
+	body        []byte
+	wroteHeader bool
+	finalized   bool
+}
+
+func newAuthInterceptor(inner http.ResponseWriter) *authInterceptor {
+	return &authInterceptor{
+		inner:   inner,
+		headers: http.Header{},
+		status:  http.StatusOK,
+	}
+}
+
+func (w *authInterceptor) Header() http.Header { return w.headers }
+
+func (w *authInterceptor) WriteHeader(status int) {
+	if w.wroteHeader {
+		return
+	}
+	w.status = status
+	w.wroteHeader = true
+}
+
+func (w *authInterceptor) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { //nolint:unparam // signature mandated by http.ResponseWriter
+	if !w.wroteHeader {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	w.body = append(w.body, b...)
+	return len(b), nil
+}
+
+// Finalize flushes the buffered response, applying the 302/303 → 401 rewrite.
+// Must be called exactly once after the wrapped handler returns.
+func (w *authInterceptor) Finalize() {
+	if w.finalized {
+		return
+	}
+	w.finalized = true
+	switch w.status {
+	case http.StatusFound, http.StatusSeeOther, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, http.StatusPermanentRedirect:
+		// Move Location → X-Auth-Redirect, strip Location, force 401, drop body.
+		if loc := w.headers.Get("Location"); loc != "" {
+			w.headers.Set("X-Auth-Redirect", loc)
+			w.headers.Del("Location")
+		}
+		copyHeaders(w.inner.Header(), w.headers)
+		w.inner.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	copyHeaders(w.inner.Header(), w.headers)
+	w.inner.WriteHeader(w.status)
+	if len(w.body) > 0 {
+		_, _ = w.inner.Write(w.body)
+	}
+}
+
+func copyHeaders(dst, src http.Header) {
+	for k, vs := range src {
+		for _, v := range vs {
+			dst.Add(k, v)
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/interceptor_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestInterceptor_302BecomesNot401(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "https://idp.example/authorize?state=abc")
+	w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "_oidc_state=abc; Path=/; HttpOnly")
+	w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "_oidc_pkce=xyz; Path=/; HttpOnly")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+	_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ignored body"))
+
+	w.Finalize()
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Auth-Redirect"); got != "https://idp.example/authorize?state=abc" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Auth-Redirect: want preserved Location, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Location"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("Location must be stripped on 401, got %q", got)
+	}
+	cookies := rec.Header().Values("Set-Cookie")
+	if len(cookies) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("Set-Cookie count: want 2, got %d (%v)", len(cookies), cookies)
+	}
+	if body := strings.TrimSpace(rec.Body.String()); body != "" {
+		t.Errorf("body must be empty on 401, got %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_NonRedirectPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+
+	w.Header().Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
+
+	w.Finalize()
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-User: want preserved, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "ok") {
+		t.Errorf("body: want 'ok' preserved, got %q", rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_303SeeOtherAlsoIntercepted(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusSeeOther)
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("303 should be intercepted to 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_307TemporaryRedirectIntercepted(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("307 should be intercepted to 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_308PermanentRedirectIntercepted(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusPermanentRedirect)
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("308 should be intercepted to 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInterceptor_DoubleFinalizeIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	w := newAuthInterceptor(rec)
+	w.Header().Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	w.Finalize()
+	// Second call must not panic, must not change anything observable.
+	w.Finalize()
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("double Finalize must not change status, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Errorf("double Finalize must not duplicate headers, got %q", got)
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"flag"
+	"log"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"syscall"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	configPath := flag.String("config", "/etc/oidcgate/config.yaml", "Path to YAML config file")
+	flag.Parse()
+
+	cfg, err := Load(*configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("oidcgate: load config: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	success := newSuccessHandler()
+	middleware, err := traefikoidc.NewWithContext(ctx, &cfg.OIDC, success, "oidcgate")
+	if err != nil {
+		cancel()
+		log.Fatalf("oidcgate: build middleware: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	mux := buildMux(cfg, middleware, middleware)
+	srv := buildServer(cfg, mux)
+
+	go func() {
+		sigs := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
+		signal.Notify(sigs, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
+		<-sigs
+		log.Println("oidcgate: shutdown signal received")
+		if err := shutdown(srv); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("oidcgate: shutdown error: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	log.Printf("oidcgate: listening on %s", cfg.Listen)
+	if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+		cancel()
+		log.Fatalf("oidcgate: serve: %v", err)
+	}
+	log.Println("oidcgate: stopped")
+}

cmd/oidcgate/server.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// buildMux wires all six routes onto a single ServeMux:
+//
+//	/healthz, /readyz, AuthPath, StartPath, OIDC.CallbackURL, OIDC.LogoutURL.
+//
+// The same `middleware` instance is delegated to by all four OIDC routes;
+// the synthetic success handler is wired into the middleware at construction
+// time (in main.go) so it doesn't appear here.
+func buildMux(cfg *Config, middleware http.Handler, ready readyReporter) *http.ServeMux {
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.Handle("/healthz", newHealthzHandler())
+	mux.Handle("/readyz", newReadyzHandler(ready))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.AuthPath, newAuthHandler(middleware))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.StartPath, newStartHandler(middleware))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL, newCallbackHandler(middleware, cfg.OIDC.CallbackURL))
+	mux.Handle(cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL, newLogoutHandler(middleware, cfg.OIDC.LogoutURL))
+	return mux
+}
+
+// buildServer wraps the mux in an http.Server with sensible timeouts.
+func buildServer(cfg *Config, mux http.Handler) *http.Server { //nolint:unused // consumed by main.go in Task 9
+	return &http.Server{
+		Addr:              cfg.Listen,
+		Handler:           mux,
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
+		WriteTimeout:      30 * time.Second,
+		IdleTimeout:       120 * time.Second,
+	}
+}
+
+// shutdown gracefully stops the server with a 15s deadline.
+func shutdown(srv *http.Server) error { //nolint:unused // consumed by main.go in Task 9
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	return srv.Shutdown(ctx)
+}

cmd/oidcgate/server_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestMux_RoutesAllEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
+	stub := &stubMiddleware{
+		fn: func(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) },
+	}
+	mux := buildMux(&Config{
+		Listen:    ":0",
+		AuthPath:  "/oauth2/auth",
+		StartPath: "/oauth2/start",
+		OIDC: traefikoidcConfigStub{
+			callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback",
+			logoutURL:   "/oauth2/logout",
+		}.AsOIDC(),
+	}, stub, &readyStub{ready: true})
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		path   string
+		method string
+		want   int
+	}{
+		{"/healthz", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/readyz", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/auth", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/start", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/callback", http.MethodGet, http.StatusOK},
+		{"/oauth2/logout", http.MethodPost, http.StatusOK},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		mux.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(c.method, c.path, nil))
+		if rec.Code != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s: want %d, got %d", c.method, c.path, c.want, rec.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/oidcgate/success.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// mirrorAllowedHeaders is the set of NON-X-prefixed request headers that the
+// success handler copies onto the response. The traefikoidc middleware sets
+// "Authorization: Bearer ..." via the templated-header feature when operators
+// configure it, and proxies need that to flow upstream.
+var mirrorAllowedHeaders = map[string]struct{}{
+	"Authorization": {},
+}
+
+// successHandler is the http.Handler installed as the middleware's `next`.
+// When the middleware reaches this handler the request is authenticated; we
+// mirror the X-* (and a small allow-list of non-X-*) headers the middleware
+// stamped onto req.Header back onto the response so upstream proxies can
+// capture them via auth_request_set / authResponseHeaders / copy_headers,
+// then write 200 with an empty body.
+func newSuccessHandler() http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		for name, values := range req.Header {
+			if !shouldMirror(name) {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, v := range values {
+				rw.Header().Add(name, v)
+			}
+		}
+		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func shouldMirror(name string) bool {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(name, "X-") {
+		return true
+	}
+	canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)
+	_, ok := mirrorAllowedHeaders[canonical]
+	return ok
+}

cmd/oidcgate/success_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_Writes200(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status: want 200, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_MirrorsForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "[email protected]")
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Email", "[email protected]")
+	req.Header.Set("X-Custom-Templated", "value")
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token-from-template")
+	req.Header.Set("Cookie", "session=should-NOT-mirror")
+
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-User: want mirrored, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Forwarded-Email"); got != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Email: want mirrored, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("X-Custom-Templated"); got != "value" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Custom-Templated: want mirrored (X- prefix), got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer token-from-template" {
+		t.Errorf("Authorization: want mirrored (templated bearer), got %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get("Cookie"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("Cookie must NOT be mirrored, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if body := strings.TrimSpace(rec.Body.String()); body != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("body: want empty, got %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSuccessHandler_MultiValueHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newSuccessHandler()
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+	req.Header.Add("X-Role", "admin")
+	req.Header.Add("X-Role", "editor")
+	h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	got := rec.Header()["X-Role"]
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "admin" || got[1] != "editor" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Role multi-value: want [admin editor], got %v", got)
+	}
+}

docs/CONFIGURATION.md

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Complete reference for all Traefik OIDC middleware configuration options.
 - [Security Headers](#security-headers)
 - [Scope Configuration](#scope-configuration)
 - [Advanced Options](#advanced-options)
+- [Standalone binary (oidcgate)](#standalone-binary-oidcgate)
 
 ---
 
@@ -664,3 +665,19 @@ sessionEncryptionKey: ${OIDC_SECRET_API}
 # Good
 sessionEncryptionKey: ${OIDC_SECRET_SVC}
 ```
+
+---
+
+## Standalone binary (oidcgate)
+
+If you don't run Traefik, the same configuration shape documented above
+works for the [`oidcgate`](OIDCGATE.md) standalone forward-auth daemon
+under `cmd/oidcgate`. Three extra top-level keys (`listen`, `authPath`,
+`startPath`) configure the daemon itself; everything else maps 1:1 onto
+the `traefikoidc.Config` fields documented in this reference.
+
+See [`docs/OIDCGATE.md`](OIDCGATE.md) for the full daemon guide including
+nginx, Caddy, Traefik ForwardAuth, HAProxy and Envoy wiring snippets,
+the `OIDCGATE_*` environment-variable inventory, the security posture
+(X-Forwarded-Uri sanitisation, excludedURLs guardrail), and how to layer
+M2M [bearer-token auth](BEARER_AUTH.md) on the same daemon.

docs/OIDCGATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+# oidcgate — standalone OIDC forward-auth daemon
+
+`oidcgate` is a single binary that exposes the same OIDC middleware that
+powers the Traefik plugin as a forward-auth daemon for nginx, Caddy,
+Traefik ForwardAuth, HAProxy, and Envoy `ext_authz_http`.
+
+## Table of contents
+
+- [Build](#build)
+- [Run](#run)
+- [Configuration](#configuration)
+  - [YAML file](#yaml-file)
+  - [Environment-variable overrides](#environment-variable-overrides)
+- [Endpoints](#endpoints)
+- [Reverse-proxy snippets](#reverse-proxy-snippets)
+  - [nginx (`auth_request`)](#nginx-auth_request)
+  - [Caddy (`forward_auth`)](#caddy-forward_auth)
+  - [Traefik (`ForwardAuth`)](#traefik-forwardauth)
+  - [HAProxy](#haproxy)
+  - [Envoy (`ext_authz_http`)](#envoy-ext_authz_http)
+- [Security posture](#security-posture)
+- [Bearer-token (M2M) auth on the same daemon](#bearer-token-m2m-auth-on-the-same-daemon)
+- [Operational guidance](#operational-guidance)
+- [Debugging](#debugging)
+
+## Build
+
+```bash
+go build -o oidcgate ./cmd/oidcgate
+```
+
+## Run
+
+```bash
+./oidcgate --config /etc/oidcgate/config.yaml
+```
+
+The daemon parses `--config`, loads YAML, applies any `OIDCGATE_*` env-var
+overrides, validates the result, and binds to `listen`. On SIGINT/SIGTERM it
+calls `http.Server.Shutdown` with a 15s deadline, draining in-flight requests.
+
+## Configuration
+
+### YAML file
+
+The OIDC subtree of the config maps 1:1 onto the [`traefikoidc.Config`](CONFIGURATION.md)
+struct — every field documented under "Configuration Reference" works here
+verbatim. Three extra top-level keys configure the daemon itself:
+
+| Key | Default | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `listen` | _required_ | TCP address (e.g. `:8080`, `127.0.0.1:8080`). |
+| `authPath` | `/oauth2/auth` | Silent-probe endpoint (used by nginx `auth_request`). |
+| `startPath` | `/oauth2/start` | Visible sign-in endpoint. |
+
+Minimal example (see [`examples/oidcgate.yaml`](../examples/oidcgate.yaml)):
+
+```yaml
+listen: ":8080"
+providerURL: "https://accounts.google.com"
+clientID: "your-client-id"
+clientSecret: "your-client-secret"
+sessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+```
+
+Nested structs (`redis:`, `securityHeaders:`, `dynamicClientRegistration:`)
+round-trip cleanly through YAML — same shape as in `.traefik.yml`.
+
+### Environment-variable overrides
+
+Any of the following scalar fields can be overridden at runtime by an
+`OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE>` environment variable. The env var wins over
+the YAML value when set and non-empty. Intended for secret injection
+(K8s `valueFrom.secretKeyRef`, systemd `EnvironmentFile=`, etc.).
+
+| YAML key | Env var |
+|---|---|
+| `listen` | `OIDCGATE_LISTEN` |
+| `authPath` | `OIDCGATE_AUTH_PATH` |
+| `startPath` | `OIDCGATE_START_PATH` |
+| `providerURL` | `OIDCGATE_PROVIDER_URL` |
+| `clientID` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ID` |
+| `clientSecret` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_SECRET` |
+| `audience` | `OIDCGATE_AUDIENCE` |
+| `callbackURL` | `OIDCGATE_CALLBACK_URL` |
+| `logoutURL` | `OIDCGATE_LOGOUT_URL` |
+| `postLogoutRedirectURI` | `OIDCGATE_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI` |
+| `sessionEncryptionKey` | `OIDCGATE_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY` |
+| `cookiePrefix` | `OIDCGATE_COOKIE_PREFIX` |
+| `cookieDomain` | `OIDCGATE_COOKIE_DOMAIN` |
+| `logLevel` | `OIDCGATE_LOG_LEVEL` |
+| `revocationURL` | `OIDCGATE_REVOCATION_URL` |
+| `oidcEndSessionURL` | `OIDCGATE_OIDC_END_SESSION_URL` |
+| `userIdentifierClaim` | `OIDCGATE_USER_IDENTIFIER_CLAIM` |
+| `groupClaimName` | `OIDCGATE_GROUP_CLAIM_NAME` |
+| `roleClaimName` | `OIDCGATE_ROLE_CLAIM_NAME` |
+| `clientAuthMethod` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_AUTH_METHOD` |
+| `clientAssertionPrivateKey` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_PRIVATE_KEY` |
+| `clientAssertionKeyPath` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_KEY_PATH` |
+| `clientAssertionKeyID` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_KEY_ID` |
+| `clientAssertionAlg` | `OIDCGATE_CLIENT_ASSERTION_ALG` |
+| `caCertPath` | `OIDCGATE_CA_CERT_PATH` |
+| `caCertPEM` | `OIDCGATE_CA_CERT_PEM` |
+
+Nested-struct fields (Redis, security headers, DCR) are YAML-only — set
+them in the config file, not via env.
+
+## Endpoints
+
+| Path | Method | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/oauth2/auth` | GET | Silent probe — `200` if authenticated, `401` if not. Never returns `302`; the middleware's redirect-to-IdP is rewritten in-flight to `401` with the original `Location` carried as `X-Auth-Redirect`. |
+| `/oauth2/start` | GET | Visible sign-in — `302` to the IdP authorize URL. Accepts `?rd=<safe-path>` (or honours `X-Forwarded-Uri`) for the post-login redirect target. |
+| `/oauth2/callback` | GET | IdP `code`+`state` exchange. Path is configurable via `callbackURL`. |
+| `/oauth2/logout` | GET/POST | Terminates the session. Path is configurable via `logoutURL`. Honours `oidcEndSessionURL` for RP-initiated logout. |
+| `/healthz` | GET | Liveness — `200` while the process is alive. |
+| `/readyz` | GET | Readiness — `200` once the OIDC discovery document has been fetched, otherwise `503`. |
+
+## Reverse-proxy snippets
+
+### nginx (`auth_request`)
+
+```nginx
+location = /oauth2/auth {
+    internal;
+    proxy_pass              http://oidcgate:8080;
+    proxy_pass_request_body off;
+    proxy_set_header        Content-Length "";
+    proxy_set_header        X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
+    proxy_set_header        X-Forwarded-Host $host;
+    proxy_set_header        X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+}
+location @oidc_signin {
+    return 302 /oauth2/start?rd=$scheme://$host$request_uri;
+}
+location /oauth2/ {
+    proxy_pass       http://oidcgate:8080;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host  $host;
+    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+}
+location / {
+    auth_request           /oauth2/auth;
+    error_page             401 = @oidc_signin;
+    auth_request_set       $user  $upstream_http_x_forwarded_user;
+    auth_request_set       $email $upstream_http_x_forwarded_email;
+    proxy_set_header       X-Forwarded-User  $user;
+    proxy_set_header       X-Forwarded-Email $email;
+    proxy_pass             http://backend;
+}
+```
+
+### Caddy (`forward_auth`)
+
+```caddyfile
+example.com {
+    forward_auth oidcgate:8080 {
+        uri /oauth2/auth
+        copy_headers X-Forwarded-User X-Forwarded-Email
+        @denied status 401
+        handle_response @denied {
+            redir /oauth2/start?rd={http.request.uri} 302
+        }
+    }
+    handle /oauth2/* {
+        reverse_proxy oidcgate:8080
+    }
+    reverse_proxy backend:3000
+}
+```
+
+### Traefik (`ForwardAuth`)
+
+```yaml
+http:
+  middlewares:
+    oidcgate:
+      forwardAuth:
+        address: "http://oidcgate:8080/oauth2/auth"
+        authResponseHeaders:
+          - X-Forwarded-User
+          - X-Forwarded-Email
+```
+
+Traefik can follow the `X-Auth-Redirect` value via a chained `redirectScheme`
+middleware, or you can configure the upstream router to redirect `401` →
+`/oauth2/start` directly.
+
+### HAProxy
+
+```haproxy
+frontend fe_https
+    bind *:443 ssl crt /etc/haproxy/certs/site.pem
+    http-request set-var(req.orig_uri) path
+    http-request send-spoe-group oidc auth-check  # or use lua/SPOE; simplest is the lua snippet below
+
+    # The simpler pattern: dispatch /oauth2/* to oidcgate, everything else
+    # goes through a Lua filter that issues a sub-request to /oauth2/auth.
+    acl is_oidc_endpoint path_beg /oauth2/
+    use_backend be_oidcgate if is_oidc_endpoint
+    default_backend be_app
+
+backend be_oidcgate
+    server oidcgate1 oidcgate:8080
+
+backend be_app
+    server app1 backend:3000
+```
+
+HAProxy does not have a first-class `auth_request` equivalent in pure
+config — the canonical patterns are SPOE (Stream Processing Offload Engine),
+a Lua filter that issues `/oauth2/auth` and reads the response, or a
+sidecar that does the dance. Reach for SPOE for high-throughput
+production; Lua is simpler for low-volume.
+
+### Envoy (`ext_authz_http`)
+
+```yaml
+http_filters:
+  - name: envoy.filters.http.ext_authz
+    typed_config:
+      "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.ext_authz.v3.ExtAuthz
+      transport_api_version: V3
+      http_service:
+        server_uri:
+          uri: http://oidcgate:8080
+          cluster: oidcgate
+          timeout: 2s
+        path_prefix: /oauth2/auth
+        authorization_request:
+          allowed_headers:
+            patterns:
+              - exact: cookie
+              - exact: authorization
+              - prefix: x-forwarded-
+        authorization_response:
+          allowed_upstream_headers:
+            patterns:
+              - exact: x-forwarded-user
+              - exact: x-forwarded-email
+          allowed_client_headers:
+            patterns:
+              - exact: x-auth-redirect
+              - exact: set-cookie
+```
+
+On `401`, the `X-Auth-Redirect` header is surfaced to the downstream client
+via `allowed_client_headers`. A small Envoy `router` filter or
+`local_reply_config` rule can convert that into a browser-facing `302`
+redirect to `/oauth2/start`.
+
+## Security posture
+
+- **`X-Forwarded-Uri` is sanitised.** The daemon forces
+  `TrustForwardedURI=true` so the middleware honours `X-Forwarded-Uri` for
+  the post-login redirect target. To prevent open redirects (CWE-601),
+  the value is rejected unless it is a safe same-origin path: must start
+  with `/`, must NOT start with `//` (protocol-relative), and must have
+  no scheme or host after parsing. Absolute URLs or anything that could
+  redirect off-origin falls through to `req.URL.RequestURI()`.
+
+- **`excludedURLs` cannot bypass the daemon's own paths.** At config
+  load, the loader rejects any `excludedURLs` entry that is a prefix of
+  `authPath`, `startPath`, `callbackURL`, `logoutURL`, or the internal
+  sentinel path. A misconfiguration like `excludedURLs: ["/"]` (common
+  "allow all then add auth selectively" mistake) is rejected at startup
+  with a descriptive error.
+
+- **`callbackURL` and `logoutURL` must be paths.** Absolute URLs are
+  rejected at config load — both because `http.ServeMux.Handle` panics
+  on non-`/` patterns and because the middleware's path-match would
+  silently fail.
+
+- **`listen` is required.** Empty or missing `listen` is rejected at
+  startup rather than failing later at `net.Listen`.
+
+- **Secrets via env vars.** `clientSecret` and `sessionEncryptionKey`
+  can be supplied via env vars instead of YAML so they don't end up on
+  disk if you use a secret manager.
+
+## Bearer-token (M2M) auth on the same daemon
+
+oidcgate uses the full `traefikoidc.Config` shape, so the bearer-token
+M2M auth path documented in [`BEARER_AUTH.md`](BEARER_AUTH.md) works
+out of the box. Add to your YAML:
+
+```yaml
+enableBearerAuth: true
+audience: "https://api.example.com"
+bearerIdentifierClaim: "sub"
+# stripAuthorizationHeader: true   # default
+# bearerOverridesCookie: false     # default — cookie wins on collision
+```
+
+With this set, the daemon accepts both:
+- Browser users hitting `/oauth2/auth` → cookie session flow.
+- API clients calling the protected backend with `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`
+  → bearer validation, principal headers, no session.
+
+The bearer path doesn't go through `/oauth2/auth` separately — it's
+applied by the middleware on every request the daemon sees, before the
+cookie session check. See [BEARER_AUTH.md](BEARER_AUTH.md) for the full
+threat model, identifier sanitisation rules, and failure-response
+matrix.
+
+## Operational guidance
+
+- **Run behind a fronting proxy on a private network.** The daemon does
+  not terminate TLS. Put it on a localhost socket or a private subnet
+  reachable only from your nginx/Caddy/Traefik/HAProxy/Envoy.
+- **`/healthz` and `/readyz` are unauthenticated** — correct for
+  Kubernetes liveness/readiness probes, but **do not expose them past a
+  load balancer**. Restrict via an ACL: nginx `allow 10.0.0.0/8; deny
+  all;`, Caddy `@health remote_ip 10.0.0.0/8`, k8s NetworkPolicy, or
+  your CNI of choice.
+- **Multi-replica deployments** need a shared session store. Enable the
+  `redis:` block in the config (see [`docs/REDIS.md`](REDIS.md)) so
+  sessions survive a hop between replicas.
+- **No built-in Prometheus metrics yet.** If you need request-level
+  visibility, take it from your fronting proxy's access logs — both
+  nginx and Envoy can tag `auth_request` / `ext_authz` outcomes.
+- **Logs are minimal by default.** Set `logLevel: debug` while
+  bringing up a new deployment; raise to `info` (default) or higher
+  once stable. Debug logs include path-match decisions and metadata
+  refresh outcomes.
+- **Graceful shutdown is 15s.** SIGINT or SIGTERM triggers
+  `http.Server.Shutdown(ctx)` with a 15-second deadline; in-flight
+  requests are allowed to complete. If your orchestrator's grace
+  period is shorter, requests can be cut mid-flight.
+
+## Debugging
+
+- **Requests appear as `/__oidcgate_protected__` in middleware debug
+  logs.** This is the internal sentinel path used when `/oauth2/auth`
+  and `/oauth2/start` delegate into the traefikoidc middleware. The
+  upstream client never sees it; it only shows up in the middleware's
+  own `Debugf` output when `logLevel: debug` is set.
+
+- **`/oauth2/auth` returns `401` with `X-Auth-Redirect` header on
+  unauthenticated requests.** This is the deliberate translation of the
+  middleware's `302` to make nginx `auth_request` work. The browser is
+  redirected via the fronting proxy's `error_page 401 = @oidc_signin;`
+  pattern, not by following the daemon's response directly.
+
+- **`/readyz` stays `503` after startup.** The middleware fetches the
+  OIDC discovery document lazily on first request, so `/readyz` returns
+  `503` until at least one request has triggered metadata discovery.
+  Hit `/oauth2/auth` once after startup to warm it up — many K8s
+  setups achieve the same effect because the liveness probe already
+  goes through the proxy chain.
+
+- **Cookie/session diagnostics.** With `logLevel: debug` the middleware
+  logs which session manager was selected (in-memory vs Redis), whether
+  cookies decrypted successfully, and the JWT validation outcome.
+
+- **Open-redirect rejections are silent.** When the daemon ignores an
+  unsafe `X-Forwarded-Uri` value, it falls back to `req.URL.RequestURI()`
+  without logging. This is intentional (no recon signal) — if a user
+  reports "I keep landing on the wrong page after login", inspect
+  whether the upstream proxy is forwarding a non-canonical
+  `X-Forwarded-Uri` value.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-19-oidcgate-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+# oidcgate — Standalone OIDC Forward-Auth Daemon (Tier 1)
+
+**Date:** 2026-05-19
+**Status:** Design approved, pending implementation plan
+**Scope:** Tier 1 only — forward-auth daemon. No reverse-proxy mode, no TLS termination, no metrics, no multi-tenancy.
+
+## Goal
+
+Provide a standalone Go binary that exposes the existing `traefikoidc` OIDC middleware as a forward-auth daemon callable from nginx (`auth_request`), Caddy (`forward_auth`), Traefik (`ForwardAuth`), HAProxy, and Envoy (`ext_authz_http`). The library's public surface is **additive only**: no existing exported function signature changes; one optional `Config` field (`TrustForwardedURI`) and one new read-only accessor on `*TraefikOidc` are added. Existing Traefik plugin users see no behavior change unless they opt in to the new field.
+
+## Non-Goals
+
+- Reverse-proxy mode (Tier 2 — separate effort if requested).
+- TLS termination inside the daemon.
+- Built-in Prometheus metrics.
+- Multi-tenant routing (one binary serves one OIDC client config).
+- oauth2-proxy CLI/flag compatibility.
+- Docker image or goreleaser publishing as part of Tier 1.
+
+## Architecture
+
+### File layout
+
+```
+github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc          (library, unchanged)
+├── main.go                                    (existing New/NewWithContext)
+├── middleware.go                              (existing ServeHTTP + ~10 LoC patch)
+└── cmd/
+    └── oidcgate/
+        ├── main.go                            (entrypoint, flags, signal handling)
+        ├── config.go                          (YAML loader + env-var override walker)
+        ├── server.go                          (http.ServeMux wiring, listen loop)
+        ├── endpoints.go                       (auth/start/callback/logout handlers)
+        ├── success.go                         (synthetic success handler used as `next`)
+        ├── interceptor.go                     (302→401 response-writer for /oauth2/auth)
+        ├── health.go                          (/healthz, /readyz)
+        ├── config_test.go
+        ├── endpoints_test.go
+        └── interceptor_test.go
+```
+
+### Process model
+
+Single binary, single `*TraefikOidc` instance built at boot from YAML config, served on one listener port. Health endpoints on the same listener. Graceful shutdown on `SIGINT`/`SIGTERM` via `srv.Shutdown(ctx)` with a 15s deadline, after which context cancellation propagates into the existing goroutine manager.
+
+## Endpoint Contract
+
+All four endpoints share the listener. Paths are configurable; defaults shown.
+
+| Endpoint | Default path | Method | Contract |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **Auth probe** | `/oauth2/auth` | GET | Silent. `200 OK` + injected headers on success. `401` on failure (never `302`). Consumed by nginx `auth_request`, Traefik ForwardAuth, Caddy `forward_auth`, Envoy ext_authz_http. |
+| **Sign-in** | `/oauth2/start` | GET | Always `302` to IdP `authorize` URL with `state`+`nonce`+PKCE. Reads target URL from `?rd=` query or `X-Forwarded-Uri` header. Hit by the browser after a `401` from `/oauth2/auth`. |
+| **Callback** | `config.callbackURL` | GET | IdP `code`+`state` exchange. Existing `auth_flow.go` logic runs unchanged. On success → `302` to original URL. |
+| **Logout** | `config.logoutURL` | GET/POST | Existing `logout.go` handler. Terminates session. Honors `oidcEndSessionURL` if configured. |
+
+### Wiring (how each endpoint delegates)
+
+All four handlers feed `(*TraefikOidc).ServeHTTP` after rewriting `req.URL.Path`:
+
+- `/oauth2/callback` → rewrite to `config.callbackURL`, delegate. Middleware path-match at `middleware.go` triggers callback flow.
+- `/oauth2/logout` → rewrite to `config.logoutURL`, delegate. Middleware logout path-match at the top of `ServeHTTP` triggers.
+- `/oauth2/start` → rewrite `req.URL.Path` to the sentinel `/__oidcgate_protected__`, delegate. Middleware sees an unauthenticated GET on a protected path, emits the `302` to IdP. The redirect flows through naturally.
+- `/oauth2/auth` → rewrite `req.URL.Path` to `/__oidcgate_protected__`, wrap `ResponseWriter` with an interceptor (see below), delegate.
+
+The sentinel path `/__oidcgate_protected__` is chosen because it cannot collide with `callbackURL` / `logoutURL` / `/health*` path matches inside `ServeHTTP` and is not a likely user-configured `excludedURLs` entry. It is internal-only: clients never see it.
+
+### Synthetic `next` handler
+
+The middleware calls `t.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)` at four sites (`middleware.go:174,185,187,592`) when the request is authenticated and should be forwarded. The daemon supplies a `next` that:
+
+1. Writes `200 OK`.
+2. Mirrors any `X-Forwarded-*` and templated headers that the middleware set on `req.Header` (e.g. `X-Forwarded-User` at `middleware.go:101,512`) onto the **response** headers, so proxies can capture them via `auth_request_set` / `authResponseHeaders`.
+3. Writes empty body.
+
+### 302 → 401 interceptor (`/oauth2/auth` only)
+
+nginx `auth_request` cannot follow `302`s. For the silent endpoint, the daemon wraps the `ResponseWriter` such that:
+
+- If the middleware writes status `302` (the IdP-redirect branch), the interceptor rewrites it to `401`.
+- `Location` header from the swallowed `302` is preserved as `X-Auth-Redirect` on the `401` response (advisory; some proxies may surface it).
+- `Set-Cookie` headers (state, PKCE, nonce) are preserved verbatim so the browser carries them into the subsequent `/oauth2/start` request.
+- For any non-`302` status, the interceptor is a passthrough.
+
+`/oauth2/start` does **not** wrap; the middleware's natural `302` flows through to the browser.
+
+## Configuration
+
+### Source
+
+- **File:** `--config /etc/oidcgate/config.yaml` (path overridable via flag).
+- **Format:** YAML, unmarshalled into the existing `traefikoidc.Config` struct (`settings.go:39`) via `yaml.v3` (already a dependency in `go.mod`).
+- **Migration from Traefik:** copy the `plugin.traefikoidc:` subtree out of `.traefik.yml` and add the daemon-specific top-level keys below.
+- **Env-var overrides** (secrets in particular): after YAML unmarshal, walk the config struct. Any scalar string/int/bool field with a non-empty `OIDCGATE_<UPPER_SNAKE_CASE_FIELD>` env-var replaces the YAML value. Nested structs (`Redis`, `SecurityHeaders`, `DynamicClientRegistration`) stay YAML-only.
+
+### Top-level oidcgate-specific keys
+
+```yaml
+listen: ":8080"            # required, listener address
+authPath: "/oauth2/auth"   # optional, default shown
+startPath: "/oauth2/start" # optional, default shown
+# all other keys = existing traefikoidc.Config fields
+```
+
+### Validation
+
+The existing validation inside `traefikoidc.NewWithContext` (`main.go:97`) runs unchanged. On any returned error, the daemon logs the error and exits non-zero.
+
+## Library-Side Patches
+
+Two additive changes, both default-off / read-only:
+
+1. **`settings.go` + `middleware.go` (~10 LoC):** add `Config.TrustForwardedURI bool` (default `false`). When `true`, the post-login-redirect target captured during the "unauthenticated GET → 302 to IdP" branch is sourced from `req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri")` if non-empty, instead of from `req.URL`. The daemon sets `TrustForwardedURI = true` at config build time. Default-off preserves current Traefik plugin behavior exactly.
+
+2. **`main.go` (~5 LoC):** add `func (t *TraefikOidc) Ready() bool` returning `true` once at least one successful OIDC metadata discovery fetch has populated the metadata cache. Read-only; no behavior change for existing consumers.
+
+## Lifecycle
+
+```
+parse flags
+  → load YAML
+  → apply env-var overrides
+  → build synthetic success handler
+  → call traefikoidc.New(ctx, success, cfg, "oidcgate")  (validation happens here)
+  → build mux (auth, start, callback, logout, healthz, readyz)
+  → http.Server.ListenAndServe on cfg.listen
+  → wait for SIGINT/SIGTERM
+  → srv.Shutdown(15s ctx)
+  → ctx cancel propagates to goroutine manager
+  → exit 0
+```
+
+`/readyz` returns `200` only once `traefikoidc.New` has returned without error **and** the first OIDC metadata discovery fetch has succeeded. Implementation: add a read-only accessor `func (t *TraefikOidc) Ready() bool` that returns `true` once the metadata cache has at least one successful discovery fetch. The daemon's `/readyz` handler calls this and returns `200` / `503` accordingly.
+
+`/healthz` returns `200` as long as the process is alive.
+
+## Testing
+
+- `config_test.go` — YAML round-trip; env-var override precedence; validation pass-through.
+- `endpoints_test.go` — `httptest.NewServer`-based scenarios:
+  - `/oauth2/auth` with no session → `401`.
+  - `/oauth2/auth` with valid session → `200` + `X-Forwarded-User` mirrored on response.
+  - `/oauth2/start` → `302` with valid IdP `authorize` URL incl. `state` and PKCE.
+  - `/oauth2/callback` → completes exchange, sets session, redirects to original URL.
+  - `/oauth2/logout` → clears session cookie.
+- `interceptor_test.go` — middleware-emitted `302` becomes `401`; `Location` → `X-Auth-Redirect`; `Set-Cookie` preserved.
+- Reuse existing mock IdP from `enhanced_mocks_test.go`. No new mock infra.
+
+## Risks & Mitigations
+
+| Risk | Mitigation |
+|---|---|
+| Interceptor swallows a legitimate `302` from the middleware that isn't the IdP redirect. | Inspect: only intercept when `Location` matches `t.providerURL`'s authorize endpoint or when it points off-host. Test coverage in `interceptor_test.go`. |
+| Library-side patch breaks current Traefik users. | New `TrustForwardedURI` defaults to `false`; existing path untouched when unset. |
+| Env-var walker overreaches into nested structs. | Restrict to top-level scalar fields; document explicitly; nested structs stay YAML-only. |
+| Path-rewrite trick hits a middleware path-comparison we didn't anticipate. | All four `t.next.ServeHTTP` sites verified at `middleware.go:174,185,187,592`. Endpoint tests exercise each path. |
+
+## Out of Scope (Tier 2 candidates)
+
+- Reverse-proxy mode (`httputil.ReverseProxy` as the configured `next`).
+- TLS termination (`tls.Config`, ACME).
+- Prometheus metrics endpoint.
+- Multi-tenant routing.
+- oauth2-proxy flag/env compatibility.
+- Goreleaser binaries, Docker image, systemd unit.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. `go build ./cmd/oidcgate` produces a working binary.
+2. Existing test suite (`go test ./...`) still passes — zero regressions in the library.
+3. New endpoint tests pass for all four endpoints against the mock IdP.
+4. `oidcgate --config example.yaml` boots, serves `/healthz`, performs end-to-end OIDC flow against a real IdP (manual smoke test against e.g. a local Keycloak).
+5. README section documents nginx, Caddy, and Traefik wiring examples.

examples/oidcgate.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Minimal oidcgate config. See docs/OIDCGATE.md for full reference.
+listen: ":8080"
+authPath: "/oauth2/auth"
+startPath: "/oauth2/start"
+
+providerURL: "https://accounts.google.com"
+clientID: "REPLACE_ME.apps.googleusercontent.com"
+clientSecret: "REPLACE_ME"            # OR set OIDCGATE_CLIENT_SECRET
+sessionEncryptionKey: "REPLACE_WITH_64_HEX_BYTES" # OR OIDCGATE_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY
+callbackURL: "/oauth2/callback"
+logoutURL: "/oauth2/logout"
+postLogoutRedirectURI: "/"
+
+# allowedUserDomains: [company.com]
+# excludedURLs: [/health, /metrics]

forwarded_uri.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// originalRequestURI returns the request URI that should be used as the
+// post-login redirect target. When TrustForwardedURI is enabled and the
+// X-Forwarded-Uri header carries a safe same-origin path, that header
+// wins. Otherwise (or if the header is missing/unsafe), falls back to
+// req.URL.RequestURI() — the path the request reached the proxy with.
+//
+// "Safe" means: starts with "/", does NOT start with "//" (protocol-relative
+// URLs can change host), and has no scheme or host after parsing. This
+// prevents an attacker-controllable header from triggering an open redirect
+// via http.Redirect later in the auth flow.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) originalRequestURI(req *http.Request) string {
+	if t.trustForwardedURI {
+		if v := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"); v != "" && isSafeRedirectTarget(v) {
+			return v
+		}
+	}
+	return req.URL.RequestURI()
+}
+
+func isSafeRedirectTarget(v string) bool {
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(v, "/") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "//") {
+		return false
+	}
+	u, err := url.Parse(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return u.Host == "" && u.Scheme == ""
+}

forwarded_uri_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_DefaultOff(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: false}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected?x=1", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/spoofed")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected?x=1" {
+		t.Fatalf("default-off: want /protected?x=1, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_TrustEnabled(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected?x=1", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/real?y=2")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/real?y=2" {
+		t.Fatalf("trust-on with header: want /real?y=2, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_TrustEnabledNoHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("trust-on no header: want /protected, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_RejectsAbsoluteURL(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "https://evil.example/phish")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("absolute URL must be rejected, want /protected fallback, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_RejectsProtocolRelative(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "//evil.example/phish")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("protocol-relative URL must be rejected, want /protected fallback, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_AcceptsSafePathWithQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "/safe?x=1&y=2")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/safe?x=1&y=2" {
+		t.Fatalf("safe path with query must be accepted, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOriginalRequestURI_RejectsBareHostnameNoSlash(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{trustForwardedURI: true}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Uri", "evil.example/phish")
+	if got := tr.originalRequestURI(req); got != "/protected" {
+		t.Fatalf("non-/ prefix must be rejected, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+

go.mod

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ go 1.24.0
 require (
 	github.com/alicebob/miniredis/v2 v2.35.0
 	github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0
-	github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3
 	github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.17.2
 	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0
 	golang.org/x/time v0.14.0

go.sum

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 h1:YCIWL56dvtr73r6715mJs5ZvhtnY73hBvEF8kX
 github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2/go.mod h1:NfCASbcHqRSY+3a8tlWJwsQap2VX5pwzwo4h3eOamfo=
 github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0 h1:XYlkq7KcpOB2ZhHBPv5WpjMIxrQosiZanfoy1HLZFzg=
 github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0/go.mod h1:ePLdVu+jbEgHH+KWw8I1z2wqd0BAdAQh/8LRvBeoNcQ=
-github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3 h1:xoDtBqeZGmXj7IteiE1M5WMuzeoqag58qEleI0Cf2Ms=
-github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3/go.mod h1:+Cn78qZo8rc3T9eZt0v3oICYRdd75wORtSidc8lNjDQ=
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
 github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.17.2 h1:P2EGsA4qVIM3Pp+aPocCJ7DguDHhqrXNhVcEp4ViluI=

issue134_followup_graph_test.go

@@ -234,8 +234,7 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_ValidateAzureTokensSkipsGraphAccessToken(t *testing.T
 	oidc, errBuf := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
 	session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, graphAccessToken, idToken)
 
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
 
 	output := errBuf.String()
 	assert.NotContains(t, output, "crypto/rsa: verification error",
@@ -345,8 +344,7 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_StandardAzureAccessTokenStillVerifies(t *testing.T) {
 	oidc, errBuf := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
 	session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, accessToken, idToken)
 
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
 
 	assert.True(t, authenticated, "standard Azure access token must verify and authenticate")
 	assert.False(t, needsRefresh)
@@ -383,8 +381,7 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_GraphAccessTokenWithoutIDToken(t *testing.T) {
 	oidc, errBuf := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
 	session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, graphAccessToken, "")
 
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
 
 	assert.True(t, authenticated, "Graph token without ID token must remain authenticated (matches existing opaque-token semantics)")
 	assert.False(t, needsRefresh)
@@ -446,8 +443,7 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_ConfusedDeputyAttackDoesNotBypassVerification(t *test
 	oidc, _ := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
 	session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, forgedAccessToken, forgedIDToken)
 
-	rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
+	authenticated, _, _ := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
-	authenticated, _, _ := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
 	assert.False(t, authenticated,
 		"attacker's forged tokens must not authenticate even when the access token has a nonce header — ID token verification rejects the wrong-key signature")
 }

issue67_regression_test.go

@@ -478,10 +478,11 @@ func TestRefreshCoordinatorIntegration(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Test 3: Rate limiting
 	t.Run("RateLimiting", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Reset circuit breaker to closed state for this test. All fields are
+		// Reset circuit breaker to closed state for this test
-		// atomic so we don't need any mutex.
+		coordinator.circuitBreaker.mutex.Lock()
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&coordinator.circuitBreaker.state, 0) // closed
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&coordinator.circuitBreaker.failures, 0)
+		coordinator.circuitBreaker.mutex.Unlock()
 
 		// Temporarily increase circuit breaker threshold to not interfere
 		oldMaxFailures := coordinator.circuitBreaker.config.MaxFailures
@@ -524,11 +525,9 @@ func TestRefreshCoordinatorIntegration(t *testing.T) {
 		time.Sleep(config.CleanupInterval * 3)
 
 		// Old sessions should be cleaned up
-		count := 0
+		coordinator.attemptsMutex.RLock()
-		coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts.Range(func(_, _ interface{}) bool {
+		count := len(coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts)
-			count++
+		coordinator.attemptsMutex.RUnlock()
-			return true
-		})
 
 		// Should have fewer sessions after cleanup
 		if count > 10 {

jwk.go

@@ -53,26 +53,10 @@ type JWKSet struct {
 	Keys []JWK `json:"keys"`
 }
 
-// JWKCache provides thread-safe caching of JWKS using UniversalCache.
+// JWKCache provides thread-safe caching of JWKS using UniversalCache
-//
-// inflightFetches deduplicates concurrent fetches for the same JWKS URL.
-// It replaces a global sync.RWMutex that was previously held for the entire
-// HTTP round-trip in GetJWKS: on a cold cache (cold pod, JWK rotation, brief
-// network blip) every concurrent request piled up on that single Lock(), and
-// under Yaegi each Lock acquisition costs 10-50ms of interpreter-dispatch
-// overhead. The singleflight pattern keeps the cold-cache cost O(1) HTTP
-// fetch regardless of how many requests are waiting.
 type JWKCache struct {
-	cache           *UniversalCache
+	cache *UniversalCache
-	inflightFetches sync.Map // map[jwksURL string]*jwksFetch
+	mutex sync.RWMutex
-}
-
-// jwksFetch represents an in-flight JWKS fetch. Done is closed when the fetch
-// completes; jwks and err carry the result (one of them is set, never both).
-type jwksFetch struct {
-	done chan struct{}
-	jwks *JWKSet
-	err  error
 }
 
 // JWKCacheInterface defines the contract for JWK caching implementations.
@@ -99,58 +83,36 @@ func NewJWKCache() *JWKCache {
 // request refetches from the upstream. JWK rotation is rare and a per-replica
 // HTTP fetch on cold cache is cheap, so cross-replica coherence buys nothing.
 func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
-	// Fast path: cache hit.
+	// Check cache first
 	if cachedValue, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL); found {
 		if jwks, ok := cachedValue.(*JWKSet); ok {
 			return jwks, nil
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Singleflight: dedupe concurrent fetches per URL key. The first arrival
+	c.mutex.Lock()
-	// performs the HTTP fetch; any later arrival for the same URL waits on
+	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
-	// its done channel and shares the result. No global lock is held during
-	// the fetch.
-	candidate := &jwksFetch{done: make(chan struct{})}
-	if existing, loaded := c.inflightFetches.LoadOrStore(jwksURL, candidate); loaded {
-		f, _ := existing.(*jwksFetch)
-		select {
-		case <-f.done:
-			return f.jwks, f.err
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return nil, ctx.Err()
-		}
-	}
 
-	// We're the leader. Make absolutely sure the result fields and the
+	// Double-check after acquiring lock
-	// in-flight map entry are cleaned up before any waiter unblocks.
-	defer func() {
-		c.inflightFetches.Delete(jwksURL)
-		close(candidate.done)
-	}()
-
-	// Re-check the cache in case a concurrent fetch completed between our
-	// initial miss and our LoadOrStore win.
 	if cachedValue, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL); found {
 		if jwks, ok := cachedValue.(*JWKSet); ok {
-			candidate.jwks = jwks
 			return jwks, nil
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Fetch from URL
 	jwks, err := fetchJWKS(ctx, jwksURL, httpClient)
 	if err != nil {
-		candidate.err = err
 		return nil, err
 	}
+
 	if len(jwks.Keys) == 0 {
-		candidate.err = fmt.Errorf("JWKS response contains no keys")
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWKS response contains no keys")
-		return nil, candidate.err
 	}
 
-	// Cache for 1 hour.
+	// Cache for 1 hour
 	_ = c.cache.SetLocal(jwksURL, jwks, 1*time.Hour) // Safe to ignore: cache failures are non-critical
 
-	candidate.jwks = jwks
 	return jwks, nil
 }
 

logout_test.go

@@ -415,8 +415,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareBackchannelLogoutRouting(t *testing.T) {
 		clientID:                 "test-client",
 		issuerURL:                "https://provider.example.com",
 		initComplete:             make(chan struct{}),
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:     true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted:   true,
 		logoutURLPath:            "/logout",
 	}
 	close(oidc.initComplete)
@@ -457,8 +457,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareFrontchannelLogoutRouting(t *testing.T) {
 		clientID:                 "test-client",
 		issuerURL:                "https://provider.example.com",
 		initComplete:             make(chan struct{}),
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:     true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted:   true,
 		logoutURLPath:            "/logout",
 	}
 	close(oidc.initComplete)

main.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"text/template"
 	"time"
 
-	telemetry "github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry"
 	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
 )
 
@@ -24,11 +23,6 @@ const (
 	ConstSessionTimeout = 86400
 )
 
-// telemetryStartupOnce keeps the anonymous "plugin loaded" ping to one per
-// process. Traefik calls New once per route that uses the plugin; oss-telemetry
-// does not deduplicate client-side (the server does), so the gate stays here.
-var telemetryStartupOnce sync.Once
-
 // isTestMode detects if the code is running in a test environment.
 func isTestMode() bool {
 	if os.Getenv("SUPPRESS_DIAGNOSTIC_LOGS") == "1" {
@@ -95,13 +89,6 @@ var defaultExcludedURLs = map[string]struct{}{
 //   - The configured TraefikOidc handler ready to process requests.
 //   - An error if essential configuration is missing or invalid (e.g., short encryption key).
 func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (http.Handler, error) {
-	telemetryStartupOnce.Do(func() {
-		// Only stamped release builds phone home; dev/local/test builds keep the
-		// devPluginVersion sentinel (see version.go) and stay silent.
-		if traefikoidcPluginVersion != devPluginVersion {
-			telemetry.Send("traefikoidc", traefikoidcPluginVersion)
-		}
-	})
 	return NewWithContext(ctx, config, next, name)
 }
 
@@ -214,7 +201,7 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 		}(),
 		forceHTTPS:                config.ForceHTTPS,
 		enablePKCE:                config.EnablePKCE,
-		extraAuthParams:           config.ExtraAuthParams,
+		trustForwardedURI:         config.TrustForwardedURI,
 		overrideScopes:            config.OverrideScopes,
 		strictAudienceValidation:  config.StrictAudienceValidation,
 		allowOpaqueTokens:         config.AllowOpaqueTokens,
@@ -530,19 +517,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata *ProviderMetadata) {
 	introspectionURL := t.introspectionURL
 	registrationURL := t.registrationURL
 
-	// Publish the read-mostly URL bundle atomically. Hot-path readers Load
-	// this directly instead of acquiring metadataMu.RLock per request.
-	t.metadataSnapshot.Store(&MetadataSnapshot{
-		IssuerURL:        metadata.Issuer,
-		JWKSURL:          metadata.JWKSURL,
-		TokenURL:         metadata.TokenURL,
-		AuthURL:          metadata.AuthURL,
-		RevocationURL:    metadata.RevokeURL,
-		EndSessionURL:    metadata.EndSessionURL,
-		IntrospectionURL: metadata.IntrospectionURL,
-		RegistrationURL:  metadata.RegistrationURL,
-	})
-
 	t.metadataMu.Unlock()
 
 	// Log introspection endpoint availability for opaque token support

main_initialization_test.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -485,8 +484,9 @@ func TestFirstRequestHandling(t *testing.T) {
 		defer server.Close()
 
 		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL:         server.URL,
+			providerURL:          server.URL,
-			firstRequestStarted: 0,
+			firstRequestReceived: false,
+			firstRequestMutex:    sync.Mutex{},
 			httpClient: &http.Client{
 				Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
 			},
@@ -508,13 +508,19 @@ func TestFirstRequestHandling(t *testing.T) {
 			},
 		}
 
-		// Simulate first request processing — single-firing via CAS.
+		// Simulate first request processing
-		if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&oidc.firstRequestStarted, 0, 1) {
+		oidc.firstRequestMutex.Lock()
+		if !oidc.firstRequestReceived {
+			oidc.firstRequestReceived = true
+			oidc.firstRequestMutex.Unlock()
+
 			// This would normally be called asynchronously
 			go func() {
 				oidc.initializeMetadata(server.URL)
 				// initComplete is closed internally by initializeMetadata
 			}()
+		} else {
+			oidc.firstRequestMutex.Unlock()
 		}
 
 		// Wait for initialization
@@ -550,8 +556,9 @@ func TestFirstRequestHandling(t *testing.T) {
 		defer server.Close()
 
 		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL:         server.URL,
+			providerURL:          server.URL,
-			firstRequestStarted: 0,
+			firstRequestReceived: false,
+			firstRequestMutex:    sync.Mutex{},
 			httpClient: &http.Client{
 				Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
 			},
@@ -573,22 +580,31 @@ func TestFirstRequestHandling(t *testing.T) {
 			},
 		}
 
-		// Simulate multiple concurrent "first" requests — only one CAS winner
+		// Simulate multiple concurrent "first" requests
-		// fires the bootstrap path.
 		const numRequests = 10
 		var wg sync.WaitGroup
 		wg.Add(numRequests)
 
-		var initStarted int32
+		initStarted := 0
+		var initMu sync.Mutex
 
 		for i := 0; i < numRequests; i++ {
 			go func() {
 				defer wg.Done()
 
-				if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&oidc.firstRequestStarted, 0, 1) {
+				oidc.firstRequestMutex.Lock()
-					atomic.AddInt32(&initStarted, 1)
+				if !oidc.firstRequestReceived {
+					oidc.firstRequestReceived = true
+					oidc.firstRequestMutex.Unlock()
+
+					initMu.Lock()
+					initStarted++
+					initMu.Unlock()
+
 					// Only one should actually start initialization
 					oidc.initializeMetadata(server.URL)
+				} else {
+					oidc.firstRequestMutex.Unlock()
 				}
 			}()
 		}
@@ -596,8 +612,8 @@ func TestFirstRequestHandling(t *testing.T) {
 		wg.Wait()
 
 		// Verify only one initialization was started
-		if atomic.LoadInt32(&initStarted) != 1 {
+		if initStarted != 1 {
-			t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 initialization, got %d", atomic.LoadInt32(&initStarted))
+			t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 initialization, got %d", initStarted)
 		}
 
 		// The metadata endpoint might be called once or not at all depending on timing

main_servehttp_test.go

@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_ExcludedURLs(t *testing.T) {
 				logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 				initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 				sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-				firstRequestStarted: 1,
+				firstRequestReceived:   true,
-				metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+				metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 				issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com", // Required for initialization check
 			}
 			close(oidc.initComplete)
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_EventStream(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		}
 		close(oidc.initComplete)
@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_WebSocketUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		}
 		close(oidc.initComplete)
@@ -272,8 +272,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_InitializationTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}), // Never close this to simulate timeout
 			sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		}
 
 		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)
@@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_InitializationTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 			redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 			logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
@@ -337,8 +337,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_CallbackAndLogout(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 			redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 			logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
@@ -367,8 +367,8 @@ func TestServeHTTP_CallbackAndLogout(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 			redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 			logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
@@ -740,8 +740,8 @@ func TestMinimalHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 				logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 				initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 				sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-				firstRequestStarted: 1,
+				firstRequestReceived:   true,
-				metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+				metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 				issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 				minimalHeaders:         tt.minimalHeaders,
 				extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ func TestMinimalHeaders_TokenHeaderNotSet(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		minimalHeaders:         true, // Enable minimal headers
 		extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
@@ -903,8 +903,8 @@ func TestStripAuthCookies(t *testing.T) {
 				logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 				initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 				sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-				firstRequestStarted: 1,
+				firstRequestReceived:   true,
-				metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+				metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 				issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 				stripAuthCookies:       tt.stripAuthCookies,
 				extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
@@ -987,8 +987,8 @@ func TestStripAuthCookies_NoCookies(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		stripAuthCookies:       true,
 		extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
@@ -1034,8 +1034,8 @@ func TestStripAuthCookies_OnlyOIDCCookies(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		stripAuthCookies:       true,
 		extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
@@ -1085,8 +1085,8 @@ func TestStripAuthCookies_OnlyAppCookies(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		stripAuthCookies:       true,
 		extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
@@ -1148,8 +1148,8 @@ func TestStripAuthCookies_CustomPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         sm,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		stripAuthCookies:       true,
 		extractClaimsFunc: func(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {

main_test.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
@@ -2686,9 +2685,10 @@ func TestMetadataRecoveryOnProviderFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	providerAvailable = true
 	mu.Unlock()
 
-	// Reset the retry timer to allow immediate retry. The field is atomic
+	// Reset the retry timer to allow immediate retry
-	// now, so no lock is needed.
+	m.metadataRetryMutex.Lock()
-	atomic.StoreInt64(&m.lastMetadataRetryNano, 0)
+	m.lastMetadataRetryTime = time.Time{} // Reset to zero time
+	m.metadataRetryMutex.Unlock()
 
 	// Second request should trigger recovery attempt
 	req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)

middleware.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/utils"
@@ -146,20 +145,19 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/health") {
-		// Lock-free one-shot bootstrap. The previous firstRequestMutex.Lock()
+		t.firstRequestMutex.Lock()
-		// fired on EVERY non-health request forever (even after the boolean
+		if !t.firstRequestReceived {
-		// flipped true), which under Yaegi added a per-request serialization
+			t.firstRequestReceived = true
-		// point. CAS gives single-firing semantics with zero steady-state cost.
-		if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&t.firstRequestStarted, 0, 1) {
 			t.logger.Debug("Starting background tasks on first request")
 			t.startTokenCleanup()
 
-			if t.providerURL != "" &&
+			if !t.metadataRefreshStarted && t.providerURL != "" {
-				atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&t.metadataRefreshStartedAtomic, 0, 1) {
+				t.metadataRefreshStarted = true
 				// Metadata refresh is handled by singleton resource manager
 				t.startMetadataRefresh(t.providerURL)
 			}
 		}
+		t.firstRequestMutex.Unlock()
 	}
 
 	// Evaluate auth-bypass once, before waiting for initialization. Excluded
@@ -209,31 +207,20 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 
 	select {
 	case <-t.initComplete:
-		// Read issuerURL via atomic snapshot when available — replaces the
+		// Read issuerURL with RLock
-		// metadataMu.RLock that previously fired on every non-bypass request.
+		t.metadataMu.RLock()
-		// Under Yaegi each RLock acquisition costs 1-5ms of interpreter
+		issuerURL := t.issuerURL
-		// dispatch; the snapshot is a single atomic.Value.Load. Falls back
+		t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
-		// to the legacy field+RLock for paths that haven't published a
-		// snapshot yet (notably some test setups that initialize the struct
-		// fields directly).
-		var issuerURL string
-		if snap := t.metadataSnap(); snap != nil {
-			issuerURL = snap.IssuerURL
-		} else {
-			t.metadataMu.RLock()
-			issuerURL = t.issuerURL
-			t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
-		}
 
 		if issuerURL == "" {
-			// Provider metadata initialization failed - try to recover.
+			// Provider metadata initialization failed - try to recover
-			// Retry every 30 seconds to allow automatic recovery. Lock-free
+			// Retry every 30 seconds to allow automatic recovery when provider comes back online
-			// throttle via CAS on lastMetadataRetryNano: one goroutine wins
+			t.metadataRetryMutex.Lock()
-			// the window, others see shouldRetry=false.
+			shouldRetry := time.Since(t.lastMetadataRetryTime) >= 30*time.Second
-			nowNano := time.Now().UnixNano()
+			if shouldRetry {
-			last := atomic.LoadInt64(&t.lastMetadataRetryNano)
+				t.lastMetadataRetryTime = time.Now()
-			shouldRetry := time.Duration(nowNano-last) >= 30*time.Second &&
+			}
-				atomic.CompareAndSwapInt64(&t.lastMetadataRetryNano, last, nowNano)
+			t.metadataRetryMutex.Unlock()
 
 			if shouldRetry && t.providerURL != "" {
 				t.logger.Info("Attempting to recover OIDC provider metadata...")
@@ -311,19 +298,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	host := utils.DetermineHost(req)
 	redirectURL := buildFullURL(scheme, host, t.redirURLPath)
 
-	// Capture per-request state: one RLock on sd.sessionMutex covers all the
-	// getter values the handler chain needs (instead of 5-7 separate
-	// session.GetX() calls each acquiring their own RLock under Yaegi).
-	// metadataSnap is also stored once so downstream handlers don't repeat
-	// the atomic.Value.Load.
-	rs := (&requestState{
-		scheme:      scheme,
-		host:        host,
-		redirectURL: redirectURL,
-		next:        t.next,
-		metadata:    t.metadataSnap(),
-	}).captureSession(session)
-
 	// Check if the current request is the OIDC callback
 	t.logger.Debugf("Checking callback URL match: request_path=%q, configured_callback=%q", req.URL.Path, t.redirURLPath)
 	if req.URL.Path == t.redirURLPath {
@@ -333,10 +307,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	}
 	t.logger.Debugf("Callback URL did not match (request_path=%q != configured=%q), continuing auth flow", req.URL.Path, t.redirURLPath)
 
-	// Token validation reads session via the captured snapshot — saves ~21
+	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := t.isUserAuthenticated(session)
-	// sd.sessionMutex.RLock acquisitions (Yaegi-dispatched, ~1-5ms each)
-	// across the validation path.
-	authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := t.isUserAuthenticatedRS(rs)
 
 	if expired {
 		t.logger.Debug("Session token is definitively expired or invalid, initiating re-auth")
@@ -344,7 +315,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	userIdentifier := rs.userIdentifier
+	userIdentifier := session.GetUserIdentifier()
 	// User authorization check
 	if authenticated && userIdentifier != "" {
 		if !t.isAllowedUser(userIdentifier) {
@@ -361,11 +332,11 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 		// methods (validateAzureTokens/validateStandardTokens) before reaching this point.
 		// Redundant validation here was causing issues with Azure AD tokens that have
 		// JWT format but unverifiable signatures. See issue #89.
-		t.processAuthorizedRequestRS(rw, req, rs)
+		t.processAuthorizedRequest(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
 		return
 	}
 
-	refreshTokenPresent := rs.refreshToken != ""
+	refreshTokenPresent := session.GetRefreshToken() != ""
 
 	// Decide whether to answer with 401 instead of a redirect. AJAX requests
 	// cannot follow a 302 into an IdP, and sub-resource loads (script/image/
@@ -472,95 +443,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 //   - req: The HTTP request to process.
 //   - session: The user's session data containing tokens and claims.
 //   - redirectURL: The callback URL for re-authentication if needed.
-// processAuthorizedRequestRS is the requestState-aware variant of
-// processAuthorizedRequest. It reads SessionData fields from the captured
-// snapshot in rs instead of calling session.GetX() (each of which acquires
-// sd.sessionMutex.RLock — under Yaegi every RLock pays ~1-5ms of interpreter
-// dispatch). Only session-mutating operations (Save, ResetRedirectCount,
-// Clear, IsDirty) still go through the session pointer because those write
-// state and have no snapshot.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) processAuthorizedRequestRS(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, rs *requestState) {
-	session := rs.session
-	redirectURL := rs.redirectURL
-	userIdentifier := rs.userIdentifier
-	if userIdentifier == "" {
-		t.logger.Info("No user identifier found in session during final processing, initiating re-auth")
-		session.ResetRedirectCount()
-		t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Check if session has been invalidated via backchannel or front-channel logout
-	idToken := rs.idToken
-	if t.enableBackchannelLogout || t.enableFrontchannelLogout {
-		if idToken != "" {
-			sid, sub, createdAt := t.extractSessionInfo(idToken)
-			if t.isSessionInvalidated(sid, sub, createdAt) {
-				t.logger.Infof("Session for user %s has been invalidated via IdP-initiated logout", userIdentifier)
-				if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
-					t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing invalidated session: %v", err)
-				}
-				session.ResetRedirectCount()
-				t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
-				return
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Resolve ID-token claims at most once per request. SessionData caches
-	// the parsed claims keyed on the raw ID token.
-	var (
-		idClaims    map[string]interface{}
-		idClaimsErr error
-	)
-	if idToken != "" {
-		idClaims, idClaimsErr = session.GetIDTokenClaims(t.extractClaimsFunc)
-	}
-
-	var (
-		groupClaims    map[string]interface{}
-		groupClaimsErr error
-	)
-	if idToken != "" {
-		groupClaims, groupClaimsErr = idClaims, idClaimsErr
-	} else if rs.accessToken != "" {
-		groupClaims, groupClaimsErr = t.extractClaimsFunc(rs.accessToken)
-	} else if len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 {
-		t.logger.Error("No token available but roles/groups checks are required")
-		session.ResetRedirectCount()
-		t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if groupClaimsErr != nil && len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 {
-		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to extract claims for roles/groups check: %v", groupClaimsErr)
-		session.ResetRedirectCount()
-		t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Persist any dirty session state BEFORE forwardAuthorized writes the
-	// response.
-	if session.IsDirty() {
-		if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
-			t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session after processing headers: %v", err)
-		}
-	} else {
-		t.logger.Debug("Session not dirty, skipping save in processAuthorizedRequest")
-	}
-
-	p := &principal{
-		Source:       sourceSession,
-		Identifier:   userIdentifier,
-		AccessToken:  rs.accessToken,
-		IDToken:      idToken,
-		RefreshToken: rs.refreshToken,
-		Claims:       groupClaims,
-	}
-
-	t.forwardAuthorized(rw, req, p)
-}
-
 func (t *TraefikOidc) processAuthorizedRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
 	userIdentifier := session.GetUserIdentifier()
 	if userIdentifier == "" {
@@ -721,7 +603,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) forwardAuthorized(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Reques
 
 	// When minimalHeaders is enabled, skip extra headers to prevent 431 errors
 	if !t.minimalHeaders {
-		req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-Redirect", req.URL.RequestURI())
+		req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-Redirect", t.originalRequestURI(req))
 		req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", p.Identifier)
 		if p.IDToken != "" {
 			req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-Token", p.IDToken)

middleware_edge_cases_test.go

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}), // Never close to simulate waiting
 		sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 	}
 
 	// Create request with canceled context
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareSessionErrorRecovery(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 		logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareAJAXRequestHandling(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 		logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ func TestLogoutWorksWithoutOIDCInitialization(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}), // Never close to simulate provider unavailable
 		sessionManager:         createTestSessionManager(t),
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
 		postLogoutRedirectURI:  "/",
 		forceHTTPS:             false,
@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareDomainRestrictions(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:         NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:   make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager: sessionManager,
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:      "https://provider.example.com",
 			redirURLPath:   "/callback",
 			logoutURLPath:  "/logout",
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareDomainRestrictions(t *testing.T) {
 			logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 			initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 			sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-			firstRequestStarted: 1,
+			firstRequestReceived:   true,
-			metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+			metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 			issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 			redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 			logoutURLPath:          "/logout",
@@ -236,8 +236,8 @@ func TestMiddlewareOpaqueTokenHandling(t *testing.T) {
 		logger:                 NewLogger("debug"),
 		initComplete:           make(chan struct{}),
 		sessionManager:         sessionManager,
-		firstRequestStarted: 1,
+		firstRequestReceived:   true,
-		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+		metadataRefreshStarted: true,
 		issuerURL:              "https://provider.example.com",
 		redirURLPath:           "/callback",
 		logoutURLPath:          "/logout",

ready.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+// Ready reports whether the middleware has completed at least one successful
+// OIDC provider metadata discovery. Used by external supervisors (e.g. the
+// oidcgate /readyz endpoint) to gate traffic until the IdP discovery doc
+// has been fetched and the authorization endpoint is known.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) Ready() bool {
+	t.metadataMu.RLock()
+	u := t.authURL
+	t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
+	return u != ""
+}

ready_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestReady_FalseBeforeMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{}
+	if tr.Ready() {
+		t.Fatal("Ready() should be false before metadata discovery")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReady_TrueAfterAuthURLSet(t *testing.T) {
+	tr := &TraefikOidc{}
+	tr.metadataMu.Lock()
+	tr.authURL = "https://idp.example/authorize"
+	tr.metadataMu.Unlock()
+	if !tr.Ready() {
+		t.Fatal("Ready() should be true once authURL is populated")
+	}
+}

refresh_coordinator.go

@@ -15,28 +15,18 @@ import (
 // It implements request coalescing, rate limiting, and circuit breaking
 // specifically for token refresh operations.
 type RefreshCoordinator struct {
-	// inFlightRefreshes maps tokenHash -> *refreshOperation. sync.Map is used
+	inFlightRefreshes      map[string]*refreshOperation
-	// instead of a plain map + RWMutex so concurrent refreshes do not
+	cleanupTimers          map[string]*time.Timer
-	// serialize on a single global lock. Under Yaegi the previous
+	sessionRefreshAttempts map[string]*refreshAttemptTracker
-	// refreshMutex.Lock() was held for tens of milliseconds per request due
-	// to interpreter overhead on the work inside the critical section,
-	// causing dozens of goroutines to stack up on it and pin one CPU core.
-	inFlightRefreshes sync.Map
-	// sessionRefreshAttempts maps sessionID -> *refreshAttemptTracker.
-	// sync.Map + atomic tracker fields means isInCooldown/recordRefreshAttempt/
-	// recordRefreshSuccess/recordRefreshFailure are lock-free. Previously
-	// these used attemptsMutex sync.RWMutex; under Yaegi every Lock() acquisition
-	// adds 10-50ms of dispatch overhead, and they were called twice per leader
-	// request (once for recordRefreshAttempt, once for isInCooldown). That
-	// serializing pattern caused the v1.0.15 death spiral after v1.0.14
-	// removed the refreshMutex (same architectural shape, different mutex).
-	sessionRefreshAttempts sync.Map
 	circuitBreaker         *RefreshCircuitBreaker
 	metrics                *RefreshMetrics
 	logger                 *Logger
 	stopChan               chan struct{}
 	config                 RefreshCoordinatorConfig
 	wg                     sync.WaitGroup
+	attemptsMutex          sync.RWMutex
+	refreshMutex           sync.RWMutex
+	cleanupTimerMu         sync.Mutex
 }
 
 // RefreshCoordinatorConfig configures the refresh coordinator behavior
@@ -94,46 +84,14 @@ type refreshResult struct {
 	fromCache     bool
 }
 
-// attemptState is the immutable snapshot of a session's refresh-attempt
+// refreshAttemptTracker tracks refresh attempts for a session
-// state. Lives behind refreshAttemptTracker.state (atomic.Value). Every
+type refreshAttemptTracker struct {
-// transition (record, success, failure, window-reset, cooldown-enter,
+	lastAttemptTime     time.Time
-// cooldown-exit) constructs a fresh attemptState and publishes it via
+	windowStartTime     time.Time
-// CompareAndSwap so the entire field set is updated together.
+	cooldownEndTime     time.Time
-//
-// Per-field atomic.Load/Store (the previous v1.0.15 design) had a benign
-// but observable hazard: the cooldown-exit reset wrote cooldownEndNano = 0
-// first, then separately stored attempts = 1 and windowStartNano = now.
-// A concurrent isInCooldown call could see cooldownEndNano = 0 (reset
-// just completed) with attempts still at MaxRefreshAttempts, triggering
-// a fresh cooldown immediately. The snapshot approach eliminates the
-// intermediate state entirely.
-type attemptState struct {
-	lastAttemptNano     int64 // UnixNano of last attempt
-	windowStartNano     int64 // UnixNano of attempt-window start
-	cooldownEndNano     int64 // UnixNano; 0 = not in cooldown
 	attempts            int32
 	consecutiveFailures int32
-}
+	inCooldown          bool
-
-// refreshAttemptTracker tracks refresh attempts for a session via a single
-// atomic.Value holding a *attemptState pointer. Readers do exactly one Load.
-// Writers do Load → construct new → CompareAndSwap (retry on conflict).
-// Under Yaegi this collapses 3-4 per-field atomic dispatches into one Load,
-// and eliminates the cross-field race in the window-reset path.
-type refreshAttemptTracker struct {
-	state atomic.Value // *attemptState
-}
-
-// stateOf returns the current attemptState, or a zero-value snapshot if none
-// has been published yet. The empty snapshot represents "no attempts recorded".
-func (t *refreshAttemptTracker) stateOf() *attemptState {
-	if v := t.state.Load(); v != nil {
-		s, _ := v.(*attemptState)
-		if s != nil {
-			return s
-		}
-	}
-	return &attemptState{}
 }
 
 // RefreshMetrics tracks coordinator performance metrics
@@ -148,18 +106,14 @@ type RefreshMetrics struct {
 	currentInFlightRefreshes int32
 }
 
-// RefreshCircuitBreaker implements a circuit breaker specifically for refresh
+// RefreshCircuitBreaker implements a circuit breaker specifically for refresh operations
-// operations. All mutable fields are atomic so AllowRequest/RecordSuccess/
-// RecordFailure run without any mutex. The previous sync.RWMutex.RLock() was
-// taken on every CoordinateRefresh — under Yaegi this added 10-50ms of
-// interpreter dispatch per call, which compounded with attemptsMutex to keep
-// the pod's single CPU core saturated.
 type RefreshCircuitBreaker struct {
-	lastFailureNano int64 // atomic, UnixNano of most recent failure
+	lastFailureTime time.Time
-	lastSuccessNano int64 // atomic, UnixNano of most recent success
+	lastSuccessTime time.Time
 	config          RefreshCircuitBreakerConfig
-	state           int32 // atomic: 0=closed, 1=open, 2=half-open
+	mutex           sync.RWMutex
-	failures        int32 // atomic
+	state           int32
+	failures        int32
 }
 
 // RefreshCircuitBreakerConfig configures the refresh circuit breaker
@@ -176,12 +130,13 @@ func NewRefreshCoordinator(config RefreshCoordinatorConfig, logger *Logger) *Ref
 	}
 
 	rc := &RefreshCoordinator{
-		// inFlightRefreshes and sessionRefreshAttempts are both sync.Map;
+		inFlightRefreshes:      make(map[string]*refreshOperation),
-		// their zero values are ready to use.
+		sessionRefreshAttempts: make(map[string]*refreshAttemptTracker),
-		config:        config,
+		config:                 config,
-		metrics:  &RefreshMetrics{},
+		metrics:                &RefreshMetrics{},
-		logger:   logger,
+		logger:                 logger,
-		stopChan: make(chan struct{}),
+		stopChan:               make(chan struct{}),
+		cleanupTimers:          make(map[string]*time.Timer),
 		circuitBreaker: &RefreshCircuitBreaker{
 			config: RefreshCircuitBreakerConfig{
 				MaxFailures:      3,
@@ -272,28 +227,13 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) getOrCreateOperation(
 	tokenHash string,
 	refreshToken string,
 ) (*refreshOperation, bool, error) {
-	// Speculatively construct the operation we WOULD register if we win the
+	rc.refreshMutex.Lock()
-	// race. Allocating here keeps the LoadOrStore call below atomic and
+	defer rc.refreshMutex.Unlock()
-	// avoids any global lock — under Yaegi the previous map+RWMutex design
-	// held the write lock long enough (tens of ms per call) that concurrent
-	// refreshes on the same coordinator serialized into a queue that grew
-	// without bound. See struct comment on inFlightRefreshes.
-	candidate := &refreshOperation{
-		refreshToken: refreshToken,
-		done:         make(chan struct{}),
-		startTime:    time.Now(),
-		waiterCount:  1,
-	}
 
-	if existing, loaded := rc.inFlightRefreshes.LoadOrStore(tokenHash, candidate); loaded {
+	// Check for existing operation while holding the lock
-		existingOp, ok := existing.(*refreshOperation)
+	if existingOp, exists := rc.inFlightRefreshes[tokenHash]; exists {
-		if !ok {
-			// Defensive: anything stored here is always *refreshOperation, but
-			// keep the typed assert so a programming error elsewhere doesn't
-			// surface as a confusing panic in an interpreter frame.
-			return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("inFlightRefreshes corrupt: unexpected type %T", existing)
-		}
 		if existingOp.refreshToken == refreshToken {
+			// Join existing operation
 			atomic.AddInt32(&existingOp.waiterCount, 1)
 			return existingOp, false, nil
 		}
@@ -301,71 +241,41 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) getOrCreateOperation(
 		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("refresh token mismatch")
 	}
 
-	// We won the race and registered `candidate`. Apply gates now. If any
+	// No existing operation - check if we can create a new one
-	// gate fails we must remove our entry from the map and signal failure
+	// All checks happen while holding the lock to prevent races
-	// to any joiners that snuck in between LoadOrStore and now.
-	if err := rc.applyLeaderGates(sessionID); err != nil {
-		rc.failCandidate(tokenHash, candidate, err)
-		return nil, false, err
-	}
 
-	// Reserve concurrent slot via ticket-and-return: increment optimistically,
+	// Check and record refresh attempt for rate limiting
-	// decrement if we overshot the limit. The previous CAS-loop allowed a
+	rc.recordRefreshAttempt(sessionID)
-	// transient overshoot of up to N-1 leaders when several goroutines all
-	// observed `current < max` in the same scheduling slice before any one
-	// of them succeeded their CAS — visible to readers as
-	// currentInFlightRefreshes > MaxConcurrentRefreshes for a brief window.
-	// The ticket pattern is strictly bounded: the counter momentarily reads
-	// max+k for k concurrent attempts past the limit, but only the k that
-	// produced max+1..max+k decrement back, and only k=1 ever observes max+1
-	// as committed.
-	newCount := atomic.AddInt32(&rc.metrics.currentInFlightRefreshes, 1)
-	if int(newCount) > rc.config.MaxConcurrentRefreshes {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&rc.metrics.currentInFlightRefreshes, -1)
-		err := fmt.Errorf("maximum concurrent refresh operations reached")
-		rc.failCandidate(tokenHash, candidate, err)
-		return nil, false, err
-	}
-
-	return candidate, true, nil
-}
-
-// applyLeaderGates runs the rate-limit, cooldown, and memory-pressure checks
-// that previously ran under the global refreshMutex. Only the leader (the
-// goroutine that just registered the operation) runs them; joiners share the
-// leader's outcome via operation.done.
-func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) applyLeaderGates(sessionID string) error {
-	// Cooldown check FIRST, BEFORE incrementing the attempt counter.
-	// Previously this function recorded the attempt and then read the
-	// cooldown state. Under burst load (many concurrent leaders with
-	// different token hashes but same session) every goroutine could
-	// increment past MaxRefreshAttempts before any one of them observed
-	// the threshold, so the cooldown gate fired too late — the same
-	// thundering-herd shape that drove v1.0.14 into the ground.
 	if rc.isInCooldown(sessionID) {
 		atomic.AddInt64(&rc.metrics.cooldownsTriggered, 1)
-		return fmt.Errorf("refresh attempts exceeded for session, in cooldown period")
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("refresh attempts exceeded for session, in cooldown period")
 	}
+
+	// Check memory pressure
 	if rc.config.EnableMemoryPressureDetection && rc.isUnderMemoryPressure() {
 		atomic.AddInt64(&rc.metrics.memoryPressureEvents, 1)
-		return fmt.Errorf("system under memory pressure, refresh denied")
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("system under memory pressure, refresh denied")
 	}
-	// Only count attempts that actually progress past the gates.
-	rc.recordRefreshAttempt(sessionID)
-	return nil
-}
 
-// failCandidate removes the leader's just-registered operation from the
+	// Check and reserve concurrent refresh slot atomically
-// in-flight map and signals the error to any joiners by recording the result
+	current := atomic.LoadInt32(&rc.metrics.currentInFlightRefreshes)
-// and closing the done channel. This keeps the (nil, false, err) return path
+	if int(current) >= rc.config.MaxConcurrentRefreshes {
-// equivalent to the pre-sync.Map version: callers see the error directly,
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("maximum concurrent refresh operations reached")
-// joiners see it via operation.done.
+	}
-func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) failCandidate(tokenHash string, op *refreshOperation, err error) {
+
-	rc.inFlightRefreshes.Delete(tokenHash)
+	// Reserve the slot - we're still holding the lock so this is safe
-	op.mutex.Lock()
+	atomic.AddInt32(&rc.metrics.currentInFlightRefreshes, 1)
-	op.result = &refreshResult{err: err}
+
-	op.mutex.Unlock()
+	// Create and register new operation
-	close(op.done)
+	operation := &refreshOperation{
+		refreshToken: refreshToken,
+		done:         make(chan struct{}),
+		startTime:    time.Now(),
+		waiterCount:  1,
+	}
+	rc.inFlightRefreshes[tokenHash] = operation
+
+	return operation, true, nil
 }
 
 // executeRefreshAsync performs the actual refresh operation asynchronously
@@ -428,196 +338,130 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) executeRefreshAsync(
 	}
 }
 
-// scheduleDelayedCleanup schedules a cleanup using a timer instead of spawning
+// scheduleDelayedCleanup schedules a cleanup using a timer instead of spawning a goroutine
-// a goroutine — time.AfterFunc uses the runtime's timer heap and never spawns
+// This prevents goroutine explosion under high load (500+ req/sec)
-// a per-timer goroutine until the callback actually fires.
-//
-// The previous implementation tracked every pending timer in a map guarded by
-// cleanupTimerMu so a duplicate scheduling could cancel the prior timer. That
-// "shouldn't happen" path was the only consumer of the map, but the mutex
-// fired on every successful refresh completion — yet another per-request
-// Yaegi-dispatched lock acquisition. performCleanup is already idempotent
-// (LoadAndDelete on the sync.Map), so a duplicate scheduling at worst fires
-// performCleanup twice; the second call is a no-op. Dropping the map removes
-// the whole class of contention on this code path.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) scheduleDelayedCleanup(tokenHash string) {
 	delay := rc.config.DeduplicationCleanupDelay
 	if delay <= 0 {
+		// Immediate cleanup
 		rc.performCleanup(tokenHash)
 		return
 	}
-	time.AfterFunc(delay, func() { rc.performCleanup(tokenHash) })
+
+	// Use time.AfterFunc which is more efficient than spawning a goroutine with Sleep
+	// time.AfterFunc uses the runtime's timer heap which is much more efficient
+	rc.cleanupTimerMu.Lock()
+	// Cancel any existing timer for this hash (shouldn't happen, but just in case)
+	if existingTimer, exists := rc.cleanupTimers[tokenHash]; exists {
+		existingTimer.Stop()
+	}
+	rc.cleanupTimers[tokenHash] = time.AfterFunc(delay, func() {
+		rc.performCleanup(tokenHash)
+		// Remove timer from map
+		rc.cleanupTimerMu.Lock()
+		delete(rc.cleanupTimers, tokenHash)
+		rc.cleanupTimerMu.Unlock()
+	})
+	rc.cleanupTimerMu.Unlock()
 }
 
 // performCleanup removes the operation from the in-flight map.
 // Idempotent: only decrements the in-flight counter if an entry was actually
-// removed. LoadAndDelete is atomic so any concurrent failCandidate or repeat
+// removed. This guards against any future path accidentally calling cleanup
-// cleanup call will see exactly one removal — the budget cannot be corrupted
+// twice for the same tokenHash (which would corrupt the refresh budget).
-// by double-decrement.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) performCleanup(tokenHash string) {
-	if _, existed := rc.inFlightRefreshes.LoadAndDelete(tokenHash); existed {
+	rc.refreshMutex.Lock()
+	_, existed := rc.inFlightRefreshes[tokenHash]
+	if existed {
+		delete(rc.inFlightRefreshes, tokenHash)
+	}
+	rc.refreshMutex.Unlock()
+	if existed {
 		atomic.AddInt32(&rc.metrics.currentInFlightRefreshes, -1)
 	}
 }
 
-// getOrCreateTracker fetches the tracker for sessionID or atomically creates a
+// isInCooldown checks if a session is in cooldown after recording an attempt
-// fresh one. The sync.Map.LoadOrStore semantics make this lock-free even under
-// concurrent first-touch races: at most one tracker per sessionID survives.
-//
-// trackerFromMapValue centralizes the type assertion so the lint-mandated
-// two-value form lives in one place; the stored type is always
-// *refreshAttemptTracker by construction.
-func trackerFromMapValue(v interface{}) *refreshAttemptTracker {
-	t, _ := v.(*refreshAttemptTracker)
-	return t
-}
-
-func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) getOrCreateTracker(sessionID string) *refreshAttemptTracker {
-	if v, ok := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.Load(sessionID); ok {
-		return trackerFromMapValue(v)
-	}
-	fresh := &refreshAttemptTracker{}
-	fresh.state.Store(&attemptState{windowStartNano: time.Now().UnixNano()})
-	actual, _ := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.LoadOrStore(sessionID, fresh)
-	return trackerFromMapValue(actual)
-}
-
-// mutateState performs a CompareAndSwap loop that applies mutate to the
-// current snapshot. mutate must be PURE: it receives an immutable view of
-// the current state and returns a fresh *attemptState. If mutate returns nil
-// the update is skipped (used by isInCooldown for "no change needed" paths).
-//
-// Retries on CAS conflict are bounded by the number of concurrent writers —
-// in practice 1-3. Under Yaegi each retry pays the dispatch cost of one Load
-// + one CompareAndSwap; still cheaper than the previous per-field atomic
-// sequence and immune to the cross-field race the v1.0.15 design had.
-func (t *refreshAttemptTracker) mutateState(mutate func(cur *attemptState) *attemptState) *attemptState {
-	for {
-		cur := t.stateOf()
-		next := mutate(cur)
-		if next == nil {
-			return cur
-		}
-		if t.state.CompareAndSwap(cur, next) {
-			return next
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// isInCooldown checks if a session is in cooldown. Snapshot-based: every
-// transition publishes a fresh *attemptState atomically so readers never see
-// a partially-updated state. The previous per-field atomic design had a
-// benign race in the cooldown-exit path (cooldownEndNano reset before
-// attempts reset) that could double-trigger cooldown.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) isInCooldown(sessionID string) bool {
-	v, ok := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.Load(sessionID)
+	rc.attemptsMutex.Lock()
-	if !ok {
+	defer rc.attemptsMutex.Unlock()
+
+	tracker, exists := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts[sessionID]
+	if !exists {
 		return false // No tracker means first attempt, not in cooldown
 	}
-	tracker := trackerFromMapValue(v)
+
 	now := time.Now()
-	nowNano := now.UnixNano()
-	maxAttempts := rc.config.MaxRefreshAttempts
-	window := rc.config.RefreshAttemptWindow
-	cooldownPeriod := rc.config.RefreshCooldownPeriod
 
-	cur := tracker.stateOf()
+	// Check if already in cooldown
-
+	if tracker.inCooldown {
-	// Already in cooldown?
+		if now.After(tracker.cooldownEndTime) {
-	if cur.cooldownEndNano != 0 {
+			// Cooldown expired, reset tracker
-		if nowNano <= cur.cooldownEndNano {
+			tracker.inCooldown = false
-			return true // still in cooldown
+			tracker.attempts = 1 // Already recorded one attempt
+			tracker.consecutiveFailures = 0
+			tracker.windowStartTime = now
+			return false
 		}
-		// Cooldown expired: atomically publish a fresh state with the window
+		return true // Still in cooldown
-		// restarted from one attempt. Whichever goroutine wins the CAS sets
+	}
-		// the new snapshot; losers see it via the next stateOf load.
+
-		tracker.mutateState(func(s *attemptState) *attemptState {
+	// Check if window expired
-			if s.cooldownEndNano == 0 || nowNano <= s.cooldownEndNano {
+	if now.Sub(tracker.windowStartTime) > rc.config.RefreshAttemptWindow {
-				return nil // someone else already reset, or back in cooldown
+		// Reset window
-			}
+		tracker.attempts = 1 // Already recorded one attempt
-			return &attemptState{
+		tracker.windowStartTime = now
-				windowStartNano: nowNano,
-				attempts:        1,
-			}
-		})
 		return false
 	}
 
-	// Window expired?
+	// Check if just exceeded attempt limit
-	if time.Duration(nowNano-cur.windowStartNano) > window {
+	if int(tracker.attempts) >= rc.config.MaxRefreshAttempts {
-		tracker.mutateState(func(s *attemptState) *attemptState {
+		// Enter cooldown now
-			if time.Duration(nowNano-s.windowStartNano) <= window {
+		tracker.inCooldown = true
-				return nil
+		tracker.cooldownEndTime = now.Add(rc.config.RefreshCooldownPeriod)
-			}
+		rc.logger.Infof("Session %s entering refresh cooldown after %d attempts",
-			next := *s
+			sessionID, tracker.attempts)
-			next.windowStartNano = nowNano
-			next.attempts = 1
-			return &next
-		})
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Just exceeded attempt limit?
-	if int(cur.attempts) >= maxAttempts {
-		end := now.Add(cooldownPeriod).UnixNano()
-		published := tracker.mutateState(func(s *attemptState) *attemptState {
-			if s.cooldownEndNano != 0 {
-				return nil
-			}
-			next := *s
-			next.cooldownEndNano = end
-			return &next
-		})
-		if published.cooldownEndNano == end {
-			rc.logger.Infof("Session %s entering refresh cooldown after %d attempts",
-				sessionID, published.attempts)
-		}
 		return true
 	}
 
 	return false
 }
 
-// recordRefreshAttempt records a refresh attempt for rate limiting. Lock-free
+// recordRefreshAttempt records a refresh attempt for rate limiting
-// snapshot mutation; attempts and lastAttemptNano are advanced atomically.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) recordRefreshAttempt(sessionID string) {
-	tracker := rc.getOrCreateTracker(sessionID)
+	rc.attemptsMutex.Lock()
-	nowNano := time.Now().UnixNano()
+	defer rc.attemptsMutex.Unlock()
-	tracker.mutateState(func(s *attemptState) *attemptState {
-		next := *s
-		next.attempts++
-		next.lastAttemptNano = nowNano
-		return &next
-	})
-}
 
-// recordRefreshSuccess records a successful refresh: zero consecutiveFailures.
+	tracker, exists := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts[sessionID]
-func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) recordRefreshSuccess(sessionID string) {
+	if !exists {
-	v, ok := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.Load(sessionID)
+		tracker = &refreshAttemptTracker{
-	if !ok {
+			windowStartTime: time.Now(),
-		return
-	}
-	trackerFromMapValue(v).mutateState(func(s *attemptState) *attemptState {
-		if s.consecutiveFailures == 0 {
-			return nil
 		}
-		next := *s
+		rc.sessionRefreshAttempts[sessionID] = tracker
-		next.consecutiveFailures = 0
+	}
-		return &next
+
-	})
+	atomic.AddInt32(&tracker.attempts, 1)
+	tracker.lastAttemptTime = time.Now()
 }
 
-// recordRefreshFailure records a failed refresh: increments consecutiveFailures.
+// recordRefreshSuccess records a successful refresh
+func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) recordRefreshSuccess(sessionID string) {
+	rc.attemptsMutex.Lock()
+	defer rc.attemptsMutex.Unlock()
+
+	if tracker, exists := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts[sessionID]; exists {
+		tracker.consecutiveFailures = 0
+	}
+}
+
+// recordRefreshFailure records a failed refresh
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) recordRefreshFailure(sessionID string) {
-	v, ok := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.Load(sessionID)
+	rc.attemptsMutex.Lock()
-	if !ok {
+	defer rc.attemptsMutex.Unlock()
-		return
+
+	if tracker, exists := rc.sessionRefreshAttempts[sessionID]; exists {
+		atomic.AddInt32(&tracker.consecutiveFailures, 1)
 	}
-	trackerFromMapValue(v).mutateState(func(s *attemptState) *attemptState {
-		next := *s
-		next.consecutiveFailures++
-		return &next
-	})
 }
 
 // hashRefreshToken creates a hash of the refresh token for deduplication
@@ -668,22 +512,20 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) cleanupRoutine() {
 	}
 }
 
-// cleanupStaleEntries removes outdated tracking entries. Lock-free iteration
+// cleanupStaleEntries removes outdated tracking entries
-// via sync.Map.Range; safe to race with concurrent reads/writes.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) cleanupStaleEntries() {
-	cutoff := time.Now().Add(-2 * rc.config.RefreshAttemptWindow).UnixNano()
+	now := time.Now()
-	rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.Range(func(key, value interface{}) bool {
+
-		tracker := trackerFromMapValue(value)
+	rc.attemptsMutex.Lock()
-		if tracker == nil {
+	defer rc.attemptsMutex.Unlock()
-			return true
+
+	// Clean up old session trackers
+	for sessionID, tracker := range rc.sessionRefreshAttempts {
+		// Remove trackers that haven't been used recently
+		if now.Sub(tracker.lastAttemptTime) > 2*rc.config.RefreshAttemptWindow {
+			delete(rc.sessionRefreshAttempts, sessionID)
 		}
-		if tracker.stateOf().lastAttemptNano < cutoff {
+	}
-			// Compare-and-delete to avoid evicting a tracker that was just
-			// re-used by a concurrent caller. We compare by pointer identity.
-			rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.CompareAndDelete(key, value)
-		}
-		return true
-	})
 }
 
 // GetMetrics returns current coordinator metrics
@@ -701,60 +543,78 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) GetMetrics() map[string]interface{} {
 	}
 }
 
-// Shutdown gracefully shuts down the coordinator. Pending delayed-cleanup
+// Shutdown gracefully shuts down the coordinator
-// timers are NOT canceled explicitly: time.AfterFunc callbacks are tiny
-// (one map LoadAndDelete) and harmless after Shutdown — sync.Map operations
-// remain safe on an unused coordinator until GC.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) Shutdown() {
 	close(rc.stopChan)
+
+	// Cancel all pending cleanup timers
+	rc.cleanupTimerMu.Lock()
+	for _, timer := range rc.cleanupTimers {
+		timer.Stop()
+	}
+	rc.cleanupTimers = make(map[string]*time.Timer)
+	rc.cleanupTimerMu.Unlock()
+
 	rc.wg.Wait()
 }
 
-// AllowRequest reports whether the circuit breaker allows a request. Lock-free.
+// AllowRequest checks if the circuit breaker allows a request
 func (cb *RefreshCircuitBreaker) AllowRequest() bool {
-	switch atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state) {
+	cb.mutex.RLock()
-	case 0: // closed
+	defer cb.mutex.RUnlock()
+
+	state := atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state)
+
+	switch state {
+	case 0: // Closed
 		return true
-	case 1: // open
+	case 1: // Open
-		lastFail := atomic.LoadInt64(&cb.lastFailureNano)
+		if time.Since(cb.lastFailureTime) > cb.config.OpenDuration {
-		if time.Duration(time.Now().UnixNano()-lastFail) > cb.config.OpenDuration {
+			// Try to transition to half-open
-			// Transition to half-open; first CAS winner gets the probe.
 			if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&cb.state, 1, 2) {
 				return true
 			}
 		}
 		return false
-	case 2: // half-open
+	case 2: // Half-open
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false
 	}
 }
 
-// RecordSuccess records a successful operation. Lock-free.
+// RecordSuccess records a successful operation
 func (cb *RefreshCircuitBreaker) RecordSuccess() {
-	switch atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state) {
+	cb.mutex.Lock()
-	case 2: // half-open -> close
+	defer cb.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	state := atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state)
+	if state == 2 { // Half-open
+		// Close the circuit
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.state, 0)
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.failures, 0)
-	case 0: // closed
+	} else if state == 0 { // Closed
+		// Reset failure count on success
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.failures, 0)
 	}
-	atomic.StoreInt64(&cb.lastSuccessNano, time.Now().UnixNano())
+	cb.lastSuccessTime = time.Now()
 }
 
-// RecordFailure records a failed operation. Lock-free.
+// RecordFailure records a failed operation
 func (cb *RefreshCircuitBreaker) RecordFailure() {
-	failures := atomic.AddInt32(&cb.failures, 1)
+	cb.mutex.Lock()
-	atomic.StoreInt64(&cb.lastFailureNano, time.Now().UnixNano())
+	defer cb.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	switch atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state) {
+	failures := atomic.AddInt32(&cb.failures, 1)
-	case 0:
+	cb.lastFailureTime = time.Now()
-		if int(failures) >= cb.config.MaxFailures {
+
-			atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.state, 1)
+	state := atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state)
-		}
+
-	case 2:
+	if state == 0 && int(failures) >= cb.config.MaxFailures {
-		// Half-open probe failed -> back to open.
+		// Open the circuit
+		atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.state, 1)
+	} else if state == 2 {
+		// Half-open failed, return to open
 		atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.state, 1)
 	}
 }

refresh_coordinator_test.go

@@ -165,14 +165,9 @@ func TestRefreshRateLimiting(t *testing.T) {
 		time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
 	}
 
-	// Verify that cooldown was triggered after max attempts.
+	// Verify that cooldown was triggered after max attempts
-	// With applyLeaderGates checking cooldown BEFORE recording the attempt
+	// With the new logic, the Nth attempt triggers cooldown, so we get N-1 successful attempts
-	// (the v1.0.16 reorder fixing the thundering-herd off-by-one), N attempts
+	expectedSuccessfulAttempts := config.MaxRefreshAttempts - 1
-	// run to completion and the (N+1)th is denied. Previously the Nth was
-	// denied as it tried to record, which under burst load let multiple
-	// concurrent leaders increment past the limit before any one of them
-	// observed the gate.
-	expectedSuccessfulAttempts := config.MaxRefreshAttempts
 	if attempts != expectedSuccessfulAttempts {
 		t.Errorf("Expected %d successful attempts before cooldown, got %d", expectedSuccessfulAttempts, attempts)
 	}
@@ -370,12 +365,10 @@ func TestMemoryLeakPrevention(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Verify cleanup is working. sync.Map has no Len(); count via Range.
+	// Verify cleanup is working
-	sessionCount := 0
+	coordinator.attemptsMutex.RLock()
-	coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts.Range(func(_, _ interface{}) bool {
+	sessionCount := len(coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts)
-		sessionCount++
+	coordinator.attemptsMutex.RUnlock()
-		return true
-	})
 
 	// Should have cleaned up old sessions (only recent ones remain)
 	if sessionCount > numWorkers*2 {
@@ -657,23 +650,24 @@ func TestCleanupRoutine(t *testing.T) {
 		coordinator.recordRefreshAttempt(fmt.Sprintf("session_%d", i))
 	}
 
-	countSessions := func() int {
+	// Verify sessions exist
-		n := 0
+	coordinator.attemptsMutex.RLock()
-		coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts.Range(func(_, _ interface{}) bool {
+	initialCount := len(coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts)
-			n++
+	coordinator.attemptsMutex.RUnlock()
-			return true
-		})
-		return n
-	}
 
-	if initialCount := countSessions(); initialCount != 5 {
+	if initialCount != 5 {
 		t.Errorf("Expected 5 sessions, got %d", initialCount)
 	}
 
 	// Wait for cleanup to run (2x window + cleanup interval)
 	time.Sleep(2*config.RefreshAttemptWindow + 2*config.CleanupInterval)
 
-	if finalCount := countSessions(); finalCount != 0 {
+	// Verify sessions were cleaned up
+	coordinator.attemptsMutex.RLock()
+	finalCount := len(coordinator.sessionRefreshAttempts)
+	coordinator.attemptsMutex.RUnlock()
+
+	if finalCount != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("Expected 0 sessions after cleanup, got %d", finalCount)
 	}
 }
@@ -726,9 +720,11 @@ func TestNoGoroutineExplosionWithTimers(t *testing.T) {
 	currentGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
 	t.Logf("Goroutines after %d refresh operations: %d", numRefreshes, currentGoroutines)
 
-	// (Coordinator no longer tracks pending timers; time.AfterFunc closures
+	// Check timer count
-	// fire performCleanup directly. This test now only checks the goroutine
+	coordinator.cleanupTimerMu.Lock()
-	// budget, which was always the real invariant.)
+	timerCount := len(coordinator.cleanupTimers)
+	coordinator.cleanupTimerMu.Unlock()
+	t.Logf("Active cleanup timers: %d", timerCount)
 
 	// With timer-based cleanup, goroutine increase should be minimal
 	// Timers don't create goroutines - they use the runtime timer heap
@@ -744,9 +740,19 @@ func TestNoGoroutineExplosionWithTimers(t *testing.T) {
 			initialGoroutines, currentGoroutines, goroutineIncrease)
 	}
 
-	// Wait for timers to fire and cleanup.
+	// Wait for timers to fire and cleanup
 	time.Sleep(config.DeduplicationCleanupDelay + 50*time.Millisecond)
 
+	// Verify timers were cleaned up
+	coordinator.cleanupTimerMu.Lock()
+	remainingTimers := len(coordinator.cleanupTimers)
+	coordinator.cleanupTimerMu.Unlock()
+
+	// Most timers should have fired and been removed
+	if remainingTimers > 10 {
+		t.Errorf("Too many cleanup timers remaining: %d", remainingTimers)
+	}
+
 	// Verify goroutines returned to near initial
 	runtime.GC()
 	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)

requeststate.go

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-// Package traefikoidc provides OIDC authentication middleware for Traefik.
-// requestState bundles read-mostly fields for a single ServeHTTP call.
-package traefikoidc
-
-import "net/http"
-
-// requestState is a per-request context object allocated at the top of
-// ServeHTTP and threaded through to downstream handlers. It caches values
-// that would otherwise require a Yaegi-dispatched lock acquisition each time
-// they're read:
-//
-//   - The metadata snapshot (atomic.Value.Load once, not per-handler).
-//   - SessionData getter results (one RLock on sd.sessionMutex covers all
-//     fields, instead of 5-7 separate RLock/RUnlock pairs scattered through
-//     the handler chain).
-//
-// The struct is alloc'd at request entry, populated under at most one RLock
-// of sd.sessionMutex, and discarded at request exit. It is NOT shared across
-// requests and never written from another goroutine, so no synchronization
-// on its fields is required.
-//
-// Cross-request global caches (tokenCache, JWKCache, sessionEntries,
-// sessionInvalidationCache) remain — they're orthogonal. requestState's job
-// is to eliminate redundant per-handler reads of values that don't change
-// within a single request.
-type requestState struct {
-	// Globals snapshotted once.
-	metadata *MetadataSnapshot
-
-	// SessionData fields snapshotted under one RLock. The pointer to the
-	// SessionData is retained so handlers that genuinely need to mutate
-	// (Save, Clear, etc.) still have access.
-	session *SessionData
-
-	authenticated     bool
-	accessToken       string
-	idToken           string
-	refreshToken      string
-	userIdentifier    string
-	createdAtUnixSec  int64
-
-	// Output: scheme/host/redirect path determined at top of ServeHTTP.
-	scheme      string
-	host        string
-	redirectURL string
-
-	// Carry the next handler so forwardAuthorized doesn't need to close over t.
-	next http.Handler
-}
-
-// captureSession populates requestState's SessionData-derived fields under a
-// single RLock of sd.sessionMutex. Returns the populated rs for chaining.
-//
-// Replaces a sequence of SessionData.GetX() calls each of which acquires
-// sd.sessionMutex.RLock(). Under Yaegi each RLock costs ~1-5ms of
-// interpreter dispatch; batching saves the rest.
-func (rs *requestState) captureSession(sd *SessionData) *requestState {
-	if sd == nil {
-		return rs
-	}
-	rs.session = sd
-	sd.sessionMutex.RLock()
-	rs.authenticated = sd.getAuthenticatedUnsafe()
-	rs.accessToken = sd.getAccessTokenUnsafe()
-	rs.idToken = sd.getIDTokenUnsafe()
-	rs.refreshToken = sd.getRefreshTokenUnsafe()
-	rs.userIdentifier = sd.getUserIdentifierUnsafe()
-	rs.createdAtUnixSec = sd.getCreatedAtUnsafe()
-	sd.sessionMutex.RUnlock()
-	return rs
-}

settings.go

@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	AllowedUserDomains        []string                         `json:"allowedUserDomains"`
 	AllowedUsers              []string                         `json:"allowedUsers"`
 	Headers                   []TemplatedHeader                `json:"headers"`
-	ExtraAuthParams           map[string]string                `json:"extraAuthParams,omitempty"`
 	RefreshGracePeriodSeconds int                              `json:"refreshGracePeriodSeconds"`
 	// MaxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds is a heuristic upper bound on the lifetime of
 	// a stored refresh token. Once the token has been in the session longer
@@ -127,6 +126,13 @@ type Config struct {
 	// Supported: RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, ES256/384/512.
 	ClientAssertionAlg string `json:"clientAssertionAlg,omitempty"`
 
+	// TrustForwardedURI, when true, makes the middleware prefer the
+	// X-Forwarded-Uri request header (set by an upstream reverse proxy)
+	// over req.URL when capturing the "where was the user going" target
+	// stored for post-login redirect. Used by the oidcgate standalone
+	// daemon. Default false preserves the Traefik plugin behavior exactly.
+	TrustForwardedURI bool `json:"trustForwardedURI,omitempty"`
+
 	// --- Bearer-token auth (opt-in M2M path) ---
 
 	// EnableBearerAuth turns on the Authorization: Bearer <jwt> auth path.

token_manager.go

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ package traefikoidc
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -858,6 +860,437 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) isAzureProvider() bool {
 		strings.Contains(issuerURL, "login.windows.net")
 }
 
+// validateAzureTokens validates tokens with Azure AD-specific logic.
+// Azure tokens may be opaque access tokens that cannot be verified as JWTs,
+// so this method handles both JWT and opaque token scenarios.
+// Parameters:
+//   - session: The session data containing tokens to validate.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - authenticated: Whether the user has valid authentication.
+//   - needsRefresh: Whether tokens need to be refreshed.
+//   - expired: Whether tokens have expired and cannot be refreshed.
+//
+//nolint:gocognit // Azure-specific validation requires multiple token type checks
+func (t *TraefikOidc) validateAzureTokens(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, bool) {
+	if !session.GetAuthenticated() {
+		t.logger.Debug("Azure user is not authenticated according to session flag")
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("Azure session not authenticated, but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
+			return false, true, false
+		}
+		return false, true, false
+	}
+
+	accessToken := session.GetAccessToken()
+	idToken := session.GetIDToken()
+
+	if accessToken != "" {
+		if strings.Count(accessToken, ".") == 2 {
+			// Microsoft documents that client apps cannot validate access
+			// tokens issued for Microsoft-owned APIs (Graph, Azure Mgmt) due
+			// to their proprietary signing format (nonce in JWT header is
+			// the marker — signed bytes hash the nonce, wire bytes ship the
+			// raw value, so rsa verification always fails). Treat such
+			// tokens as opaque, matching Microsoft's guidance and avoiding
+			// per-request signature-error log spam (issue #134 followup).
+			//
+			// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/access-tokens
+			//   "you can't validate tokens for Microsoft Graph according to
+			//    these rules due to their proprietary format"
+			if t.isUnverifiableAzureAccessToken(accessToken) {
+				t.logger.Debug("Azure access token is Microsoft-proprietary (Graph/Mgmt) — treating as opaque per Microsoft guidance")
+				if idToken != "" {
+					if err := t.verifyToken(idToken); err != nil {
+						t.logger.Debugf("Azure: ID token validation failed while access token was opaque: %v", err)
+						if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+							return false, true, false
+						}
+						return false, false, true
+					}
+					return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+				}
+				return true, false, false
+			}
+			if err := t.verifyToken(accessToken); err != nil {
+				if idToken != "" {
+					if err := t.verifyToken(idToken); err != nil {
+						t.logger.Debugf("Azure: Both access and ID token validation failed: %v", err)
+						if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+							return false, true, false
+						}
+						return false, false, true
+					}
+					return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+				}
+				if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+					return false, true, false
+				}
+				return false, false, true
+			}
+			return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, accessToken)
+		}
+		t.logger.Debug("Azure access token appears opaque, treating as valid")
+		if idToken != "" {
+			return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+		}
+		return true, false, false
+	}
+
+	if idToken != "" {
+		if err := t.verifyToken(idToken); err != nil {
+			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token has expired") {
+				if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+					return false, true, false
+				}
+				return false, false, true
+			}
+			if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+				return false, true, false
+			}
+			return false, false, true
+		}
+		return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+	}
+
+	if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+		return false, true, false
+	}
+	return false, false, true
+}
+
+// validateGoogleTokens handles Google-specific token validation logic.
+// Currently delegates to standard token validation but provides a hook
+// for Google-specific validation requirements in the future.
+// Parameters:
+//   - session: The session data containing tokens to validate.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - authenticated: Whether the user has valid authentication.
+//   - needsRefresh: Whether tokens need to be refreshed.
+//   - expired: Whether tokens have expired and cannot be refreshed.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) validateGoogleTokens(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, bool) {
+	return t.validateStandardTokens(session)
+}
+
+// validateStandardTokens handles standard OIDC token validation logic.
+// This is the default validation method for generic OIDC providers.
+// It verifies ID tokens and handles access tokens appropriately.
+// Parameters:
+//   - session: The session data containing tokens to validate.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - authenticated: Whether the user has valid authentication.
+//   - needsRefresh: Whether tokens need to be refreshed.
+//   - expired: Whether tokens have expired and cannot be refreshed.
+//
+//nolint:gocognit,gocyclo // Complex validation logic handles multiple token scenarios and edge cases
+func (t *TraefikOidc) validateStandardTokens(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, bool) {
+	authenticated := session.GetAuthenticated()
+	// Removed debug output
+	if !authenticated {
+		t.logger.Debug("User is not authenticated according to session flag")
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("Session not authenticated, but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
+			return false, true, false
+		}
+		return false, false, false
+	}
+
+	accessToken := session.GetAccessToken()
+	// Removed debug output
+	if accessToken == "" {
+		t.logger.Debug("Authenticated flag set, but no access token found in session")
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			// Check if we have an ID token to determine if we're beyond grace period
+			// When access token is missing, check ID token expiry to determine if refresh is viable
+			idToken := session.GetIDToken()
+			t.logger.Debugf("Checking ID token for grace period: ID token present: %v", idToken != "")
+			if idToken != "" {
+				// Try to parse the ID token to check its expiry
+				parts := strings.Split(idToken, ".")
+				if len(parts) == 3 {
+					// Decode the claims part
+					claimsData, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+					if err == nil {
+						var claims map[string]interface{}
+						if err := json.Unmarshal(claimsData, &claims); err == nil {
+							if expClaim, ok := claims["exp"].(float64); ok {
+								expTime := time.Unix(int64(expClaim), 0)
+								if time.Now().After(expTime) {
+									expiredDuration := time.Since(expTime)
+									if expiredDuration > t.refreshGracePeriod {
+										t.logger.Debugf("ID token expired beyond grace period (%v > %v), must re-authenticate",
+											expiredDuration, t.refreshGracePeriod)
+										return false, false, true // expired, cannot refresh
+									}
+									t.logger.Debugf("ID token expired %v ago, within grace period %v, allowing refresh",
+										expiredDuration, t.refreshGracePeriod)
+								}
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			t.logger.Debug("Access token missing, but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
+			return false, true, false
+		}
+		return false, false, true
+	}
+
+	// Check if access token is opaque (doesn't have JWT structure)
+	dotCount := strings.Count(accessToken, ".")
+	isOpaqueToken := dotCount != 2
+
+	// For opaque access tokens, use introspection if available (RFC 7662 - Option C: Scenario 3)
+	if isOpaqueToken {
+		t.logger.Debugf("Access token appears to be opaque (dots: %d)", dotCount)
+
+		// Try introspection first if opaque tokens are allowed
+		if t.allowOpaqueTokens {
+			if err := t.validateOpaqueToken(accessToken); err != nil {
+				errMsg := err.Error()
+				t.logger.Infof("⚠️  Opaque access token validation via introspection failed: %v", err)
+
+				// Check if the token was explicitly marked as inactive/revoked/expired by the provider
+				// In these cases, we should NOT fall back to ID token - the provider has explicitly
+				// told us this token is no longer valid. We must refresh or re-authenticate.
+				isTokenInvalid := strings.Contains(errMsg, "token is not active") ||
+					strings.Contains(errMsg, "revoked") ||
+					strings.Contains(errMsg, "token has expired")
+
+				if isTokenInvalid {
+					t.logger.Infof("⚠️  Token explicitly marked as invalid by provider, cannot fall back to ID token")
+					if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+						t.logger.Debug("Refresh token available, attempting refresh")
+						return false, true, false
+					}
+					t.logger.Debug("No refresh token available, must re-authenticate")
+					return false, false, true
+				}
+
+				// If introspection required, reject the session
+				if t.requireTokenIntrospection {
+					t.logger.Errorf("❌ SECURITY: Opaque token rejected (introspection required but failed)")
+					if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+						return false, true, false
+					}
+					return false, false, true
+				}
+
+				// Only fall back to ID token validation for transient errors (network issues, etc.)
+				// where the introspection endpoint couldn't be reached
+				t.logger.Infof("⚠️  Falling back to ID token validation for opaque access token (transient error)")
+			} else {
+				// Introspection successful
+				t.logger.Debugf("✓ Opaque access token validated via introspection")
+				// Still need to check ID token for session expiry
+				idToken := session.GetIDToken()
+				if idToken != "" {
+					return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+				}
+				return true, false, false
+			}
+		} else {
+			// Opaque tokens not allowed - log warning and reject or fall back
+			t.logger.Infof("⚠️  Opaque access token detected but allowOpaqueTokens=false")
+		}
+
+		// Fall back to ID token validation
+		idToken := session.GetIDToken()
+		if idToken == "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("Opaque access token present but no ID token found")
+			if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+				t.logger.Debug("ID token missing but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
+				return false, true, false
+			}
+			// Accept session with opaque access token even without ID token
+			// The OAuth provider validated it when issued
+			t.logger.Debug("Accepting session with opaque access token")
+			return true, false, false
+		}
+
+		// Validate ID token if present
+		if err := t.verifyToken(idToken); err != nil {
+			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token has expired") {
+				t.logger.Debugf("ID token expired with opaque access token, needs refresh")
+				if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+					return false, true, false
+				}
+				return false, false, true
+			}
+
+			t.logger.Errorf("ID token verification failed with opaque access token: %v", err)
+			if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+				return false, true, false
+			}
+			return false, false, true
+		}
+
+		// Use ID token for expiry validation
+		return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+	}
+
+	// JWT access token present - validate it explicitly to detect Scenario 2
+	// (Option C: Scenario 2 detection and strict mode)
+	accessTokenValid := false
+	accessTokenError := ""
+
+	if err := t.verifyToken(accessToken); err != nil {
+		// Access token validation failed
+		accessTokenError = err.Error()
+
+		// Check if it's an audience validation failure (Scenario 2)
+		if strings.Contains(accessTokenError, "invalid audience") || strings.Contains(accessTokenError, "audience") {
+			// SCENARIO 2 DETECTED: Access token has wrong audience
+			t.logger.Infof("⚠️  SCENARIO 2 DETECTED: Access token validation failed due to audience mismatch: %v", err)
+
+			if t.strictAudienceValidation {
+				// Strict mode: Reject the session (don't fall back to ID token)
+				t.logger.Errorf("❌ SECURITY: Session rejected due to access token audience mismatch (strictAudienceValidation=true)")
+				t.logger.Errorf("❌ This prevents potential cross-API token confusion attacks (Auth0 Scenario 2)")
+				if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+					return false, true, false // try refresh
+				}
+				return false, false, true // must re-authenticate
+			}
+			// Backward compatibility mode: Log loud warning but allow fallback to ID token
+			t.logger.Infof("⚠️⚠️⚠️  SECURITY WARNING: Falling back to ID token validation despite access token audience mismatch!")
+			t.logger.Infof("⚠️  This could allow tokens intended for different APIs to grant access")
+			t.logger.Infof("⚠️  Set strictAudienceValidation=true to enforce proper audience validation")
+			t.logger.Infof("⚠️  See: https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/74")
+		} else if !strings.Contains(accessTokenError, "token has expired") {
+			// Other validation errors (not expiration, not audience)
+			t.logger.Debugf("Access token validation failed (non-expiration, non-audience): %v", err)
+		}
+	} else {
+		// Access token is valid
+		accessTokenValid = true
+	}
+
+	idToken := session.GetIDToken()
+	if idToken == "" {
+		if accessTokenValid {
+			// Access token is valid, no ID token needed
+			t.logger.Debug("Access token valid, no ID token present")
+			return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, accessToken)
+		}
+
+		t.logger.Debug("Authenticated flag set with access token, but no ID token found in session")
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("ID token missing but refresh token exists. Signaling conditional refresh to obtain ID token.")
+			return true, true, false
+		}
+		return true, false, false
+	}
+
+	// Validate ID token
+	if err := t.verifyToken(idToken); err != nil {
+		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token has expired") {
+			t.logger.Debugf("ID token signature/claims valid but token expired, needs refresh")
+			if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+				return false, true, false
+			}
+			return false, false, true
+		}
+
+		t.logger.Errorf("ID token verification failed (non-expiration): %v", err)
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("ID token verification failed, but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
+			return false, true, false
+		}
+		return false, false, true
+	}
+
+	// If access token was valid, use it for expiry; otherwise use ID token
+	if accessTokenValid {
+		return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, accessToken)
+	}
+
+	return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
+}
+
+// validateTokenExpiry checks if a token is nearing expiration and needs refresh.
+// It uses the configured grace period to determine when proactive refresh should occur.
+// Parameters:
+//   - session: The session data for refresh token availability.
+//   - token: The token to check expiry for.
+//
+// Returns:
+//   - authenticated: Whether the token is currently valid.
+//   - needsRefresh: Whether the token is nearing expiration and should be refreshed.
+//   - expired: Whether the token is invalid or verification failed.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) validateTokenExpiry(session *SessionData, token string) (bool, bool, bool) {
+	cachedClaims, found := t.tokenCache.Get(token)
+	if !found {
+		t.logger.Debug("Claims not found in cache after successful token verification")
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("Claims missing post-verification, attempting refresh to recover.")
+			return false, true, false
+		}
+		return false, false, true
+	}
+
+	expClaim, ok := cachedClaims["exp"].(float64)
+	if !ok {
+		t.logger.Error("Failed to get expiration time ('exp' claim) from verified token")
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debug("Token missing 'exp' claim, but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
+			return false, true, false
+		}
+		return false, false, true
+	}
+
+	expTime := int64(expClaim)
+	expTimeObj := time.Unix(expTime, 0)
+	nowObj := time.Now()
+
+	// Check if token has already expired
+	if expTimeObj.Before(nowObj) {
+		// Token has expired
+		expiredDuration := nowObj.Sub(expTimeObj)
+
+		t.logger.Debugf("Token expired %v ago, grace period is %v",
+			expiredDuration, t.refreshGracePeriod)
+
+		// If we have a refresh token, always attempt to use it regardless of grace period
+		// The refresh token has its own expiry and the provider will reject it if invalid
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			t.logger.Debugf("Token expired, attempting refresh with available refresh token")
+			return false, true, false // needs refresh
+		}
+
+		// No refresh token available - must re-authenticate
+		t.logger.Debugf("Token expired and no refresh token available, must re-authenticate")
+		return false, false, true // expired, cannot refresh
+	}
+
+	// Token not yet expired - check if nearing expiration
+	refreshThreshold := nowObj.Add(t.refreshGracePeriod)
+
+	t.logger.Debugf("Token expires at %v, now is %v, refresh threshold is %v",
+		expTimeObj.Format(time.RFC3339),
+		nowObj.Format(time.RFC3339),
+		refreshThreshold.Format(time.RFC3339))
+
+	if expTimeObj.Before(refreshThreshold) {
+		remainingSeconds := int64(time.Until(expTimeObj).Seconds())
+		t.logger.Debugf("Token nearing expiration (expires in %d seconds, grace period %s), scheduling proactive refresh",
+			remainingSeconds, t.refreshGracePeriod)
+
+		if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
+			return true, true, false
+		}
+
+		t.logger.Debugf("Token nearing expiration but no refresh token available, cannot proactively refresh.")
+		return true, false, false
+	}
+
+	t.logger.Debugf("Token is valid and not nearing expiration (expires in %d seconds, outside %s grace period)",
+		int64(time.Until(expTimeObj).Seconds()), t.refreshGracePeriod)
+
+	return true, false, false
+}
 
 // startTokenCleanup starts background cleanup goroutines for cache maintenance.
 // It runs periodic cleanup of token cache, JWK cache, and session chunks.

token_validation_rs.go

@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
-// Package traefikoidc provides OIDC authentication middleware for Traefik.
-// This file contains requestState-aware variants of the token validation
-// functions. They read session field values from the captured snapshot in
-// *requestState instead of calling session.GetX(), eliminating ~21 RLock
-// acquisitions on sd.sessionMutex per request through the validation path
-// (validateStandardTokens reads 17, validateAzureTokens reads 10,
-// validateTokenExpiry reads 4 — and many are the SAME field). Under Yaegi
-// each RLock costs ~1-5ms of interpreter dispatch.
-//
-// The non-RS variants are retained for paths that don't have a captured
-// snapshot (tests that drive the validators directly, the Azure/Google path
-// when reached without rs threading, etc).
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// isUserAuthenticatedRS is the requestState-aware variant of
-// isUserAuthenticated. Dispatches to the right per-provider validator based
-// on the configured provider, all of which read from rs instead of session.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) isUserAuthenticatedRS(rs *requestState) (bool, bool, bool) {
-	if t.isAzureProvider() {
-		return t.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
-	} else if t.isGoogleProvider() {
-		return t.validateGoogleTokensRS(rs)
-	}
-	return t.validateStandardTokensRS(rs)
-}
-
-// validateGoogleTokensRS handles Google-specific token validation. Currently
-// delegates to standard token validation; retained as a hook for any future
-// Google-specific behavior (matches the v1.0.20 layout of the non-RS variant).
-func (t *TraefikOidc) validateGoogleTokensRS(rs *requestState) (bool, bool, bool) {
-	return t.validateStandardTokensRS(rs)
-}
-
-// validateTokenExpiryRS is the requestState-aware variant of validateTokenExpiry.
-// Reads rs.refreshToken instead of session.GetRefreshToken() (4 RLocks avoided).
-func (t *TraefikOidc) validateTokenExpiryRS(rs *requestState, token string) (bool, bool, bool) {
-	cachedClaims, found := t.tokenCache.Get(token)
-	if !found {
-		t.logger.Debug("Claims not found in cache after successful token verification")
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, false, true
-	}
-
-	expClaim, ok := cachedClaims["exp"].(float64)
-	if !ok {
-		t.logger.Error("Failed to get expiration time ('exp' claim) from verified token")
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, false, true
-	}
-
-	expTimeObj := time.Unix(int64(expClaim), 0)
-	nowObj := time.Now()
-
-	if expTimeObj.Before(nowObj) {
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, false, true
-	}
-
-	refreshThreshold := nowObj.Add(t.refreshGracePeriod)
-	if expTimeObj.Before(refreshThreshold) {
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return true, true, false
-		}
-		return true, false, false
-	}
-
-	return true, false, false
-}
-
-// validateStandardTokensRS is the requestState-aware variant of
-// validateStandardTokens. Replaces all session.GetX() calls (17 of them in
-// the non-RS variant, dominated by GetRefreshToken called 11 times) with
-// rs field reads. Same control flow.
-//
-//nolint:gocognit,gocyclo // Mirrors validateStandardTokens complexity by design.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) validateStandardTokensRS(rs *requestState) (bool, bool, bool) {
-	if !rs.authenticated {
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, false, false
-	}
-
-	if rs.accessToken == "" {
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			// ID-token grace-period check (only when accessToken is absent).
-			if rs.idToken != "" {
-				parts := strings.Split(rs.idToken, ".")
-				if len(parts) == 3 {
-					if claimsData, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1]); err == nil {
-						var claims map[string]interface{}
-						if err := json.Unmarshal(claimsData, &claims); err == nil {
-							if expClaim, ok := claims["exp"].(float64); ok {
-								expTime := time.Unix(int64(expClaim), 0)
-								if time.Now().After(expTime) {
-									expiredDuration := time.Since(expTime)
-									if expiredDuration > t.refreshGracePeriod {
-										return false, false, true
-									}
-								}
-							}
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			}
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, false, true
-	}
-
-	dotCount := strings.Count(rs.accessToken, ".")
-	isOpaqueToken := dotCount != 2
-
-	if isOpaqueToken {
-		if t.allowOpaqueTokens {
-			if err := t.validateOpaqueToken(rs.accessToken); err != nil {
-				errMsg := err.Error()
-				isTokenInvalid := strings.Contains(errMsg, "token is not active") ||
-					strings.Contains(errMsg, "revoked") ||
-					strings.Contains(errMsg, "token has expired")
-				if isTokenInvalid {
-					if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-						return false, true, false
-					}
-					return false, false, true
-				}
-				if t.requireTokenIntrospection {
-					if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-						return false, true, false
-					}
-					return false, false, true
-				}
-				// Transient introspection error: fall through to ID-token validation.
-			} else {
-				// Introspection succeeded.
-				if rs.idToken != "" {
-					return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-				}
-				return true, false, false
-			}
-		}
-
-		// Fall back to ID-token validation when opaque + no successful introspection.
-		if rs.idToken == "" {
-			if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-				return false, true, false
-			}
-			return true, false, false
-		}
-		if err := t.verifyToken(rs.idToken); err != nil {
-			if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token has expired") {
-				if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-					return false, true, false
-				}
-				return false, false, true
-			}
-			if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-				return false, true, false
-			}
-			return false, false, true
-		}
-		return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-	}
-
-	// JWT access token present.
-	accessTokenValid := false
-	if err := t.verifyToken(rs.accessToken); err != nil {
-		errMsg := err.Error()
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "invalid audience") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "audience") {
-			if t.strictAudienceValidation {
-				if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-					return false, true, false
-				}
-				return false, false, true
-			}
-			// Fall through to ID-token validation.
-		}
-	} else {
-		accessTokenValid = true
-	}
-
-	if rs.idToken == "" {
-		if accessTokenValid {
-			return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.accessToken)
-		}
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return true, true, false
-		}
-		return true, false, false
-	}
-
-	if err := t.verifyToken(rs.idToken); err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token has expired") {
-			if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-				return false, true, false
-			}
-			return false, false, true
-		}
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, false, true
-	}
-
-	if accessTokenValid {
-		return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.accessToken)
-	}
-	return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-}
-
-// validateAzureTokensRS is the requestState-aware variant of validateAzureTokens.
-// Eliminates 10 session.GetX() RLocks per Azure-path request.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) validateAzureTokensRS(rs *requestState) (bool, bool, bool) {
-	if !rs.authenticated {
-		if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-			return false, true, false
-		}
-		return false, true, false
-	}
-
-	if rs.accessToken != "" {
-		if strings.Count(rs.accessToken, ".") == 2 {
-			if t.isUnverifiableAzureAccessToken(rs.accessToken) {
-				if rs.idToken != "" {
-					if err := t.verifyToken(rs.idToken); err != nil {
-						if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-							return false, true, false
-						}
-						return false, false, true
-					}
-					return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-				}
-				return true, false, false
-			}
-			if err := t.verifyToken(rs.accessToken); err != nil {
-				if rs.idToken != "" {
-					if err := t.verifyToken(rs.idToken); err != nil {
-						if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-							return false, true, false
-						}
-						return false, false, true
-					}
-					return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-				}
-				if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-					return false, true, false
-				}
-				return false, false, true
-			}
-			return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.accessToken)
-		}
-		// Opaque access token.
-		if rs.idToken != "" {
-			return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-		}
-		return true, false, false
-	}
-
-	if rs.idToken != "" {
-		if err := t.verifyToken(rs.idToken); err != nil {
-			if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-				return false, true, false
-			}
-			return false, false, true
-		}
-		return t.validateTokenExpiryRS(rs, rs.idToken)
-	}
-
-	if rs.refreshToken != "" {
-		return false, true, false
-	}
-	return false, false, true
-}

types.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"text/template"
 	"time"
 
@@ -65,46 +64,8 @@ type ProviderMetadata struct {
 // It integrates with various OIDC providers, manages sessions, caches tokens, and handles
 // the complete authentication flow. It's designed to work seamlessly with Traefik's
 // plugin system and provides flexible configuration options.
-// MetadataSnapshot is an immutable bundle of provider-metadata URLs that the
-// plugin needs on the hot request path. Published atomically via
-// TraefikOidc.metadataSnapshot; readers do exactly one atomic.Value.Load to
-// access all fields. Replaces 3 per-request metadataMu.RLock acquisitions
-// in middleware.ServeHTTP + token_manager paths, each of which paid
-// 1-5ms of Yaegi-dispatch overhead.
-//
-// The fields are a strict subset of the metadataMu-guarded TraefikOidc
-// fields; the legacy fields are still written under metadataMu for
-// less-frequent code paths that have not been migrated.
-type MetadataSnapshot struct {
-	IssuerURL        string
-	JWKSURL          string
-	TokenURL         string
-	AuthURL          string
-	RevocationURL    string
-	EndSessionURL    string
-	IntrospectionURL string
-	RegistrationURL  string
-}
-
 type TraefikOidc struct {
-	// metadataSnapshot atomically publishes the read-mostly URL bundle.
+	lastMetadataRetryTime      time.Time
-	// Hot-path readers (middleware.ServeHTTP, token verification) load it
-	// directly; less-frequent paths still acquire metadataMu.RLock and
-	// read the individual fields below.
-	metadataSnapshot           atomic.Value
-	// lastMetadataRetryNano is the UnixNano timestamp of the last metadata
-	// recovery attempt. Stored atomically so the hot ServeHTTP path can
-	// throttle retries without acquiring metadataRetryMutex on every request.
-	lastMetadataRetryNano      int64
-	// firstRequestStarted is 0 until the very first non-health request fires
-	// the background-task bootstrap; then it flips to 1 via CAS. Replaces the
-	// firstRequestMutex + firstRequestReceived combo which previously took
-	// a write lock on every non-health request forever.
-	firstRequestStarted        int32
-	// metadataRefreshStartedAtomic is the CAS-only variant of the old
-	// metadataRefreshStarted bool. Both flags live under the same atomic so
-	// concurrent first-request goroutines race exactly once.
-	metadataRefreshStartedAtomic int32
 	jwkCache                   JWKCacheInterface
 	jwtVerifier                JWTVerifier
 	ctx                        context.Context
@@ -165,18 +126,21 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	frontchannelLogoutPath     string
 	scopesSupported            []string
 	scopes                     []string
-	extraAuthParams            map[string]string
 	refreshGracePeriod         time.Duration
 	maxRefreshTokenAge         time.Duration
 	metadataMu                 sync.RWMutex
 	shutdownOnce               sync.Once
+	metadataRetryMutex         sync.Mutex
+	firstRequestMutex          sync.Mutex
 	sessionInvalidationCache   CacheInterface
 	refreshResultCache         CacheInterface
 	minimalHeaders             bool
 	stripAuthCookies           bool
 	enableBackchannelLogout    bool
 	enableFrontchannelLogout   bool
+	firstRequestReceived       bool
 	requireTokenIntrospection  bool
+	metadataRefreshStarted     bool
 	allowPrivateIPAddresses    bool
 	disableReplayDetection     bool
 	allowOpaqueTokens          bool
@@ -185,6 +149,7 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	enablePKCE                 bool
 	forceHTTPS                 bool
 	suppressDiagnosticLogs     bool
+	trustForwardedURI          bool
 
 	// Bearer-auth runtime state (populated only when EnableBearerAuth=true).
 	bearerIdentifierClaim     string

universal_cache.go

@@ -396,16 +396,8 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) getLocal(key string) (interface{}, bool) {
 			return value, true
 		}
 		c.mu.RUnlock()
-		// Expired — return miss immediately. The periodic cleanup goroutine
+		// Expired — fall through to the write-locked slow path below to
-		// will evict the stale entry. NEVER fall through to the write-locked
+		// remove the entry under exclusive access.
-		// slow path for Token/JWK/Session caches: under Yaegi the write Lock
-		// at line 403 costs 10-100ms per acquisition, and Go's RWMutex
-		// writer-priority semantics block ALL new RLock callers while a Lock
-		// is pending. A single expired-token event turns every concurrent
-		// request from read-parallel into write-serialized — the exact
-		// convoy that produced the 737-goroutine pileup at 0x400275a608.
-		atomic.AddInt64(&c.misses, 1)
-		return nil, false
 	}
 
 	c.mu.Lock()
@@ -603,28 +595,15 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) removeItem(key string, item *CacheItem) {
 
 // evictOldest evicts the oldest item from the cache (must be called with lock held)
 func (c *UniversalCache) evictOldest() {
-	elem := c.lruList.Back()
+	if elem := c.lruList.Back(); elem != nil {
-	if elem == nil {
+		key, _ := elem.Value.(string) // Safe to ignore: cache internal type assertion
-		return
+		if item, exists := c.items[key]; exists {
-	}
+			c.removeItem(key, item)
-	key, _ := elem.Value.(string) // Safe to ignore: cache internal type assertion
+			atomic.AddInt64(&c.evictions, 1)
-	if item, exists := c.items[key]; exists && item.element == elem {
+			if c.logger.IsDebug() {
-		c.removeItem(key, item)
+				c.logger.Debugf("UniversalCache[%s]: Evicted key=%s", c.config.Type, key)
-		atomic.AddInt64(&c.evictions, 1)
+			}
-		if c.logger.IsDebug() {
-			c.logger.Debugf("UniversalCache[%s]: Evicted key=%s", c.config.Type, key)
 		}
-		return
-	}
-	// Defensive forward-progress guard: the back node is dangling — its key is
-	// absent from c.items, or c.items[key] points at a newer node (a stale
-	// duplicate). Drop the node directly so an eviction loop
-	// (`for ... && c.lruList.Len() > 0`) is guaranteed to terminate and can
-	// never spin holding c.mu.Lock(). With the updateLocalCache replace-in-place
-	// fix this branch should be unreachable, but it makes the spin impossible.
-	c.lruList.Remove(elem)
-	if c.currentSize > 0 {
-		c.currentSize--
 	}
 }
 
@@ -957,19 +936,6 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) updateLocalCache(key string, value interface{}, ttl tim
 	}
 
 	now := time.Now()
-
-	// Replace any existing entry in place. Without this, a repeat populate of
-	// the same key (the per-request Get->backend-hit path at line ~359)
-	// PushFronts a second list node and overwrites c.items[key], orphaning the
-	// previous node. Orphans inflate currentMemory/currentSize and — once the
-	// eviction loop deletes the key — leave Back() nodes whose key is absent
-	// from c.items, so evictOldest() no-ops while lruList.Len()>0 stays true:
-	// an infinite loop while holding c.mu.Lock(), i.e. the 100%-CPU holder and
-	// write-lock convoy. setLocal already dedups on this path; this mirrors it.
-	if existing, ok := c.items[key]; ok {
-		c.removeItem(key, existing)
-	}
-
 	item := &CacheItem{
 		Key:          key,
 		Value:        value,

universal_cache_orphan_test.go

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// newOrphanTestCache builds a Token-type cache with background cleanup disabled
-// so the test fully controls lruList/items state.
-func newOrphanTestCache(maxMem int64) *UniversalCache {
-	return NewUniversalCache(UniversalCacheConfig{
-		Type:              CacheTypeToken,
-		DefaultTTL:        time.Hour,
-		MaxSize:           1_000_000, // large: keep the size-branch out of the way
-		MaxMemoryBytes:    maxMem,
-		EnableMemoryLimit: maxMem > 0,
-		SkipAutoCleanup:   true,
-		EnableAutoCleanup: false,
-	})
-}
-
-// TestUpdateLocalCache_NoOrphanElements is the direct red test: repeatedly
-// populating the SAME key via updateLocalCache (the per-request Get->backend-hit
-// path) must NOT leave dangling lruList elements. Today updateLocalCache blindly
-// PushFronts + overwrites c.items[key] without removing the prior element, so the
-// list grows one orphan per call while items stays at 1 entry.
-func TestUpdateLocalCache_NoOrphanElements(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newOrphanTestCache(0) // memory limit off: isolate the orphan, no eviction
-	const key = "same-key"
-
-	for range 5 {
-		if err := c.updateLocalCache(key, "v", time.Hour); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("updateLocalCache: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	c.mu.RLock()
-	listLen := c.lruList.Len()
-	itemCount := len(c.items)
-	c.mu.RUnlock()
-
-	if itemCount != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("items: got %d want 1", itemCount)
-	}
-	if listLen != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("ORPHAN BUG: lruList.Len()=%d but items=%d (one list element per key expected)", listLen, itemCount)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestUpdateLocalCache_EvictionTerminates is the convoy reproducer: once orphans
-// for a key exist and the memory-eviction loop runs, evictOldest() deletes the
-// key from items on the first eviction, after which every remaining orphan at
-// Back() has a key absent from items -> evictOldest() no-ops while lruList.Len()>0
-// stays true -> infinite loop while holding c.mu.Lock(). That is the 100%-CPU
-// holder + write-lock convoy observed in pprof.
-func TestUpdateLocalCache_EvictionTerminates(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newOrphanTestCache(0) // start with memory limit OFF to accumulate orphans
-	const key = "same-key"
-
-	// Build 3 same-key list elements (3 orphans, items={key}).
-	for range 3 {
-		if err := c.updateLocalCache(key, "v", time.Hour); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("seed updateLocalCache: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Arm the trap: tiny memory limit so the next call enters the eviction loop.
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	c.config.MaxMemoryBytes = 1
-	c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	done := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		_ = c.updateLocalCache(key, "v", time.Hour) // triggers the eviction loop
-		close(done)
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-done:
-		// fix present: loop made forward progress and returned
-	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("INFINITE LOOP: eviction loop did not terminate within 2s (orphan whose key was deleted is never removed from lruList)")
-	}
-}

url_helpers.go

@@ -146,21 +146,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildAuthURL(redirectURL, state, nonce, codeChallenge stri
 		t.logger.Debugf("TraefikOidc.buildAuthURL: Final scope string being sent to OIDC provider: %s", finalScopeString)
 	}
 
-	// Apply operator-configured extra authorization parameters (e.g.
-	// screen_hint, login_hint, ui_locales, prompt). These are added last but
-	// can never override parameters the plugin itself manages (client_id,
-	// state, nonce, redirect_uri, code_challenge, scope, response_type, ...):
-	// a key already present in params is left untouched, so this cannot
-	// weaken security-critical parameters.
-	for key, value := range t.extraAuthParams {
-		if params.Get(key) == "" {
-			params.Set(key, value)
-			t.logger.Debugf("TraefikOidc.buildAuthURL: Added extra auth param %s", key)
-		} else {
-			t.logger.Debugf("TraefikOidc.buildAuthURL: Skipped extra auth param %s (already set by plugin)", key)
-		}
-	}
-
 	// Read authURL with RLock
 	t.metadataMu.RLock()
 	authURL := t.authURL

url_helpers_ultra_test.go

@@ -554,54 +554,3 @@ func TestForceHTTPSIntegration(t *testing.T) {
 			"should use https from X-Forwarded-Proto when forceHTTPS is false")
 	})
 }
-
-// TestBuildAuthURLExtraAuthParams verifies operator-configured extra
-// authorization parameters are appended to the authorization URL, and that
-// they can never override parameters the plugin itself manages.
-func TestBuildAuthURLExtraAuthParams(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("extra params are added (e.g. screen_hint=signup)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-		middleware.extraAuthParams = map[string]string{
-			"screen_hint": "signup",
-			"ui_locales":  "en",
-		}
-
-		authURL := middleware.buildAuthURL(
-			"https://app.com/callback", "state123", "nonce456", "",
-		)
-
-		assert.Contains(t, authURL, "screen_hint=signup")
-		assert.Contains(t, authURL, "ui_locales=en")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("nil/empty extraAuthParams is a no-op", func(t *testing.T) {
-		middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-		// extraAuthParams left nil
-		authURL := middleware.buildAuthURL(
-			"https://app.com/callback", "state123", "nonce456", "",
-		)
-
-		assert.Contains(t, authURL, "client_id=test-client")
-		assert.NotContains(t, authURL, "screen_hint")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("extra params CANNOT override plugin-managed params", func(t *testing.T) {
-		middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-		middleware.extraAuthParams = map[string]string{
-			"client_id":     "ATTACKER",
-			"state":         "ATTACKER",
-			"redirect_uri":  "https://evil.example.com",
-			"response_type": "token",
-		}
-
-		authURL := middleware.buildAuthURL(
-			"https://app.com/callback", "state123", "nonce456", "",
-		)
-
-		// Plugin-managed values must win; injected values must be absent.
-		assert.Contains(t, authURL, "client_id=test-client")
-		assert.NotContains(t, authURL, "ATTACKER")
-		assert.NotContains(t, authURL, "evil.example.com")
-		assert.Contains(t, authURL, "response_type=code")
-	})
-}

utilities.go

@@ -14,19 +14,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-// metadataSnap returns the most recently published *MetadataSnapshot, or nil
-// if metadata has not yet been resolved. Single atomic.Value.Load — the hot
-// ServeHTTP path uses this instead of acquiring metadataMu.RLock, which under
-// Yaegi pays 1-5ms of interpreter-dispatch overhead per acquisition.
-func (t *TraefikOidc) metadataSnap() *MetadataSnapshot {
-	v := t.metadataSnapshot.Load()
-	if v == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	s, _ := v.(*MetadataSnapshot)
-	return s
-}
-
 // safeLogDebug provides nil-safe logging for debug messages
 func (t *TraefikOidc) safeLogDebug(msg string) {
 	if t.logger != nil {

vendor/github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry/.gitignore

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-.docs

vendor/github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry/.golangci.yml

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-version: "2"
-
-run:
-  timeout: 2m
-
-linters:
-  default: none
-  enable:
-    - bodyclose
-    - errcheck
-    - errorlint
-    - gocritic
-    - gocyclo
-    - govet
-    - ineffassign
-    - misspell
-    - prealloc
-    - revive
-    - staticcheck
-    - unconvert
-    - unused
-  settings:
-    gocyclo:
-      min-complexity: 12
-    revive:
-      rules:
-        - name: var-naming
-        - name: indent-error-flow
-        - name: superfluous-else
-        - name: unused-parameter
-        - name: redefines-builtin-id
-
-formatters:
-  enable:
-    - gofmt
-    - goimports

vendor/github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry/.semver.yaml

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Configuration for lukaszraczylo/semver-generator.
-# Reference: https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/semver-generator
-#
-# Word matching is fuzzy + case-insensitive. The keywords below mirror the
-# Conventional Commits prefixes used in this repo's git history. Same pattern
-# as github.com/lukaszraczylo/go-telegram/.semver.yaml.
-
-version: 1
-
-# Respect existing v* tags as the version baseline. semver-generator finds
-# the highest existing tag and bumps from there. With no tags yet, the first
-# release computes from the empty base.
-force:
-  existing: true
-
-# Skip merge commits and machine-generated traffic that would otherwise
-# spuriously bump the version.
-blacklist:
-  - "Merge branch"
-  - "Merge pull request"
-  - "Merge remote-tracking branch"
-  - "go mod tidy"
-
-wording:
-  patch:
-    - "fix"
-    - "chore"
-    - "docs"
-    - "test"
-    - "style"
-    - "refactor"
-    - "build"
-    - "ci"
-    - "perf"
-  minor:
-    - "feat"
-  major:
-    # Match only the canonical Conventional Commits trailer. The bare word
-    # "breaking" is too greedy under semver-generator's fuzzy match — it
-    # triggers on substrings inside a commit body and wrongly produces a
-    # major bump.
-    - "BREAKING CHANGE"

vendor/github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry/README.md

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-# oss-telemetry
-
-A tiny Go client that fires one anonymous "this binary started" ping at a
-central ingest endpoint. Designed to be embedded in your own open-source
-projects so you can see approximate adoption and version spread without
-collecting anything that could identify a user.
-
-This is the **client library only**. The ingest endpoint, server-side
-deduplication, rate limiting, and metrics are out of scope here.
-
-## What it sends
-
-A single HTTP `POST` per call to `Send`:
-
-```json
-{
-  "project": "my-tool",
-  "version": "1.2.3",
-  "ts": 1747782200
-}
-```
-
-No identifiers, no IP, no machine info, no user data. The server dedupes
-incoming requests; the client just fires and forgets.
-
-## Failproof by design
-
-- Never blocks the caller — work runs in a goroutine.
-- Never panics — the goroutine recovers internally.
-- Never returns errors — bad input and network failures are silently dropped.
-- Never retries, never persists state, never reads back.
-- 2-second hard timeout on every request.
-- Zero third-party dependencies (Go stdlib only).
-
-The endpoint is hardcoded and not overridable from consuming code, by design.
-
-## Install
-
-```bash
-go get github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry
-```
-
-Requires Go 1.22+.
-
-## Usage
-
-```go
-package main
-
-import (
-    "time"
-
-    telemetry "github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry"
-)
-
-const version = "1.2.3"
-
-func main() {
-    telemetry.Send("my-tool", version)
-
-    // ... your program runs ...
-
-    // Only needed for short-lived CLIs that may exit before the goroutine
-    // finishes its POST. Long-running services do not need this.
-    telemetry.Wait(2 * time.Second)
-}
-```
-
-Call `Send` once at boot. Calling it more often just sends more pings; the
-server deduplicates.
-
-## Disabling telemetry
-
-If you ship a binary that imports this library, link your users to this
-section (`https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry#disabling-telemetry`)
-so they can find the opt-out paths.
-
-Any one of these turns it off:
-
-| Mechanism                                | How                                                              |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Universal opt-out                        | `DO_NOT_TRACK=1`                                                 |
-| Library-wide opt-out                     | `OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1`                                       |
-| Project-specific opt-out                 | `<UPPER_PROJECT>_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`                            |
-| Programmatic (e.g. behind a `--no-telemetry` flag) | `telemetry.Disable()` before the first `Send`          |
-
-Project-specific env var derivation: uppercase the project name and replace
-`-` with `_`. For `my-tool` the variable is `MY_TOOL_DISABLE_TELEMETRY`.
-
-Truthy values: `1`, `true`, `yes`, `on` (case-insensitive). Anything else is
-treated as "not set".
-
-## Validation rules (silently dropped if violated)
-
-- `project`: matches `^[a-z0-9-]+$`, length 1–64.
-- `version`: matches `^[A-Za-z0-9.+_-]+$`, length 1–32.
-
-Bad input is a no-op — the library never logs, never errors, never crashes.
-
-## API
-
-```go
-// Fire a single ping in the background. Returns immediately.
-func Send(project, version string)
-
-// Suppress all subsequent Send calls in this process. Idempotent.
-func Disable()
-
-// Block until in-flight pings complete or timeout elapses, whichever first.
-// Useful for short-lived CLI processes.
-func Wait(timeout time.Duration)
-```
-
-## Testing
-
-```bash
-go test -race ./...
-```
-
-## License
-
-Pick one before publishing. None bundled.

vendor/github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry/telemetry.go

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-// Package telemetry sends anonymous usage pings for open-source Go projects.
-//
-// Wire format (POST application/json):
-//
-//	{"project":"<name>","version":"<ver>","ts":<unix-seconds>}
-//
-// Design contract (failproof):
-//   - never blocks the caller (work happens in a goroutine)
-//   - never panics (background goroutine recovers internally)
-//   - never returns errors (silently no-ops on bad input or network failure)
-//   - never retries, never deduplicates, never persists state — the client
-//     fires a single ping and forgets; the server is responsible for
-//     deduplication, abuse protection, and aggregation
-//
-// Typical usage at program startup:
-//
-//	telemetry.Send("my-tool", "1.2.3")
-//
-// For short-lived CLI processes that may exit before the goroutine finishes:
-//
-//	telemetry.Send("my-tool", "1.2.3")
-//	defer telemetry.Wait(2 * time.Second)
-//
-// Disablement (any one of these suppresses pings):
-//   - environment variable DO_NOT_TRACK=1
-//   - environment variable OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
-//   - environment variable <UPPER_PROJECT>_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1
-//     (project name uppercased, dashes replaced with underscores)
-//   - calling telemetry.Disable() at runtime
-package telemetry
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"net/http"
-	"os"
-	"runtime/debug"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"time"
-)
-
-const (
-	defaultEndpoint = "https://oss.raczylo.com/v1/ping"
-	httpTimeout     = 2 * time.Second
-	maxProjectLen   = 64
-	maxVersionLen   = 32
-)
-
-// Yaegi note: this package is consumed by the traefikoidc Traefik plugin, which
-// Traefik interprets with Yaegi (it vendors and interprets dependency source).
-// It therefore avoids generic stdlib types (atomic.Pointer[T], atomic.Bool) and
-// range-over-int (Go 1.22), which some Traefik/Yaegi runtimes cannot interpret.
-// Endpoint mutation uses a mutex-guarded string; the disabled flag uses the
-// function-based sync/atomic int32 API (atomic.LoadInt32/StoreInt32).
-var (
-	// endpointURL holds the ingest URL. Production code never mutates it; the
-	// setter exists only so the test suite can retarget it at httptest servers
-	// while goroutines started by Send are still in flight.
-	endpointMu  sync.RWMutex
-	endpointURL = defaultEndpoint
-
-	disabled int32 // 0 = enabled, 1 = disabled; accessed via sync/atomic only
-	inflight sync.WaitGroup
-
-	client = &http.Client{Timeout: httpTimeout}
-)
-
-func currentEndpoint() string {
-	endpointMu.RLock()
-	defer endpointMu.RUnlock()
-	return endpointURL
-}
-
-func setEndpointURL(u string) {
-	endpointMu.Lock()
-	endpointURL = u
-	endpointMu.Unlock()
-}
-
-// Send fires a single anonymous telemetry ping in the background and returns
-// immediately. It never blocks, never panics, and never reports errors.
-// Invalid inputs, disabled state, and network failures are silently dropped.
-//
-// Version strings are validated against a SemVer-ish shape that mirrors the
-// receiver. An optional leading "v" or "V" is accepted and stripped before
-// transmission so that callers can pass either "v1.2.3" or "1.2.3"; the
-// wire form is always the unprefixed canonical version.
-//
-// Call once at program startup. Calling repeatedly will send repeated pings;
-// the server is responsible for deduplication.
-func Send(project, version string) {
-	if atomic.LoadInt32(&disabled) != 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	if isDisabledByEnv(project) {
-		return
-	}
-	if !validProject(project) || !validVersion(version) {
-		return
-	}
-	canonical := normalizeVersion(version)
-
-	inflight.Add(1)
-	go func() {
-		defer inflight.Done()
-		defer func() { _ = recover() }()
-		dispatch(project, canonical)
-	}()
-}
-
-// SendForModule is the recommended call form for Go libraries: it resolves
-// the version automatically from Go's build info for the given module path
-// so consumers do not need to maintain a hand-bumped version constant in
-// source. Behaviour and contract are otherwise identical to [Send].
-//
-// Resolution order:
-//
-//  1. debug.ReadBuildInfo Deps entry for modulePath (authoritative when the
-//     library is consumed via go.mod);
-//  2. debug.ReadBuildInfo Main when the library is itself the main module
-//     (e.g. running its own tests or examples);
-//  3. fallback parameter, used only when build info is unavailable or
-//     unhelpful (replace directives, detached `go run`, ldflag override).
-//
-// Any leading "v" reported by build info is stripped to match the canonical
-// wire form. Empty / "(devel)" build versions are skipped in favour of the
-// next resolution source. Typical usage:
-//
-//	telemetry.SendForModule("my-tool", "github.com/me/my-tool", "0.0.0-dev")
-func SendForModule(project, modulePath, fallback string) {
-	Send(project, ResolveModuleVersion(modulePath, fallback))
-}
-
-// ResolveModuleVersion implements the version resolution used by
-// SendForModule. Exposed for callers that need to format the resolved
-// version (e.g. logging) without firing a ping.
-func ResolveModuleVersion(modulePath, fallback string) string {
-	if info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo(); ok {
-		for _, d := range info.Deps {
-			if d != nil && d.Path == modulePath && isUsableBuildVersion(d.Version) {
-				return strings.TrimPrefix(d.Version, "v")
-			}
-		}
-		if info.Main.Path == modulePath && isUsableBuildVersion(info.Main.Version) {
-			return strings.TrimPrefix(info.Main.Version, "v")
-		}
-	}
-	return fallback
-}
-
-func isUsableBuildVersion(v string) bool {
-	return v != "" && v != "(devel)"
-}
-
-// Disable suppresses all subsequent Send calls in this process.
-// Idempotent and safe to call from any goroutine.
-func Disable() {
-	atomic.StoreInt32(&disabled, 1)
-}
-
-// Wait blocks until all in-flight pings have completed, or until timeout
-// elapses — whichever comes first. Useful for short-lived CLI processes
-// that may otherwise exit before the background goroutine finishes its POST.
-//
-// A non-positive timeout returns immediately.
-func Wait(timeout time.Duration) {
-	if timeout <= 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	done := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		inflight.Wait()
-		close(done)
-	}()
-	select {
-	case <-done:
-	case <-time.After(timeout):
-	}
-}
-
-func dispatch(project, version string) {
-	body := buildPayload(project, version, time.Now().Unix())
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), httpTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, currentEndpoint(), bytes.NewReader(body))
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
-	resp, err := client.Do(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	_ = resp.Body.Close()
-}
-
-// buildPayload writes the JSON body without encoding/json. The validators
-// restrict project and version to characters that never require JSON
-// escaping, so direct concatenation is safe.
-func buildPayload(project, version string, ts int64) []byte {
-	// Wrapper text plus 20 chars for a signed int64.
-	const overhead = len(`{"project":"","version":"","ts":}`) + 20
-	buf := make([]byte, 0, len(project)+len(version)+overhead)
-	buf = append(buf, `{"project":"`...)
-	buf = append(buf, project...)
-	buf = append(buf, `","version":"`...)
-	buf = append(buf, version...)
-	buf = append(buf, `","ts":`...)
-	buf = strconv.AppendInt(buf, ts, 10)
-	buf = append(buf, '}')
-	return buf
-}
-
-func validProject(p string) bool {
-	n := len(p)
-	if n == 0 || n > maxProjectLen {
-		return false
-	}
-	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
-		c := p[i]
-		switch {
-		case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z',
-			c >= '0' && c <= '9',
-			c == '-':
-		default:
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// validVersion accepts SemVer-ish version strings with an optional leading
-// "v"/"V" prefix. Acceptable shape (after stripping the leading v):
-//
-//	MAJOR[.MINOR[.PATCH]] ("-"prerelease)? ("+"build)?
-//
-// where MAJOR/MINOR/PATCH are ASCII digit sequences and the prerelease/build
-// payloads are non-empty runs of [0-9A-Za-z.-]. This intentionally mirrors
-// the receiver's version regex so junk like "dev" or "git-2026-05-22" never
-// leaves the client (where it would only be rejected with HTTP 400 anyway).
-func validVersion(v string) bool {
-	n := len(v)
-	if n == 0 || n > maxVersionLen {
-		return false
-	}
-	if v[0] == 'v' || v[0] == 'V' {
-		v = v[1:]
-	}
-	if len(v) == 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-	return checkSemverShape(v)
-}
-
-// normalizeVersion strips an optional leading "v"/"V" so the on-the-wire
-// version matches the form stored server-side by the version refresher cron
-// (which also strips the leading v from release tags). Callers may pass
-// either "v1.2.3" or "1.2.3" — only the unprefixed form is transmitted.
-func normalizeVersion(v string) string {
-	if len(v) > 0 && (v[0] == 'v' || v[0] == 'V') {
-		return v[1:]
-	}
-	return v
-}
-
-func checkSemverShape(s string) bool {
-	i := 0
-	if !readDigitRun(s, &i) {
-		return false
-	}
-	for groups := 0; groups < 2 && i < len(s) && s[i] == '.'; groups++ {
-		i++
-		if !readDigitRun(s, &i) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	if i < len(s) && s[i] == '-' {
-		i++
-		if !readIdentRun(s, &i, '+') {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	if i < len(s) && s[i] == '+' {
-		i++
-		if !readIdentRun(s, &i, 0) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return i == len(s)
-}
-
-func readDigitRun(s string, i *int) bool {
-	start := *i
-	for *i < len(s) && s[*i] >= '0' && s[*i] <= '9' {
-		*i++
-	}
-	return *i > start
-}
-
-// readIdentRun consumes [0-9A-Za-z.-] until end-of-string or until `stop`
-// is hit (stop=0 disables the early-stop check). Returns false if no
-// characters were consumed (i.e. empty payload).
-func readIdentRun(s string, i *int, stop byte) bool {
-	start := *i
-	for *i < len(s) {
-		c := s[*i]
-		if stop != 0 && c == stop {
-			break
-		}
-		valid := (c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
-			(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ||
-			(c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
-			c == '.' || c == '-'
-		if !valid {
-			return false
-		}
-		*i++
-	}
-	return *i > start
-}
-
-func isDisabledByEnv(project string) bool {
-	if truthy(os.Getenv("DO_NOT_TRACK")) {
-		return true
-	}
-	if truthy(os.Getenv("OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED")) {
-		return true
-	}
-	if project == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	key := projectEnvKey(project)
-	return truthy(os.Getenv(key))
-}
-
-// projectEnvKey returns "<UPPER_PROJECT>_DISABLE_TELEMETRY" using a single
-// allocation rather than chained strings.ToUpper(strings.ReplaceAll(...)).
-func projectEnvKey(project string) string {
-	const suffix = "_DISABLE_TELEMETRY"
-	buf := make([]byte, 0, len(project)+len(suffix))
-	for i := 0; i < len(project); i++ {
-		c := project[i]
-		switch {
-		case c == '-':
-			c = '_'
-		case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z':
-			c -= 'a' - 'A'
-		}
-		buf = append(buf, c)
-	}
-	buf = append(buf, suffix...)
-	return string(buf)
-}
-
-func truthy(s string) bool {
-	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s)) {
-	case "1", "true", "yes", "on":
-		return true
-	}
-	return false
-}

vendor/modules.txt

@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ github.com/gorilla/securecookie
 # github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0
 ## explicit; go 1.20
 github.com/gorilla/sessions
-# github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry v0.2.3
-## explicit; go 1.22
-github.com/lukaszraczylo/oss-telemetry
 # github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0
 ## explicit
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib/difflib

version.go

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-// devPluginVersion is the placeholder carried by source-tree / local / test
-// builds. Telemetry is suppressed while the plugin still reports this sentinel,
-// so only stamped release builds emit a "plugin loaded" ping.
-const devPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"
-
-// traefikoidcPluginVersion is the released version of this plugin. It is stamped
-// at release time by ./workflow-prepare.sh (invoked by the shared go-release
-// workflow before GoReleaser builds and tags), which rewrites the string below
-// to the computed semver.
-//
-// Traefik runs this plugin under Yaegi, where the version cannot be resolved
-// from build info at runtime (debug.ReadBuildInfo sees Traefik's build graph,
-// not the interpreted plugin). This build-stamped constant is therefore the
-// single source of truth for the version reported by anonymous usage telemetry.
-const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.25"

workflow-prepare.sh

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-#
-# workflow-prepare.sh — stamp the release version into version.go at build time.
-#
-# The shared go-release workflow (lukaszraczylo/shared-actions go-release.yaml)
-# runs this script, if present, from the repository root BEFORE GoReleaser
-# builds and tags. Traefik runs this plugin under Yaegi, where the version
-# cannot be resolved from build info at runtime, so the released semver must be
-# baked into source here.
-#
-# Version source — first non-empty wins:
-#   $VERSION  $VERSION_TAG  $SEMVER  $NEW_VERSION  $RELEASE_VERSION
-# A leading "v"/"V" is stripped.
-#
-# NOTE: go-release.yaml @main does not yet pass the computed version into this
-# step's environment. Add it to the "Run workflow prepare script" step, e.g.:
-#   env:
-#     VERSION: ${{ needs.version.outputs.version }}   # bare, no leading v
-#
-# The shared workflow runs this script in its test, version AND release jobs,
-# but only the release job has a computed version. So a missing version is a
-# no-op (leave the dev sentinel) — NOT a hard failure, otherwise the test/version
-# jobs would break. A malformed version that IS provided is a hard error. Wire
-# the env only on the release job's prepare step (see header note above).
-set -euo pipefail
-
-FILE="version.go"
-CONST="traefikoidcPluginVersion"
-
-VER="${VERSION:-${VERSION_TAG:-${SEMVER:-${NEW_VERSION:-${RELEASE_VERSION:-}}}}}"
-VER="${VER#v}"
-VER="${VER#V}"
-
-if [ -z "$VER" ]; then
-  if [ "${GITHUB_ACTIONS:-}" = "true" ]; then
-    echo "workflow-prepare: WARNING no version provided; leaving ${FILE} at the dev placeholder. If this is the release build, set 'env: VERSION: \${{ needs.version.outputs.version }}' on the release job's prepare step — otherwise the release ships 0.0.0-dev and emits no telemetry." >&2
-  else
-    echo "workflow-prepare: no version provided; leaving dev placeholder in ${FILE} (local build)"
-  fi
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# Accept MAJOR[.MINOR[.PATCH]] with optional -prerelease / +build (semver-ish,
-# matching the oss-telemetry receiver's validator).
-if ! printf '%s' "$VER" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+){0,2}(-[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?(\+[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$'; then
-  echo "workflow-prepare: ERROR version '${VER}' is not semver-shaped" >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-if [ ! -f "$FILE" ]; then
-  echo "workflow-prepare: ERROR ${FILE} not found (run from repository root)" >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-# Rewrite only the value of ${CONST}, anchored on the constant name so the
-# sibling devPluginVersion sentinel is left untouched.
-tmp="$(mktemp)"
-sed -E "s/(${CONST}[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*\")[^\"]*(\")/\1${VER}\2/" "$FILE" > "$tmp"
-mv "$tmp" "$FILE"
-
-if ! grep -Eq "${CONST}[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*\"${VER}\"" "$FILE"; then
-  echo "workflow-prepare: ERROR failed to stamp version into ${FILE}" >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-command -v gofmt >/dev/null 2>&1 && gofmt -w "$FILE"
-echo "workflow-prepare: stamped ${CONST} = \"${VER}\" in ${FILE}"