Compare commits

..

5 Commits

24 changed files with 702 additions and 5022 deletions
+1 -2
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ testData:
clientSecret: secret
callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
postLogoutRedirectURI: /oidc/different-logout # If not provided it will redirect to the "/" URL
scopes: # If not provided, default scopes will be used (openid, email, profile)
- openid
- email
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ testData:
- raczylo.com
allowedRolesAndGroups:
- guest-endpoints
sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret
forceHTTPS: false
logLevel: debug # debug, info, warn, error
rateLimit: 100 # Simple rate limiter to prevent brute force attacks
-35
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,6 @@ This middleware is supposed to replace the need for the forward-auth and oauth2-
Middleware has been tested with Auth0 and Logto.
### Traefik version compatibility
Code follows closely the current traefik helm chart versions. If plugin fails to load - it's time to update to the latest version of the traefik helm chart.
### Configuration options
Middleware currently supports following scenarios:
@@ -19,37 +15,6 @@ Middleware currently supports following scenarios:
#### How to configure...
* `sessionEncryptionKey` should be at least 32 bytes long.
##### Keeping secrets secret
This works ONLY in kubernetes environments. Don't forget to create secret traefik-middleware-oidc with fields ISSUER, CLIENT_ID and SECRET keys.
```
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: Middleware
metadata:
name: oidc-with-open-urls
namespace: traefik
spec:
plugin:
traefikoidc:
providerURL: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-middleware-oidc:ISSUER
clientID: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-middleware-oidc:CLIENT_ID
clientSecret: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-middleware-oidc:SECRET
sessionEncryptionKey: vvv
callbackURL: /cool-oidc/callback
logoutURL: /cool-oidc/logout
postLogoutRedirectURI: /my-website/you-have-logged-out # Optional post logout URL redirection
scopes:
- openid
- email
- profile
excludedURLs: # Determines the list of URLs which are NOT a subject to authentication
- /login # covers /login, /login/me, /login/reminder etc.
- /my-public-data
```
##### Excluded URLs with open access
```
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
### TODO / wishlist
- [] Improve test coverage
- [x] Improve caching mechanism
- [x] Add automatic release and semver generation
-110
View File
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"sync"
"time"
)
// TokenBlacklist manages a thread-safe list of revoked tokens with expiration.
type TokenBlacklist struct {
tokens map[string]time.Time
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
// NewTokenBlacklist creates a new token blacklist instance.
func NewTokenBlacklist() *TokenBlacklist {
return &TokenBlacklist{
tokens: make(map[string]time.Time),
}
}
// Add adds a token to the blacklist with an expiration time.
func (b *TokenBlacklist) Add(token string, expiry time.Time) {
b.mutex.Lock()
defer b.mutex.Unlock()
// Clean up expired tokens if we're at capacity
if len(b.tokens) >= 1000 {
now := time.Now()
futureThreshold := now.Add(time.Minute)
for t, exp := range b.tokens {
if now.After(exp) || futureThreshold.After(exp) {
delete(b.tokens, t)
}
}
// If still at capacity, remove oldest token
if len(b.tokens) >= 1000 {
var oldestToken string
var oldestTime time.Time
first := true
for t, exp := range b.tokens {
if first || exp.Before(oldestTime) {
oldestToken = t
oldestTime = exp
first = false
}
}
if oldestToken != "" {
delete(b.tokens, oldestToken)
}
}
}
b.tokens[token] = expiry
}
// IsBlacklisted checks if a token is in the blacklist and not expired.
func (b *TokenBlacklist) IsBlacklisted(token string) bool {
b.mutex.RLock()
defer b.mutex.RUnlock()
expiry, exists := b.tokens[token]
if !exists {
return false
}
// If token is expired, remove it and return false
if time.Now().After(expiry) {
// Switch to write lock to remove expired token
b.mutex.RUnlock()
b.mutex.Lock()
delete(b.tokens, token)
b.mutex.Unlock()
b.mutex.RLock()
return false
}
return true
}
// Cleanup removes expired tokens from the blacklist.
// Also removes tokens that will expire within the next minute to prevent edge cases.
func (b *TokenBlacklist) Cleanup() {
b.mutex.Lock()
defer b.mutex.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
futureThreshold := now.Add(time.Minute)
for token, expiry := range b.tokens {
// Remove tokens that are expired or will expire soon
if now.After(expiry) || futureThreshold.After(expiry) {
delete(b.tokens, token)
}
}
}
// Remove removes a token from the blacklist regardless of its expiration.
func (b *TokenBlacklist) Remove(token string) {
b.mutex.Lock()
defer b.mutex.Unlock()
delete(b.tokens, token)
}
// Count returns the current number of tokens in the blacklist.
func (b *TokenBlacklist) Count() int {
b.mutex.RLock()
defer b.mutex.RUnlock()
return len(b.tokens)
}
-169
View File
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"container/list"
"sync"
"time"
)
// CacheItem represents an item stored in the cache with its associated metadata.
type CacheItem struct {
// Value is the cached data of any type.
Value interface{}
// ExpiresAt is the timestamp when this item should be considered expired.
ExpiresAt time.Time
}
// lruEntry represents an entry in the LRU list.
type lruEntry struct {
key string
}
// Cache provides a thread-safe in-memory caching mechanism with expiration support.
// It implements an LRU (Least Recently Used) eviction policy using a doubly-linked list for efficiency.
type Cache struct {
// items stores the cached data with string keys.
items map[string]CacheItem
// order maintains the usage order; most recently used items are at the back.
order *list.List
// elems maps keys to their corresponding list elements for O(1) access.
elems map[string]*list.Element
// mutex protects concurrent access to the cache.
mutex sync.RWMutex
// maxSize is the maximum number of items allowed in the cache.
maxSize int
}
// DefaultMaxSize is the default maximum number of items in the cache.
const DefaultMaxSize = 1000
// NewCache creates a new empty cache instance that is ready for use.
func NewCache() *Cache {
return &Cache{
items: make(map[string]CacheItem, DefaultMaxSize),
order: list.New(),
elems: make(map[string]*list.Element, DefaultMaxSize),
maxSize: DefaultMaxSize,
}
}
// Set adds or updates an item in the cache with the specified expiration duration.
// It moves the item to the most recently used position.
func (c *Cache) Set(key string, value interface{}, expiration time.Duration) {
c.mutex.Lock()
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
expTime := now.Add(expiration)
// Update existing item.
if _, exists := c.items[key]; exists {
c.items[key] = CacheItem{
Value: value,
ExpiresAt: expTime,
}
if elem, ok := c.elems[key]; ok {
c.order.MoveToBack(elem)
}
return
}
// Evict oldest item if cache is full.
if len(c.items) >= c.maxSize {
c.evictOldest()
}
// Add new item.
c.items[key] = CacheItem{
Value: value,
ExpiresAt: expTime,
}
elem := c.order.PushBack(lruEntry{key: key})
c.elems[key] = elem
}
// Get retrieves an item from the cache if it exists and hasn't expired.
// Moving the accessed item to the most recently used position.
func (c *Cache) Get(key string) (interface{}, bool) {
c.mutex.Lock()
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
item, exists := c.items[key]
if !exists {
return nil, false
}
// Check for expiration.
if time.Now().After(item.ExpiresAt) {
c.removeItem(key)
return nil, false
}
// Move item to the back (most recently used).
if elem, ok := c.elems[key]; ok {
c.order.MoveToBack(elem)
}
return item.Value, true
}
// Delete removes an item from the cache.
func (c *Cache) Delete(key string) {
c.mutex.Lock()
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
c.removeItem(key)
}
// Cleanup removes all expired items from the cache. This should be called periodically
// to prevent memory bloat from expired entries.
func (c *Cache) Cleanup() {
c.mutex.Lock()
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
for key, item := range c.items {
// Only remove items that are already expired
if now.After(item.ExpiresAt) {
c.removeItem(key)
}
}
}
// evictOldest removes the least recently used item from the cache.
func (c *Cache) evictOldest() {
now := time.Now()
elem := c.order.Front()
// First try to find an expired item from the front
for elem != nil {
entry := elem.Value.(lruEntry)
if item, exists := c.items[entry.key]; exists {
if now.After(item.ExpiresAt) {
c.removeItem(entry.key)
return
}
}
elem = elem.Next()
}
// If no expired items found, remove the oldest item
if elem = c.order.Front(); elem != nil {
entry := elem.Value.(lruEntry)
c.removeItem(entry.key)
}
}
// removeItem removes an item from both the cache and the LRU tracking structures.
func (c *Cache) removeItem(key string) {
delete(c.items, key)
if elem, ok := c.elems[key]; ok {
c.order.Remove(elem)
delete(c.elems, key)
}
}
-306
View File
@@ -1,306 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestCache(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Basic Set and Get", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
key := "test-key"
value := "test-value"
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Test Set
cache.Set(key, value, expiration)
// Test Get
got, found := cache.Get(key)
if !found {
t.Error("Expected to find key in cache")
}
if got != value {
t.Errorf("Expected value %v, got %v", value, got)
}
})
t.Run("Expiration", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
key := "test-key"
value := "test-value"
expiration := 10 * time.Millisecond
// Set with short expiration
cache.Set(key, value, expiration)
// Wait for expiration
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
// Should not find expired key
_, found := cache.Get(key)
if found {
t.Error("Expected key to be expired")
}
})
t.Run("Delete", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
key := "test-key"
value := "test-value"
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Set and then delete
cache.Set(key, value, expiration)
cache.Delete(key)
// Should not find deleted key
_, found := cache.Get(key)
if found {
t.Error("Expected key to be deleted")
}
})
t.Run("Cleanup", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
// Add multiple items with different expirations
cache.Set("expired1", "value1", 10*time.Millisecond)
cache.Set("expired2", "value2", 10*time.Millisecond)
cache.Set("valid", "value3", 1*time.Second)
// Wait for some items to expire
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
// Run cleanup
cache.Cleanup()
// Check expired items are removed
_, found1 := cache.Get("expired1")
_, found2 := cache.Get("expired2")
_, found3 := cache.Get("valid")
if found1 {
t.Error("Expected expired1 to be cleaned up")
}
if found2 {
t.Error("Expected expired2 to be cleaned up")
}
if !found3 {
t.Error("Expected valid item to remain in cache")
}
})
t.Run("Concurrent Access", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
done := make(chan bool)
// Start multiple goroutines to access cache concurrently
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
go func(id int) {
key := "key"
value := "value"
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Perform multiple operations
cache.Set(key, value, expiration)
cache.Get(key)
cache.Delete(key)
cache.Cleanup()
done <- true
}(i)
}
// Wait for all goroutines to complete
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
<-done
}
})
t.Run("Zero Expiration", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
key := "test-key"
value := "test-value"
// Set with zero expiration
cache.Set(key, value, 0)
// Should not find the key
_, found := cache.Get(key)
if found {
t.Error("Expected key with zero expiration to be immediately expired")
}
})
t.Run("Negative Expiration", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
key := "test-key"
value := "test-value"
// Set with negative expiration
cache.Set(key, value, -1*time.Second)
// Should not find the key
_, found := cache.Get(key)
if found {
t.Error("Expected key with negative expiration to be immediately expired")
}
})
t.Run("Update Existing Key", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
key := "test-key"
value1 := "value1"
value2 := "value2"
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Set initial value
cache.Set(key, value1, expiration)
// Update value
cache.Set(key, value2, expiration)
// Check updated value
got, found := cache.Get(key)
if !found {
t.Error("Expected to find key in cache")
}
if got != value2 {
t.Errorf("Expected updated value %v, got %v", value2, got)
}
})
t.Run("Different Value Types", func(t *testing.T) {
cache := NewCache()
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Test with different value types
testCases := []struct {
key string
value interface{}
}{
{"string", "test"},
{"int", 42},
{"float", 3.14},
{"bool", true},
{"slice", []string{"a", "b", "c"}},
{"map", map[string]int{"a": 1, "b": 2}},
{"struct", struct{ Name string }{"test"}},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.key, func(t *testing.T) {
cache.Set(tc.key, tc.value, expiration)
got, found := cache.Get(tc.key)
if !found {
t.Error("Expected to find key in cache")
}
// Use reflect.DeepEqual for comparing complex types like slices and maps
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.value) {
t.Errorf("Expected value %v, got %v", tc.value, got)
}
})
}
})
}
func TestTokenCache(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Basic Operations", func(t *testing.T) {
tc := NewTokenCache()
token := "test-token"
claims := map[string]interface{}{
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "John Doe",
"admin": true,
}
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Test Set and Get
tc.Set(token, claims, expiration)
gotClaims, found := tc.Get(token)
if !found {
t.Error("Expected to find token in cache")
}
if len(gotClaims) != len(claims) {
t.Errorf("Expected %d claims, got %d", len(claims), len(gotClaims))
}
for k, v := range claims {
if gotClaims[k] != v {
t.Errorf("Expected claim %s to be %v, got %v", k, v, gotClaims[k])
}
}
// Test Delete
tc.Delete(token)
_, found = tc.Get(token)
if found {
t.Error("Expected token to be deleted")
}
})
t.Run("Expiration", func(t *testing.T) {
tc := NewTokenCache()
token := "test-token"
claims := map[string]interface{}{"sub": "1234567890"}
expiration := 10 * time.Millisecond
// Set with short expiration
tc.Set(token, claims, expiration)
// Wait for expiration
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
// Should not find expired token
_, found := tc.Get(token)
if found {
t.Error("Expected token to be expired")
}
})
t.Run("Cleanup", func(t *testing.T) {
tc := NewTokenCache()
// Add multiple tokens with different expirations
tc.Set("expired1", map[string]interface{}{"sub": "1"}, 10*time.Millisecond)
tc.Set("expired2", map[string]interface{}{"sub": "2"}, 10*time.Millisecond)
tc.Set("valid", map[string]interface{}{"sub": "3"}, 1*time.Second)
// Wait for some tokens to expire
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
// Run cleanup
tc.Cleanup()
// Check expired tokens are removed
_, found1 := tc.Get("expired1")
_, found2 := tc.Get("expired2")
_, found3 := tc.Get("valid")
if found1 {
t.Error("Expected expired1 to be cleaned up")
}
if found2 {
t.Error("Expected expired2 to be cleaned up")
}
if !found3 {
t.Error("Expected valid token to remain in cache")
}
})
t.Run("Token Prefix", func(t *testing.T) {
tc := NewTokenCache()
token := "test-token"
claims := map[string]interface{}{"sub": "1234567890"}
expiration := 1 * time.Second
// Set token
tc.Set(token, claims, expiration)
// Verify internal storage uses prefix
_, found := tc.cache.Get("t-" + token)
if !found {
t.Error("Expected to find prefixed token in underlying cache")
}
})
}
+2 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
module github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
go 1.23
toolchain go1.23.1
go 1.22.2
require (
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0
golang.org/x/time v0.7.0
golang.org/x/time v0.5.0
)
require github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 // indirect
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 h1:YCIWL56dvtr73r6715mJs5ZvhtnY73hBvEF8kX
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2/go.mod h1:NfCASbcHqRSY+3a8tlWJwsQap2VX5pwzwo4h3eOamfo=
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0 h1:XYlkq7KcpOB2ZhHBPv5WpjMIxrQosiZanfoy1HLZFzg=
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0/go.mod h1:ePLdVu+jbEgHH+KWw8I1z2wqd0BAdAQh/8LRvBeoNcQ=
golang.org/x/time v0.7.0 h1:ntUhktv3OPE6TgYxXWv9vKvUSJyIFJlyohwbkEwPrKQ=
golang.org/x/time v0.7.0/go.mod h1:3BpzKBy/shNhVucY/MWOyx10tF3SFh9QdLuxbVysPQM=
golang.org/x/time v0.5.0 h1:o7cqy6amK/52YcAKIPlM3a+Fpj35zvRj2TP+e1xFSfk=
golang.org/x/time v0.5.0/go.mod h1:3BpzKBy/shNhVucY/MWOyx10tF3SFh9QdLuxbVysPQM=
+200 -252
View File
@@ -6,18 +6,16 @@ import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/cookiejar"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
)
// generateNonce creates a cryptographically secure random nonce
// for use in the OIDC authentication flow. The nonce is used to
// prevent replay attacks by ensuring the token received matches
// the authentication request.
func generateNonce() (string, error) {
nonceBytes := make([]byte, 32)
_, err := rand.Read(nonceBytes)
@@ -27,34 +25,14 @@ func generateNonce() (string, error) {
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(nonceBytes), nil
}
// TokenResponse represents the response from the OIDC token endpoint.
// It contains the various tokens and metadata returned after successful
// code exchange or token refresh operations.
type TokenResponse struct {
// IDToken is the OIDC ID token containing user claims
IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
// AccessToken is the OAuth 2.0 access token for API access
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
// RefreshToken is the OAuth 2.0 refresh token for obtaining new tokens
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
// ExpiresIn is the lifetime in seconds of the access token
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
// TokenType is the type of token, typically "Bearer"
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
func buildFullURL(scheme, host, path string) string {
if scheme == "" {
scheme = "http"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s%s", scheme, host, path)
}
// exchangeTokens performs the OAuth 2.0 token exchange with the OIDC provider.
// It supports both authorization code and refresh token grant types.
// Parameters:
// - ctx: Context for the HTTP request
// - grantType: The OAuth 2.0 grant type ("authorization_code" or "refresh_token")
// - codeOrToken: Either the authorization code or refresh token
// - redirectURL: The callback URL for authorization code grant
func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType, codeOrToken, redirectURL string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType, codeOrToken, redirectURL string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
data := url.Values{
"grant_type": {grantType},
"client_id": {t.clientID},
@@ -68,83 +46,131 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType, codeOrToken
data.Set("refresh_token", codeOrToken)
}
// Create a cookie jar for this request to handle redirects with cookies
jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
client := &http.Client{
Transport: t.httpClient.Transport,
Timeout: t.httpClient.Timeout,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
// Always follow redirects for OIDC endpoints
if len(via) >= 50 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 50 redirects")
}
return nil
},
Jar: jar,
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", t.tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
resp, err := t.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange tokens: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token endpoint returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
}
var tokenResponse TokenResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tokenResponse); err != nil {
var result map[string]interface{}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token response: %w", err)
}
return &tokenResponse, nil
return result, nil
}
type TokenResponse struct {
IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
}
// getNewTokenWithRefreshToken obtains new tokens using a refresh token.
// This is used to refresh access tokens before they expire.
func (t *TraefikOidc) getNewTokenWithRefreshToken(refreshToken string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
ctx := context.Background()
tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "refresh_token", refreshToken, "")
result, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "refresh_token", refreshToken, "")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh token: %w", err)
}
t.logger.Debugf("Token response: %+v", tokenResponse)
return tokenResponse, nil
newAccessToken, ok := result["access_token"].(string)
if !ok || newAccessToken == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no access_token field in token response")
}
rawIDToken, ok := result["id_token"].(string)
if !ok || rawIDToken == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no id_token field in token response")
}
newRefreshToken, ok := result["refresh_token"].(string)
if !ok || newRefreshToken == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no refresh_token field in token response")
}
response := &TokenResponse{
IDToken: rawIDToken,
AccessToken: newAccessToken,
ExpiresIn: int(result["expires_in"].(float64)),
TokenType: result["token_type"].(string),
}
// The refresh token might not be returned if it hasn't changed
if newRefreshToken != refreshToken {
response.RefreshToken = newRefreshToken
} else {
response.RefreshToken = refreshToken
}
t.logger.Debug("Token response: %+v", response)
return response, nil
}
// handleExpiredToken manages token expiration by clearing the session
// and initiating a new authentication flow.
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleExpiredToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
// Clear authentication data but preserve CSRF state
session.SetAuthenticated(false)
session.SetAccessToken("")
session.SetRefreshToken("")
session.SetEmail("")
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := t.store.Get(req, cookieName)
t.logger.Debugf("Logging out user")
if err != nil {
handleError(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError, t.logger)
return
}
// Save the cleared session state
if idToken, ok := session.Values["id_token"].(string); ok {
err := t.RevokeTokenWithProvider(idToken)
if err != nil {
handleError(rw, "Failed to revoke token", http.StatusInternalServerError, t.logger)
return
}
t.RevokeToken(idToken)
}
session.Options = defaultSessionOptions
// Clear the session
session.Options.MaxAge = -1
session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
err = session.Save(req, rw)
if err != nil {
handleError(rw, "Failed to save session", http.StatusInternalServerError, t.logger)
return
}
http.Error(rw, "Logged out", http.StatusForbidden)
}
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleExpiredToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *sessions.Session) {
// Clear the existing session
session.Options.MaxAge = -1
for k := range session.Values {
delete(session.Values, k)
}
// Set new values
session.Values["csrf"] = uuid.New().String()
session.Values["incoming_path"] = req.URL.Path
session.Values["nonce"], _ = generateNonce()
session.Options = defaultSessionOptions
// Save the session before initiating authentication
if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save cleared session: %v", err)
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
// Initiate a new authentication flow
t.initiateAuthenticationFunc(rw, req, session, t.redirectURL)
}
// handleCallback processes the authentication callback from the OIDC provider.
// It validates the callback parameters, exchanges the authorization code for
// tokens, verifies the tokens, and establishes the user's session.
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, redirectURL string) {
session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := t.store.Get(req, cookieName)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Session error: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -153,36 +179,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
t.logger.Debugf("Handling callback, URL: %s", req.URL.String())
// Check for errors in the callback
if req.URL.Query().Get("error") != "" {
errorDescription := req.URL.Query().Get("error_description")
t.logger.Errorf("Authentication error: %s - %s", req.URL.Query().Get("error"), errorDescription)
http.Error(rw, fmt.Sprintf("Authentication error: %s", errorDescription), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Validate CSRF state
state := req.URL.Query().Get("state")
if state == "" {
t.logger.Error("No state in callback")
http.Error(rw, "State parameter missing in callback", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
csrfToken := session.GetCSRF()
if csrfToken == "" {
t.logger.Error("CSRF token missing in session")
http.Error(rw, "CSRF token missing", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if state != csrfToken {
t.logger.Error("State parameter does not match CSRF token in session")
http.Error(rw, "Invalid state parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Exchange code for tokens
code := req.URL.Query().Get("code")
if code == "" {
t.logger.Error("No code in callback")
@@ -190,49 +186,27 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
return
}
tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeCodeForTokenFunc(code, redirectURL)
token, err := t.exchangeCodeForTokenFunc(code)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to exchange code for token: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Verify tokens and claims
if err := t.verifyToken(tokenResponse.IDToken); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to verify id_token: %v", err)
idToken, ok := token["id_token"].(string)
if !ok || idToken == "" {
t.logger.Error("No id_token in token response")
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
claims, err := t.extractClaimsFunc(tokenResponse.IDToken)
claims, err := t.extractClaimsFunc(idToken)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to extract claims: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Verify nonce to prevent replay attacks
nonceClaim, ok := claims["nonce"].(string)
if !ok || nonceClaim == "" {
t.logger.Error("Nonce claim missing in id_token")
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
sessionNonce := session.GetNonce()
if sessionNonce == "" {
t.logger.Error("Nonce not found in session")
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if nonceClaim != sessionNonce {
t.logger.Error("Nonce claim does not match session nonce")
http.Error(rw, "Authentication failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Validate user's email domain
email, _ := claims["email"].(string)
if email == "" || !t.isAllowedDomain(email) {
t.logger.Errorf("Invalid or disallowed email: %s", email)
@@ -240,11 +214,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
return
}
// Update session with authentication data
session.SetAuthenticated(true)
session.SetEmail(email)
session.SetAccessToken(tokenResponse.IDToken)
session.SetRefreshToken(tokenResponse.RefreshToken)
session.Values["authenticated"] = true
session.Values["email"] = email
session.Values["id_token"] = idToken
session.Options = defaultSessionOptions
if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
@@ -252,17 +225,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
return
}
// Redirect to original path or root
redirectPath := "/"
if incomingPath := session.GetIncomingPath(); incomingPath != "" && incomingPath != t.redirURLPath {
redirectPath = incomingPath
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, redirectPath, http.StatusFound)
t.logger.Debugf("Authentication successful. User email: %s", email)
http.Redirect(rw, req, "/", http.StatusFound)
}
// extractClaims parses a JWT token and extracts its claims.
// It handles base64url decoding and JSON parsing of the token payload.
func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
@@ -282,131 +248,113 @@ func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
return claims, nil
}
// TokenCache provides a caching mechanism for validated tokens.
// It stores token claims to avoid repeated validation of the
// same token, improving performance for frequently used tokens.
type TokenCache struct {
// cache is the underlying cache implementation
cache *Cache
type UsedTokens struct {
tokens map[string]bool
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
type TokenBlacklist struct {
blacklist map[string]time.Time
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
func NewTokenBlacklist() *TokenBlacklist {
return &TokenBlacklist{
blacklist: make(map[string]time.Time),
}
}
func (tb *TokenBlacklist) Add(tokenID string, expiration time.Time) {
tb.mutex.Lock()
defer tb.mutex.Unlock()
tb.blacklist[tokenID] = expiration
}
func (tb *TokenBlacklist) IsBlacklisted(tokenID string) bool {
tb.mutex.RLock()
defer tb.mutex.RUnlock()
expiration, exists := tb.blacklist[tokenID]
return exists && time.Now().Before(expiration)
}
func (tb *TokenBlacklist) Cleanup() {
tb.mutex.Lock()
defer tb.mutex.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
for tokenID, expiration := range tb.blacklist {
if now.After(expiration) {
delete(tb.blacklist, tokenID)
}
}
}
type TokenCache struct {
cache map[string]*TokenInfo
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
type TokenInfo struct {
Token string
ExpiresAt time.Time
}
// NewTokenCache creates a new TokenCache instance.
func NewTokenCache() *TokenCache {
return &TokenCache{
cache: NewCache(),
cache: make(map[string]*TokenInfo),
}
}
// Set stores a token's claims in the cache with an expiration time.
func (tc *TokenCache) Set(token string, claims map[string]interface{}, expiration time.Duration) {
token = "t-" + token
tc.cache.Set(token, claims, expiration)
func (tc *TokenCache) Set(token string, expiresAt time.Time) {
tc.mutex.Lock()
defer tc.mutex.Unlock()
tc.cache[token] = &TokenInfo{Token: token, ExpiresAt: expiresAt}
}
// Get retrieves a token's claims from the cache.
// Returns the claims and a boolean indicating if the token was found.
func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (map[string]interface{}, bool) {
token = "t-" + token
value, found := tc.cache.Get(token)
if !found {
return nil, false
func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (*TokenInfo, bool) {
tc.mutex.RLock()
defer tc.mutex.RUnlock()
info, exists := tc.cache[token]
if exists && time.Now().Before(info.ExpiresAt) {
return info, true
}
claims, ok := value.(map[string]interface{})
return claims, ok
return nil, false
}
// Delete removes a token from the cache.
func (tc *TokenCache) Delete(token string) {
token = "t-" + token
tc.cache.Delete(token)
tc.mutex.Lock()
defer tc.mutex.Unlock()
delete(tc.cache, token)
}
// Cleanup removes expired tokens from the cache.
func (tc *TokenCache) Cleanup() {
tc.cache.Cleanup()
}
// exchangeCodeForToken exchanges an authorization code for tokens.
func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeCodeForToken(code string, redirectURL string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
ctx := context.Background()
tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "authorization_code", code, redirectURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %w", err)
}
return tokenResponse, nil
}
// createStringMap creates a map from a slice of strings.
// Used for efficient lookups in allowed domains and roles.
func createStringMap(keys []string) map[string]struct{} {
result := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, key := range keys {
result[key] = struct{}{}
}
return result
}
// handleLogout manages the OIDC logout process.
// It clears the session and redirects either to the OIDC provider's
// end session endpoint (if available) or to the configured post-logout URL.
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Error getting session: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
accessToken := session.GetAccessToken()
if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing session: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
host := t.determineHost(req)
scheme := t.determineScheme(req)
baseURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", scheme, host)
postLogoutRedirectURI := t.postLogoutRedirectURI
if postLogoutRedirectURI == "" {
postLogoutRedirectURI = fmt.Sprintf("%s/", baseURL)
} else if !strings.HasPrefix(postLogoutRedirectURI, "http") {
postLogoutRedirectURI = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", baseURL, postLogoutRedirectURI)
}
if t.endSessionURL != "" && accessToken != "" {
logoutURL, err := BuildLogoutURL(t.endSessionURL, accessToken, postLogoutRedirectURI)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to build logout URL: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Logout error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
tc.mutex.Lock()
defer tc.mutex.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
for token, info := range tc.cache {
if now.After(info.ExpiresAt) {
delete(tc.cache, token)
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, logoutURL, http.StatusFound)
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, postLogoutRedirectURI, http.StatusFound)
}
// BuildLogoutURL constructs the OIDC end session URL with appropriate parameters.
// Parameters:
// - endSessionURL: The OIDC provider's end session endpoint
// - idToken: The ID token to be invalidated
// - postLogoutRedirectURI: Where to redirect after logout completes
func BuildLogoutURL(endSessionURL, idToken, postLogoutRedirectURI string) (string, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(endSessionURL)
func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeCodeForToken(code string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
data := url.Values{}
data.Set("grant_type", "authorization_code")
data.Set("client_id", t.clientID)
data.Set("client_secret", t.clientSecret)
data.Set("code", code)
data.Set("redirect_uri", t.redirectURL)
resp, err := t.httpClient.PostForm(t.tokenURL, data)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse end session URL: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange token: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
var result map[string]interface{}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token response: %v", err)
}
q := u.Query()
q.Set("id_token_hint", idToken)
if postLogoutRedirectURI != "" {
q.Set("post_logout_redirect_uri", postLogoutRedirectURI)
}
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
return u.String(), nil
return result, nil
}
-227
View File
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"fmt"
"runtime"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestTokenBlacklistSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
tb := NewTokenBlacklist()
// Add tokens up to maxSize
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
tb.Add(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i), time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
}
// Verify size is at max
if tb.Count() != 1000 {
t.Errorf("Expected blacklist size to be 1000, got %d", tb.Count())
}
// Add one more token, should trigger cleanup/eviction
tb.Add("newtoken", time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
// Size should still be at max
if tb.Count() > 1000 {
t.Errorf("Blacklist exceeded max size: %d", tb.Count())
}
}
func TestTokenBlacklistExpiredCleanup(t *testing.T) {
tb := NewTokenBlacklist()
// Add some expired tokens
for i := 0; i < 500; i++ {
tb.Add(fmt.Sprintf("expired%d", i), time.Now().Add(-time.Hour))
}
// Add some valid tokens
for i := 0; i < 500; i++ {
tb.Add(fmt.Sprintf("valid%d", i), time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
}
// Force cleanup
tb.Cleanup()
// Only valid tokens should remain
if tb.Count() != 500 {
t.Errorf("Expected 500 valid tokens after cleanup, got %d", tb.Count())
}
// Verify only valid tokens remain
tb.mutex.RLock()
defer tb.mutex.RUnlock()
for token, expiry := range tb.tokens {
if time.Now().After(expiry) {
t.Errorf("Found expired token after cleanup: %s", token)
}
}
}
func TestTokenBlacklistOldestEviction(t *testing.T) {
tb := NewTokenBlacklist()
// Add tokens at capacity with different expiration times
baseTime := time.Now()
oldestToken := "oldest"
// Add oldest token first
tb.Add(oldestToken, baseTime.Add(time.Hour))
// Fill up to capacity with newer tokens
for i := 0; i < 999; i++ {
tb.Add(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i), baseTime.Add(time.Hour*2))
}
// Add a new token that should evict the oldest
newToken := "newest"
tb.Add(newToken, baseTime.Add(time.Hour*3))
// Verify oldest token was evicted
if tb.IsBlacklisted(oldestToken) {
t.Error("Oldest token should have been evicted")
}
// Verify newest token is present
if !tb.IsBlacklisted(newToken) {
t.Error("Newest token should be present")
}
}
func TestTokenBlacklistMemoryUsage(t *testing.T) {
tb := NewTokenBlacklist()
iterations := 10000
// Force initial GC
runtime.GC()
// Record initial memory stats
var m1, m2 runtime.MemStats
runtime.ReadMemStats(&m1)
// Simulate heavy usage
for i := 0; i < iterations; i++ {
// Add new token
tb.Add(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i), time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
// Periodically check blacklisted status
if i%100 == 0 {
tb.IsBlacklisted(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i-50))
}
// Periodically cleanup
if i%1000 == 0 {
tb.Cleanup()
}
}
// Force GC and wait for it to complete
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.ReadMemStats(&m2)
// Check memory growth (using HeapAlloc for more accurate measurement)
memoryGrowth := int64(m2.HeapAlloc - m1.HeapAlloc)
maxAllowedGrowth := int64(2 * 1024 * 1024) // 2MB max growth
if memoryGrowth > maxAllowedGrowth {
t.Logf("Initial HeapAlloc: %d, Final HeapAlloc: %d", m1.HeapAlloc, m2.HeapAlloc)
t.Errorf("Excessive memory growth: %d bytes", memoryGrowth)
}
// Verify size stayed within limits
if tb.Count() > 1000 {
t.Errorf("Blacklist exceeded max size: %d", tb.Count())
}
}
func TestConcurrentTokenBlacklistOperations(t *testing.T) {
tb := NewTokenBlacklist()
iterations := 1000
concurrency := 10
done := make(chan bool)
// Start multiple goroutines performing operations
for i := 0; i < concurrency; i++ {
go func(id int) {
for j := 0; j < iterations; j++ {
// Add tokens
token := fmt.Sprintf("token%d-%d", id, j)
tb.Add(token, time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
// Check blacklist status
tb.IsBlacklisted(token)
// Periodic cleanup
if j%100 == 0 {
tb.Cleanup()
}
}
done <- true
}(i)
}
// Wait for all goroutines to complete
for i := 0; i < concurrency; i++ {
<-done
}
// Verify size constraints were maintained
if tb.Count() > 1000 {
t.Errorf("Blacklist exceeded max size under concurrent operations: %d", tb.Count())
}
}
func TestTokenCacheMemoryUsage(t *testing.T) {
tc := NewTokenCache()
iterations := 10000
// Force initial GC
runtime.GC()
// Record initial memory stats
var m1, m2 runtime.MemStats
runtime.ReadMemStats(&m1)
// Simulate heavy cache usage
for i := 0; i < iterations; i++ {
claims := map[string]interface{}{
"sub": fmt.Sprintf("user%d", i),
"exp": time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
}
// Add to cache
tc.Set(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i), claims, time.Hour)
// Periodically retrieve
if i%100 == 0 {
tc.Get(fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i-50))
}
// Periodically cleanup
if i%1000 == 0 {
tc.Cleanup()
}
}
// Force GC and wait for it to complete
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.ReadMemStats(&m2)
// Check memory growth (using HeapAlloc for more accurate measurement)
memoryGrowth := int64(m2.HeapAlloc - m1.HeapAlloc)
maxAllowedGrowth := int64(2 * 1024 * 1024) // 2MB max growth
if memoryGrowth > maxAllowedGrowth {
t.Logf("Initial HeapAlloc: %d, Final HeapAlloc: %d", m1.HeapAlloc, m2.HeapAlloc)
t.Errorf("Excessive cache memory growth: %d bytes", memoryGrowth)
}
// Verify cache size stayed within limits
if len(tc.cache.items) > tc.cache.maxSize {
t.Errorf("Cache exceeded max size: %d", len(tc.cache.items))
}
}
+65 -104
View File
@@ -4,87 +4,43 @@ import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"math/big"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
)
// JWK represents a JSON Web Key as defined in RFC 7517.
// It contains the cryptographic key information used for token verification.
type JWK struct {
// Kty is the key type (e.g., "RSA", "EC")
Kty string `json:"kty"`
// Kid is the unique key identifier
Kid string `json:"kid"`
// Use specifies the intended use of the key (e.g., "sig" for signature)
Use string `json:"use"`
// N is the modulus for RSA keys
N string `json:"n"`
// E is the exponent for RSA keys
E string `json:"e"`
// Alg is the algorithm intended for use with the key
N string `json:"n"`
E string `json:"e"`
Alg string `json:"alg"`
// Crv is the curve for EC keys (e.g., "P-256", "P-384", "P-521")
Crv string `json:"crv"`
// X is the x-coordinate for EC keys
X string `json:"x"`
// Y is the y-coordinate for EC keys
Y string `json:"y"`
X string `json:"x"`
Y string `json:"y"`
}
// JWKSet represents a set of JSON Web Keys as returned by the JWKS endpoint.
// OIDC providers typically expose multiple keys to support key rotation.
type JWKSet struct {
// Keys is the array of JSON Web Keys
Keys []JWK `json:"keys"`
}
// JWKCache provides a thread-safe caching mechanism for JWK sets.
// It caches the keys for a configurable duration to reduce load on the OIDC provider
// while ensuring keys are refreshed periodically to handle key rotation.
type JWKCache struct {
// jwks holds the cached set of JSON Web Keys
jwks *JWKSet
// expiresAt is the timestamp when the cached keys should be refreshed
jwks *JWKSet
expiresAt time.Time
// mutex protects concurrent access to the cache
mutex sync.RWMutex
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
// JWKCacheInterface defines the interface for JWK caching operations.
// This interface allows for different caching implementations while
// maintaining consistent behavior in the token verification process.
type JWKCacheInterface interface {
GetJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error)
}
// GetJWKS retrieves the JSON Web Key Set, either from cache or by fetching it
// from the OIDC provider. It implements a thread-safe double-checked locking
// pattern to prevent multiple simultaneous fetches of the same keys.
// Parameters:
// - jwksURL: The URL of the JWKS endpoint
// - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for fetching keys
//
// Returns:
// - The JSON Web Key Set
// - An error if the keys cannot be retrieved or parsed
func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
c.mutex.RLock()
if c.jwks != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
@@ -111,15 +67,6 @@ func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, er
return jwks, nil
}
// fetchJWKS retrieves the JSON Web Key Set from the OIDC provider's JWKS endpoint.
// It handles HTTP communication and JSON parsing of the response.
// Parameters:
// - jwksURL: The URL of the JWKS endpoint
// - httpClient: The HTTP client to use for the request
//
// Returns:
// - The parsed JSON Web Key Set
// - An error if the request fails or the response is invalid
func fetchJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
resp, err := httpClient.Get(jwksURL)
if err != nil {
@@ -139,68 +86,82 @@ func fetchJWKS(jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
return &jwks, nil
}
// jwkToPEM converts a JSON Web Key to PEM format for use with standard
// cryptographic functions. It supports both RSA and EC keys, delegating
// to the appropriate converter based on the key type.
func verifyAudience(tokenAudience interface{}, expectedAudience string) error {
switch aud := tokenAudience.(type) {
case string:
if aud != expectedAudience {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
}
case []interface{}:
found := false
for _, v := range aud {
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == expectedAudience {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("invalid 'aud' claim type")
}
return nil
}
func verifyIssuer(tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer string) error {
if tokenIssuer != expectedIssuer {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid issuer")
}
return nil
}
func jwkToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
converter, ok := jwkConverters[jwk.Kty]
if !ok {
switch jwk.Kty {
case "RSA":
return rsaJWKToPEM(jwk)
case "EC":
return ecJWKToPEM(jwk)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type: %s", jwk.Kty)
}
return converter(jwk)
}
type jwkToPEMConverter func(*JWK) ([]byte, error)
var jwkConverters = map[string]jwkToPEMConverter{
"RSA": rsaJWKToPEM,
"EC": ecJWKToPEM,
}
// rsaJWKToPEM converts an RSA JSON Web Key to PEM format.
// It handles base64url decoding of the modulus and exponent,
// constructs an RSA public key, and encodes it in PEM format.
func rsaJWKToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.N)
n, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.N)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWK 'n' parameter: %w", err)
}
eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.E)
e, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.E)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWK 'e' parameter: %w", err)
}
n := new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes)
e := new(big.Int).SetBytes(eBytes)
pubKey := &rsa.PublicKey{
N: n,
E: int(e.Int64()),
publicKey := &rsa.PublicKey{
N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(n),
E: int(new(big.Int).SetBytes(e).Int64()),
}
pubKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pubKey)
publicKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(publicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal RSA public key: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %w", err)
}
pubKeyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "PUBLIC KEY",
Bytes: pubKeyBytes,
publicKeyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "RSA PUBLIC KEY",
Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
})
return pubKeyPEM, nil
return publicKeyPEM, nil
}
// ecJWKToPEM converts an EC (Elliptic Curve) JSON Web Key to PEM format.
// It supports the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves as defined in the
// OIDC specification, decoding the x and y coordinates and encoding
// the resulting public key in PEM format.
func ecJWKToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
xBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
x, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWK 'x' parameter: %w", err)
}
yBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
y, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWK 'y' parameter: %w", err)
}
@@ -217,21 +178,21 @@ func ecJWKToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported elliptic curve: %s", jwk.Crv)
}
pubKey := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
publicKey := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
Curve: curve,
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(xBytes),
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(yBytes),
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(x),
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(y),
}
pubKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pubKey)
publicKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(publicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal EC public key: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %w", err)
}
pubKeyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
publicKeyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "PUBLIC KEY",
Bytes: pubKeyBytes,
Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
})
return pubKeyPEM, nil
return publicKeyPEM, nil
}
+40 -285
View File
@@ -4,53 +4,29 @@ import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/rsa"
"math/big"
"strings"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"strings"
"time"
)
// JWT represents a JSON Web Token as defined in RFC 7519.
// It contains the three parts of a JWT: header, claims (payload),
// and signature, along with the original token string.
type JWT struct {
// Header contains the token metadata (algorithm, key ID, etc.)
Header map[string]interface{}
// Claims contains the token claims (subject, expiration, etc.)
Claims map[string]interface{}
// Signature contains the raw signature bytes
Signature []byte
// Token is the original JWT string
Token string
Header map[string]interface{}
Claims map[string]interface{}
Signature string
}
// parseJWT parses a JWT token string into a JWT struct.
// It validates the token format and decodes the three parts
// (header, claims, signature) using base64url decoding.
// Parameters:
// - tokenString: The raw JWT token string
//
// Returns:
// - A parsed JWT struct
// - An error if the token format is invalid or parsing fails
func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
}
jwt := &JWT{
Token: tokenString,
}
jwt := &JWT{}
// Decode and unmarshal the header
headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
@@ -70,53 +46,15 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to unmarshal claims: %v", err)
}
// Decode the signature
signatureBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to decode signature: %v", err)
}
jwt.Signature = signatureBytes
// Set the signature
jwt.Signature = parts[2]
return jwt, nil
}
// Verify validates the standard JWT claims as defined in RFC 7519.
// It checks:
// - issuer (iss) matches the expected issuer URL
// - audience (aud) includes the client ID
// - expiration time (exp) is in the future (with clock skew tolerance)
// - issued at time (iat) is in the past (with clock skew tolerance)
// - not before time (nbf) is in the past (with clock skew tolerance)
// - subject (sub) is present and not empty
// - algorithm matches expected value to prevent algorithm switching attacks
//
// Returns an error if any validation fails.
func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
// Debug logging of validation parameters
fmt.Printf("Validating token against:\nIssuer: %s\nClient ID: %s\n", issuerURL, clientID)
// Debug logging of token header
fmt.Printf("Token header: %+v\n", j.Header)
// Validate algorithm to prevent algorithm switching attacks
alg, ok := j.Header["alg"].(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("missing 'alg' header")
}
// List of supported algorithms - should match those in verifySignature
supportedAlgs := map[string]bool{
"RS256": true, "RS384": true, "RS512": true,
"PS256": true, "PS384": true, "PS512": true,
"ES256": true, "ES384": true, "ES512": true,
}
if !supportedAlgs[alg] {
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm: %s", alg)
}
claims := j.Claims
// Debug logging of all claims
fmt.Printf("Token claims: %+v\n", claims)
iss, ok := claims["iss"].(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("missing 'iss' claim")
@@ -149,19 +87,6 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
return err
}
// Validate nbf (not before) claim if present
if nbf, ok := claims["nbf"].(float64); ok {
if err := verifyNotBefore(nbf); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Validate jti (JWT ID) claim if present
if jti, ok := claims["jti"].(string); ok {
// Could add replay detection here if needed
_ = jti
}
sub, ok := claims["sub"].(string)
if !ok || sub == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("missing or empty 'sub' claim")
@@ -170,198 +95,25 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string) error {
return nil
}
// verifyAudience validates the token's audience claim.
// The audience can be either a single string or an array of strings.
// For array audiences, the expected audience must match any one value.
// Parameters:
// - tokenAudience: The audience claim from the token
// - expectedAudience: The expected audience value
//
// Returns an error if validation fails.
func verifyAudience(tokenAudience interface{}, expectedAudience string) error {
// Debug logging
fmt.Printf("Verifying audience:\nToken aud: %+v\nExpected: %s\n",
tokenAudience, expectedAudience)
switch aud := tokenAudience.(type) {
case string:
if aud != expectedAudience {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
}
case []interface{}:
found := false
for _, v := range aud {
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == expectedAudience {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("invalid 'aud' claim type")
}
return nil
}
// verifyIssuer validates the token's issuer claim.
// The issuer URL must exactly match the expected issuer.
// Parameters:
// - tokenIssuer: The issuer claim from the token
// - expectedIssuer: The expected issuer URL
//
// Returns an error if validation fails.
func verifyIssuer(tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer string) error {
// Debug logging
fmt.Printf("Verifying issuer:\nToken iss: %s\nExpected: %s\n",
tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer)
if tokenIssuer != expectedIssuer {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid issuer (token: %s, expected: %s)",
tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer)
}
return nil
}
// Clock skew tolerance for time-based validations
const clockSkewTolerance = 2 * time.Minute
// verifyExpiration checks if the token's expiration time has passed.
// The expiration time is compared against the current time with clock skew tolerance.
// Parameters:
// - expiration: The expiration timestamp from the token
//
// Returns an error if the token has expired.
func verifyExpiration(expiration float64) error {
expirationTime := time.Unix(int64(expiration), 0)
// Truncate current time to seconds for consistent comparison
now := time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
skewedNow := now.Add(clockSkewTolerance)
// Debug logging
fmt.Printf("Token exp: %v\nCurrent time: %v\nSkewed time: %v\nSkew: %v\n",
expirationTime.UTC(),
now.UTC(),
skewedNow.UTC(),
clockSkewTolerance)
// Allow tokens that expire exactly now
if expirationTime.Equal(now) {
return nil
}
if skewedNow.After(expirationTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("token has expired (exp: %v, now: %v)",
expirationTime.UTC(), now.UTC())
if time.Now().After(expirationTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("token has expired")
}
return nil
}
// verifyIssuedAt validates the token's issued-at time.
// Ensures the token wasn't issued in the future, accounting for clock skew.
// Parameters:
// - issuedAt: The issued-at timestamp from the token
//
// Returns an error if the token was issued in the future.
func verifyIssuedAt(issuedAt float64) error {
issuedAtTime := time.Unix(int64(issuedAt), 0)
// Truncate current time to seconds for consistent comparison
now := time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
skewedNow := now.Add(-clockSkewTolerance)
// Debug logging
fmt.Printf("Token iat: %v\nCurrent time: %v\nSkewed time: %v\nSkew: %v\n",
issuedAtTime.UTC(),
now.UTC(),
skewedNow.UTC(),
clockSkewTolerance)
// Allow tokens issued in the same second as current time
if issuedAtTime.Equal(now) {
return nil
}
if skewedNow.Before(issuedAtTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("token used before issued (iat: %v, now: %v)",
issuedAtTime.UTC(), now.UTC())
}
return nil
}
// verifyNotBefore validates the token's not-before time if present.
// Ensures the token is not used before its valid time period, accounting for clock skew.
// Parameters:
// - notBefore: The not-before timestamp from the token
//
// Returns an error if the token is not yet valid.
func verifyNotBefore(notBefore float64) error {
notBeforeTime := time.Unix(int64(notBefore), 0)
// Truncate current time to seconds for consistent comparison
now := time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
skewedNow := now.Add(-clockSkewTolerance)
// Debug logging
fmt.Printf("Token nbf: %v\nCurrent time: %v\nSkewed time: %v\nSkew: %v\n",
notBeforeTime.UTC(),
now.UTC(),
skewedNow.UTC(),
clockSkewTolerance)
// Allow tokens that become valid exactly now
if notBeforeTime.Equal(now) {
return nil
}
if skewedNow.Before(notBeforeTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("token not yet valid (nbf: %v, now: %v)",
notBeforeTime.UTC(), now.UTC())
}
return nil
}
// verifySignature validates the token's cryptographic signature.
// Supports multiple signature algorithms:
// - RSA: RS256, RS384, RS512 (PKCS#1 v1.5)
// - RSA-PSS: PS256, PS384, PS512
// - ECDSA: ES256, ES384, ES512
//
// Parameters:
// - tokenString: The complete JWT token string
// - publicKeyPEM: The PEM-encoded public key for verification
// - alg: The signature algorithm identifier
//
// Returns an error if signature verification fails.
func verifySignature(tokenString string, publicKeyPEM []byte, alg string) error {
// Debug logging
fmt.Printf("Verifying signature with algorithm: %s\n", alg)
// Split the token into its three parts
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid token format")
}
signedContent := parts[0] + "." + parts[1]
// Decode the signature from the token
signature, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode signature: %w", err)
}
// Decode the PEM-encoded public key
func verifySignature(signedContent string, signature []byte, publicKeyPEM []byte, alg string) error {
block, _ := pem.Decode(publicKeyPEM)
if block == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse PEM block containing the public key")
}
// Parse the public key
pubKey, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse public key: %w", err)
}
// Determine the hash function to use based on the algorithm
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
switch alg {
@@ -375,42 +127,45 @@ func verifySignature(tokenString string, publicKeyPEM []byte, alg string) error
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm: %s", alg)
}
// Hash the signed content
h := hashFunc.New()
h.Write([]byte(signedContent))
hashed := h.Sum(nil)
// Verify the signature based on the key type and algorithm
switch pubKey := pubKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "RS") {
// RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, hashed, signature)
} else if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "PS") {
// RSA PSS signature
return rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, hashed, signature, nil)
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected key type for algorithm %s", alg)
}
switch pub := pubKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "ES") {
// ECDSA signature
var r, s big.Int
sigLen := len(signature)
if sigLen%2 != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA signature length")
// ECDSA signature handling
keyBytes := (pub.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
if len(signature) != 2*keyBytes {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature length: expected %d bytes, got %d bytes", 2*keyBytes, len(signature))
}
r.SetBytes(signature[:sigLen/2])
s.SetBytes(signature[sigLen/2:])
if ecdsa.Verify(pubKey, hashed, &r, &s) {
r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(signature[:keyBytes])
s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(signature[keyBytes:])
if ecdsa.Verify(pub, hashed, r, s) {
return nil
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA signature")
}
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected key type for algorithm %s", alg)
return fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA signature")
}
return fmt.Errorf("algorithm %s is not compatible with ECDSA public key", alg)
case *rsa.PublicKey:
if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "RS") {
err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, hashFunc, hashed, signature)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("RSA signature verification failed: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("algorithm %s is not compatible with RSA public key", alg)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported public key type: %T", pubKey)
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported public key type: %T", pub)
}
}
func verifyIssuedAt(issuedAt float64) error {
issuedAtTime := time.Unix(int64(issuedAt), 0)
if time.Now().Before(issuedAtTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("token used before issued")
}
return nil
}
+242 -425
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-57
View File
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// BenchmarkOIDCMiddleware benchmarks the OIDC middleware's ability to handle concurrent requests.
func BenchmarkOIDCMiddleware(b *testing.B) {
// Setup test environment
ts := &TestSuite{}
ts.Setup()
ts.token = "valid.jwt.token"
// Define the handler with OIDC middleware
ts.tOidc.next = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
// Create test server
server := httptest.NewServer(ts.tOidc.next)
defer server.Close()
// Prepare HTTP client
client := &http.Client{}
// Reset timer to exclude setup time
b.ResetTimer()
// Run benchmark
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
// Create new request
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL, nil)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
// Set necessary headers or cookies
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+ts.token)
// Send the request
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
// Close response body
resp.Body.Close()
// Check response status code
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
b.Errorf("Unexpected status code: got %v, want %v", resp.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
}
}
}
+86 -1387
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-54
View File
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
)
// MetadataCache provides thread-safe caching for OIDC provider metadata
type MetadataCache struct {
metadata *ProviderMetadata
expiresAt time.Time
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
// NewMetadataCache creates a new metadata cache instance
func NewMetadataCache() *MetadataCache {
return &MetadataCache{}
}
// GetMetadata retrieves the metadata from cache or fetches it if expired
func (c *MetadataCache) GetMetadata(providerURL string, httpClient *http.Client, logger *Logger) (*ProviderMetadata, error) {
c.mutex.RLock()
if c.metadata != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
defer c.mutex.RUnlock()
return c.metadata, nil
}
c.mutex.RUnlock()
c.mutex.Lock()
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
// Double-check after acquiring write lock
if c.metadata != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
return c.metadata, nil
}
metadata, err := discoverProviderMetadata(providerURL, httpClient, logger)
if err != nil {
if c.metadata != nil {
// On error, extend current cache by 5 minutes to prevent thundering herd
c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute)
logger.Errorf("Failed to refresh metadata, using cached version for 5 more minutes: %v", err)
return c.metadata, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch provider metadata: %w", err)
}
c.metadata = metadata
c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)
return metadata, nil
}
-10
View File
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
version: 1
force:
existing: true
wording:
patch:
- patch-release
minor:
- minor-release
major:
- breaking
-596
View File
@@ -1,596 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
)
// generateSecureRandomString creates a cryptographically secure random string of specified length.
// It returns the generated string or an error if random generation fails.
func generateSecureRandomString(length int) (string, error) {
bytes := make([]byte, length)
if _, err := rand.Read(bytes); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate random bytes: %w", err)
}
return hex.EncodeToString(bytes), nil
}
// Cookie names and configuration constants used for session management
const (
// Using fixed prefixes for consistent cookie naming across restarts
mainCookieName = "_oidc_raczylo_m"
accessTokenCookie = "_oidc_raczylo_a"
refreshTokenCookie = "_oidc_raczylo_r"
)
const (
// maxCookieSize is the maximum size for each cookie chunk.
// This value is calculated to ensure the final cookie size stays within browser limits:
// 1. Browser cookie size limit is typically 4096 bytes
// 2. Cookie content undergoes encryption (adds 28 bytes) and base64 encoding (4/3 ratio)
// 3. Calculation:
// - Let x be the chunk size
// - After encryption: x + 28 bytes
// - After base64: ((x + 28) * 4/3) bytes
// - Must satisfy: ((x + 28) * 4/3) ≤ 4096
// - Solving for x: x ≤ 3044
// 4. We use 2000 as a conservative limit to account for cookie metadata
maxCookieSize = 2000
// absoluteSessionTimeout defines the maximum lifetime of a session
// regardless of activity (24 hours)
absoluteSessionTimeout = 24 * time.Hour
// minEncryptionKeyLength defines the minimum length for the encryption key
minEncryptionKeyLength = 32
)
// compressToken compresses a token using gzip and base64 encodes it.
func compressToken(token string) string {
var b bytes.Buffer
gz := gzip.NewWriter(&b)
if _, err := gz.Write([]byte(token)); err != nil {
return token // fallback to uncompressed on error
}
if err := gz.Close(); err != nil {
return token
}
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b.Bytes())
}
// decompressToken decompresses a base64 encoded gzipped token.
func decompressToken(compressed string) string {
data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(compressed)
if err != nil {
return compressed // return as-is if not base64
}
gz, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
if err != nil {
return compressed
}
defer gz.Close()
decompressed, err := io.ReadAll(gz)
if err != nil {
return compressed
}
return string(decompressed)
}
// SessionManager handles the management of multiple session cookies for OIDC authentication.
// It provides functionality for storing and retrieving authentication state, tokens,
// and other session-related data across multiple cookies.
type SessionManager struct {
// store is the underlying session store for cookie management.
store sessions.Store
// forceHTTPS enforces secure cookie attributes regardless of request scheme.
forceHTTPS bool
// logger provides structured logging capabilities.
logger *Logger
// sessionPool is a sync.Pool for reusing SessionData objects.
sessionPool sync.Pool
}
// NewSessionManager creates a new session manager with the specified configuration.
// Parameters:
// - encryptionKey: Key used to encrypt session data (must be at least 32 bytes)
// - forceHTTPS: When true, forces secure cookie attributes regardless of request scheme
// - logger: Logger instance for recording session-related events
//
// Returns an error if the encryption key does not meet minimum length requirements.
func NewSessionManager(encryptionKey string, forceHTTPS bool, logger *Logger) (*SessionManager, error) {
// Validate encryption key length.
if len(encryptionKey) < minEncryptionKeyLength {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encryption key must be at least %d bytes long", minEncryptionKeyLength)
}
sm := &SessionManager{
store: sessions.NewCookieStore([]byte(encryptionKey)),
forceHTTPS: forceHTTPS,
logger: logger,
}
// Initialize session pool.
sm.sessionPool.New = func() interface{} {
return &SessionData{
manager: sm,
accessTokenChunks: make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
refreshTokenChunks: make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
}
}
return sm, nil
}
// getSessionOptions returns secure session options configured for the current request.
// Parameters:
// - isSecure: Whether the current request is using HTTPS.
//
// The options ensure cookies are:
// - HTTP-only (not accessible via JavaScript)
// - Secure when using HTTPS or when forceHTTPS is enabled
// - Using SameSite=Lax for CSRF protection
// - Set with appropriate timeout and path settings
func (sm *SessionManager) getSessionOptions(isSecure bool) *sessions.Options {
return &sessions.Options{
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: isSecure || sm.forceHTTPS,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
MaxAge: int(absoluteSessionTimeout.Seconds()),
Path: "/",
}
}
// GetSession retrieves all session data for the current request.
// It loads the main session and token sessions, including any chunked token data,
// and combines them into a single SessionData structure for easy access.
// Returns an error if any session component cannot be loaded.
func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
// Get session from pool.
sessionData := sm.sessionPool.Get().(*SessionData)
sessionData.request = r
var err error
sessionData.mainSession, err = sm.store.Get(r, mainCookieName)
if err != nil {
sm.sessionPool.Put(sessionData)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get main session: %w", err)
}
// Check for absolute session timeout.
if createdAt, ok := sessionData.mainSession.Values["created_at"].(int64); ok {
if time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0)) > absoluteSessionTimeout {
sessionData.Clear(r, nil)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session expired")
}
}
sessionData.accessSession, err = sm.store.Get(r, accessTokenCookie)
if err != nil {
sm.sessionPool.Put(sessionData)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get access token session: %w", err)
}
sessionData.refreshSession, err = sm.store.Get(r, refreshTokenCookie)
if err != nil {
sm.sessionPool.Put(sessionData)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get refresh token session: %w", err)
}
// Clear and reuse chunk maps.
for k := range sessionData.accessTokenChunks {
delete(sessionData.accessTokenChunks, k)
}
for k := range sessionData.refreshTokenChunks {
delete(sessionData.refreshTokenChunks, k)
}
// Retrieve chunked token sessions.
sm.getTokenChunkSessions(r, accessTokenCookie, sessionData.accessTokenChunks)
sm.getTokenChunkSessions(r, refreshTokenCookie, sessionData.refreshTokenChunks)
return sessionData, nil
}
// getTokenChunkSessions retrieves all session chunks for a given token type.
// Parameters:
// - r: The HTTP request
// - baseName: The base name for the token's session cookies
// - chunks: Map to store the chunks in
func (sm *SessionManager) getTokenChunkSessions(r *http.Request, baseName string, chunks map[int]*sessions.Session) {
for i := 0; ; i++ {
sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", baseName, i)
session, err := sm.store.Get(r, sessionName)
if err != nil || session.IsNew {
break
}
chunks[i] = session
}
}
// SessionData holds all session information for an authenticated user.
// It manages multiple session cookies to handle the main session state
// and potentially large access and refresh tokens that may need to be
// split across multiple cookies due to browser size limitations.
type SessionData struct {
// manager is the SessionManager that created this SessionData.
manager *SessionManager
// request is the current HTTP request associated with this session.
request *http.Request
// mainSession stores authentication state and basic user info.
mainSession *sessions.Session
// accessSession stores the primary access token cookie.
accessSession *sessions.Session
// refreshSession stores the primary refresh token cookie.
refreshSession *sessions.Session
// accessTokenChunks stores additional chunks of the access token
// when it exceeds the maximum cookie size.
accessTokenChunks map[int]*sessions.Session
// refreshTokenChunks stores additional chunks of the refresh token
// when it exceeds the maximum cookie size.
refreshTokenChunks map[int]*sessions.Session
}
// Save persists all session data to cookies in the HTTP response.
// It saves the main session, token sessions, and any token chunks,
// applying appropriate security options to each cookie. All cookies
// are saved with consistent security settings based on the request scheme.
func (sd *SessionData) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
isSecure := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Scheme, "https") || sd.manager.forceHTTPS
// Set options for all sessions.
options := sd.manager.getSessionOptions(isSecure)
sd.mainSession.Options = options
sd.accessSession.Options = options
sd.refreshSession.Options = options
// Save main session.
if err := sd.mainSession.Save(r, w); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save main session: %w", err)
}
// Save access token session.
if err := sd.accessSession.Save(r, w); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save access token session: %w", err)
}
// Save refresh token session.
if err := sd.refreshSession.Save(r, w); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save refresh token session: %w", err)
}
// Save access token chunks.
for _, session := range sd.accessTokenChunks {
session.Options = options
if err := session.Save(r, w); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save access token chunk session: %w", err)
}
}
// Save refresh token chunks.
for _, session := range sd.refreshTokenChunks {
session.Options = options
if err := session.Save(r, w); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save refresh token chunk session: %w", err)
}
}
return nil
}
// Clear removes all session data by expiring all cookies and clearing their values.
func (sd *SessionData) Clear(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
// Clear and expire all sessions.
sd.mainSession.Options.MaxAge = -1
sd.accessSession.Options.MaxAge = -1
sd.refreshSession.Options.MaxAge = -1
for k := range sd.mainSession.Values {
delete(sd.mainSession.Values, k)
}
for k := range sd.accessSession.Values {
delete(sd.accessSession.Values, k)
}
for k := range sd.refreshSession.Values {
delete(sd.refreshSession.Values, k)
}
// Clear chunk sessions.
sd.clearTokenChunks(r, sd.accessTokenChunks)
sd.clearTokenChunks(r, sd.refreshTokenChunks)
var err error
if w != nil {
err = sd.Save(r, w)
}
// Return session to pool.
sd.manager.sessionPool.Put(sd)
return err
}
// clearTokenChunks removes all session chunks for a given token type.
func (sd *SessionData) clearTokenChunks(r *http.Request, chunks map[int]*sessions.Session) {
for _, session := range chunks {
session.Options.MaxAge = -1
for k := range session.Values {
delete(session.Values, k)
}
}
}
// GetAuthenticated returns whether the current session is authenticated.
func (sd *SessionData) GetAuthenticated() bool {
auth, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["authenticated"].(bool)
if !auth {
return false
}
// Check session expiration.
createdAt, ok := sd.mainSession.Values["created_at"].(int64)
if !ok {
return false
}
return time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0)) <= absoluteSessionTimeout
}
// SetAuthenticated updates the session's authentication status and rotates session ID.
// Returns an error if generating a new session ID fails.
func (sd *SessionData) SetAuthenticated(value bool) error {
if value {
id, err := generateSecureRandomString(32)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate secure session id: %w", err)
}
sd.mainSession.ID = id
sd.mainSession.Values["created_at"] = time.Now().Unix()
}
sd.mainSession.Values["authenticated"] = value
return nil
}
// GetAccessToken retrieves the complete access token from the session.
func (sd *SessionData) GetAccessToken() string {
token, _ := sd.accessSession.Values["token"].(string)
if token != "" {
compressed, _ := sd.accessSession.Values["compressed"].(bool)
if compressed {
return decompressToken(token)
}
return token
}
// Reassemble token from chunks.
if len(sd.accessTokenChunks) == 0 {
return ""
}
var chunks []string
for i := 0; ; i++ {
session, ok := sd.accessTokenChunks[i]
if !ok {
break
}
chunk, _ := session.Values["token_chunk"].(string)
chunks = append(chunks, chunk)
}
token = strings.Join(chunks, "")
compressed, _ := sd.accessSession.Values["compressed"].(bool)
if compressed {
return decompressToken(token)
}
return token
}
// SetAccessToken stores the access token in the session.
func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
// Expire any existing chunk cookies first.
if sd.request != nil {
sd.expireAccessTokenChunks(nil) // Will be saved when Save() is called.
}
// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token.
sd.accessTokenChunks = make(map[int]*sessions.Session)
// Compress token.
compressed := compressToken(token)
if len(compressed) <= maxCookieSize {
sd.accessSession.Values["token"] = compressed
sd.accessSession.Values["compressed"] = true
} else {
// Split compressed token into chunks.
sd.accessSession.Values["token"] = ""
sd.accessSession.Values["compressed"] = true
chunks := splitIntoChunks(compressed, maxCookieSize)
for i, chunk := range chunks {
sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", accessTokenCookie, i)
session, _ := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
session.Values["token_chunk"] = chunk
sd.accessTokenChunks[i] = session
}
}
}
// GetRefreshToken retrieves the complete refresh token from the session.
func (sd *SessionData) GetRefreshToken() string {
token, _ := sd.refreshSession.Values["token"].(string)
if token != "" {
compressed, _ := sd.refreshSession.Values["compressed"].(bool)
if compressed {
return decompressToken(token)
}
return token
}
// Reassemble token from chunks.
if len(sd.refreshTokenChunks) == 0 {
return ""
}
var chunks []string
for i := 0; ; i++ {
session, ok := sd.refreshTokenChunks[i]
if !ok {
break
}
chunk, _ := session.Values["token_chunk"].(string)
chunks = append(chunks, chunk)
}
token = strings.Join(chunks, "")
compressed, _ := sd.refreshSession.Values["compressed"].(bool)
if compressed {
return decompressToken(token)
}
return token
}
// SetRefreshToken stores the refresh token in the session.
func (sd *SessionData) SetRefreshToken(token string) {
// Expire any existing chunk cookies first.
if sd.request != nil {
sd.expireRefreshTokenChunks(nil) // Will be saved when Save() is called.
}
// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token.
sd.refreshTokenChunks = make(map[int]*sessions.Session)
// Compress token.
compressed := compressToken(token)
if len(compressed) <= maxCookieSize {
sd.refreshSession.Values["token"] = compressed
sd.refreshSession.Values["compressed"] = true
} else {
// Split compressed token into chunks.
sd.refreshSession.Values["token"] = ""
sd.refreshSession.Values["compressed"] = true
chunks := splitIntoChunks(compressed, maxCookieSize)
for i, chunk := range chunks {
sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", refreshTokenCookie, i)
session, _ := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
session.Values["token_chunk"] = chunk
sd.refreshTokenChunks[i] = session
}
}
}
// expireAccessTokenChunks expires any existing access token chunk cookies.
func (sd *SessionData) expireAccessTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
for i := 0; ; i++ {
sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", accessTokenCookie, i)
session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
if err != nil || session.IsNew {
break
}
session.Options.MaxAge = -1
session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
if w != nil {
if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired access token cookie: %v", err)
}
}
}
}
// expireRefreshTokenChunks expires any existing refresh token chunk cookies.
func (sd *SessionData) expireRefreshTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
for i := 0; ; i++ {
sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", refreshTokenCookie, i)
session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
if err != nil || session.IsNew {
break
}
session.Options.MaxAge = -1
session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
if w != nil {
if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired refresh token cookie: %v", err)
}
}
}
}
// splitIntoChunks splits a string into chunks of specified size.
func splitIntoChunks(s string, chunkSize int) []string {
var chunks []string
for len(s) > 0 {
if len(s) > chunkSize {
chunks = append(chunks, s[:chunkSize])
s = s[chunkSize:]
} else {
chunks = append(chunks, s)
break
}
}
return chunks
}
// GetCSRF retrieves the CSRF token from the session.
func (sd *SessionData) GetCSRF() string {
csrf, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["csrf"].(string)
return csrf
}
// SetCSRF stores a new CSRF token in the session.
func (sd *SessionData) SetCSRF(token string) {
sd.mainSession.Values["csrf"] = token
}
// GetNonce retrieves the nonce value from the session.
func (sd *SessionData) GetNonce() string {
nonce, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["nonce"].(string)
return nonce
}
// SetNonce stores a new nonce value in the session.
func (sd *SessionData) SetNonce(nonce string) {
sd.mainSession.Values["nonce"] = nonce
}
// GetEmail retrieves the authenticated user's email address from the session.
func (sd *SessionData) GetEmail() string {
email, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["email"].(string)
return email
}
// SetEmail stores the user's email address in the session.
func (sd *SessionData) SetEmail(email string) {
sd.mainSession.Values["email"] = email
}
// GetIncomingPath retrieves the original request path that triggered the authentication flow.
func (sd *SessionData) GetIncomingPath() string {
path, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["incoming_path"].(string)
return path
}
// SetIncomingPath stores the original request path that triggered the authentication flow.
func (sd *SessionData) SetIncomingPath(path string) {
sd.mainSession.Values["incoming_path"] = path
}
-382
View File
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"math/rand"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// generateRandomString creates a random string of specified length
func generateRandomString(length int) string {
const charset = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
b := make([]byte, length)
for i := range b {
b[i] = charset[rand.Intn(len(charset))]
}
return string(b)
}
// TestTokenCompression tests the token compression functionality
func TestTokenCompression(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
wantSize int // Expected size after compression (approximate)
}{
{
name: "Short token",
token: "shorttoken",
wantSize: 50, // Base64 encoded gzip has overhead for small content
},
{
name: "Repeating content",
token: strings.Repeat("abcdef", 1000),
wantSize: 100, // Should compress well due to repetition
},
{
name: "Random content",
token: generateRandomString(1000),
wantSize: 2000, // Random content won't compress much
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
compressed := compressToken(tt.token)
decompressed := decompressToken(compressed)
// Only verify compression ratio for non-short tokens
if len(tt.token) > 100 {
compressionRatio := float64(len(compressed)) / float64(len(tt.token))
t.Logf("Compression ratio for %s: %.2f", tt.name, compressionRatio)
if compressionRatio > 1.1 { // Allow up to 10% size increase
t.Errorf("Compression increased size too much: original=%d, compressed=%d, ratio=%.2f",
len(tt.token), len(compressed), compressionRatio)
}
}
// Verify decompression restores original
if decompressed != tt.token {
t.Error("Decompression failed to restore original token")
}
// Verify approximate compression ratio
if len(compressed) > tt.wantSize*2 {
t.Errorf("Compression ratio worse than expected: got=%d, want<%d", len(compressed), tt.wantSize*2)
}
})
}
}
// TestSessionManager tests the SessionManager functionality
func TestCookiePrefix(t *testing.T) {
// Create a session and verify cookie names
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
sm, _ := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, NewLogger("debug"))
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
// Set some data to ensure cookies are created
session.SetAuthenticated(true)
// Expire any existing cookies
session.expireAccessTokenChunks(rr)
session.expireRefreshTokenChunks(rr)
// Set new tokens
session.SetAccessToken("test_token")
session.SetRefreshToken("test_refresh_token")
if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
}
// Check cookie prefixes
cookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if !strings.HasPrefix(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo_") {
t.Errorf("Cookie %s does not have expected prefix '_oidc_raczylo_'", cookie.Name)
}
}
}
func TestTokenRefreshCleanup(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
sm, _ := NewSessionManager("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", true, NewLogger("debug"))
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
// Set a large token that will be split into chunks
largeToken := strings.Repeat("x", 5000)
session.SetAccessToken(largeToken)
if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
}
// Get initial cookies
initialCookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
// Create a new request with the initial cookies
newReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
for _, cookie := range initialCookies {
newReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
newRr := httptest.NewRecorder()
// Get session with cookies and set a new token
newSession, err := sm.GetSession(newReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get new session: %v", err)
}
// Create a response recorder for expired cookies
expiredRr := httptest.NewRecorder()
// Expire old chunk cookies
newSession.expireAccessTokenChunks(expiredRr)
// Set a smaller token that won't need chunks
newSession.SetAccessToken("small_token")
// Save session with new token
if err := newSession.Save(newReq, newRr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save new session: %v", err)
}
// Check cookies in response where old cookies are expired
intermediateResponse := expiredRr.Result()
intermediateCount := 0
chunkCount := 0
expiredCount := 0
for _, cookie := range intermediateResponse.Cookies() {
if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo_a_") && strings.Count(cookie.Name, "_") > 3 {
chunkCount++
if cookie.MaxAge < 0 {
expiredCount++
t.Logf("Found expired chunk cookie: %s (MaxAge=%d)", cookie.Name, cookie.MaxAge)
}
} else if cookie.MaxAge >= 0 {
intermediateCount++
t.Logf("Found active cookie: %s (MaxAge=%d)", cookie.Name, cookie.MaxAge)
}
}
// All chunk cookies should be expired
if chunkCount > 0 && chunkCount != expiredCount {
t.Errorf("Not all chunk cookies are expired: %d chunks, %d expired", chunkCount, expiredCount)
}
// Should have fewer active cookies after setting smaller token
if intermediateCount >= len(initialCookies) {
t.Errorf("Expected fewer active cookies after token refresh, got %d, want less than %d", intermediateCount, len(initialCookies))
}
}
func TestSessionManager(t *testing.T) {
ts := &TestSuite{t: t}
ts.Setup()
tests := []struct {
name string
authenticated bool
email string
accessToken string
refreshToken string
expectedCookieCount int
wantCompressed bool // Whether tokens should be compressed
}{
{
name: "Short tokens",
authenticated: true,
email: "test@example.com",
accessToken: "shortaccesstoken",
refreshToken: "shortrefreshtoken",
expectedCookieCount: 3, // main, access, refresh
wantCompressed: true,
},
{
name: "Long tokens exceeding 4096 bytes",
authenticated: true,
email: "test@example.com",
accessToken: strings.Repeat("x", 5000),
refreshToken: strings.Repeat("y", 6000),
expectedCookieCount: calculateExpectedCookieCount(strings.Repeat("x", 5000), strings.Repeat("y", 6000)),
wantCompressed: true,
},
{
name: "REALLY long tokens, exceeding 25000 bytes",
authenticated: true,
email: "test@example.com",
accessToken: strings.Repeat("x", 25000),
refreshToken: strings.Repeat("y", 25000),
expectedCookieCount: calculateExpectedCookieCount(strings.Repeat("x", 25000), strings.Repeat("y", 25000)),
wantCompressed: true,
},
{
name: "Unauthenticated session",
authenticated: false,
email: "",
accessToken: "",
refreshToken: "",
expectedCookieCount: 3, // main, access, refresh
wantCompressed: false,
},
{
name: "Random content tokens",
authenticated: true,
email: "test@example.com",
accessToken: generateRandomString(5000),
refreshToken: generateRandomString(5000),
expectedCookieCount: calculateExpectedCookieCount(generateRandomString(5000), generateRandomString(5000)),
wantCompressed: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
tc := tc // Capture range variable
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
session, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
// Set session values
session.SetAuthenticated(tc.authenticated)
session.SetEmail(tc.email)
// Expire any existing cookies
session.expireAccessTokenChunks(rr)
session.expireRefreshTokenChunks(rr)
// Set new tokens
session.SetAccessToken(tc.accessToken)
session.SetRefreshToken(tc.refreshToken)
// Save session
if err := session.Save(req, rr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
}
// Verify cookies are set and compression is used when appropriate
cookies := rr.Result().Cookies()
if len(cookies) != tc.expectedCookieCount {
t.Errorf("Expected %d cookies, got %d", tc.expectedCookieCount, len(cookies))
}
// Verify compression is working by checking token sizes
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, accessTokenCookie) {
// Get original and stored sizes
originalSize := len(tc.accessToken)
storedSize := len(cookie.Value)
if originalSize > 100 && tc.wantCompressed {
// For large tokens, verify some compression occurred
compressionRatio := float64(storedSize) / float64(originalSize)
t.Logf("Access token compression ratio: %.2f (original: %d, stored: %d)",
compressionRatio, originalSize, storedSize)
if compressionRatio > 0.9 { // Allow some overhead, but should see compression
t.Errorf("Expected compression for large token in cookie %s (ratio: %.2f)",
cookie.Name, compressionRatio)
}
}
} else if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, refreshTokenCookie) {
originalSize := len(tc.refreshToken)
storedSize := len(cookie.Value)
if originalSize > 100 && tc.wantCompressed {
compressionRatio := float64(storedSize) / float64(originalSize)
t.Logf("Refresh token compression ratio: %.2f (original: %d, stored: %d)",
compressionRatio, originalSize, storedSize)
if compressionRatio > 0.9 {
t.Errorf("Expected compression for large token in cookie %s (ratio: %.2f)",
cookie.Name, compressionRatio)
}
}
}
}
// Create a new request with the cookies
newReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
for _, cookie := range cookies {
newReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
// Get the session again and verify values
newSession, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(newReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get new session: %v", err)
}
// Verify session values
if newSession.GetAuthenticated() != tc.authenticated {
t.Errorf("Authentication status not preserved")
}
if email := newSession.GetEmail(); email != tc.email {
t.Errorf("Expected email %s, got %s", tc.email, email)
}
if token := newSession.GetAccessToken(); token != tc.accessToken {
t.Errorf("Access token not preserved: got len=%d, want len=%d", len(token), len(tc.accessToken))
}
if token := newSession.GetRefreshToken(); token != tc.refreshToken {
t.Errorf("Refresh token not preserved: got len=%d, want len=%d", len(token), len(tc.refreshToken))
}
// Verify session pooling by checking if the session is reused
session2, _ := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(newReq)
if session2 == newSession {
t.Error("Session not properly pooled")
}
})
}
}
func calculateExpectedCookieCount(accessToken, refreshToken string) int {
count := 3 // main, access, refresh
// Helper to calculate chunks for compressed token
calculateChunks := func(token string) int {
// Compress token (matching the actual implementation)
compressed := compressToken(token)
// If compressed token fits in one cookie, no additional chunks needed
if len(compressed) <= maxCookieSize {
return 0
}
// Calculate chunks needed for compressed token
return len(splitIntoChunks(compressed, maxCookieSize))
}
// Add chunks for access token if needed
accessChunks := calculateChunks(accessToken)
if accessChunks > 0 {
count += accessChunks
}
// Add chunks for refresh token if needed
refreshChunks := calculateChunks(refreshToken)
if refreshChunks > 0 {
count += refreshChunks
}
return count
}
+47 -207
View File
@@ -5,235 +5,96 @@ import (
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
)
// Config holds the configuration for the OIDC middleware.
// It provides all necessary settings to configure OpenID Connect authentication
// with various providers like Auth0, Logto, or any standard OIDC provider.
type Config struct {
// ProviderURL is the base URL of the OIDC provider (required)
// Example: https://accounts.google.com
ProviderURL string `json:"providerURL"`
// RevocationURL is the endpoint for revoking tokens (optional)
// If not provided, it will be discovered from provider metadata
RevocationURL string `json:"revocationURL"`
// CallbackURL is the path where the OIDC provider will redirect after authentication (required)
// Example: /oauth2/callback
CallbackURL string `json:"callbackURL"`
// LogoutURL is the path for handling logout requests (optional)
// If not provided, it will be set to CallbackURL + "/logout"
LogoutURL string `json:"logoutURL"`
// ClientID is the OAuth 2.0 client identifier (required)
ClientID string `json:"clientID"`
// ClientSecret is the OAuth 2.0 client secret (required)
ClientSecret string `json:"clientSecret"`
// Scopes defines the OAuth 2.0 scopes to request (optional)
// Defaults to ["openid", "profile", "email"] if not provided
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
// LogLevel sets the logging verbosity (optional)
// Valid values: "debug", "info", "error"
// Default: "info"
LogLevel string `json:"logLevel"`
// SessionEncryptionKey is used to encrypt session data (required)
// Must be a secure random string
SessionEncryptionKey string `json:"sessionEncryptionKey"`
// ForceHTTPS forces the use of HTTPS for all URLs (optional)
// Default: false
ForceHTTPS bool `json:"forceHTTPS"`
// RateLimit sets the maximum number of requests per second (optional)
// Default: 100
RateLimit int `json:"rateLimit"`
// ExcludedURLs lists paths that bypass authentication (optional)
// Example: ["/health", "/metrics"]
ExcludedURLs []string `json:"excludedURLs"`
// AllowedUserDomains restricts access to specific email domains (optional)
// Example: ["company.com", "subsidiary.com"]
AllowedUserDomains []string `json:"allowedUserDomains"`
// AllowedRolesAndGroups restricts access to users with specific roles or groups (optional)
// Example: ["admin", "developer"]
AllowedRolesAndGroups []string `json:"allowedRolesAndGroups"`
// OIDCEndSessionURL is the provider's end session endpoint (optional)
// If not provided, it will be discovered from provider metadata
OIDCEndSessionURL string `json:"oidcEndSessionURL"`
// PostLogoutRedirectURI is the URL to redirect to after logout (optional)
// Default: "/"
PostLogoutRedirectURI string `json:"postLogoutRedirectURI"`
// HTTPClient allows customizing the HTTP client used for OIDC operations (optional)
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
const (
// DefaultRateLimit defines the default rate limit for requests per second
DefaultRateLimit = 100
// MinRateLimit defines the minimum allowed rate limit to prevent DOS
MinRateLimit = 10
// DefaultLogLevel defines the default logging level
DefaultLogLevel = "info"
// MinSessionEncryptionKeyLength defines the minimum length for session encryption key
MinSessionEncryptionKeyLength = 32
cookieName = "_raczylo_oidc"
)
// CreateConfig creates a new Config with secure default values.
// Default values are set for optional fields:
// - Scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email"]
// - LogLevel: "info"
// - LogoutURL: CallbackURL + "/logout"
// - RateLimit: 100 requests per second
// - PostLogoutRedirectURI: "/"
// - ForceHTTPS: true (for security)
type Config struct {
ProviderURL string `json:"providerURL"`
RevocationURL string `json:"revocationURL"`
CallbackURL string `json:"callbackURL"`
LogoutURL string `json:"logoutURL"`
ClientID string `json:"clientID"`
ClientSecret string `json:"clientSecret"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
LogLevel string `json:"logLevel"`
SessionEncryptionKey string `json:"sessionEncryptionKey"`
ForceHTTPS bool `json:"forceHTTPS"`
RateLimit int `json:"rateLimit"`
ExcludedURLs []string `json:"excludedURLs"`
AllowedUserDomains []string `json:"allowedUserDomains"`
AllowedRolesAndGroups []string `json:"allowedRolesAndGroups"`
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
var defaultSessionOptions = &sessions.Options{
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: false,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
MaxAge: ConstSessionTimeout,
Path: "/",
}
func CreateConfig() *Config {
c := &Config{
Scopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
LogLevel: DefaultLogLevel,
RateLimit: DefaultRateLimit,
ForceHTTPS: true, // Secure by default
c := &Config{}
if c.Scopes == nil {
c.Scopes = []string{"openid", "profile", "email"}
}
if c.LogLevel == "" {
c.LogLevel = "info"
}
if c.LogoutURL == "" {
c.LogoutURL = c.CallbackURL + "/logout"
}
if c.RateLimit == 0 {
c.RateLimit = 100
}
return c
}
// Validate performs validation checks on the Config.
// It ensures all required fields are set and have valid values.
// Returns an error if any validation check fails.
func (c *Config) Validate() error {
// Validate provider URL
if c.ProviderURL == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("providerURL is required")
}
if !isValidSecureURL(c.ProviderURL) {
return fmt.Errorf("providerURL must be a valid HTTPS URL")
}
// Validate callback URL
if c.CallbackURL == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("callbackURL is required")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(c.CallbackURL, "/") {
return fmt.Errorf("callbackURL must start with /")
}
// Validate client credentials
if c.ClientID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("clientID is required")
}
if c.ClientSecret == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("clientSecret is required")
}
// Validate session encryption key
if c.SessionEncryptionKey == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("sessionEncryptionKey is required")
}
if len(c.SessionEncryptionKey) < MinSessionEncryptionKeyLength {
return fmt.Errorf("sessionEncryptionKey must be at least %d characters long", MinSessionEncryptionKeyLength)
}
// Validate log level
if c.LogLevel != "" && !isValidLogLevel(c.LogLevel) {
return fmt.Errorf("logLevel must be one of: debug, info, error")
}
// Validate excluded URLs
for _, url := range c.ExcludedURLs {
if !strings.HasPrefix(url, "/") {
return fmt.Errorf("excluded URL must start with /: %s", url)
}
if strings.Contains(url, "..") {
return fmt.Errorf("excluded URL must not contain path traversal: %s", url)
}
if strings.Contains(url, "*") {
return fmt.Errorf("excluded URL must not contain wildcards: %s", url)
}
}
// Validate revocation URL if set
if c.RevocationURL != "" && !isValidSecureURL(c.RevocationURL) {
return fmt.Errorf("revocationURL must be a valid HTTPS URL")
}
// Validate end session URL if set
if c.OIDCEndSessionURL != "" && !isValidSecureURL(c.OIDCEndSessionURL) {
return fmt.Errorf("oidcEndSessionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL")
}
// Validate post-logout redirect URI if set
if c.PostLogoutRedirectURI != "" && c.PostLogoutRedirectURI != "/" {
if !isValidSecureURL(c.PostLogoutRedirectURI) && !strings.HasPrefix(c.PostLogoutRedirectURI, "/") {
return fmt.Errorf("postLogoutRedirectURI must be either a valid HTTPS URL or start with /")
}
}
// Validate rate limit
if c.RateLimit < MinRateLimit {
return fmt.Errorf("rateLimit must be at least %d", MinRateLimit)
}
return nil
}
// isValidSecureURL checks if the provided string is a valid HTTPS URL
func isValidSecureURL(s string) bool {
u, err := url.Parse(s)
return err == nil && u.Scheme == "https" && u.Host != ""
}
// isValidLogLevel checks if the provided log level is valid
func isValidLogLevel(level string) bool {
return level == "debug" || level == "info" || level == "error"
}
// Logger provides structured logging capabilities with different severity levels.
// It supports error, info, and debug levels with appropriate output streams
// and formatting for each level.
type Logger struct {
// logError handles error-level messages, writing to stderr
logError *log.Logger
// logInfo handles informational messages, writing to stdout
logInfo *log.Logger
// logDebug handles debug-level messages, writing to stdout when debug is enabled
logInfo *log.Logger
logDebug *log.Logger
}
// NewLogger creates a new Logger with the specified log level.
// The log level determines which messages are output:
// - "debug": Outputs all messages (debug, info, error)
// - "info": Outputs info and error messages
// - "error": Outputs only error messages
//
// Error messages are always written to stderr, while info and debug
// messages are written to stdout when enabled.
func NewLogger(logLevel string) *Logger {
logError := log.New(io.Discard, "ERROR: TraefikOidcPlugin: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime)
logInfo := log.New(io.Discard, "INFO: TraefikOidcPlugin: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime)
logDebug := log.New(io.Discard, "DEBUG: TraefikOidcPlugin: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime)
logError.SetOutput(os.Stderr)
logInfo.SetOutput(os.Stdout)
if logLevel == "debug" || logLevel == "info" {
logInfo.SetOutput(os.Stdout)
}
if logLevel == "debug" {
logDebug.SetOutput(os.Stdout)
}
@@ -245,51 +106,30 @@ func NewLogger(logLevel string) *Logger {
}
}
// Info logs an informational message.
// These messages are intended for general operational information
// and are written to stdout.
func (l *Logger) Info(format string, args ...interface{}) {
l.logInfo.Printf(format, args...)
}
// Debug logs a debug message.
// These messages are only output when debug level logging is enabled
// and are intended for detailed troubleshooting information.
func (l *Logger) Debug(format string, args ...interface{}) {
l.logDebug.Printf(format, args...)
}
// Error logs an error message.
// These messages indicate problems that need attention and are
// always written to stderr regardless of the log level.
func (l *Logger) Error(format string, args ...interface{}) {
l.logError.Printf(format, args...)
}
// Infof logs an informational message using Printf formatting.
// These messages are intended for general operational information
// and are written to stdout.
func (l *Logger) Infof(format string, args ...interface{}) {
l.logInfo.Printf(format, args...)
}
// Debugf logs a debug message using Printf formatting.
// These messages are only output when debug level logging is enabled
// and are intended for detailed troubleshooting information.
func (l *Logger) Debugf(format string, args ...interface{}) {
l.logDebug.Printf(format, args...)
}
// Errorf logs an error message using Printf formatting.
// These messages indicate problems that need attention and are
// always written to stderr regardless of the log level.
func (l *Logger) Errorf(format string, args ...interface{}) {
l.logError.Printf(format, args...)
}
// handleError writes an error message to both the HTTP response and the error log.
// It ensures consistent error handling across the middleware by logging the error
// and sending an appropriate HTTP response to the client.
func handleError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string, code int, logger *Logger) {
logger.Error(message)
http.Error(w, message, code)
-397
View File
@@ -1,397 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"bytes"
"log"
"net/http"
"testing"
)
func TestCreateConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Default Values", func(t *testing.T) {
config := CreateConfig()
// Check default scopes
expectedScopes := []string{"openid", "profile", "email"}
if len(config.Scopes) != len(expectedScopes) {
t.Errorf("Expected %d default scopes, got %d", len(expectedScopes), len(config.Scopes))
}
for i, scope := range expectedScopes {
if config.Scopes[i] != scope {
t.Errorf("Expected scope %s at position %d, got %s", scope, i, config.Scopes[i])
}
}
// Check default log level
if config.LogLevel != DefaultLogLevel {
t.Errorf("Expected default log level '%s', got '%s'", DefaultLogLevel, config.LogLevel)
}
// Check default rate limit
if config.RateLimit != DefaultRateLimit {
t.Errorf("Expected default rate limit %d, got %d", DefaultRateLimit, config.RateLimit)
}
// Check ForceHTTPS default
if !config.ForceHTTPS {
t.Error("Expected ForceHTTPS to be true by default")
}
})
t.Run("Custom Values Preserved", func(t *testing.T) {
config := CreateConfig()
config.Scopes = []string{"custom_scope"}
config.LogLevel = "debug"
config.RateLimit = 50
config.ForceHTTPS = false
// Verify custom values are not overwritten
if len(config.Scopes) != 1 || config.Scopes[0] != "custom_scope" {
t.Error("Custom scopes were overwritten")
}
if config.LogLevel != "debug" {
t.Error("Custom log level was overwritten")
}
if config.RateLimit != 50 {
t.Error("Custom rate limit was overwritten")
}
if config.ForceHTTPS {
t.Error("Custom ForceHTTPS value was overwritten")
}
})
}
func TestConfigValidate(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
config *Config
expectedError string
}{
{
name: "Empty Config",
config: &Config{},
expectedError: "providerURL is required",
},
{
name: "Missing CallbackURL",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
},
expectedError: "callbackURL is required",
},
{
name: "Missing ClientID",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
},
expectedError: "clientID is required",
},
{
name: "Missing ClientSecret",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
},
expectedError: "clientSecret is required",
},
{
name: "Missing SessionEncryptionKey",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
},
expectedError: "sessionEncryptionKey is required",
},
{
name: "Non-HTTPS ProviderURL",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "http://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "encryption-key",
},
expectedError: "providerURL must be a valid HTTPS URL",
},
{
name: "Invalid CallbackURL",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "callback", // Missing leading slash
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "encryption-key",
},
expectedError: "callbackURL must start with /",
},
{
name: "Short SessionEncryptionKey",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "short",
},
expectedError: "sessionEncryptionKey must be at least 32 characters long",
},
{
name: "Low RateLimit",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-long-enough-encryption-key",
RateLimit: 5,
},
expectedError: "rateLimit must be at least 10",
},
{
name: "Invalid LogLevel",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-long-enough-encryption-key",
LogLevel: "invalid",
},
expectedError: "logLevel must be one of: debug, info, error",
},
{
name: "Non-HTTPS RevocationURL",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-long-enough-encryption-key",
RevocationURL: "http://revoke.com",
},
expectedError: "revocationURL must be a valid HTTPS URL",
},
{
name: "Non-HTTPS OIDCEndSessionURL",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-long-enough-encryption-key",
OIDCEndSessionURL: "http://endsession.com",
},
expectedError: "oidcEndSessionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL",
},
{
name: "Valid Config",
config: &Config{
ProviderURL: "https://provider.com",
CallbackURL: "/callback",
ClientID: "client-id",
ClientSecret: "client-secret",
SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-long-enough-encryption-key",
LogLevel: "debug",
RateLimit: 100,
RevocationURL: "https://revoke.com",
OIDCEndSessionURL: "https://endsession.com",
},
expectedError: "",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := tc.config.Validate()
if tc.expectedError == "" {
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
} else {
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("Expected error containing '%s', got nil", tc.expectedError)
} else if err.Error() != tc.expectedError {
t.Errorf("Expected error '%s', got '%s'", tc.expectedError, err.Error())
}
}
})
}
}
func TestLogger(t *testing.T) {
// Capture log output
var debugBuf, infoBuf, errorBuf bytes.Buffer
tests := []struct {
name string
logLevel string
testFunc func(*Logger)
checkFunc func(t *testing.T, debugOut, infoOut, errorOut string)
}{
{
name: "Debug Level",
logLevel: "debug",
testFunc: func(l *Logger) {
l.Debug("debug message")
l.Info("info message")
l.Error("error message")
},
checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, debugOut, infoOut, errorOut string) {
if debugOut == "" {
t.Error("Expected debug message in output")
}
if infoOut == "" {
t.Error("Expected info message in output")
}
if errorOut == "" {
t.Error("Expected error message in output")
}
},
},
{
name: "Info Level",
logLevel: "info",
testFunc: func(l *Logger) {
l.Debug("debug message")
l.Info("info message")
l.Error("error message")
},
checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, debugOut, infoOut, errorOut string) {
if debugOut != "" {
t.Error("Did not expect debug message in output")
}
if infoOut == "" {
t.Error("Expected info message in output")
}
if errorOut == "" {
t.Error("Expected error message in output")
}
},
},
{
name: "Error Level",
logLevel: "error",
testFunc: func(l *Logger) {
l.Debug("debug message")
l.Info("info message")
l.Error("error message")
},
checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, debugOut, infoOut, errorOut string) {
if debugOut != "" {
t.Error("Did not expect debug message in output")
}
if infoOut != "" {
t.Error("Did not expect info message in output")
}
if errorOut == "" {
t.Error("Expected error message in output")
}
},
},
{
name: "Printf Methods",
logLevel: "debug",
testFunc: func(l *Logger) {
l.Debugf("debug %s", "formatted")
l.Infof("info %s", "formatted")
l.Errorf("error %s", "formatted")
},
checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, debugOut, infoOut, errorOut string) {
if !bytes.Contains([]byte(debugOut), []byte("debug formatted")) {
t.Error("Expected formatted debug message")
}
if !bytes.Contains([]byte(infoOut), []byte("info formatted")) {
t.Error("Expected formatted info message")
}
if !bytes.Contains([]byte(errorOut), []byte("error formatted")) {
t.Error("Expected formatted error message")
}
},
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Reset buffers
debugBuf.Reset()
infoBuf.Reset()
errorBuf.Reset()
// Create logger with test buffers
logger := NewLogger(tc.logLevel)
logger.logError.SetOutput(&errorBuf)
if tc.logLevel == "debug" || tc.logLevel == "info" {
logger.logInfo.SetOutput(&infoBuf)
}
if tc.logLevel == "debug" {
logger.logDebug.SetOutput(&debugBuf)
}
// Run test
tc.testFunc(logger)
// Check results
tc.checkFunc(t, debugBuf.String(), infoBuf.String(), errorBuf.String())
})
}
}
func TestHandleError(t *testing.T) {
// Create a test logger with captured output
var errorBuf bytes.Buffer
logger := &Logger{
logError: log.New(&errorBuf, "ERROR: ", log.Ldate|log.Ltime),
}
logger.logError.SetOutput(&errorBuf)
// Create a test response recorder
rr := &testResponseRecorder{
headers: make(map[string][]string),
}
// Test error handling
message := "test error message"
code := 400
handleError(rr, message, code, logger)
// Check response code
if rr.statusCode != code {
t.Errorf("Expected status code %d, got %d", code, rr.statusCode)
}
// Check response body
expectedBody := message + "\n"
if rr.body != expectedBody {
t.Errorf("Expected body %q, got %q", expectedBody, rr.body)
}
// Check error was logged
if !bytes.Contains(errorBuf.Bytes(), []byte(message)) {
t.Error("Error message was not logged")
}
}
// Test helper types
type testResponseRecorder struct {
statusCode int
body string
headers map[string][]string
}
func (r *testResponseRecorder) Header() http.Header {
return r.headers
}
func (r *testResponseRecorder) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
r.body = string(b)
return len(b), nil
}
func (r *testResponseRecorder) WriteHeader(code int) {
r.statusCode = code
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Copyright 2009 The Go Authors.
Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
* Neither the name of Google LLC nor the names of its
* Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
+14 -3
View File
@@ -99,9 +99,8 @@ func (lim *Limiter) Tokens() float64 {
// bursts of at most b tokens.
func NewLimiter(r Limit, b int) *Limiter {
return &Limiter{
limit: r,
burst: b,
tokens: float64(b),
limit: r,
burst: b,
}
}
@@ -345,6 +344,18 @@ func (lim *Limiter) reserveN(t time.Time, n int, maxFutureReserve time.Duration)
tokens: n,
timeToAct: t,
}
} else if lim.limit == 0 {
var ok bool
if lim.burst >= n {
ok = true
lim.burst -= n
}
return Reservation{
ok: ok,
lim: lim,
tokens: lim.burst,
timeToAct: t,
}
}
t, tokens := lim.advance(t)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ github.com/gorilla/securecookie
# github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.3.0
## explicit; go 1.20
github.com/gorilla/sessions
# golang.org/x/time v0.7.0
# golang.org/x/time v0.5.0
## explicit; go 1.18
golang.org/x/time/rate