chore(release): v1.0.28

* fix(settings): allow documented range + static header templates (#149)

Upgrading past the release where NewWithContext began calling
config.Validate() (546ceb9) broke `headers` configs that worked in 0.8.25:
New() returned a nil handler and Traefik logged the opaque "invalid handler
type: <nil>". Two header-validation checks were stricter than the documented,
legitimate usage:

- validateTemplateSecure rejected the documented multi-valued-claim join
  "{{range $i,$e := .Claims.groups}}...{{end}}" as a dangerous {{range}},
  even though README/CONFIGURATION show exactly that for groups/roles.
- Config.Validate required every header value to contain {{ }}, rejecting
  static/literal values such as a shared proxy secret.

Fixes:
- Allow static/literal header values (reject only CR/LF/NUL header-injection
  chars); flag unbalanced {{ }} explicitly.
- Allow {{range}} only when its clause targets .Claims.<field>; a range over
  the bare .Claims map stays blocked and a decoy {{.Claims.x}} elsewhere no
  longer launders it. Generalize the claims whitelist scan to .Claims. so a
  claim reached via range/with/default is whitelisted identically to a direct
  {{.Claims.x}} reference.
- normalizeTemplateDelimiters now collapses ALL whitespace inside {{ }}
  (newline/CR/FF too), closing a newline-obfuscation bypass ({{\nrange,
  {{\nindex) found in review.
- Log the concrete validation reason at construction so operators see WHY the
  middleware failed to build instead of only "invalid handler type: <nil>".

Adds issue149_regression_test.go: pins the exact issue config, the documented
groups template rendering "admin,users" past the runtime sanitizer, static and
delimiter edge cases, and the security boundary (whole-Claims-map dump via
range, non-whitelisted claims, call/define/template/printf, and
newline-obfuscated actions all rejected).

* fix(settings): AST-based header template validation, close whitelist bypasses

Follow-up hardening to the #149 work. An adversarial review showed the
substring-based validateTemplateSecure could not actually bound what a header
template reads: get/index with arbitrary keys, {{with .Claims}} field access,
and a whitelisted-decoy + bare {{.}}/{{$}}/{{.Claims}} render all leaked the
whole root (every raw token) or the whole Claims map past validation. The core
problem is structural — the meaning of "." depends on scope, which substrings
cannot see.

Replace the substring validator with an AST walk (text/template/parse):
- Parse with only get/default known; every other function (printf, call, index,
  js, urlquery, ...) then fails to parse and is rejected — no blocklist.
- Reject {{define}}/{{block}} (they produce extra trees).
- Walk the tree tracking whether "." is the root. Permit ONLY: literal text;
  the four root token fields (AccessToken, IdToken, IDToken, RefreshToken);
  whitelisted .Claims.<field>; range/with over a whitelisted .Claims.<field>
  ("." inside the body is the already-whitelisted element); get on .Claims with
  a whitelisted literal key; default over safe values; {{if}} control flow and
  $-scoped range/with/decl variables. Everything else — bare {{.}} / {{$}}
  (whole-root dump), bare {{.Claims}} (whole-map dump), non-whitelisted claims,
  $.Claims root reach — is rejected.

Also closes the get/default exfil and the with-over-bare-map vectors, and fixes
ID-token forwarding: templateData now carries both IDToken and IdToken and the
validator accepts {{.IdToken}} (documented) and {{.IDToken}}; previously the
documented spelling rendered empty and the working one was rejected.

Runtime `get` additionally enforces the claims whitelist on its key, and
safeClaimsFields is promoted to a package-level single source of truth shared by
the validator and the get helper. The header template funcMap is extracted to
headerTemplateFuncMap() so tests exercise the exact production map. Removes the
now-dead normalizeTemplateDelimiters/regex (the parser handles whitespace).

Extends issue149_regression_test.go: renders through the real funcMap to prove
get cannot leak; asserts the whole-root/whole-map/decoy/var-launder/index
vectors are rejected while every documented pattern (groups/roles join,
with .Claims.email, get .Claims "internal_role", default, both IdToken
spellings) still validates and renders.

* feat(settings): allowedClaims to extend the header-template claim whitelist

The AST validator and the runtime `get` only permit a fixed set of claim fields
in header value templates. Providers issue custom claims (e.g. employee_id) that
aren't built in, and there was no supported way to forward them — the previous
`get` escape hatch was closed by the security hardening.

Add `allowedClaims []string` to Config. Listed names extend the effective
whitelist for BOTH static validation and the runtime `get` (a single
claimsWhitelist() = built-in safeClaimsFields + AllowedClaims, so the two never
drift). Built-in claims need not be listed; unlisted claims stay rejected.

  allowedClaims:
    - employee_id
  headers:
    - name: X-Employee-Id
      value: "{{`{{.Claims.employee_id}}`}}"

Implementation: the whitelist is threaded through the validator (now a small
templateValidator struct carrying the allowed set) and headerTemplateFuncMap
instead of the package global, so it is per-config with no shared mutable state.

Docs: README and docs/CONFIGURATION document the whitelist, the validation
behaviour, and allowedClaims (grounded in safeClaimsFields).

Tests: TestIssue149_AllowedClaimsExtendsWhitelist pins that a custom claim is
rejected by default and validates + renders once listed, via both direct access
and get, while an unlisted claim stays rejected. A regression assertion that
coupled to the old validator's "dangerous" wording now checks the stable
"failed security validation" wrapper (the templates are still rejected).

README.md

@@ -379,8 +379,32 @@ headers:
     value: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}"
 ```
 
-Available bindings: `.Claims.<field>`, `.AccessToken`, `.IdToken`,
-`.RefreshToken`. Names are case-sensitive (`.Claims`, not `.claims`).
+Available bindings: `.Claims.<field>`, `.AccessToken`, `.IdToken`
+(or `.IDToken`), `.RefreshToken`. Names are case-sensitive (`.Claims`, not
+`.claims`).
+
+Header templates are validated at startup (a failing template stops the
+middleware from loading). Only a fixed set of claim fields may be emitted —
+standard OIDC claims plus common provider claims (`email`, `name`,
+`given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `sub`, `groups`, `roles`,
+`realm_access`, `resource_access`, `oid`, `tid`, `upn`, `hd`, `picture`,
+`locale`, `email_verified`, and a few more; see `safeClaimsFields` in
+`template_validation.go`). To emit a claim not on that list, add it to
+`allowedClaims`:
+
+```yaml
+allowedClaims:
+  - employee_id
+headers:
+  - name: X-Employee-Id
+    value: "{{{{.Claims.employee_id}}}}"
+```
+
+Rendering the whole context (`{{.}}`, `{{$}}`), the whole claims map
+(`{{.Claims}}`), or any non-listed claim is rejected — this prevents a template
+from accidentally forwarding raw tokens or unlisted claims. `range`/`with` must
+target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims.groups}}`); `get`/`default`
+are the only functions allowed.
 
 > **Escape with quadruple braces.** If you see
 > `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool`, Traefik's YAML parser ate

coverage_boost_final_test.go

@@ -750,11 +750,53 @@ func TestValidateTemplateSecure_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 			template:    "{{.Unknown}}",
 			shouldError: true,
 		},
+		// Issue #148: whitespace after {{ and before }} must be tolerated
+		{
+			name:        "get with leading space (issue #148)",
+			template:    "{{ get .Claims \"email\" }}",
+			shouldError: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "get with multiple leading spaces",
+			template:    "{{  get .Claims \"email\"}}",
+			shouldError: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "default with spaces",
+			template:    "{{ default \"unknown\" .Claims.email }}",
+			shouldError: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "claims with spaces",
+			template:    "{{ .Claims.email }}",
+			shouldError: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "access token with spaces",
+			template:    "{{ .AccessToken }}",
+			shouldError: false,
+		},
+		// Issue #148: space must NOT let dangerous patterns bypass detection
+		{
+			name:        "range with leading space stays blocked",
+			template:    "{{ range .Items }}{{.}}{{end}}",
+			shouldError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "call with leading space stays blocked",
+			template:    "{{ call .Func }}",
+			shouldError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "disallowed claim with spaces stays blocked",
+			template:    "{{ .Claims.password }}",
+			shouldError: true,
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTemplateSecure(tt.template)
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tt.template, nil)
 			if tt.shouldError && err == nil {
 				t.Errorf("Expected error for template: %s", tt.template)
 			}

docs/CONFIGURATION.md

@@ -441,13 +441,46 @@ headers:
 ```
 
 **Template Variables:**
-- `{{.Claims.field}}` - ID token claims
+- `{{.Claims.field}}` - ID token claims (only whitelisted fields; see below)
 - `{{.AccessToken}}` - Raw access token
-- `{{.IdToken}}` - Raw ID token
+- `{{.IdToken}}` / `{{.IDToken}}` - Raw ID token (both spellings work)
 - `{{.RefreshToken}}` - Raw refresh token
 
 **Important:** Use double curly braces (`{{{{` and `}}}}`) to escape templates in YAML.
 
+**Validation and the claims whitelist.** Header templates are parsed and
+validated when the middleware loads; an invalid or disallowed template stops the
+middleware from starting (the route then returns Traefik's
+`invalid handler type: <nil>`). To prevent a template from accidentally
+forwarding raw tokens or sensitive claims, only a fixed set of claim fields may
+be emitted — the standard OIDC claims plus common provider claims (`email`,
+`name`, `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `sub`, `groups`,
+`roles`, `internal_role`, `role`, `department`, `organization`, `realm_access`,
+`resource_access`, `oid`, `tid`, `upn`, `hd`, `picture`, `locale`, `zoneinfo`,
+`phone_number`, `email_verified`, `updated_at`; the authoritative list is
+`safeClaimsFields` in `template_validation.go`). Rejected: rendering the whole
+context (`{{.}}`, `{{$}}`) or the whole claims map (`{{.Claims}}`), any claim not
+on the list, functions other than `get`/`default`, and `range`/`with` that do not
+target a specific listed claim (e.g. `{{range .Claims}}` is rejected; `{{range
+.Claims.groups}}` is allowed).
+
+**`allowedClaims`** extends the whitelist for claims your provider issues that
+are not built in:
+
+```yaml
+allowedClaims:
+  - employee_id
+  - cost_center
+headers:
+  - name: "X-Employee-Id"
+    value: "{{{{.Claims.employee_id}}}}"
+```
+
+Listed names apply to both direct access (`{{.Claims.employee_id}}`) and
+`get` (`{{get .Claims "employee_id"}}`). Subfields of a whitelisted map-valued
+claim (e.g. `realm_access.roles`) are already accessible without listing them
+individually.
+
 ---
 
 ## Security Headers

issue149_regression_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+)
+
+// Issue #149: after NewWithContext started calling config.Validate() (commit
+// 546ceb9), `headers` configs that had worked in 0.8.25 began failing, so New()
+// returned a nil handler and Traefik logged the opaque router error
+// "invalid handler type: <nil>". Two independent header-validation checks were
+// too strict:
+//
+//  1. validateTemplateSecure rejected the documented multi-valued-claim join
+//     pattern "{{range .. := .Claims.groups}}..." as a dangerous {{range}}.
+//  2. Config.Validate required every header value to contain {{ }}, rejecting
+//     static/literal values (e.g. a shared proxy secret).
+//
+// These tests pin the fix while proving the security boundary still holds.
+
+// issue149BaseConfig returns a complete, valid config with no headers. Header
+// cases are layered on per-test. No network is performed by Config.Validate.
+func issue149BaseConfig() *Config {
+	return &Config{
+		ProviderURL:          "https://provider.example.com",
+		ClientID:             "frigate-client",
+		ClientSecret:         "frigate-client-secret",
+		CallbackURL:          "/oauth2/callback",
+		SessionEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789",
+		RateLimit:            100,
+		Scopes:               []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_HeadersConfigValidates is the exact reproduction: the issue's
+// three headers (after Traefik file-provider un-escaping) must now validate.
+func TestIssue149_HeadersConfigValidates(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := issue149BaseConfig()
+	cfg.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+		{Name: "X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username", Value: `{{.Claims.preferred_username}}`},
+		{Name: "X-Forwarded-Groups", Value: `{{range $i, $e := .Claims.groups}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}`},
+		{Name: "X-Proxy-Secret", Value: `super-secret-shared-value`},
+	}
+	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue #149 headers config must validate after the fix, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_TemplateSecurityBoundary asserts the relaxed validator accepts
+// the documented range/if join over claims while still blocking genuinely
+// dangerous templates and access to non-whitelisted claims.
+func TestIssue149_TemplateSecurityBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		template   string
+		shouldFail bool
+	}{
+		// --- allowed: documented, safe patterns ---
+		{"direct claim", `{{.Claims.preferred_username}}`, false},
+		{"documented groups join", `{{range $i, $e := .Claims.groups}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}`, false},
+		{"documented roles join", `{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}`, false},
+		{"simple range over claims", `{{range .Claims.groups}}{{.}} {{end}}`, false},
+		{"default over claim", `{{default "none" .Claims.email}}`, false},
+		{"access token", `{{.AccessToken}}`, false},
+		{"with over claim field", `{{with .Claims.email}}{{.}}{{end}}`, false},
+		{"id token IdToken spelling", `{{.IdToken}}`, false}, // documented spelling (C6)
+		{"id token IDToken spelling", `{{.IDToken}}`, false}, // actual data key (C6)
+
+		// --- still blocked: with over the bare Claims map leaks arbitrary fields ---
+		{"with over bare claims map", `{{with .Claims}}{{.password}}{{end}}`, true},
+
+		// --- still blocked: dangerous control/functions ---
+		{"range over non-claims data", `{{range .Items}}{{.}}{{end}}`, true},
+		{"call function", `{{call .Func}}`, true},
+		{"define template", `{{define "x"}}{{.}}{{end}}`, true},
+		{"template inclusion", `{{template "other"}}`, true},
+		{"printf", `{{printf "%s" .}}`, true},
+
+		// --- still blocked: non-whitelisted claim access, incl. via range ---
+		{"non-whitelisted claim direct", `{{.Claims.password}}`, true},
+		{"non-whitelisted claim via range", `{{range $i, $e := .Claims.ssn}}{{$e}}{{end}}`, true},
+		{"no recognized variable", `{{.Unknown}}`, true},
+
+		// --- still blocked: whole-Claims-map dump via range (issue #149 review, C1).
+		// A decoy {{.Claims.sub}} must NOT launder a bare-map range past the gate.
+		{"whole claims map dump via range", `{{range .Claims}}{{.}} {{end}}{{.Claims.sub}}`, true},
+		{"claims keys dump via range assign", `{{range $k, $v := .Claims}}{{$k}} {{end}}{{.Claims.sub}}`, true},
+		// --- still blocked: newline-obfuscated actions — the AST parser resolves
+		// whitespace, so these are just {{range}}/{{index}} and are rejected.
+		{"newline-obfuscated range over map", "{{\nrange .Claims}}{{.}}{{end}}{{.Claims.sub}}", true},
+		{"newline-obfuscated index exfil", "{{\nindex .Claims \"password\"}}{{.Claims.sub}}", true},
+
+		// --- still blocked: whole-root / whole-Claims-map render (AST review). A
+		// whitelisted decoy {{.Claims.email}} must NOT launder a bare-map/root dump.
+		{"whole claims map render", `{{.Claims}}`, true},
+		{"whole root render dot", `{{.}}`, true},
+		{"whole root render dollar", `{{$}}`, true},
+		{"root claims via dollar", `{{$.Claims}}`, true},
+		{"decoy plus root dump", `{{.Claims.email}}{{.}}`, true},
+		{"decoy plus map dump", `{{.Claims.email}}{{.Claims}}`, true},
+		{"var-laundered map dump", `{{$x := .Claims}}{{$x}}{{.Claims.sub}}`, true},
+		{"index builtin blocked", `{{index .Claims "password"}}`, true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tc.template, nil)
+			if tc.shouldFail && err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected %q to be rejected, but it passed", tc.template)
+			}
+			if !tc.shouldFail && err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected %q to be allowed, but it was rejected: %v", tc.template, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_GroupsTemplateRendersForwardableValue proves the end goal: the
+// documented groups join template parses, executes to a comma-separated string,
+// and passes the runtime header sanitizer — so the header is actually emitted,
+// not merely accepted by validation. Parse options mirror main.go:414.
+func TestIssue149_GroupsTemplateRendersForwardableValue(t *testing.T) {
+	const tmplStr = `{{range $i, $e := .Claims.groups}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}`
+
+	tmpl, err := template.New("X-Forwarded-Groups").Option("missingkey=zero").Parse(tmplStr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("documented groups template must parse: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	data := map[string]any{
+		"Claims": map[string]any{
+			"groups": []any{"admin", "users", "viewers"},
+		},
+	}
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	if err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, data); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("groups template must execute: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := buf.String(); got != "admin,users,viewers" {
+		t.Fatalf("groups render mismatch: got %q want %q", got, "admin,users,viewers")
+	}
+
+	// The comma-joined value must survive the runtime injection guard; commas
+	// are not control/bidi runes, so it forwards intact.
+	if reason := headerValueReason(buf.String(), headerTemplateMaxLen); reason != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("rendered groups header was dropped by sanitizer: %s", reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_GetEnforcesClaimsWhitelist proves the runtime `get` helper cannot
+// exfiltrate a non-whitelisted claim, a raw token, or the whole data map — even
+// though validateTemplateSecure accepts {{get ...}} syntactically. This is the
+// defense-in-depth layer for C2/C3/C4 from the issue #149 security review.
+func TestIssue149_GetEnforcesClaimsWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	data := map[string]any{
+		"AccessToken":  "AT-SECRET",
+		"IDToken":      "IDT",
+		"IdToken":      "IDT",
+		"RefreshToken": "RT-SECRET",
+		"Claims": map[string]any{
+			"email":    "[email protected]",
+			"password": "PW-SECRET",
+			"ssn":      "123-45-6789",
+		},
+	}
+	fns := headerTemplateFuncMap(nil)
+	render := func(tmplStr string) string {
+		tmpl := template.Must(template.New("h").Funcs(fns).Option("missingkey=zero").Parse(tmplStr))
+		var b bytes.Buffer
+		if err := tmpl.Execute(&b, data); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("execute %q: %v", tmplStr, err)
+		}
+		return b.String()
+	}
+
+	// Every exfil attempt must render empty (or the default fallback), never a secret.
+	leaky := map[string]string{
+		"get non-whitelisted claim": `{{get .Claims "password"}}`,
+		"get ssn":                   `{{get .Claims "ssn"}}`,
+		"get raw token off root":    `{{get . "AccessToken"}}`,
+		"get whole claims map":      `{{get . "Claims"}}`,
+		"default wrapping get(ssn)": `{{default "none" (get .Claims "ssn")}}`,
+	}
+	for name, tmplStr := range leaky {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := render(tmplStr)
+			for _, secret := range []string{"PW-SECRET", "AT-SECRET", "RT-SECRET", "123-45-6789"} {
+				if strings.Contains(got, secret) {
+					t.Fatalf("%q leaked %q (rendered %q)", tmplStr, secret, got)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	// A whitelisted claim via get must still resolve.
+	if got := render(`{{get .Claims "email"}}`); got != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Fatalf(`get of whitelisted "email" must work, got %q`, got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_IdTokenBothSpellingsRender pins C6: both {{.IdToken}} (documented)
+// and {{.IDToken}} (runtime data key) resolve to the ID token, and both validate.
+func TestIssue149_IdTokenBothSpellingsRender(t *testing.T) {
+	data := map[string]any{"IDToken": "IDT-REAL", "IdToken": "IDT-REAL"}
+	for _, tmplStr := range []string{`{{.IdToken}}`, `{{.IDToken}}`} {
+		if err := validateTemplateSecure(tmplStr, nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%q must validate: %v", tmplStr, err)
+		}
+		tmpl := template.Must(template.New("h").Option("missingkey=zero").Parse(tmplStr))
+		var b bytes.Buffer
+		if err := tmpl.Execute(&b, data); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("execute %q: %v", tmplStr, err)
+		}
+		if b.String() != "IDT-REAL" {
+			t.Fatalf("%q rendered %q, want IDT-REAL", tmplStr, b.String())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_AllowedClaimsExtendsWhitelist pins the allowedClaims config
+// option: a custom claim is rejected by default but validates and renders once
+// listed, via both direct access and get.
+func TestIssue149_AllowedClaimsExtendsWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	const custom = "employee_id"
+
+	// Default (no allowedClaims): the custom claim is not forwardable.
+	base := issue149BaseConfig()
+	base.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{{Name: "X-Emp", Value: `{{.Claims.employee_id}}`}}
+	if err := base.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("custom claim %q must be rejected without allowedClaims", custom)
+	}
+
+	// With allowedClaims: direct access and get both validate.
+	cfg := issue149BaseConfig()
+	cfg.AllowedClaims = []string{custom}
+	cfg.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+		{Name: "X-Emp", Value: `{{.Claims.employee_id}}`},
+		{Name: "X-Emp-Get", Value: `{{get .Claims "employee_id"}}`},
+	}
+	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("allowedClaims must permit %q, got: %v", custom, err)
+	}
+
+	// The whitelist (validation) and the runtime get share the same effective set.
+	whitelist := claimsWhitelist(cfg.AllowedClaims)
+	if err := validateTemplateSecure(`{{get .Claims "employee_id"}}`, whitelist); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get on allowed custom claim must validate: %v", err)
+	}
+	fns := headerTemplateFuncMap(whitelist)
+	tmpl := template.Must(template.New("h").Funcs(fns).Option("missingkey=zero").Parse(`{{get .Claims "employee_id"}}`))
+	var b bytes.Buffer
+	if err := tmpl.Execute(&b, map[string]any{"Claims": map[string]any{"employee_id": "E-42"}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("render: %v", err)
+	}
+	if b.String() != "E-42" {
+		t.Fatalf("runtime get of allowed claim rendered %q, want E-42", b.String())
+	}
+
+	// A still-unlisted claim stays rejected even when another is allowed.
+	if err := validateTemplateSecure(`{{.Claims.ssn}}`, whitelist); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("non-allowed claim ssn must still be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIssue149_StaticAndDelimiterHandling covers the Config.Validate header loop
+// for literal values and malformed delimiters (validateTemplateSecure is not
+// invoked for pure literals).
+func TestIssue149_StaticAndDelimiterHandling(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name        string
+		value       string
+		shouldFail  bool
+		errContains string
+	}{
+		{"static literal secret", `super-secret-shared-value`, false, ""},
+		{"static with equals/base64", `AAAA1234==`, false, ""},
+		{"static with CRLF is rejected", "line1\r\nline2", true, "invalid characters"},
+		{"unbalanced open only", `{{.Claims.email`, true, "unbalanced template delimiters"},
+		{"unbalanced close only", `.Claims.email}}`, true, "unbalanced template delimiters"},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			cfg := issue149BaseConfig()
+			cfg.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{{Name: "X-Test", Value: tc.value}}
+			err := cfg.Validate()
+			if tc.shouldFail {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatalf("expected value %q to be rejected, but it passed", tc.value)
+				}
+				if tc.errContains != "" && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.errContains) {
+					t.Fatalf("expected error to contain %q, got: %v", tc.errContains, err)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected value %q to be allowed, but it was rejected: %v", tc.value, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

main.go

@@ -83,6 +83,39 @@ var defaultExcludedURLs = map[string]struct{}{
 	"/favicon": {},
 }
 
+// headerTemplateFuncMap returns the function map available to custom header
+// value templates, gated by the effective claims whitelist (built-in +
+// config.AllowedClaims). It exposes exactly two helpers:
+//   - default: substitute a fallback when a value is nil/empty.
+//   - get: safe map access RESTRICTED to whitelisted claim keys, so it cannot be
+//     used to read a non-whitelisted claim, a raw token, or the whole data map
+//     (issue #149 review). This is the sole runtime enforcement of the claims
+//     whitelist for `get`; static validation cannot reliably parse its arguments.
+func headerTemplateFuncMap(allowedClaims map[string]bool) template.FuncMap {
+	if allowedClaims == nil {
+		allowedClaims = safeClaimsFields
+	}
+	return template.FuncMap{
+		"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
+			if val == nil || val == "" {
+				return defaultVal
+			}
+			return val
+		},
+		"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+			if !allowedClaims[key] {
+				return ""
+			}
+			if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+				if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+					return val
+				}
+			}
+			return ""
+		},
+	}
+}
+
 // New creates a new TraefikOidc middleware instance.
 // It initializes all components including caches, HTTP clients, session management,
 // templates, and starts background processes for metadata discovery.
@@ -124,6 +157,11 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 	// any session. Traefik's yaegi plugin analyzer supplies a valid key via
 	// .traefik.yml testData, so it passes; only misconfigured deployments fail.
 	if err := config.Validate(); err != nil {
+		// Surface the concrete reason. When New() returns a nil handler, Traefik
+		// only logs the opaque router-level "invalid handler type: <nil>" and
+		// swallows this error, leaving operators no way to see WHY the plugin
+		// failed to build (issue #149). Log it explicitly at construction.
+		logger.Errorf("traefikoidc: invalid configuration, middleware not built: %v", err)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid configuration: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Setup HTTP client
@@ -388,22 +426,7 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 
 	t.headerTemplates = make(map[string]*template.Template)
 
-	funcMap := template.FuncMap{
-		"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
-			if val == nil || val == "" {
-				return defaultVal
-			}
-			return val
-		},
-		"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
-			if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
-				if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
-					return val
-				}
-			}
-			return ""
-		},
-	}
+	funcMap := headerTemplateFuncMap(claimsWhitelist(config.AllowedClaims))
 
 	for _, header := range config.Headers {
 		tmpl := template.New(header.Name).Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")

middleware.go

@@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) forwardAuthorized(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Reques
 		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
 			"AccessToken":  p.AccessToken,
 			"IDToken":      p.IDToken,
+			"IdToken":      p.IDToken, // documented spelling (README/CONFIGURATION); alias so {{.IdToken}} renders (issue #149 review)
 			"RefreshToken": p.RefreshToken,
 			"Claims":       p.Claims,
 		}

regression/regression_test.go

@@ -18,6 +18,50 @@ func TestIssueRegressions(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Run("Issue60_Missing_Claim_Fields", testIssue60MissingClaimFields)
 	t.Run("Issue60_Safe_Template_Functions", testIssue60SafeTemplateFunctions)
 	t.Run("Issue60_Double_Processing_Concern", testIssue60DoubleProcessing)
+	t.Run("Issue148_Template_Whitespace_Tolerance", testIssue148TemplateWhitespace)
+}
+
+// testIssue148TemplateWhitespace tests that header template validation tolerates
+// whitespace inside Go template delimiters (e.g. "{{ get" with a leading space),
+// which Go's text/template treats identically to "{{get". v1.0.26 rejected the
+// spaced form, causing "invalid handler type: <nil>" at startup. See issue #148.
+func testIssue148TemplateWhitespace(t *testing.T) {
+	baseConfig := func() *traefikoidc.Config {
+		c := traefikoidc.CreateConfig()
+		c.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		c.ClientID = "test-client"
+		c.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		c.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		c.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+		return c
+	}
+
+	// Spaced delimiters must validate identically to the compact form.
+	validSpaced := []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
+		{Name: "X-Get-Spaced", Value: "{{ get .Claims \"email\" }}"},
+		{Name: "X-Get-MultiSpace", Value: "{{  get .Claims \"email\"}}"},
+		{Name: "X-Default-Spaced", Value: "{{ default \"unknown\" .Claims.department }}"},
+		{Name: "X-Claims-Spaced", Value: "{{ .Claims.email }}"},
+		{Name: "X-AccessToken-Spaced", Value: "{{ .AccessToken }}"},
+	}
+	for _, header := range validSpaced {
+		config := baseConfig()
+		config.Headers = []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{header}
+		assert.NoError(t, config.Validate(),
+			"Spaced template should validate: %s", header.Value)
+	}
+
+	// A leading space must NOT smuggle a dangerous pattern past validation.
+	dangerousSpaced := []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
+		{Name: "X-Bad-Range", Value: "{{ range .Items }}{{.}}{{end}}"},
+		{Name: "X-Bad-Call", Value: "{{ call .Func }}"},
+	}
+	for _, header := range dangerousSpaced {
+		config := baseConfig()
+		config.Headers = []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{header}
+		assert.Error(t, config.Validate(),
+			"Spaced dangerous template must still be rejected: %s", header.Value)
+	}
 }
 
 // testIssue53CSRFRegression tests the specific issue reported in GitHub issue #53
@@ -325,7 +369,10 @@ func testIssue60SafeTemplateFunctions(t *testing.T) {
 		config.Headers = []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{header}
 		err := config.Validate()
 		require.Error(t, err, "Dangerous template should be rejected: %s", header.Value)
-		assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "dangerous", "Error should mention dangerous pattern")
+		// The template validator (template_validation.go) rejects these; Config.Validate
+		// wraps the reason with this stable prefix. Assert the behavior (rejected by
+		// the security validator) rather than a specific message word.
+		assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed security validation", "should be rejected by the template security validator")
 	}
 
 	// Test all safe patterns from the documentation

settings.go

@@ -55,8 +55,14 @@ type Config struct {
 	AllowedUserDomains        []string                         `json:"allowedUserDomains"`
 	AllowedUsers              []string                         `json:"allowedUsers"`
 	Headers                   []TemplatedHeader                `json:"headers"`
-	ExtraAuthParams           map[string]string                `json:"extraAuthParams,omitempty"`
-	RefreshGracePeriodSeconds int                              `json:"refreshGracePeriodSeconds"`
+	// AllowedClaims extends the built-in claims whitelist that header value
+	// templates may emit. Add the exact claim name (e.g. "employee_id") to allow
+	// {{.Claims.employee_id}} / {{get .Claims "employee_id"}}. Applies to both
+	// template validation and the runtime get helper. Built-in claims (email,
+	// groups, roles, realm_access, ...) need not be listed.
+	AllowedClaims             []string          `json:"allowedClaims,omitempty"`
+	ExtraAuthParams           map[string]string `json:"extraAuthParams,omitempty"`
+	RefreshGracePeriodSeconds int               `json:"refreshGracePeriodSeconds"`
 	// MaxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds is a heuristic upper bound on the lifetime of
 	// a stored refresh token. Once the token has been in the session longer
 	// than this, requests treat it as expired up-front - returning 401 to
@@ -530,7 +536,9 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Validate headers configuration for template security
+	// Validate headers configuration for template security. Header templates may
+	// emit the built-in claims plus any operator-configured AllowedClaims.
+	allowedClaims := claimsWhitelist(c.AllowedClaims)
 	for _, header := range c.Headers {
 		if header.Name == "" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("header name cannot be empty")
@@ -538,8 +546,20 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		if header.Value == "" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("header value template cannot be empty")
 		}
-		if !strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{") || !strings.Contains(header.Value, "}}") {
-			return fmt.Errorf("header value '%s' does not appear to be a valid template (missing {{ }})", header.Value)
+		hasOpen := strings.Contains(header.Value, "{{")
+		hasClose := strings.Contains(header.Value, "}}")
+		if hasOpen != hasClose {
+			return fmt.Errorf("header value '%s' has unbalanced template delimiters (need both {{ and }})", header.Value)
+		}
+		if !hasOpen {
+			// Static/literal header value with no template actions (e.g. a shared
+			// proxy secret or a constant marker). Allowed as-is — it worked before
+			// the constructor started calling Validate() (issue #149). Reject only
+			// header-injection characters; the rendered value is emitted verbatim.
+			if strings.ContainsAny(header.Value, "\r\n\x00") {
+				return fmt.Errorf("header value for '%s' contains invalid characters (CR/LF/NUL)", header.Name)
+			}
+			continue
 		}
 
 		// Provide more helpful guidance for common template errors BEFORE security validation
@@ -557,7 +577,7 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		}
 
 		// Validate template syntax and security
-		if err := validateTemplateSecure(header.Value); err != nil {
+		if err := validateTemplateSecure(header.Value, allowedClaims); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("header template '%s' failed security validation: %w", header.Value, err)
 		}
 	}
@@ -565,190 +585,50 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// safeClaimsFields is the single source of truth for which claim fields a header
+// template may emit. It gates both static validation (validateTemplateSecure)
+// and the runtime `get` function (main.go funcMap), so a claim can never be
+// forwarded via `get`/`index` that a direct {{.Claims.x}} reference would reject.
+// Includes standard OIDC claims and common provider-specific claims.
+var safeClaimsFields = map[string]bool{
+	// Standard OIDC claims
+	"email":              true,
+	"name":               true,
+	"given_name":         true,
+	"family_name":        true,
+	"preferred_username": true,
+	"sub":                true,
+	"iss":                true,
+	"aud":                true,
+	"exp":                true,
+	"iat":                true,
+	"groups":             true,
+	"roles":              true,
+	// Common custom claims
+	"internal_role": true, // Custom roles field (issue #60)
+	"role":          true, // Alternative role field
+	"department":    true, // Organization info
+	"organization":  true, // Organization info
+	// Provider-specific claims
+	"realm_access":    true, // Keycloak specific
+	"resource_access": true, // Keycloak specific
+	"oid":             true, // Azure AD object ID
+	"tid":             true, // Azure AD tenant ID
+	"upn":             true, // Azure AD User Principal Name
+	"hd":              true, // Google hosted domain
+	"picture":         true, // Profile picture
+	// Additional standard claims
+	"locale":         true, // User locale
+	"zoneinfo":       true, // Timezone
+	"phone_number":   true, // Contact info
+	"email_verified": true, // Email verification status
+	"updated_at":     true, // Last update time
+}
+
 // validateTemplateSecure validates template expressions for security vulnerabilities.
 // It checks for dangerous template patterns that could lead to code execution or data leaks
 // while allowing safe custom functions for field access and default values.
-func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
-	// Allow our specific safe custom functions
-	// These are added specifically to handle missing fields safely (issue #60)
-	safeCustomFunctions := []string{
-		"{{get ",     // Safe map access function
-		"{{default ", // Safe default value function
-	}
-
-	// Check if template uses safe custom functions
-	usesSafeFunctions := false
-	for _, safeFn := range safeCustomFunctions {
-		if strings.Contains(templateStr, safeFn) {
-			usesSafeFunctions = true
-			// These functions are explicitly allowed for safe field access
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Check for dangerous template functions and patterns
-	// Skip certain checks if using our safe functions
-	dangerousPatterns := []string{
-		"{{call",     // Function calls (except our safe ones)
-		"{{range",    // Range over arbitrary data
-		"{{define",   // Template definitions
-		"{{template", // Template inclusions
-		"{{block",    // Block definitions
-		"{{/*",       // Comments that could hide malicious code
-		"{{-",        // Trim whitespace (could be used to obfuscate)
-		"-}}",        // Trim whitespace (could be used to obfuscate)
-		"{{printf",   // Printf functions
-		"{{print",    // Print functions (but not our safe ones)
-		"{{println",  // Println functions
-		"{{html",     // HTML functions
-		"{{js",       // JavaScript functions
-		"{{urlquery", // URL query functions
-		"{{index",    // Index access to arbitrary data
-		"{{slice",    // Slice operations
-		"{{len",      // Length operations on arbitrary data
-		"{{eq",       // Comparison operations
-		"{{ne",       // Comparison operations
-		"{{lt",       // Comparison operations
-		"{{le",       // Comparison operations
-		"{{gt",       // Comparison operations
-		"{{ge",       // Comparison operations
-		"{{and",      // Logical operations
-		"{{or",       // Logical operations
-		"{{not",      // Logical operations
-	}
-
-	// Allow 'with' for safe conditional access
-	if !strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{with .Claims") {
-		dangerousPatterns = append(dangerousPatterns, "{{with")
-	}
-
-	templateLower := strings.ToLower(templateStr)
-	for _, pattern := range dangerousPatterns {
-		// Skip check if it's one of our safe functions
-		if usesSafeFunctions && (pattern == "{{call" || pattern == "{{print") {
-			// Allow these if we're using safe functions
-			continue
-		}
-
-		// Special handling for comparison operators to avoid false positives with "get" and "default"
-		if pattern == "{{ge" && (strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{get ") || strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{default ")) {
-			// Skip {{ge check if we're using the safe {{get or {{default functions
-			continue
-		}
-
-		// Skip {{de checks if using {{default
-		if pattern == "{{define" && strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{default ") {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		if strings.Contains(templateLower, strings.ToLower(pattern)) {
-			return fmt.Errorf("dangerous template pattern detected: %s", pattern)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Validate template variables against whitelist
-	allowedPatterns := []string{
-		"{{.AccessToken}}",
-		"{{.IdToken}}",
-		"{{.RefreshToken}}",
-		"{{.Claims.",
-		"{{get ",     // Safe custom function
-		"{{default ", // Safe custom function
-		"{{with ",    // Safe conditional (when used with Claims)
-	}
-
-	// Check if template contains only allowed patterns
-	hasAllowedPattern := false
-	for _, pattern := range allowedPatterns {
-		if strings.Contains(templateStr, pattern) {
-			hasAllowedPattern = true
-			break
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !hasAllowedPattern {
-		return fmt.Errorf("template must use only allowed variables: AccessToken, IdToken, RefreshToken, Claims.*, or safe functions (get, default, with)")
-	}
-
-	// Validate claims access patterns
-	if strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{.Claims.") {
-		// Simple validation - ensure claims access is to known safe fields
-		// This list includes standard OIDC claims and common provider-specific claims
-		safeClaimsFields := map[string]bool{
-			// Standard OIDC claims
-			"email":              true,
-			"name":               true,
-			"given_name":         true,
-			"family_name":        true,
-			"preferred_username": true,
-			"sub":                true,
-			"iss":                true,
-			"aud":                true,
-			"exp":                true,
-			"iat":                true,
-			"groups":             true,
-			"roles":              true,
-			// Common custom claims
-			"internal_role": true, // Custom roles field (issue #60)
-			"role":          true, // Alternative role field
-			"department":    true, // Organization info
-			"organization":  true, // Organization info
-			// Provider-specific claims
-			"realm_access":    true, // Keycloak specific
-			"resource_access": true, // Keycloak specific
-			"oid":             true, // Azure AD object ID
-			"tid":             true, // Azure AD tenant ID
-			"upn":             true, // Azure AD User Principal Name
-			"hd":              true, // Google hosted domain
-			"picture":         true, // Profile picture
-			// Additional standard claims
-			"locale":         true, // User locale
-			"zoneinfo":       true, // Timezone
-			"phone_number":   true, // Contact info
-			"email_verified": true, // Email verification status
-			"updated_at":     true, // Last update time
-		}
-
-		// Extract field names from Claims access
-		start := strings.Index(templateStr, "{{.Claims.")
-		for start != -1 {
-			end := strings.Index(templateStr[start:], "}}")
-			if end == -1 {
-				return fmt.Errorf("malformed Claims template syntax")
-			}
-
-			// Extract the content between "{{.Claims." and "}}"
-			// start+10 skips "{{.Claims." and start+end is the position of "}}"
-			claimsContent := templateStr[start+10 : start+end]
-
-			// Get the field name (first part before any dots)
-			fieldName := strings.Split(claimsContent, ".")[0]
-
-			if !safeClaimsFields[fieldName] {
-				return fmt.Errorf("access to Claims.%s is not allowed for security reasons", fieldName)
-			}
-
-			// Search for next occurrence
-			nextStart := strings.Index(templateStr[start+end+2:], "{{.Claims.")
-			if nextStart != -1 {
-				start = start + end + 2 + nextStart
-			} else {
-				start = -1
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Prevent code injection through template syntax
-	if strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{") && strings.Contains(templateStr, "}}") {
-		// Count opening and closing braces
-		openCount := strings.Count(templateStr, "{{")
-		closeCount := strings.Count(templateStr, "}}")
-		if openCount != closeCount {
-			return fmt.Errorf("unbalanced template braces")
-		}
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
+// validateTemplateSecure lives in template_validation.go (AST-based validation).
 
 // isValidSecureURL checks if a given string represents a valid, absolute HTTPS URL.
 // It uses url.Parse and checks for a nil error, an "https" scheme, and a non-empty host.

template_validation.go

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"text/template/parse"
+)
+
+// allowedRootTokenFields are the non-Claims values a header template may render
+// directly from the root data context. Both ID-token spellings are accepted
+// (templateData carries IDToken and IdToken).
+var allowedRootTokenFields = map[string]bool{
+	"AccessToken":  true,
+	"IdToken":      true,
+	"IDToken":      true,
+	"RefreshToken": true,
+}
+
+// validateTemplateParseFuncs is the function set the parser is told about. Only
+// get/default exist; every other identifier used as a command (printf, call,
+// index, js, ...) then fails to parse and is rejected — no blocklist needed.
+var validateTemplateParseFuncs = map[string]any{
+	"get":     struct{}{},
+	"default": struct{}{},
+}
+
+// claimsWhitelist returns the effective set of claim field names a header
+// template may emit: the built-in safeClaimsFields plus any operator-configured
+// extras (config.AllowedClaims). Blank/whitespace extras are ignored. The result
+// gates BOTH static validation and the runtime get helper so the two never drift.
+func claimsWhitelist(extra []string) map[string]bool {
+	m := make(map[string]bool, len(safeClaimsFields)+len(extra))
+	for k := range safeClaimsFields {
+		m[k] = true
+	}
+	for _, c := range extra {
+		if c = strings.TrimSpace(c); c != "" {
+			m[c] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+// templateValidator walks a parsed header template against a specific claims
+// whitelist (built-in + operator-configured). Holding the set on the walker
+// keeps it out of every method signature.
+type templateValidator struct {
+	allowed map[string]bool
+}
+
+// validateTemplateSecure parses a header value template and walks its AST,
+// permitting ONLY: literal text; the whitelisted root token fields; whitelisted
+// .Claims.<field> access; range/with over a whitelisted .Claims.<field>; the
+// safe get/default helpers; and {{if}} control flow. Everything else — bare
+// {{.}}/{{$}} (whole-root dump), bare {{.Claims}} (whole-map dump), non-
+// whitelisted claims, unknown functions, define/template/block — is rejected.
+//
+// allowed is the effective claim whitelist (see claimsWhitelist); a nil set
+// falls back to the built-in safeClaimsFields.
+//
+// Parsing (not substring matching) is what makes this sound: the parser resolves
+// whitespace, comments and the meaning of "." per scope, so obfuscation and the
+// "whitelisted decoy + bare-map render" bypass class cannot slip through.
+func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string, allowed map[string]bool) error {
+	if allowed == nil {
+		allowed = safeClaimsFields
+	}
+	trees, err := parse.Parse("headerTemplate", templateStr, "{{", "}}", validateTemplateParseFuncs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid template: %w", err)
+	}
+	// {{define}}/{{block}} produce additional named trees; a header value template
+	// must be a single anonymous template, so reject anything that defines more.
+	if len(trees) != 1 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("template definitions ({{define}}/{{block}}) are not allowed")
+	}
+	tree, ok := trees["headerTemplate"]
+	if !ok || tree.Root == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid template: empty parse tree")
+	}
+	v := &templateValidator{allowed: allowed}
+	// dotIsRoot=true: "." is the whole data context at the top level. Inside a
+	// range/with over a claims field it rebinds to that (already-whitelisted)
+	// element, so relative access there is safe.
+	return v.walkNode(tree.Root, true)
+}
+
+// walkNode validates a node and its children. dotIsRoot reports whether "."
+// currently refers to the root data context (true) or to a whitelisted claim
+// element rebound by an enclosing range/with (false).
+func (v *templateValidator) walkNode(n parse.Node, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	switch node := n.(type) {
+	case nil:
+		return nil
+	case *parse.ListNode:
+		if node == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		for _, child := range node.Nodes {
+			if err := v.walkNode(child, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	case *parse.TextNode:
+		return nil
+	case *parse.ActionNode:
+		return v.validatePipe(node.Pipe, dotIsRoot)
+	case *parse.IfNode:
+		return v.walkBranch(node.Pipe, node.List, node.ElseList, dotIsRoot, dotIsRoot)
+	case *parse.WithNode:
+		// with rebinds "." to the target inside its body; the target must be a
+		// whitelisted claim, so the body runs with dotIsRoot=false.
+		if err := v.validateClaimSelector(node.Pipe, dotIsRoot, "with"); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return v.walkBranch(nil, node.List, node.ElseList, false, dotIsRoot)
+	case *parse.RangeNode:
+		// range iterates the target and rebinds "." to each element; the target
+		// must be a whitelisted claim collection, so the body is dotIsRoot=false.
+		if err := v.validateClaimSelector(node.Pipe, dotIsRoot, "range"); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return v.walkBranch(nil, node.List, node.ElseList, false, dotIsRoot)
+	case *parse.TemplateNode:
+		return fmt.Errorf("template inclusion is not allowed")
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported template construct: %s", n.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// walkBranch validates an if/with/range: an optional condition pipe (evaluated
+// in the outer scope), the body (bodyDotIsRoot), and the else branch (outer
+// scope). For with/range the condition pipe is validated by the caller and
+// condPipe is nil here.
+func (v *templateValidator) walkBranch(condPipe *parse.PipeNode, body, elseList *parse.ListNode, bodyDotIsRoot, outerDotIsRoot bool) error {
+	if condPipe != nil {
+		if err := v.validatePipe(condPipe, outerDotIsRoot); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := v.walkNode(body, bodyDotIsRoot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if elseList != nil {
+		if err := v.walkNode(elseList, outerDotIsRoot); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validatePipe validates every command in a pipeline, including the right-hand
+// side of any variable declaration ($x := ...). Declared vars therefore always
+// hold already-validated values, so later references to them are safe.
+func (v *templateValidator) validatePipe(pipe *parse.PipeNode, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	if pipe == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	for _, cmd := range pipe.Cmds {
+		if err := v.validateCommand(cmd, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateCommand validates a single command (one stage of a pipeline). The
+// first argument may be the get/default function; the rest, and every argument
+// of a non-function command, must be a safe value expression.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateCommand(cmd *parse.CommandNode, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	if cmd == nil || len(cmd.Args) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if id, ok := cmd.Args[0].(*parse.IdentifierNode); ok {
+		return v.validateFunctionCall(id.Ident, cmd.Args[1:], dotIsRoot)
+	}
+	for _, arg := range cmd.Args {
+		if err := v.validateValue(arg, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateFunctionCall allows only get/default. get's map argument must be a
+// claims reference (never the root) and default's arguments are validated as
+// values; the runtime get additionally enforces the key whitelist.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateFunctionCall(name string, args []parse.Node, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	switch name {
+	case "default":
+		for _, arg := range args {
+			if err := v.validateValue(arg, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	case "get":
+		if len(args) < 1 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("get requires a map argument")
+		}
+		// The map argument must reference .Claims, never the root map (which
+		// would expose tokens / the whole Claims map). Remaining args (the key,
+		// possibly a pipeline) are validated as values.
+		if err := v.validateClaimsReference(args[0], dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("get is only allowed on .Claims: %w", err)
+		}
+		// A literal key must be whitelisted (matches direct .Claims.<field>
+		// strictness); a dynamic key is enforced by the runtime get.
+		if len(args) >= 2 {
+			if key, ok := args[1].(*parse.StringNode); ok && !v.allowed[key.Text] {
+				return fmt.Errorf("access to Claims.%s is not allowed for security reasons", key.Text)
+			}
+		}
+		for _, arg := range args[1:] {
+			if err := v.validateValue(arg, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("function %q is not allowed in header templates", name)
+	}
+}
+
+// validateValue validates an expression that may be rendered or passed as an
+// argument. It rejects anything resolving to the whole root or the whole Claims
+// map, and any non-whitelisted claim.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateValue(node parse.Node, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	switch val := node.(type) {
+	case *parse.StringNode, *parse.NumberNode, *parse.BoolNode, *parse.NilNode:
+		return nil
+	case *parse.DotNode:
+		// "." is the whole root at the top level (dumps tokens + all claims); it
+		// is a single already-whitelisted claim element inside a range/with body.
+		if dotIsRoot {
+			return fmt.Errorf("rendering the whole data context ({{.}}) is not allowed")
+		}
+		return nil
+	case *parse.FieldNode:
+		return v.validateFieldAccess(val.Ident, dotIsRoot)
+	case *parse.VariableNode:
+		return v.validateVariableAccess(val.Ident)
+	case *parse.PipeNode:
+		return v.validatePipe(val, dotIsRoot)
+	case *parse.ChainNode:
+		// (base).Field.Field — the field chain only narrows access, so validating
+		// the base value is sufficient.
+		return v.validateValue(val.Node, dotIsRoot)
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported template expression: %s", node.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// validateFieldAccess validates a dot-relative field access ".A.B.C" given
+// whether "." is the root. In an element scope (dotIsRoot=false) the element is
+// already a whitelisted claim, so any sub-field access is safe.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateFieldAccess(idents []string, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	if !dotIsRoot {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if len(idents) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rendering the whole data context is not allowed")
+	}
+	root := idents[0]
+	if allowedRootTokenFields[root] {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if root == "Claims" {
+		if len(idents) < 2 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("rendering the whole Claims map ({{.Claims}}) is not allowed")
+		}
+		if !v.allowed[idents[1]] {
+			return fmt.Errorf("access to Claims.%s is not allowed for security reasons", idents[1])
+		}
+		// By design, only the top-level claim is whitelisted; deeper subfields
+		// (idents[2:]) of a map-valued whitelisted claim such as realm_access /
+		// resource_access are forwarded as-is. Whitelisting a map claim means
+		// opting into its nested contents, and the documented Keycloak pattern
+		// {{with .Claims.realm_access}}{{.roles}}{{end}} relies on it; nested
+		// provider keys can't be enumerated to whitelist individually.
+		return nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("access to .%s is not allowed in header templates", root)
+}
+
+// validateVariableAccess validates a $-variable reference. The bare root ("$"
+// and "$.x") is treated as a root field access; a named range/with/declaration
+// variable holds an already-validated value, so it and its sub-fields are safe.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateVariableAccess(idents []string) error {
+	if len(idents) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if idents[0] == "$" {
+		// "$" is the root: "$" alone dumps everything; "$.Claims.email" is a
+		// root-absolute field access validated like ".Claims.email".
+		if len(idents) == 1 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("rendering the whole data context ({{$}}) is not allowed")
+		}
+		return v.validateFieldAccess(idents[1:], true)
+	}
+	// Named variable ($e, $i, $x): holds a validated element/index/value.
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateClaimsReference requires a node to reference .Claims (or $.Claims),
+// never the root map — used for get's map argument, whose key is separately
+// enforced against the whitelist at render time.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateClaimsReference(node parse.Node, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	switch ref := node.(type) {
+	case *parse.FieldNode:
+		if dotIsRoot && len(ref.Ident) >= 1 && ref.Ident[0] == "Claims" {
+			if len(ref.Ident) >= 2 && !v.allowed[ref.Ident[1]] {
+				return fmt.Errorf("access to Claims.%s is not allowed for security reasons", ref.Ident[1])
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+	case *parse.VariableNode:
+		if len(ref.Ident) >= 2 && ref.Ident[0] == "$" && ref.Ident[1] == "Claims" {
+			if len(ref.Ident) >= 3 && !v.allowed[ref.Ident[2]] {
+				return fmt.Errorf("access to Claims.%s is not allowed for security reasons", ref.Ident[2])
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("expected a .Claims reference")
+}
+
+// validateClaimSelector validates the target of a range/with: it must iterate a
+// specific whitelisted claim field (.Claims.<field> or $.Claims.<field>), never
+// the bare Claims map or any non-claims value.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateClaimSelector(pipe *parse.PipeNode, dotIsRoot bool, kind string) error {
+	if pipe == nil || len(pipe.Cmds) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s requires a .Claims.<field> target", kind)
+	}
+	cmd := pipe.Cmds[len(pipe.Cmds)-1]
+	if len(cmd.Args) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s requires a .Claims.<field> target", kind)
+	}
+	target := cmd.Args[0]
+	if err := v.validateClaimField(target, dotIsRoot); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s is only allowed over a whitelisted claims field, e.g. {{range $i, $e := .Claims.groups}} or {{with .Claims.email}}: %w", kind, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateClaimField requires a node to be a specific whitelisted claim field
+// (.Claims.<whitelisted> or $.Claims.<whitelisted>) — stricter than
+// validateClaimsReference, which also permits the bare .Claims map for get.
+func (v *templateValidator) validateClaimField(node parse.Node, dotIsRoot bool) error {
+	switch field := node.(type) {
+	case *parse.FieldNode:
+		if dotIsRoot && len(field.Ident) >= 2 && field.Ident[0] == "Claims" && v.allowed[field.Ident[1]] {
+			return nil
+		}
+	case *parse.VariableNode:
+		if len(field.Ident) >= 3 && field.Ident[0] == "$" && field.Ident[1] == "Claims" && v.allowed[field.Ident[2]] {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("not a whitelisted .Claims.<field>")
+}

version.go

@@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ const devPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"
 // from build info at runtime (debug.ReadBuildInfo sees Traefik's build graph,
 // not the interpreted plugin). This build-stamped constant is therefore the
 // single source of truth for the version reported by anonymous usage telemetry.
-const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"
+const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.28"