R89: normalize excluded-url paths; apply defaults to pooled HTTP clients

Two verified defects from R89 scout round:

1. Excluded-URL dot-segment traversal widening (P1, auth bypass).
   shouldBypassAuth passes req.URL.Path raw (middleware.go:54); Go's server
   leaves '..' in URL.Path (url.ParseRequestURI does not normalize), so an
   exclusion for /public also matched /public/../admin, letting a real
   sibling (/admin) reach the backend unauthenticated. pathExcluded now
   path.Clean()s the request path ('.' -> '' to preserve root semantics)
   before boundary matching. Regression TestR89ExcludedPathDotTraversal
   fails on old (all 4 traversal cases wrongly excluded), passes on new.

2. Pooled HTTP client had no zero-value defaults (P2, unbounded stall).
   CreateHTTPClient applies defaults; CreatePooledHTTPClient and
   GetOrCreateTransport did not, so a partial config yielded Timeout=0 and
   ResponseHeaderTimeout=0 (a hanging upstream stalls forever). Extracted
   applyHTTPClientDefaults (single source of truth) and applied it in all
   three construction paths; pool cache key now reflects normalized values.
   Regression TestR89PooledClientAppliesDefaults fails on old, passes on new.

R89 clean/declined: session max-age IS absolute-and-enforced-every-request
(verified, review_r68 already locks it); AllowedUserDomains fail-closed (P2
'*' not a wildcard, P3 TrimSpace — declined as config-scoped).
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-13 19:34:38 +01:00
parent 866e57380d
commit d0ec853499
4 changed files with 98 additions and 4 deletions
+14 -4
View File
@@ -138,10 +138,13 @@ func (f *HTTPClientFactory) ValidateHTTPClientConfig(config *HTTPClientConfig) e
return nil
}
// CreateHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with the given configuration
// Validates configuration parameters before creating the client
func (f *HTTPClientFactory) CreateHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
// Set defaults for zero values before validation
// applyHTTPClientDefaults fills zero-valued fields in cfg with the standard
// conservative defaults so that a partially-populated config never yields an
// unbounded HTTP client (zero overall Timeout or ResponseHeaderTimeout would make
// a stalled upstream hang forever). All construction paths MUST converge on this
// helper so behavior is identical: CreateHTTPClient and the shared transport
// pool (CreatePooledHTTPClient / GetOrCreateTransport).
func applyHTTPClientDefaults(config *HTTPClientConfig) {
if config.Timeout == 0 {
config.Timeout = 30 * time.Second
}
@@ -178,6 +181,13 @@ func (f *HTTPClientFactory) CreateHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Clie
if config.ReadBufferSize == 0 {
config.ReadBufferSize = 4096
}
}
// CreateHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with the given configuration
// Validates configuration parameters before creating the client
func (f *HTTPClientFactory) CreateHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
// Set defaults for zero values before validation
applyHTTPClientDefaults(&config)
// Validate configuration - only fail on critical errors
if err := f.ValidateHTTPClientConfig(&config); err != nil {
+9
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@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ func GetGlobalTransportPool() *SharedTransportPool {
// GetOrCreateTransport gets or creates a shared transport with the given config
func (p *SharedTransportPool) GetOrCreateTransport(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Transport {
// Apply the same zero-value defaults as CreateHTTPClient so a partially
// populated config never yields an unbounded client/transport, and so the
// pool cache key reflects normalized values (configKey). Bounded here,
// before the client-count gate, so both the gate and the key see
// normalized timeouts.
applyHTTPClientDefaults(&config)
// SECURITY FIX: Check client limit before creating new transport.
if atomic.LoadInt32(&p.clientCount) >= p.maxClients {
// At the client limit: only reuse a transport that was built for the
@@ -282,6 +288,9 @@ func (p *SharedTransportPool) Cleanup() {
// CreatePooledHTTPClient creates an HTTP client using the shared transport pool
func CreatePooledHTTPClient(config HTTPClientConfig) *http.Client {
// Apply the same zero-value defaults as CreateHTTPClient so a partially
// populated config still gets a bounded overall request Timeout.
applyHTTPClientDefaults(&config)
pool := GetGlobalTransportPool()
transport := pool.GetOrCreateTransport(config)
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
)
// R89 regression: pathExcluded matched the RAW request path as a string
// prefix. Go's server leaves ".." in req.URL.Path (url.ParseRequestURI does
// not normalize dot segments), so an exclusion for "/public" also matched
// "/public/../admin", letting a dot-segment traversal reach a sibling
// resource (e.g. /admin) unauthenticated. The matcher must normalize the
// request path (path.Clean) before the boundary comparison so traversal
// cannot widen an exclusion into an authentication bypass.
func TestR89ExcludedPathDotTraversal(t *testing.T) {
// Exact-matching and legitimate-subtree exclusions must be preserved.
if !pathExcluded("/public", "/public") {
t.Error("exact match should be excluded")
}
if !pathExcluded("/public/page", "/public") {
t.Error("sub-path should still be excluded")
}
if !pathExcluded("/public/./page", "/public") {
t.Error("un-escaped ./ inside the excluded subtree should still be excluded")
}
// Dot-segment traversal must NOT escape INTO the exclusion namespace and
// thereby reach a sibling resource unauthenticated.
if pathExcluded("/public/../admin", "/public") {
t.Error("excluded /public must not also cover /admin reached via ../ (auth bypass)")
}
if pathExcluded("/public/..", "/public") {
t.Error("excluded /public must not cover root reached via ..")
}
if pathExcluded("/public/../", "/public") {
t.Error("excluded /public must not cover the bare root reached via ../")
}
if pathExcluded("/public/x/../../admin", "/public") {
t.Error("nested traversal must not escape the subtree into /admin")
}
}
// R89 regression: CreatePooledHTTPClient / GetOrCreateTransport must apply the
// same zero-value defaults as CreateHTTPClient. Before, a partially populated
// config (e.g. only {Timeout: 10s}, or zero) produced an http.Client with
// Timeout == 0 and a transport with ResponseHeaderTimeout == 0 — an unbounded
// stall on a hanging upstream. Both must now be bounded by the shared
// defaults.
func TestR89PooledClientAppliesDefaults(t *testing.T) {
client := CreatePooledHTTPClient(HTTPClientConfig{})
if client.Timeout == 0 {
t.Error("pooled HTTP client must carry a default overall Timeout; zero = unbounded stall")
}
tr, ok := client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("pooled client transport is %T, want *http.Transport", client.Transport)
}
if tr.ResponseHeaderTimeout == 0 {
t.Error("pooled transport must carry a default ResponseHeaderTimeout; zero = unbounded stall")
}
if tr.IdleConnTimeout == 0 {
t.Error("pooled transport must carry a default IdleConnTimeout")
}
}
+11
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"path"
"strings"
)
@@ -33,6 +34,16 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) determineExcludedURL(currentRequest string) bool {
// an unrelated sibling such as "/publicsecret", so a configured exclusion can no
// longer be widened into an authentication bypass on a different resource.
func pathExcluded(requestPath, excluded string) bool {
// Normalize dot segments and redundant slashes so an exclusion cannot be
// escaped by traversal. Go's server leaves ".." in req.URL.Path (verified:
// url.ParseRequestURI keeps dot segments), so "/public/../admin" would match
// an "/public" exclusion even though the real resource is "/admin". path.Clean
// resolves this to "/admin" before the boundary check. "." (empty or bare)
// maps back to "" preserving the original root-match semantics.
requestPath = path.Clean(requestPath)
if requestPath == "." {
requestPath = ""
}
excluded = strings.TrimRight(excluded, "/")
if excluded == "" {
// A "/" (root) exclusion only matches the root path, not everything.