traefik-llmgateway

A Traefik middleware plugin that turns a Traefik instance into a multi-provider LLM gateway: one endpoint, several upstream providers, per-user API keys organised into groups, request/token/cost limits, and a registry plus authenticated proxy for in-cluster MCP servers and A2A agents.

The plugin is self-contained. It has no sidecar and no companion service. It runs as a Yaegi-interpreted Go module, the same way traefikoidc does, configured per-middleware in Traefik's dynamic configuration.

Status: stable at v1.0. Configuration keys, endpoints, and behaviour now follow semver — breaking changes wait for a major release instead of landing between patches, as they could before 1.0.

Feature-complete, all gates green (unit tests, -race, yaegi-check, integration), and published to the Traefik Plugin Catalog. One behaviour worth knowing before you deploy: streaming is delivered buffered rather than token-by-token under the current Traefik + Yaegi combination.

What it is

• A unified, OpenAI-compatible surface (/v1/chat/completions, /v1/embeddings, /v1/models) that translates requests and responses to and from Anthropic's and Google Gemini's own wire formats, so any OpenAI-SDK-compatible client can talk to all three providers through one API shape.
• An Anthropic-compatible surface (POST /v1/messages) for Anthropic SDK clients — including Claude Code — to talk to any configured provider in Anthropic's own Messages API shape; see Anthropic Messages API (/v1/messages).
• Native passthrough per provider (/{provider}/...) for callers that want a provider's own wire format untouched, with the gateway injecting that provider's own API key and still enforcing auth and limits.
• Per-user API keys, organised into groups that control which providers, models, MCP servers, and agents a user can reach, plus request/token/cost limits enforced per user and per group.
• A registry and authenticated reverse proxy for MCP servers and A2A agents, so those can sit behind the same gateway, the same auth, and the same group-based visibility rules as the LLM traffic.

Request flow diagram (mermaid — renders on GitHub)

flowchart LR
    Req["incoming request"] --> Route{"route<br/>ServeHTTP: path+method dispatch"}
    Route -->|"a recognized route:<br/>/v1/models, /v1/chat/completions,<br/>/v1/embeddings, /v1/mcp/servers,<br/>/v1/agents, /mcp (federated),<br/>/mcp/name/...,<br/>/a2a/name/..., or /providerName/...<br/>for a known provider"| Auth["auth (per branch)<br/>identify(): key digest lookup"]
    Route -->|"no route matches"| Fallback["passthroughUnknown ? next : 404<br/>never calls identify()"]
    Auth -->|"no match"| E401["401 authentication_error"]
    Auth -->|"user, group"| Branch{"branch"}
    Branch --> Models["GET /v1/models"]
    Branch --> Unified["POST /v1/chat/completions<br/>POST /v1/embeddings"]
    Branch --> Registry["GET /v1/mcp/servers, /v1/agents"]
    Branch --> MCP["MCP/A2A proxy"]
    Branch --> Federated["POST /mcp (federated JSON-RPC)"]
    Branch --> Passthrough["native passthrough"]
    Unified --> Resolve["resolve model<br/>registry.resolve"]
    Resolve -->|"unknown/denied"| E404["404 / 403"]
    Resolve --> Limit1["limiter.checkAndCount"]
    MCP --> Limit2["limiter.checkAndCount"]
    Federated --> Limit4["limiter.checkAndCount"]
    Passthrough --> Limit3["limiter.checkAndCount"]
    Limit1 -->|"over budget"| E429["429 / 503"]
    Limit2 -->|"over budget"| E429
    Limit3 -->|"over budget"| E429
    Limit4 -->|"over budget"| E429
    Limit1 --> Exec["execute: translate + call adapter"]
    Limit2 --> ExecProxy["execute: reverse proxy"]
    Limit3 --> ExecProxy
    Limit4 --> ExecFed["execute: answer locally, or<br/>JSON-RPC call(s) to backend server(s)"]
    Exec --> Account["account: usage, cost"]
    Account --> Resp["respond to client"]
    ExecProxy --> Resp
    ExecFed --> Resp
    Models --> Resp
    Registry --> Resp

Every route the plugin recognises is handled entirely inside the middleware — next (the router's configured backing service) is only reached when a request matches none of the plugin's routes and passthroughUnknown is true.

Quickstart

Static configuration

The plugin is in the Traefik Plugin Catalog, so the catalog form of static configuration works:

experimental:
  plugins:
    llmgateway:
      moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway
      version: v1.0.3

You can also load it as a localPlugin, mounting this repository's source into the Traefik container at <plugins-local dir>/src/github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway. That form tracks a branch instead of a pinned release, which suits development and any deployment that wants to follow main — see examples/docker-compose.yml for a working, tested setup that does exactly this:

# traefik static config (traefik.yml / --experimental.localPlugins.*)
experimental:
  localPlugins:
    llmgateway:
      moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway

The catalog form above pins a released tag instead, which is the better default for production: a pod restart cannot pick up a change you have not deployed on purpose.

Dynamic configuration

A minimal single-provider middleware, one group, one user:

http:
  middlewares:
    llmgateway:
      plugin:
        llmgateway:
          providers:
            openai:
              type: openai
              apiKey: "env:OPENAI_API_KEY"
              models: ["gpt-5-mini", "gpt-4o"]
          groups:
            default:
              providers: [] # empty = every configured provider is allowed
          users:
            inline:
              - name: alice
                group: default
                apiKey: "env:LLMGW_KEY_ALICE"

Write an "allow everything" group as providers: [] (an explicit empty list), not a bare {}. See the note at the top of examples/kubernetes.yaml — confirmed against Traefik's file provider, twice, with this exact plugin build: a bare default: {} fails plugin construction with expected a map, got 'string'; default: {providers: []} loads cleanly. Not tested against the Docker/ECS label providers or the Kubernetes CRD provider — no claim either way for those. An explicit empty list means the same thing as an empty object (all values allowed), so writing it this way costs nothing even where the bug does not apply.

Attach the middleware to a router the same way as any other Traefik middleware. The router's backing service is never actually reached unless passthroughUnknown: true and the request matches none of the plugin's routes — a small dummy service (traefik/whoami, or any always-up internal service) is enough.

Call it:

curl http://llm.example.com/v1/chat/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LLMGW_KEY_ALICE" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"gpt-5-mini","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'

Full configuration reference

Every limit or visibility list follows one convention throughout: empty or omitted means unlimited / all. Field names below are the exact JSON keys the plugin's Go structs expect (llmgateway.go); Traefik's dynamic config accepts them as YAML, which decodes to the same JSON shape.

Config (top level)

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
providers	map[string]ProviderConfig	—	Required, at least one entry, or the plugin refuses to construct.
groups	map[string]GroupConfig	{}	Optional. A user references one group by name; an unknown reference is a construction error.
pricing	map[string]ModelPricing	{}	Per-model USD/1M-token overrides, keyed by model id (bare or provider/model). Merged over, not replacing, the built-in table (pricing.go).
mcpServers	map[string]TargetConfig	{}	MCP server registry; see MCP/A2A.
agents	map[string]AgentConfig	{}	A2A agent registry; see MCP/A2A.
users	UsersConfig	—	Inline and/or file-backed API-key holders. With none configured, every request is unauthenticated and gets 401.
redis	RedisConfig	—	Distributed limit-counter backend. Omitted means in-process counters only (per-replica, approximate across multiple Traefik instances).
retry	RetryConfig	{} (disabled)	Same-provider retry for transient upstream failures — see Retry. Omitted or enabled: false means no retry: every request makes exactly one upstream attempt, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed.
failover	FailoverConfig	{} (disabled)	Cross-provider failover for a bare model id more than one configured provider serves — see Failover. Omitted or enabled: false means no failover, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed. enabled: true opts in; a deployment with no overlapping providers behaves exactly as before regardless of this setting either way.
requestTimeout	string (Go duration)	5m	Progress-based upstream request timeout, applied to every provider adapter call, native passthrough, and the MCP/A2A target proxy — see Request timeout. Behavior change for every deployment: before this field existed, no timeout was set at all, so a provider that accepted a connection and then went silent hung the request forever. A provider's own requestTimeout (ProviderConfig) overrides this. Empty means the default; a value that fails to parse, or parses to zero or a negative duration, is a construction error.
cache	CacheConfig	{} (disabled)	Opt-in Redis-backed response cache for unified non-streaming chat/embeddings — see Caching. Omitted or enabled: false means no caching, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed.
breaker	BreakerConfig	{} (every default)	Per-provider discovery circuit breaker — see Provider health (discovery circuit breaker). Every field is individually zero-means-default; a provider whose discovery never fails is unaffected regardless of what this block contains.
admin	*AdminConfig	nil (disabled)	Read-only admin dashboard — see Admin. nil or enabled: false means the /admin* routes are not registered at all.
metrics	*MetricsConfig	nil (disabled)	Prometheus text-exposition endpoint — see Metrics. nil or enabled: false means the metrics route is not registered at all.
modelAliases	map[string]string	{}	Operator-defined alias id → target model id — see Model aliases. Omitted or empty means no aliases, byte-identical to a gateway built before this field existed.
modelMeta	map[string]*ModelMetaConfig	{}	Per-model context-window and cost overrides, keyed by exact provider/model or a bare model id — see Model metadata. Omitted or empty means no overrides; every model's metadata still resolves through discovery and the built-in table.
passthroughUnknown	bool	false	false: a request matching none of the plugin's routes gets a 404 JSON envelope. true: it falls through to the router's own backing service. Does not cover the three media routes — see the upgrade note below.
maxInFlightBodyRequests	int	0 (self-tuned)	Caps how many unified/media requests may concurrently be inside their own request-body read+decode step — see Body-admission limit. 0 self-tunes from the host's own GOMAXPROCS; a positive value pins an exact cap instead, clamped to a maximum of 10,000.

Upgrading from v0.1: POST /v1/images/generations, POST /v1/audio/speech, and POST /v1/audio/transcriptions are now handled by the gateway itself, unconditionally — see Image and audio endpoints. They no longer fall through to next even when passthroughUnknown: true. A v0.1 deployment that served its own backend on any of these three exact paths, relying on passthrough to reach it, must move that backend to a different path before upgrading to v0.2 — the gateway now intercepts these paths first, every time.

Provider, mcpServers, and agents map keys (names) must match ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$ and must not be v1, mcp, or a2a — those names are reserved because they would shadow the gateway's own fixed routes (/v1/..., /mcp/{name}/..., /a2a/{name}/...); a name that collides is a construction error, not a silently-unreachable provider. A nil map value under any of providers, groups, mcpServers, or agents is also a construction error, never a panic (providers.go, mcp_a2a.go, auth.go).

ProviderConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
type	string	—	Required: openai, anthropic, or gemini. openai also serves any OpenAI-wire-compatible provider (Grok, DeepSeek, a local vLLM/Ollama gateway, ...) via baseUrl.
baseUrl	string	Per type: https://api.openai.com, https://api.anthropic.com, https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com	Trailing slash trimmed.
apiKey	string	—	Secret form: literal, env:VAR, or file:/path — see Secret forms. An openai-type provider resolving to an empty key is a valid keyless upstream (no Authorization header sent) — useful for a local model server with no auth. anthropic and gemini reject an empty resolved key at construction.
discoveryInterval	string (Go duration)	1h	Only meaningful when discovery: true. Invalid duration string is a construction error.
models	[]string	[]	Explicit model ids this provider serves. Combined with any discovered ids.
discovery	bool	false	Pull the provider's own model-listing endpoint at startup and on discoveryInterval. A discovery failure is logged and non-fatal; construction still succeeds on models alone.
metadataPath	string	"" (no metadata capture)	Only read by openai-type providers. A second endpoint, fetched alongside discovery, that reports per-model context length — for example /api/v0/models on an LM Studio server. Must start with / when set (checked at construction). See Model metadata.
passthrough	*bool	nil (enabled)	nil or true: this provider's native passthrough route (/{name}/...) stays reachable, unchanged from before this field existed. false: the route is disabled — ServeHTTP treats it exactly like an unconfigured provider name, falling through to the ordinary unknown-route 404 without even reaching authentication. Does not affect the MCP/A2A target proxy, which has its own routing prefix.
requestTimeout	string (Go duration)	Inherits the top-level requestTimeout (5m if that is also unset)	Overrides the global request timeout for this provider alone, including its native passthrough route — see Request timeout. An explicit override always wins over the global default. Empty inherits; a value that fails to parse, or parses to zero or a negative duration, is a construction error.

GroupConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
limits	*LimitsConfig	nil (unlimited)
providers	[]string	[] (all)	Glob-matched (path.Match) against a provider's configured name.
models	[]string	[] (all)	Glob-matched, exactly as given — no automatic provider/ prefix stripping. Both the bare and provider-prefixed forms of a model id are checked, so a pattern like gpt-* matches a client request for either gpt-5-mini or openai/gpt-5-mini.
cache	*bool	nil (inherit)	Overrides the top-level cache.enabled setting for this group's requests — see Caching. nil inherits the global setting; false opts the group out even when caching is globally on; true opts the group in, but only when the top-level cache block is actually configured (a construction error otherwise — there is nothing to inherit ttl/maxBodyBytes from).
cacheTTL	string	"" (inherit)	Sets the TTL written when this group's own request populates a cache entry — see Caching. It does not scope entries to a group: cache entries are shared across every group that can reach the model (see the Caching section's "User identity is not part of the key" note, which applies to group identity too), so this controls a write's TTL only, not which group can read the entry. Empty inherits the global TTL. A set value must be a valid, positive Go duration ("30s", "5m"), and requires the top-level cache block to be configured — a construction error otherwise, the same "nothing to inherit from" reasoning as cache: true above.
mcpServers	[]string	[] (all)	Glob-matched against a configured MCP server name.
agents	[]string	[] (all)	Glob-matched against a configured agent name.
passthroughPaths	[]string	[] (all)	Restricts which REST path this group's native passthrough requests may address — glob-matched (path.Match) against the path segment after the provider name (e.g. v1/files for a request to /openai/v1/files). Empty is allow-all, matching every other field on this table — not ["*"]: path.Match's * does not cross /, so a literal ["*"] pattern denies every multi-segment rest (almost all real passthrough traffic). Leave this unset to actually allow everything. See Unified vs. passthrough for the related model-authorization rule.

LimitsConfig

All six fields default to 0 (unlimited). A negative count, or a cost that is negative, NaN, or ±Inf, is a construction error.

Field	Type	Window
requestsPerMinute	int64	Fixed 1-minute window, UTC.
requestsPerDay	int64	Fixed calendar-day window, UTC midnight to midnight.
tokensPerDay	int64	Fixed calendar-day window, UTC.
tokensPerMonth	int64	Fixed calendar-month window, UTC.
costPerDayUSD	float64	Fixed calendar-day window, UTC.
costPerMonthUSD	float64	Fixed calendar-month window, UTC.

Every window enforces correctly on the in-process fallback too, not only Redis — see Limits and accounting's "Fallback" bullet for the retention floor that keeps tokensPerMonth/costPerMonthUSD a true calendar-month budget rather than a rolling one when Redis is absent or down.

A user's own limits, when set, are checked in addition to their group's limits, not instead of them — a request is refused the moment it breaches whichever of the two is tighter. A user with no limits of their own is governed purely by their group's — see UserConfig.

UsersConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
file	string	—	Path to a JSON users file, merged over inline and hot-reloaded — see Users file.
inline	[]UserConfig	[]	Resolved once at plugin construction.

UserConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
name	string	—	Required.
group	string	—	Required; must reference a configured group, or construction fails.
apiKey	string	—	Secret form (see Secret forms); must resolve non-empty and unique across every inline and file-sourced user.
limits	*LimitsConfig	nil (governed by group's limits alone)	When set, enforced alongside — not instead of — the group's own limits; both scopes are checked, and the request is refused by whichever is breached first.
admin	bool	false	Grants access to the read-only admin dashboard — see Admin. Works the same for an inline or a file-sourced user. An admin user is otherwise ordinary: their own keys, group, and limits still apply, including to the admin routes themselves.

RedisConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
address	string	—	Required when the redis block is present at all. host:port, RESP protocol — works against Redis, Valkey, or Dragonfly.
password	string	"" (no AUTH)	Secret form.
db	int	0	Must be ≥ 0. Sent via SELECT on every new connection.
failOpen	*bool	true	true: a Redis error switches that operation to the in-process fallback store and logs (rate-limited to once per 30s). false: a Redis error returns 503 instead of enforcing against a non-shared fallback.

RetryConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
enabled	bool	false	false: no retry, one upstream attempt per request. true: retry per Retry below.
attempts	int	1	Retries performed after the first try, not the total try count. 1 (default) allows one retry — two tries total. The maximum, 3, allows three retries — four tries total. A value outside 1-3 is a construction error.
backoff	string (Go duration)	250ms	Base wait before the first retry; doubles on each further retry, capped at 2s per wait. Invalid duration string is a construction error.

CacheConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
enabled	bool	false	false: no caching, /v1/chat/completions and /v1/embeddings behave byte-identically to a gateway built before this field existed. true: caching per Caching below — requires redis to be configured too, or it silently stays off (one warning logged).
ttl	string (Go duration)	5m	How long a cached response stays valid. Invalid duration string is a construction error.
maxBodyBytes	int	1048576 (1MiB)	Largest response body still eligible for caching; a larger one is skipped (never stored, never an error). Maximum accepted value is 8388608 (8MiB) — above that is a construction error.

BreakerConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
failureThreshold	int	3	Consecutive failed discovery refreshes that open the breaker — see Provider health. 0 uses the default. Must be between 1 and 100, or construction fails.
openDuration	string (Go duration)	1m	Base backoff a newly opened breaker waits before its first half-open probe; doubles on every further failed probe, capped at maxOpenDuration. Invalid or non-positive duration string is a construction error.
maxOpenDuration	string (Go duration)	6h	Ceiling on the backoff openDuration doubles into. Must be >= openDuration and no more than 24h, or construction fails. Deliberately longer than the default discoveryInterval (1h) — see Provider health for why a value at or below discoveryInterval suppresses nothing.

AdminConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
enabled	bool	false	false: the /admin* routes are not registered at all — a request to any of them falls through to the plugin's existing 404/passthroughUnknown handling like any other unrecognized path. true: the read-only dashboard per Admin below.

MetricsConfig

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
enabled	bool	false	false: the metrics route is not registered at all. true: the Prometheus text-exposition endpoint per Metrics below.
path	string	/metrics	Overrides the served path.
allowedCIDRs	[]string	[] (no bypass)	CIDR blocks whose source address may scrape without an admin key — e.g. 10.42.0.0/16 for a cluster's pod network. Never use a whole RFC1918 range like 10.0.0.0/8 — see Metrics's own warning for why that specific mistake is live-reproducible, not theoretical.
modelLabel	bool	false	Adds a model label to the provider attempt/failure counters, breaking them out per (provider, model) pair. Off by default: a deployment with hundreds of discovered model ids is a series-count explosion waiting to happen.

ModelPricing

Field	Type	Semantics
inputPerM	float64	USD per 1,000,000 input/prompt tokens.
outputPerM	float64	USD per 1,000,000 output/completion tokens.

ModelMetaConfig (a modelMeta entry)

Overrides one model's context window and per-token cost for display — see Model metadata. Distinct from ModelPricing above, which drives request-cost accounting: modelMeta never changes what a request is billed.

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
contextTokens	int	0 (not overridden)	A value of 0 falls through to the next layer (discovery, then the built-in table) instead of overriding with an unknown value. Must not be negative.
inputCostPerMTokMicroUsd	int64	0 (not overridden)	Input cost per 1,000,000 tokens, in micro-USD (1 USD = 1,000,000). 0 falls through to the next layer unless free is set. Must not be negative.
outputCostPerMTokMicroUsd	int64	0 (not overridden)	Output cost per 1,000,000 tokens, in micro-USD. Same fallthrough rule as inputCostPerMTokMicroUsd.
free	bool	false	true sets both cost fields to an explicit, known zero — distinct from leaving them at 0, which means "not overridden here, keep looking." Rejected at construction when combined with a non-zero cost field (contradictory).

TargetConfig (an mcpServers entry)

Field	Type	Semantics
url	string	Required; must parse with an http or https scheme, checked at construction.

AgentConfig (an agents entry)

Field	Type	Default	Semantics
url	string	—	Required; same URL validation as TargetConfig.
card	string	/.well-known/agent-card.json	Path appended to the agent's gateway-relative proxy URL for its A2A agent-card listing.

Secret forms

Every apiKey/password field accepts one of three forms (secrets.go):

• Literal — the value itself, used as-is. Fine for local/dev; avoid for anything real.
• env:VAR — read from environment variable VAR on the Traefik process. Errors if unset or empty.
• file:/path — read from a file, trimmed of surrounding whitespace. Errors if unreadable or the trimmed content is empty.

Provider keys, Redis's password, and inline users' keys are resolved once, at plugin construction. A file-sourced user's apiKey is re-resolved on every hot reload (see below), so it can use env:/file: forms too and pick up a rotated value without a Traefik restart.

Users file format

One JSON object, one users array, mounted from a single Kubernetes Secret (users_file.go):

{
  "users": [
    {"name": "alice", "group": "engineering", "apiKey": "sk-llmgw-..."},
    {"name": "bob", "group": "general", "apiKey": "env:LLMGW_KEY_BOB", "limits": {"requestsPerDay": 100}}
  ]
}

A file user with the same name as an inline user overrides it (the inline entry is dropped from the merged set). Hot reload polls the file's mtime, throttled to once per 5 seconds on the request path, and is best-effort: a reload already in progress is skipped rather than serialising every concurrent request behind it, so a change lands within a few request-driven checks, not necessarily on the very next one. A reload's own error (unreadable file, malformed JSON, a user referencing an unknown group, a duplicate key) is logged and the last good user set is kept — a bad edit to the file never breaks already-authenticated traffic.

Model routing

• A model id in provider/model form resolves directly against that provider, but only when the part before the slash names an actually configured provider. Any other id — including one that merely contains a slash, such as an upstream's own uni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731 naming — is treated as a single bare id.
• A bare id resolves against the first configured provider, in sorted provider-name order, whose known model set (explicit models plus any discovered ids) contains it. When more than one provider knows the same bare id, the sorted-first provider wins it and the gateway logs a collision warning once per id; every provider's copy stays reachable through the explicit provider/model form regardless of who won the bare id, and GET /v1/models lists both the bare (winner's) form and every provider/model form.
• On the unified routes (modelRegistry.resolve, used by /v1/chat/completions, /v1/embeddings, and the three media endpoints), authorization requires both group.allowsModel and group.allowsProvider for the resolved provider — a model that exists but the caller's group cannot reach returns 403, distinct from a model no configured provider knows at all (404). Native passthrough (/{provider}/...) always checks group.allowsProvider, and additionally checks group.allowsModel — against a model field peeked from the request body — whenever the group's models list is non-empty; see Native passthrough model authorization and the authorization row in Unified vs. passthrough.
• Discovery: GET {baseUrl}/v1/models for an openai-type provider, GET {baseUrl}/v1/models for anthropic, GET {baseUrl}/v1beta/models for gemini. Runs once at plugin construction (bounded to 5s per provider) and again on discoveryInterval in the background. A failed refresh is logged and keeps the provider's last-known discovered set — stale-while-error, never an empty list just because one refresh attempt failed.

Model aliases

Operator-defined indirection: a client-facing alias id that resolves to a real target model id. modelAliases is empty by default, and an empty map changes nothing about model resolution — this is purely additive.

http:
  middlewares:
    llmgateway:
      plugin:
        llmgateway:
          # ... providers, groups, users unchanged ...
          modelAliases:
            # Client-facing name -> real target. The target can itself be
            # bare ("gpt-5-mini") or provider-prefixed
            # ("anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5"); either resolves through the
            # normal rules in [Model routing](#model-routing) above.
            aliased/coding: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5"
            aliased/fast: "gpt-5-mini"

• Swapping the underlying model: point an alias at a different target and let Traefik's dynamic-config reload apply it — no gateway restart, no client-side change. A client that has always addressed aliased/coding keeps working unmodified after the operator moves that alias to a newer model.
• Precedence: an EXACT alias match wins resolution before any other rule, including provider/model prefix splitting — checked first in modelRegistry.resolve. The target then resolves through the same rules as any other id (bare, provider/model, or a discovered id). Because of this, an alias whose id contains a / is rejected at construction if the part before the / names an actually configured provider (it would be shadowed by prefix resolution) — see the validation rules below.
• Authorization: a group may use an alias when its models glob matches the alias name itself, OR when it already grants access to the resolved target — either is enough. providers still gates the target's own provider as usual.
• Validation at construction (a bad alias config fails the same way a bad provider config does — no gateway starts with a broken alias table):
  • the alias must be non-empty and contain no control characters;
  • when the alias contains /, its prefix must not name a configured provider (would be shadowed by prefix resolution);
  • the alias must not equal an explicit models entry of any provider (ambiguous — which one wins?);
  • the target must not itself be another alias (no alias chains);
  • the target must not be empty. A target naming a model that is not yet known (awaiting a provider's first discovery fetch, or simply never configured) is accepted at construction — it resolves lazily. An unresolvable target at request time returns 404 with a message naming both the alias and the missing target. A target that is later discovered and collides with an already-configured alias id is not a construction error either — the alias always wins that resolution, and the gateway logs one warning per such id.
• GET /v1/models listing: every alias the caller's group may use is listed as a model object alongside real models — id is the alias, owned_by is the target's resolved provider name. An alias whose target does not resolve yet is omitted from the listing until it does.
• Echo behavior: exactly like the existing provider-prefix alias echo (__alias, Unified vs. passthrough) — anthropic- and gemini-type targets build their own response envelope and echo the client's exact alias string back in its model field. An openai-type target's response is a verbatim passthrough of the upstream body, so its model field carries whatever the upstream itself returned (typically the bare upstream model id) — not the alias — the same documented v0.1 passthrough asymmetry, unchanged by this feature.
• Applies everywhere a model routes: unified chat and embeddings, /v1/images/generations, /v1/audio/speech, and /v1/audio/transcriptions (including its multipart rewrite — the upstream model field receives the resolved target's own upstream id, never the alias, exactly like a provider-prefixed id already does).
• Admin overview: GET /admin/api/overview includes an aliases array ({alias, target}, sorted by alias) — see Admin. No secrets involved.

Model metadata

Per-model context window and per-token cost, resolved for display — GET /v1/models and the admin dashboard show what an operator or client actually knows about a model, without inventing a number nobody configured or reported. modelMeta (config overrides) is a separate config surface from pricing (request-cost accounting, see ModelPricing) — the two never affect each other.

Context and cost each resolve through their own layer stack (modelmeta.go's resolveModelMeta), most specific first:

1. Context: a modelMeta config override → a provider's own discovery-captured context (metadataPath, below) → the built-in table → unknown.
2. Cost: a modelMeta config override (or its free: true) → a ":free"-suffixed model id (see the free-tier note below) → the built-in table → unknown.

A field genuinely unknown at every layer stays unknown — never invented — and is omitted from GET /v1/models, not sent as a misleading zero.

http:
  middlewares:
    llmgateway:
      plugin:
        llmgateway:
          # ... providers, groups, users unchanged ...
          modelMeta:
            # Exact "provider/model" key.
            "uni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731":
              contextTokens: 524288
              free: true
            # Bare model id — applies wherever that bare id resolves.
            "ornith-397b/qwen3.6-27b/btl-4":
              contextTokens: 262144
              free: true

• Alias inheritance: a model alias inherits its target's fully resolved metadata, unless the alias id itself has its own modelMeta entry — that entry's fields win, independently per field (setting only contextTokens on the alias still inherits the target's cost).
• Free-tier naming convention: a model id ending in :free (a real provider naming convention some upstreams use for their own free-tier models) resolves to a known, zero cost even with no modelMeta entry and no built-in table row for that exact id — ranked above the built-in table, below an explicit modelMeta override. Context is unaffected by this rule; it still resolves through the normal layers above.

Discovery-captured context (metadataPath)

Set metadataPath on an openai-type provider to fetch a second endpoint alongside discovery, one that reports per-model context length — LM Studio's own, non-OpenAI-compatible endpoint is the supported shape:

providers:
  macstudio:
    type: openai
    baseUrl: "http://macstudio.local:1234"
    discovery: true
    metadataPath: "/api/v0/models"

The response's loaded_context_length field is preferred over max_context_length when both are present — it reflects the context actually usable right now, which an operator can configure smaller than the model's own maximum under VRAM-constrained runtime settings. This means the reported context window can change across a discovery refresh (a model reloaded with a different context setting reports a different value) — it is not a fixed, one-time fact the way the built-in table's numbers are. A failed or absent metadata fetch is always non-fatal: no metadata is captured for that refresh, and discovery itself is unaffected.

Built-in table

pricing_data_gen.go is a generated, checked-in table synced from LiteLLM's own pricing data, pruned to the provider types this gateway can meaningfully match (openai, anthropic, deepseek, xai, minimax, cerebras, dashscope, moonshot) and to chat/embedding models only — the full upstream table is over 3,000 entries, most of them for providers this gateway has no adapter for.

Run make pricing-sync to regenerate it against the current upstream data. This fetches over the network and writes pricing_data_gen.go at build time only — the running plugin never fetches anything itself. The generated file's header records a content digest of the fetched bytes, not a date, so a re-run against unchanged upstream data reproduces an identical file with nothing to review.

GET /v1/models extension fields

Two OpenAI-compat-safe extra fields on each model object, present only when known:

{
  "id": "openai/gpt-5",
  "object": "model",
  "owned_by": "openai",
  "context_window": 400000,
  "pricing": {"input_per_mtok_usd": 1.25, "output_per_mtok_usd": 10}
}

• context_window — an integer token count, omitted when unknown.
• pricing — {input_per_mtok_usd, output_per_mtok_usd}, both floats in USD per 1,000,000 tokens. Omitted when unknown; present with 0 values for an explicitly free model — a known zero, not an absent field.

The admin dashboard's GET /admin/api/overview exposes the identical resolved values per provider (providers[].modelMeta, keyed by upstream model id) and per alias (aliases[].modelMeta) — see Admin.

Limits and accounting

• Counters use fixed windows, keyed by UTC calendar boundaries (the minute, the day, the month) — not a sliding window. Requests-per-minute and requests-per-day counters increment before evaluation, so every request counts toward its scopes' rate tracking even if it is ultimately refused by a different scope's limit.
• Token and cost budgets are checked against the value already accumulated from prior requests, before this request's own usage is known (usage only arrives after the upstream call completes). A request that would start already over budget is refused; a request that starts under budget but pushes the scope over it is still allowed to complete — an accepted at-most-one-request overshoot, not an exactly-enforced cap.
• Accounting parses usage from the provider's own response: OpenAI-type usage, Anthropic usage (from message_start/message_delta), Gemini usageMetadata. When a non-streaming unified-route response reports no usage at all, the gateway falls back to a rough estimate — ceil(request-body-bytes / 4) counted as prompt tokens, no completion estimate — and marks it estimated. Estimated usage therefore lands entirely in the tokin counter below; tokout never moves for an estimated request. A streaming unified-route response with no usage is logged and the request itself is still counted, but no token estimate is applied.
• Tokens are tracked in two directions: every prompt token increments a tokin counter, every completion token a separate tokout counter — the same split the admin usage API and usage-history API both expose (see Admin). tokensPerDay/tokensPerMonth limits are unchanged by this: they still enforce one TOTAL budget, read as tokin + tokout in a single batched store read at evaluation time. A violation message still says "tokens", regardless of which direction pushed the scope over.
• A synthetic total scope (kind: "total", id: "all") is counted alongside every request's own user/group scopes on every metered route (unified chat/embeddings, the media endpoints, native passthrough, the per-server MCP/A2A proxy, and the federated /mcp endpoint) — the sum of all LLM traffic combined. It carries no limit and is never evaluated: no configuration can throttle it. The admin usage API's total row and every scope=total usage-history query read this scope.
• An hour window (req/tokin/tokout/cost, UTC calendar hour) is counted alongside minute/day/month on every metered route, purely for charting — no LimitsConfig field ever names it, so it is never evaluated against a limit. It is the finest granularity the usage- history API (below) can query.
• Cost is tokens × price, computed in integer micro-USD (1,000,000ths of a dollar) throughout to avoid float drift, from the built-in per-model table (pricing.go) or a configured pricing override. An unpriced model costs 0 and logs a once-per-model warning (capped at 128 distinct unpriced model names per process lifetime, then one summary warning). The built-in table is approximate — list prices as each provider published them, recorded 2026-08, and not kept in sync automatically. Set pricing overrides for billing-grade accuracy.
• Storage: redis configured wires a hand-rolled, stdlib-only RESP2 client (resp.go) — no go-redis, which is not Yaegi-interpretable — against Redis, Valkey, or Dragonfly. Every counter write (checkAndCount, account) goes through ONE pipelined round trip for the whole request, regardless of how many user/group/total counters it touches (perf review, 2026-08-21) — a 3-scope request previously paid up to 9 (request counting) or 27 (usage accounting) separate round trips. Semantics are deliberately at-least-once, never under-counting: a lost reply after the server already applied the pipeline can cause a resend that over-counts every counter in it by its own delta. This is a fail-safe trade-off (more restrictive than reality), never a fail-open one.
• Fallback (no redis configured, or a Redis error with failOpen: true): counters live in an in-process map — correct for one Traefik replica, only approximate across several, since each replica counts independently. Exact limits across multiple Traefik replicas require the shared Redis. Enforcement stays correct on the fallback at every window, including tokensPerMonth/costPerMonthUSD: a window's counter always outlives its own natural length (enforceTTLFor, limits.go), so a month budget is still a true calendar-month budget, never a rolling one, whether Redis is configured or not.
• Usage-history charting is more limited on the fallback, and the limit differs by window (memoryStoreMaxTTL's 48h ceiling only binds where a window's own enforceTTLFor floor sits under it — limits.go): hour charts its full default span (48 buckets fit inside the 48h ceiling); day only shows its most recent ~2-3 buckets out of the 35 a request can ask for (a day bucket's own key also sits under the ceiling, so it expires long before a 35-day span would need it); month charts its CURRENT bucket in full (a month's own floor, ~32 days, wins over the ceiling — the in-progress month's key outlives the whole month), but not any earlier one, since each past month's key already expired ~32 days after its own creation. Redis applies the real hour/day/month retention TTLs directly (no ceiling), so a Redis-backed deployment charts the full span every window supports.
• Retention (Redis counter key TTL, distinct from a window's own length): a minute key lives 2 minutes, an hour key 48 hours, a day key 35 days, a month key 400 days — long enough for the usage-history API's largest span (48 hourly / 35 daily / 13 monthly buckets) to always find a live key, not just long enough to survive that bucket's own single rollover. Migration: none — a deployed process's old, unsplit tok counter keys simply expire on their existing TTL and are never read again; nothing needs backfilling.
• Provider/model success rates (limits.go): a separate counter family from request/token/cost accounting above, tracking upstream HEALTH rather than usage — llmgw:prov:{provider}:attempt:{window}: {bucket} and llmgw:prov:{provider}:fail:{window}:{bucket} per provider, llmgw:provmodel:{provider}/{model}:attempt:{window}:{bucket} and the fail counterpart per (provider, model) pair. window is min (2-minute TTL) or day (35-day TTL) only — no hour or month: provider health is a now-and-today question, not a billing one. Every upstream HTTP attempt increments attempt; only a provider-fault outcome increments fail — the SAME transient classification Retry's own retry decision uses (connection error, HTTP 429, HTTP 5xx), plus one addition this counter family alone applies: a request that hit the gateway's own configured deadline (context.DeadlineExceeded) also counts as a failure here, even though retry itself never retries a deadline it already knows has passed. A request the CLIENT canceled (context.Canceled) still counts as an attempt only, from both — not the provider's fault either way. A non-429 4xx (the provider answered, just didn't like the request) is never a failure. Retried attempts are all counted individually: a request retried twice before succeeding writes three attempts here (two failures, one success), not one. The admin overview API (see Admin) is the only reader; the write itself runs off the request's own goroutine (fire-and-forget — this is telemetry, and nothing in the request path waits on or gates against it), so it never adds latency to a response, streaming included. That goroutine is bounded (64 in flight per process) and lossy under sustained pressure: a write that cannot start immediately is dropped, not queued — a deliberate trade-off against an unbounded goroutine pile-up if the configured store ever goes slow without going fully down. Enforcement (request/token/cost limits) never goes through this path at all.
• Native passthrough accounts provider-level only, never per-model. POST /{provider}/... has no resolved model at request time — the upstream model, if any, only appears in the response body, read after the attempt has already resolved — so it never writes a provmodel counter, only the provider-level ones above.

Body-admission limit

The unified chat/completions/embeddings routes and the three media routes (images/generations, audio/speech, audio/transcriptions) each decode their request body into memory before doing anything else with it — a step that can use several times the body's own byte size, worst case, for an adversarially-shaped payload. To bound how many requests can be doing that at once, each of those routes claims a slot from a small in-process semaphore for exactly the duration of its own read-and-decode step, and releases it immediately afterward — not for the rest of the request. Resolving the model, checking the response cache, and the upstream call itself (which can run for seconds to minutes on a real completion) all happen with the slot already released, so this never becomes a ceiling on total concurrent requests.

• On exhaustion (every slot in use at that instant), the request gets an immediate 503 with a Retry-After header — never queued, never blocked.
• The slot count self-tunes from the host's own GOMAXPROCS by default; maxInFlightBodyRequests (see the Config table above) pins an exact value instead when set.
• The unified chat/embeddings routes decode against a 4MiB cap — narrower than the 10MiB the media routes and audio/transcriptions' multipart body still use (see Body limits above) — sized to comfortably fit a single inline base64-encoded image in a chat message while bounding worst-case decode memory.
• Native passthrough is not gated by this at all: it streams the request/response body straight through rather than decoding it into memory, so there is nothing here for this limit to bound (the one exception, a bounded 64KiB peek for model-restricted groups, is already capped independently — see Native passthrough model authorization).

Retry

Same-provider retry for a transient upstream failure. Off by default (retry.enabled: false); every config that predates this field keeps making exactly one upstream attempt per request. See Failover below for the separate, cross-provider mechanism.

• Scope: every adapter upstream call — chat, embeddings, model listing, and the three media endpoints (images/generations, audio/speech, audio/transcriptions) — across all three provider types. Native passthrough (/{provider}/...) and the MCP/A2A proxy are raw reverse proxies and are never retried; the client owns retry semantics there.
• Attempts is retries, not tries: attempts counts retries performed after the first try. The default, 1, allows one retry — two tries total, not one. The maximum, 3, allows three retries — four tries total.
• Transient classification: a connection error (dial/EOF/reset), HTTP 429, or HTTP 5xx. Never a non-429 4xx, a translation error, a request that failed to build in the first place (a malformed method or URL fails identically on every attempt), or a context cancellation/deadline.
• Zero-bytes rule: retry only runs before any response byte reaches the client. A non-streaming call may retry its whole exchange. A streaming call retries only the initial request, up to the point the upstream's headers and status arrive — once the first chunk is forwarded, a stream that then dies mid-flight is not retried, since the client already holds partial data.
• Waiting: a 429 response carrying a Retry-After header that parses as a non-negative whole-second count no greater than 2s waits exactly that long. Every other case — no header, an unparseable value (for example the HTTP-date form), a negative value, a value over 2s, or a Retry-After on a non-429 5xx — falls back to exponential backoff (backoff × 2^(attempt-1)), capped at 2s per wait either way. A context canceled or timed out during a wait aborts the remaining retries immediately, rather than blocking out the wait in full.
• Accounting: only the final attempt's usage is recorded — a failed attempt's body is drained and discarded, never parsed for usage, so it is never double-counted. Request counters still increment once per client request, unchanged.

Failover

Cross-provider failover for a bare model id more than one configured provider serves — for example whisper-1 configured on both openai and openai-audio. Off by default (failover.enabled: false unless set otherwise): a version upgrade with no config change preserves prior behavior exactly, since failover changes which provider serves a request and can shift cost attribution or mask a broken provider key behind an apparent success. Set failover.enabled: true to opt in. A deployment with no overlapping providers, or with a single provider, behaves exactly as before regardless of this setting either way, since there is never a second candidate to try.

• Scope: POST /v1/chat/completions, POST /v1/embeddings, and POST /v1/messages only. The image/audio endpoints (images/generations, audio/speech, audio/transcriptions) are not wired into failover yet — each has its own request-shape handling (multipart rebuild, binary/streaming responses) that needs its own scoped follow-up.
• Eligible candidates: a bare model id resolved via the collision winner (the same mechanism GET /v1/models documents for overlapping catalogs) offers every OTHER configured provider that also serves that id and that the caller's group is authorized to use. A provider/model request, or an alias whose target is provider/model, is an explicit, exact choice and is never eligible for substitution.
• What falls through: everything except HTTP 400 — connection failures, timeouts, HTTP 429/401/403/404, and any 5xx. A 400 never falls through: the request is malformed and every provider would reject it identically. A failover past a 404 is logged loudly, always, naming both providers and the model — a 404 usually means a real configuration mistake, not a transient outage. The routine "failing over from X to Y" line is rate-limited to once per 30s during a sustained outage (with a suppressed-count note on the next line), so it cannot itself become a blocking synchronous write on every request; the 404 line is exempt from that limit.
• Cost guard (not optional): failover never routes to a candidate priced higher than the provider it is failing over FROM (the first candidate actually attempted, never the cheapest in the list), checked on BOTH input and output cost per token — a candidate cheaper on input but dearer on output is still rejected. Pricing is resolved exactly the way real billing resolves it: the canonical provider/model id in pricing first, falling back to the bare model id, so a per-provider pricing override correctly makes the identical model id cost different amounts on different providers. Unknown pricing is never treated as free: if the primary's price is known and a candidate's is not, the candidate is skipped (an unknown price cannot be proven cheaper); if the primary's price is unknown and a candidate's is known and non-zero, the candidate is skipped too (moving from unbilled to billed is itself a spend increase); both unknown, or both an explicit known-zero price, are treated as equal and allowed. There is no config flag for this — it applies unconditionally whenever failover is enabled.
• The cost guard cannot see modelMeta's free: true. It resolves pricing only through pricing and the built-in table — the same source unifiedCostMicros actually bills against — deliberately never through modelMeta (see Model metadata / ModelMetaConfig), since modelMeta drives GET /v1/models display only and never affects billing. A model declared free the modelMeta way is therefore treated as unknown-priced by the cost guard and loses redundancy: it is skipped as a failover candidate whenever the primary has a known price (fail-safe, and logged like any other cost skip). Declare the price through pricing (e.g. {"inputPerM": 0, "outputPerM": 0}) if you want a genuinely free model to remain eligible as a cheaper failover candidate.
• Never mid-stream: failover only happens while nothing has reached the client yet. Once the first byte of a response is written, status and body are committed and the request is never retried elsewhere.
• Health signals, kept separate: the discovery-endpoint health surfaced on the admin dashboard is an ordering hint only — a provider whose /v1/models is unhealthy is tried later, never skipped outright, since plenty of providers serve chat completions fine while their model listing is broken. A separate, in-memory, per-pod request-path health signal (not yet exposed on the admin dashboard) is the actual routing gate: a provider is skipped without being called once it has failed three consecutive LOGICAL requests (same-provider retries all count as one outcome, not one each) — everything except HTTP 400 counts as a failure for this gate, including 401/403/404, so a provider with a dead API key is eventually routed around instead of retried forever.
• Accounting: a failover chain still counts as exactly one client request against requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay — never once per attempt. Per-provider attempt/failure counters (the admin dashboard's success-rate badge) attribute every attempt to the provider that actually made it.
• Caching: a cacheable response produced by a failover provider is stored under that provider's own cache key, never the first candidate's. Each candidate's own cache entry is checked immediately before that candidate's own attempt, in try order — never for every candidate up front. Checking every candidate's cache before any of them was attempted was tried and reverted: it silently served a DIFFERENT candidate's cached response even while the actual primary was perfectly healthy, which is failover with no failure. The request-path health signal above is what actually keeps a genuinely dead primary from being dialed again — once it is marked unhealthy it is excluded from the candidate list entirely, so a later request reaches the next candidate's cache without the dead one ever being attempted.
• Configurable: failover.maxAttempts caps how many different providers one request will try in total, primary included (default 3, maximum 10) — distinct from retry.attempts, which retries the SAME provider. failover.enabled: false (the default) turns the whole mechanism off.
• Known limitation — no per-attempt timeout: newAdapterHTTPClient sets no client timeout and no response-header timeout; the only bound on an upstream call is the incoming request's own context, shared identically across every candidate. A provider that accepts the TCP connection and then simply never responds will hang the request indefinitely and never trigger failover — only a failure fast enough to leave time on that shared context (a dial failure, a fast non-2xx response, or the context's own deadline finally expiring) does. This is a pre-existing property of the plugin's HTTP client, not specific to failover, and applies to every route, not only this one; it is not addressed in this change.

Request timeout

Every provider adapter call and every native passthrough (/{provider}/...) request is bounded by a progress-based timeout: aborted once this gateway observes no upstream read progress for the configured duration, never simply because elapsed time crossed a fixed deadline. The MCP/A2A target proxy (/mcp/{name}/..., /a2a/{name}/...) shares the identical mechanism. The federated /mcp endpoint (mcp_federation.go) does not — see the "Federated MCP" note below.

Behavior change for every deployment, not an invisible bug fix. Before this feature, an adapter's *http.Client set no timeout of any kind: a provider that accepted the connection and then went silent — sent no headers, or sent headers and then stalled mid-body — hung the gateway request forever. Default, when neither requestTimeout field is set: five minutes.

• Two mechanisms, one config value: time to the first response header (Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout), and idle time WITHIN the response body once headers arrive. The second is what catches a provider that answers promptly and then stalls mid-stream or mid-JSON-body — ResponseHeaderTimeout alone only bounds the wait for headers.
• Progress-based, not total-duration. A streaming response resets the idle timer on every chunk it forwards, so a long generation that keeps producing tokens completes even if the whole exchange runs for 20 minutes — a total-duration cap was deliberately rejected for exactly this reason. Non-streaming responses share the identical mechanism: a large or slow-but-progressing body is unaffected; only a body that goes quiet for the full timeout is aborted.
• What "progress" means, precisely. The idle timer resets on bytes read from the decoded body — after net/http's own transparent gzip decompression, when the upstream used it. A gzip'd response whose compressed bytes keep arriving on the wire but whose deflate stream yields no decompressed output for the whole timeout window is still aborted: this gateway has no visibility into wire-level progress without a transport or connection wrapper, which is disproportionate at the five-minute default. In the same vein, a streaming forwarder reads one chunk from the upstream, writes it to the client, then reads again — the write is not itself watched, so time spent blocked writing to a slow or stalled client counts against the SAME idle window as a silent upstream. Aborting in that case is still the right call (holding an upstream connection open indefinitely for a stalled client is its own problem), but the failure is not always the provider's fault even though the request is attributed to one for accounting purposes.
• Never retried. A ResponseHeaderTimeout failure surfaces as a context.DeadlineExceeded-shaped error, which Retry's own transient classification explicitly excludes. A mid-body watchdog timeout happens after the retry mechanism has already returned its response to the caller, so it is never in a position to be retried either way. Not retrying a hang is the intended behavior — retrying a provider that just proved it cannot make progress would only waste the same amount of time again.
• Scope and override: requestTimeout (top level) sets the global default. A provider's own requestTimeout overrides it — an explicit override always wins. Native passthrough for a provider uses that same provider's resolved value, so a client hitting /{provider}/... gets the identical bound as a request through /v1/chat/completions. The MCP/A2A target proxy has no per-target override; it always uses the global default.
• Config form and validation: a Go duration string ("5m", "90s"), matching retry.backoff/cache.ttl's own convention. Empty means the default. A value that fails to parse, or parses to zero or a negative duration, is a construction error — unlike cache.ttl, zero/negative is never accepted here as "no timeout": that would silently reintroduce the exact hang this feature fixes.
• Classification: a timeout firing is always logged and reported to the client as an upstream failure (502, server_error), naming whichever provider or target the request was addressed to, and is never classified as a client disconnect (context.Canceled) — the two stay distinguishable in every log line. The log wording says "upstream progress stalled", not "provider timed out": for the reason described above (a slow client can trip the same watchdog a slow provider does), the message reports what was observed without asserting which side caused it.

Federated MCP (POST /mcp) is bounded differently, not left unbounded. mcp_federation.go's two direct upstream calls (doBackendJSONRPC/mcpBackendCloseSession) are not wrapped by the idle-progress watchdog described above — a federated backend that sends headers and then stalls mid-body is not caught by it. They are not unbounded either: both still run through g.targetClient, so Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout (the global requestTimeout) still bounds the wait for headers, and each call additionally runs under its own fixed context.WithTimeout — 20s for tools/list, 120s for tools/call, 5s for the best-effort session-close DELETE. A worst-case stall there is bounded at whichever of those applies, not indefinite.

Caching

An opt-in, Redis-backed response cache for the unified, non-streaming POST /v1/chat/completions and POST /v1/embeddings routes. Off by default (cache.enabled: false); every config that predates this field keeps calling the upstream on every request. Caching also requires redis to be configured — without it, cache.enabled: true is silently disabled with one warning logged at construction, never a per-replica in-process fallback: divergent replicas would otherwise serve different cached bodies for the same request.

• What's cacheable: a non-streaming request to either route, whose upstream response was HTTP 200 and no larger than cache.maxBodyBytes. Never cached: a streaming request, native passthrough, MCP/A2A, the image/audio endpoints (see Image and audio endpoints), or any non-200 upstream response.
• Key: llmgw:cache: plus a hex SHA-256 digest of the provider name, the resolved upstream model id, the client's own exactly-as-sent model string (requestedModel), the endpoint (chat or embeddings), and the canonical JSON of the request body with stream_options and user removed. requestedModel and the endpoint are both part of the key so that two different alias forms of the same upstream model (claude-x versus anthropic/claude-x) never collide into one cache entry: a translating adapter (anthropic, gemini) bakes the client's own alias into the cached response body's model field, so a second client using the other alias form would otherwise receive an id it never sent.
• User identity is not part of the key. Identical requests share one cache entry across every user and group that can reach the model — by design, since a provider's response to an identical request is provider-deterministic and carries no per-user data.
• Hit/miss header: every cacheable request's response carries X-Llmgw-Cache: hit or X-Llmgw-Cache: miss, set before the body is written either way.
• Accounting: a cache hit increments request counters exactly like any other request — limiter.checkAndCount runs before the cache lookup — but never touches token or cost counters, and never runs the streaming-response-with-no-usage estimate. Only a genuine upstream call (a miss) accounts real tokens and cost. This means a cache hit is request-quota-counted but token/cost-free.
• Group override: GroupConfig.cache (a *bool) overrides the top-level cache.enabled setting per group — nil inherits it, false opts the group out even when caching is globally on, true opts the group in. Setting true on a group when the top-level cache is not enabled — the block omitted entirely, or present with enabled: false, both read the same way — is a construction error: there is nothing configured to inherit ttl/maxBodyBytes from.
• Group TTL override: GroupConfig.cacheTTL sets the TTL written when this group's own request populates a cache entry — it is not a per-group scope. Cache entries are shared across groups, exactly like the "User identity is not part of the key" bullet above: whichever group's request happens to populate (or later refresh) an entry decides that entry's TTL, and a later request from a different group that hits the same entry reads it with the TTL already stored there, unaffected by its own cacheTTL. An empty value inherits the global TTL for that group's own writes; a set value must parse as a positive Go duration and requires the top-level cache block to be configured, or construction fails.
• Storage: values are stored via the same hand-rolled RESP2 client (resp.go) the limiter's distributed counters use — the identical Redis/Valkey/Dragonfly connection, not a second one. A Redis error during a cache read or write is treated as a miss (logged, rate-limited) and never fails the request; the upstream call still happens and the client still gets a correct answer.

Provider health (discovery circuit breaker)

A per-provider, in-memory, three-state circuit breaker (closed → open → half-open) driven entirely by discovery refresh outcomes — never by /v1/chat/completions or any other request-path traffic. It exists so a provider whose discovery endpoint fails on every cycle (an expired API key, a typo'd baseUrl, an upstream outage) is re-probed LESS often the longer it stays broken, instead of at the same fixed discoveryInterval forever, and so the admin dashboard can show that provider as visibly broken instead of indistinguishable from a healthy one.

• States: closed is normal — refreshes run on the provider's own discoveryInterval, exactly as if this feature did not exist. breaker.failureThreshold (default 3) CONSECUTIVE failed refreshes open it; any success in between resets the count to zero. open skips refresh attempts until a backoff window elapses, starting at breaker.openDuration (default 1m) and doubling on every further failed probe, capped at breaker.maxOpenDuration (default 6h). half-open is exactly one probe refresh, deciding whether to close the breaker again (success) or reopen it with a doubled backoff (failure).
• The backoff window is an ADDITIONAL gate on top of discoveryInterval, never a replacement for it — whichever of the two is currently longer wins, and the shorter one is masked entirely rather than merely adding a little extra delay. This means breaker.maxOpenDuration only ever reduces re-probe frequency once it EXCEEDS discoveryInterval; set no higher, it changes nothing observable and the provider is refreshed at the same cadence a deployment without this feature would already see. The shipped defaults are chosen with this in mind: maxOpenDuration (6h) is deliberately longer than the default discoveryInterval (1h), so a permanently broken provider under stock config backs off 1h, 2h, 4h, 6h, 6h, ... — roughly 5 re-probes a day instead of 24. A custom discoveryInterval shorter than maxOpenDuration keeps this relationship; one set LONGER than maxOpenDuration reverts to plain interval-only throttling with no suppression from this feature at all.
• Classification: any refresh outcome with a non-nil error counts as a failure, including a malformed-baseUrl request-build failure — this is deliberately NOT the same classification retry above uses for deciding whether to retry a request, since a permanently broken provider must still be able to trip the breaker. A client-canceled context (plugin shutdown, an outer context canceled upstream) is NEUTRAL: it counts as neither a failure nor a success, and never resets or closes an open breaker.
• A provider that never fails is completely unaffected — every default is chosen so closed never diverges from plain discoveryInterval gating.
• Scope: this reflects the DISCOVERY endpoint only. A provider whose model listing 401s while its actual completion endpoint works fine (common behind a proxy that exposes chat but not model listing) is reported unhealthy here despite being entirely usable for real traffic — this signal must never be the sole reason to refuse routing to a provider.
• Per-pod, not distributed. Each replica learns a provider's discovery health independently — a latency optimization, not a correctness guarantee. Three replicas disagreeing briefly after a provider starts failing is expected, not a bug.
• Dashboard: the Providers tab shows a provider's current state and, while open, when it will next be probed — see Admin.

Unified vs. passthrough

	Unified (/v1/...)	Native passthrough (/{provider}/...)
Wire format	Always OpenAI-shaped in, OpenAI-shaped out.	The provider's own native format, untouched.
Authorization	group.allowsModel AND group.allowsProvider, both checked against the resolved provider (modelRegistry.resolve — see Model routing).	group.allowsProvider, always. group.allowsModel too, but ONLY when the group's models list is non-empty — see the model-enforcement note below the table. passthroughPaths, when set, also gates the REST path.
Translation	openai-type: body forwarded verbatim (model id rewritten). anthropic/gemini: full bidirectional translation, including streaming, chunk by chunk.	None — a raw reverse proxy.
Model alias in the response	Translated providers (anthropic, gemini) echo back the client's exact requested model string in the response's model field, even though the upstream call used the resolved provider model id. An openai-type response is a verbatim passthrough of the upstream body, so it carries whatever model id the upstream itself returned — this asymmetry is intentional, not a bug.	The upstream's own model field, verbatim — there is no alias to echo.
Embeddings	openai-type: passthrough. gemini: mapped to :embedContent/:batchEmbedContents. anthropic: 501 — Anthropic's API has no embeddings endpoint.	Whatever the provider itself supports at that path, subject to the same models/passthroughPaths authorization as every other native passthrough request.
Unsupported parameters	A semantically meaningful field the target provider cannot express (e.g. n > 1, logit_bias, logprobs on Anthropic) is a 400, never silently dropped.	Not applicable — the request reaches the provider exactly as sent.
Non-2xx upstream response	Wrapped in the gateway's own error envelope, with the provider's own body embedded under error.upstream.	Forwarded to the client exactly as the upstream sent it — status, headers, and body.

Native passthrough model authorization

A group's models glob authorizes native passthrough traffic too, but only once it has something to authorize:

• models empty (the default) — nothing for allowsModel to reject, so the request body is never even read for this purpose. Every request reaches the provider exactly as it did before this feature existed.
• models non-empty — the gateway reads up to 64KiB of a JSON request body looking for a top-level model field (a genuinely binary body — multipart, audio/*, image/*, video/*, application/octet-stream — is never read at all, since it cannot carry one). The field, when found, is checked against models in both its bare and provider/model forms. A model field not found within that 64KiB window is DENIED (403) — fail closed, not fail open. This includes a Gemini passthrough request: Gemini's model id lives in the URL path, never the JSON body, so a group with a restricted models list will see every Gemini passthrough request denied. Route Gemini traffic for a model-restricted group through the unified /v1/* API instead.

Anthropic Messages API (/v1/messages)

POST /v1/messages serves Anthropic SDK clients — including Claude Code — directly, in Anthropic's own Messages API request/response shape: the inbound counterpart to the outbound-only Anthropic support the unified routes already had. From model resolution through response caching, usage accounting, and adapter-error handling, this route shares one implementation with /v1/chat/completions (runMeteredCall, routes_unified.go) — the same group authorization (see GroupConfig), limits and accounting, and caching semantics apply. Only the wire shape and the client-facing error envelope are specific to this route.

Authentication

Anthropic SDKs authenticate with the x-api-key header, not Authorization: Bearer. This route accepts both — the identical credential lookup (authStore.identify, auth.go) every other route uses already reads either header, Authorization: Bearer taking priority if a request somehow carries both — so no separate credential path exists for this route. A failed auth answers in Anthropic's own error shape ({"type":"error","error":{"type":"authentication_error", "message":"..."}}), never the OpenAI-shaped {"error":{"type":...,"code":...}} every other route uses.

Translation vs. passthrough

Behavior depends entirely on the resolved provider's configured type:

Resolved provider type	Behavior
anthropic	Passthrough. The request reaches that provider's own /v1/messages endpoint untranslated — no message-body translation of any kind. The response reaches the client BYTE-FOR-BYTE identical, with one exception: "model" is rewritten to the client's own requested alias, the same routing rewrite every route applies before any adapter call — not a translation of the response body. This is a real byte-level guarantee, not an approximation: every other field's value is copied from the upstream's raw bytes without ever passing through a Go value, so a JSON integer beyond float64's exact range (inside, say, a tool_use block's arbitrary input) survives intact instead of being silently rounded.
openai or gemini	Full bidirectional translation, through the same providerAdapter.chatCompletion a /v1/chat/completions request against that provider already uses — its contract is OpenAI-shape in, OpenAI-shape out regardless of provider type. The Anthropic-shaped request is translated to OpenAI's shape before the call; that provider's OpenAI-shaped response is translated back to Anthropic's shape before it reaches the client.

A few translation specifics worth knowing:

• anthropic-beta is forwarded to an anthropic-type upstream (an explicit allowlist — Authorization, x-api-key, Cookie, and every hop-by-hop header are never forwarded, and the gateway's own credential injection always overrides whatever the allowlist copied), so Claude Code and the SDKs can still opt into 1M context, token-efficient tools, computer use, and other beta features through this route.
• Prompt-cache tokens are billed. Anthropic's cache_creation_input_tokens and cache_read_input_tokens fold into the same combined prompt-token count every other route's budgets track, alongside input_tokens — not dropped, and not priced at a separate cache-tier rate.
• tool_result.is_error has no native OpenAI tool-message field. content — a string, Anthropic's content-block array form (Claude Code sends this), or absent — is normalized to a plain string first (OpenAI's own tool message requires one; a null content is rejected), then gets an "Error: " prefix, so an OpenAI-backed agentic loop still sees the failure signal regardless of which shape the client sent.
• Reasoning models (OpenAI's o1/o3/o4/gpt-5 families) get max_completion_tokens instead of max_tokens — the field those models reject with a 400.
• thinking (Anthropic's extended-thinking config) has no OpenAI equivalent and is dropped when translating to an openai/gemini target; the gateway logs a warning naming the dropped field rather than discarding it silently.

Streaming is not yet supported

"stream" set to anything other than the JSON literal false, null, or an absent key gets a clean 400 invalid_request_error — never silently ignored, never answered non-streamed. null is treated the same as unset, so an SDK that serializes an unset optional field as explicit null never gets a false-positive rejection on an ordinary non-streaming call. This is deliberately a 400, not a 501: Anthropic's own SDKs retry any status ≥ 500, so a 501 here would turn every streaming call — the default for Claude Code — into a multi-request retry storm against the caller's own request-rate limit. The rejection happens before the rate limiter runs, so a streaming-rejected request never consumes budget either. A follow-up release adds the Anthropic SSE event translator (message_start/content_block_delta/message_stop) — a genuinely different event model from OpenAI's own stream shape this plugin already forwards on /v1/chat/completions.

Route takeover

On a deployment running passthroughUnknown: true, POST /v1/messages used to fall through to next (the router's own backing service) before this route existed — nothing in this plugin recognized the path. Now the gateway intercepts it unconditionally: next is never reached for this path again, regardless of passthroughUnknown. This is intended — the whole point of this route is for the gateway itself to answer /v1/messages — but it is a real behavior change for any deployment currently proxying /v1/messages downstream through passthroughUnknown. Route that traffic elsewhere, or expect the gateway to answer it directly, before upgrading.

Image and audio endpoints

POST /v1/images/generations, POST /v1/audio/speech, and POST /v1/audio/transcriptions follow the same pipeline as /v1/chat/completions — auth, model routing, group authorization, limits, adapter call — minus response caching and token/cost accounting (below).

Upgrading from v0.1: these three routes are now handled by the gateway unconditionally. They are matched and served before passthroughUnknown is ever consulted, so a request to any of them never falls through to next — not even with passthroughUnknown: true. If a v0.1 deployment pointed its router's backing service at one of these exact paths and relied on passthrough to reach it, that backend must move to a different path before upgrading.

	openai-type	gemini	anthropic
images/generations	Native forward.	Translated to Imagen's :predict (below).	501.
audio/speech	Native forward; the binary response is streamed to the client as it arrives.	501 — no OpenAI-compatible text-to-speech endpoint.	501.
audio/transcriptions	Native forward; see below for how the multipart body is forwarded.	501 — no OpenAI-compatible speech-to-text endpoint.	501.

• Model routing: images/generations and audio/speech read model from the JSON request body. audio/transcriptions reads it from the multipart request's model form field instead — the field can appear in any position among the request's parts, and a body with more than one model field is a 400.
• Multipart forwarding: when the client's model field already equals the resolved upstream model id (a bare id, the common case), the original multipart body is replayed byte-for-byte, unchanged. When it does not — a provider-prefixed id (openai/whisper-1) or another alias resolves to a different upstream model string — the body is rebuilt with every other part copied verbatim and only the model part's value rewritten, so the alias never reaches the real provider. The rebuilt body uses a new multipart boundary; the client's exact boundary is not preserved, only an equivalent body.
• Gemini image translation: {model, prompt, n, size, response_format} maps to Imagen's {instances:[{prompt}], parameters: {sampleCount, aspectRatio}}. size maps to aspectRatio: 1024x1024/512x512 → 1:1, 1792x1024 → 16:9, 1024x1792 → 9:16; an absent size defaults to 1:1; any other value is a 400. response_format: "url" is a 400 — the gateway stores nothing to host a URL from. A truthy quality or style is a 400, the same convention chat's translators use for an unsupported field. Imagen's predictions[].bytesBase64Encoded maps back to OpenAI's data[].b64_json.
• Never cached: image and audio responses are excluded from the response cache (cache.enabled) regardless of its configuration.
• Accounting: request counters (requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay) increment the same as any other route. Token counters never move, and cost is always recorded as 0 — images and audio are not cost-accounted.
• Body limits: images/generations and audio/speech share a 10MiB JSON cap — no longer the unified chat/completions/embeddings routes' own cap, which is narrower (4MiB, see below); the media routes kept the original 10MiB. audio/transcriptions enforces the same 10MiB cap explicitly, returning 413 over it — unlike an oversized JSON body, which is silently truncated into a parse failure, a truncated multipart body can still parse a valid prefix and would forward cut-off audio upstream if it were not rejected outright.
• Retry (above) applies to all three the same as chat/embeddings; a streaming audio/speech response is retried only before the first response byte reaches the client, the same zero-bytes rule as chat's streaming path.

Admin

A read-only dashboard and JSON API for operational visibility — providers, groups, model aliases, and per-user/per-group/total usage against configured limits, plus usage charts. No mutation of any kind; config stays owned by GitOps/Traefik as usual. Off by default (admin.enabled: false, or the admin block omitted entirely): none of the routes below are registered at all, and a request to any of them falls through to the plugin's existing 404/passthroughUnknown handling.

The dashboard itself is a small Vue 3 + Pinia + Chart.js single-page app (webui/), built once with vite build and baked into the plugin as generated Go source (admin_assets_gen.go — see Development); nothing under webui/ is needed at runtime or in CI.

• Enabling it: set admin.enabled: true, then flag at least one user admin: true (UserConfig.admin) so someone can actually reach /admin/api/*. An admin user is otherwise ordinary — their own keys, group, and limits still apply everywhere except the admin routes themselves (see "Admin traffic is never counted" below).

• GET /admin serves the built app's index.html shell, and GET /admin/assets/{hashedname} serves its content-hashed JS/CSS. Both are deliberately served with no authentication at all once admin.enabled is true (disabled still falls through to the same 404/passthroughUnknown handling described above): a browser navigating straight to the URL has no way to attach a custom Authorization or x-api-key header, so gating the page itself would make it unreachable from a browser in the first place. This is safe because the shell and its assets carry zero data of their own — every value is fetched client-side from the JSON routes below, which stay fully gated — and the built JS/CSS is exactly what vite build emits from webui/, publicly inspectable by any admin dashboard user already. Each asset response carries a long-lived Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable (the hash in the filename changes whenever the content does, so a cached response never goes stale); an unrecognized asset name is a 404 in the same error envelope every other unknown route returns.

• Browser key-entry flow: the page reads an admin API key from the current tab's sessionStorage (a Pinia store owns this). Absent a stored key, or on any 401/403 from a JSON route, it shows an inline key-entry form instead of the dashboard. A submitted key is kept only in sessionStorage — never a cookie, localStorage, or any persistent store — so it disappears when the tab closes, and it is sent only as the x-api-key header on this page's own /admin/api/* fetches.

• GET /admin/api/overview and GET /admin/api/usage share one gate: unauthenticated → 401, authenticated non-admin → 403, admin → serve. overview returns the provider list, groups, the configured model alias table (alias/target pairs, sorted by alias — see Model aliases), redis/cache/retry status (retry's enabled/attempts/backoff are the EFFECTIVE values after Retry's own defaulting, not the raw config — attempts and backoff are both omitted when retry is disabled), and the plugin version string. Each provider entry also carries discoveryEnabled (the configured discovery flag, so the dashboard can tell "discovery is off" apart from "discovery is on but has not refreshed yet" — both otherwise show the identical zero lastRefresh), attemptsDay/ failuresDay/attemptsMinute/failuresMinute (the provider's own current-window success-rate counters — see Limits and accounting), modelRates (the identical attemptsDay/failuresDay pair per known model, keyed by model id — no per-model minute figures, since nothing displays them; the dashboard's per-model badge falls back to a day-window-only detail instead), and modelMeta (the resolved context window and cost per known model — see Model metadata), and healthState/openUntil (the discovery circuit breaker's current state — "closed", "open", or "half-open" — and, while open, when it will next attempt a half-open probe; see Provider health). openUntil is the zero time when healthState is not "open". Each alias entry carries its own modelMeta too. usage returns every user's and every group's current-window counter values — requestsPerMinute, requestsPerDay, tokensInPerDay/tokensOutPerDay, tokensInPerMonth/ tokensOutPerMonth, costPerDayMicroUsd, costPerMonthMicroUsd — alongside their configured limits, plus one extra total row: the synthetic all-traffic scope (see Limits and accounting), limits always null. A group row also carries its configured providers/models/mcpServers/agents access lists, omitted when unrestricted. The dashboard's Providers and Usage views poll both every 5 seconds while open.

• GET /admin/api/usage/history returns a bucketed series for one scope/metric/window — the data source for the dashboard's Charts view (per-user/per-group/total, stacked tokens-in/tokens-out, with a 24h/30d/12mo window switcher). Query parameters:

  • scope: user:{id}, group:{id}, or the literal total.
  • metric: req, tokin, tokout, or cost.
  • window: hour, day, or month.
  • span (optional): number of buckets, oldest-first, inclusive of the current (possibly partial) bucket. Defaults to the window's max — 48 for hour, 35 for day, 13 for month — and a larger value is a 400.

  An unrecognized scope/metric/window, or an out-of-range span, is 400; a user/group id that names no configured entity is 404; the configured store being unreachable is 503 (a chart must never read an outage as "zero usage"). Response shape: {"scope","metric","window","points":[{"bucket":"2026082114","value":123},...]}. The Charts view fetches this once per selection change, plus a 30s auto-refresh of the current selection.

• GET /admin/api/targets returns every configured MCP server and agent for the dashboard's "MCP & Agents" tab: {"mcpServers":[...],"agents":[...]}, each entry {"name","url","access","counters"}. url has any userinfo/query string stripped, same as a provider's baseUrl in overview. access is the list of group names actually allowed to reach that target, computed via the identical glob match mcpServers/agents authorization itself uses (GroupConfig.mcpServers/agents), so this view can never disagree with what the proxy enforces; omitted when every configured group can reach it. counters is requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay/requestsPerMonth — requests only, no tokens or cost (see MCP and A2A for why). Polled every 5 seconds, in the same batch as overview and usage.

• What's exposed: provider names, types, base URLs (with any userinfo/query string stripped before it's ever echoed), model counts, discovery status, group/user names, membership, limits, MCP/agent target names/URLs/access, and live usage counters. Never exposed: API keys (not even digests), provider keys, the Redis password, or users-file path contents — every secret-bearing field is redacted from every response.

• Admin traffic is never counted: none of the four /admin/api/* JSON routes call checkAndCount — admin polling never moves any user's or group's requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay counters, and usage statistics reflect real LLM traffic only (operator directive: an admin dashboard tab left open, however aggressively it polls, must never itself distort the numbers it displays). The direct consequence: an admin's own requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay limit, if configured, is never enforced against admin-route traffic either — an admin key holder can poll any of the four routes as fast as they like. This is an accepted trade-off, not an oversight: these are admin-gated, cheap reads, and an admin holder polling aggressively is a self-inflicted, not a shared, resource cost. GET /admin and GET /admin/assets/* count nothing either, for the simpler reason that they are unauthenticated — there is no identified user to count a request against.

• Response headers: all four JSON routes set X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Cache-Control: no-store; every hashed asset sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and its own immutable Cache-Control (above). Every one of these routes — GET /admin, every hashed asset, and the four JSON routes — shares one Content-Security-Policy header (default-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none') — no 'unsafe-inline', since the built app has no inline script or style of any kind, only external /admin/assets/* references; img-src additionally allows data: for the page's inlined favicon. A browser only enforces CSP against the top-level document that names it, so an asset response's own header governs nothing when the browser fetched it as a <script src>/<link> sub-resource of GET /admin — it matters only if that asset URL is ever navigated to directly, and every other admin route already sends the identical header, so there is no reason for asset responses to be the exception. The dashboard loads no external asset of any kind and works in an air-gapped cluster.

Metrics

A hand-written Prometheus text-exposition endpoint — the plugin is stdlib-only under Yaegi, so it cannot use client_golang or any other metrics library. Off by default (metrics.enabled: false, or the metrics block omitted entirely): the route is not registered at all, the same nil-disables convention Admin uses. Served at /metrics by default, overridable via metrics.path. Works identically with any scraper that speaks the standard text exposition format — Prometheus with a ServiceMonitor/PodMonitor, or VictoriaMetrics with a VMServiceScrape; the format is the same either way, only the CRD kind that points a scraper at this endpoint differs, and that is entirely outside this plugin's config.

• This endpoint exposes per-user and per-group cost and usage data (everything Admin's GET /admin/api/usage exposes, in Prometheus form), so it is never reachable unauthenticated by default. Two ways in, either is sufficient on its own:

  • Admin bearer token (the default, and always works): the identical gate GET /admin/api/* uses — present a key belonging to a user flagged admin: true as Authorization: Bearer <key> or x-api-key: <key>. Unauthenticated → 401; authenticated non-admin → 403; admin → served. There is no second credential path — this reuses authStore.identify exactly.
  • metrics.allowedCIDRs (optional, off by default): CIDR blocks whose source address may scrape with no key at all — for a Prometheus/VictoriaMetrics server that should not need to carry a credential. Checked against the request's source address exactly as Traefik's own net/http server sees it (RemoteAddr, never a client-supplied header like X-Forwarded-For) — only meaningful for a caller whose real source address actually survives to this gateway. Behind a Kubernetes Service or a second reverse proxy that does not preserve the original address, every caller looks identical to this check, and the allowlist becomes either "everyone" or "no one" depending on what address arrives; confirm RemoteAddr reflects the scraper's own address in your deployment before relying on this instead of a key.

  On CIDR sizing — this is the mistake that actually breaks security, live-reproduced, not a theoretical warning: always scope allowedCIDRs to the narrowest block that covers only your actual scrapers — a cluster's Prometheus/VictoriaMetrics pod network, e.g. 10.42.0.0/16. Never configure a whole RFC1918 range such as 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, or 192.168.0.0/16. The failure mode is not "the allowlist does not work" — it is "the allowlist works exactly as configured, and what survives to RemoteAddr is an address you never intended to trust": a SNAT-ing router or load balancer makes external traffic arrive from an address inside that same private range. allowedCIDRs: ["10.0.0.0/8"] paired with a router's own SNAT address has been reproduced returning full per-user cost data to an external caller with no key at all.

• metrics.modelLabel (false by default) adds a model label to the provider attempt/failure counters (llmgateway_provider_model_attempts_total/ llmgateway_provider_model_failures_total), breaking them out per (provider, model) pair in addition to the always-on per-provider totals. Left off by default because a deployment with hundreds of discovered model ids across several providers is a series-count explosion waiting to happen — enable it only when your scraper's retention and cardinality budget can absorb one series per (provider, model) pair actually seen.

• What's exposed (families; see each one's own # HELP line in the live output for the exact contract):

  • llmgateway_requests_total{scope_kind,scope_id}, llmgateway_tokens_total{scope_kind,scope_id,direction}, llmgateway_cost_micro_usd_total{scope_kind,scope_id} — the identical per-user/per-group/total accounting GET /admin/api/usage already exposes as JSON, today's UTC-calendar-day window (resets at UTC midnight).
  • llmgateway_budget_consumed_ratio{scope_kind,scope_id,budget} — fraction of a configured limit already consumed in its own window (0.0–1.0+; above 1.0 means the limit has been breached), for Prometheus's own alerting to threshold on. Emitted only for a scope with that particular limit configured.
  • llmgateway_provider_attempts_total{provider} / llmgateway_provider_failures_total{provider} (+ opt-in _model_ variants, above) — the identical attemptsDay/failuresDay counters GET /admin/api/overview already exposes.
  • llmgateway_provider_healthy{provider} — 1/0 gauge from the discovery circuit breaker (healthState in the admin API); see Provider health.
  • llmgateway_limit_store_up — 1/0 gauge for this replica's own connection to the configured limit store (Redis); absent entirely when no store is configured. Every store-backed family above simply goes silent, scope by scope, for whatever it cannot currently read — the honest choice for those families, but on its own that gives a store outage no independent signal on this endpoint (with redis.failOpen: false and a store flapping faster than its 5s fail latch, every store-backed family can be absent scrape after scrape with nothing else here saying why). This gauge is that signal.
  • llmgateway_rate_limit_rejections_total{scope_kind,scope_id} — how many requests a rate or budget limit actually refused, by scope. This one has no equivalent in the admin JSON API: nothing else tracks it. It does not reset only on process restart: a scope's own count also resets to 0 when that user is removed via a hot-reloaded users file, and every tracked scope resets together, in one bulk cliff, the instant more than 2000 distinct scopes have ever been seen in this process's lifetime (a bounded-memory safeguard, not a graceful per-scope decay). A value that unexpectedly drops is one of these events, not a scrape anomaly — see the live # HELP line for the exact current threshold.

• Aggregation across replicas — read this before wiring an alert: with redis configured, every replica reads the SAME shared counters (the underlying key carries no per-instance component), so llmgateway_requests_total, llmgateway_tokens_total, llmgateway_cost_micro_usd_total, llmgateway_budget_consumed_ratio, and both llmgateway_provider_*_total families are the gateway-wide total, identical on every replica's own /metrics response. Prometheus scrapes each replica as its own target, so sum(rate(llmgateway_requests_total[5m])) (or any other sum()) across a 3-replica deployment triple-counts — a cost alert built on sum() fires at a third of its intended threshold. Aggregate these with max(), never sum(). Without redis (the in-process fallback), the identical families become genuinely per-replica instead — each replica counts only the traffic it personally handled — and sum() becomes the correct aggregation instead. This flips on that one config bit; know which one you are running before wiring an alert. Three families do not follow this rule:

  • llmgateway_rate_limit_rejections_total lives only in each replica's own process memory, never in Redis, regardless of the redis config — sum() is always correct for it.
  • llmgateway_provider_healthy reflects each replica's own, independently-running discovery circuit breaker — never shared via Redis either — so two replicas can legitimately disagree about one provider's health at the same instant. Read it per-instance where possible; if you must aggregate, min() surfaces "at least one replica sees this provider as unhealthy" — sum() is meaningless for a 0/1 gauge.
  • llmgateway_limit_store_up reflects each replica's own, locally -discovered connection health to the configured store — it cannot itself be read from the store it describes, so it is inherently per-replica too. Same guidance as llmgateway_provider_healthy: prefer per-instance, min() if you must aggregate.

• Labels are escaped: a label value that is user- or upstream-controlled (a user/group name, a model id) is escaped for backslash, double quote, and newline — the exact rule the text-exposition format requires. This matters more than it looks: an unescaped quote or newline breaks the exposition format's own lexical structure (an unterminated quoted string), and Prometheus reports an unparseable scrape as the whole target being down, not as one bad line — so a single unescaped quote in a model id would otherwise take the entire endpoint offline from Prometheus's point of view, not just that one series. A raw, invalid UTF-8 byte is escaped too, as a deterministic \xHH marker rather than passed through unchanged: an invalid-UTF-8 label value is independently fatal to a real Prometheus scrape (measured against promparse.go), so the escaping keeps every distinct input distinguishable (no two different names collapse onto one series) while guaranteeing the output stays valid UTF-8 either way.

• A store outage never fabricates a zero: if the configured Redis is unreachable, an affected scope's request/token/cost/provider counters are skipped entirely for that scrape rather than reported as 0 — a temporary gap in the series is the honest signal; a fabricated 0 would read to Prometheus as a counter reset followed by a phantom spike the instant the store recovers. This holds regardless of redis.failOpen: with failOpen: false (or unset) the request itself is refused during the outage, and with failOpen: true (the default) requests keep flowing against the in-process fallback, but /metrics still treats the affected scopes as unreadable rather than presenting the fallback's own, non-authoritative zero as real gateway-wide usage. llmgateway_provider_healthy is unaffected either way — it never reads from the store.

MCP and A2A

• Registry (group-filtered, sorted by name): GET /v1/mcp/servers → {"servers":[{"name","url"}]}; GET /v1/agents → {"agents":[{"name","url","card"}]}.
• Proxy: /mcp/{name}/{rest...} and /a2a/{name}/{rest...} reverse-proxy {rest...} to the configured target's url, streaming (SSE) preserved via a flush-per-write proxy. The gateway's own Authorization/x-api-key credential is stripped before proxying, and — unlike native provider passthrough — no credential is injected on the way out: an MCP server or A2A agent is treated as an in-cluster target that trusts the gateway's network position, not a per-provider key the gateway holds on the caller's behalf.
• Request-rate limits (requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay) apply to target-proxy calls the same as everywhere else; token/cost metrics do not, since there is no usage to parse from an arbitrary MCP/A2A response. Every proxied call (per-server proxy or federated /mcp) is additionally counted against its own target's request-rate counters — requests only, no configurable limit of its own this round — visible via GET /admin/api/targets above.
• Group visibility (mcpServers/agents glob lists) gates both the registry listing and the proxy path itself — a denied name is a 403 at the proxy, not just hidden from the listing.
• Federated POST /mcp: a single JSON-RPC 2.0 endpoint aggregating every MCP server the caller's group can reach — for clients built against a single aggregated endpoint (the earlier, pre-plugin gateway this replaces) rather than the per-server /mcp/{name}/... proxy above. Unlike that proxy, this is not a byte-level reverse proxy: the gateway decodes the request itself, answers initialize/ping locally, and for tools/list/tools/call issues its own outbound JSON-RPC call(s) to the relevant server(s) as part of handling that one request — no session state is cached across separate CLIENT requests (per-request upstream sessions, matching the per-server proxy's own complete absence of gateway-side session tracking); a session a handshake retry opens (below) lives entirely inside the one client request that triggered it. Any other HTTP method on exactly /mcp is a 405 with an Allow: POST header, checked before authentication.
  • tools/list fans out to every allowed server concurrently — each under its own 20s timeout — and merges the results, prefixing each tool's name "<serverName>_<toolName>" — the same underscore- separator convention the earlier agentgateway used and that existing MCP clients (pugbot's mcpclient, agentkit) already persist in their own tool-id records (e.g. brave-search_brave_web_search). A server that errors, times out, or answers with a response that is not valid JSON-RPC is skipped, not surfaced as a whole-call failure — the aggregate degrades to every other server's tools. If EVERY attempted server fails, the response is a JSON-RPC internal error ("no MCP server reachable") instead of a silently-empty tools list, which would otherwise be indistinguishable from "this caller's group has no MCP access at all".
  • tools/call resolves the target server by the LONGEST matching "<serverName>_" prefix against the caller's allowed servers (so two configured servers where one name prefixes the other, e.g. foo and foo_bar, resolve unambiguously), strips the prefix, forwards the call under a 120s timeout, and relays the result under the caller's own JSON-RPC id. An unresolvable prefix — including one that names a real but group-restricted or transport-excluded server (below) — is a JSON-RPC invalid params error (-32602), not an HTTP 404: the request reached a real route and method, it just named a tool nothing could route.
  • Session handshake fallback: each outbound backend call tries bare (no session) first. A backend that answers with a JSON-RPC error or an HTTP 4xx — signalling "you need a session" — gets ONE retry: POST initialize (this gateway's own protocol version and minimal clientInfo), capture the Mcp-Session-Id response header if the backend sets one, re-issue the real call carrying that header, then best-effort DELETE the session afterward (failure logged, never surfaced). A network failure, timeout, or 5xx never triggers this retry — only a response that specifically signals "missing session" is worth a second attempt. This ruling was verified against all 11 production MCP servers behind this gateway: 8 answer bare outright, 2 (readitall, fetch) need exactly this handshake, and one — see below — needs neither because it cannot be reached this way at all.
  • Legacy HTTP+SSE transport is excluded, not handshaken around: an MCP server configured with a URL whose path ends in /sse speaks the superseded HTTP+SSE transport, not Streamable HTTP — its client must drive a persistent SSE session no simple POST-per-call model (with or without a session handshake) can replicate. Such a server never appears in tools/list's aggregate and can never be resolved by tools/call — it is invisible to federation for every caller, independent of group access — but stays fully reachable via the per-server proxy (/mcp/{name}/... above), where the real client drives the transport end to end.
  • notifications/* gets a 202 Accepted with no body (no response is ever due for a JSON-RPC notification); any other method is a JSON-RPC method not found (-32601). Malformed JSON is a JSON-RPC parse error (-32700) with id: null, per spec. A non-2xx backend response, or one whose body is valid JSON but carries neither result nor error, is always treated as a failure — never silently relayed as an empty success.
  • initialize's protocolVersion echoes the caller's own requested value only when it names one of a small, explicit set of recognized revisions (2024-11-05, 2025-03-26, 2025-06-18, 2025-11-25); an unrecognized or omitted value gets this gateway's own default (2025-11-25) instead — never an arbitrary caller string echoed back as a capability claim this plugin cannot back up.
  • checkAndCount runs once per request (the caller's own user/group/ total scopes); each backend server actually ATTEMPTED — not necessarily reached or succeeded — is additionally attributed its own per-target counters, batched into one write per request, see GET /admin/api/targets above and the request-rate note below. Applies to MCP servers only, not agents: there is no equivalent aggregated /a2a endpoint.

Security notes

• API keys are never retained in memory as plaintext after construction — only their SHA-256 digests. Lookup is by digest, verified with crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare against the stored digest, so matching does not leak timing information about a near-miss key.
• Provider API keys are injected server-side (native passthrough's injectAuth) and never reach the client; a client's own gateway key is stripped before any upstream or target request and never reaches a provider, MCP server, or A2A agent.
• Neither kind of key is ever written to a log line — the logging helpers (logger.go) carry an explicit "never log key material" contract. providerHTTPError's Error() string (providers.go) separately omits the upstream response body it still holds as a struct field, so a future caller that ever formats the error bare (%v) cannot accidentally echo provider response content into a log line; today's only caller (writeProviderUpstreamError) reads that body directly and puts it in the client-facing response, never in a log.
• Every authentication attempt is logged, through one shared helper (logAuthEvent, logger.go) called at each of the six routes that authenticate a request (llmgateway.go's ServeHTTP, and routes_unified.go's handleModels). A failed attempt logs the request method, path, and remote address, and returns the usual 401 JSON envelope. A successful attempt logs the resolved user's name and the route. Neither line ever includes the presented API key — only the identity it resolved to, never the key material itself.
• GET /metrics (see Metrics) exposes per-user and per-group cost and usage data, the identical sensitivity as the admin dashboard's JSON API, so it is gated the same way: an admin bearer token by default, with an optional, narrowly-scoped allowedCIDRs bypass for a co-located scraper — never leave it reachable with neither.

Anonymous usage reporting

Release builds send one anonymous "plugin loaded" ping per process, at startup, so the project can see roughly how many installs exist and which versions are in use.

What is sent — the whole payload:

{ "project": "traefik-llmgateway", "version": "1.0.3", "ts": 1747782200 }

What is never sent: no identifiers, no hostname or IP, no machine information, no configuration, no provider names or base URLs, no API keys, no user or group names, no model names, and nothing derived from a request. The gateway sends the three fields above and nothing else.

When it does not happen at all:

• Builds from source stay silent. The version constant is stamped only at release time, so a checkout, a local build, and every test run carry the 0.0.0-dev sentinel and never ping.
• Failed startups stay silent. The ping is sent only after the plugin constructs successfully, so a rejected configuration is never counted.
• Only once per process, however many routes use the plugin.

How to turn it off in a release build — set any one of these in Traefik's environment:

DO_NOT_TRACK=1                          # honours the do-not-track.dev convention
OSS_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
TRAEFIK_LLMGATEWAY_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1  # this project only

In Kubernetes, add it to the Traefik deployment:

env:
  - name: DO_NOT_TRACK
    value: "1"

It cannot affect your gateway. The call runs in its own goroutine with a 2-second timeout, never blocks request handling or startup, never retries, never persists anything, and swallows every error. If the endpoint is unreachable or blocked by egress rules, nothing happens.

The client is oss-telemetry, vendored in this repository, so you can read exactly what it does — it is the plugin's only non-standard-library runtime dependency.

Known limitations

• Streaming is delivered buffered, not token-by-token, under the current Traefik + Yaegi combination. The plugin's own code streams correctly (proven by its unit tests, which drive the exact same code compiled, not interpreted): content is always complete and correct, but a Yaegi limitation strips the http.Flusher interface from the http.ResponseWriter crossing from Traefik's compiled dispatcher into the interpreted plugin, so no per-chunk flush actually reaches the client — the whole response arrives in one batch once the handler returns. This is a confirmed, external, still-open upstream bug (traefik/traefik#10269, labelled kind/bug/confirmed by Traefik's own maintainers; see also traefik/yaegi#1600), not a defect in this plugin, and no code-level workaround is known. The integration suite's true incremental-delivery timing assertion is gated behind INTEGRATION_STREAMING=1 and skipped by default for exactly this reason — re-run it once the upstream issue is fixed.
• POST /v1/messages now intercepts unconditionally, even with passthroughUnknown: true. Before this route existed, that path fell through to next on a passthroughUnknown deployment like any other unrecognized path. The gateway now answers it directly and next is never reached for it again — intended, but a real behavior change for a deployment currently proxying /v1/messages downstream. See Anthropic Messages API — Route takeover.
• A request rejected before it reaches a provider never consumes request-rate quota. On the unified routes, a malformed body, a missing model field, or an unknown/denied model (404/403) is rejected before limiter.checkAndCount runs. /v1/messages goes further for one specific field: it decodes the body and rejects a streaming request (400) before the rate limiter runs too, the opposite relative order from the unified routes' own admission-before-decode default — a deliberate, route-scoped exception (see Anthropic Messages API), since Anthropic SDKs retry any 5xx and would otherwise burn multiple requests of budget per logical streaming call against a route that does not support streaming yet. On native passthrough and the MCP/A2A proxy, denied provider/target access (403), an unsupported Upgrade request (501), and a path-traversal attempt (400) are all checked before the limiter too. Once a request does reach a provider adapter, though, a translate-time 400 (an unsupported parameter combination) or Anthropic's embeddings 501 still count toward the caller's request-rate limit — the limiter already ran by then — though neither ever bills a token or cost, since usage stays at zero either way. The federated /mcp endpoint follows the same shape: an unreadable body, an unsupported Upgrade, or a malformed JSON-RPC envelope are all rejected before the limiter runs, but a JSON-RPC-level error discovered AFTER dispatch — method not found, an unresolvable tools/call prefix — still counts, since checkAndCount already ran by the time the method is even looked at.
• Gateway-to-client responses on passthrough and MCP/A2A routes are identity-encoded. The gateway strips a client's own Accept-Encoding header before forwarding to the upstream, so Go's http.Transport adds its own Accept-Encoding: gzip and, per its documented contract, transparently decompresses a gzip response and strips its Content-Encoding/Content-Length headers before handing it back — the client sees plain, uncompressed bytes with no Content-Encoding header, regardless of what it originally asked for. This covers the gzip case Go's Transport auto-negotiates; an upstream that used a different encoding on its own initiative (never observed against OpenAI, Anthropic, or Gemini) would pass through unmodified instead.
• Image and audio responses are never cost-accounted. Request counters (requestsPerMinute/requestsPerDay) increment as usual, but images/generations, audio/speech, and audio/transcriptions never move a token counter and always record cost as 0, regardless of what a provider itself would charge for them — a real gap for an operator billing on these endpoints, not just an accounting nuance.
• An upstream response over 32MiB (maxResponseBytes, providers.go) is silently truncated, not rejected. Every adapter response read — the unified chat/embeddings JSON, and the three media endpoints — is capped at this limit. audio/speech's streaming copy (openaiAdapter.audioSpeech, provider_openai.go) already committed the upstream's 200 status before it starts copying bytes, so a response over the cap simply ends early: no error, no truncation signal of any kind, a shorter audio file indistinguishable from a genuinely short one. images/generations and audio/transcriptions (forwardMediaBody) read their whole response before writing a status, so they hit the identical cap with the same silent-truncation-into-200 outcome. 32MiB is generous for any of these payloads in practice, but nothing enforces or signals the cutoff.
• The response cache shares entries across every user and group that can reach a model. cache's key (see Caching) carries no user identity by design, so two different callers sending the same request receive the exact same cached response, including the exact same id/timing-shaped fields a provider embeds in it. This is intentional — a provider's response to an identical request is provider-deterministic — but it means the cache is not a per-tenant isolation boundary: don't enable it for a deployment where two callers must never observe evidence that another caller made the identical request.

Kubernetes

See examples/kubernetes.yaml for a complete, YAML-validated example manifest that kubectl apply -f applies cleanly once Traefik's CRDs (Middleware, IngressRoute) are installed in the cluster: a Secret holding the users file, a Middleware custom resource carrying the plugin's own configuration (validated against the real Config struct — every field in that example round-trips through New() cleanly), a dummy backing Deployment/Service (Traefik requires a real router backend even though this middleware never actually reaches it — see Quickstart), an IngressRoute wiring it all to a host, a second, Host-free IngressRoute plus a VMServiceScrape for scraping /metrics (a ServiceMonitor works the same way on a Prometheus-operator cluster — only the CRD kind differs), and a Traefik Helm values snippet for loading the plugin and wiring provider keys in from Secrets via environment variables.

The short version:

• Provider keys and the Redis password live in env:VAR form inside the Middleware, sourced from Kubernetes Secrets mounted as environment variables on the Traefik pod — never as literals in the CR.
• The users file lives in its own Secret, mounted as a volume, referenced by users.file in the Middleware spec. Editing that Secret (and letting it propagate to the mounted file, or restarting the pod if your cluster's kubelet doesn't sync Secret volumes fast enough for your needs) updates the live user set within the 5-second reload window — no Traefik restart required.
• Point redis.address at your cluster's existing Redis/Valkey/Dragonfly rather than standing up a dedicated instance for this plugin — the distributed limiter is a client, not a datastore.
• /metrics is served by Traefik itself, not by any backend Service, so scraping it needs its own Host-free route (see the example manifest's own comment on this — a Host-restricted router alone 404s an in-cluster scrape) and its own CIDR/admin-key auth — never point a scraper at it without one or the other configured.

Config hot-reload

Editing the Middleware custom resource applies with no pod restart and no manual reload step. The Kubernetes CRD provider watches Middleware resources natively: on a change, Traefik builds a whole new plugin instance from the updated config, lets it warm-fill discovery for every provider with discovery: true (see Model routing), then swaps it in for new requests. This repository does not carry evidence of Traefik's exact draining mechanism for requests already in flight on the old instance at swap time. What is verified: the integration suite's sustained-traffic reload test (TestConfigHotReload, integration/config_hot_reload_test.go) sends requests throughout the whole rewrite-and-propagation window and sees zero non-200 responses. That result means different things depending on whether Traefik's directory watch actually picks up the change within the test's own bound. When it does, zero non-200s is evidence of a blip-free reload. When it does not — a host-dependent propagation delay, not a plugin defect — the same zero-non-200s result only shows the stack stayed healthy through an unreloaded rewrite attempt, not that a reload itself is blip-free.

A rebuilt instance keeps some state and resets the rest:

• Survives a rebuild: request/token/cost counters and cached responses, both stored in Redis. A counter's key comes from windowKey's (kind, id, metric, window, time) alone (see Limits and accounting) — never from anything specific to one Gateway instance — so a new instance reads the exact counters the old one wrote. The response cache's keys work the same way.
• Resets on a rebuild: the in-process fallback counters (used whenever no Redis is configured, and also transparently during a Redis outage when failOpen is true — the default; see limiter.storeIncrMulti, limits.go), the limiter's and cache's own Redis-outage down-latches, and the model registry's discovery cache — a new instance always runs its own full warm-fill before serving, rather than inheriting the old instance's listing. This is separate from the fallback's own TTL-bounded retention (a window's counter still expires and resets on its own, per-window schedule, even between rebuilds — see Limits and accounting's "Fallback" bullet): a rebuild loses every fallback counter at once, TTL or not.

Two practical implications follow:

• New models need no config edit at all. A provider's own discoveryInterval polls the upstream directly on its own schedule; adding a model upstream needs neither a Middleware change nor a rebuild.
• The users Secret must be a whole-volume mount, never subPath. A subPath volume mount binds once at pod start — the kubelet never updates it again, so a Secret change behind a subPath mount stays invisible to the running pod for its whole lifetime (a documented kubelet limitation, not a plugin one). Mount the whole Secret as its own volume instead, exactly as examples/kubernetes.yaml's additionalVolumeMounts snippet does: a whole-volume mount updates by the kubelet swapping a symlink, and the plugin's own 5-second mtime poll (reloadEvery, users_file.go) picks that swap up with no pod restart.

If you run Traefik's file provider in Kubernetes instead of the CRD provider — a ConfigMap-mounted dynamic config file rather than Middleware resources — point it at the mount with directory:, never filename:. A ConfigMap update reaches the pod the same way a Secret does: the kubelet swaps a symlink for the whole mounted directory, which Traefik's single-file filename: watch never observes; directory: watches the directory itself and picks the swap up. The same directory: requirement also holds for local/Docker Desktop development against this plugin: a single file's fsnotify watch does not fire reliably over Docker Desktop's VirtioFS bind mount, which is why this repository's own integration stack (integration/traefik/traefik.yml) uses directory: rather than filename:.

Development

make test            # go test ./... -count=1
make lint            # gofmt -l . && go vet ./...
make yaegi-check      # interprets the plugin with Yaegi, exercises .traefik.yml's testData
make admin-ui         # rebuilds webui/ (npm ci && vite build) and regenerates
                      # admin_assets_gen.go — needed only after a webui/ source change
make integration      # docker-compose: real Traefik, real Redis, mock providers; brings the
                      # stack up, waits for it, runs the suite, always tears it down after
make integration-keep # same run, but leaves the stack up afterward for debugging —
                      # tear it down yourself with `make integration-down` when done

make admin-ui needs Node (developed against v22 / npm 11) but nothing else does: admin_assets_gen.go is committed, so make test/make lint/make yaegi-check/make integration/CI never invoke Node at all. Regenerate it after editing anything under webui/, then commit both the webui/ change and the regenerated admin_assets_gen.go together.

Also run before committing (not wired into make lint, since it needs a separate binary): golangci-lint run ./... and golangci-lint run --enable=gosec ./... (gosec applies to _test.go files too), plus fieldalignment ./... (golang.org/x/tools/go/analysis/passes/fieldalignment). All are 0-issues on this repository as of this commit.

The plugin ships stdlib-only (no third-party dependencies at all, see go.mod) — a hard constraint of Yaegi interpretation, not a style preference. resp.go is the clearest example: a hand-rolled, ~400-line RESP2 client instead of go-redis, which proved unsuitable for Yaegi interpretation.

Catalog

The plugin is listed, and the catalog serves the released tags.

.traefik.yml carries a basePkg override (traefikllmgateway) because Traefik's Yaegi middleware loader otherwise binds the interpreted package under strings.ReplaceAll(path.Base(import), "-", "_") — traefik_llmgateway — which does not match this package's actual package traefikllmgateway declaration. This was discovered running the plugin in real Traefik for the first time; see the comment in .traefik.yml itself. The catalog's own analyzer (piceus) accepts the override the same way real Traefik does, which the successful listing confirms.

Note that the catalog renders .traefik.yml's description with a plain CommonMark renderer: GitHub callout syntax (> [!WARNING]) and mermaid blocks appear as literal text there, so keep that file's prose to plain Markdown.

License

MIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Lukasz Raczylo.