mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway.git
synced 2026-10-11 04:47:00 +00:00
perf(openai): presize upstream JSON response reads from Content-Length
forwardJSON read upstream response bodies with io.ReadAll, which grows its buffer many times. readAllLimited returns the same data and errors, but it uses the declared Content-Length as a capacity hint. A body of known length then usually needs one allocation. A wrong Content-Length still reads to EOF or to the limit. The hint is clamped to 1 MiB, so a peer that declares a large length and then stalls cannot make the gateway allocate more than that before data arrives. The client request path keeps io.ReadAll, because the client controls its own Content-Length. Tests compare readAllLimited with io.ReadAll for exact, short, long, unknown and oversized lengths, for a mid-body error and for the clamp. With both commits, the yaegi harness measures 729565 bytes per embeddings request instead of 925587 (-21%), 12.6% fewer allocations, and 1.15 ms instead of 1.31 ms. With 16 embeddings per request, allocation falls from 5.0 MB to 3.0 MB. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KwtV5ecajCrftcf8TkfPad
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-1
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ type chatUsagePayload struct {
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// since a malformed-but-readable body is the upstream's problem to answer
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// for, not a reason to swallow the response.
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func (a *openaiAdapter) forwardJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, resp *http.Response) (usage, error) {
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body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBytes))
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body, err := readAllLimited(resp.Body, resp.ContentLength, maxResponseBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return usage{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: read response body: %w", errUpstream, err)
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}
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@@ -80,6 +80,35 @@ func newProviderHTTPError(resp *http.Response) *providerHTTPError {
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return &providerHTTPError{status: resp.StatusCode, body: body}
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}
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// readAllHintMax caps how much readAllLimited allocates up front from a
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// declared Content-Length. A peer that declares a large length and then
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// stalls must not make the gateway hold more than this before any byte
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// arrives; a longer body still reads correctly, it just regrows past it.
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const readAllHintMax = 1 << 20
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// readAllLimited returns the same result as io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r,
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// limit)); contentLength is only a capacity hint — a wrong value still
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// reads to EOF or limit, never trusted for correctness. Used for upstream
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// response bodies (forwardJSON), where the sender is the operator-
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// configured provider, not an arbitrary client. When it looks usable, it
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// lets a body of known length be read into a single allocation instead of
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// io.ReadAll's repeated doubling regrowth, but the hint itself is clamped
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// to readAllHintMax before allocating — the added bytes.MinRead keeps
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// ReadFrom's final probe read (which always tries to read past what it
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// expects) from itself forcing one more regrow.
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func readAllLimited(r io.Reader, contentLength, limit int64) ([]byte, error) {
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if contentLength <= 0 || contentLength > limit {
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return io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit))
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}
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hint := contentLength
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if hint > readAllHintMax {
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hint = readAllHintMax
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}
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buf := bytes.NewBuffer(make([]byte, 0, hint+bytes.MinRead))
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_, err := buf.ReadFrom(io.LimitReader(r, limit))
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return buf.Bytes(), err
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}
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// errUpstream is a sentinel wrapped into errors an adapter returns when it
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// cannot reach, or cannot make sense of a response from, its upstream —
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// distinct from providerHTTPError, which means the upstream answered, just
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@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
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package traefikllmgateway
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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"testing/iotest"
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)
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// TestProviderPassthroughEnabled is the security+performance audit
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@@ -95,3 +99,114 @@ func TestWithAttemptRecorder_NilRecorder_ReturnsSameContext(t *testing.T) {
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t.Errorf("attemptRecorderFromContext = %v, want nil after a nil recorder was passed in", rec)
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}
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}
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// TestReadAllLimited compares readAllLimited against the reference
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// io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit)) on an identical input for every
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// shape of contentLength hint: exact, too small, too large, unknown (-1),
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// zero with a non-empty body, larger than limit, and a body longer than
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// limit (which must still truncate to limit) both via the io.ReadAll
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// fallback (hint <= 0 or hint > limit) and via the presized bytes.Buffer
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// fast path directly (hint > 0 and hint <= limit) — the fast path's own
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// io.LimitReader must still do the truncating, not just size the buffer.
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func TestReadAllLimited(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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body []byte
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contentLength int64
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limit int64
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}{
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{name: "exact content-length", body: []byte("hello world"), contentLength: 11, limit: 1024},
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{name: "hint smaller than body", body: []byte("hello world"), contentLength: 3, limit: 1024},
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{name: "hint larger than body", body: []byte("hi"), contentLength: 1000, limit: 1024},
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{name: "unknown content-length (-1)", body: []byte("hello"), contentLength: -1, limit: 1024},
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{name: "zero hint with non-empty body", body: []byte("hello"), contentLength: 0, limit: 1024},
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{name: "hint larger than limit", body: []byte("hello world"), contentLength: 2000, limit: 5},
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{name: "body longer than limit, hint exceeds limit (fallback path) truncates", body: bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), 20), contentLength: 20, limit: 10},
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{name: "body longer than limit, unknown hint (fallback path) truncates", body: bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), 20), contentLength: -1, limit: 10},
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{name: "body longer than limit, hint equals limit (fast path) truncates", body: bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), 20), contentLength: 10, limit: 10},
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{name: "body longer than limit, hint below limit (fast path) truncates", body: bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), 20), contentLength: 5, limit: 10},
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{name: "empty body", body: nil, contentLength: 0, limit: 1024},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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want, wantErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(c.body), c.limit))
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got, gotErr := readAllLimited(bytes.NewReader(c.body), c.contentLength, c.limit)
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if (gotErr == nil) != (wantErr == nil) {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want error presence %v", gotErr, wantErr != nil)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Errorf("readAllLimited(%q, %d, %d) = %q, want %q", c.body, c.contentLength, c.limit, got, want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestReadAllLimited_ClampsHintToReadAllHintMax asserts a large declared
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// Content-Length never drives an unbounded up-front allocation before any
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// byte has arrived — an authenticated peer that declares a huge length and
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// then stalls must not make readAllLimited hold more than readAllHintMax
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// per call — while a genuinely large body (bigger than readAllHintMax)
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// still reads back identically to the io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(...))
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// reference, just via regrowth past the initial cap.
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func TestReadAllLimited_ClampsHintToReadAllHintMax(t *testing.T) {
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t.Run("huge declared length, tiny body: allocation stays capped", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := []byte("0123456789")
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const contentLength = 32 << 20
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const limit = 32 << 20
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got, err := readAllLimited(bytes.NewReader(body), contentLength, limit)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("readAllLimited: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(got, body) {
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t.Errorf("readAllLimited = %q, want %q", got, body)
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}
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if cap(got) > readAllHintMax+bytes.MinRead {
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t.Errorf("cap(got) = %d, want <= %d: the declared length must not drive an unbounded up-front allocation",
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cap(got), readAllHintMax+bytes.MinRead)
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}
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})
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t.Run("body larger than readAllHintMax with exact hint still reads fully", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := bytes.Repeat([]byte("y"), readAllHintMax+100)
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contentLength := int64(len(body))
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limit := int64(len(body))
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want, wantErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(body), limit))
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if wantErr != nil {
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t.Fatalf("reference io.ReadAll: %v", wantErr)
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}
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got, err := readAllLimited(bytes.NewReader(body), contentLength, limit)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("readAllLimited: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Errorf("readAllLimited returned %d bytes, want %d bytes matching reference", len(got), len(want))
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}
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})
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}
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// TestReadAllLimited_PropagatesNonEOFError asserts a reader that yields
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// some data and then a non-EOF error fails readAllLimited the same way it
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// fails the reference io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit)) — the injected
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// error must still be reachable via errors.Is, not swallowed.
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func TestReadAllLimited_PropagatesNonEOFError(t *testing.T) {
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injected := errors.New("stub: read failed")
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newFailingReader := func() io.Reader {
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return io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader([]byte("partial")), iotest.ErrReader(injected))
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}
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_, refErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(newFailingReader(), 1024))
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if !errors.Is(refErr, injected) {
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t.Fatalf("reference io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader) err = %v, want errors.Is match for %v", refErr, injected)
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}
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_, gotErr := readAllLimited(newFailingReader(), 100, 1024)
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if gotErr == nil {
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t.Fatal("readAllLimited: want a non-nil error")
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}
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if !errors.Is(gotErr, injected) {
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t.Errorf("readAllLimited err = %v, want errors.Is match for %v", gotErr, injected)
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}
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}
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