Clients sent X-Skip-Cache: true or Cache-Control: no-cache on reads
that gate money and quotas, but the proxy ignored both and answered
from its cache for up to CACHE_TTL seconds. A quota or overage setting
change therefore took effect late.
A request with either header now goes to the backend, is not stored
and does not join an identical request in flight.
The sustained gate compared requests per second with Req, which is a count per Interval. An interval of one minute with req 10 allowed 600 requests. The gate now compares the count in the interval with Req. One-second intervals behave as before. A burst at or above req has no effect, because the sustained gate always binds first.
The proxy derived per-user GraphQL cache keys from JWT claims without
verifying the token signature (CWE-345). A remote attacker could forge a
token that carried a victim's claim value and read the victim's cached
response.
This change adds opt-in signature verification behind JWT_VERIFY_SIGNATURE.
The flag defaults to false, so an upgrade without a config change keeps the
previous delegate-to-upstream behavior byte for byte.
When verification is on, the operator must set exactly one key source:
JWT_SECRET, JWT_PUBLIC_KEY, or JWT_JWKS_URL. The verifier pins the accepted
algorithms to the key family through WithValidMethods and a type-switched
keyfunc, and it refuses alg=none. This closes the algorithm-confusion class
of attack. A present but invalid token now returns 401. A missing
Authorization header stays anonymous.
Startup fails loudly when verification is on and the key source is absent or
unreadable, so the proxy can never boot half-configured.
An audit against the code found stale defaults, wrong numbers, an
invented error-response example, and capability claims for features that
do not exist (query-complexity limiting, IP-based and per-endpoint rate
limits, config hot-reload).
Correct the env-var defaults, the degraded-retry and keepalive numbers,
and the circuit-open response example. Reframe the cache-key isolation as
a correctness boundary, not an authentication one, because the proxy does
not verify JWT signatures. Document the admin dashboard exposure, the API
key scope, the WebSocket ban and rate-limit checks, and the new
BIND_ADDRESS option.
- Document WebSocket-streamed live metrics (2s) with 5s polling fallback, the overview KPIs and live charts, and the cluster-view toggle (aggregated vs this-node, disabled in single-node).
- Complete the API endpoint list (stats, cache, ws/stats, cluster endpoints, cache/clear) to match the registered routes. - Regenerate static/admin-dashboard.png for the redesigned dashboard.
Fixes the stale 'auto-refreshes every 5 seconds' claim.
Discloses the single anonymous adoption ping sent on startup and points
users to the upstream README section for full opt-out instructions
instead of duplicating the table here.
* This change introduces ability to set additional endpoint leading to the
instance of the graphql server connected to the read only database.
If regular query is detected and endpoint for `HOST_GRAPHQL_READONLY` value is set,
the query will be proxied to it. Mutations and non-graphql will be sent
to the `HOST_GRAPHQL` endpoint.