feat: comprehensive audit + Tier 3 wiring (security/correctness/features)

Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.

SECURITY & CORRECTNESS

- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
  scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
  on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
  npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
  pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
  on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
  rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
  filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
  Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
  panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
  lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
  true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
  collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
  race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
  (RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
  --detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
  vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
  default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
  async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
  (skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
  OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
  DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
  detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
  managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
  app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
  with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
  realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
  override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
  MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.

LINT/HYGIENE

- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
  gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
  staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
  field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.

BEHAVIOR CHANGES

- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
  (trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
  serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
  server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
  validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
  Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.

NEW PACKAGES

- pkg/events  - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs  - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper

DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)

- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
  BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
  integrator scope).

pkg/scanner/npmaudit/npmaudit.go

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// Package npmaudit wraps the `npm audit` CLI to surface vulnerability
+// findings for npm packages.
 package npmaudit
 
 import (
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ func (s *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version strin
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp dir: %w", err)
 	}
-	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+	defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir) }()
 
 	// Extract the .tgz file
 	if err := s.extractTgz(filePath, tmpDir); err != nil {
@@ -80,8 +82,36 @@ func (s *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version strin
 		packageDir = tmpDir
 	}
 
-	// Run npm audit
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "npm", "audit", "--json", "--package-lock-only")
+	// npm tarballs ship only package.json — there is no lockfile. We must
+	// generate one before `npm audit` can resolve the dependency tree.
+	// NOTE: this performs network egress (npm registry lookups for
+	// transitive deps). Acceptable here because the scanner runs server-
+	// side and the operator already trusts upstream resolution to cache
+	// the package; we use --ignore-scripts to avoid running install hooks.
+	log.Info().
+		Str("scanner", ScannerName).
+		Str("package", packageName).
+		Msg("Generating package-lock.json for npm audit (network egress)")
+
+	installCmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "npm", "install",
+		"--package-lock-only",
+		"--omit=dev",
+		"--ignore-scripts",
+		"--no-audit",
+	)
+	installCmd.Dir = packageDir
+	if installOut, err := installCmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		log.Warn().
+			Err(err).
+			Str("package", packageName).
+			Str("output", string(installOut)).
+			Msg("npm install --package-lock-only failed; returning scan-error")
+		return s.scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version,
+			fmt.Sprintf("npm install --package-lock-only failed: %v", err)), nil
+	}
+
+	// Run npm audit against the freshly generated lockfile.
+	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "npm", "audit", "--json")
 	cmd.Dir = packageDir
 	output, _ := cmd.CombinedOutput() // npm audit returns non-zero when vulns found
 
@@ -90,8 +120,9 @@ func (s *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version strin
 	if len(output) > 0 {
 		if err := json.Unmarshal(output, &auditResult); err != nil {
 			log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to parse npm audit output")
-			// Return clean result on parse error
-			return s.emptyResult(registry, packageName, version), nil
+			// Parse failure means we couldn't determine vulnerability state — fail closed.
+			return s.scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version,
+				fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse npm audit output: %v", err)), nil
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -123,7 +154,11 @@ func (s *Scanner) extractTgz(tgzPath, destDir string) error {
 }
 
 // emptyResult returns an empty scan result
-func (s *Scanner) emptyResult(registry, packageName, version string) *metadata.ScanResult {
+
+// scanErrorResult returns a result marked as scan-error so the manager merge
+// and CheckVulnerabilities can fail closed. Use this when the scan could not
+// complete and we therefore have no signal about vulnerabilities.
+func (s *Scanner) scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version, reason string) *metadata.ScanResult {
 	return &metadata.ScanResult{
 		ID:                 uuid.New().String(),
 		Registry:           registry,
@@ -131,10 +166,12 @@ func (s *Scanner) emptyResult(registry, packageName, version string) *metadata.S
 		PackageVersion:     version,
 		Scanner:            ScannerName,
 		ScannedAt:          time.Now(),
-		Status:             metadata.ScanStatusClean,
+		Status:             metadata.ScanStatusError,
 		VulnerabilityCount: 0,
 		Vulnerabilities:    []metadata.Vulnerability{},
-		Details:            map[string]interface{}{},
+		Details: map[string]interface{}{
+			"error": reason,
+		},
 	}
 }