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e39d6a0f0d
Multi-agent audit + fix pass covering bugs, security, dead config wiring,
and missing features. All quality gates green: build/vet/test -race/govulncheck/
golangci-lint. Frontend tests 47/47.
SECURITY & CORRECTNESS
- Scanner pipeline fail-closed: cache.go scan timeout now 503 (was goto servePkg);
scanner.go all-scanners-fail saves ScanStatusError; CheckVulnerabilities blocks
on missing/error result instead of allowing.
- Scanner argv corrections: govulncheck source-mode + go.mod discovery;
npm-audit generates lockfile via npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts;
pip-audit per-extension dispatch (wheel direct / sdist extract+pyproject).
- GHSA version-range filtering implemented (was always-include); url.QueryEscape
on package name.
- pypi SSRF closed via host allowlist on original_url; url.QueryEscape on
rewriteURL output.
- Path traversal: cache temp file uses os.CreateTemp; smb keyToPath sanitized;
filesystem keyToPath returns error + filepath.Abs prefix-verify.
- Goroutine leaks plugged: cache.cleanupWorker stop channel; auth.ValidationCache
Stop() with sync.Once; ws.unregister buffered with non-blocking send.
- WebSocket double-close panic fixed via sync.Once Client.closeSend().
- Race conditions: gormstore.registryCache sync.RWMutex (was concurrent map
panic); auth.LastUsedAt no longer mutated under RLock; analytics strict
lock-ordering invariant (statsMu before downloadsMu).
- Auth validator fails CLOSED on transport/unknown-status errors (was returning
true,err 'allow cache fallback').
- Credential cache hash full SHA256 (was 8-byte truncate; eliminates 2^32
collision risk).
- filesystem.fs.used incremented after successful rename (no quota inflation
race).
- gormstore aggregation events deleted in same tx as insert (no double-counting).
- gormstore.SavePackage uses Updates(map) so zero-value security flags
(RequiresAuth=false) can be cleared.
- partition_manager validates partition name regex before DROP TABLE.
- vcs/git: version regex validation rejects --option-injection; checkout uses
--detach -- separator; removed TrimPrefix(repo,'v') that corrupted vault/
vitess/vim-go.
- WebSocket CheckOrigin allowlist (was return true; CSWSH closed); same-origin
default + ServerConfig.AllowedOrigins.
- fiber CVE GO-2026-4543 patched (v2.52.10 -> v2.52.12).
FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
- API key DB persistence: APIKeyModel + migration 202604280002, full CRUD,
async LastUsedAt updates with WaitGroup-tracked goroutines drained on Close.
- Admin bootstrap via GOHOARDER_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_KEY env var; idempotent
(skipped when non-revoked admin already exists).
- Auth middleware factory in pkg/app: RequireAuth, RequireRole, RequirePermission,
OptionalAuth. Mounted on proxy + read APIs when Auth.Enabled=true.
DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role. /health public for k8s probes.
- NFS storage backend: pkg/storage/nfs wraps filesystem with /proc/mounts
detection (Linux), post-write fsync, read-after-write health probe.
- WebSocket real-time pipeline: pkg/events Broadcaster interface; cache + scanner
managers emit EventPackageCached / EventPackageDownloaded / EventScanComplete;
app.go runs 30s EventStatsUpdate ticker. Frontend has full WS client (reconnect
with exponential backoff 1s->30s, 25s heartbeat, subscriber pattern), Pinia
realtime store, Dashboard live indicator + activity feed + reactive stats
override.
- TLS termination: fiber.ListenTLS when Server.TLS.Enabled.
- Pre-warming: Prewarming.Enabled flag wired (was hardcoded false); Interval,
MaxConcurrent, TopPackages plumbed.
- NetworkConfig wired (timeouts, retry, rate-limit, circuit-breaker).
- AuthConfig.BcryptCost wired.
- Security.Scanners.Static.MaxPackageSize plumbed to cache.io.LimitReader.
- Handlers.{Go,NPM,PyPI}.Enabled gates route mounting.
- Graceful shutdown: authManager.Close drains async writes.
LINT/HYGIENE
- 80 golangci-lint issues resolved: errcheck (Close/Write/RemoveAll wrapped),
gofmt, gosec G104/G306, govet shadow renames + fieldalignment reorders,
staticcheck ST1000 pkg comments + QF1003 tagged switches + QF1008 embedded
field selectors + QF1001 De Morgan's law.
BEHAVIOR CHANGES
- Scanner now fail-closed: deployments without scanner binaries
(trivy/govulncheck/npm-audit/pip-audit/grype) BLOCK packages instead of
serving unscanned. Add binaries or plan a future allow-on-scan-error flag.
- WS origin defaults to same-origin; cross-origin dashboards must set
server.allowed_origins.
- Validator no longer fails open; private packages won't serve from cache when
validation can't be performed.
- download_events retention dropped from 24h to ~5min (deleted in agg tx).
Migration 202604280001 purges pre-upgrade events.
- DELETE /api/packages/* requires admin role when auth enabled.
NEW PACKAGES
- pkg/events - Broadcaster interface
- pkg/storage/nfs - NFS-aware filesystem wrapper
DEFERRED (out of scope this pass)
- Static scanner implementation (config defines AllowedLicenses/MaxPackageSize/
BlockSuspicious but pkg/scanner/static/ does not exist).
- AuthConfig.AuditLog wiring (no audit log infra yet).
- CacheConfig.TTLOverrides passthrough (would touch cache.Config beyond
integrator scope).
272 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
272 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
// Package npmaudit wraps the `npm audit` CLI to surface vulnerability
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// findings for npm packages.
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package npmaudit
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"time"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/config"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/metadata"
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"github.com/lukaszraczylo/gohoarder/pkg/uuid"
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"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
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)
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// ScannerName is the name of this scanner
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const ScannerName = "npm-audit"
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// Scanner implements the npm audit vulnerability scanner
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type Scanner struct {
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config config.NpmAuditConfig
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}
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// New creates a new npm audit scanner
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func New(cfg config.NpmAuditConfig) *Scanner {
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return &Scanner{
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config: cfg,
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}
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}
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// Name returns the scanner name
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func (s *Scanner) Name() string {
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return ScannerName
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}
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// Scan scans an npm package using npm audit
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func (s *Scanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, registry, packageName, version string, filePath string) (*metadata.ScanResult, error) {
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// Only scan npm packages
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if registry != "npm" {
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return &metadata.ScanResult{
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ID: uuid.New().String(),
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Registry: registry,
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PackageName: packageName,
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PackageVersion: version,
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Scanner: ScannerName,
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ScannedAt: time.Now(),
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Status: metadata.ScanStatusClean,
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VulnerabilityCount: 0,
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Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
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Details: map[string]interface{}{
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"skipped": "npm-audit only supports npm packages",
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},
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}, nil
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}
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log.Info().
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Str("scanner", ScannerName).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Str("version", version).
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Msg("Starting npm audit scan")
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// Create a temporary directory
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tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "npm-audit-*")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp dir: %w", err)
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}
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defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir) }()
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// Extract the .tgz file
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if err := s.extractTgz(filePath, tmpDir); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract tgz: %w", err)
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}
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// Find the package directory (usually "package/")
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packageDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "package")
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if _, err := os.Stat(packageDir); os.IsNotExist(err) {
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// Try the tmpDir itself
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packageDir = tmpDir
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}
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// npm tarballs ship only package.json — there is no lockfile. We must
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// generate one before `npm audit` can resolve the dependency tree.
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// NOTE: this performs network egress (npm registry lookups for
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// transitive deps). Acceptable here because the scanner runs server-
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// side and the operator already trusts upstream resolution to cache
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// the package; we use --ignore-scripts to avoid running install hooks.
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log.Info().
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Str("scanner", ScannerName).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Msg("Generating package-lock.json for npm audit (network egress)")
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installCmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "npm", "install",
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"--package-lock-only",
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"--omit=dev",
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"--ignore-scripts",
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"--no-audit",
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)
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installCmd.Dir = packageDir
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if installOut, err := installCmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
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log.Warn().
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Err(err).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Str("output", string(installOut)).
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Msg("npm install --package-lock-only failed; returning scan-error")
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return s.scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version,
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fmt.Sprintf("npm install --package-lock-only failed: %v", err)), nil
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}
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// Run npm audit against the freshly generated lockfile.
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "npm", "audit", "--json")
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cmd.Dir = packageDir
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output, _ := cmd.CombinedOutput() // npm audit returns non-zero when vulns found
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// Parse npm audit output
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var auditResult NpmAuditResult
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if len(output) > 0 {
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if err := json.Unmarshal(output, &auditResult); err != nil {
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log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to parse npm audit output")
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// Parse failure means we couldn't determine vulnerability state — fail closed.
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return s.scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version,
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fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse npm audit output: %v", err)), nil
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}
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}
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// Convert to our format
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result := s.convertResult(&auditResult, registry, packageName, version)
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log.Info().
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Str("scanner", ScannerName).
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Str("package", packageName).
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Int("vulnerabilities", result.VulnerabilityCount).
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Msg("npm audit scan completed")
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return result, nil
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}
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// Health checks if npm is available
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func (s *Scanner) Health(ctx context.Context) error {
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "npm", "--version")
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if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("npm not available: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// extractTgz extracts a .tgz file
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func (s *Scanner) extractTgz(tgzPath, destDir string) error {
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cmd := exec.Command("tar", "-xzf", tgzPath, "-C", destDir)
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return cmd.Run()
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}
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// emptyResult returns an empty scan result
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// scanErrorResult returns a result marked as scan-error so the manager merge
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// and CheckVulnerabilities can fail closed. Use this when the scan could not
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// complete and we therefore have no signal about vulnerabilities.
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func (s *Scanner) scanErrorResult(registry, packageName, version, reason string) *metadata.ScanResult {
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return &metadata.ScanResult{
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ID: uuid.New().String(),
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Registry: registry,
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PackageName: packageName,
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PackageVersion: version,
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Scanner: ScannerName,
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ScannedAt: time.Now(),
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Status: metadata.ScanStatusError,
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VulnerabilityCount: 0,
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Vulnerabilities: []metadata.Vulnerability{},
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Details: map[string]interface{}{
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"error": reason,
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},
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}
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}
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// convertResult converts npm audit output to our ScanResult format
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func (s *Scanner) convertResult(auditResult *NpmAuditResult, registry, packageName, version string) *metadata.ScanResult {
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vulnerabilities := make([]metadata.Vulnerability, 0)
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severityCounts := make(map[string]int)
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// Process vulnerabilities from the audit result
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for _, vuln := range auditResult.Vulnerabilities {
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// Normalize severity
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normalizedSeverity := metadata.NormalizeSeverity(vuln.Severity)
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severityCounts[normalizedSeverity]++
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// Get references
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refs := make([]string, 0)
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if vuln.URL != "" {
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refs = append(refs, vuln.URL)
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}
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for _, ref := range vuln.References {
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if ref.URL != "" {
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refs = append(refs, ref.URL)
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}
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}
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// Get fixed version
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fixedIn := ""
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if vuln.FixAvailable != nil {
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fixedIn = fmt.Sprintf("%v", vuln.FixAvailable)
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}
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vulnerabilities = append(vulnerabilities, metadata.Vulnerability{
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ID: vuln.Via,
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Severity: normalizedSeverity,
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Title: vuln.Name,
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Description: vuln.Name,
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References: refs,
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FixedIn: fixedIn,
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})
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}
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status := metadata.ScanStatusClean
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if len(vulnerabilities) > 0 {
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status = metadata.ScanStatusVulnerable
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}
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return &metadata.ScanResult{
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ID: uuid.New().String(),
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Registry: registry,
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PackageName: packageName,
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PackageVersion: version,
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Scanner: ScannerName,
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ScannedAt: time.Now(),
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Status: status,
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VulnerabilityCount: len(vulnerabilities),
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Vulnerabilities: vulnerabilities,
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Details: map[string]interface{}{
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"severity_counts": severityCounts,
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},
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}
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}
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// NpmAuditResult represents npm audit JSON output
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type NpmAuditResult struct {
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Vulnerabilities map[string]NpmVulnerability `json:"vulnerabilities"`
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Metadata NpmAuditMetadata `json:"metadata"`
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AuditReportVersion int `json:"auditReportVersion"`
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}
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type NpmVulnerability struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Severity string `json:"severity"`
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Via string `json:"via"`
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Effects []string `json:"effects"`
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Range string `json:"range"`
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FixAvailable interface{} `json:"fixAvailable"`
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URL string `json:"url"`
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References []NpmReference `json:"references"`
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}
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type NpmReference struct {
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URL string `json:"url"`
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}
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type NpmAuditMetadata struct {
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Vulnerabilities NpmVulnCounts `json:"vulnerabilities"`
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Dependencies int `json:"dependencies"`
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}
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type NpmVulnCounts struct {
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Info int `json:"info"`
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Low int `json:"low"`
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Moderate int `json:"moderate"`
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High int `json:"high"`
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Critical int `json:"critical"`
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Total int `json:"total"`
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}
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