mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc.git
synced 2026-06-05 22:44:17 +00:00
a316a98e4f
Add userIdentifierClaim configuration option to support Azure AD users without email addresses. This allows using alternative JWT claims like "sub", "oid", "upn", or "preferred_username" for user identification. - Default behavior uses "email" claim (backward compatible) - Falls back to "sub" claim if configured claim is missing - allowedUsers matches against the configured claim value - allowedUserDomains only applies when using email-based identification Fixes #95
370 lines
13 KiB
Go
370 lines
13 KiB
Go
// Package traefikoidc provides OIDC authentication middleware for Traefik.
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// This file contains the core HTTP middleware functionality for request processing
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// and authentication flow management.
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package traefikoidc
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import (
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"bytes"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// ============================================================================
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// HTTP MIDDLEWARE
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// ============================================================================
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// ServeHTTP implements the main middleware logic for processing HTTP requests.
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// It handles the complete OIDC authentication flow including:
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// - Excluded URL bypass
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// - Session validation and management
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// - Authentication callback processing
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// - Logout handling
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// - Token verification and refresh
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// - Header injection for authenticated requests
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//
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// Parameters:
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// - rw: The HTTP response writer.
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// - req: The incoming HTTP request.
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func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/health") {
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t.firstRequestMutex.Lock()
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if !t.firstRequestReceived {
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t.firstRequestReceived = true
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t.logger.Debug("Starting background tasks on first request")
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t.startTokenCleanup()
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if !t.metadataRefreshStarted && t.providerURL != "" {
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t.metadataRefreshStarted = true
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// Metadata refresh is handled by singleton resource manager
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t.startMetadataRefresh(t.providerURL)
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}
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}
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t.firstRequestMutex.Unlock()
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}
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select {
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case <-t.initComplete:
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// Read issuerURL with RLock
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t.metadataMu.RLock()
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issuerURL := t.issuerURL
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t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
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if issuerURL == "" {
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t.logger.Error("OIDC provider metadata initialization failed or incomplete")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "OIDC provider metadata initialization failed - please check provider availability and configuration", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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case <-req.Context().Done():
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t.logger.Debug("Request canceled while waiting for OIDC initialization")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Request canceled", http.StatusRequestTimeout)
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return
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case <-time.After(30 * time.Second):
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t.logger.Error("Timeout waiting for OIDC initialization")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Timeout waiting for OIDC provider initialization - please try again later", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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if t.determineExcludedURL(req.URL.Path) {
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t.logger.Debugf("Request path %s excluded by configuration, bypassing OIDC", req.URL.Path)
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t.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
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return
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}
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acceptHeader := req.Header.Get("Accept")
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if strings.Contains(acceptHeader, "text/event-stream") {
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t.logger.Debugf("Request accepts text/event-stream (%s), bypassing OIDC", acceptHeader)
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t.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
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return
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}
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t.sessionManager.CleanupOldCookies(rw, req)
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session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
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if err != nil {
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t.logger.Errorf("Error getting session: %v. Initiating authentication.", err)
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cleanReq := req.Clone(req.Context())
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session, _ = t.sessionManager.GetSession(cleanReq) // Safe to ignore: error already logged, proceeding with new session
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if session != nil {
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defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
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if clearErr := session.Clear(cleanReq, rw); clearErr != nil {
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t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing potentially corrupted session: %v", clearErr)
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}
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} else {
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t.logger.Error("Critical session error: Failed to get even a new session.")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Critical session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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scheme := t.determineScheme(req)
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host := t.determineHost(req)
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redirectURL := buildFullURL(scheme, host, t.redirURLPath)
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t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
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scheme := t.determineScheme(req)
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host := t.determineHost(req)
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redirectURL := buildFullURL(scheme, host, t.redirURLPath)
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if req.URL.Path == t.logoutURLPath {
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t.handleLogout(rw, req)
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return
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}
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if req.URL.Path == t.redirURLPath {
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t.handleCallback(rw, req, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := t.isUserAuthenticated(session)
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if expired {
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t.logger.Debug("Session token is definitively expired or invalid, initiating re-auth")
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t.handleExpiredToken(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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userIdentifier := session.GetEmail() // GetEmail returns the stored user identifier (email or other claim)
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// User authorization check
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if authenticated && userIdentifier != "" {
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if !t.isAllowedUser(userIdentifier) {
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t.logger.Infof("User %s is not authorized", userIdentifier)
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errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("Access denied: You are not authorized to access this resource. To log out, visit: %s", t.logoutURLPath)
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, errorMsg, http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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}
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if authenticated && !needsRefresh {
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t.logger.Debug("User authenticated and token valid, proceeding to process authorized request")
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// Access token validation is already performed by provider-specific validation
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// methods (validateAzureTokens/validateStandardTokens) before reaching this point.
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// Redundant validation here was causing issues with Azure AD tokens that have
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// JWT format but unverifiable signatures. See issue #89.
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t.processAuthorizedRequest(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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refreshTokenPresent := session.GetRefreshToken() != ""
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// Check if this is an AJAX request that should receive 401 instead of redirect
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isAjaxRequest := t.isAjaxRequest(req)
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// Check if refresh token is likely expired (older than 6 hours)
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refreshTokenExpired := refreshTokenPresent && t.isRefreshTokenExpired(session)
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shouldAttemptRefresh := needsRefresh && refreshTokenPresent && !refreshTokenExpired
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// If AJAX request and refresh token expired, return 401 immediately
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if isAjaxRequest && refreshTokenExpired {
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t.logger.Debug("AJAX request with expired refresh token, returning 401")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Session expired", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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if shouldAttemptRefresh {
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idToken := session.GetIDToken()
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if idToken != "" {
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jwt, err := parseJWT(idToken)
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if err == nil {
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claims := jwt.Claims
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if expClaim, ok := claims["exp"].(float64); ok {
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expTime := int64(expClaim)
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expTimeObj := time.Unix(expTime, 0)
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refreshThreshold := time.Now().Add(t.refreshGracePeriod)
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if !expTimeObj.Before(refreshThreshold) {
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t.logger.Debug("Token is valid and outside grace period, skipping refresh")
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t.processAuthorizedRequest(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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} else {
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t.logger.Debug("Could not extract 'exp' claim for grace period check, proceeding with refresh")
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}
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}
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}
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if needsRefresh && authenticated {
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t.logger.Debug("Session token needs proactive refresh, attempting refresh")
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} else if needsRefresh && !authenticated {
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t.logger.Debug("ID token invalid/expired, but refresh token found. Attempting refresh.")
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}
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refreshed := t.refreshToken(rw, req, session)
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if refreshed {
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userIdentifier = session.GetEmail() // GetEmail returns the stored user identifier
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if userIdentifier != "" && !t.isAllowedUser(userIdentifier) {
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t.logger.Infof("User with refreshed token %s is not authorized", userIdentifier)
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errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("Access denied: You are not authorized to access this resource. To log out, visit: %s", t.logoutURLPath)
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, errorMsg, http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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t.logger.Debug("Token refresh successful, proceeding to process authorized request")
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t.processAuthorizedRequest(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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t.logger.Debug("Token refresh failed, requiring re-authentication")
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if isAjaxRequest {
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t.logger.Debug("AJAX request with failed token refresh, sending 401 Unauthorized")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Token refresh failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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} else {
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t.logger.Debug("Browser request with failed token refresh, initiating re-auth")
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// Reset redirect count when starting fresh auth after failed refresh to prevent redirect loops
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session.ResetRedirectCount()
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t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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}
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return
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}
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t.logger.Debugf("Initiating full OIDC authentication flow (authenticated=%v, needsRefresh=%v, refreshTokenPresent=%v)", authenticated, needsRefresh, refreshTokenPresent)
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// If AJAX request without valid authentication, return 401
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if isAjaxRequest {
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t.logger.Debug("AJAX request requires authentication, sending 401 Unauthorized")
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Reset redirect count when starting fresh authentication flow
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session.ResetRedirectCount()
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t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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}
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// ============================================================================
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// REQUEST PROCESSING
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// ============================================================================
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// processAuthorizedRequest processes requests for authenticated users.
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// It extracts claims, validates roles/groups if configured, sets authentication headers,
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// processes header templates, and forwards the request to the next handler.
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// Domain checks should be performed before calling this method.
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// Parameters:
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// - rw: The HTTP response writer.
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// - req: The HTTP request to process.
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// - session: The user's session data containing tokens and claims.
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// - redirectURL: The callback URL for re-authentication if needed.
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func (t *TraefikOidc) processAuthorizedRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
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email := session.GetEmail()
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if email == "" {
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t.logger.Info("No email found in session during final processing, initiating re-auth")
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// Reset redirect count to prevent loops when session is invalid
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session.ResetRedirectCount()
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t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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tokenForClaims := session.GetIDToken()
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if tokenForClaims == "" {
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tokenForClaims = session.GetAccessToken()
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if tokenForClaims == "" && len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 {
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t.logger.Error("No token available but roles/groups checks are required")
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// Reset redirect count to prevent loops when token is missing
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session.ResetRedirectCount()
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t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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}
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}
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// Initialize empty slices
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var groups, roles []string
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if tokenForClaims != "" {
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var err error
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groups, roles, err = t.extractGroupsAndRoles(tokenForClaims)
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if err != nil && len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 {
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t.logger.Errorf("Failed to extract groups and roles: %v", err)
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// Reset redirect count to prevent loops when claim extraction fails
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session.ResetRedirectCount()
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t.defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw, req, session, redirectURL)
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return
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} else if err == nil {
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if len(groups) > 0 {
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req.Header.Set("X-User-Groups", strings.Join(groups, ","))
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}
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if len(roles) > 0 {
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req.Header.Set("X-User-Roles", strings.Join(roles, ","))
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}
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}
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}
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if len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 {
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allowed := false
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for _, roleOrGroup := range append(groups, roles...) {
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if _, ok := t.allowedRolesAndGroups[roleOrGroup]; ok {
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allowed = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !allowed {
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t.logger.Infof("User with email %s does not have any allowed roles or groups", email)
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errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("Access denied: You do not have any of the allowed roles or groups. To log out, visit: %s", t.logoutURLPath)
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t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, errorMsg, http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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}
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", email)
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req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-Redirect", req.URL.RequestURI())
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req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", email)
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if idToken := session.GetIDToken(); idToken != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-Token", idToken)
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}
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if len(t.headerTemplates) > 0 {
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claims, err := t.extractClaimsFunc(session.GetIDToken())
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if err != nil {
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t.logger.Errorf("Failed to extract claims from ID Token for template headers: %v", err)
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} else {
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templateData := map[string]interface{}{
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"AccessToken": session.GetAccessToken(),
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"IDToken": session.GetIDToken(),
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"RefreshToken": session.GetRefreshToken(),
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"Claims": claims,
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}
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for headerName, tmpl := range t.headerTemplates {
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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if err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, templateData); err != nil {
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t.logger.Errorf("Failed to execute template for header %s: %v", headerName, err)
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continue
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}
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headerValue := buf.String()
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req.Header.Set(headerName, headerValue)
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t.logger.Debugf("Set templated header %s = %s", headerName, headerValue)
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}
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session.MarkDirty()
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t.logger.Debugf("Session marked dirty after templated header processing.")
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}
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}
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if session.IsDirty() {
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if err := session.Save(req, rw); err != nil {
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t.logger.Errorf("Failed to save session after processing headers: %v", err)
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}
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} else {
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t.logger.Debug("Session not dirty, skipping save in processAuthorizedRequest")
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}
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// Apply security headers if configured
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if t.securityHeadersApplier != nil {
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t.securityHeadersApplier(rw, req)
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} else {
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// Fallback to basic security headers
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rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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rw.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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rw.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")
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rw.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
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}
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t.logger.Debugf("Request authorized for user %s, forwarding to next handler", email)
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t.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
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}
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