Files
traefikoidc/content_valid_cache_test.go
T
lukaszraczyloandGitHub 94a8664403 perf(session): cut yaegi allocations on authenticated requests (#164)
Under yaegi, the authenticated cookie path allocated about 3.8 MB per
request. A yaegi harness measures bytes per request with a browser-like
cookie jar. With it, these changes cut bytes by 83%, allocations by 69%
and time by about 93%.

- Replace range loops over tokens with index loops. Under yaegi, ranging
  over a string allocates O(n^2) bytes.
- Pool gzip readers for combined session cookies.
- Memoize the validated ID token within one request.
- Cache content-only token validation across requests. The key is the
  token type and SHA-256, and the cache holds at most 4096 entries. The
  entry keeps the parsed exp and iat claims. The expiry and freshness
  checks still run on every request.

New tests pin the validator results, the memo and the cache behavior.
2026-09-29 11:59:31 +01:00

68 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestContentValidCache(t *testing.T) {
cm := NewChunkManager(NewLogger(""))
t.Cleanup(cm.Shutdown)
now := time.Now()
valid := tokenWithGroups(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "a", "exp": float64(now.Add(time.Hour).Unix()), "iat": float64(now.Unix())})
futureIat := tokenWithGroups(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "b", "exp": float64(now.Add(2 * time.Hour).Unix()), "iat": float64(now.Add(time.Hour).Unix())})
badContent := jwtLike("eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9", "eyJzdWIiOiJ4In0", "c2ln\x01bmF0dXJlLXZhbHVl")
t.Run("valid token passes twice and is cached", func(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
if res := cm.validateToken(valid, AccessTokenConfig); res.Error != nil {
t.Fatalf("pass %d: %v", i, res.Error)
}
}
if _, ok := cm.cachedTokenTimes(contentValidKey(valid, AccessTokenConfig)); !ok {
t.Fatal("valid token was not cached")
}
})
t.Run("cache is per token type", func(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok := cm.cachedTokenTimes(contentValidKey(valid, IDTokenConfig)); ok {
t.Fatal("access-token entry leaked into the ID-token key")
}
})
t.Run("time checks still run on a cache hit", func(t *testing.T) {
cm.markContentValid(contentValidKey(futureIat, AccessTokenConfig), cm.tokenTimesOf(futureIat))
res := cm.validateToken(futureIat, AccessTokenConfig)
if res.Error == nil || !strings.Contains(res.Error.Error(), "issued in future") {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want issued-in-future through the content cache", res.Error)
}
})
t.Run("cache hit uses the stored claims", func(t *testing.T) {
other := tokenWithGroups(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "c", "exp": float64(now.Add(time.Hour).Unix()), "iat": float64(now.Unix())})
future := now.Add(time.Hour)
cm.markContentValid(contentValidKey(other, AccessTokenConfig), tokenTimes{jwt: true, iat: &future})
res := cm.validateToken(other, AccessTokenConfig)
if res.Error == nil || !strings.Contains(res.Error.Error(), "issued in future") {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the cached iat to drive the freshness check", res.Error)
}
})
t.Run("invalid content never cached", func(t *testing.T) {
if res := cm.validateToken(badContent, AccessTokenConfig); res.Error == nil {
t.Fatal("control character accepted")
}
if _, ok := cm.cachedTokenTimes(contentValidKey(badContent, AccessTokenConfig)); ok {
t.Fatal("invalid token was cached")
}
})
t.Run("cache stays bounded", func(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < contentValidCacheMax+10; i++ {
cm.markContentValid(contentValidKey(strings.Repeat("x", i%7)+string(rune('a'+i%26))+strings.Repeat("y", i/26), AccessTokenConfig), tokenTimes{})
}
cm.contentMu.Lock()
n := len(cm.contentValid)
cm.contentMu.Unlock()
if n > contentValidCacheMax {
t.Fatalf("cache size %d exceeds %d", n, contentValidCacheMax)
}
})
}