Files
traefikoidc/main_goroutine_leak_test.go
T
lukaszraczylo 546ceb949c security: remediate audit findings (ranks 1–16 + 22 Lows) + yaegi load validation (#144)
* fix(security): encrypt session cookies + fail closed on invalid config

Batch 1 of security audit remediation (ranks 1, 2, 6).

- session.go: derive independent HMAC + AES-256 keys via stdlib HKDF-SHA256
  and build the gorilla cookie store with both, so session cookies are now
  encrypted, not merely signed. The single-key store previously left OIDC
  access/refresh/ID tokens recoverable from raw cookie bytes. Cookie format
  changes, so existing sessions are invalidated on deploy (one-time re-login).
- main.go: call config.Validate() at construction and error out on failure,
  instead of silently substituting a public hardcoded encryption key for
  empty/short keys (which allowed session forgery). The yaegi analyzer
  passes via .traefik.yml testData.
- settings.go: isValidSecureURL permits plaintext HTTP for loopback hosts
  only (RFC 8252); remote providers must still use HTTPS.
- tests: complete configs that did not satisfy Validate(); add regression
  tests in security_audit_fixes_test.go.

Configs below documented minimums (rateLimit < 10, key < 32 chars) are now
rejected at startup (fail closed).

* fix(security): validate discovered OIDC endpoints + pin introspection host

Batch 2 of security audit remediation (ranks 3, 4).

- url_helpers.go: add validateDiscoveredEndpoint, an SSRF screen for endpoints
  taken from the provider discovery document (jwks_uri, token, authorization,
  revocation, end_session, introspection, registration). Blocks link-local
  (cloud metadata 169.254.169.254), multicast, unspecified and private
  addresses (unless allowPrivateIPAddresses); blocks loopback unless the
  configured providerURL is itself loopback (dev/test). Cross-domain JWKS
  hosts (e.g. Google) stay allowed. Add sameHost helper.
- main.go: updateMetadataEndpoints screens every discovered endpoint and
  blanks any that fail (fail closed downstream). The introspection endpoint
  carries the client secret via HTTP Basic, so it is additionally pinned to
  the providerURL host to stop a poisoned discovery document exfiltrating the
  secret to an attacker-controlled host.
- tests: regression tests for the SSRF guard and the host pin.

* fix(security): close open redirects + anchor excluded-URL matching

Batch 3 of security audit remediation (ranks 5, 14, 15).

- auth_flow.go: run the stored incoming path through normalizeLogoutPath
  before using it as the post-login redirect, so //evil.com and /\evil.com
  payloads become host-relative (open-redirect, rank 5).
- url_helpers.go: excluded-URL matching is anchored at a natural boundary
  (exact, sub-path "/", or file extension "."), so excluding "/public" no
  longer also bypasses auth on "/publicsecret"; "/favicon" still matches
  "/favicon.ico" (rank 14).
- internal/utils: X-Forwarded-Host is sanitized (first value only; reject
  CRLF/whitespace/multi-value) before building redirect URLs (rank 15).
- helpers.go: the logout redirect used when there is no provider end-session
  endpoint is host-relative, never an absolute URL derived from the
  client-controllable request host (logout open-redirect, rank 15).
- tests: update two logout cases that asserted the old absolute redirect;
  add regression tests.

* fix(security): reject unverified Azure tokens; fix transport TLS reuse

Batch 4 of security audit remediation (ranks 7, 11).

- token_validation_rs.go: an Azure nonce-bearing access token that cannot be
  cryptographically verified no longer returns "authenticated" when there is
  no ID token to corroborate it; it refreshes (if possible) or forces
  re-authentication instead of failing open (rank 7).
- http_client_pool.go: the at-limit transport-reuse path now takes the write
  lock before mutating refCount (fixes a data race) and only reuses a
  transport whose TLS settings (CA pool + InsecureSkipVerify) match the
  caller's, never one with a different trust store; if none matches it returns
  nil so the caller falls back to a verifying default transport (rank 11).
- tests: add a transport-pool TLS-isolation regression test.

* fix(security): stop logging templated header values (token leak)

Batch 5 of security audit remediation (rank 16).

middleware.go: templated downstream headers commonly carry the access token
(e.g. "Authorization: Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"). The debug log line printed
the full header value, leaking credentials into logs. Log the header name and
byte length instead.

* fix(security): cache-key collision, cache-config divergence, fleet cleanup

Batch 6 of security audit remediation (ranks 9, 10, 12).

- token_manager.go: detectTokenType keys its cache on a SHA-256 hash of the
  full token instead of the first 32 chars (which are only the base64url JWT
  header). Distinct tokens sharing alg+kid no longer collide and get
  mis-classified (rank 10).
- cache_manager.go: the process-global cache manager is initialized once and
  shared across plugin instances; it now logs a loud warning when a later
  instance requests a different explicit Redis backend that is silently
  ignored, surfacing the cross-instance state-isolation hazard (rank 9).
- singleton_resources.go / main.go / utilities.go: track a process-global live
  instance count; the shared singleton-token-cleanup task is stopped only when
  the LAST instance shuts down, so one instance's Close() (e.g. a config reload)
  no longer kills cleanup for surviving instances (rank 12).
- tests: update TestDetectTokenTypeCaching for the new key; add regression tests.

* fix(security): bound introspection cache + cookie lifetime to config

Batch 7 of security audit remediation (ranks 8, 13).

- token_introspection.go: when requireTokenIntrospection is enabled, cap the
  positive introspection-result cache at 30s (instead of 5m) so a token
  revoked at the provider stops passing within ~30s, matching the operator's
  near-real-time revocation expectation (rank 8).
- session.go: bind the cookie store's MaxAge to the configured sessionMaxAge,
  so the cookie codec's cryptographic timestamp validity is no longer fixed at
  gorilla's 30-day default; a stolen cookie is valid only for the configured
  session lifetime (rank 13).
- tests: add a cookie-lifetime regression test.

* fix(security): low-severity hardening (cache, DoS caps, PKCE, throttle)

Batch 8 of security audit remediation — low severity
(ranks 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 36, 37, 41, 45, 46, 49).

- universal_cache.go: updateLocalCache updates an existing key in place instead
  of orphaning its LRU element and double-counting currentSize/currentMemory
  (rank 36 — the only production-reachable bug in this batch).
- jwk.go / metadata_cache.go / token_introspection.go: bound response bodies
  with io.LimitReader (1 MiB) to prevent memory exhaustion from a hostile or
  buggy provider (ranks 24, 25).
- jwk.go: skip JWKs not usable for signature verification (use != sig, or
  key_ops without "verify") when building the key set (rank 49).
- auth_flow.go: fail closed at the callback when PKCE is enabled but the code
  verifier is missing, instead of silently dropping it (rank 27).
- utilities.go / main.go: match allowedUserDomains case-insensitively (rank 31).
- bearer_auth.go: a single success no longer wipes an active per-IP penalty;
  the counter resets only when no penalty is in effect (rank 29).
- main.go: handle (not discard) the NewSessionManager error (rank 37).
- error_recovery.go: take a write lock in isServiceDegraded (it deletes from a
  map); compare retryable-error substrings case-insensitively (ranks 45, 46).
- singleton_resources.go: bind the generic-cache cleanup goroutine to the
  resource-manager shutdown channel so it cannot outlive its owner (rank 41).
- tests: update the bearer throttle test to the corrected penalty semantics.

* fix(security): header sanitization, issuer pinning, fail-closed paths

Batch 9 of security audit remediation (ranks 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 33, 34).

- middleware.go / bearer_auth.go: sanitize claim-derived values on the cookie
  auth path before injecting them into downstream headers. Drop group/role and
  identifier values containing control chars, bidi-override runes, or the
  , ; = delimiters (a comma would inject phantom entries into X-User-Groups);
  reject control/bidi/over-length in rendered templated header output (but
  permit , ; = in free-form values such as a bearer token). The bearer path
  already sanitized; the cookie path did not (ranks 33, 34).
- main.go / metadata_cache.go: pin the discovered issuer to the configured
  provider host (sameHost) and refuse/never-cache a mismatch, so a poisoned
  discovery document cannot redefine the JWT trust anchor (ranks 21, 22).
- token_introspection.go: when a distinct API audience is configured, fail
  closed on a missing or mismatched introspection audience; aud parsed as
  string-or-array per RFC 7662 (rank 19).
- logout.go: front-channel logout requires a matching issuer; an empty iss is
  rejected (blocks unauthenticated forced-logout via a known sid) (rank 30).
- token_validation_rs.go: an opaque access token with no ID token and no
  successful introspection fails closed (re-auth) instead of authenticating
  (ranks 18, 20).
- tests: realistic same-host provider mocks; regression tests for the header
  sanitization distinction and the fail-closed paths.

* chore(security): remove unwired dead code with latent footguns

Batch 10 of security audit remediation — delete confirmed-dead, unwired
subsystems (ranks 26, 35, 50). None had a production caller (grep-verified);
removal eliminates the latent footguns and ~2.1k lines of dead code.

- token_validator.go (deleted): an unused *TokenValidator whose validateJWT set
  Valid=true with NO signature verification — a severe footgun if ever wired
  (rank 50). The wired RS-aware validators are unaffected.
- security_monitoring.go (deleted): an unused *SecurityMonitor / ExtractClientIP
  that trusted spoofable X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP. The live bearer throttle
  uses clientIPForBearer (RemoteAddr-only), unchanged (rank 35).
- dynamic_client_registration.go: removed the RFC 7592 management methods
  (Update/Read/DeleteClientRegistration) that dereferenced an attacker-
  influenced RegistrationClientURI with the registration token attached and no
  HTTPS/SSRF gate, and had no callers. The wired RFC 7591 RegisterClient and
  credential-store helpers are kept (rank 26).
- tests: removed the tests covering the deleted code.

* chore: add Makefile with yaegi load validation

No Makefile existed. The new `yaegi-validate` target interprets the plugin
under the yaegi interpreter the same way Traefik loads it, catching yaegi-only
incompatibilities (unsupported stdlib symbols, reflection edge cases) that the
native `go build` / `go test` toolchain does not. Importing the plugin forces
yaegi to interpret every file plus its vendored deps; CreateConfig + New
exercise the instantiation path.

- cmd/yaegicheck/main.go: the load driver, marked //go:build ignore so it is
  excluded from `go build ./...` (avoids VCS-stamping a main binary, which
  fails in git-worktree layouts) yet is run explicitly by yaegi.
- Makefile: build / fmt / vet / lint / test / vendor / yaegi-validate / check
  targets; `make check` runs vet + tests + yaegi-validate.

Verified: `make yaegi-validate` passes on this branch — the HKDF cookie
encryption, net-based endpoint validation, and claim sanitizers all interpret
and instantiate cleanly under yaegi.

* ci: bump workflow Go toolchain to 1.25; pin yaegi-validate to v0.16.1

Traefik v3.7.1 (the deployed version) is built with `go 1.25.0`, so the PR and
release workflows now use Go 1.25.x to match the toolchain Traefik uses.

Important distinction: the CI Go version is the build TOOLCHAIN. The plugin's
actual interpreter-compatibility ceiling is the yaegi version Traefik bundles
(v0.16.1, which declares go 1.21 and ships a ~Go 1.22 stdlib symbol surface),
NOT the CI Go version. That ceiling is enforced by `make yaegi-validate` plus
the go.mod language directive — e.g. it is why HKDF is hand-rolled with
hmac+sha256 rather than Go 1.24's crypto/hkdf, which yaegi v0.16.1 lacks.

Also pin Makefile YAEGI_VERSION to v0.16.1 (what Traefik v3.7.1 vendors) so
yaegi-validate exercises the real deployed interpreter instead of @latest,
which could pass on a newer yaegi that supports symbols the deployed one does
not.

* docs: align README/CONFIGURATION with branch behavior changes

- excludedURLs: documented as segment/extension-boundary matching (was
  "prefix-matched") — "/public" no longer also matches "/publicsecret" (rank 14).
- Front-channel logout now requires a matching `iss`; requests without one are
  rejected with 400 (rank 30).
- Add an "Upgrading from an earlier release" note: session cookies are now
  AES-256 encrypted with lifetime tracking sessionMaxAge (one-time re-login on
  upgrade), and invalid configuration (rateLimit < 10, key < 32 bytes, missing
  callbackURL, non-HTTPS remote providerURL) now fails closed at startup.

* fix: remove staticcheck-flagged unused functions; wire staticcheck into make check

CI Static Analysis (standalone staticcheck) failed with U1000 "unused":
- dynamic_client_registration.go: deleteCredentialsFromStore — its only caller
  was the RFC 7592 DeleteClientRegistration removed in the dead-code batch.
- token_test.go: createTestJWTSimple — its only callers were the TokenValidator
  tests removed in the same batch.
Both confirmed to have zero remaining callers and removed. build / vet /
go test ./... / staticcheck ./... all green.

The pre-commit hook runs golangci-lint, but CI runs standalone staticcheck
(which flags U1000). Add a `staticcheck` Makefile target and include it in
`make check` so this class of finding is caught locally before push.

* fix(test): stabilize flaky TestWorkerPool_TaskPanic

tasksFailed is incremented in the worker's deferred recover(), which runs after the panicking task's own defer wg.Done(). wg.Wait() could therefore return before the failure was recorded, so reading the counter immediately raced and flaked on slow CI runners. Poll until the failure lands (2s budget) instead. Verified 200x plain + 50x under -race/GOMAXPROCS=1.
2026-05-30 14:10:32 +01:00

423 lines
12 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"context"
"runtime"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
// TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_ContextCancellation tests that goroutines are properly cleaned up
// when the context is canceled during middleware initialization and operation
func TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_ContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
description string
cancelAfter time.Duration
expectedLeaks int
}{
{
name: "immediate_cancellation",
cancelAfter: 1 * time.Millisecond,
expectedLeaks: 10, // Allow for background tasks (replay-cache-cleanup, health-check, etc.)
description: "Context canceled immediately during initialization",
},
{
name: "quick_cancellation",
cancelAfter: 50 * time.Millisecond,
expectedLeaks: 5, // Allow for some background task leaks during cancellation
description: "Context canceled during metadata initialization",
},
{
name: "delayed_cancellation",
cancelAfter: 200 * time.Millisecond,
expectedLeaks: 5, // Allow for some background task leaks during cancellation
description: "Context canceled after partial initialization",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Record initial goroutine count
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC() // Double GC to ensure cleanup
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
// Create cancellable context
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Create plugin config
config := CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://accounts.google.com"
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long"
config.ClientID = "test-client-id"
config.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
// Start goroutine leak test
var plugin *TraefikOidc
var wg sync.WaitGroup
// Initialize plugin in separate goroutine to simulate real usage
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
handler, _ := New(ctx, nil, config, "test")
if handler != nil {
plugin = handler.(*TraefikOidc)
}
}()
// Cancel context after specified delay
time.Sleep(tt.cancelAfter)
cancel()
// Wait for initialization to complete or timeout
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
wg.Wait()
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-done:
// Initialization completed (or was canceled)
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Plugin initialization did not complete within timeout")
}
// Clean up plugin if it was created
if plugin != nil {
// Use proper Close() method for cleanup
if err := plugin.Close(); err != nil {
t.Logf("Plugin close error: %v", err)
}
}
// Allow time for goroutine cleanup
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
// Check final goroutine count
finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
goroutineDiff := finalGoroutines - initialGoroutines
if goroutineDiff > tt.expectedLeaks {
t.Errorf("Goroutine leak detected: %s\n"+
"Initial goroutines: %d\n"+
"Final goroutines: %d\n"+
"Difference: %d (expected max: %d)",
tt.description, initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines,
goroutineDiff, tt.expectedLeaks)
}
t.Logf("Test %s: Initial: %d, Final: %d, Diff: %d",
tt.name, initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines, goroutineDiff)
})
}
}
// TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_PanicRecovery tests that goroutines are cleaned up
// even when panics occur during initialization
func TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_PanicRecovery(t *testing.T) {
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
// Create context that will be valid but cause initialization issues
ctx := context.Background()
// Create invalid config to potentially cause panics
config := CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "://invalid-url" // Invalid URL format
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "too-short" // Invalid key length
config.ClientID = ""
config.ClientSecret = ""
// Attempt to create plugin - should handle errors gracefully
handler, err := New(ctx, nil, config, "test")
var plugin *TraefikOidc
if handler != nil {
plugin = handler.(*TraefikOidc)
}
// Verify error is handled gracefully (no panic)
if err == nil {
t.Log("Plugin creation succeeded despite invalid config")
if plugin != nil {
// Clean up if somehow created using proper Close() method
if err := plugin.Close(); err != nil {
t.Logf("Plugin close error: %v", err)
}
}
} else {
t.Logf("Plugin creation failed as expected: %v", err)
}
// Allow cleanup time
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
goroutineDiff := finalGoroutines - initialGoroutines
if goroutineDiff > 5 { // Allow more tolerance for background tasks
t.Errorf("Goroutine leak after panic recovery: "+
"Initial: %d, Final: %d, Diff: %d",
initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines, goroutineDiff)
}
}
// TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_MultipleInstances tests that multiple middleware instances
// don't cause goroutine leaks
func TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_MultipleInstances(t *testing.T) {
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
ctx := context.Background()
const numInstances = 5
plugins := make([]*TraefikOidc, 0, numInstances)
// Create multiple plugin instances
for i := 0; i < numInstances; i++ {
config := CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://accounts.google.com"
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long"
config.ClientID = "test-client-id"
config.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
handler, err := New(ctx, nil, config, "test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create plugin instance %d: %v", i, err)
}
if handler != nil {
plugin := handler.(*TraefikOidc)
plugins = append(plugins, plugin)
}
}
// Allow initialization to complete
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Clean up all plugins
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i, plugin := range plugins {
wg.Add(1)
go func(p *TraefikOidc, idx int) {
defer wg.Done()
// Use proper Close() method for cleanup
if err := p.Close(); err != nil {
t.Logf("Plugin %d close error: %v", idx, err)
}
}(plugin, i)
}
// Wait for all cleanups with timeout
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
wg.Wait()
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-done:
// All cleanups completed
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Plugin cleanup did not complete within timeout")
}
// Allow final cleanup
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
goroutineDiff := finalGoroutines - initialGoroutines
// Allow for reasonable tolerance due to background tasks and test infrastructure
maxExpectedLeaks := 10 // Increased to account for background tasks from multiple instances
if goroutineDiff > maxExpectedLeaks {
t.Errorf("Excessive goroutine leaks with multiple instances: "+
"Initial: %d, Final: %d, Diff: %d (max expected: %d)",
initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines, goroutineDiff, maxExpectedLeaks)
}
t.Logf("Multiple instances test: Created %d instances, "+
"Initial goroutines: %d, Final: %d, Diff: %d",
numInstances, initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines, goroutineDiff)
}
// TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_TimeoutCleanup tests that stuck goroutines are cleaned up
// within reasonable timeouts
func TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_TimeoutCleanup(t *testing.T) {
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
// Create context with timeout
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
config := CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://httpbin.org/delay/10" // Slow endpoint to trigger timeout
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long"
config.ClientID = "test-client-id"
config.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
// Create plugin - initialization may timeout
handler, err := New(ctx, nil, config, "test")
var plugin *TraefikOidc
if handler != nil {
plugin = handler.(*TraefikOidc)
}
// Wait for context timeout
<-ctx.Done()
if plugin != nil {
// Clean up if plugin was created using proper Close() method
if err := plugin.Close(); err != nil {
t.Logf("Plugin close error: %v", err)
}
}
// Allow extended cleanup time for timeout scenarios
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
goroutineDiff := finalGoroutines - initialGoroutines
if goroutineDiff > 5 { // Allow more tolerance for timeout scenarios
t.Errorf("Goroutines not cleaned up after timeout: "+
"Initial: %d, Final: %d, Diff: %d, Error: %v",
initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines, goroutineDiff, err)
}
}
// TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_BackgroundTaskCleanup tests that background metadata refresh
// goroutines are properly stopped and cleaned up
func TestGoroutineLeakPrevention_BackgroundTaskCleanup(t *testing.T) {
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
ctx := context.Background()
config := CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://accounts.google.com"
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long"
config.ClientID = "test-client-id"
config.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
handler, err := New(ctx, nil, config, "test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create plugin: %v", err)
}
plugin := handler.(*TraefikOidc)
// Allow initialization and background task startup
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
// Check that we have more goroutines (background tasks started)
midGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
if midGoroutines <= initialGoroutines {
t.Log("Warning: No additional goroutines detected for background tasks")
}
// Stop all background tasks properly
err = plugin.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Logf("Warning: Error closing plugin: %v", err)
}
// Allow cleanup time
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
goroutineDiff := finalGoroutines - initialGoroutines
if goroutineDiff > 5 { // Allow tolerance for background task cleanup timing
t.Errorf("Background tasks not properly cleaned up: "+
"Initial: %d, Mid: %d, Final: %d, Diff: %d",
initialGoroutines, midGoroutines, finalGoroutines, goroutineDiff)
}
t.Logf("Background task cleanup: Initial: %d, Mid: %d, Final: %d",
initialGoroutines, midGoroutines, finalGoroutines)
}
// BenchmarkGoroutineLeakPrevention_CreationDestruction benchmarks goroutine usage
// during plugin creation and destruction cycles
func BenchmarkGoroutineLeakPrevention_CreationDestruction(b *testing.B) {
ctx := context.Background()
// Record baseline
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
baselineGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
config := CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://accounts.google.com"
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long"
config.ClientID = "test-client-id"
config.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
handler, err := New(ctx, nil, config, "test")
if err != nil {
b.Fatalf("Failed to create plugin: %v", err)
}
plugin := handler.(*TraefikOidc)
// Clean up immediately using proper Close() method
if err := plugin.Close(); err != nil {
b.Logf("Plugin close error at iteration %d: %v", i, err)
}
// Periodic goroutine count check
if i%100 == 99 {
runtime.GC()
current := runtime.NumGoroutine()
if current > baselineGoroutines+10 {
b.Fatalf("Goroutine leak detected at iteration %d: baseline=%d, current=%d",
i, baselineGoroutines, current)
}
}
}
b.StopTimer()
// Final cleanup and verification
runtime.GC()
runtime.GC()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
if finalGoroutines > baselineGoroutines+5 {
b.Errorf("Potential goroutine leak after benchmark: baseline=%d, final=%d",
baselineGoroutines, finalGoroutines)
}
}