Files
traefikoidc/helpers.go
T
lukaszraczylo 1e33bb0a4d feat(auth): support private_key_jwt and client_secret_basic (#137)
revocation endpoints, joining the existing client_secret_post default.
Both are opt-in via the new clientAuthMethod config field. Closes #135.

private_key_jwt (RFC 7523 §2.2 / OpenID Connect Core §9)
========================================================
Plugin signs a short-lived JWT with a configured private key and presents
it as client_assertion. Use when the IdP enforces short secret TTLs or
requires secretless client auth (Microsoft Entra ID / Azure AD, Okta,
Auth0, Keycloak).

New Config fields:
  clientAuthMethod          (default: client_secret_post)
  clientAssertionPrivateKey (inline PEM)
  clientAssertionKeyPath    (PEM file path; mutually exclusive)
  clientAssertionKeyID      (JWS kid header — required)
  clientAssertionAlg        (default: RS256; RS/PS/ES 256–512 supported)

PEM forms accepted: PKCS#8, PKCS#1, SEC1.
Assertion claims: iss=sub=clientID, aud=tokenURL, iat=now, exp=now+60s,
random 16-byte hex jti per request. ECDSA signatures are raw r||s per
RFC 7515 (not ASN.1).

client_secret_basic (RFC 6749 §2.3.1)
=====================================
Sends credentials in the Authorization: Basic header instead of the
body. Both halves are form-urlencoded individually before base64 — that
encoding step is required by the spec and is NOT what stdlib's
http.Request.SetBasicAuth does, so the plugin uses its own helper. The
form body omits client_id and client_secret on this path.

Wire-up
=======
Both methods are dispatched at the same two call sites:
  helpers.go:exchangeTokens — auth_code + refresh_token grants
  token_manager.go:RevokeTokenWithProvider — RFC 7009 revocation

Existing clientSecret deployments are unaffected — empty
clientAuthMethod maps to the historical client_secret_post behavior, and
clientAssertion remains nil unless the new fields are set.

Yaegi compatibility
===================
All required crypto/rsa, crypto/ecdsa, crypto/x509, encoding/pem and
crypto/sha256/384/512 symbols are exposed by the traefik/yaegi stdlib
symbol tables (RSA SignPKCS1v15 + SignPSS, ECDSA Sign,
ParsePKCS8/1PrivateKey, ParseECPrivateKey).

Tests (16 new)
==============
Algorithm-family coverage:
  TestIssue135_SignerRSAFamily — RS256/384/512 + PS256/384/512
  TestIssue135_SignerECDSAFamily — ES256/384/512, raw r||s shape
  TestIssue135_SignerRejectsAlgKeyMismatch
  TestIssue135_SignerJTIUniqueness — 50 sigs, all jti distinct
  TestIssue135_SignerPEMVariants — PKCS#8, PKCS#1, SEC1

Config validation:
  TestIssue135_ConfigValidation — full Validate() matrix
  TestIssue135_ConfigKeyPathLoadsFile

Wire-up:
  TestIssue135_AuthCodeExchangeUsesAssertion
  TestIssue135_RefreshTokenUsesAssertion
  TestIssue135_BackcompatClientSecretPath
  TestIssue135_RevocationUsesAssertion
  TestIssue135_BuildSignerFromInlineConfig
  TestIssue135_BuildSignerDefaultsToRS256
  TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicAuth — Authorization header, no body creds
  TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicURLEncodesReservedChars — :, +, /, @, =, &
  TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicRevocation — revocation parity

Documentation
=============
  README.md — required-row note + 5 optional rows + dedicated section
  docs/CONFIGURATION.md — new Client Authentication section with three
    method subsections, OpenSSL keygen snippet, RFC links
  docs/index.html — 5 new config-table rows + Private Key JWT
    explainer card
  .traefik.yml + examples/complete-traefik-config.yaml — commented
    opt-in example

Out of scope (deferred)
=======================
mTLS / tls_client_auth (RFC 8705) — separate change; requires per-call
http.Client with tls.Config.Certificates and conflicts with the current
pooled HTTP client architecture.
2026-05-09 18:02:41 +01:00

477 lines
17 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/cookiejar"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/utils"
)
// newUUIDv4 returns an RFC 4122 v4 UUID string (e.g.
// "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479") backed by crypto/rand. Used for CSRF
// tokens and other opaque random identifiers — replaces github.com/google/uuid
// to keep the plugin stdlib-only on the production path.
func newUUIDv4() (string, error) {
var b [16]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("could not generate UUID: %w", err)
}
b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 // version 4
b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 // RFC 4122 variant
return fmt.Sprintf("%08x-%04x-%04x-%04x-%012x",
b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]), nil
}
// generateNonce creates a cryptographically secure random nonce for OIDC flows.
// The nonce is used to prevent replay attacks and associate client sessions with ID tokens.
// Returns:
// - A base64 URL-encoded nonce string (43 characters)
// - An error if the random byte generation fails
func generateNonce() (string, error) {
nonceBytes := make([]byte, 32)
_, err := rand.Read(nonceBytes)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("could not generate nonce: %w", err)
}
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(nonceBytes), nil
}
// generateCodeVerifier creates a PKCE code verifier according to RFC 7636.
// The code verifier is a cryptographically random string used for the PKCE flow
// to prevent authorization code interception attacks.
// Returns:
// - A base64 raw URL-encoded code verifier string (43 characters)
// - An error if the random byte generation fails
func generateCodeVerifier() (string, error) {
verifierBytes := make([]byte, 32)
_, err := rand.Read(verifierBytes)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("could not generate code verifier: %w", err)
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(verifierBytes), nil
}
// deriveCodeChallenge creates a PKCE code challenge from the code verifier.
// It computes the SHA-256 hash of the code verifier and base64 URL-encodes it
// according to RFC 7636 specification.
// Parameters:
// - codeVerifier: The code verifier string
//
// Returns:
// - The base64 URL encoded SHA-256 hash of the code verifier (code challenge)
func deriveCodeChallenge(codeVerifier string) string {
hasher := sha256.New()
hasher.Write([]byte(codeVerifier))
hash := hasher.Sum(nil)
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash)
}
// TokenResponse represents the standard OAuth 2.0/OIDC token response.
// It contains the tokens and metadata returned by the authorization server during
// code exchange or token refresh operations.
type TokenResponse struct {
// IDToken contains the OpenID Connect identity token (JWT)
IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
// AccessToken is the OAuth 2.0 access token for API access
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
// RefreshToken allows obtaining new tokens when the access token expires
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
// TokenType specifies the token type (typically "Bearer")
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
// ExpiresIn indicates token lifetime in seconds
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
}
// exchangeTokens performs OAuth 2.0 token exchange with the authorization server.
// It supports both authorization code and refresh token grant types with PKCE support.
// Parameters:
// - ctx: Context for request timeout and cancellation
// - grantType: OAuth grant type ("authorization_code" or "refresh_token")
// - codeOrToken: Authorization code or refresh token depending on grant type
// - redirectURL: Redirect URI used in authorization (required for code exchange)
// - codeVerifier: PKCE code verifier (optional, used with PKCE flow)
//
// Returns:
// - *TokenResponse: Parsed token response from the authorization server
// - An error if the token exchange fails (e.g., network error, provider error, invalid grant)
func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, codeOrToken string, redirectURL string, codeVerifier string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
data := url.Values{
"grant_type": {grantType},
}
// client_id is sent in the body for every method except client_secret_basic,
// where it is carried in the Authorization header per RFC 6749 §2.3.1.
if t.clientAuthMethod != "client_secret_basic" || t.clientAssertion != nil {
data.Set("client_id", t.clientID)
}
if grantType == "authorization_code" {
data.Set("code", codeOrToken)
data.Set("redirect_uri", redirectURL)
if codeVerifier != "" {
data.Set("code_verifier", codeVerifier)
}
} else if grantType == "refresh_token" {
data.Set("refresh_token", codeOrToken)
}
client := t.tokenHTTPClient
if client == nil {
// Use shared transport pool to prevent memory leaks
jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil) // Safe to ignore: cookiejar creation with nil options rarely fails
pooledClient := CreateTokenHTTPClient()
client = &http.Client{
Transport: pooledClient.Transport,
Timeout: pooledClient.Timeout,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 50 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 50 redirects")
}
return nil
},
Jar: jar,
}
}
// Read tokenURL with RLock — needed as audience for private_key_jwt (RFC 7523 §3).
t.metadataMu.RLock()
tokenURL := t.tokenURL
t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
useBasicAuth := false
if t.clientAssertion != nil {
assertion, err := t.clientAssertion.Sign(tokenURL, t.clientID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign client assertion: %w", err)
}
data.Set("client_assertion_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer")
data.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
} else if t.clientAuthMethod == "client_secret_basic" {
useBasicAuth = true
} else {
data.Set("client_secret", t.clientSecret)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
if useBasicAuth {
setOAuthBasicAuth(req, t.clientID, t.clientSecret)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange tokens: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body) // Safe to ignore: draining response body on defer
_ = resp.Body.Close() // Safe to ignore: closing body on defer
}()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
limitReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*10)
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(limitReader) // Safe to ignore: reading error body for diagnostics
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token endpoint returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
}
var tokenResponse TokenResponse
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tokenResponse); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token response: %w", err)
}
return &tokenResponse, nil
}
// getNewTokenWithRefreshToken refreshes access and ID tokens using a refresh token.
// This is used when the current tokens are expired but the refresh token is still valid.
// It now uses the TokenResilienceManager for circuit breaker and retry logic.
// Parameters:
// - refreshToken: The refresh token to exchange for new tokens
//
// Returns:
// - *TokenResponse: New token set from the authorization server
// - An error if the refresh operation fails
func (t *TraefikOidc) getNewTokenWithRefreshToken(refreshToken string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
ctx := context.Background()
// Use token resilience manager if available, otherwise fall back to direct call
if t.tokenResilienceManager != nil {
return t.tokenResilienceManager.ExecuteTokenRefresh(ctx, t, refreshToken)
}
// Fallback for backward compatibility
tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "refresh_token", refreshToken, "", "")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh token: %w", err)
}
t.logger.Debugf("Token response: %+v", tokenResponse)
return tokenResponse, nil
}
// extractClaims extracts and parses claims from a JWT token without signature verification.
// This is a utility function for quickly accessing token payload data when signature
// verification is not required or has already been performed.
// Parameters:
// - tokenString: The JWT token string to parse
//
// Returns:
// - map[string]interface{}: Parsed claims from the token payload
// - An error if the token format is invalid, decoding fails, or JSON unmarshaling fails
func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token format")
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token payload: %w", err)
}
var claims map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal claims: %w", err)
}
return claims, nil
}
// TokenCache provides a specialized cache for JWT tokens and their parsed claims.
// It wraps the UniversalCache with token-specific operations.
type TokenCache struct {
// cache is the underlying universal cache implementation
cache *UniversalCache
}
// NewTokenCache creates and initializes a new TokenCache.
// It uses the global cache manager to ensure singleton behavior.
func NewTokenCache() *TokenCache {
manager := GetUniversalCacheManager(nil)
return &TokenCache{
cache: manager.GetTokenCache(),
}
}
// Set stores parsed token claims in the cache with expiration.
// The token is prefixed to prevent collisions with other cache entries.
// Parameters:
// - token: The JWT token string (used as cache key)
// - claims: Parsed claims from the token
// - expiration: The duration for which the cache entry should be valid
func (tc *TokenCache) Set(token string, claims map[string]interface{}, expiration time.Duration) {
token = "t-" + token
_ = tc.cache.Set(token, claims, expiration) // Safe to ignore: cache failures are non-critical
}
// Get retrieves cached claims for a token.
// Parameters:
// - token: The JWT token string to look up
//
// Returns:
// - map[string]interface{}: The cached claims if found
// - A boolean indicating whether the token was found in the cache (true if found, false otherwise)
func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (map[string]interface{}, bool) {
token = "t-" + token
value, found := tc.cache.Get(token)
if !found {
return nil, false
}
claims, ok := value.(map[string]interface{})
return claims, ok
}
// Delete removes a token from the cache.
// Parameters:
// - token: The raw token string to remove from the cache
func (tc *TokenCache) Delete(token string) {
token = "t-" + token
tc.cache.Delete(token)
}
// Cleanup removes expired entries from the token cache.
// This is a no-op as cleanup is handled internally by UniversalCache.
func (tc *TokenCache) Cleanup() {
// Cleanup is handled internally by UniversalCache
}
// Close stops the cleanup goroutine and releases resources.
// This is a no-op as the cache is managed globally.
func (tc *TokenCache) Close() {
// Cache is managed globally by UniversalCacheManager
}
// Clear removes all items from the cache
func (tc *TokenCache) Clear() {
tc.cache.Clear()
}
// exchangeCodeForToken exchanges an authorization code for tokens.
// This implements the OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow with optional PKCE support.
// It now uses the TokenResilienceManager for circuit breaker and retry logic.
// Parameters:
// - code: The authorization code received from the authorization server
// - redirectURL: The redirect URI used in the authorization request
// - codeVerifier: PKCE code verifier (used if PKCE is enabled)
//
// Returns:
// - *TokenResponse: The token response containing access, refresh, and ID tokens
// - An error if the code exchange fails
func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeCodeForToken(code string, redirectURL string, codeVerifier string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
ctx := context.Background()
effectiveCodeVerifier := ""
if t.enablePKCE && codeVerifier != "" {
effectiveCodeVerifier = codeVerifier
}
// Use token resilience manager if available, otherwise fall back to direct call
if t.tokenResilienceManager != nil {
return t.tokenResilienceManager.ExecuteTokenExchange(ctx, t, "authorization_code", code, redirectURL, effectiveCodeVerifier)
}
// Fallback for backward compatibility
tokenResponse, err := t.exchangeTokens(ctx, "authorization_code", code, redirectURL, effectiveCodeVerifier)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %w", err)
}
return tokenResponse, nil
}
// createStringMap converts a slice of strings to a set-like map for fast lookups.
// This is a utility function for creating efficient membership tests.
// Parameters:
// - keys: Slice of strings to convert to a map
//
// Returns:
// - A map where the keys are the strings from the input slice and the values are empty structs
func createStringMap(keys []string) map[string]struct{} {
result := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, key := range keys {
result[key] = struct{}{}
}
return result
}
// handleLogout processes user logout requests and performs proper session cleanup.
// It retrieves the ID token for logout URL construction, clears the session,
// and redirects to the provider's logout endpoint or configured post-logout URI.
// It handles potential errors during session retrieval or clearing.
func (t *TraefikOidc) handleLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
t.logger.Debug("Processing logout request")
session, err := t.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Error getting session: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
idToken := session.GetIDToken()
if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing session: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Session error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
host := utils.DetermineHost(req)
scheme := utils.DetermineScheme(req, t.forceHTTPS)
baseURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", scheme, host)
postLogoutRedirectURI := t.postLogoutRedirectURI
if postLogoutRedirectURI == "" {
postLogoutRedirectURI = fmt.Sprintf("%s/", baseURL)
} else if !strings.HasPrefix(postLogoutRedirectURI, "http") {
postLogoutRedirectURI = fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", baseURL, postLogoutRedirectURI)
}
// Read endSessionURL with RLock
t.metadataMu.RLock()
endSessionURL := t.endSessionURL
t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
if endSessionURL != "" && idToken != "" {
logoutURL, err := BuildLogoutURL(endSessionURL, idToken, postLogoutRedirectURI)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to build logout URL: %v", err)
http.Error(rw, "Logout error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, logoutURL, http.StatusFound)
return
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, postLogoutRedirectURI, http.StatusFound)
}
// BuildLogoutURL constructs a logout URL for the OIDC provider's end session endpoint.
// It includes the ID token hint and post-logout redirect URI according to OIDC specifications.
// Parameters:
// - endSessionURL: The provider's logout/end session endpoint
// - idToken: The ID token to include as a hint
// - postLogoutRedirectURI: Where to redirect after logout
//
// Returns:
// - The complete logout URL with query parameters
// - An error if the provided endSessionURL is invalid
func BuildLogoutURL(endSessionURL, idToken, postLogoutRedirectURI string) (string, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(endSessionURL)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse end session URL: %w", err)
}
q := u.Query()
q.Set("id_token_hint", idToken)
if postLogoutRedirectURI != "" {
q.Set("post_logout_redirect_uri", postLogoutRedirectURI)
}
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
return u.String(), nil
}
// setOAuthBasicAuth sets the Authorization header per RFC 6749 §2.3.1: the
// client_id and client_secret are form-urlencoded individually, joined with a
// colon, then base64-encoded. This differs from http.Request.SetBasicAuth,
// which skips the form-urlencode step — that matters for credentials with
// reserved characters (`:`, `@`, `+`, `%`, etc.) where the wire format would
// otherwise diverge from what the spec mandates.
func setOAuthBasicAuth(req *http.Request, clientID, clientSecret string) {
user := url.QueryEscape(clientID)
pass := url.QueryEscape(clientSecret)
auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + pass))
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+auth)
}
// deduplicateScopes removes duplicate scopes from a slice while preserving order.
// This ensures that OAuth scope parameters don't contain duplicates which could
// cause issues with some authorization servers.
// The first occurrence of each scope is kept.
func deduplicateScopes(scopes []string) []string {
if len(scopes) == 0 {
return []string{}
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{})
result := []string{}
for _, scope := range scopes {
if _, ok := seen[scope]; !ok {
seen[scope] = struct{}{}
result = append(result, scope)
}
}
return result
}