Files
traefikoidc/jwk.go
T
lukaszraczylo 546ceb949c security: remediate audit findings (ranks 1–16 + 22 Lows) + yaegi load validation (#144)
* fix(security): encrypt session cookies + fail closed on invalid config

Batch 1 of security audit remediation (ranks 1, 2, 6).

- session.go: derive independent HMAC + AES-256 keys via stdlib HKDF-SHA256
  and build the gorilla cookie store with both, so session cookies are now
  encrypted, not merely signed. The single-key store previously left OIDC
  access/refresh/ID tokens recoverable from raw cookie bytes. Cookie format
  changes, so existing sessions are invalidated on deploy (one-time re-login).
- main.go: call config.Validate() at construction and error out on failure,
  instead of silently substituting a public hardcoded encryption key for
  empty/short keys (which allowed session forgery). The yaegi analyzer
  passes via .traefik.yml testData.
- settings.go: isValidSecureURL permits plaintext HTTP for loopback hosts
  only (RFC 8252); remote providers must still use HTTPS.
- tests: complete configs that did not satisfy Validate(); add regression
  tests in security_audit_fixes_test.go.

Configs below documented minimums (rateLimit < 10, key < 32 chars) are now
rejected at startup (fail closed).

* fix(security): validate discovered OIDC endpoints + pin introspection host

Batch 2 of security audit remediation (ranks 3, 4).

- url_helpers.go: add validateDiscoveredEndpoint, an SSRF screen for endpoints
  taken from the provider discovery document (jwks_uri, token, authorization,
  revocation, end_session, introspection, registration). Blocks link-local
  (cloud metadata 169.254.169.254), multicast, unspecified and private
  addresses (unless allowPrivateIPAddresses); blocks loopback unless the
  configured providerURL is itself loopback (dev/test). Cross-domain JWKS
  hosts (e.g. Google) stay allowed. Add sameHost helper.
- main.go: updateMetadataEndpoints screens every discovered endpoint and
  blanks any that fail (fail closed downstream). The introspection endpoint
  carries the client secret via HTTP Basic, so it is additionally pinned to
  the providerURL host to stop a poisoned discovery document exfiltrating the
  secret to an attacker-controlled host.
- tests: regression tests for the SSRF guard and the host pin.

* fix(security): close open redirects + anchor excluded-URL matching

Batch 3 of security audit remediation (ranks 5, 14, 15).

- auth_flow.go: run the stored incoming path through normalizeLogoutPath
  before using it as the post-login redirect, so //evil.com and /\evil.com
  payloads become host-relative (open-redirect, rank 5).
- url_helpers.go: excluded-URL matching is anchored at a natural boundary
  (exact, sub-path "/", or file extension "."), so excluding "/public" no
  longer also bypasses auth on "/publicsecret"; "/favicon" still matches
  "/favicon.ico" (rank 14).
- internal/utils: X-Forwarded-Host is sanitized (first value only; reject
  CRLF/whitespace/multi-value) before building redirect URLs (rank 15).
- helpers.go: the logout redirect used when there is no provider end-session
  endpoint is host-relative, never an absolute URL derived from the
  client-controllable request host (logout open-redirect, rank 15).
- tests: update two logout cases that asserted the old absolute redirect;
  add regression tests.

* fix(security): reject unverified Azure tokens; fix transport TLS reuse

Batch 4 of security audit remediation (ranks 7, 11).

- token_validation_rs.go: an Azure nonce-bearing access token that cannot be
  cryptographically verified no longer returns "authenticated" when there is
  no ID token to corroborate it; it refreshes (if possible) or forces
  re-authentication instead of failing open (rank 7).
- http_client_pool.go: the at-limit transport-reuse path now takes the write
  lock before mutating refCount (fixes a data race) and only reuses a
  transport whose TLS settings (CA pool + InsecureSkipVerify) match the
  caller's, never one with a different trust store; if none matches it returns
  nil so the caller falls back to a verifying default transport (rank 11).
- tests: add a transport-pool TLS-isolation regression test.

* fix(security): stop logging templated header values (token leak)

Batch 5 of security audit remediation (rank 16).

middleware.go: templated downstream headers commonly carry the access token
(e.g. "Authorization: Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"). The debug log line printed
the full header value, leaking credentials into logs. Log the header name and
byte length instead.

* fix(security): cache-key collision, cache-config divergence, fleet cleanup

Batch 6 of security audit remediation (ranks 9, 10, 12).

- token_manager.go: detectTokenType keys its cache on a SHA-256 hash of the
  full token instead of the first 32 chars (which are only the base64url JWT
  header). Distinct tokens sharing alg+kid no longer collide and get
  mis-classified (rank 10).
- cache_manager.go: the process-global cache manager is initialized once and
  shared across plugin instances; it now logs a loud warning when a later
  instance requests a different explicit Redis backend that is silently
  ignored, surfacing the cross-instance state-isolation hazard (rank 9).
- singleton_resources.go / main.go / utilities.go: track a process-global live
  instance count; the shared singleton-token-cleanup task is stopped only when
  the LAST instance shuts down, so one instance's Close() (e.g. a config reload)
  no longer kills cleanup for surviving instances (rank 12).
- tests: update TestDetectTokenTypeCaching for the new key; add regression tests.

* fix(security): bound introspection cache + cookie lifetime to config

Batch 7 of security audit remediation (ranks 8, 13).

- token_introspection.go: when requireTokenIntrospection is enabled, cap the
  positive introspection-result cache at 30s (instead of 5m) so a token
  revoked at the provider stops passing within ~30s, matching the operator's
  near-real-time revocation expectation (rank 8).
- session.go: bind the cookie store's MaxAge to the configured sessionMaxAge,
  so the cookie codec's cryptographic timestamp validity is no longer fixed at
  gorilla's 30-day default; a stolen cookie is valid only for the configured
  session lifetime (rank 13).
- tests: add a cookie-lifetime regression test.

* fix(security): low-severity hardening (cache, DoS caps, PKCE, throttle)

Batch 8 of security audit remediation — low severity
(ranks 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 36, 37, 41, 45, 46, 49).

- universal_cache.go: updateLocalCache updates an existing key in place instead
  of orphaning its LRU element and double-counting currentSize/currentMemory
  (rank 36 — the only production-reachable bug in this batch).
- jwk.go / metadata_cache.go / token_introspection.go: bound response bodies
  with io.LimitReader (1 MiB) to prevent memory exhaustion from a hostile or
  buggy provider (ranks 24, 25).
- jwk.go: skip JWKs not usable for signature verification (use != sig, or
  key_ops without "verify") when building the key set (rank 49).
- auth_flow.go: fail closed at the callback when PKCE is enabled but the code
  verifier is missing, instead of silently dropping it (rank 27).
- utilities.go / main.go: match allowedUserDomains case-insensitively (rank 31).
- bearer_auth.go: a single success no longer wipes an active per-IP penalty;
  the counter resets only when no penalty is in effect (rank 29).
- main.go: handle (not discard) the NewSessionManager error (rank 37).
- error_recovery.go: take a write lock in isServiceDegraded (it deletes from a
  map); compare retryable-error substrings case-insensitively (ranks 45, 46).
- singleton_resources.go: bind the generic-cache cleanup goroutine to the
  resource-manager shutdown channel so it cannot outlive its owner (rank 41).
- tests: update the bearer throttle test to the corrected penalty semantics.

* fix(security): header sanitization, issuer pinning, fail-closed paths

Batch 9 of security audit remediation (ranks 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 33, 34).

- middleware.go / bearer_auth.go: sanitize claim-derived values on the cookie
  auth path before injecting them into downstream headers. Drop group/role and
  identifier values containing control chars, bidi-override runes, or the
  , ; = delimiters (a comma would inject phantom entries into X-User-Groups);
  reject control/bidi/over-length in rendered templated header output (but
  permit , ; = in free-form values such as a bearer token). The bearer path
  already sanitized; the cookie path did not (ranks 33, 34).
- main.go / metadata_cache.go: pin the discovered issuer to the configured
  provider host (sameHost) and refuse/never-cache a mismatch, so a poisoned
  discovery document cannot redefine the JWT trust anchor (ranks 21, 22).
- token_introspection.go: when a distinct API audience is configured, fail
  closed on a missing or mismatched introspection audience; aud parsed as
  string-or-array per RFC 7662 (rank 19).
- logout.go: front-channel logout requires a matching issuer; an empty iss is
  rejected (blocks unauthenticated forced-logout via a known sid) (rank 30).
- token_validation_rs.go: an opaque access token with no ID token and no
  successful introspection fails closed (re-auth) instead of authenticating
  (ranks 18, 20).
- tests: realistic same-host provider mocks; regression tests for the header
  sanitization distinction and the fail-closed paths.

* chore(security): remove unwired dead code with latent footguns

Batch 10 of security audit remediation — delete confirmed-dead, unwired
subsystems (ranks 26, 35, 50). None had a production caller (grep-verified);
removal eliminates the latent footguns and ~2.1k lines of dead code.

- token_validator.go (deleted): an unused *TokenValidator whose validateJWT set
  Valid=true with NO signature verification — a severe footgun if ever wired
  (rank 50). The wired RS-aware validators are unaffected.
- security_monitoring.go (deleted): an unused *SecurityMonitor / ExtractClientIP
  that trusted spoofable X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP. The live bearer throttle
  uses clientIPForBearer (RemoteAddr-only), unchanged (rank 35).
- dynamic_client_registration.go: removed the RFC 7592 management methods
  (Update/Read/DeleteClientRegistration) that dereferenced an attacker-
  influenced RegistrationClientURI with the registration token attached and no
  HTTPS/SSRF gate, and had no callers. The wired RFC 7591 RegisterClient and
  credential-store helpers are kept (rank 26).
- tests: removed the tests covering the deleted code.

* chore: add Makefile with yaegi load validation

No Makefile existed. The new `yaegi-validate` target interprets the plugin
under the yaegi interpreter the same way Traefik loads it, catching yaegi-only
incompatibilities (unsupported stdlib symbols, reflection edge cases) that the
native `go build` / `go test` toolchain does not. Importing the plugin forces
yaegi to interpret every file plus its vendored deps; CreateConfig + New
exercise the instantiation path.

- cmd/yaegicheck/main.go: the load driver, marked //go:build ignore so it is
  excluded from `go build ./...` (avoids VCS-stamping a main binary, which
  fails in git-worktree layouts) yet is run explicitly by yaegi.
- Makefile: build / fmt / vet / lint / test / vendor / yaegi-validate / check
  targets; `make check` runs vet + tests + yaegi-validate.

Verified: `make yaegi-validate` passes on this branch — the HKDF cookie
encryption, net-based endpoint validation, and claim sanitizers all interpret
and instantiate cleanly under yaegi.

* ci: bump workflow Go toolchain to 1.25; pin yaegi-validate to v0.16.1

Traefik v3.7.1 (the deployed version) is built with `go 1.25.0`, so the PR and
release workflows now use Go 1.25.x to match the toolchain Traefik uses.

Important distinction: the CI Go version is the build TOOLCHAIN. The plugin's
actual interpreter-compatibility ceiling is the yaegi version Traefik bundles
(v0.16.1, which declares go 1.21 and ships a ~Go 1.22 stdlib symbol surface),
NOT the CI Go version. That ceiling is enforced by `make yaegi-validate` plus
the go.mod language directive — e.g. it is why HKDF is hand-rolled with
hmac+sha256 rather than Go 1.24's crypto/hkdf, which yaegi v0.16.1 lacks.

Also pin Makefile YAEGI_VERSION to v0.16.1 (what Traefik v3.7.1 vendors) so
yaegi-validate exercises the real deployed interpreter instead of @latest,
which could pass on a newer yaegi that supports symbols the deployed one does
not.

* docs: align README/CONFIGURATION with branch behavior changes

- excludedURLs: documented as segment/extension-boundary matching (was
  "prefix-matched") — "/public" no longer also matches "/publicsecret" (rank 14).
- Front-channel logout now requires a matching `iss`; requests without one are
  rejected with 400 (rank 30).
- Add an "Upgrading from an earlier release" note: session cookies are now
  AES-256 encrypted with lifetime tracking sessionMaxAge (one-time re-login on
  upgrade), and invalid configuration (rateLimit < 10, key < 32 bytes, missing
  callbackURL, non-HTTPS remote providerURL) now fails closed at startup.

* fix: remove staticcheck-flagged unused functions; wire staticcheck into make check

CI Static Analysis (standalone staticcheck) failed with U1000 "unused":
- dynamic_client_registration.go: deleteCredentialsFromStore — its only caller
  was the RFC 7592 DeleteClientRegistration removed in the dead-code batch.
- token_test.go: createTestJWTSimple — its only callers were the TokenValidator
  tests removed in the same batch.
Both confirmed to have zero remaining callers and removed. build / vet /
go test ./... / staticcheck ./... all green.

The pre-commit hook runs golangci-lint, but CI runs standalone staticcheck
(which flags U1000). Add a `staticcheck` Makefile target and include it in
`make check` so this class of finding is caught locally before push.

* fix(test): stabilize flaky TestWorkerPool_TaskPanic

tasksFailed is incremented in the worker's deferred recover(), which runs after the panicking task's own defer wg.Done(). wg.Wait() could therefore return before the failure was recorded, so reading the counter immediately raced and flaked on slow CI runners. Poll until the failure lands (2s budget) instead. Verified 200x plain + 50x under -race/GOMAXPROCS=1.
2026-05-30 14:10:32 +01:00

396 lines
12 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
)
// parsedKeysSuffix marks the parallel UniversalCache entry that stores
// pre-parsed public keys for a given JWKS URL.
const parsedKeysSuffix = ":parsed"
// parsedJWKS holds keys decoded from a JWKSet, indexed by kid. Storing the
// already-parsed crypto.PublicKey avoids re-running the DER/PEM round trip
// on every JWT verification — a costly operation under the yaegi interpreter
// that hosts Traefik plugins.
type parsedJWKS struct {
keys map[string]crypto.PublicKey
}
// JWK represents a JSON Web Key as defined in RFC 7517.
// It can represent different key types including RSA, EC, and symmetric keys.
type JWK struct {
Kty string `json:"kty"`
Use string `json:"use,omitempty"`
Alg string `json:"alg,omitempty"`
Kid string `json:"kid,omitempty"`
N string `json:"n,omitempty"`
E string `json:"e,omitempty"`
Crv string `json:"crv,omitempty"`
X string `json:"x,omitempty"`
Y string `json:"y,omitempty"`
KeyOps []string `json:"key_ops,omitempty"`
}
// JWKSet represents a set of JSON Web Keys.
// Typically fetched from an OIDC provider's JWKS endpoint.
type JWKSet struct {
// Keys contains the array of JWK objects
Keys []JWK `json:"keys"`
}
// JWKCache provides thread-safe caching of JWKS using UniversalCache.
//
// inflightFetches deduplicates concurrent fetches for the same JWKS URL.
// It replaces a global sync.RWMutex that was previously held for the entire
// HTTP round-trip in GetJWKS: on a cold cache (cold pod, JWK rotation, brief
// network blip) every concurrent request piled up on that single Lock(), and
// under Yaegi each Lock acquisition costs 10-50ms of interpreter-dispatch
// overhead. The singleflight pattern keeps the cold-cache cost O(1) HTTP
// fetch regardless of how many requests are waiting.
type JWKCache struct {
cache *UniversalCache
inflightFetches sync.Map // map[jwksURL string]*jwksFetch
}
// jwksFetch represents an in-flight JWKS fetch. Done is closed when the fetch
// completes; jwks and err carry the result (one of them is set, never both).
type jwksFetch struct {
done chan struct{}
jwks *JWKSet
err error
}
// JWKCacheInterface defines the contract for JWK caching implementations.
type JWKCacheInterface interface {
GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error)
GetPublicKey(ctx context.Context, jwksURL, kid string, httpClient *http.Client) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
Cleanup()
Close()
}
// NewJWKCache creates a new JWK cache using the global cache manager
func NewJWKCache() *JWKCache {
manager := GetUniversalCacheManager(nil)
return &JWKCache{
cache: manager.GetJWKCache(),
}
}
// GetJWKS retrieves JWKS from cache or fetches from the remote URL if not cached.
//
// The entry is stored locally only via SetLocal/GetLocal. Going through a
// distributed backend defeats the cache: JSON round-tripping turns *JWKSet
// into map[string]interface{}, the type assertion below fails, and every
// request refetches from the upstream. JWK rotation is rare and a per-replica
// HTTP fetch on cold cache is cheap, so cross-replica coherence buys nothing.
func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
// Fast path: cache hit.
if cachedValue, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL); found {
if jwks, ok := cachedValue.(*JWKSet); ok {
return jwks, nil
}
}
// Singleflight: dedupe concurrent fetches per URL key. The first arrival
// performs the HTTP fetch; any later arrival for the same URL waits on
// its done channel and shares the result. No global lock is held during
// the fetch.
candidate := &jwksFetch{done: make(chan struct{})}
if existing, loaded := c.inflightFetches.LoadOrStore(jwksURL, candidate); loaded {
f, _ := existing.(*jwksFetch)
select {
case <-f.done:
return f.jwks, f.err
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
// We're the leader. Make absolutely sure the result fields and the
// in-flight map entry are cleaned up before any waiter unblocks.
defer func() {
c.inflightFetches.Delete(jwksURL)
close(candidate.done)
}()
// Re-check the cache in case a concurrent fetch completed between our
// initial miss and our LoadOrStore win.
if cachedValue, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL); found {
if jwks, ok := cachedValue.(*JWKSet); ok {
candidate.jwks = jwks
return jwks, nil
}
}
jwks, err := fetchJWKS(ctx, jwksURL, httpClient)
if err != nil {
candidate.err = err
return nil, err
}
if len(jwks.Keys) == 0 {
candidate.err = fmt.Errorf("JWKS response contains no keys")
return nil, candidate.err
}
// Cache for 1 hour.
_ = c.cache.SetLocal(jwksURL, jwks, 1*time.Hour) // Safe to ignore: cache failures are non-critical
candidate.jwks = jwks
return jwks, nil
}
// GetPublicKey returns the parsed public key for a given kid, fetching and
// caching the JWKS plus its derived parsedJWKS on miss. The parsed entry is
// stored alongside the raw JWKSet under a sibling cache key with the same
// 1-hour TTL, so both invalidate together when the upstream JWKS rotates.
//
// parsedJWKS is stored locally only (SetLocal/GetLocal). Its values are
// crypto.PublicKey interfaces wrapping *rsa.PublicKey/*ecdsa.PublicKey,
// which contain *big.Int that marshals to a hundreds-digit JSON number.
// On a distributed backend round-trip, json.Unmarshal into interface{} would
// try to fit that into float64 and fail with UnmarshalTypeError. Under yaegi
// the unexported parsedJWKS.keys field is exposed via an X-prefixed name on
// Marshal, leaking the modulus into the cached payload (issue #134).
func (c *JWKCache) GetPublicKey(ctx context.Context, jwksURL, kid string, httpClient *http.Client) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
parsedKey := jwksURL + parsedKeysSuffix
if v, found := c.cache.GetLocal(parsedKey); found {
if pj, ok := v.(*parsedJWKS); ok {
if k, ok := pj.keys[kid]; ok {
return k, nil
}
}
}
jwks, err := c.GetJWKS(ctx, jwksURL, httpClient)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pj := buildParsedJWKS(jwks)
_ = c.cache.SetLocal(parsedKey, pj, 1*time.Hour) // Safe to ignore: cache failures are non-critical
if k, ok := pj.keys[kid]; ok {
return k, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no matching public key found for kid: %s", kid)
}
// buildParsedJWKS pre-parses every JWK in the set into the matching
// crypto.PublicKey, indexed by kid. Errors on individual keys are skipped so
// a single bad key does not block the rest of the keyset.
func buildParsedJWKS(jwks *JWKSet) *parsedJWKS {
out := make(map[string]crypto.PublicKey, len(jwks.Keys))
for i := range jwks.Keys {
k := &jwks.Keys[i]
if k.Kid == "" {
continue
}
// Skip keys that are not intended for signature verification.
if k.Use != "" && k.Use != "sig" {
continue
}
if len(k.KeyOps) > 0 {
hasVerify := false
for _, op := range k.KeyOps {
if op == "verify" {
hasVerify = true
break
}
}
if !hasVerify {
continue
}
}
var pub crypto.PublicKey
var err error
switch k.Kty {
case "RSA":
pub, err = k.ToRSAPublicKey()
case "EC":
pub, err = k.ToECDSAPublicKey()
default:
continue
}
if err != nil {
continue
}
out[k.Kid] = pub
}
return &parsedJWKS{keys: out}
}
// Cleanup is a no-op as cleanup is handled by UniversalCache
func (c *JWKCache) Cleanup() {
// Handled internally by UniversalCache
}
// Close is a no-op as the cache is managed globally
func (c *JWKCache) Close() {
// Managed by global cache manager
}
// fetchJWKS fetches JWKS from a remote URL
func fetchJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", jwksURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error creating JWKS request: %w", err)
}
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error fetching JWKS: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() // Safe to ignore: closing body on defer
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 10*1024)) // Safe to ignore: reading error body for diagnostics
return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWKS fetch failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading JWKS response: %w", err)
}
var jwks JWKSet
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &jwks); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error parsing JWKS: %w", err)
}
return &jwks, nil
}
// ToRSAPublicKey converts a JWK to an RSA public key.
// Returns an error if the JWK is not an RSA key or if the key data is invalid.
func (jwk *JWK) ToRSAPublicKey() (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
if jwk.Kty != "RSA" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not an RSA key")
}
nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.N)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding modulus: %w", err)
}
eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.E)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding exponent: %w", err)
}
// Convert exponent bytes to int
var e int
if len(eBytes) <= 8 {
// Pad to 8 bytes for uint64
paddedE := make([]byte, 8)
copy(paddedE[8-len(eBytes):], eBytes)
eUint64 := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(paddedE)
// RSA exponents are typically small (65537 is common), so overflow is not a concern
// #nosec G115 -- RSA public exponents are small values that fit in int
e = int(eUint64)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("exponent too large")
}
return &rsa.PublicKey{
N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes),
E: e,
}, nil
}
// ToECDSAPublicKey converts a JWK to an ECDSA public key.
// Returns an error if the JWK is not an EC key or if the key data is invalid.
func (jwk *JWK) ToECDSAPublicKey() (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
if jwk.Kty != "EC" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not an EC key")
}
var curve elliptic.Curve
switch jwk.Crv {
case "P-256":
curve = elliptic.P256()
case "P-384":
curve = elliptic.P384()
case "P-521":
curve = elliptic.P521()
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported curve: %s", jwk.Crv)
}
xBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding X coordinate: %w", err)
}
yBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding Y coordinate: %w", err)
}
return &ecdsa.PublicKey{
Curve: curve,
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(xBytes),
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(yBytes),
}, nil
}
// GetKey finds a key by its ID (kid) in the JWKSet.
// Returns nil if no key with the given ID is found.
func (jwks *JWKSet) GetKey(kid string) *JWK {
for i := range jwks.Keys {
if jwks.Keys[i].Kid == kid {
return &jwks.Keys[i]
}
}
return nil
}
// jwkToPEM converts a JWK to PEM format for signature verification
func jwkToPEM(jwk *JWK) ([]byte, error) {
var publicKey interface{}
var err error
switch jwk.Kty {
case "RSA":
publicKey, err = jwk.ToRSAPublicKey()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert RSA JWK: %w", err)
}
case "EC":
publicKey, err = jwk.ToECDSAPublicKey()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert EC JWK: %w", err)
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type: %s", jwk.Kty)
}
// Marshal the public key to DER format
pubKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(publicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %w", err)
}
// Encode to PEM format
pemBlock := &pem.Block{
Type: "PUBLIC KEY",
Bytes: pubKeyBytes,
}
return pem.EncodeToMemory(pemBlock), nil
}