Files
traefikoidc/regression/regression_test.go
T
lukaszraczylo 6efb78b7a8 Smarter approach to the cookies (#103)
* Smarter approach to the cookies

  - Single maxCookieSize = 1400 constant with clear documentation
  - Combined cookie storage for ~40-45% size reduction
  - Backward compatible migration from legacy cookies

* Tuneup the code.
2025-12-12 18:35:06 +00:00

376 lines
14 KiB
Go

package regression
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
traefikoidc "github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestIssueRegressions consolidates regression tests for reported GitHub issues
func TestIssueRegressions(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Issue53_CSRF_Missing_In_Session", testIssue53CSRFRegression)
t.Run("Issue53_Reverse_Proxy_HTTPS_Detection", testIssue53ReverseProxyHTTPS)
t.Run("Issue53_SameSite_Cookie_Handling", testIssue53SameSiteCookies)
t.Run("Issue60_Missing_Claim_Fields", testIssue60MissingClaimFields)
t.Run("Issue60_Safe_Template_Functions", testIssue60SafeTemplateFunctions)
t.Run("Issue60_Double_Processing_Concern", testIssue60DoubleProcessing)
}
// testIssue53CSRFRegression tests the specific issue reported in GitHub issue #53
// where Azure OIDC authentication fails with "CSRF token missing in session"
// This was caused by incorrect HTTPS detection in reverse proxy environments
func testIssue53CSRFRegression(t *testing.T) {
// This test reproduces the exact scenario from issue #53:
// 1. User accesses app via HTTPS through Traefik
// 2. Traefik terminates SSL and forwards HTTP internally
// 3. Session cookies must be properly configured for HTTPS
// 4. CSRF token must persist through the OAuth flow
sessionManager, err := traefikoidc.NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, "", "", 0, traefikoidc.NewLogger("debug"))
require.NoError(t, err)
// Step 1: Initial request to protected resource
// User accesses https://app.example.com/protected
// Traefik forwards as http://internal/protected with X-Forwarded-Proto: https
initReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/protected", nil)
initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
initReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0") // Real browser
// Get session and set OAuth flow data
session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(initReq)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Set CSRF and other OAuth data
csrfToken := "csrf-token-for-azure"
nonce := "nonce-for-azure"
session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
session.SetNonce(nonce)
session.SetCodeVerifier("pkce-verifier")
session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
session.MarkDirty()
// Save session - this is where the bug was
// Previously: used r.URL.Scheme which is always "http" behind proxy
// Now: uses X-Forwarded-Proto header
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(initReq, rec)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify cookies are secure
cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "Cookies must be set")
var mainCookie *http.Cookie
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
mainCookie = cookie
break
}
}
require.NotNil(t, mainCookie, "Main session cookie must be set")
// Critical assertions for issue #53
assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie MUST have Secure flag for HTTPS (was the bug)")
assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "MUST use Lax for OAuth callbacks to work")
assert.Equal(t, "/", mainCookie.Path, "Cookie path must be root")
assert.True(t, mainCookie.HttpOnly, "Cookie must be HttpOnly")
assert.Equal(t, "app.example.com", mainCookie.Domain, "Domain should use X-Forwarded-Host")
// Step 2: OAuth provider redirects back to callback
// Azure redirects to https://app.example.com/oidc/callback?code=...&state=...
// Traefik forwards as http://internal/oidc/callback with headers
callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET",
"http://internal/oidc/callback?code=azure-auth-code&state="+csrfToken, nil)
callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
callbackReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
// Add cookies from initial request
// Browser sends secure cookies because request is HTTPS
for _, cookie := range cookies {
callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
// Get session in callback
callbackSession, err := sessionManager.GetSession(callbackReq)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify CSRF token is present (was missing in issue #53)
retrievedCSRF := callbackSession.GetCSRF()
assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, retrievedCSRF,
"CSRF token MUST persist (was missing in issue #53)")
// Verify other session data also persists
assert.Equal(t, nonce, callbackSession.GetNonce(),
"Nonce must persist for security")
assert.Equal(t, "pkce-verifier", callbackSession.GetCodeVerifier(),
"PKCE verifier must persist")
assert.Equal(t, "/protected", callbackSession.GetIncomingPath(),
"Original path must persist for redirect after auth")
}
// testIssue53ReverseProxyHTTPS tests HTTPS detection in reverse proxy setups
func testIssue53ReverseProxyHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
sessionManager, err := traefikoidc.NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, "", "", 0, traefikoidc.NewLogger("debug"))
require.NoError(t, err)
// Create authenticated session with Azure tokens
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/api/data", nil)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Simulate successful Azure authentication
session.SetAuthenticated(true)
session.SetEmail("user@example.com")
// Azure may use opaque access tokens
session.SetAccessToken("opaque-azure-access-token")
session.SetIDToken("eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiYWRtaW4iOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTUxNjIzOTAyMn0.NHVaYe26MbtOYhSKkoKYdFVomg4i8ZJd8_-RU8VNbftc4TSMb4bXP3l3YlNWACwyXPGffz5aXHc6lty1Y2t4SWRqGteragsVdZufDn5BlnJl9pdR_kdVFUsra2rWKEofkZeIC4yWytE58sMIihvo9H1ScmmVwBcQP6XETqYd0aSHp1gOa9RdUPDvoXQ5oqygTqVtxaDr6wUFKrKItgBMzWIdNZ6y7O9E0DhEPTbE9rfBo6KTFsHAZnMg4k68CDp2woYIaXbmYTWcvbzIuHO7_37GT79XdIwkm95QJ7hYC9RiwrV7mesbY4PAahERJawntho0my942XheVLmGwLMBkQ") // trufflehog:ignore
session.SetRefreshToken("azure-refresh-token")
// Save with proper security
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(req, rec)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Verify session can be retrieved and tokens are intact
cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/api/data", nil)
req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
for _, cookie := range cookies {
req2.AddCookie(cookie)
}
session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, session2.GetAuthenticated(), "User should remain authenticated")
assert.Equal(t, "user@example.com", session2.GetEmail())
assert.NotEmpty(t, session2.GetAccessToken(), "Access token should persist")
assert.NotEmpty(t, session2.GetIDToken(), "ID token should persist")
assert.NotEmpty(t, session2.GetRefreshToken(), "Refresh token should persist")
// Test redirect loop prevention
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
session2.IncrementRedirectCount()
}
// Verify redirect count is tracked
count := session2.GetRedirectCount()
assert.Equal(t, 3, count, "Redirect count should be tracked")
// After successful auth, count should be reset
session2.SetAuthenticated(true)
session2.ResetRedirectCount()
assert.Equal(t, 0, session2.GetRedirectCount(), "Count should reset after auth")
}
// testIssue53SameSiteCookies tests SameSite cookie attribute handling
// in different reverse proxy scenarios
func testIssue53SameSiteCookies(t *testing.T) {
testCases := []struct {
name string
proto string
description string
expectedSameSite http.SameSite
expectedSecure bool
}{
{
name: "HTTPS via proxy",
proto: "https",
expectedSecure: true,
expectedSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "HTTPS should use Lax SameSite for OAuth callbacks",
},
{
name: "HTTP direct",
proto: "",
expectedSecure: false,
expectedSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "HTTP should use Lax SameSite for compatibility",
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
sessionManager, err := traefikoidc.NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, "", "", 0, traefikoidc.NewLogger("debug"))
require.NoError(t, err)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/test", nil)
if tc.proto != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", tc.proto)
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
session.SetCSRF("test")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(req, rec)
require.NoError(t, err)
cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedSecure, cookie.Secure, tc.description)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedSameSite, cookie.SameSite, tc.description)
break
}
}
})
}
}
// testIssue60MissingClaimFields tests handling of missing claim fields (GitHub issue #60)
func testIssue60MissingClaimFields(t *testing.T) {
config := traefikoidc.CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
config.ClientID = "test-client"
config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
testCases := []struct {
name string
description string
headers []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader
shouldValidate bool
}{
{
name: "Direct claim access",
headers: []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
{Name: "X-Internal-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
},
shouldValidate: true,
description: "Direct claim access should validate",
},
{
name: "Azure AD claims",
headers: []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
{Name: "X-User-OID", Value: "{{.Claims.oid}}"},
{Name: "X-User-TID", Value: "{{.Claims.tid}}"},
{Name: "X-User-UPN", Value: "{{.Claims.upn}}"},
{Name: "X-Internal-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"}, // Custom claim from issue #60
},
shouldValidate: true,
description: "Azure AD claims should validate",
},
{
name: "Valid context fields",
headers: []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
{Name: "X-Access-Token", Value: "{{.AccessToken}}"},
{Name: "X-ID-Token", Value: "{{.IdToken}}"},
{Name: "X-Refresh-Token", Value: "{{.RefreshToken}}"},
{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
{Name: "X-User-Sub", Value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"},
},
shouldValidate: true,
description: "All valid context fields should pass validation",
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
config.Headers = tc.headers
err := config.Validate()
if tc.shouldValidate {
assert.NoError(t, err, tc.description)
} else {
assert.Error(t, err, tc.description)
}
})
}
}
// testIssue60SafeTemplateFunctions tests safe template functions for handling missing fields
func testIssue60SafeTemplateFunctions(t *testing.T) {
config := traefikoidc.CreateConfig()
config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
config.ClientID = "test-client"
config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
// Templates using safe functions for missing fields
config.Headers = []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}"},
{Name: "X-User-Dept", Value: "{{default \"unknown\" .Claims.department}}"},
{Name: "X-User-Groups", Value: "{{with .Claims.groups}}{{.}}{{end}}"},
}
// Configuration should validate successfully
err := config.Validate()
assert.NoError(t, err, "Config with safe template functions should validate")
// Test that dangerous templates are rejected
dangerousTemplates := []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
{Name: "X-Bad-1", Value: "{{call .SomeFunc}}"},
{Name: "X-Bad-2", Value: "{{range .Items}}{{.}}{{end}}"},
{Name: "X-Bad-3", Value: "{{index .Array 0}}"},
{Name: "X-Bad-4", Value: "{{printf \"%s\" .Data}}"},
}
for _, header := range dangerousTemplates {
config.Headers = []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{header}
err := config.Validate()
require.Error(t, err, "Dangerous template should be rejected: %s", header.Value)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "dangerous", "Error should mention dangerous pattern")
}
// Test all safe patterns from the documentation
safePatterns := []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
// Basic field access
{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
// Using the get function
{Name: "X-User-Role-Get", Value: "{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}"},
// Using the default function
{Name: "X-User-Role-Default", Value: "{{default \"guest\" .Claims.role}}"},
// Nested fields with 'with'
{Name: "X-User-Admin", Value: "{{with .Claims.groups}}{{.admin}}{{end}}"},
}
config.Headers = safePatterns
err = config.Validate()
assert.NoError(t, err, "All safe patterns from guide should validate")
}
// testIssue60DoubleProcessing tests the user's concern about double processing of templates
func testIssue60DoubleProcessing(t *testing.T) {
// The user was concerned that templates might be processed twice:
// 1. Once when Traefik parses the config
// 2. Once when the plugin executes the template
// This test verifies that templates are stored as strings during config parsing
config := &traefikoidc.Config{
Headers: []traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
{Name: "X-Test", Value: "{{.Claims.test}}"},
},
}
// The template should still be a raw string after config creation
assert.Equal(t, "{{.Claims.test}}", config.Headers[0].Value,
"Template should remain as raw string in config")
// Test that our custom function syntax survives config marshaling/unmarshaling
originalValue := `{{get .Claims "internal_role"}}`
header := traefikoidc.TemplatedHeader{
Name: "X-Role",
Value: originalValue,
}
// Even after any marshaling/unmarshaling, the template string should be preserved
assert.Equal(t, originalValue, header.Value,
"Template with functions should be preserved exactly")
}