traefikoidc/security_edge_cases_test.go

package traefikoidc

import (
	"crypto"
	"crypto/ecdsa"
	"crypto/elliptic"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
)

// TestJWTAlgorithmConfusionAttack tests if the plugin is vulnerable to JWT algorithm confusion attacks
// where an attacker might try to switch from an asymmetric algorithm (RS256) to a symmetric one (HS256)
func TestJWTAlgorithmConfusionAttack(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a standard JWT with RS256 algorithm
	validRS256JWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create valid RS256 JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// Parse the JWT to manipulate it
	parts := strings.Split(validRS256JWT, ".")
	if len(parts) != 3 {
		t.Fatalf("Invalid JWT format")
	}

	// Decode the header
	headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to decode header: %v", err)
	}

	// Parse header
	var header map[string]interface{}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &header); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to unmarshal header: %v", err)
	}

	// Modify the algorithm to HS256 (symmetric)
	header["alg"] = "HS256"
	modifiedHeaderBytes, err := json.Marshal(header)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal modified header: %v", err)
	}

	// Encode header
	modifiedHeader := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(modifiedHeaderBytes)

	// Create a manipulated JWT with algorithm confusion attack
	manipulatedJWT := modifiedHeader + "." + parts[1] + "." + parts[2]

	// Attempt to verify the manipulated token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(manipulatedJWT)

	// Should fail with algorithm error
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Algorithm confusion attack succeeded - token with HS256 algorithm was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// Check that the error message indicates unsupported algorithm
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported algorithm") {
			t.Errorf("Expected unsupported algorithm error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestJWTNoneAlgorithmAttack tests the plugin's resistance to the "none" algorithm attack
// where an attacker removes the signature and sets the algorithm to "none"
func TestJWTNoneAlgorithmAttack(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a standard JWT
	validJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create valid JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// Parse the JWT to manipulate it
	parts := strings.Split(validJWT, ".")
	if len(parts) != 3 {
		t.Fatalf("Invalid JWT format")
	}

	// Decode the header
	headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to decode header: %v", err)
	}

	// Parse header
	var header map[string]interface{}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &header); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to unmarshal header: %v", err)
	}

	// Modify the algorithm to "none"
	header["alg"] = "none"
	modifiedHeaderBytes, err := json.Marshal(header)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal modified header: %v", err)
	}

	// Encode header
	modifiedHeader := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(modifiedHeaderBytes)

	// Create a manipulated JWT with empty signature
	manipulatedJWT := modifiedHeader + "." + parts[1] + "."

	// Attempt to verify the manipulated token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(manipulatedJWT)

	// Should fail with algorithm error
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("None algorithm attack succeeded - token with 'none' algorithm was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// Check that the error message indicates unsupported algorithm
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported algorithm") {
			t.Errorf("Expected unsupported algorithm error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestJWTTokenTampering tests the plugin's ability to detect modifications to the JWT payload
func TestJWTTokenTampering(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a standard JWT
	validJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create valid JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// Parse the JWT to manipulate it
	parts := strings.Split(validJWT, ".")
	if len(parts) != 3 {
		t.Fatalf("Invalid JWT format")
	}

	// Decode the claims (payload)
	claimsBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to decode claims: %v", err)
	}

	// Parse claims
	var claims map[string]interface{}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(claimsBytes, &claims); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to unmarshal claims: %v", err)
	}

	// Modify the claims (elevate privileges by changing email)
	claims["email"] = "admin@example.com"
	modifiedClaimsBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal modified claims: %v", err)
	}

	// Encode claims
	modifiedClaims := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(modifiedClaimsBytes)

	// Create a manipulated JWT with modified claims but original signature
	manipulatedJWT := parts[0] + "." + modifiedClaims + "." + parts[2]

	// Attempt to verify the manipulated token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(manipulatedJWT)

	// Should fail with signature verification error
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Token tampering attack succeeded - modified token was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// The error should be related to signature verification
		if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "signature") &&
			!strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "verify") {
			t.Errorf("Expected signature verification error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestJWTExpiredToken tests the plugin's handling of expired tokens
func TestJWTExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a JWT that is already expired
	expiredJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix()), // Expired 1 hour ago
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create expired JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// Attempt to verify the expired token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(expiredJWT)

	// Should fail with expiration error
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Expired token was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// Check that the error message indicates token expiration
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "expired") {
			t.Errorf("Expected token expiration error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestJWTFutureToken tests the plugin's handling of tokens issued in the future
func TestJWTFutureToken(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a JWT with a future issuance time
	futureJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()), // Issued 1 hour in the future
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create future JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// Attempt to verify the future token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(futureJWT)

	// Should fail with issuance time error
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Future-issued token was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// Check that the error message indicates token issuance time issue
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "used before issued") {
			t.Errorf("Expected token issuance time error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestJWTReplayAttack tests the plugin's protection against token replay attacks
func TestJWTReplayAttack(t *testing.T) {
	// Create cleanup helper
	tc := newTestCleanup(t)

	// Create a new instance for this test to avoid interference from global state
	logger := NewLogger("debug")
	tokenBlacklist := tc.addCache(NewCache())
	tokenCache := tc.addTokenCache(NewTokenCache())

	// Create keys
	rsaPrivateKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to generate RSA key: %v", err)
	}
	rsaPublicKey := &rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey

	// Create JWK
	jwk := JWK{
		Kty: "RSA",
		Kid: "test-key-id",
		Alg: "RS256",
		N:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rsaPublicKey.N.Bytes()),
		E:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537 in bytes
	}
	jwks := &JWKSet{
		Keys: []JWK{jwk},
	}

	// Create mock JWK cache
	mockJWKCache := &MockJWKCache{
		JWKS: jwks,
		Err:  nil,
	}

	// Create a fixed JTI (JWT ID) to simulate replay
	fixedJTI := "fixed-test-jti-for-replay-" + generateRandomString(8)

	// Create a JWT with the fixed JTI
	replayJWT, err := createTestJWT(rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   fixedJTI, // Fixed JTI to test replay protection
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create JWT for replay test: %v", err)
	}

	// Create the TraefikOidc instance
	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
		issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
		clientID:           "test-client-id",
		clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
		jwkCache:           mockJWKCache,
		jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
		tokenBlacklist:     tokenBlacklist,
		tokenCache:         tokenCache,
		limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
		logger:             logger,
		allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
		excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
		httpClient:         &http.Client{},
		extractClaimsFunc:  extractClaims,
	}

	// Set up the token verifier and JWT verifier
	tOidc.jwtVerifier = tOidc
	tOidc.tokenVerifier = tOidc

	// First verification should succeed
	err = tOidc.VerifyToken(replayJWT)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("First verification of token failed unexpectedly: %v", err)
	}

	// Verify that the JTI was blacklisted
	if blacklisted, exists := tOidc.tokenBlacklist.Get(fixedJTI); !exists || blacklisted == nil {
		t.Fatalf("JTI was not added to blacklist after first verification")
	}

	// Since there's a special bypass for tokens starting with the test JWT prefix,
	// we need to test with a direct check of the blacklisted JTI instead

	// Directly verify that a replay would be caught by checking the blacklist
	if blacklisted, exists := tOidc.tokenBlacklist.Get(fixedJTI); !exists || blacklisted == nil {
		t.Errorf("JTI was not properly blacklisted for replay protection")
	}

	// Also verify our JTI replay detection function directly
	claims, _ := extractClaims(replayJWT)
	if claims != nil {
		if jti, ok := claims["jti"].(string); ok && jti != "" {
			if blacklisted, exists := tOidc.tokenBlacklist.Get(jti); exists && blacklisted != nil {
				t.Logf("Replay protection verified: JTI %s is correctly blacklisted", jti)
			} else {
				t.Errorf("JTI %s was not found in blacklist", jti)
			}
		}
	}
}

// TestMissingClaims tests validation of tokens with missing required claims
func TestMissingClaims(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Test cases for missing claims
	testCases := []struct {
		name          string
		expectedError string
		omittedClaims []string
	}{
		{
			name:          "Missing Issuer",
			omittedClaims: []string{"iss"},
			expectedError: "missing 'iss'",
		},
		{
			name:          "Missing Audience",
			omittedClaims: []string{"aud"},
			expectedError: "missing 'aud'",
		},
		{
			name:          "Missing Expiration",
			omittedClaims: []string{"exp"},
			expectedError: "missing or invalid 'exp'",
		},
		{
			name:          "Missing IssuedAt",
			omittedClaims: []string{"iat"},
			expectedError: "missing or invalid 'iat'",
		},
		{
			name:          "Missing Subject",
			omittedClaims: []string{"sub"},
			expectedError: "missing or empty 'sub'",
		},
	}

	for _, tc := range testCases {
		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
			// Create standard claims
			claims := map[string]interface{}{
				"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
				"aud":   "test-client-id",
				"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
				"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
				"sub":   "test-subject",
				"email": "user@example.com",
				"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
			}

			// Remove specified claims
			for _, claim := range tc.omittedClaims {
				delete(claims, claim)
			}

			// Create JWT with missing claims
			invalidJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", claims)
			if err != nil {
				t.Fatalf("Failed to create JWT with missing claims: %v", err)
			}

			// Attempt to verify the token
			err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(invalidJWT)

			// Should fail with the expected error
			if err == nil {
				t.Errorf("Token with missing %v claim was incorrectly verified", tc.omittedClaims)
			} else {
				if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.expectedError) {
					t.Errorf("Expected error containing '%s', but got: %v", tc.expectedError, err)
				}
			}
		})
	}
}

// TestSessionFixationAttack tests the plugin's resistance to session fixation attacks
func TestSessionFixationAttack(t *testing.T) {
	// Create cleanup helper
	tc := newTestCleanup(t)

	logger := NewLogger("debug")
	sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-secret-key-that-is-at-least-32-bytes", false, "", logger)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create session manager: %v", err)
	}

	// Create a test request
	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
	resp := httptest.NewRecorder()

	// Create an attacker's session
	attackerSession, err := sm.GetSession(req)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to get attacker session: %v", err)
	}

	// Set up the attacker's session with malicious data
	attackerSession.SetAuthenticated(true)
	attackerSession.SetEmail("attacker@evil.com")
	attackerSession.SetIDToken(ValidIDToken)
	attackerSession.SetAccessToken(ValidAccessToken)

	// Save the session to get cookies
	if err := attackerSession.Save(req, resp); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to save attacker session: %v", err)
	}

	// Extract the cookies from the response
	attackerCookies := resp.Result().Cookies()

	// Create a test next handler that would be called after successful authentication
	nextHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		// Get the current session
		session, err := sm.GetSession(r)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session in next handler: %v", err)
		}

		// Check if the session is authenticated
		if !session.GetAuthenticated() {
			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
			return
		}

		// Get the email from the session
		email := session.GetEmail()
		w.Header().Set("X-User-Email", email)
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	})

	// Create keys for JWT verification
	rsaPrivateKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to generate RSA key: %v", err)
	}
	rsaPublicKey := &rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey

	// Create JWK
	jwk := JWK{
		Kty: "RSA",
		Kid: "test-key-id",
		Alg: "RS256",
		N:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rsaPublicKey.N.Bytes()),
		E:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537 in bytes
	}
	jwks := &JWKSet{
		Keys: []JWK{jwk},
	}

	// Create mock JWK cache
	mockJWKCache := &MockJWKCache{
		JWKS: jwks,
		Err:  nil,
	}

	// Create the TraefikOidc middleware
	tokenBlacklist := tc.addCache(NewCache())
	tokenCache := tc.addTokenCache(NewTokenCache())
	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
		next:               nextHandler,
		name:               "test",
		redirURLPath:       "/callback",
		logoutURLPath:      "/callback/logout",
		issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
		clientID:           "test-client-id",
		clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
		jwkCache:           mockJWKCache,
		jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
		tokenBlacklist:     tokenBlacklist,
		tokenCache:         tokenCache,
		limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
		logger:             logger,
		allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
		excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
		httpClient:         &http.Client{},
		initComplete:       make(chan struct{}),
		sessionManager:     sm,
		extractClaimsFunc:  extractClaims,
	}

	// Set up the token verifier and JWT verifier
	tOidc.jwtVerifier = tOidc
	tOidc.tokenVerifier = tOidc

	close(tOidc.initComplete)

	// Now create a victim's request with the attacker's cookies
	victimReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)

	// Add the attacker's cookies to the victim's request
	for _, cookie := range attackerCookies {
		victimReq.AddCookie(cookie)
	}

	// Set common request headers
	victimReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
	victimReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")

	victimResp := httptest.NewRecorder()

	// Process the victim's request
	tOidc.ServeHTTP(victimResp, victimReq)

	// Check if the session fixation attack was prevented
	// The victim should either:
	// 1. Be redirected to authenticate (302 status) OR
	// 2. Receive an unauthorized error (401 status)
	// but NOT be authenticated as the attacker
	if victimResp.Code == http.StatusOK {
		// If we got a 200 OK, check if the user was authenticated as the attacker
		if email := victimResp.Header().Get("X-User-Email"); email == "attacker@evil.com" {
			t.Errorf("Session fixation attack succeeded - victim authenticated as attacker")
		}
	}

	// Verify that either:
	// - The response is a redirect to the login page (302), OR
	// - The response is unauthorized (401), OR
	// - The token verification failed
	expectedCodes := []int{http.StatusFound, http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusForbidden}
	codeFound := false
	for _, code := range expectedCodes {
		if victimResp.Code == code {
			codeFound = true
			break
		}
	}

	if !codeFound {
		t.Errorf("Expected status code to be one of %v, but got %d", expectedCodes, victimResp.Code)
	}
}

// TestCSRFProtection tests the plugin's CSRF protection mechanisms
// TestCSRFProtection tests CSRF protection in POST requests
func TestCSRFProtection(t *testing.T) {
	logger := NewLogger("debug")
	sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-secret-key-that-is-at-least-32-bytes", false, "", logger)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create session manager: %v", err)
	}

	// Test case 1: Valid CSRF token should succeed
	t.Run("Valid CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {
		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
		resp := httptest.NewRecorder()

		// Create a session and set CSRF token
		session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
		}

		csrfToken := "valid-csrf-token-12345"
		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
		if err := session.Save(req, resp); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
		}

		// Get cookies from response
		cookies := resp.Result().Cookies()

		// Create new request with CSRF token in header and cookies
		req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
		req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrfToken)
		for _, cookie := range cookies {
			req.AddCookie(cookie)
		}

		// Get session again to verify CSRF
		session, err = sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session with cookies: %v", err)
		}

		sessionCSRF := session.GetCSRF()
		if sessionCSRF != csrfToken {
			t.Errorf("CSRF token mismatch: expected %s, got %s", csrfToken, sessionCSRF)
		}

		// Verify CSRF token matches
		headerCSRF := req.Header.Get("X-CSRF-Token")
		if headerCSRF != sessionCSRF {
			t.Errorf("CSRF validation failed: header token %s != session token %s", headerCSRF, sessionCSRF)
		}
	})

	// Test case 2: Missing CSRF token should fail
	t.Run("Missing CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {
		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
		resp := httptest.NewRecorder()

		// Create a session with CSRF token
		session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
		}

		csrfToken := "expected-csrf-token-67890"
		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
		if err := session.Save(req, resp); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
		}

		// Get cookies from response
		cookies := resp.Result().Cookies()

		// Create new request WITHOUT CSRF token in header but with cookies
		req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
		// Intentionally NOT setting X-CSRF-Token header
		for _, cookie := range cookies {
			req.AddCookie(cookie)
		}

		// Get session to verify CSRF exists
		session, err = sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session with cookies: %v", err)
		}

		sessionCSRF := session.GetCSRF()
		headerCSRF := req.Header.Get("X-CSRF-Token")

		// This should fail - no CSRF token in header
		if headerCSRF == sessionCSRF && headerCSRF != "" {
			t.Errorf("CSRF protection failed: request without CSRF token was accepted")
		}

		if headerCSRF == "" && sessionCSRF != "" {
			t.Logf("CSRF protection working: missing header token, session has %s", sessionCSRF)
		}
	})

	// Test case 3: Invalid CSRF token should fail
	t.Run("Invalid CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {
		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
		resp := httptest.NewRecorder()

		// Create a session with CSRF token
		session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
		}

		csrfToken := "valid-csrf-token-abcdef"
		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
		if err := session.Save(req, resp); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
		}

		// Get cookies from response
		cookies := resp.Result().Cookies()

		// Create new request with WRONG CSRF token in header
		req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
		req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", "wrong-csrf-token-xyz")
		for _, cookie := range cookies {
			req.AddCookie(cookie)
		}

		// Get session to verify CSRF
		session, err = sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session with cookies: %v", err)
		}

		sessionCSRF := session.GetCSRF()
		headerCSRF := req.Header.Get("X-CSRF-Token")

		// This should fail - wrong CSRF token
		if headerCSRF == sessionCSRF {
			t.Errorf("CSRF protection failed: request with wrong CSRF token was accepted")
		}

		if headerCSRF != sessionCSRF {
			t.Logf("CSRF protection working: header token %s != session token %s", headerCSRF, sessionCSRF)
		}
	})

	// Test case 4: CSRF token generation and validation
	t.Run("CSRF token generation", func(t *testing.T) {
		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/login", nil)
		resp := httptest.NewRecorder()

		// Create a session
		session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
		}

		// Generate and set CSRF token
		csrfToken := generateRandomString(32)
		if len(csrfToken) != 32 {
			t.Errorf("CSRF token length incorrect: expected 32, got %d", len(csrfToken))
		}

		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
		if err := session.Save(req, resp); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
		}

		// Verify token was stored
		storedToken := session.GetCSRF()
		if storedToken != csrfToken {
			t.Errorf("CSRF token storage failed: expected %s, got %s", csrfToken, storedToken)
		}

		// Verify token is not empty and has reasonable entropy
		if storedToken == "" {
			t.Error("CSRF token is empty")
		}

		if len(storedToken) < 16 {
			t.Errorf("CSRF token too short: %d characters", len(storedToken))
		}
	})
}

// TestTokenBlacklisting tests the token blacklisting mechanism
func TestTokenBlacklisting(t *testing.T) {
	// Create cleanup helper
	tc := newTestCleanup(t)

	// Create a new instance for this test to avoid interference from global state
	logger := NewLogger("debug")
	tokenBlacklist := tc.addCache(NewCache())
	tokenCache := tc.addTokenCache(NewTokenCache())

	// Create keys
	rsaPrivateKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to generate RSA key: %v", err)
	}
	rsaPublicKey := &rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey

	// Create JWK
	jwk := JWK{
		Kty: "RSA",
		Kid: "test-key-id",
		Alg: "RS256",
		N:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rsaPublicKey.N.Bytes()),
		E:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537 in bytes
	}
	jwks := &JWKSet{
		Keys: []JWK{jwk},
	}

	// Create mock JWK cache
	mockJWKCache := &MockJWKCache{
		JWKS: jwks,
		Err:  nil,
	}

	// Create a valid JWT
	validJWT, err := createTestJWT(rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create valid JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// Create the TraefikOidc instance
	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
		issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
		clientID:           "test-client-id",
		clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
		jwkCache:           mockJWKCache,
		jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
		tokenBlacklist:     tokenBlacklist,
		tokenCache:         tokenCache,
		limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
		logger:             logger,
		allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
		excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
		httpClient:         &http.Client{},
		extractClaimsFunc:  extractClaims,
	}

	// Set up the token verifier and JWT verifier
	tOidc.jwtVerifier = tOidc
	tOidc.tokenVerifier = tOidc

	// First verification should succeed
	err = tOidc.VerifyToken(validJWT)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("First verification failed unexpectedly: %v", err)
	}

	// Now blacklist the token directly
	tOidc.tokenBlacklist.Set(validJWT, true, time.Hour)

	// Second verification should fail due to blacklisting
	err = tOidc.VerifyToken(validJWT)
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Verification succeeded despite token being blacklisted")
	} else {
		// Verify the error message indicates the token is blacklisted
		if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "blacklisted") {
			t.Errorf("Expected blacklist error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestDifferentSigningAlgorithms tests that the plugin properly handles different signing algorithms
func TestDifferentSigningAlgorithms(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Test cases for different algorithms - the implementation actually supports multiple algorithms
	testCases := []struct {
		name          string
		algorithm     string
		keyType       string
		shouldSucceed bool
	}{
		// RSA algorithms
		{"RS256 Algorithm", "RS256", "RSA", true},
		{"RS384 Algorithm", "RS384", "RSA", true},
		{"RS512 Algorithm", "RS512", "RSA", true},
		{"PS256 Algorithm", "PS256", "RSA", true},
		{"PS384 Algorithm", "PS384", "RSA", true},
		{"PS512 Algorithm", "PS512", "RSA", true},

		// EC algorithms
		{"ES256 Algorithm", "ES256", "EC", true},
		{"ES384 Algorithm", "ES384", "EC", true},
		{"ES512 Algorithm", "ES512", "EC", true},

		// Unsupported algorithms
		{"HS256 Algorithm", "HS256", "RSA", false},
		{"HS384 Algorithm", "HS384", "RSA", false},
		{"HS512 Algorithm", "HS512", "RSA", false},
		{"None Algorithm", "none", "RSA", false},
	}

	for _, tc := range testCases {
		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
			// Define standard claims with unique JTI for each test
			standardClaims := map[string]interface{}{
				"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
				"aud":   "test-client-id",
				"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
				"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
				"sub":   "test-subject",
				"email": "user@example.com",
				"jti":   generateRandomString(16), // Generate unique JTI for each test
			}

			var jwtToken string
			var err error

			// Use appropriate key type and create corresponding JWK
			if tc.keyType == "RSA" {
				// Update the RSA JWK to support the current algorithm
				rsaJWK := JWK{
					Kty: "RSA",
					Kid: "test-key-id",
					Alg: tc.algorithm, // Use the algorithm being tested
					N:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(ts.rsaPrivateKey.PublicKey.N.Bytes()),
					E:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{1, 0, 1}), // 65537 in bytes
				}

				// Update the mock JWK cache with the correct algorithm
				ts.mockJWKCache.JWKS = &JWKSet{
					Keys: []JWK{rsaJWK},
				}

				jwtToken, err = createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, tc.algorithm, "test-key-id", standardClaims)
				if err != nil {
					if !tc.shouldSucceed {
						t.Logf("Expected failure creating JWT with %s algorithm: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
						return // This is expected for unsupported algorithms
					}
					t.Fatalf("Failed to create JWT with %s algorithm: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
				}
			} else if tc.keyType == "EC" {
				// Generate EC key for the specific curve
				var curve elliptic.Curve
				switch tc.algorithm {
				case "ES256":
					curve = elliptic.P256()
				case "ES384":
					curve = elliptic.P384()
				case "ES512":
					curve = elliptic.P521()
				default:
					t.Fatalf("Unsupported EC algorithm: %s", tc.algorithm)
				}

				ecPrivateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(curve, rand.Reader)
				if err != nil {
					t.Fatalf("Failed to generate EC key for %s: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
				}

				// Create EC JWK for this test
				ecJWK := createECJWK(ecPrivateKey, tc.algorithm, "test-ec-key-id")

				// Replace the JWK cache entirely with just the EC key for this test
				ts.mockJWKCache.JWKS = &JWKSet{
					Keys: []JWK{ecJWK},
				}

				// Ensure rate limiter is initialized for EC tests
				if ts.tOidc.limiter == nil {
					ts.tOidc.limiter = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10)
				}

				jwtToken, err = createTestJWTWithECKey(ecPrivateKey, tc.algorithm, "test-ec-key-id", standardClaims)
				if err != nil {
					t.Fatalf("Failed to create JWT with %s algorithm: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
				}
			} else {
				t.Fatalf("Unsupported key type: %s", tc.keyType)
			}

			// Verify the token
			err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(jwtToken)

			if tc.shouldSucceed {
				if err != nil {
					t.Errorf("Verification with %s failed: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
				} else {
					t.Logf("Successfully verified token with %s algorithm", tc.algorithm)
				}
			} else {
				if err == nil {
					t.Errorf("Verification with unsupported algorithm %s succeeded", tc.algorithm)
				} else {
					// Check that the error message indicates unsupported algorithm
					if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported algorithm") {
						t.Errorf("Expected unsupported algorithm error for %s, but got: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
					} else {
						t.Logf("Correctly rejected unsupported algorithm %s: %v", tc.algorithm, err)
					}
				}
			}
		})
	}
}

// createTestJWTWithECKey creates a JWT signed with an EC private key
func createTestJWTWithECKey(privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, alg, kid string, claims map[string]interface{}) (string, error) {
	// Create the header
	header := map[string]interface{}{
		"alg": alg,
		"typ": "JWT",
		"kid": kid,
	}

	// Encode header and claims to base64
	headerJSON, err := json.Marshal(header)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal header: %v", err)
	}
	headerBase64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)

	claimsJSON, err := json.Marshal(claims)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal claims: %v", err)
	}
	claimsBase64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)

	// Create the signing input
	signingInput := headerBase64 + "." + claimsBase64

	// Create signature based on algorithm
	var signature []byte

	switch alg {
	case "ES256":
		h := crypto.SHA256.New()
		h.Write([]byte(signingInput))
		hashed := h.Sum(nil)
		r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, privateKey, hashed)
		if err != nil {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with ES256: %v", err)
		}
		// For ES256, each coordinate should be 32 bytes (256 bits / 8)
		rBytes := r.Bytes()
		sBytes := s.Bytes()
		if len(rBytes) < 32 {
			padded := make([]byte, 32)
			copy(padded[32-len(rBytes):], rBytes)
			rBytes = padded
		}
		if len(sBytes) < 32 {
			padded := make([]byte, 32)
			copy(padded[32-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
			sBytes = padded
		}
		signature = append(rBytes, sBytes...)
	case "ES384":
		h := crypto.SHA384.New()
		h.Write([]byte(signingInput))
		hashed := h.Sum(nil)
		r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, privateKey, hashed)
		if err != nil {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with ES384: %v", err)
		}
		// For ES384 (P-384), each coordinate should be 48 bytes (384 bits / 8)
		rBytes := r.Bytes()
		sBytes := s.Bytes()
		// Pad to exactly 48 bytes each
		if len(rBytes) < 48 {
			padded := make([]byte, 48)
			copy(padded[48-len(rBytes):], rBytes)
			rBytes = padded
		} else if len(rBytes) > 48 {
			// Truncate if too long (shouldn't happen with P-384)
			rBytes = rBytes[len(rBytes)-48:]
		}
		if len(sBytes) < 48 {
			padded := make([]byte, 48)
			copy(padded[48-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
			sBytes = padded
		} else if len(sBytes) > 48 {
			// Truncate if too long (shouldn't happen with P-384)
			sBytes = sBytes[len(sBytes)-48:]
		}
		signature = append(rBytes, sBytes...)
	case "ES512":
		h := crypto.SHA512.New()
		h.Write([]byte(signingInput))
		hashed := h.Sum(nil)
		r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, privateKey, hashed)
		if err != nil {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to sign with ES512: %v", err)
		}
		// For ES512 (P-521), each coordinate should be 66 bytes (521 bits / 8 = 65.125, rounded up to 66)
		rBytes := r.Bytes()
		sBytes := s.Bytes()
		// Pad to 66 bytes each
		if len(rBytes) < 66 {
			padded := make([]byte, 66)
			copy(padded[66-len(rBytes):], rBytes)
			rBytes = padded
		} else if len(rBytes) > 66 {
			// Truncate if too long (shouldn't happen with P-521)
			rBytes = rBytes[len(rBytes)-66:]
		}
		if len(sBytes) < 66 {
			padded := make([]byte, 66)
			copy(padded[66-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
			sBytes = padded
		} else if len(sBytes) > 66 {
			// Truncate if too long (shouldn't happen with P-521)
			sBytes = sBytes[len(sBytes)-66:]
		}
		signature = append(rBytes, sBytes...)
	default:
		return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported EC algorithm: %s", alg)
	}

	// Encode signature
	signatureBase64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)

	// Combine to create JWT
	return signingInput + "." + signatureBase64, nil
}

// createECJWK creates a JWK from an EC private key
func createECJWK(privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, alg, kid string) JWK {
	// Get the curve name
	var crv string
	switch privateKey.Curve {
	case elliptic.P256():
		crv = "P-256"
	case elliptic.P384():
		crv = "P-384"
	case elliptic.P521():
		crv = "P-521"
	default:
		panic("unsupported curve")
	}

	// Get the key size for coordinate encoding
	keySize := (privateKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8

	// Encode X and Y coordinates
	xBytes := privateKey.PublicKey.X.Bytes()
	yBytes := privateKey.PublicKey.Y.Bytes()

	// Pad to the correct length
	if len(xBytes) < keySize {
		padded := make([]byte, keySize)
		copy(padded[keySize-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
		xBytes = padded
	}
	if len(yBytes) < keySize {
		padded := make([]byte, keySize)
		copy(padded[keySize-len(yBytes):], yBytes)
		yBytes = padded
	}

	return JWK{
		Kty: "EC",
		Kid: kid,
		Alg: alg,
		Crv: crv,
		X:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xBytes),
		Y:   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yBytes),
	}
}

// TestMalformedTokens tests the plugin's handling of malformed tokens
func TestMalformedTokens(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	testCases := []struct {
		name          string
		token         string
		expectedError string
	}{
		{
			name:          "Empty Token",
			token:         "",
			expectedError: "invalid JWT format",
		},
		{
			name:          "Missing Parts",
			token:         "header.payload",
			expectedError: "invalid JWT format",
		},
		{
			name:          "Invalid Base64 in Header",
			token:         "invalid!base64.payload.signature",
			expectedError: "failed to decode header",
		},
		{
			name:          "Invalid Base64 in Payload",
			token:         "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.invalid!base64.signature",
			expectedError: "failed to decode claims",
		},
		{
			name:          "Invalid Base64 in Signature",
			token:         "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.invalid!base64",
			expectedError: "failed to decode signature",
		},
		{
			name:          "Invalid JSON in Header",
			token:         "eyJpbnZhbGlkIGpzb24=.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.signature",
			expectedError: "failed to decode header",
		},
		{
			name:          "Invalid JSON in Payload",
			token:         "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJpbnZhbGlkIGpzb24=.signature",
			expectedError: "failed to decode claims",
		},
	}

	for _, tc := range testCases {
		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
			err := ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(tc.token)

			// Should fail with expected error
			if err == nil {
				t.Errorf("Malformed token was incorrectly verified: %s", tc.token)
			} else {
				if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.expectedError) {
					t.Errorf("Expected error containing '%s', but got: %v", tc.expectedError, err)
				}
			}
		})
	}
}

// TestRateLimiting tests the rate limiting functionality to prevent brute force attacks
func TestRateLimiting(t *testing.T) {
	// Create cleanup helper
	tc := newTestCleanup(t)

	// Create a fresh instance for this test to avoid affecting other tests with rate limiting
	logger := NewLogger("debug")

	// Create a new test suite for this test only
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a separate TraefikOidc instance with a very restrictive rate limiter
	// This prevents the global instance from being rate-limited
	tokenBlacklist := tc.addCache(NewCache())
	tokenCache := tc.addTokenCache(NewTokenCache())
	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
		issuerURL:      "https://test-issuer.com",
		clientID:       "test-client-id",
		clientSecret:   "test-client-secret",
		jwkCache:       ts.mockJWKCache,
		jwksURL:        "https://test-jwks-url.com",
		tokenBlacklist: tokenBlacklist,
		tokenCache:     tokenCache,
		// Allow only 2 requests per 10 seconds
		limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(10*time.Second), 2),
		logger:             logger,
		allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
		excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
		httpClient:         &http.Client{},
		extractClaimsFunc:  extractClaims,
	}

	// Set up the token verifier and JWT verifier
	tOidc.jwtVerifier = tOidc
	tOidc.tokenVerifier = tOidc

	// Create a valid JWT token
	validJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create valid JWT: %v", err)
	}

	// First request should succeed
	err = tOidc.VerifyToken(validJWT)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("First token verification failed unexpectedly: %v", err)
	}

	// Second request should succeed
	validJWT2, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create second valid JWT: %v", err)
	}

	err = tOidc.VerifyToken(validJWT2)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Second token verification failed unexpectedly: %v", err)
	}

	// Third request should be rate limited
	validJWT3, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create third valid JWT: %v", err)
	}

	err = tOidc.VerifyToken(validJWT3)
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Third token verification succeeded despite rate limiting")
	} else {
		// Check that the error message indicates rate limiting
		if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "rate") {
			t.Errorf("Expected rate limiting error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestAuthorizationHeaderBypass tests that the plugin correctly handles attempts to bypass
// authorization by directly providing an Authorization header
func TestAuthorizationHeaderBypass(t *testing.T) {
	// Create cleanup helper
	tc := newTestCleanup(t)

	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a test next handler that would indicate successful authentication
	nextHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		w.Write([]byte("Authenticated"))
	})

	// Create the TraefikOidc instance
	tokenBlacklist := tc.addCache(NewCache())
	tokenCache := tc.addTokenCache(NewTokenCache())
	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
		next:               nextHandler,
		name:               "test",
		redirURLPath:       "/callback",
		logoutURLPath:      "/callback/logout",
		issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
		clientID:           "test-client-id",
		clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
		jwkCache:           ts.mockJWKCache,
		jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
		tokenBlacklist:     tokenBlacklist,
		tokenCache:         tokenCache,
		limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
		logger:             NewLogger("debug"),
		allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
		excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
		httpClient:         &http.Client{},
		initComplete:       make(chan struct{}),
		sessionManager:     ts.sessionManager,
	}
	close(tOidc.initComplete)

	// Create a request with a forged Authorization header but no valid session
	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)
	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")

	// Add a forged Authorization header
	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+ts.token)

	// Record the response
	resp := httptest.NewRecorder()

	// Process the request
	tOidc.ServeHTTP(resp, req)

	// The middleware should not honor the direct Authorization header
	// and should either redirect to authentication or return an error
	if resp.Code == http.StatusOK {
		body := resp.Body.String()
		if body == "Authenticated" {
			t.Errorf("Authorization header bypass succeeded - request was authenticated without a valid session")
		}
	}

	// Verify that the response is a redirect to authentication (302) or unauthorized (401)
	expectedCodes := []int{http.StatusFound, http.StatusUnauthorized}
	codeFound := false
	for _, code := range expectedCodes {
		if resp.Code == code {
			codeFound = true
			break
		}
	}

	if !codeFound {
		t.Errorf("Expected status code to be one of %v, but got %d", expectedCodes, resp.Code)
	}
}

// TestEmptyAudience tests tokens with empty audience claim
func TestEmptyAudience(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a JWT with empty audience
	emptyAudJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "https://test-issuer.com",
		"aud":   "", // Empty audience
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create JWT with empty audience: %v", err)
	}

	// Verify the token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(emptyAudJWT)

	// Should fail due to invalid audience
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Token with empty audience was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// Check error message
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid audience") {
			t.Errorf("Expected invalid audience error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestEmptyIssuer tests tokens with empty issuer claim
func TestEmptyIssuer(t *testing.T) {
	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a JWT with empty issuer
	emptyIssJWT, err := createTestJWT(ts.rsaPrivateKey, "RS256", "test-key-id", map[string]interface{}{
		"iss":   "", // Empty issuer
		"aud":   "test-client-id",
		"exp":   float64(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix()),
		"iat":   float64(time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute).Unix()),
		"sub":   "test-subject",
		"email": "user@example.com",
		"jti":   generateRandomString(16),
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to create JWT with empty issuer: %v", err)
	}

	// Verify the token
	err = ts.tOidc.VerifyToken(emptyIssJWT)

	// Should fail due to invalid issuer
	if err == nil {
		t.Errorf("Token with empty issuer was incorrectly verified")
	} else {
		// Check error message
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid issuer") {
			t.Errorf("Expected invalid issuer error, but got: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

// TestInvalidRedirectURI tests the plugin's handling of invalid redirect URIs
func TestInvalidRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {
	// Create cleanup helper
	tc := newTestCleanup(t)

	ts := NewTestSuite(t)
	ts.Setup()

	// Create a test request with an invalid redirect URI
	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/callback?state=validstate&code=validcode&redirect_uri=https://evil.com", nil)
	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")

	// Create a session with a state
	session, err := ts.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
	}

	// Set legitimate state and redirect
	session.mainSession.Values["state"] = "validstate"
	session.mainSession.Values["redirect"] = "/legitimate-redirect"

	resp := httptest.NewRecorder()
	if err := session.Save(req, resp); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
	}

	// Get cookies
	cookies := resp.Result().Cookies()

	// Create a new request with those cookies
	req = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/callback?state=validstate&code=validcode&redirect_uri=https://evil.com", nil)
	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")

	// Add cookies
	for _, cookie := range cookies {
		req.AddCookie(cookie)
	}

	// Create a next handler for the middleware
	nextHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	})

	// Create the TraefikOidc instance
	tokenBlacklist := tc.addCache(NewCache())
	tokenCache := tc.addTokenCache(NewTokenCache())
	tOidc := &TraefikOidc{
		next:               nextHandler,
		name:               "test",
		redirURLPath:       "/callback",
		logoutURLPath:      "/callback/logout",
		issuerURL:          "https://test-issuer.com",
		clientID:           "test-client-id",
		clientSecret:       "test-client-secret",
		jwkCache:           ts.mockJWKCache,
		jwksURL:            "https://test-jwks-url.com",
		tokenBlacklist:     tokenBlacklist,
		tokenCache:         tokenCache,
		limiter:            rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10),
		logger:             NewLogger("debug"),
		allowedUserDomains: map[string]struct{}{"example.com": {}},
		excludedURLs:       map[string]struct{}{"/favicon": {}},
		httpClient:         &http.Client{},
		initComplete:       make(chan struct{}),
		sessionManager:     ts.sessionManager,
		tokenExchanger:     ts.tOidc.tokenExchanger,
	}
	close(tOidc.initComplete)

	// Process the callback request
	resp = httptest.NewRecorder()
	tOidc.ServeHTTP(resp, req)

	// Check if open redirect is blocked
	// The response should not redirect to the evil.com domain
	location := resp.Header().Get("Location")
	if location != "" && strings.Contains(location, "evil.com") {
		t.Errorf("Open redirect vulnerability - redirected to %s", location)
	}

	// Should redirect to the legitimate URL
	if location != "" && !strings.Contains(location, "/legitimate-redirect") {
		t.Errorf("Expected redirect to /legitimate-redirect, but got: %s", location)
	}
}