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lukaszraczylo
f728f61777
Issue #152 asks for a manual introspection endpoint because some IdPs
omit introspection_endpoint from discovery. Analysis found the two
documented overrides revocationURL and oidcEndSessionURL were dead
code: the 1b49e13 rebuild dropped their constructor wiring.
Add the IntrospectionURL config field and wire all three overrides.
The overrides apply inside updateMetadataEndpoints, so they survive
every metadata refresh. A manual value always wins over discovery.
The constructor also seeds the live fields, so a failed discovery
does not lose operator configuration.
Manual values skip the poisoned-discovery defences on purpose. They
sit at the same trust tier as providerURL and isValidSecureURL gates
them at config time.
Add issue152_regression_test.go: 8 tests pin precedence, refresh
survival, cold-start seeding, end-to-end introspection over HTTP,
and the validation contract.
110 lines
4.7 KiB
YAML
110 lines
4.7 KiB
YAML
displayName: Traefik OIDC
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type: middleware
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import: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
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summary: |
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OpenID Connect authentication middleware for Traefik. Replaces forward-auth
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+ oauth2-proxy with a single plugin that auto-detects all major OIDC
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providers (Google, Azure AD, Auth0, Okta, Keycloak, AWS Cognito, GitLab,
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generic) and OAuth 2.0 for GitHub.
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Features: ID-token validation with auto-discovery, session encryption,
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proactive token refresh, RBAC via roles/groups claims, domain restriction,
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templated downstream headers, security headers (CSP, HSTS, CORS), rate
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limiting, PKCE, opaque-token introspection (RFC 7662), back/front-channel
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logout, Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), and Redis-backed shared
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state for multi-replica deployments.
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Full documentation: https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
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testData:
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# Required
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providerURL: https://accounts.google.com
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clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com
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clientSecret: your-client-secret
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# Alternative: RFC 7523 private_key_jwt client authentication (Entra ID,
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# Okta, Auth0, Keycloak). Replaces clientSecret with a signed JWT assertion.
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# See README "Client authentication via private key JWT".
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# clientAuthMethod: private_key_jwt
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# clientAssertionKeyID: my-key-2026
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# clientAssertionAlg: RS256 # default; or PS256/384/512, ES256/384/512
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# # File path option:
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# clientAssertionKeyPath: /etc/traefik/oidc/client-key.pem
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# # Or inline PEM (PKCS#8 / PKCS#1 / SEC1):
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# clientAssertionPrivateKey: |
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# -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
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# MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDexampleexample
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# -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
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sessionEncryptionKey: potato-secret-is-at-least-32-bytes-long
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callbackURL: /oauth2/callback
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# Common production knobs
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logoutURL: /oauth2/logout
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postLogoutRedirectURI: /
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forceHTTPS: true # default; only set false for plaintext HTTP local dev
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logLevel: info
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rateLimit: 100
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# Access control
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allowedUserDomains:
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- company.com
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allowedRolesAndGroups:
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- admin
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- developer
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excludedURLs:
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- /health
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- /metrics
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# Scopes are appended to the defaults ["openid", "profile", "email"]
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scopes:
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- roles
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# Templated headers forwarded to backends. Values are Go templates and must
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# be written with plain double braces — the catalog analyzer feeds them to
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# the plugin verbatim (issue #151; quadruple braces do NOT get collapsed).
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# Only when your dynamic config file is rendered by Traefik's file-provider
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# Go templating do the braces need escaping there, e.g.
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# value: "{{`{{.Claims.email}}`}}"
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# (see README "Templated headers").
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headers:
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- name: X-User-Email
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value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
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- name: Authorization
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value: "Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"
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# Security headers (default profile is enabled out of the box)
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securityHeaders:
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enabled: true
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profile: default
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# Optional: Redis for multi-replica deployments. See docs/REDIS.md.
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# redis:
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# enabled: true
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# address: redis:6379
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# password: urn:k8s:secret:redis:password
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# cacheMode: hybrid
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# Optional: bearer-token authentication for M2M (machine-to-machine) API
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# clients. Default off. When enabled, requests presenting
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# "Authorization: Bearer <jwt>" are validated against the configured OIDC
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# provider (signature/issuer/audience/exp) and forwarded without creating
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# a cookie session. The bearer path REJECTS ID tokens, requires a non-
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# default audience, and never trusts the `email` claim as the identifier.
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# See docs/BEARER_AUTH.md for the full threat model.
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#
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# enableBearerAuth: true # opt-in
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# audience: https://api.example.com # REQUIRED when bearer is enabled
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# bearerIdentifierClaim: sub # default; used as X-Forwarded-User. `email` is rejected.
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# stripAuthorizationHeader: true # default; drops the raw token before forwarding
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# bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate: true # default; RFC 6750 hint on 401s
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# bearerOverridesCookie: false # default; cookie wins when both are present
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# requireTokenIntrospection: false # opt-in; calls RFC 7662 introspection per request
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# introspectionURL: https://idp.example.com/oauth/introspect # manual override; set when discovery omits introspection_endpoint
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# maxTokenAgeSeconds: 86400 # 24h cap on iat (rejects clock-skew/forever tokens)
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# maxIdentifierLength: 256 # cap on the sanitised principal identifier
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# bearerFailureThreshold: 20 # consecutive 401s/IP that trip the throttle
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# bearerFailureWindowSeconds: 60 # rolling window over which 401s are counted
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# bearerFailurePenaltySeconds: 60 # 429 + Retry-After duration after threshold trips
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