Files
traefikoidc/token_validator.go
lukaszraczylo 1b49e133da Complete rebuild of the plugin
* Fix bug affecting Azure OIDC authentication ( and most likely others )

* Fixes issue #51

* Ensure that appended roles are unique. Update the documentation.

* Improvements targetting possible memory usage spikes.

* Additional fixes and cleanup

* Refactoring code to fix the issues identified by the users.

* Modernize run

* Fieldalignment

* Multiple changes to improve performance and reduce complexity.
- Optimise the errors and recovery.
- Deduplicate code in metadata cache.
- Remove unused performance monitoring code.
- Simplify session management and settings handling.

* Fix claims issue.

* Add ability to overwrite the default scopes in the settings file

* Well.. that escalated quickly.

Completely forgot that Traefik uses outdated Yaegi and requires compatibility with 1.20 ( pre-generic Go code ).

* Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* fixup! fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* Abstract the provider logic into a separate package.

* Additional micro fixes and cleanups.

* Simplify all the things.

* fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* ...

* Cleanup tests.

* fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* Issue #53: Fix CSRF token handling in reverse proxy

1.  HTTPS Detection Fixed (session.go:723)
- Now uses X-Forwarded-Proto header instead of r.URL.Scheme
- Properly detects HTTPS in reverse proxy environments
2.  SameSite Cookie Attribute Fixed
- Removed automatic SameSiteStrictMode for HTTPS (would break OAuth)
- Keeps SameSiteLaxMode to allow OAuth callbacks from external domains
- Only uses Strict for AJAX requests which don't involve OAuth redirects
3.  Cookie Domain Handling Fixed
- Now respects X-Forwarded-Host header for cookie domain
- Ensures cookies are set for the public domain, not internal proxy domain
4.  EnhanceSessionSecurity Properly Integrated
- Function is now actually called during session save
- Applies security enhancements without breaking OAuth flow

Why Issue #53 Failed Before:

1. Cookies were not marked Secure in HTTPS environments (browser wouldn't send them back)
2. If they had been Secure with SameSite=Strict, Azure callbacks would still fail
3. Cookie domain might have been wrong (internal vs public domain)

Why It Works Now:

1. Cookies are properly marked Secure for HTTPS
2. Uses SameSite=Lax to allow OAuth provider callbacks
3. Cookie domain uses public domain from X-Forwarded-Host
4. CSRF token persists through the entire OAuth flow

* Next set of enhancements together with memory usage improvements.

* Memory leak fixes and optimisations.

* CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes

* fixup! CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes

* Metadata cache leak fix + profiling

* fixup! Metadata cache leak fix + profiling

* Memory leaks hunting, part 1337.

* Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* Clear race conditions

* fixup! Clear race conditions

* Weekend fun with memory leaks

* Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

```
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc    117.017s        coverage: 72.6% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/auth       0.505s  coverage: 87.1% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/circuit_breaker    0.283s  coverage: 99.0% of statements
        github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/config             coverage: 0.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/handlers   0.349s  coverage: 98.2% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/providers (cached)        coverage: 94.3% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/middleware 0.808s  coverage: 78.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/recovery   0.653s  coverage: 100.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/chunking   (cached)        coverage: 87.8% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/core       (cached)        coverage: 85.6% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/crypto     (cached)        coverage: 81.8% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/storage    (cached)        coverage: 93.5% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/validators (cached)        coverage: 98.8% of statements
````

* fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

* fixup! fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

* Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* Pre-release cleanup.

* Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage.
2025-09-18 11:01:30 +01:00

256 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
)
// TokenValidator provides unified token validation functionality
type TokenValidator struct {
logger *Logger
}
// NewTokenValidator creates a new token validator
func NewTokenValidator(logger *Logger) *TokenValidator {
if logger == nil {
logger = GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
}
return &TokenValidator{
logger: logger,
}
}
// TokenValidationResult contains the result of token validation
type TokenValidationResult struct {
Valid bool
TokenType string
Claims map[string]interface{}
Expiry *time.Time
IssuedAt *time.Time
Error error
}
// ValidateToken performs comprehensive token validation
func (v *TokenValidator) ValidateToken(token string, requireJWT bool) TokenValidationResult {
result := TokenValidationResult{}
// Basic validation
if token == "" {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("token is empty")
return result
}
// Check if it's a JWT or opaque token
dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".")
isJWT := dotCount == 2
if requireJWT && !isJWT {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("token is not a valid JWT (found %d dots, expected 2)", dotCount)
return result
}
if isJWT {
return v.validateJWT(token)
} else {
return v.validateOpaqueToken(token)
}
}
// validateJWT validates a JWT token
func (v *TokenValidator) validateJWT(token string) TokenValidationResult {
result := TokenValidationResult{
TokenType: "JWT",
}
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
return result
}
// Validate each part
for i, part := range parts {
if part == "" {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("JWT part %d is empty", i)
return result
}
// Check for valid base64url characters
if !v.isValidBase64URL(part) {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("JWT part %d contains invalid base64url characters", i)
return result
}
}
// Decode and parse claims
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT payload: %w", err)
return result
}
var claims map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT claims: %w", err)
return result
}
result.Claims = claims
// Extract standard claims
if exp, ok := claims["exp"]; ok {
expTime := v.extractTime(exp)
if expTime != nil {
result.Expiry = expTime
// Check if expired
if time.Now().After(*expTime) {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("token is expired (expired at %v)", expTime.Format(time.RFC3339))
return result
}
}
}
if iat, ok := claims["iat"]; ok {
iatTime := v.extractTime(iat)
if iatTime != nil {
result.IssuedAt = iatTime
// Check if issued in future
if iatTime.After(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute)) {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("token issued in future (iat: %v)", iatTime.Format(time.RFC3339))
return result
}
}
}
// Check nbf (not before)
if nbf, ok := claims["nbf"]; ok {
nbfTime := v.extractTime(nbf)
if nbfTime != nil && time.Now().Before(*nbfTime) {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("token not yet valid (nbf: %v)", nbfTime.Format(time.RFC3339))
return result
}
}
result.Valid = true
return result
}
// validateOpaqueToken validates an opaque token
func (v *TokenValidator) validateOpaqueToken(token string) TokenValidationResult {
result := TokenValidationResult{
TokenType: "Opaque",
}
// Check minimum length
if len(token) < 20 {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("opaque token too short (length: %d)", len(token))
return result
}
// Check for spaces
if strings.Contains(token, " ") {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("opaque token contains spaces")
return result
}
// Check for control characters
for i, char := range token {
if char < 32 || char == 127 {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("opaque token contains control character at position %d", i)
return result
}
}
// Check entropy
if len(token) >= 20 {
uniqueChars := make(map[rune]bool)
for _, char := range token {
uniqueChars[char] = true
}
if len(uniqueChars) < 8 {
result.Error = fmt.Errorf("opaque token has insufficient entropy (unique chars: %d)", len(uniqueChars))
return result
}
}
result.Valid = true
return result
}
// isValidBase64URL checks if a string contains only valid base64url characters
func (v *TokenValidator) isValidBase64URL(s string) bool {
for _, char := range s {
if !((char >= 'A' && char <= 'Z') ||
(char >= 'a' && char <= 'z') ||
(char >= '0' && char <= '9') ||
char == '-' || char == '_' || char == '=') {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// extractTime extracts a time.Time from various claim formats
func (v *TokenValidator) extractTime(claim interface{}) *time.Time {
var timestamp int64
switch val := claim.(type) {
case float64:
timestamp = int64(val)
case int64:
timestamp = val
case int:
timestamp = int64(val)
default:
return nil
}
t := time.Unix(timestamp, 0)
return &t
}
// ValidateTokenSize checks if token size is within acceptable limits
func (v *TokenValidator) ValidateTokenSize(token string, maxSize int) error {
if len(token) > maxSize {
return fmt.Errorf("token exceeds maximum size (size: %d, max: %d)", len(token), maxSize)
}
return nil
}
// ExtractClaims extracts claims from a JWT without full validation
func (v *TokenValidator) ExtractClaims(token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format")
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode payload: %w", err)
}
var claims map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse claims: %w", err)
}
return claims, nil
}
// CompareTokens safely compares two tokens for equality
func (v *TokenValidator) CompareTokens(token1, token2 string) bool {
if len(token1) != len(token2) {
return false
}
// Use constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
var result byte
for i := 0; i < len(token1); i++ {
result |= token1[i] ^ token2[i]
}
return result == 0
}