Files
traefikoidc/input_validation.go
lukaszraczylo 1b49e133da Complete rebuild of the plugin
* Fix bug affecting Azure OIDC authentication ( and most likely others )

* Fixes issue #51

* Ensure that appended roles are unique. Update the documentation.

* Improvements targetting possible memory usage spikes.

* Additional fixes and cleanup

* Refactoring code to fix the issues identified by the users.

* Modernize run

* Fieldalignment

* Multiple changes to improve performance and reduce complexity.
- Optimise the errors and recovery.
- Deduplicate code in metadata cache.
- Remove unused performance monitoring code.
- Simplify session management and settings handling.

* Fix claims issue.

* Add ability to overwrite the default scopes in the settings file

* Well.. that escalated quickly.

Completely forgot that Traefik uses outdated Yaegi and requires compatibility with 1.20 ( pre-generic Go code ).

* Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* fixup! fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* Abstract the provider logic into a separate package.

* Additional micro fixes and cleanups.

* Simplify all the things.

* fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* ...

* Cleanup tests.

* fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* Issue #53: Fix CSRF token handling in reverse proxy

1.  HTTPS Detection Fixed (session.go:723)
- Now uses X-Forwarded-Proto header instead of r.URL.Scheme
- Properly detects HTTPS in reverse proxy environments
2.  SameSite Cookie Attribute Fixed
- Removed automatic SameSiteStrictMode for HTTPS (would break OAuth)
- Keeps SameSiteLaxMode to allow OAuth callbacks from external domains
- Only uses Strict for AJAX requests which don't involve OAuth redirects
3.  Cookie Domain Handling Fixed
- Now respects X-Forwarded-Host header for cookie domain
- Ensures cookies are set for the public domain, not internal proxy domain
4.  EnhanceSessionSecurity Properly Integrated
- Function is now actually called during session save
- Applies security enhancements without breaking OAuth flow

Why Issue #53 Failed Before:

1. Cookies were not marked Secure in HTTPS environments (browser wouldn't send them back)
2. If they had been Secure with SameSite=Strict, Azure callbacks would still fail
3. Cookie domain might have been wrong (internal vs public domain)

Why It Works Now:

1. Cookies are properly marked Secure for HTTPS
2. Uses SameSite=Lax to allow OAuth provider callbacks
3. Cookie domain uses public domain from X-Forwarded-Host
4. CSRF token persists through the entire OAuth flow

* Next set of enhancements together with memory usage improvements.

* Memory leak fixes and optimisations.

* CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes

* fixup! CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes

* Metadata cache leak fix + profiling

* fixup! Metadata cache leak fix + profiling

* Memory leaks hunting, part 1337.

* Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* Clear race conditions

* fixup! Clear race conditions

* Weekend fun with memory leaks

* Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

```
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc    117.017s        coverage: 72.6% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/auth       0.505s  coverage: 87.1% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/circuit_breaker    0.283s  coverage: 99.0% of statements
        github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/config             coverage: 0.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/handlers   0.349s  coverage: 98.2% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/providers (cached)        coverage: 94.3% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/middleware 0.808s  coverage: 78.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/recovery   0.653s  coverage: 100.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/chunking   (cached)        coverage: 87.8% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/core       (cached)        coverage: 85.6% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/crypto     (cached)        coverage: 81.8% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/storage    (cached)        coverage: 93.5% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/validators (cached)        coverage: 98.8% of statements
````

* fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

* fixup! fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

* Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* Pre-release cleanup.

* Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage.
2025-09-18 11:01:30 +01:00

736 lines
22 KiB
Go

package traefikoidc
import (
"fmt"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
)
// InputValidator provides comprehensive input validation and sanitization
// to protect against common security vulnerabilities including SQL injection,
// XSS, path traversal, and other injection attacks. It validates and sanitizes
// various input types used in OIDC authentication flows.
type InputValidator struct {
usernameRegex *regexp.Regexp
tokenRegex *regexp.Regexp
logger *Logger
urlRegex *regexp.Regexp
emailRegex *regexp.Regexp
sqlInjectionPatterns []string
pathTraversalPatterns []string
xssPatterns []string
maxUsernameLength int
maxURLLength int
maxTokenLength int
maxEmailLength int
maxClaimLength int
maxHeaderLength int
}
// ValidationResult encapsulates the outcome of input validation.
// It includes the sanitized value, detected security risks, validation
// errors and warnings, and an overall validity status.
type ValidationResult struct {
SanitizedValue string `json:"sanitized_value,omitempty"`
SecurityRisk string `json:"security_risk,omitempty"`
Errors []string `json:"errors,omitempty"`
Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
IsValid bool `json:"is_valid"`
}
// InputValidationConfig defines the configuration parameters for input validation.
// It specifies maximum lengths for various input types and controls whether
// strict validation mode is enabled.
type InputValidationConfig struct {
MaxTokenLength int `json:"max_token_length"`
MaxURLLength int `json:"max_url_length"`
MaxHeaderLength int `json:"max_header_length"`
MaxClaimLength int `json:"max_claim_length"`
MaxEmailLength int `json:"max_email_length"`
MaxUsernameLength int `json:"max_username_length"`
StrictMode bool `json:"strict_mode"`
}
// DefaultInputValidationConfig returns a secure default configuration
// for input validation with reasonable limits based on industry standards
// and security best practices.
func DefaultInputValidationConfig() InputValidationConfig {
return InputValidationConfig{
MaxTokenLength: 50000, // 50KB for tokens
MaxURLLength: 2048, // Standard URL length limit
MaxHeaderLength: 8192, // 8KB for headers
MaxClaimLength: 1024, // 1KB for individual claims
MaxEmailLength: 254, // RFC 5321 limit
MaxUsernameLength: 64, // Reasonable username limit
StrictMode: true, // Enable strict validation by default
}
}
// NewInputValidator creates a new input validator with the specified configuration.
// It compiles all necessary regex patterns and initializes security pattern lists.
//
// Parameters:
// - config: Validation configuration with size limits and mode settings.
// - logger: Logger instance for recording validation events.
//
// Returns:
// - A configured InputValidator instance.
// - An error if regex compilation fails.
func NewInputValidator(config InputValidationConfig, logger *Logger) (*InputValidator, error) {
// Compile regex patterns
emailRegex, err := regexp.Compile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to compile email regex: %w", err)
}
urlRegex, err := regexp.Compile(`^https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+(?:\.[a-zA-Z]{2,})?(?::[0-9]+)?(?:/[^\s]*)?$`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to compile URL regex: %w", err)
}
tokenRegex, err := regexp.Compile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to compile token regex: %w", err)
}
usernameRegex, err := regexp.Compile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to compile username regex: %w", err)
}
return &InputValidator{
maxTokenLength: config.MaxTokenLength,
maxURLLength: config.MaxURLLength,
maxHeaderLength: config.MaxHeaderLength,
maxClaimLength: config.MaxClaimLength,
maxEmailLength: config.MaxEmailLength,
maxUsernameLength: config.MaxUsernameLength,
emailRegex: emailRegex,
urlRegex: urlRegex,
tokenRegex: tokenRegex,
usernameRegex: usernameRegex,
sqlInjectionPatterns: []string{
"'", "\"", ";", "--", "/*", "*/", "xp_", "sp_",
"union", "select", "insert", "update", "delete", "drop",
"create", "alter", "exec", "execute", "script",
},
xssPatterns: []string{
"<script", "</script>", "javascript:", "vbscript:",
"onload=", "onerror=", "onclick=", "onmouseover=",
"<iframe", "<object", "<embed", "<link", "<meta",
},
pathTraversalPatterns: []string{
"../", "..\\", "%2e%2e%2f", "%2e%2e%5c",
"..%2f", "..%5c", "%252e%252e%252f",
},
logger: logger,
}, nil
}
// ValidateToken validates JWT tokens and similar token strings
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateToken(token string) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
// Check for empty token
if token == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token cannot be empty")
return result
}
// Check length limits
if len(token) > iv.maxTokenLength {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("token length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(token), iv.maxTokenLength))
return result
}
// Check for minimum reasonable length
if len(token) < 10 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token is too short to be valid")
return result
}
// Check for valid JWT structure (3 parts separated by dots)
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token does not have valid JWT structure (expected 3 parts)")
return result
}
// Validate each part is base64url encoded
for i, part := range parts {
if !iv.isValidBase64URL(part) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("token part %d is not valid base64url", i+1))
return result
}
}
// Check for suspicious patterns
if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(token); risk != "" {
result.SecurityRisk = risk
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
}
// Check for null bytes and control characters
if iv.containsNullBytes(token) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token contains null bytes")
return result
}
if iv.containsControlCharacters(token) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token contains control characters")
return result
}
// Validate UTF-8 encoding
if !utf8.ValidString(token) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "token contains invalid UTF-8 sequences")
return result
}
result.SanitizedValue = token
return result
}
// ValidateEmail validates email addresses
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateEmail(email string) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
// Check for empty email
if email == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email cannot be empty")
return result
}
// Check length limits
if len(email) > iv.maxEmailLength {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("email length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(email), iv.maxEmailLength))
return result
}
// Sanitize email (trim whitespace, convert to lowercase)
sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(email))
// Check regex pattern
if !iv.emailRegex.MatchString(sanitized) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email format is invalid")
return result
}
// Check for suspicious patterns
if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(sanitized); risk != "" {
result.SecurityRisk = risk
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
}
// Additional email-specific validations
parts := strings.Split(sanitized, "@")
if len(parts) != 2 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email must contain exactly one @ symbol")
return result
}
localPart, domain := parts[0], parts[1]
// Validate local part
if len(localPart) == 0 || len(localPart) > 64 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email local part length is invalid")
return result
}
// Validate domain
if len(domain) == 0 || len(domain) > 253 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email domain length is invalid")
return result
}
// Check for consecutive dots
if strings.Contains(sanitized, "..") {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "email contains consecutive dots")
return result
}
result.SanitizedValue = sanitized
return result
}
// ValidateURL validates URLs
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateURL(urlStr string) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
// Check for empty URL
if urlStr == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL cannot be empty")
return result
}
// Check length limits
if len(urlStr) > iv.maxURLLength {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("URL length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(urlStr), iv.maxURLLength))
return result
}
// Sanitize URL (trim whitespace)
sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(urlStr)
// Parse URL
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(sanitized)
if err != nil {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("URL parsing failed: %v", err))
return result
}
// Check scheme
if parsedURL.Scheme != "https" && parsedURL.Scheme != "http" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL scheme must be http or https")
return result
}
// Prefer HTTPS
if parsedURL.Scheme == "http" {
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "HTTP URLs are less secure than HTTPS")
}
// Check host
if parsedURL.Host == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL must have a valid host")
return result
}
// Check for localhost or private IPs for security
// Allow localhost for HTTPS (development/testing) but warn about it
hostname := strings.ToLower(parsedURL.Hostname())
if hostname == "localhost" || hostname == "127.0.0.1" || hostname == "::1" {
if parsedURL.Scheme == "https" {
// Allow HTTPS localhost for development but warn
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "localhost URLs should only be used for development/testing")
} else {
// Reject non-HTTPS localhost for security
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "non-HTTPS localhost URLs are not allowed for security")
return result
}
}
// Check for private IP ranges (RFC 1918)
if strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "10.") ||
strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "192.168.") ||
strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "172.") {
// For 172.x check if it's in the 172.16.0.0/12 range
if strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "172.") {
parts := strings.Split(hostname, ".")
if len(parts) >= 2 {
if second, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1]); err == nil && second >= 16 && second <= 31 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "private IP URLs are not allowed for security")
return result
}
}
} else {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "private IP URLs are not allowed for security")
return result
}
}
// Check for suspicious patterns
if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(sanitized); risk != "" {
result.SecurityRisk = risk
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
}
// Check for path traversal attempts
if iv.containsPathTraversal(sanitized) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "URL contains path traversal patterns")
return result
}
result.SanitizedValue = sanitized
return result
}
// ValidateUsername validates usernames
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateUsername(username string) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
// Check for empty username
if username == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "username cannot be empty")
return result
}
// Check length limits
if len(username) > iv.maxUsernameLength {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("username length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(username), iv.maxUsernameLength))
return result
}
// Check minimum length
if len(username) < 2 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "username must be at least 2 characters long")
return result
}
// Sanitize username (trim whitespace)
sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(username)
// Check regex pattern
if !iv.usernameRegex.MatchString(sanitized) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "username contains invalid characters (only letters, numbers, dots, underscores, and hyphens allowed)")
return result
}
// Check for suspicious patterns
if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(sanitized); risk != "" {
result.SecurityRisk = risk
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
}
result.SanitizedValue = sanitized
return result
}
// ValidateClaim validates individual JWT claims
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateClaim(claimName, claimValue string) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
// Check claim name
if claimName == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim name cannot be empty")
return result
}
// Check claim value length
if len(claimValue) > iv.maxClaimLength {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("claim value length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(claimValue), iv.maxClaimLength))
return result
}
// Check for null bytes and control characters
if iv.containsNullBytes(claimValue) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains null bytes")
return result
}
if iv.containsControlCharacters(claimValue) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains control characters")
return result
}
// Validate UTF-8 encoding
if !utf8.ValidString(claimValue) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains invalid UTF-8 sequences")
return result
}
// Check for suspicious patterns
if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(claimValue); risk != "" {
result.SecurityRisk = risk
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
return result
}
// Check for excessive unicode (emojis and special characters)
unicodeCount := 0
runeCount := 0
for _, r := range claimValue {
runeCount++
if r > 127 { // Non-ASCII character
unicodeCount++
}
}
// If more than 50% of the characters are unicode, consider it suspicious
if runeCount > 0 && unicodeCount > runeCount/2 {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "claim value contains excessive unicode characters")
return result
}
// Specific validations based on claim name
switch claimName {
case "email":
emailResult := iv.ValidateEmail(claimValue)
if !emailResult.IsValid {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, emailResult.Errors...)
}
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, emailResult.Warnings...)
result.SanitizedValue = emailResult.SanitizedValue
case "iss", "aud":
urlResult := iv.ValidateURL(claimValue)
if !urlResult.IsValid {
// For issuer/audience, we're more lenient - just warn
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("%s claim is not a valid URL: %v", claimName, urlResult.Errors))
}
result.SanitizedValue = claimValue
case "preferred_username", "username":
usernameResult := iv.ValidateUsername(claimValue)
if !usernameResult.IsValid {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, usernameResult.Errors...)
}
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, usernameResult.Warnings...)
result.SanitizedValue = usernameResult.SanitizedValue
default:
// Generic string validation
result.SanitizedValue = strings.TrimSpace(claimValue)
}
return result
}
// ValidateHeader validates HTTP header values
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateHeader(headerName, headerValue string) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
// Check header name
if headerName == "" {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header name cannot be empty")
return result
}
// Check for control characters in header name (including CRLF)
if iv.containsControlCharacters(headerName) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header name contains control characters")
return result
}
// Check for CRLF injection in header name
if strings.Contains(headerName, "\r") || strings.Contains(headerName, "\n") {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header name contains CRLF characters (potential header injection)")
return result
}
// Check header value length
if len(headerValue) > iv.maxHeaderLength {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("header value length %d exceeds maximum %d", len(headerValue), iv.maxHeaderLength))
return result
}
// Check for null bytes and control characters (except allowed ones)
if iv.containsNullBytes(headerValue) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains null bytes")
return result
}
// Check for CRLF injection
if strings.Contains(headerValue, "\r") || strings.Contains(headerValue, "\n") {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains CRLF characters (potential header injection)")
return result
}
// Check for control characters in header value
if iv.containsControlCharacters(headerValue) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains control characters")
return result
}
// Validate UTF-8 encoding
if !utf8.ValidString(headerValue) {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "header value contains invalid UTF-8 sequences")
return result
}
// Check for suspicious patterns
if risk := iv.detectSecurityRisk(headerValue); risk != "" {
result.SecurityRisk = risk
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("potential security risk detected: %s", risk))
return result
}
result.SanitizedValue = strings.TrimSpace(headerValue)
return result
}
// isValidBase64URL checks if a string is valid base64url encoding
func (iv *InputValidator) isValidBase64URL(s string) bool {
// Base64url uses A-Z, a-z, 0-9, -, _ and no padding
for _, r := range s {
if !((r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') ||
(r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '-' || r == '_') {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// containsNullBytes checks if a string contains null bytes
func (iv *InputValidator) containsNullBytes(s string) bool {
return strings.Contains(s, "\x00")
}
// containsControlCharacters checks if a string contains control characters
func (iv *InputValidator) containsControlCharacters(s string) bool {
for _, r := range s {
if unicode.IsControl(r) && r != '\t' && r != '\n' && r != '\r' {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// containsPathTraversal checks for path traversal patterns
func (iv *InputValidator) containsPathTraversal(s string) bool {
lowerS := strings.ToLower(s)
for _, pattern := range iv.pathTraversalPatterns {
if strings.Contains(lowerS, pattern) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// detectSecurityRisk detects potential security risks in input
func (iv *InputValidator) detectSecurityRisk(input string) string {
lowerInput := strings.ToLower(input)
// Check for SQL injection patterns
for _, pattern := range iv.sqlInjectionPatterns {
if strings.Contains(lowerInput, pattern) {
return "sql_injection"
}
}
// Check for XSS patterns
for _, pattern := range iv.xssPatterns {
if strings.Contains(lowerInput, pattern) {
return "xss"
}
}
// Check for path traversal
if iv.containsPathTraversal(input) {
return "path_traversal"
}
// Check for excessive length (potential DoS)
if len(input) > 10000 {
return "excessive_length"
}
// Check for suspicious character patterns
if iv.containsNullBytes(input) {
return "null_bytes"
}
// Check for binary data patterns
nonPrintableCount := 0
for _, r := range input {
if !unicode.IsPrint(r) && !unicode.IsSpace(r) {
nonPrintableCount++
}
}
if nonPrintableCount > len(input)/10 { // More than 10% non-printable
return "binary_data"
}
return ""
}
// SanitizeInput provides general input sanitization
func (iv *InputValidator) SanitizeInput(input string, maxLength int) string {
// Trim whitespace
sanitized := strings.TrimSpace(input)
// Truncate if too long
if len(sanitized) > maxLength {
sanitized = sanitized[:maxLength]
}
// Remove null bytes
sanitized = strings.ReplaceAll(sanitized, "\x00", "")
// Remove other control characters except tab, newline, carriage return
var result strings.Builder
for _, r := range sanitized {
if !unicode.IsControl(r) || r == '\t' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' {
result.WriteRune(r)
}
}
return result.String()
}
// ValidateBoundaryValues validates numeric boundary values
func (iv *InputValidator) ValidateBoundaryValues(value interface{}, min, max int64) ValidationResult {
result := ValidationResult{IsValid: true, Errors: []string{}, Warnings: []string{}}
var numValue int64
switch v := value.(type) {
case int:
numValue = int64(v)
case int32:
numValue = int64(v)
case int64:
numValue = v
case float64:
numValue = int64(v)
if float64(numValue) != v {
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "floating point value truncated to integer")
}
default:
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, "value is not a numeric type")
return result
}
if numValue < min {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("value %d is below minimum %d", numValue, min))
}
if numValue > max {
result.IsValid = false
result.Errors = append(result.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("value %d exceeds maximum %d", numValue, max))
}
return result
}