# Traefik OIDC Middleware OpenID Connect authentication middleware for Traefik. Replaces forward-auth + oauth2-proxy. Auto-detects all major OIDC providers, validates ID tokens, manages sessions, and forwards user identity to downstream services. ## Documentation - [Configuration reference](docs/CONFIGURATION.md) — every parameter - [Provider guide](docs/PROVIDERS.md) — Google, Azure, Auth0, Okta, Keycloak, Cognito, GitLab, GitHub, generic - [Auth0 audience guide](docs/AUTH0_AUDIENCE_GUIDE.md) — custom APIs, opaque tokens, token confusion - [Redis cache](docs/REDIS.md) — multi-replica deployments - [Dynamic Client Registration](docs/DCR.md) — RFC 7591 - [Development](docs/DEVELOPMENT.md) · [Testing](docs/TESTING.md) ## Provider support | Provider | OIDC | Refresh | Auto-detected by | |----------|------|---------|------------------| | Google | Full | Yes | `accounts.google.com` | | Azure AD | Full | Yes | `login.microsoftonline.com`, `sts.windows.net` | | Auth0 | Full | Yes | `*.auth0.com` | | Okta | Full | Yes | `*.okta.com`, `*.oktapreview.com`, `*.okta-emea.com` | | Keycloak | Full | Yes | host containing `keycloak`, or `/realms/` in path (covers KC <17 `/auth/realms/` and 17+ `/realms/`) | | AWS Cognito | Full | Yes | `cognito-idp.*.amazonaws.com` | | GitLab | Full | Yes | `gitlab.com` | | GitHub | OAuth 2.0 only — no ID token, no refresh | No | `github.com` | | Generic | Full | Yes | any RFC-compliant `.well-known/openid-configuration` | > Authentication and claim extraction use the **ID token**. Ensure your > provider includes required claims (email, roles, groups) in the ID token, > not just the access token or UserInfo endpoint. ## Install Enable the plugin in Traefik's static configuration: ```yaml # traefik.yml experimental: plugins: traefikoidc: moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc version: v0.7.10 ``` Then attach the middleware in your dynamic configuration (see [Quickstart](#quickstart) below). This middleware tracks the current Traefik helm chart release. If it fails to load, update Traefik first. ### Verify release signatures Release checksums are signed with [cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) keyless signing: ```bash cosign verify-blob \ --certificate-identity-regexp "https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/.*" \ --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \ --bundle "traefikoidc_v_checksums.txt.sigstore.json" \ traefikoidc_v_checksums.txt ``` ## Quickstart ```yaml apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1 kind: Middleware metadata: name: oidc-auth namespace: traefik spec: plugin: traefikoidc: providerURL: https://accounts.google.com clientID: 1234567890.apps.googleusercontent.com clientSecret: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-oidc:CLIENT_SECRET sessionEncryptionKey: urn:k8s:secret:traefik-oidc:SESSION_KEY callbackURL: /oauth2/callback logoutURL: /oauth2/logout postLogoutRedirectURI: / # forceHTTPS defaults to true (secure-by-default). Only set false if you # serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP for local dev. allowedUserDomains: [company.com] allowedRolesAndGroups: [admin, developer] excludedURLs: [/health, /metrics] ``` More example configs in [`examples/`](examples/). ## Required parameters | Parameter | Description | |-----------|-------------| | `providerURL` | Issuer URL (used for OIDC discovery). | | `clientID` | OAuth 2.0 client ID. | | `clientSecret` | OAuth 2.0 client secret. Supports `urn:k8s:secret:ns:name:key`. | | `sessionEncryptionKey` | Cookie encryption key, **min 32 bytes**. | | `callbackURL` | Callback path, e.g. `/oauth2/callback`. | ## Common optional parameters Full reference in [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md). | Parameter | Default | Purpose | |-----------|---------|---------| | `forceHTTPS` | `true` | Forces `https://` in redirect URIs. Leave at default behind any TLS-terminating LB (AWS ALB, GCP LB, Azure App Gateway). Set `false` only for plaintext HTTP local dev. | | `logoutURL` | `callbackURL + "/logout"` | RP-initiated logout path. | | `postLogoutRedirectURI` | `/` | Where to send users after logout. | | `scopes` | appended to `openid profile email` | Extra OAuth scopes. Set `overrideScopes: true` to replace defaults. | | `excludedURLs` | none | Prefix-matched paths that bypass auth. | | `allowedUserDomains` | none | Restrict to email domains. | | `allowedUsers` | none | Restrict to specific addresses (or claim values when `userIdentifierClaim != email`). | | `allowedRolesAndGroups` | none | Require any of these roles/groups from ID-token claims. | | `roleClaimName` / `groupClaimName` | `roles` / `groups` | For namespaced claims (Auth0). | | `userIdentifierClaim` | `email` | Use `sub`, `oid`, `upn`, or `preferred_username` for users without email. | | `enablePKCE` | `false` | PKCE on the auth code flow. | | `cookieDomain` | auto | Set explicitly for multi-subdomain setups (`.example.com`). | | `cookiePrefix` | `_oidc_raczylo_` | Unique prefix per middleware instance to isolate sessions. | | `sessionMaxAge` | `86400` | Session lifetime in seconds. | | `refreshGracePeriodSeconds` | `60` | Proactively refresh tokens this many seconds before expiry. | | `rateLimit` | `100` | Requests/sec. Min `10`. | | `logLevel` | `info` | `debug`, `info`, `error`. | | `audience` | `clientID` | Custom access-token audience (Auth0 custom APIs). | | `strictAudienceValidation` | `false` | Reject mismatched audiences. **Set `true` in production.** | | `allowOpaqueTokens` / `requireTokenIntrospection` | `false` | Accept opaque access tokens via RFC 7662. | | `disableReplayDetection` | `false` | Disable JTI cache. Use Redis instead for multi-replica. | | `allowPrivateIPAddresses` | `false` | Permit private-IP `providerURL` (internal Keycloak, etc.). | | `minimalHeaders` | `false` | Reduce forwarded headers (mitigates HTTP 431). | | `stripAuthCookies` | `false` | Strip OIDC cookies from backend hop (mitigates HTTP 431). | | `caCertPath` / `caCertPEM` | none | Trust an internal CA for the provider's TLS. | | `insecureSkipVerify` | `false` | **Local dev only.** Disables TLS verification, logs a security warning. | | `enableBackchannelLogout` / `backchannelLogoutURL` | `false` / none | OIDC Back-Channel Logout (server-to-server). | | `enableFrontchannelLogout` / `frontchannelLogoutURL` | `false` / none | OIDC Front-Channel Logout (iframe). | | `redis` | disabled | See [docs/REDIS.md](docs/REDIS.md). | | `dynamicClientRegistration` | disabled | See [docs/DCR.md](docs/DCR.md). | ## Production gotchas ### TLS termination at a load balancer `forceHTTPS` defaults to `true`, so redirect URIs always use `https://`. This is the right default behind AWS ALB, GCP LB, Azure App Gateway, or any LB that terminates TLS — `X-Forwarded-Proto` is unreliable (ALB may overwrite it). Only set `forceHTTPS: false` when you actually serve OIDC over plaintext HTTP (local dev). See [issue #82](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/82). ### Multi-replica deployments Each replica keeps its own in-memory JTI cache → false positive "token replay detected" when the same token hits different replicas. Two options: 1. Set `disableReplayDetection: true` (loses replay protection). 2. Enable Redis for shared state (recommended) — see [docs/REDIS.md](docs/REDIS.md). For IdP-initiated logout (back/front-channel) in multi-replica setups, Redis is **required** so a logout on one instance invalidates sessions on the others. ### Multiple middleware instances on the same host Each instance must use a unique `cookiePrefix` **and** `sessionEncryptionKey`, otherwise a session minted by one instance can grant access through another. See [issue #87](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/87). ### HTTP 431 from backends Either the ID token or the chunked OIDC cookies overflow your backend's header buffer. Combine these as needed: ```yaml minimalHeaders: true # drop X-Auth-Request-Token et al. stripAuthCookies: true # strip _oidc_raczylo_* cookies on the backend hop ``` Cookies remain in the browser; only the Traefik→backend hop is affected. See [#64](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/64), [#122](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/122). ### Internal CA for the provider If the provider's TLS cert is signed by a private CA (self-hosted GitLab, internal Keycloak, ADFS): ```yaml caCertPath: /etc/ssl/certs/internal-ca.pem # or, inline: caCertPEM: | -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- ``` Both can be combined. An unparseable bundle fails the plugin at startup. See [#125](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/125). ### Environment variable names containing `API` Traefik reserves `TRAEFIK_API_*`. User vars whose name contains `API` (e.g. `OIDC_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_API`) make the plugin fail with `invalid handler type: `. Rename to anything without the literal `API` substring. See [#98](https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/issues/98). ## Templated headers Forward identity to backends via Go templates over ID-token claims and tokens: ```yaml headers: - name: X-User-Email value: "{{{{.Claims.email}}}}" - name: Authorization value: "Bearer {{{{.AccessToken}}}}" - name: X-User-Roles value: "{{{{range $i, $e := .Claims.roles}}}}{{{{if $i}}}},{{{{end}}}}{{{{$e}}}}{{{{end}}}}" ``` Available bindings: `.Claims.`, `.AccessToken`, `.IdToken`, `.RefreshToken`. Names are case-sensitive (`.Claims`, not `.claims`). > **Escape with quadruple braces.** If you see > `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool`, Traefik's YAML parser ate > your `{{ }}`. The fix that actually works is `{{{{ }}}}` — the YAML pass > turns it into `{{ }}` for the Go template engine. Other escaping tricks > (literal blocks, single quotes) do not work reliably. ## Default downstream headers When a request is authenticated, the middleware sets: | Header | Notes | |--------|-------| | `X-Forwarded-User` | User's email (always). | | `X-User-Groups` | Comma-separated. | | `X-User-Roles` | Comma-separated. | | `X-Auth-Request-User` | User's email. | | `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` | Original request URI. | | `X-Auth-Request-Token` | Full ID token — the largest header; suppressed by `minimalHeaders`. | Plus security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, X-XSS-Protection, Referrer-Policy) controlled by the `securityHeaders` section — see [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md#security-headers). ## Common errors | Symptom | Cause | |---------|-------| | `Token verification failed` | Wrong/unreachable `providerURL`, or clock skew. | | `Session encryption key too short` | `sessionEncryptionKey` is < 32 bytes. | | `No matching public key found` | JWKS endpoint down, or `kid` mismatch. | | `Access denied: Your email domain is not allowed` | User's domain not in `allowedUserDomains`. | | `Access denied: You do not have any of the allowed roles or groups` | Claims missing or not in `allowedRolesAndGroups`. | | `can't evaluate field AccessToken in type bool` | Template not escaped — use `{{{{ }}}}`. | | `tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority` | Internal CA — set `caCertPath` / `caCertPEM`. | | `invalid handler type: ` | Env var name contains `API` — rename it. | | `false positive replay detected` | Multi-replica without Redis — see [Multi-replica deployments](#multi-replica-deployments). | | Google sessions expire after ~1h | Consent screen still in "Testing" mode. **Do not** add `offline_access` — Google rejects it; the middleware sets `access_type=offline` automatically. | Provider-specific issues (Keycloak mappers, Azure AD group overage, Auth0 namespaced claims, Cognito regions, GitLab self-hosted) live in [docs/PROVIDERS.md](docs/PROVIDERS.md). Set `logLevel: debug` to surface detail. ## License See [LICENSE](LICENSE).