refactor(session): remove unreachable ChunkManager eviction code

ChunkManager.sessionMap is never written in this package, so the limit
and emergency eviction paths cannot run. Remove enforceSessionLimit,
findOldestSessions, CanCreateSession, EmergencyCleanup, GetSessionCount,
GetMemoryStats and globalMaxSessions, with the tests that only covered them.
The session/chunking package keeps its own copy.

audience_sentinel_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Only a real audience mismatch may select the lenient-audience path; an
+// error text that merely embeds the attacker-chosen kid must not.
+func TestAudienceErrorClassifiedBySentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	if !errors.Is(fmt.Errorf("standard claim verification failed: %w", verifyAudience("x", "y")), errInvalidAudience) {
+		t.Fatal("audience mismatch not recognized through wrapping")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(verifyAudience("y", "y"), errInvalidAudience) {
+		t.Fatal("matching audience classified as mismatch")
+	}
+	for _, kid := range []string{"audience", "invalid audience"} {
+		err := fmt.Errorf("failed to get public key: no matching public key found for kid: %s", kid)
+		if errors.Is(err, errInvalidAudience) {
+			t.Errorf("kid %q fooled the audience classifier", kid)
+		}
+	}
+}

bearer_auth.go

@@ -371,6 +371,11 @@ func enforceIatAge(claims map[string]interface{}, maxAge time.Duration) *bearerE
 	if time.Since(iat) > maxAge {
 		return newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token iat outside age bound")
 	}
+	// The opaque introspection path never runs jwt.Verify, so a future iat
+	// would otherwise defeat the age bound for the token's whole lifetime.
+	if time.Until(iat) > ClockSkewToleranceFuture {
+		return newBearerError(bearerErrInvalidToken, "token iat in the future")
+	}
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -553,9 +558,10 @@ func clientIPForBearer(req *http.Request) string {
 	}
 	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.RemoteAddr)
 	if err != nil {
-		return req.RemoteAddr
+		host = req.RemoteAddr
 	}
-	return host
+	// One IPv6 /64 shares a key, so a single host cannot mint 2^64 entries.
+	return limiterKey(host)
 }
 
 // --- Bearer auth entrypoint ---

bearer_failure_ipv6_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Addresses in one IPv6 /64 must share one failure-tracker key.
+func TestClientIPForBearerCollapsesIPv6Prefix(t *testing.T) {
+	key := func(addr string) string {
+		r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+		r.RemoteAddr = addr
+		return clientIPForBearer(r)
+	}
+	if a, b := key("[2001:db8:1:2::1]:1"), key("[2001:db8:1:2:ffff::9]:2"); a != b {
+		t.Fatalf("same /64 got different keys: %q vs %q", a, b)
+	}
+	if a, b := key("[2001:db8:1:2::1]:1"), key("[2001:db8:1:3::1]:1"); a == b {
+		t.Fatalf("different /64 shared key %q", a)
+	}
+	if got := key("192.0.2.7:80"); got != "192.0.2.7" {
+		t.Fatalf("ipv4 key = %q", got)
+	}
+}

coverage_boost_final_test.go

@@ -921,82 +921,6 @@ func TestMemoryTestOrchestrator_StopLeakDetection_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 // CHUNK MANAGER TESTS
 // =============================================================================
 
-func TestChunkManager_GetSessionCount_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
-	logger := NewLogger("debug")
-	cm := NewChunkManager(logger)
-	if cm == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil ChunkManager")
-	}
-	defer cm.Shutdown()
-
-	// Test GetSessionCount
-	count := cm.GetSessionCount()
-	if count != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("Expected 0 sessions, got %d", count)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestChunkManager_GetMemoryStats_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
-	logger := NewLogger("debug")
-	cm := NewChunkManager(logger)
-	if cm == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil ChunkManager")
-	}
-	defer cm.Shutdown()
-
-	// Test GetMemoryStats
-	stats := cm.GetMemoryStats()
-	if stats == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil stats")
-	}
-
-	// Verify expected keys exist
-	if _, ok := stats["active_sessions"]; !ok {
-		t.Error("Expected active_sessions key in stats")
-	}
-	if _, ok := stats["max_sessions"]; !ok {
-		t.Error("Expected max_sessions key in stats")
-	}
-	if _, ok := stats["bytes_allocated"]; !ok {
-		t.Error("Expected bytes_allocated key in stats")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestChunkManager_CanCreateSession_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
-	logger := NewLogger("debug")
-	cm := NewChunkManager(logger)
-	if cm == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil ChunkManager")
-	}
-	defer cm.Shutdown()
-
-	// Test CanCreateSession - should be true initially
-	canCreate, err := cm.CanCreateSession()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("Unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !canCreate {
-		t.Error("Expected CanCreateSession to return true when empty")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestChunkManager_EmergencyCleanup_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
-	logger := NewLogger("debug")
-	cm := NewChunkManager(logger)
-	if cm == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Expected non-nil ChunkManager")
-	}
-	defer cm.Shutdown()
-
-	// Test EmergencyCleanup - should not panic on empty session map
-	cm.EmergencyCleanup()
-
-	// Verify no sessions exist
-	if cm.GetSessionCount() != 0 {
-		t.Error("Expected 0 sessions after cleanup")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestChunkManager_CleanupExpiredSessions_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 	logger := NewLogger("debug")
 	cm := NewChunkManager(logger)
@@ -1008,8 +932,7 @@ func TestChunkManager_CleanupExpiredSessions_CoverageBoost(t *testing.T) {
 	// Test CleanupExpiredSessions - should not panic on empty session map
 	cm.CleanupExpiredSessions()
 
-	// Verify no sessions exist
+	if len(cm.sessionMap) != 0 {
-	if cm.GetSessionCount() != 0 {
 		t.Error("Expected 0 sessions after cleanup")
 	}
 }

header_templates_owned_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+)
+
+func ownedHeaderOIDC(t *testing.T, names ...string) *TraefikOidc {
+	t.Helper()
+	m := map[string]*template.Template{}
+	for _, n := range names {
+		m[n] = template.Must(template.New(n).Option("missingkey=zero").Parse("{{.Claims.tenant}}"))
+	}
+	return &TraefikOidc{logger: NewLogger("error"), headerTemplates: m}
+}
+
+// A templated header the middleware owns must never carry a client value:
+// an optional claim that renders empty must leave the header absent.
+func TestTemplatedHeaderDropsClientSpoof(t *testing.T) {
+	o := ownedHeaderOIDC(t, "X-Tenant")
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Tenant", "admin-corp")
+	o.applyHeaderTemplates(req, &principal{Claims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": "u"}})
+	if got := req.Header.Get("X-Tenant"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("client-supplied X-Tenant reached the backend: %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTemplatedHeaderRenderedValueWins(t *testing.T) {
+	o := ownedHeaderOIDC(t, "X-Tenant")
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Tenant", "evil")
+	o.applyHeaderTemplates(req, &principal{Claims: map[string]interface{}{"tenant": "acme"}})
+	if got := req.Header.Get("X-Tenant"); got != "acme" {
+		t.Fatalf("X-Tenant = %q, want acme", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// Identity headers are injected before templates run; an empty render must
+// not clobber them, and Authorization stays as received.
+func TestTemplatedHeaderKeepsIdentityAndAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
+	o := ownedHeaderOIDC(t, "X-Forwarded-User", "Authorization")
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "alice")
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer abc")
+	o.applyHeaderTemplates(req, &principal{Claims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": "u"}})
+	if got := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-User"); got != "alice" {
+		t.Fatalf("identity header clobbered: %q", got)
+	}
+	if got := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer abc" {
+		t.Fatalf("Authorization changed: %q", got)
+	}
+}

helpers.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http/cookiejar"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 )
 
@@ -293,10 +294,37 @@ func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
 // TokenCache provides a specialized cache for JWT tokens and their parsed claims.
 // It wraps the UniversalCache with token-specific operations.
 type TokenCache struct {
+	// ns scopes entries to one middleware instance (issuer|client|audience)
+	// so a verdict cached by one instance cannot satisfy another.
+	ns atomic.Value
 	// cache is the underlying universal cache implementation
 	cache *UniversalCache
 }
 
+// SetNamespace sets the verification context that scopes this cache's keys.
+func (tc *TokenCache) SetNamespace(ns string) {
+	if tc == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	tc.ns.Store(ns)
+}
+
+// Namespace returns the scope set by SetNamespace, or "" when none is set.
+func (tc *TokenCache) Namespace() string {
+	if tc == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	ns, _ := tc.ns.Load().(string)
+	return ns
+}
+
+func (tc *TokenCache) key(token string) string {
+	if ns, _ := tc.ns.Load().(string); ns != "" {
+		return "t-" + ns + "|" + token
+	}
+	return "t-" + token
+}
+
 // NewTokenCache creates and initializes a new TokenCache.
 // It uses the global cache manager to ensure singleton behavior.
 func NewTokenCache() *TokenCache {
@@ -313,7 +341,7 @@ func NewTokenCache() *TokenCache {
 //   - claims: Parsed claims from the token
 //   - expiration: The duration for which the cache entry should be valid
 func (tc *TokenCache) Set(token string, claims map[string]interface{}, expiration time.Duration) {
-	token = "t-" + token
+	token = tc.key(token)
 	_ = tc.cache.Set(token, claims, expiration) // Safe to ignore: cache failures are non-critical
 }
 
@@ -325,7 +353,7 @@ func (tc *TokenCache) Set(token string, claims map[string]interface{}, expiratio
 //   - map[string]interface{}: The cached claims if found
 //   - A boolean indicating whether the token was found in the cache (true if found, false otherwise)
 func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (map[string]interface{}, bool) {
-	token = "t-" + token
+	token = tc.key(token)
 	value, found := tc.cache.Get(token)
 	if !found {
 		return nil, false
@@ -338,7 +366,7 @@ func (tc *TokenCache) Get(token string) (map[string]interface{}, bool) {
 // Parameters:
 //   - token: The raw token string to remove from the cache
 func (tc *TokenCache) Delete(token string) {
-	token = "t-" + token
+	token = tc.key(token)
 	tc.cache.Delete(token)
 }
 

host_canon_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestValidateHostCanonicalForms(t *testing.T) {
+	o := &TraefikOidc{}
+	blocked := []string{
+		"localhost.", "LOCALHOST.", "metadata.google.internal.", "metadata.google.internal",
+		"169.254.169.254.", "fe80::1%eth0", "[fe80::1]", "::1",
+	}
+	for _, h := range blocked {
+		if err := o.validateHost(h); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("validateHost(%q) = nil, want blocked", h)
+		}
+	}
+	allowed := []string{"idp.example.com", "idp.example.com.", "2606:4700::1111"}
+	for _, h := range allowed {
+		if err := o.validateHost(h); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("validateHost(%q) = %v, want allowed", h, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if !isLoopbackHost("localhost.") {
+		t.Error("isLoopbackHost(localhost.) = false")
+	}
+}

hunt_20261015_regression_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestEnhanceSessionSecurity_CaseVariantForwardedHostStaysHostScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		xfh  string
+	}{
+		{name: "exact-case parent", xfh: "corp.example.com"},
+		{name: "upper-case parent", xfh: "CORP.example.com"},
+		{name: "mixed-case parent", xfh: "Corp.Example.COM"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			sm := createTestSessionManager(t)
+			t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sm.Shutdown() })
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.corp.example.com/", nil)
+			req.Host = "app.corp.example.com"
+			req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", tc.xfh)
+			opts := sm.EnhanceSessionSecurity(nil, req)
+			if opts.Domain != "app.corp.example.com" {
+				t.Fatalf("Domain = %q, want host-scoped app.corp.example.com", opts.Domain)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	t.Run("case-variant forwarded host equal to serving host is kept", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sm := createTestSessionManager(t)
+		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sm.Shutdown() })
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://internal.svc/", nil)
+		req.Host = "internal.svc"
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "App.Example.com")
+		opts := sm.EnhanceSessionSecurity(nil, req)
+		if opts.Domain != "app.example.com" {
+			t.Fatalf("Domain = %q, want app.example.com", opts.Domain)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestEnforceIatAge_RejectsFutureIat(t *testing.T) {
+	const maxAge = 24 * time.Hour
+	now := time.Now()
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		iat     time.Time
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{name: "now", iat: now},
+		{name: "within future skew", iat: now.Add(ClockSkewToleranceFuture / 2)},
+		{name: "one hour ahead", iat: now.Add(time.Hour), wantErr: true},
+		{name: "just beyond skew", iat: now.Add(ClockSkewToleranceFuture + 10*time.Second), wantErr: true},
+		{name: "older than max age", iat: now.Add(-48 * time.Hour), wantErr: true},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := enforceIatAge(map[string]interface{}{"iat": float64(tc.iat.Unix())}, maxAge)
+			if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
+				t.Fatalf("enforceIatAge err = %v, wantErr %v", err, tc.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestJWKCache_CooldownServesParsedEntryWithoutReparse(t *testing.T) {
+	priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("keygen: %v", err)
+	}
+	c := NewJWKCache()
+	url := fmt.Sprintf("https://jwks.invalid/%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
+	// The raw set is empty, so only the pre-parsed entry can satisfy the lookup.
+	_ = c.cache.SetLocal(url, &JWKSet{}, time.Hour)
+	_ = c.cache.SetLocal(url+parsedKeysSuffix, &parsedJWKS{keys: map[string]crypto.PublicKey{"k1": &priv.PublicKey}}, time.Hour)
+	c.lastSignatureRefresh[url] = time.Now()
+
+	got, err := c.getPublicKeyFresh(context.Background(), url, "k1", http.DefaultClient)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("getPublicKeyFresh: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != crypto.PublicKey(&priv.PublicKey) {
+		t.Fatal("cooldown branch did not serve the cached parsed key")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFrontchannelLogout_FloodCannotEvictSignedMarkers(t *testing.T) {
+	cache := &CacheInterfaceWrapper{cache: NewUniversalCache(UniversalCacheConfig{
+		Type:             CacheTypeSession,
+		MaxSize:          5000,
+		DefaultTTL:       sessionInvalidationTTL,
+		Logger:           NewLogger("error"),
+		SkipAutoCleanup:  true,
+		MonotonicMarkers: true,
+	})}
+	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
+		logger:                   NewLogger("error"),
+		enableFrontchannelLogout: true,
+		sessionInvalidationCache: cache,
+		issuerURL:                "https://idp.example.com",
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cache.cache.Close() })
+
+	if err := oidc.invalidateSession("", "real-subject"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("invalidateSession: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := oidc.checkAndMarkLogoutJTIProcessed("real-jti", time.Now().Unix()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mark jti: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < 6000; i++ {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, fmt.Sprintf("/fc?iss=https://idp.example.com&sid=flood-%d", i), nil)
+		rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		oidc.handleFrontchannelLogout(rw, req)
+		if rw.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("flood request %d: status %d", i, rw.Code)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := cache.Get(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sub", "real-subject")); !ok {
+		t.Error("backchannel sub marker evicted by front-channel flood")
+	}
+	if err := oidc.checkAndMarkLogoutJTIProcessed("real-jti", time.Now().Unix()); err == nil {
+		t.Error("jti replay marker evicted by front-channel flood: replay accepted")
+	}
+	held := 0
+	for i := 0; i < 6000; i++ {
+		if _, ok := cache.Get(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", fmt.Sprintf("flood-%d", i))); ok {
+			held++
+		}
+	}
+	if held > maxFrontchannelMarkers {
+		t.Errorf("front-channel markers held = %d, want <= %d", held, maxFrontchannelMarkers)
+	}
+	if _, ok := cache.Get(oidc.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", "flood-5999")); !ok {
+		t.Error("most recent front-channel marker must remain")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMarkerQuota_Admit(t *testing.T) {
+	var q markerQuota
+	if got := q.admit("a", 2); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("admit a = %q, want none", got)
+	}
+	if got := q.admit("a", 2); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("re-admit a = %q, want none", got)
+	}
+	if got := q.admit("b", 2); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("admit b = %q, want none", got)
+	}
+	if got := q.admit("c", 2); got != "a" {
+		t.Errorf("admit c evicted %q, want a", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServeHTTP_InitWaitQueueFullFailsFast(t *testing.T) {
+	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
+		logger:                       NewLogger("error"),
+		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
+		sessionManager:               createTestSessionManager(t),
+		firstRequestStarted:          1,
+		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+	}
+	oidc.initWaiters = maxInitWaiters
+
+	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	start := time.Now()
+	oidc.ServeHTTP(rw, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil))
+
+	if rw.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 503", rw.Code)
+	}
+	if rw.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
+		t.Error("missing Retry-After header")
+	}
+	if time.Since(start) > 5*time.Second {
+		t.Errorf("rejected after %v, want immediate", time.Since(start))
+	}
+	if oidc.initWaiters != maxInitWaiters {
+		t.Errorf("initWaiters = %d, want unchanged %d", oidc.initWaiters, maxInitWaiters)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServeHTTP_InitWaiterReleasedOnCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
+		logger:                       NewLogger("error"),
+		initComplete:                 make(chan struct{}),
+		sessionManager:               createTestSessionManager(t),
+		firstRequestStarted:          1,
+		metadataRefreshStartedAtomic: 1,
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/protected", nil).WithContext(ctx)
+	oidc.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
+	if oidc.initWaiters != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("initWaiters = %d after canceled wait, want 0", oidc.initWaiters)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCleanupOldCookies_CapsDeletionHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long!!", false, "cookie.example.com", "testpref", 0, newNoOpLogger())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("session manager: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sm.Shutdown() })
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+	req.Host = "a.b.example.com"
+	for i := 0; i < 180; i++ {
+		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: fmt.Sprintf("testpref_%d", i), Value: "x"})
+	}
+	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	sm.CleanupOldCookies(rw, req)
+
+	got := len(rw.Result().Cookies())
+	if got == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected deletion cookies for the first wave")
+	}
+	if limit := maxCleanupCookies * 4; got > limit {
+		t.Fatalf("deletion Set-Cookie headers = %d, want <= %d", got, limit)
+	}
+	for _, c := range rw.Result().Cookies() {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(c.Name, "testpref_") {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected deletion cookie %q", c.Name)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/cache/backends/redis.go

@@ -120,15 +120,8 @@ func (r *RedisBackend) Set(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte, ttl ti
 
 		// Use PSETEX for millisecond precision, SETEX for second precision
 		if ttl > 0 {
-			ttlMillis := ttl.Milliseconds()
+			cmd, arg := ttlCommand(ttl)
-			if ttlMillis < 1000 {
+			_, err = conn.Do(cmd, prefixedKey, arg, string(value))
-				// Use PSETEX for sub-second TTLs (millisecond precision)
-				_, err = conn.Do("PSETEX", prefixedKey, fmt.Sprintf("%d", ttlMillis), string(value))
-			} else {
-				// Use SETEX for larger TTLs (second precision)
-				ttlSeconds := int(ttl.Seconds())
-				_, err = conn.Do("SETEX", prefixedKey, fmt.Sprintf("%d", ttlSeconds), string(value))
-			}
 		} else {
 			_, err = conn.Do("SET", prefixedKey, string(value))
 		}
@@ -624,6 +617,19 @@ func isRetryableError(err error) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// ttlCommand picks SETEX for whole seconds and PSETEX otherwise. The expiry is
+// rounded up to a millisecond and is never zero, so a key never dies early.
+func ttlCommand(ttl time.Duration) (cmd, arg string) {
+	ms := (ttl + time.Millisecond - 1).Milliseconds()
+	if ms < 1 {
+		ms = 1
+	}
+	if ms >= 1000 && ms%1000 == 0 {
+		return "SETEX", fmt.Sprintf("%d", ms/1000)
+	}
+	return "PSETEX", fmt.Sprintf("%d", ms)
+}
+
 // SetMany stores multiple values in Redis using pipelining for efficiency
 // This reduces N round-trips to a single round-trip
 func (r *RedisBackend) SetMany(ctx context.Context, items map[string][]byte, ttl time.Duration) error {
@@ -658,20 +664,16 @@ func (r *RedisBackend) SetMany(ctx context.Context, items map[string][]byte, ttl
 	pipeline := conn.NewPipeline()
 
 	// Queue all SET commands
-	ttlSeconds := int(ttl.Seconds())
+	var ttlCmd, ttlArg string
-	ttlMillis := ttl.Milliseconds()
+	if ttl > 0 {
+		ttlCmd, ttlArg = ttlCommand(ttl)
+	}
 
 	for key, value := range items {
 		prefixedKey := r.prefixKey(key)
 
 		if ttl > 0 {
-			if ttlMillis < 1000 {
+			pipeline.Queue(ttlCmd, prefixedKey, ttlArg, string(value))
-				// Use PSETEX for sub-second TTLs
-				pipeline.Queue("PSETEX", prefixedKey, fmt.Sprintf("%d", ttlMillis), string(value))
-			} else {
-				// Use SETEX for larger TTLs
-				pipeline.Queue("SETEX", prefixedKey, fmt.Sprintf("%d", ttlSeconds), string(value))
-			}
 		} else {
 			pipeline.Queue("SET", prefixedKey, string(value))
 		}

internal/cache/backends/redis_ttl_bounds_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+package backends
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestRedisSetTTLNeverZeroOrEarly(t *testing.T) {
+	mr := NewMiniredisServer(t)
+	b, err := NewRedisBackend(DefaultRedisConfig(mr.GetAddr()))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer b.Close()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	t.Run("sub-millisecond ttl is accepted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, b.Set(ctx, "sub", []byte("v"), 500*time.Microsecond))
+	})
+	t.Run("sub-millisecond ttl accepted by SetMany", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, b.SetMany(ctx, map[string][]byte{"sub-many": []byte("v")}, 500*time.Microsecond))
+	})
+	t.Run("fractional seconds are not rounded down", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, b.Set(ctx, "frac", []byte("v"), 1999*time.Millisecond))
+		_, ttl, ok, err := b.Get(ctx, "frac")
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, ok)
+		require.Greater(t, ttl, time.Second, "1999ms ttl must not be stored as 1s")
+	})
+	t.Run("fractional seconds SetMany", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, b.SetMany(ctx, map[string][]byte{"frac-many": []byte("v")}, 1999*time.Millisecond))
+		_, ttl, ok, err := b.Get(ctx, "frac-many")
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, ok)
+		require.Greater(t, ttl, time.Second)
+	})
+	t.Run("whole seconds still work", func(t *testing.T) {
+		require.NoError(t, b.Set(ctx, "whole", []byte("v"), 5*time.Second))
+		_, ttl, ok, err := b.Get(ctx, "whole")
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, ok)
+		require.Greater(t, ttl, 3*time.Second)
+	})
+}

internal/cache/resilience/circuit_breaker.go

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ type CircuitBreaker struct {
 	stateMu             sync.RWMutex
 	timeMu              sync.RWMutex
 	halfOpenRequests    atomic.Int32
+	halfOpenSuccesses   atomic.Int32
 	consecutiveFailures atomic.Int32
 	state               atomic.Int32
 }
@@ -170,12 +171,12 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) RecordSuccess() {
 
 	case StateHalfOpen:
 		// If we've had enough successful requests, close the circuit
-		successfulRequests := cb.halfOpenRequests.Load()
+		successfulRequests := cb.halfOpenSuccesses.Add(1)
-		// #nosec G115 -- HalfOpenMaxRequests is a small config value that fits in int32
+		if int64(successfulRequests) >= int64(cb.config.HalfOpenMaxRequests) {
-		if successfulRequests >= int32(cb.config.HalfOpenMaxRequests) {
 			cb.setState(StateClosed)
 			cb.consecutiveFailures.Store(0)
 			cb.halfOpenRequests.Store(0)
+			cb.halfOpenSuccesses.Store(0)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) RecordFailure() {
 func (cb *CircuitBreaker) openCircuit() {
 	cb.setState(StateOpen)
 	cb.halfOpenRequests.Store(0)
+	cb.halfOpenSuccesses.Store(0)
 
 	cb.timeMu.Lock()
 	cb.nextRetryTime = time.Now().Add(cb.config.Timeout)
@@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Reset() {
 	cb.totalRequests.Store(0)
 	cb.totalFailures.Store(0)
 	cb.halfOpenRequests.Store(0)
+	cb.halfOpenSuccesses.Store(0)
 	cb.rejectedRequests.Store(0)
 	cb.stateTransitions.Store(0)
 

internal/cache/resilience/health_check_backend.go

@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ func (h *HealthCheckBackend) IsHealthy() bool {
 func (h *HealthCheckBackend) recordResult(success bool) {
 	// #nosec G115 -- threshold config values are small integers that fit in int32
 	if success {
-		fails := h.consecutiveFails.Swap(0)
+		h.consecutiveFails.Store(0)
 		oks := h.consecutiveOK.Add(1)
 
-		// Check if we should transition to healthy
+		// Promote on a success streak. Keyed on the status, not on the fail
-		if fails > 0 && oks >= int32(h.config.HealthyThreshold) {
+		// counter, which the first success of the streak already zeroed.
+		if HealthStatus(h.status.Load()) != HealthHealthy && oks >= int32(h.config.HealthyThreshold) {
 			oldStatus := HealthStatus(h.status.Swap(int32(HealthHealthy)))
 			if oldStatus != HealthHealthy && h.config.OnStatusChange != nil {
 				h.config.OnStatusChange(oldStatus, HealthHealthy)

internal/cache/resilience/recovery_bounds_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package resilience
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// With HealthyThreshold >= 2 an Unhealthy backend must recover once it
+// answers HealthyThreshold times in a row.
+func TestHealthCheckRecoversWithThresholdTwo(t *testing.T) {
+	h := &HealthCheckBackend{config: &HealthCheckConfig{HealthyThreshold: 2, UnhealthyThreshold: 3}}
+	for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
+		h.recordResult(false)
+	}
+	if HealthStatus(h.status.Load()) != HealthUnhealthy {
+		t.Fatalf("precondition: status=%v, want unhealthy", HealthStatus(h.status.Load()))
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
+		h.recordResult(true)
+	}
+	if got := HealthStatus(h.status.Load()); got != HealthHealthy {
+		t.Fatalf("status after 5 successes = %v, want healthy", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// Half-open closes after HalfOpenMaxRequests successes, not admissions.
+func TestHalfOpenClosesOnSuccessesNotAdmissions(t *testing.T) {
+	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(&CircuitBreakerConfig{
+		MaxFailures: 1, Timeout: time.Millisecond, HalfOpenMaxRequests: 3, ResetTimeout: time.Second,
+	})
+	cb.RecordFailure()
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		if !cb.AllowRequest() {
+			t.Fatalf("probe %d rejected", i)
+		}
+	}
+	cb.RecordSuccess()
+	if cb.GetState() != StateHalfOpen {
+		t.Fatalf("closed after 1 of 3 probe successes; state=%v", cb.GetState())
+	}
+	cb.RecordFailure()
+	if cb.GetState() != StateOpen {
+		t.Fatalf("a failing probe must reopen; state=%v", cb.GetState())
+	}
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		cb.AllowRequest()
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		cb.RecordSuccess()
+	}
+	if cb.GetState() != StateClosed {
+		t.Fatalf("state after 3 successes = %v, want closed", cb.GetState())
+	}
+}

internal/recovery/circuit_breaker.go

@@ -93,8 +93,16 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) ExecuteWithContext(ctx context.Context, fn func() erro
 		return fmt.Errorf("circuit breaker is open")
 	}
 
-	// Execute the function
+	// A panicking fn must still settle the breaker, otherwise a half-open
+	// probe slot leaks until the next open->half-open transition.
+	panicked := true
+	defer func() {
+		if panicked {
+			cb.recordFailure()
+		}
+	}()
 	err := fn()
+	panicked = false
 
 	if err != nil {
 		cb.recordFailure()

internal/recovery/hunt_20261015_regression_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package recovery
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestCircuitBreaker_PanickingProbeReleasesHalfOpenSlot(t *testing.T) {
+	cb := NewCircuitBreaker(CircuitBreakerConfig{
+		FailureThreshold: 1,
+		SuccessThreshold: 1,
+		Timeout:          20 * time.Millisecond,
+		MaxRequests:      1,
+	}, &mockLogger{})
+
+	_ = cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { return errors.New("fail") })
+	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	func() {
+		defer func() {
+			if recover() == nil {
+				t.Error("panic must still propagate to the caller")
+			}
+		}()
+		_ = cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { panic("boom") })
+	}()
+
+	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerOpen {
+		t.Fatalf("state after panicking probe = %s, want open", cb.GetState())
+	}
+	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
+	if err := cb.ExecuteWithContext(context.Background(), func() error { return nil }); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("probe after next timeout rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cb.GetState() != CircuitBreakerClosed {
+		t.Fatalf("state = %s, want closed", cb.GetState())
+	}
+}

internal/utils/utils.go

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func DetermineScheme(req *http.Request, forceHTTPS bool) string {
 	// "X-Forwarded-Proto: ftp") would otherwise be emitted verbatim into
 	// redirect_uri as a broken or weakened scheme. Invalid values fall
 	// through to the TLS check (R103).
-	if scheme := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); scheme == "https" || scheme == "http" {
+	if scheme := strings.ToLower(req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")); scheme == "https" || scheme == "http" {
 		return scheme
 	}
 

jwk.go

@@ -389,6 +389,13 @@ func (c *JWKCache) getPublicKeyFresh(ctx context.Context, jwksURL, kid string, h
 
 	if withinCooldown {
 		// Serve the cached keyset; do not fetch upstream again.
+		if v, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL + parsedKeysSuffix); found {
+			if pj, ok := v.(*parsedJWKS); ok {
+				if k, ok := pj.keys[kid]; ok {
+					return k, nil
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		if cached, found := c.cache.GetLocal(jwksURL); found {
 			if jwks, ok := cached.(*JWKSet); ok {
 				if k, ok := buildParsedJWKS(jwks).keys[kid]; ok {

jwt.go

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ import (
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
 	"crypto/rsa"
 	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"math"
 	"math/big"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -194,11 +196,16 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, expectedAudience string) error {
 //
 // Returns:
 //   - An error if the claim type is invalid or the expected audience is not present
+//
+// errInvalidAudience marks a token whose aud does not match; callers match it
+// with errors.Is, never by message text.
+var errInvalidAudience = errors.New("invalid audience")
+
 func verifyAudience(tokenAudience interface{}, expectedAudience string) error {
 	switch aud := tokenAudience.(type) {
 	case string:
 		if aud != expectedAudience {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
+			return errInvalidAudience
 		}
 	case []interface{}:
 		found := false
@@ -209,7 +216,7 @@ func verifyAudience(tokenAudience interface{}, expectedAudience string) error {
 			}
 		}
 		if !found {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
+			return errInvalidAudience
 		}
 	default:
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid 'aud' claim type")
@@ -231,6 +238,9 @@ func verifyIssuer(tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// maxClaimUnix is 9999-12-31T23:59:59Z, the largest time claim accepted.
+const maxClaimUnix = 253402300799
+
 // verifyTimeConstraint validates time-based JWT claims with clock skew tolerance.
 // It handles both future constraints (exp) and past constraints (iat, nbf).
 // Parameters:
@@ -241,6 +251,10 @@ func verifyIssuer(tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer string) error {
 // Returns:
 //   - An error describing the failure (e.g., "token has expired", "token used before issued")
 func verifyTimeConstraint(unixTime float64, claimName string, future bool) error {
+	// int64(float64) wraps out of range, which put a far-future nbf/iat in the past.
+	if math.IsNaN(unixTime) || math.IsInf(unixTime, 0) || math.Abs(unixTime) > maxClaimUnix {
+		return fmt.Errorf("token %s claim out of range", claimName)
+	}
 	claimTime := time.Unix(int64(unixTime), 0)
 	now := time.Now()
 
@@ -314,6 +328,9 @@ func verifyTimeClaims(claims map[string]interface{}) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// ecdsaAlgBits maps an ES* algorithm to its curve size (RFC 7518 3.4).
+var ecdsaAlgBits = map[string]int{"ES256": 256, "ES384": 384, "ES512": 521}
+
 // verifySignatureWithKey verifies a JWT signature using an already-parsed
 // public key, skipping the PEM-encode/decode round trip. This is the hot
 // path used by VerifyJWTSignatureAndClaims and verifyLogoutTokenSignature.
@@ -361,7 +378,13 @@ func verifySignatureWithKey(tokenString string, pubKey crypto.PublicKey, alg str
 		if strings.HasPrefix(alg, "ES") {
 			var r, s big.Int
 			sigLen := len(signature)
-			if sigLen%2 != 0 {
+			// RFC 7518 3.4: the curve is fixed by the algorithm and the
+			// signature is R||S at exactly the curve's octet length.
+			bits := ecdsaAlgBits[alg]
+			if bits == 0 || pubKey.Curve.Params().BitSize != bits {
+				return fmt.Errorf("ECDSA key curve does not match algorithm %s", alg)
+			}
+			if sigLen != 2*((bits+7)/8) {
 				return fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA signature length")
 			}
 			r.SetBytes(signature[:sigLen/2])

jwt_ecdsa_strict_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func signES(t *testing.T, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey, signed string, h256 bool, size int) (sigRS []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var digest []byte
+	if h256 {
+		d := sha256.Sum256([]byte(signed))
+		digest = d[:]
+	} else {
+		d := sha512.Sum384([]byte(signed))
+		digest = d[:]
+	}
+	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, 2*size)
+	r.FillBytes(out[:size])
+	s.FillBytes(out[size:])
+	return out
+}
+
+func TestECDSAVerifyIsStrict(t *testing.T) {
+	const signed = "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1In0"
+	enc := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString
+	p256, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	p384, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
+
+	if err := verifySignatureWithKey(signed+"."+enc(signES(t, p256, signed, true, 32)), &p256.PublicKey, "ES256"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid ES256 rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := verifySignatureWithKey(signed+"."+enc(signES(t, p384, signed, false, 48)), &p384.PublicKey, "ES384"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("valid ES384 rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+	// ES256 token verified against a P-384 key.
+	if err := verifySignatureWithKey(signed+"."+enc(signES(t, p384, signed, true, 48)), &p384.PublicKey, "ES256"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("ES256 accepted with a P-384 key")
+	}
+	// Zero-padded halves: 66 bytes for ES256.
+	if err := verifySignatureWithKey(signed+"."+enc(signES(t, p256, signed, true, 33)), &p256.PublicKey, "ES256"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("ES256 accepted a 66-byte signature")
+	}
+}

logout.go

@@ -51,8 +51,43 @@ const (
 	// sessionInvalidationTTL is how long to remember invalidated sessions
 	// Should be at least as long as your session max age
 	sessionInvalidationTTL = 25 * time.Hour
+
+	// maxFrontchannelMarkers caps the sid markers the unauthenticated
+	// front-channel endpoint may keep in the shared invalidation cache, so
+	// a flood cannot LRU-evict signed backchannel and jti replay markers.
+	maxFrontchannelMarkers = 1000
 )
 
+// markerQuota is a FIFO of cache keys written on behalf of one untrusted
+// source. The zero value is ready to use.
+type markerQuota struct {
+	set  map[string]struct{}
+	keys []string
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+}
+
+// admit records key and returns the oldest key to drop once more than limit
+// keys are held, or "" when none must go. Re-admitting a held key is a no-op.
+func (q *markerQuota) admit(key string, limit int) string {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+	if q.set == nil {
+		q.set = make(map[string]struct{})
+	}
+	if _, ok := q.set[key]; ok {
+		return ""
+	}
+	q.set[key] = struct{}{}
+	q.keys = append(q.keys, key)
+	if len(q.keys) <= limit {
+		return ""
+	}
+	oldest := q.keys[0]
+	q.keys = q.keys[1:]
+	delete(q.set, oldest)
+	return oldest
+}
+
 // LogoutTokenClaims represents the claims in an OIDC logout token
 // as defined in OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0
 type LogoutTokenClaims struct {
@@ -191,6 +226,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleFrontchannelLogout(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http
 		return
 	}
 
+	if evicted := t.frontchannelMarkers.admit(t.buildSessionInvalidationKey("sid", sid), maxFrontchannelMarkers); evicted != "" {
+		t.sessionInvalidationCache.Delete(evicted)
+	}
+
 	t.logger.Infof("Front-channel logout: successfully invalidated session (sid=%s)", sid)
 
 	// Return a minimal HTML response that's suitable for iframe loading
@@ -578,6 +617,11 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) isSessionInvalidated(sid, sub string, sessionCreatedAt tim
 
 // buildSessionInvalidationKey creates a cache key for session invalidation
 func (t *TraefikOidc) buildSessionInvalidationKey(keyType, value string) string {
+	// sub, sid and jti are unique only within an issuer; the cache is shared by
+	// every instance, so scope the key to this instance's provider and client.
+	if ns := t.tokenCache.Namespace(); ns != "" {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("session_invalidation:%s|%s:%s", ns, keyType, value)
+	}
 	return fmt.Sprintf("session_invalidation:%s:%s", keyType, value)
 }
 
@@ -600,6 +644,22 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation(idToken string, session *S
 	return time.Time{} // zero: treated as invalidated -> safe re-auth
 }
 
+// invalidationInputs returns sid, sub and the creation time for the IdP-logout
+// check from one parseJWT call, with the same results as extractSessionInfo
+// and sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation called separately.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) invalidationInputs(idToken string, session *SessionData) (sid, sub string, createdAt time.Time) {
+	jwt, err := parseJWT(idToken)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", t.sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation("", session)
+	}
+	sid, _ = jwt.Claims["sid"].(string)
+	sub, _ = jwt.Claims["sub"].(string)
+	if iat, ok := jwt.Claims["iat"].(float64); ok {
+		return sid, sub, time.Unix(int64(iat), 0)
+	}
+	return sid, sub, t.sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation("", session)
+}
+
 // extractSessionInfo extracts sid and sub from an ID token for session tracking
 func (t *TraefikOidc) extractSessionInfo(idToken string) (sid, sub string, createdAt time.Time) {
 	if idToken == "" {

logout_invalidation_inputs_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
+)
+
+// invalidationInputs must return exactly what extractSessionInfo and
+// sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation return when called separately.
+func TestInvalidationInputsMatchSeparateCalls(t *testing.T) {
+	oidc := &TraefikOidc{logger: newNoOpLogger()}
+	sess := &SessionData{mainSession: &sessions.Session{Values: map[interface{}]interface{}{"created_at": int64(1700000000)}}}
+
+	tokens := map[string]string{
+		"all claims":  makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sid": "s1", "sub": "u1", "iat": float64(1700000100)}),
+		"no iat":      makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sid": "s1", "sub": "u1"}),
+		"sid only":    makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sid": "s1", "iat": float64(1700000200)}),
+		"sub only":    makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "u1"}),
+		"wrong types": makeTestJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sid": 5, "sub": true, "iat": "x"}),
+		"malformed":   "not-a-jwt",
+		"empty":       "",
+	}
+	for name, tok := range tokens {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			wantSID, wantSub, _ := oidc.extractSessionInfo(tok)
+			wantAt := oidc.sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation(tok, sess)
+			gotSID, gotSub, gotAt := oidc.invalidationInputs(tok, sess)
+			if gotSID != wantSID || gotSub != wantSub || !gotAt.Equal(wantAt) {
+				t.Fatalf("got (%q,%q,%v) want (%q,%q,%v)", gotSID, gotSub, gotAt, wantSID, wantSub, wantAt)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

logout_key_scope_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestSessionInvalidationKeyScopedPerInstance(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &TraefikOidc{tokenCache: &TokenCache{}}
+	b := &TraefikOidc{tokenCache: &TokenCache{}}
+	a.tokenCache.SetNamespace("https://kc/realms/a|c|c")
+	b.tokenCache.SetNamespace("https://kc/realms/b|c|c")
+	for _, kind := range []string{"sub", "sid", "jti"} {
+		if a.buildSessionInvalidationKey(kind, "u1") == b.buildSessionInvalidationKey(kind, "u1") {
+			t.Errorf("%s key shared across issuers", kind)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := (&TraefikOidc{}).buildSessionInvalidationKey("sub", "u1"); got != "session_invalidation:sub:u1" {
+		t.Errorf("namespace-less key changed: %q", got)
+	}
+}

main.go

@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 	logger.Debugf("TraefikOidc.New: logoutURLPath configured as: %q", t.logoutURLPath)
 
 	t.providerURL = config.ProviderURL
+	t.tokenCache.SetNamespace(t.tokenCacheNamespace())
 
 	// Use singleton resource manager for metadata initialization
 	rm := GetResourceManager()
@@ -944,6 +945,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) performDynamicClientRegistration() {
 	if t.audience == "" {
 		t.audience = resp.ClientID // Default audience to client ID
 	}
+	t.tokenCache.SetNamespace(t.tokenCacheNamespace())
 	// R162: DCR can provision a client whose method is private_key_jwt
 	// (RFC 7591 ClientMetadata.TokenEndpointAuthMethod) even when the
 	// static config did not set ClientAuthMethod=private_key_jwt. In that
@@ -1083,3 +1085,8 @@ func buildFullURL(scheme, host, path string) string {
 
 	return fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s%s", scheme, host, path)
 }
+
+// tokenCacheNamespace identifies the verification context of this instance.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) tokenCacheNamespace() string {
+	return t.providerURL + "|" + t.clientID + "|" + t.audience
+}

middleware.go

@@ -158,6 +158,15 @@ func (w *optionsPreflightWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
 	return len(b), nil
 }
 
+const (
+	// maxInitWaiters bounds requests parked on initComplete so a boot-time
+	// flood with the IdP down cannot hold unbounded connections for 30s each.
+	maxInitWaiters = 512
+	// initWaitRetryAfter is the Retry-After value (seconds) sent when the
+	// init-wait queue is full.
+	initWaitRetryAfter = "5"
+)
+
 // bypassReason describes why a request is being forwarded without OIDC auth.
 // It is only used for logging and to decide whether extra side-effects
 // (propagating the user header from an existing session) should run.
@@ -701,6 +710,13 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	// Log waiting for initialization to help diagnose hanging requests
 	t.logger.Debug("Waiting for OIDC provider initialization...")
 
+	if atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, 1) > maxInitWaiters {
+		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
+		rw.Header().Set("Retry-After", initWaitRetryAfter)
+		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "OIDC provider initialization in progress - please try again later", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+		return
+	}
+
 	// time.NewTimer + Stop avoids leaking a goroutine+channel for 30s on every
 	// request when initComplete fires quickly (would happen with time.After).
 	initTimer := time.NewTimer(30 * time.Second)
@@ -708,6 +724,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 
 	select {
 	case <-t.initComplete:
+		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
 		// Read issuerURL via atomic snapshot when available — replaces the
 		// metadataMu.RLock that previously fired on every non-bypass request.
 		// Under Yaegi each RLock acquisition costs 1-5ms of interpreter
@@ -744,10 +761,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 			return
 		}
 	case <-req.Context().Done():
+		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
 		t.logger.Debug("Request canceled while waiting for OIDC initialization")
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Request canceled", http.StatusRequestTimeout)
 		return
 	case <-initTimer.C:
+		atomic.AddInt32(&t.initWaiters, -1)
 		t.logger.Error("Timeout waiting for OIDC initialization")
 		t.sendErrorResponse(rw, req, "Timeout waiting for OIDC provider initialization - please try again later", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
 		return
@@ -1035,8 +1054,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) processAuthorizedRequestRS(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *ht
 	idToken := rs.idToken
 	if t.enableBackchannelLogout || t.enableFrontchannelLogout {
 		if idToken != "" {
-			sid, sub, _ := t.extractSessionInfo(idToken)
+			sid, sub, createdAt := t.invalidationInputs(idToken, session)
-			createdAt := t.sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation(idToken, session)
 			if t.isSessionInvalidated(sid, sub, createdAt) {
 				t.logger.Infof("Session for user %s has been invalidated via IdP-initiated logout", userIdentifier)
 				if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
@@ -1128,8 +1146,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) processAuthorizedRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http
 	if t.enableBackchannelLogout || t.enableFrontchannelLogout {
 		idToken := session.GetIDToken()
 		if idToken != "" {
-			sid, sub, _ := t.extractSessionInfo(idToken)
+			sid, sub, createdAt := t.invalidationInputs(idToken, session)
-			createdAt := t.sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation(idToken, session)
 			if t.isSessionInvalidated(sid, sub, createdAt) {
 				t.logger.Infof("Session for user %s has been invalidated via IdP-initiated logout", userIdentifier)
 				// Clear the session and redirect to login
@@ -1324,6 +1341,23 @@ func joinBoundedClaimHeader(values []string) string {
 	return b.String()
 }
 
+// dropInboundTemplated removes a client-supplied value for a header the
+// middleware owns, so a skipped render leaves it absent instead of forwarding
+// the client's. Identity headers (already stripped and re-injected) and
+// Authorization (the inbound bearer credential) are left alone.
+func dropInboundTemplated(req *http.Request, name string) {
+	canon := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)
+	if canon == "Authorization" {
+		return
+	}
+	for _, h := range identityHeaders {
+		if canon == http.CanonicalHeaderKey(h) {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	req.Header.Del(canon)
+}
+
 // applyHeaderTemplates renders the configured header templates for p onto req.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) applyHeaderTemplates(req *http.Request, p *principal) {
 	if len(t.headerTemplates) == 0 {
@@ -1342,6 +1376,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) applyHeaderTemplates(req *http.Request, p *principal) {
 	}
 
 	for headerName, tmpl := range t.headerTemplates {
+		dropInboundTemplated(req, headerName)
 		var buf bytes.Buffer
 		if err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, templateData); err != nil {
 			t.logger.Errorf("Failed to execute template for header %s: %v", headerName, err)

per_source_ratelimit.go

@@ -62,10 +62,11 @@ func (l *perSourceAuthLimiter) allow(req *http.Request) bool {
 	if now.Sub(l.lastSweep) >= time.Minute {
 		l.sweep(now)
 	}
-	e := l.entries[ip]
+	key := limiterKey(ip)
+	e := l.entries[key]
 	if e == nil {
 		e = &perSourceAuthEntry{limiter: rate.NewLimiter(l.limit, l.burst)}
-		l.entries[ip] = e
+		l.entries[key] = e
 	}
 	e.lastSeen = now
 	return e.limiter.Allow()
@@ -115,3 +116,19 @@ func isInternalSource(ip string) bool {
 	return p.IsLoopback() || p.IsPrivate() || p.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
 		p.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || p.IsUnspecified()
 }
+
+// ipv6PrefixBits is the IPv6 prefix that shares one bucket: a host holds a
+// whole /64, so per-address keys would give it 2^64 buckets.
+const ipv6PrefixBits = 64
+
+// limiterKey maps a source IP to its bucket key (IPv6 collapses to its /64).
+func limiterKey(ip string) string {
+	p := net.ParseIP(ip)
+	if p == nil {
+		return ip
+	}
+	if p.To4() != nil {
+		return p.String()
+	}
+	return (&net.IPNet{IP: p.Mask(net.CIDRMask(ipv6PrefixBits, 128)), Mask: net.CIDRMask(ipv6PrefixBits, 128)}).String()
+}

per_source_ratelimit_ipv6_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// An IPv6 /64 holder must share one bucket; per-address keys let one host
+// mint 2^64 buckets and bypass the throttle.
+func TestPerSourceLimiter_IPv6SamePrefixSharesBucket(t *testing.T) {
+	const burst = 3
+	l := newPerSourceAuthLimiter(burst)
+	allowed := 0
+	for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = fmt.Sprintf("[2001:db8:1:2::%x]:1234", i+1)
+		if l.allow(req) {
+			allowed++
+		}
+	}
+	if allowed > burst {
+		t.Fatalf("one /64 got %d allows, want <= %d", allowed, burst)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerSourceLimiter_IPv6DifferentPrefixIndependent(t *testing.T) {
+	l := newPerSourceAuthLimiter(1)
+	a := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+	a.RemoteAddr = "[2001:db8:1:2::1]:1"
+	b := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+	b.RemoteAddr = "[2001:db8:1:3::1]:1"
+	if !l.allow(a) || !l.allow(b) {
+		t.Fatal("distinct /64 prefixes must have independent buckets")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLimiterKey(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := map[string]string{
+		"192.0.2.1":        "192.0.2.1",
+		"2001:db8:1:2::9":  "2001:db8:1:2::/64",
+		"::ffff:192.0.2.1": "192.0.2.1",
+	}
+	for in, want := range cases {
+		if got := limiterKey(in); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("limiterKey(%q)=%q want %q", in, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

refresh_cleanup_chunktrim_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
+)
+
+// Cleanup must not evict a tracker whose cooldown is still running.
+func TestRefreshCleanupKeepsTrackerInCooldown(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultRefreshCoordinatorConfig()
+	cfg.MaxRefreshAttempts = 2
+	cfg.RefreshAttemptWindow = 20 * time.Millisecond
+	cfg.RefreshCooldownPeriod = time.Hour
+	rc := NewRefreshCoordinator(cfg, GetSingletonNoOpLogger())
+	defer rc.Shutdown()
+
+	rc.recordRefreshAttempt("s")
+	rc.recordRefreshAttempt("s")
+	if !rc.isInCooldown("s") {
+		t.Fatal("precondition: session must enter cooldown")
+	}
+	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
+	rc.cleanupStaleEntries()
+	if !rc.isInCooldown("s") {
+		t.Fatal("cleanup evicted a tracker still in cooldown")
+	}
+}
+
+// Stale chunks above token_total must be dropped by key, even when the key
+// set is sparse.
+func TestChunkTrimDropsStaleSparseKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	cm := NewChunkManager(newNoOpLogger())
+	mk := func(s string, total interface{}) *sessions.Session {
+		v := map[interface{}]interface{}{"token_chunk": s}
+		if total != nil {
+			v["token_total"] = total
+		}
+		return &sessions.Session{Values: v}
+	}
+	chunks := map[int]*sessions.Session{
+		0: mk("Zq8xK2mP", 3), 1: mk("r7TnB4wY", nil), 2: mk("c9LdG5sH", nil), 7: mk("stale", nil),
+	}
+	res := cm.processChunkedToken(chunks, RefreshTokenConfig)
+	if res.Error != nil || res.Token != "Zq8xK2mPr7TnB4wYc9LdG5sH" {
+		t.Fatalf("token=%q err=%v, want Zq8xK2mPr7TnB4wYc9LdG5sH", res.Token, res.Error)
+	}
+}

refresh_coordinator.go

@@ -672,7 +672,6 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) isInCooldown(sessionID string) bool {
 			}
 			return &attemptState{
 				windowStartNano: nowNano,
-				attempts:        1,
 			}
 		})
 		return false
@@ -686,7 +685,7 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) isInCooldown(sessionID string) bool {
 			}
 			next := *s
 			next.windowStartNano = nowNano
-			next.attempts = 1
+			next.attempts = 0
 			return &next
 		})
 		return false
@@ -824,13 +823,16 @@ func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) cleanupRoutine() {
 // cleanupStaleEntries removes outdated tracking entries. Lock-free iteration
 // via sync.Map.Range; safe to race with concurrent reads/writes.
 func (rc *RefreshCoordinator) cleanupStaleEntries() {
-	cutoff := time.Now().Add(-2 * rc.config.RefreshAttemptWindow).UnixNano()
+	now := time.Now()
+	cutoff := now.Add(-2 * rc.config.RefreshAttemptWindow).UnixNano()
+	nowNano := now.UnixNano()
 	rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.Range(func(key, value interface{}) bool {
 		tracker := trackerFromMapValue(value)
 		if tracker == nil {
 			return true
 		}
-		if tracker.stateOf().lastAttemptNano < cutoff {
+		st := tracker.stateOf()
+		if st.lastAttemptNano < cutoff && st.cooldownEndNano <= nowNano {
 			// Compare-and-delete to avoid evicting a tracker that was just
 			// re-used by a concurrent caller. We compare by pointer identity.
 			rc.sessionRefreshAttempts.CompareAndDelete(key, value)
@@ -939,20 +941,28 @@ func (cb *RefreshCircuitBreaker) AllowRequest() bool {
 		return true
 	case 1: // open
 		lastFail := atomic.LoadInt64(&cb.lastFailureNano)
-		if time.Duration(time.Now().UnixNano()-lastFail) > cb.config.OpenDuration {
+		return cb.claimProbe(lastFail)
-			// Transition to half-open; first CAS winner gets the probe.
+	case 2: // half-open: one probe at a time; a stale probe is replaced
-			if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&cb.state, 1, 2) {
+		return cb.claimProbe(atomic.LoadInt64(&cb.lastFailureNano))
-				return true
-			}
-		}
-		return false
-	case 2: // half-open
-		return true
 	default:
 		return false
 	}
 }
 
+// claimProbe admits one probe when OpenDuration has passed since lastFail.
+// The CAS on lastFailureNano makes the claim exclusive and restarts the clock.
+func (cb *RefreshCircuitBreaker) claimProbe(lastFail int64) bool {
+	now := time.Now().UnixNano()
+	if time.Duration(now-lastFail) <= cb.config.OpenDuration {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !atomic.CompareAndSwapInt64(&cb.lastFailureNano, lastFail, now) {
+		return false
+	}
+	atomic.StoreInt32(&cb.state, 2)
+	return true
+}
+
 // RecordSuccess records a successful operation. Lock-free.
 func (cb *RefreshCircuitBreaker) RecordSuccess() {
 	switch atomic.LoadInt32(&cb.state) {

refresh_window_halfopen_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// After a window reset the tracker must allow the full MaxRefreshAttempts,
+// the same as a fresh tracker.
+func TestRefreshWindowResetAllowsFullQuota(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultRefreshCoordinatorConfig()
+	cfg.MaxRefreshAttempts = 3
+	cfg.RefreshAttemptWindow = 50 * time.Millisecond
+	cfg.RefreshCooldownPeriod = time.Hour
+	rc := NewRefreshCoordinator(cfg, GetSingletonNoOpLogger())
+	defer rc.Shutdown()
+
+	pass := func() int {
+		n := 0
+		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+			if rc.isInCooldown("s") {
+				break
+			}
+			rc.recordRefreshAttempt("s")
+			n++
+		}
+		return n
+	}
+	if got := pass(); got != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("fresh window passes=%d want 3", got)
+	}
+	// Window expiry alone cannot reset while in cooldown, so use a new
+	// session that never hits the cap: record 1, wait out the window.
+	rc.recordRefreshAttempt("w")
+	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
+	n := 0
+	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+		if rc.isInCooldown("w") {
+			break
+		}
+		rc.recordRefreshAttempt("w")
+		n++
+	}
+	if n != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("post-reset window passes=%d want 3", n)
+	}
+}
+
+// Half-open admits a single probe until it reports.
+func TestRefreshBreakerHalfOpenSingleProbe(t *testing.T) {
+	cb := &RefreshCircuitBreaker{config: RefreshCircuitBreakerConfig{
+		MaxFailures: 1, OpenDuration: 20 * time.Millisecond, HalfOpenRequests: 1,
+	}}
+	cb.RecordFailure()
+	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
+	var admitted int32
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			if cb.AllowRequest() {
+				atomic.AddInt32(&admitted, 1)
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	if admitted != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("half-open admitted %d, want 1", admitted)
+	}
+	cb.RecordSuccess()
+	if !cb.AllowRequest() {
+		t.Fatal("breaker must close after probe success")
+	}
+}
+
+// A probe that never reports must not wedge the breaker.
+func TestRefreshBreakerHalfOpenProbeTimeout(t *testing.T) {
+	cb := &RefreshCircuitBreaker{config: RefreshCircuitBreakerConfig{
+		MaxFailures: 1, OpenDuration: 20 * time.Millisecond, HalfOpenRequests: 1,
+	}}
+	cb.RecordFailure()
+	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
+	if !cb.AllowRequest() || cb.AllowRequest() {
+		t.Fatal("want exactly one probe")
+	}
+	time.Sleep(40 * time.Millisecond)
+	if !cb.AllowRequest() {
+		t.Fatal("stale probe must allow a new one")
+	}
+}

session.go

@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ const (
 	defaultCookiePrefix  = "_oidc_raczylo_"
 )
 
+// maxCleanupCookies bounds the cookie names CleanupOldCookies emits deletion
+// headers for per response (up to 4 Set-Cookie headers each).
+const maxCleanupCookies = 32
+
 const (
 	// maxCookieSize is the maximum raw data size per chunk before securecookie encoding.
 	//
@@ -937,6 +941,9 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) EnhanceSessionSecurity(options *sessions.Options, r *h
 			// service). Keep it unless it is a strict parent of the serving
 			// host, which would scope the token-bearing cookie to sibling
 			// subdomains — then fall back to the serving host.
+			// DNS names and the cookie Domain attribute are case-insensitive.
+			host = strings.ToLower(host)
+			fh = strings.ToLower(fh)
 			if !strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+fh) {
 				host = fh
 			}
@@ -1024,6 +1031,7 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) CleanupOldCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	}
 
 	processedCookies := make(map[string]bool)
+	deletedCookies := 0
 
 	for _, cookie := range cookies {
 		// Check if cookie belongs to this middleware instance using the configured prefix
@@ -1037,7 +1045,8 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) CleanupOldCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 			shouldCleanup := currentDomain != "" && !sm.cleanupDone
 			sm.cleanupMutex.RUnlock()
 
-			if shouldCleanup {
+			if shouldCleanup && deletedCookies < maxCleanupCookies {
+				deletedCookies++
 				for _, domain := range domainsToClean {
 					if domain == currentDomain || domain == "."+currentDomain || "."+domain == currentDomain {
 						continue
@@ -2293,6 +2302,13 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
 			return
 		}
 
+		// Chunk cookies bind to the request; without one the store cannot
+		// complete, so keep the previous token.
+		if sd.request == nil {
+			sd.manager.logger.Error("SetAccessToken: sd.request is nil, cannot create chunk sessions")
+			return
+		}
+
 		// Validation passed: now it is safe to clear the existing token
 		// before storing the new chunked one.
 		sd.clearAccessTokenChunks()
@@ -2928,6 +2944,9 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetIncomingPath() string {
 	return path
 }
 
+// maxIncomingPathLen bounds the post-login redirect path kept in the session.
+const maxIncomingPathLen = 2048
+
 // SetIncomingPath stores the original request URI for post-authentication redirect.
 // This allows the user to be redirected to their originally requested resource
 // after completing the authentication flow.
@@ -2936,6 +2955,11 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetIncomingPath() string {
 func (sd *SessionData) SetIncomingPath(path string) {
 	sd.sessionMutex.Lock()
 	defer sd.sessionMutex.Unlock()
+	// The path becomes cookie bytes on every later request; an oversized one
+	// would bloat the Cookie header or fail the save. Fall back to "/".
+	if len(path) > maxIncomingPathLen {
+		path = ""
+	}
 	currentVal, _ := sd.mainSession.Values["incoming_path"].(string)
 	if currentVal != path {
 		sd.mainSession.Values["incoming_path"] = path

session_access_token_nilrequest_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// A chunked store that cannot run (no request to bind chunk cookies to) must
+// leave the previous access token intact.
+func TestSetAccessTokenNilRequestKeepsOldToken(t *testing.T) {
+	sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, "", "", 0, NewLogger("error"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sess, err := sm.GetSession(httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(sess.returnToPoolSafely)
+
+	const old = "smallaccesstokenvaluevaluevalue"
+	sess.SetAccessToken(old)
+
+	blob := make([]byte, 3000)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(blob); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sess.request = nil
+	sess.SetAccessToken(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(blob))
+
+	if got := sess.GetAccessToken(); got != old {
+		t.Fatalf("old access token lost after a failed chunked store: %q", got)
+	}
+}

session_chunk_manager.go

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ type TokenConfig struct {
 // Global session tracking to prevent memory leaks across all instances
 var (
 	globalSessionCount int64 = 0
-	globalMaxSessions  int64 = 5000 // CRITICAL FIX: Global limit of 5000 total sessions
 )
 
 // ResetGlobalSessionCounters resets global session tracking for testing
@@ -445,9 +444,10 @@ func (cm *ChunkManager) processChunkedToken(chunks map[int]*sessions.Session, co
 				// not clear cookies above n). token_total is the authoritative
 				// count; drop the excess rather than failing — which forced a
 				// re-auth and discarded the still-valid new token (R129).
-				n := len(chunks)
+				for i := range chunks {
-				for i := total; i < n; i++ {
+					if i >= total {
-					delete(chunks, i)
+						delete(chunks, i)
+					}
 				}
 			}
 			if len(chunks) < total {
@@ -1242,226 +1242,4 @@ func (cm *ChunkManager) CleanupExpiredSessions(force ...bool) {
 		cm.logger.Debugf("Cleaned up %d expired sessions, freed %d bytes",
 			len(expiredKeys), totalBytesFreed)
 	}
-
-	// Enforce max sessions limit
-	if len(cm.sessionMap) > cm.maxSessions {
-		cm.enforceSessionLimit()
-	}
-}
-
-// enforceSessionLimit removes oldest sessions when limit is exceeded
-// Uses partial sort (O(n) for finding k smallest) instead of full sort (O(n log n))
-func (cm *ChunkManager) enforceSessionLimit() {
-	currentLocal := len(cm.sessionMap)
-	currentGlobal := atomic.LoadInt64(&globalSessionCount)
-
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Aggressive eviction when approaching limits
-	shouldEvict := false
-	targetCapacity := cm.maxSessions
-
-	// Check global limit first (more critical)
-	if currentGlobal >= globalMaxSessions {
-		shouldEvict = true
-		targetCapacity = cm.maxSessions / 4 // Aggressive reduction to 25%
-	} else if currentGlobal >= globalMaxSessions*8/10 { // 80% of global
-		shouldEvict = true
-		targetCapacity = cm.maxSessions / 2 // Reduce to 50%
-	} else if currentLocal >= cm.maxSessions {
-		shouldEvict = true
-		targetCapacity = cm.maxSessions * 3 / 4 // Reduce to 75%
-	}
-
-	if !shouldEvict {
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Calculate how many sessions to remove
-	excessCount := currentLocal - targetCapacity
-	if excessCount <= 0 {
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Use partial selection instead of full sort for better performance
-	// For finding k oldest sessions, we only need O(n) operations
-	keysToRemove := cm.findOldestSessions(excessCount)
-
-	totalBytesFreed := int64(0)
-	removedCount := int64(0)
-
-	for _, key := range keysToRemove {
-		if entry, exists := cm.sessionMap[key]; exists {
-			totalBytesFreed += entry.SizeEstimate
-			atomic.AddInt64(&cm.bytesAllocated, -entry.SizeEstimate)
-			removedCount++
-		}
-		delete(cm.sessionMap, key)
-	}
-
-	// Update global count
-	if removedCount > 0 {
-		atomic.AddInt64(&globalSessionCount, -removedCount)
-	}
-
-	cm.logger.Infof("Enforced session limit: removed %d excess sessions, freed %d bytes",
-		len(keysToRemove), totalBytesFreed)
-}
-
-// findOldestSessions returns keys of the k oldest sessions efficiently
-// Uses a simple approach: find the kth oldest timestamp, then collect all older entries
-func (cm *ChunkManager) findOldestSessions(k int) []string {
-	if k <= 0 || len(cm.sessionMap) == 0 {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	if k >= len(cm.sessionMap) {
-		// Remove all sessions
-		keys := make([]string, 0, len(cm.sessionMap))
-		for key := range cm.sessionMap {
-			keys = append(keys, key)
-		}
-		return keys
-	}
-
-	// Collect all timestamps with keys
-	type sessionAge struct {
-		lastUsed time.Time
-		key      string
-	}
-
-	sessions := make([]sessionAge, 0, len(cm.sessionMap))
-	for key, entry := range cm.sessionMap {
-		sessions = append(sessions, sessionAge{key: key, lastUsed: entry.LastUsed})
-	}
-
-	// Partial sort: get the k smallest elements using selection
-	// This is O(n*k) which is better than O(n log n) when k << n
-	for i := 0; i < k; i++ {
-		minIdx := i
-		for j := i + 1; j < len(sessions); j++ {
-			if sessions[j].lastUsed.Before(sessions[minIdx].lastUsed) {
-				minIdx = j
-			}
-		}
-		if minIdx != i {
-			sessions[i], sessions[minIdx] = sessions[minIdx], sessions[i]
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Return the k oldest
-	result := make([]string, k)
-	for i := 0; i < k; i++ {
-		result[i] = sessions[i].key
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// CanCreateSession checks if a new session can be created within limits
-func (cm *ChunkManager) CanCreateSession() (bool, error) {
-	cm.mutex.RLock()
-	currentCount := len(cm.sessionMap)
-	cm.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-	// Hard limit check - never exceed maxSessions
-	if currentCount >= cm.maxSessions {
-		cm.logger.Error("Cannot create session: at maximum limit (%d)", cm.maxSessions)
-		return false, fmt.Errorf("session storage at maximum capacity (%d sessions)", cm.maxSessions)
-	}
-
-	// Emergency cleanup at 90% capacity
-	emergencyThreshold := int(float64(cm.maxSessions) * 0.9)
-	if currentCount >= emergencyThreshold {
-		cm.logger.Info("Session storage at %d%% capacity, triggering emergency cleanup",
-			(currentCount*100)/cm.maxSessions)
-		cm.EmergencyCleanup()
-
-		// Recheck after cleanup
-		cm.mutex.RLock()
-		newCount := len(cm.sessionMap)
-		cm.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-		if newCount >= cm.maxSessions {
-			return false, fmt.Errorf("session storage full even after emergency cleanup (%d sessions)", newCount)
-		}
-	}
-
-	return true, nil
-}
-
-// EmergencyCleanup performs aggressive session cleanup when approaching limits
-func (cm *ChunkManager) EmergencyCleanup() {
-	cm.mutex.Lock()
-	defer cm.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	now := time.Now()
-	removed := 0
-
-	// Remove any expired sessions first
-	expiredKeys := make([]string, 0)
-	for key, entry := range cm.sessionMap {
-		if now.After(entry.ExpiresAt) || now.Sub(entry.LastUsed) > cm.sessionTTL {
-			expiredKeys = append(expiredKeys, key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	for _, key := range expiredKeys {
-		if entry, exists := cm.sessionMap[key]; exists {
-			atomic.AddInt64(&cm.bytesAllocated, -entry.SizeEstimate)
-		}
-		delete(cm.sessionMap, key)
-		removed++
-	}
-
-	// If still over 80% capacity, remove oldest sessions more aggressively
-	targetCapacity := int(float64(cm.maxSessions) * 0.8)
-	if len(cm.sessionMap) > targetCapacity {
-		excessCount := len(cm.sessionMap) - targetCapacity
-
-		// Use efficient partial sort to find oldest sessions
-		keysToRemove := cm.findOldestSessions(excessCount)
-
-		for _, key := range keysToRemove {
-			if entry, exists := cm.sessionMap[key]; exists {
-				atomic.AddInt64(&cm.bytesAllocated, -entry.SizeEstimate)
-			}
-			delete(cm.sessionMap, key)
-			removed++
-		}
-	}
-
-	cm.lastCleanup = now
-	cm.logger.Infof("Emergency cleanup completed: removed %d sessions, %d remaining",
-		removed, len(cm.sessionMap))
-
-	// Log memory stats after emergency cleanup (read only, no forced GC)
-	cm.logger.Infof("Sessions after emergency cleanup: %d, Tracked bytes: %d",
-		len(cm.sessionMap), atomic.LoadInt64(&cm.bytesAllocated))
-}
-
-// GetSessionCount returns the current number of active sessions (for monitoring)
-func (cm *ChunkManager) GetSessionCount() int {
-	cm.mutex.RLock()
-	defer cm.mutex.RUnlock()
-	return len(cm.sessionMap)
-}
-
-// GetMemoryStats returns memory usage statistics for monitoring
-func (cm *ChunkManager) GetMemoryStats() map[string]interface{} {
-	cm.mutex.RLock()
-	sessionCount := len(cm.sessionMap)
-	cm.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-	stats := make(map[string]interface{})
-	stats["active_sessions"] = sessionCount
-	stats["max_sessions"] = cm.maxSessions
-	stats["bytes_allocated"] = atomic.LoadInt64(&cm.bytesAllocated)
-	stats["peak_sessions"] = atomic.LoadInt64(&cm.peakSessions)
-	stats["cleanup_count"] = atomic.LoadInt64(&cm.cleanupCount)
-	stats["session_ttl_hours"] = cm.sessionTTL.Hours()
-
-	// Update peak sessions
-	if int64(sessionCount) > atomic.LoadInt64(&cm.peakSessions) {
-		atomic.StoreInt64(&cm.peakSessions, int64(sessionCount))
-	}
-
-	return stats
 }

session_incoming_scheme_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/utils"
+)
+
+// A deep link longer than the cap must not be persisted into the cookies.
+func TestSetIncomingPathCapsLength(t *testing.T) {
+	sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, "", "", 0, NewLogger("error"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sess, err := sm.GetSession(httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(sess.returnToPoolSafely)
+
+	sess.SetIncomingPath("/ok?a=1")
+	if got := sess.GetIncomingPath(); got != "/ok?a=1" {
+		t.Fatalf("short path changed: %q", got)
+	}
+	sess.SetIncomingPath("/x?" + strings.Repeat("q", maxIncomingPathLen+1))
+	if got := sess.GetIncomingPath(); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("oversized path stored (%d bytes)", len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDetermineSchemeCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
+	for in, want := range map[string]string{"HTTPS": "https", "Https": "https", "HTTP": "http", "https": "https"} {
+		r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+		r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", in)
+		if got := utils.DetermineScheme(r, false); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Proto %q -> %q, want %q", in, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

settings.go

@@ -659,6 +659,24 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("sessionMaxAge is too large; must be at most %d seconds", math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Second))
 	}
 
+	// Bearer durations are int64 seconds * time.Second at startup (main.go); an
+	// unbounded value wraps negative or to zero and disables the age check
+	// and failure throttle.
+	for name, v := range map[string]int64{
+		"maxTokenAgeSeconds":          c.MaxTokenAgeSeconds,
+		"bearerFailureWindowSeconds":  int64(c.BearerFailureWindowSeconds),
+		"bearerFailurePenaltySeconds": int64(c.BearerFailurePenaltySeconds),
+	} {
+		if v > maxDurationSeconds {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%s is too large; must be at most %d seconds", name, maxDurationSeconds)
+		}
+	}
+	// The throttle sweep cutoff adds window and penalty.
+	if int64(c.BearerFailureWindowSeconds) > 0 && int64(c.BearerFailurePenaltySeconds) > 0 &&
+		int64(c.BearerFailureWindowSeconds)+int64(c.BearerFailurePenaltySeconds) > maxDurationSeconds {
+		return fmt.Errorf("bearerFailureWindowSeconds plus bearerFailurePenaltySeconds is too large")
+	}
+
 	// Validate audience if specified
 	if c.Audience != "" {
 		// Validate audience format - should be a valid identifier or URL
@@ -954,6 +972,7 @@ func isValidSecureURL(s string) bool {
 // isLoopbackHost reports whether host is "localhost" or a loopback IP literal
 // (127.0.0.0/8 or ::1).
 func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool {
+	host = canonicalHost(host)
 	if strings.EqualFold(host, "localhost") {
 		return true
 	}
@@ -1227,6 +1246,14 @@ func (c *Config) GetSecurityHeadersApplier() func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Req
 }
 
 // isOriginAllowed checks if an origin is in the allowed list
+const (
+	// maxDurationSeconds is the largest whole-second value whose
+	// time.Duration product with time.Second does not overflow int64.
+	maxDurationSeconds = math.MaxInt64 / int64(time.Second)
+	// maxRedisPoolSize bounds the eagerly allocated connection channel.
+	maxRedisPoolSize = 10000
+)
+
 // Validate checks if the Redis configuration is valid
 func (rc *RedisConfig) Validate() error {
 	if !rc.Enabled {
@@ -1253,6 +1280,9 @@ func (rc *RedisConfig) Validate() error {
 	if rc.PoolSize < 0 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("pool size cannot be negative")
 	}
+	if rc.PoolSize > maxRedisPoolSize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("pool size is too large; must be at most %d", maxRedisPoolSize)
+	}
 	if rc.ConnectTimeout < 0 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("connect timeout cannot be negative")
 	}
@@ -1286,6 +1316,21 @@ func (rc *RedisConfig) Validate() error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("health check interval cannot be negative")
 	}
 
+	// Seconds become time.Duration (x * time.Second) and the threshold is
+	// narrowed to int32 in the breaker; out-of-range values wrap, which
+	// panics time.NewTicker or trips the breaker on the first failure.
+	for name, v := range map[string]int{
+		"health check interval":   rc.HealthCheckInterval,
+		"circuit breaker timeout": rc.CircuitBreakerTimeout,
+	} {
+		if int64(v) > maxDurationSeconds {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%s is too large; must be at most %d seconds", name, maxDurationSeconds)
+		}
+	}
+	if rc.CircuitBreakerThreshold > math.MaxInt32 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("circuit breaker threshold is too large; must be at most %d", math.MaxInt32)
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 

settings_duration_bounds_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"math"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func boundsTestConfig() *Config {
+	cfg := CreateConfig()
+	cfg.ProviderURL = "https://auth.example.com"
+	cfg.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+	cfg.ClientID = "test-client"
+	cfg.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
+	cfg.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-bytes-long!!"
+	return cfg
+}
+
+const maxWholeSeconds = math.MaxInt64 / int64(time.Second)
+
+func TestConfigValidateRejectsDurationOverflow(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := map[string]func(c *Config){
+		"maxTokenAgeSeconds wraps negative": func(c *Config) { c.MaxTokenAgeSeconds = maxWholeSeconds + 1 },
+		"maxTokenAgeSeconds wraps to zero":  func(c *Config) { c.MaxTokenAgeSeconds = 1 << 55 },
+		"bearerFailureWindowSeconds":        func(c *Config) { c.BearerFailureWindowSeconds = int(maxWholeSeconds + 1) },
+		"bearerFailurePenaltySeconds":       func(c *Config) { c.BearerFailurePenaltySeconds = int(maxWholeSeconds + 1) },
+	}
+	for name, mutate := range cases {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			cfg := boundsTestConfig()
+			mutate(cfg)
+			if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("Validate accepted an overflowing duration")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	t.Run("max exact value still valid", func(t *testing.T) {
+		cfg := boundsTestConfig()
+		cfg.MaxTokenAgeSeconds = maxWholeSeconds
+		if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("boundary value rejected: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestRedisConfigValidateRejectsOverflowAndHugePool(t *testing.T) {
+	base := func() *RedisConfig {
+		rc := &RedisConfig{Enabled: true, Address: "localhost:6379"}
+		return rc
+	}
+	cases := map[string]func(rc *RedisConfig){
+		"healthCheckInterval wraps to zero": func(rc *RedisConfig) { rc.HealthCheckInterval = 1 << 55 },
+		"circuitBreakerTimeout wraps":       func(rc *RedisConfig) { rc.CircuitBreakerTimeout = int(maxWholeSeconds + 1) },
+		"circuitBreakerThreshold narrows":   func(rc *RedisConfig) { rc.CircuitBreakerThreshold = math.MaxInt32 + 1 },
+		"poolSize absurd":                   func(rc *RedisConfig) { rc.PoolSize = 1_000_000_000 },
+	}
+	for name, mutate := range cases {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			rc := base()
+			mutate(rc)
+			if err := rc.Validate(); err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("Validate accepted an unsafe value")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	t.Run("defaults and sane values stay valid", func(t *testing.T) {
+		rc := base()
+		rc.PoolSize, rc.CircuitBreakerThreshold, rc.HealthCheckInterval = 50, 5, 30
+		if err := rc.Validate(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("sane config rejected: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}

token_cache_namespace_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func newNSCache(t *testing.T) *UniversalCache {
+	t.Helper()
+	c := NewUniversalCache(UniversalCacheConfig{Type: CacheTypeToken, MaxSize: 100, DefaultTTL: time.Hour, CleanupInterval: time.Hour})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = c.Close() })
+	return c
+}
+
+// A verdict stored by one middleware instance must not satisfy another
+// instance that verifies against a different client or audience.
+func TestTokenCacheIsolatedPerInstanceNamespace(t *testing.T) {
+	shared := newNSCache(t)
+	a := &TokenCache{cache: shared}
+	b := &TokenCache{cache: shared}
+	a.SetNamespace("https://idp|app-a|app-a")
+	b.SetNamespace("https://idp|app-b|app-b")
+
+	a.Set("tok", map[string]interface{}{"sub": "u"}, time.Minute)
+	if _, ok := b.Get("tok"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("instance B hit a verdict cached by instance A")
+	}
+	if _, ok := a.Get("tok"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("instance A lost its own verdict")
+	}
+	a.Delete("tok")
+	if _, ok := a.Get("tok"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("Delete did not remove the namespaced entry")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTokenCacheNamespaceFollowsDCR(t *testing.T) {
+	shared := newNSCache(t)
+	tc := &TokenCache{cache: shared}
+	tc.SetNamespace("p|old|old")
+	tc.Set("tok", map[string]interface{}{"sub": "u"}, time.Minute)
+	tc.SetNamespace("p|new|new")
+	if _, ok := tc.Get("tok"); ok {
+		t.Fatal("verdict cached under the old client survived a namespace change")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTokenCacheEmptyNamespaceKeepsLegacyKey(t *testing.T) {
+	shared := newNSCache(t)
+	a := &TokenCache{cache: shared}
+	b := &TokenCache{cache: shared}
+	a.Set("tok", map[string]interface{}{"sub": "u"}, time.Minute)
+	if _, ok := b.Get("tok"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("namespace-less caches must keep sharing the legacy key")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIntrospectionKeyScopedPerInstance(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &TraefikOidc{tokenCache: &TokenCache{}}
+	b := &TraefikOidc{tokenCache: &TokenCache{}}
+	a.tokenCache.SetNamespace("p|app-a|app-a")
+	b.tokenCache.SetNamespace("p|app-b|app-b")
+	if a.introspectionKey("tok") == b.introspectionKey("tok") {
+		t.Fatal("different instances share an introspection cache key")
+	}
+	if got := (&TraefikOidc{}).introspectionKey("tok"); got != "tok" {
+		t.Fatalf("namespace-less key = %q, want raw token", got)
+	}
+}

token_introspection.go

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ type IntrospectionResponse struct {
 func (t *TraefikOidc) introspectToken(token string) (*IntrospectionResponse, error) {
 	// Check cache first
 	if t.introspectionCache != nil {
-		if cached, found := t.introspectionCache.Get(token); found {
+		if cached, found := t.introspectionCache.Get(t.introspectionKey(token)); found {
 			if response, ok := cached.(*IntrospectionResponse); ok {
 				t.logger.Debugf("Using cached introspection result for token")
 				return response, nil
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) introspectToken(token string) (*IntrospectionResponse, err
 				cacheDuration = untilExp
 			}
 		}
-		t.introspectionCache.Set(token, &introspectionResp, cacheDuration)
+		t.introspectionCache.Set(t.introspectionKey(token), &introspectionResp, cacheDuration)
 		t.logger.Debugf("Cached introspection result for %v", cacheDuration)
 	}
 
@@ -280,3 +280,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateOpaqueToken(token string) error {
 	t.logger.Debugf("Opaque token validation successful via introspection")
 	return nil
 }
+
+// introspectionKey scopes an introspection verdict to this instance's
+// provider, client and audience, like the verified-token cache.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) introspectionKey(token string) string {
+	if ns := t.tokenCache.Namespace(); ns != "" {
+		return ns + "|" + token
+	}
+	return token
+}

token_manager.go

@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) RevokeToken(token string) {
 	// from the introspection cache after revocation. Next request
 	// re-introspects and sees active=false.
 	if t.introspectionCache != nil {
-		t.introspectionCache.Delete(token)
+		t.introspectionCache.Delete(t.introspectionKey(token))
 	}
 
 	d := blacklistDuration(token)

token_validation_rs.go

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ package traefikoidc
 import (
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -266,8 +267,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateStandardTokensRS(rs *requestState) (bool, bool, bo
 	var accessVerifyErr error
 	if err := t.verifyToken(rs.accessToken); err != nil {
 		accessVerifyErr = err
-		errMsg := err.Error()
+		if errors.Is(err, errInvalidAudience) {
-		if strings.Contains(errMsg, "invalid audience") || strings.Contains(errMsg, "audience") {
 			if t.strictAudienceValidation {
 				if rs.refreshToken != "" {
 					return false, true, false

types.go

@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	// recovery attempt. Stored atomically so the hot ServeHTTP path can
 	// throttle retries without acquiring metadataRetryMutex on every request.
 	lastMetadataRetryNano int64
+	// initWaiters counts requests parked on initComplete; bounded by
+	// maxInitWaiters so a boot-time flood cannot hold unbounded connections.
+	initWaiters int32
 	// firstRequestStarted is 0 until the very first non-health request fires
 	// the background-task bootstrap; then it flips to 1 via CAS. Replaces the
 	// firstRequestMutex + firstRequestReceived combo which previously took
@@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	dcrMu                     sync.Mutex
 	shutdownOnce              sync.Once
 	sessionInvalidationCache  CacheInterface
+	frontchannelMarkers       markerQuota
 	refreshResultCache        CacheInterface
 	minimalHeaders            bool
 	stripAuthCookies          bool

universal_cache.go

@@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) setLocalLocked(key string, value interface{}, ttl time.
 		growth = size - existing.Size
 	}
 
+	if c.rejectOversized(key, size) {
+		return
+	}
+
 	// Check memory limits
 	if c.config.MaxMemoryBytes > 0 {
 		// Evict items if necessary to make room
@@ -712,6 +716,9 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) getLocal(key string) (interface{}, bool) {
 			if gracePeriod, ok := item.Metadata["grace_period_active"].(bool); ok && gracePeriod {
 				if c.shouldExtendGracePeriod(item, now) {
 					newExpiry := c.calculateNewExpiry(item, now)
+					if _, set := item.Metadata[graceOriginKey]; !set {
+						item.Metadata[graceOriginKey] = item.ExpiresAt
+					}
 					item.ExpiresAt = newExpiry
 					c.logger.Infof("UniversalCache[%s]: Extended grace period for key=%s until %v",
 						c.config.Type, key, newExpiry)
@@ -915,11 +922,29 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) evictOldest() {
 	}
 }
 
+// rejectOversized drops a value larger than the whole memory cap instead of
+// flushing every other entry to fit it. A stale copy under the key is removed.
+// Caller holds c.mu.
+func (c *UniversalCache) rejectOversized(key string, size int64) bool {
+	if c.config.MaxMemoryBytes <= 0 || size <= c.config.MaxMemoryBytes {
+		return false
+	}
+	if existing, ok := c.items[key]; ok {
+		c.removeItem(key, existing)
+	}
+	c.logger.Infof("UniversalCache[%s]: dropped oversized value key=%s size=%d cap=%d",
+		c.config.Type, key, size, c.config.MaxMemoryBytes)
+	return true
+}
+
 // SetMaxSize sets the maximum size and evicts items if necessary
 func (c *UniversalCache) SetMaxSize(newSize int) {
 	c.mu.Lock()
 	defer c.mu.Unlock()
 
+	if newSize < 1 {
+		newSize = 1 // a non-positive bound would spin the eviction loop forever
+	}
 	oldSize := c.config.MaxSize
 	c.config.MaxSize = newSize
 
@@ -1021,6 +1046,9 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) estimateSize(value interface{}) int64 {
 	}
 }
 
+// graceOriginKey holds the item's first expiry once grace has started.
+const graceOriginKey = "grace_origin"
+
 // shouldExtendGracePeriod determines if grace period should be extended
 func (c *UniversalCache) shouldExtendGracePeriod(item *CacheItem, now time.Time) bool {
 	if c.config.MetadataConfig == nil {
@@ -1040,8 +1068,12 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) shouldExtendGracePeriod(item *CacheItem, now time.Time)
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Calculate how long since the item originally expired
+	// Measure from the first expiry: later extensions overwrite ExpiresAt.
-	timeSinceExpiry := now.Sub(item.ExpiresAt)
+	origin := item.ExpiresAt
+	if o, ok := item.Metadata[graceOriginKey].(time.Time); ok {
+		origin = o
+	}
+	timeSinceExpiry := now.Sub(origin)
 	return timeSinceExpiry <= maxGrace
 }
 
@@ -1523,6 +1555,10 @@ func (c *UniversalCache) updateLocalCache(key string, value interface{}, ttl tim
 		growth = size - existing.Size
 	}
 
+	if c.rejectOversized(key, size) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	// Check memory limits
 	if c.config.MaxMemoryBytes > 0 {
 		for c.currentMemory+growth > c.config.MaxMemoryBytes && c.lruList.Len() > 0 {

universal_cache_bounds_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"math"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func newBoundsCache(t *testing.T, cfg UniversalCacheConfig) *UniversalCache {
+	t.Helper()
+	cfg.CleanupInterval = time.Hour
+	if cfg.DefaultTTL == 0 {
+		cfg.DefaultTTL = time.Hour
+	}
+	c := NewUniversalCache(cfg)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = c.Close() })
+	return c
+}
+
+// Grace extensions must stay within MaxGracePeriod of the ORIGINAL expiry.
+func TestGraceNeverServesPastOriginalExpiryBound(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newBoundsCache(t, UniversalCacheConfig{
+		Type: CacheTypeMetadata, MaxSize: 10,
+		MetadataConfig: &MetadataCacheConfig{
+			GracePeriod: 20 * time.Millisecond, ExtendedGracePeriod: 20 * time.Millisecond,
+			MaxGracePeriod: 100 * time.Millisecond, SecurityCriticalMaxGracePeriod: 100 * time.Millisecond,
+		},
+	})
+	if err := c.Set("k", "v", 10*time.Millisecond); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	c.ActivateGracePeriod("k")
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(600 * time.Millisecond)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+		if _, ok := c.Get("k"); !ok {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatal("stale entry still served 600ms after a 100ms max grace")
+}
+
+func TestSetMaxSizeNegativeTerminates(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newBoundsCache(t, UniversalCacheConfig{Type: CacheTypeGeneral, MaxSize: 10})
+	for _, k := range []string{"a", "b", "c"} {
+		_ = c.Set(k, "v", time.Hour)
+	}
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() { c.SetMaxSize(-1); close(done) }()
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("SetMaxSize(-1) did not return")
+	}
+}
+
+// One oversized value must not flush the other live entries.
+func TestOversizedValueDoesNotFlushCache(t *testing.T) {
+	c := newBoundsCache(t, UniversalCacheConfig{
+		Type: CacheTypeGeneral, MaxSize: 10, MaxMemoryBytes: 1000, EnableMemoryLimit: true,
+	})
+	_ = c.Set("live", "x", time.Hour)
+	_ = c.Set("big", make([]byte, 5000), time.Hour)
+	if _, ok := c.Get("live"); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("oversized insert evicted a live entry")
+	}
+	c.mu.RLock()
+	mem := c.currentMemory
+	c.mu.RUnlock()
+	if mem > 1000 {
+		t.Fatalf("currentMemory=%d exceeds cap 1000", mem)
+	}
+}
+
+// Out-of-range or non-finite nbf/iat must be rejected, not wrapped into the past.
+func TestTimeClaimsRejectOutOfRange(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, v := range []float64{1e19, 1e300, math.Inf(1), math.Inf(-1), math.NaN()} {
+		if verifyNotBefore(v) == nil {
+			t.Errorf("nbf=%v accepted", v)
+		}
+		if verifyIssuedAt(v) == nil {
+			t.Errorf("iat=%v accepted", v)
+		}
+		if verifyExpiration(v) == nil {
+			t.Errorf("exp=%v accepted", v)
+		}
+	}
+}

url_helpers.go

@@ -453,6 +453,15 @@ func sameHost(a, b string) bool {
 	return strings.EqualFold(ua.Host, ub.Host)
 }
 
+// canonicalHost drops the root dot ("localhost." is localhost) and an IPv6
+// zone id so the blocklists see one spelling per host.
+func canonicalHost(host string) string {
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(host, '%'); i > 0 && net.ParseIP(host[:i]) != nil {
+		host = host[:i]
+	}
+	return strings.TrimRight(host, ".")
+}
+
 // validateHost validates a hostname or IP address for security.
 // It prevents access to localhost, private networks, and known metadata endpoints.
 // When allowPrivateIPAddresses is enabled, private IP checks are skipped.
@@ -462,13 +471,14 @@ func sameHost(a, b string) bool {
 // Returns:
 //   - An error if the host is dangerous or not allowed, nil if safe.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
-	hostname := host
+	hostname := canonicalHost(host)
-	if strings.Contains(host, ":") {
+	if net.ParseIP(hostname) == nil && strings.Contains(hostname, ":") {
 		var err error
-		hostname, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(host)
+		hostname, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(hostname)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("invalid host format: %w", err)
 		}
+		hostname = canonicalHost(hostname)
 	}
 
 	ip := net.ParseIP(hostname)

version.go

@@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ const devPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"
 // from build info at runtime (debug.ReadBuildInfo sees Traefik's build graph,
 // not the interpreted plugin). This build-stamped constant is therefore the
 // single source of truth for the version reported by anonymous usage telemetry.
-const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.44"
+const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"