chore(release): v1.0.29

.traefik.yml

@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ testData:
   # bearerEmitWWWAuthenticate: true       # default; RFC 6750 hint on 401s
   # bearerOverridesCookie: false          # default; cookie wins when both are present
   # requireTokenIntrospection: false      # opt-in; calls RFC 7662 introspection per request
-  # introspectionURL: https://idp.example.com/oauth/introspect  # manual override; set when discovery omits introspection_endpoint
   # maxTokenAgeSeconds: 86400             # 24h cap on iat (rejects clock-skew/forever tokens)
   # maxIdentifierLength: 256              # cap on the sanitised principal identifier
   # bearerFailureThreshold: 20            # consecutive 401s/IP that trip the throttle

README.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ experimental:
   plugins:
     traefikoidc:
       moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
-      version: v1.0.29
+      version: v0.7.10
 ```
 
 Then attach the middleware in your dynamic configuration (see
@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ Full reference in [docs/CONFIGURATION.md](docs/CONFIGURATION.md).
 | `enablePKCE` | `false` | PKCE on the auth code flow. |
 | `cookieDomain` | auto | Set explicitly for multi-subdomain setups (`.example.com`). |
 | `cookiePrefix` | `_oidc_raczylo_` | Unique prefix per middleware instance to isolate sessions. |
-| `cookiePath` | `/` | Restrict cookies to a path prefix. Set to the middleware's path (e.g. `/app`) to prevent the browser from sending OIDC cookies to unprotected paths, avoiding 431 "Request Header Or Cookie Too Large" errors on mixed-use domains. |
 | `sessionMaxAge` | `86400` | Session lifetime in seconds. |
 | `refreshGracePeriodSeconds` | `60` | Proactively refresh tokens this many seconds before expiry. |
 | `maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds` | `21600` | Heuristic max stored refresh-token lifetime (6h). Past this, the plugin treats the RT as expired without contacting the IdP — returns 401 to AJAX, full re-auth on navigations. Set `0` to disable. Tune to match your IdP's RT TTL. |

docs/AUTH0_AUDIENCE_GUIDE.md

@@ -298,20 +298,13 @@ strictAudienceValidation: true
    ```
    Look for `introspection_endpoint`
 
-2. **Configure the endpoint manually:**
+2. **Disable required introspection (less secure):**
-   ```yaml
-   introspectionURL: https://YOUR_DOMAIN/oauth/introspect
-   ```
-   Set this when Auth0 omits `introspection_endpoint` from discovery. The
-   manual value takes precedence over the discovered value.
-
-3. **Disable required introspection (less secure):**
    ```yaml
    allowOpaqueTokens: true
    requireTokenIntrospection: false  # Falls back to ID token
    ```
 
-4. **Use JWT access tokens instead** (recommended)
+3. **Use JWT access tokens instead** (recommended)
 
 ---
 

docs/CONFIGURATION.md

@@ -179,9 +179,8 @@ clientSecret: your-client-secret
 | `forceHTTPS` | bool | `true` | Force HTTPS for redirect URIs (set `false` only for plaintext HTTP local dev) |
 | `rateLimit` | int | `100` | Maximum requests per second |
 | `excludedURLs` | []string | none | Paths that bypass authentication, matched at a path-segment or file-extension boundary |
-| `revocationURL` | string | auto-discovered | Token revocation endpoint. Takes precedence over the discovered value. |
+| `revocationURL` | string | auto-discovered | Token revocation endpoint |
-| `oidcEndSessionURL` | string | auto-discovered | Provider's end session endpoint. Takes precedence over the discovered value. |
+| `oidcEndSessionURL` | string | auto-discovered | Provider's end session endpoint |
-| `introspectionURL` | string | auto-discovered | RFC 7662 token introspection endpoint. Set this when your IdP omits `introspection_endpoint` from discovery. Takes precedence over the discovered value. |
 | `enablePKCE` | bool | `false` | Enable PKCE for authorization code flow |
 | `minimalHeaders` | bool | `false` | Reduce forwarded headers |
 | `clientAuthMethod` | string | `client_secret_post` | Client authentication method at token/revocation endpoints. One of `client_secret_post`, `client_secret_basic`, `private_key_jwt`. See [Client Authentication](#client-authentication). |

examples/complete-traefik-config.yaml

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ experimental:
   plugins:
     traefikoidc:
       moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
-      version: v1.0.29
+      version: v0.8.0
 
 log:
   level: INFO
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ services:
       - "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
       - "--entrypoints.websecure.address=:443"
       - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.modulename=github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc"
-      - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.version=v1.0.29"
+      - "--experimental.plugins.traefikoidc.version=v0.8.0"
     ports:
       - "80:80"
       - "443:443"

examples/redis-config.yaml

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ experimental:
   plugins:
     traefikoidc:
       moduleName: github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
-      version: v1.0.29
+      version: v0.8.0
 
 # Dynamic configuration (dynamic.yml or labels)
 http:

issue152_regression_test.go

@@ -1,568 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// issue152_regression_test.go — regression tests for issue #152.
-//
-// Three provider endpoints — token revocation, OIDC end-session (logout), and
-// RFC 7662 token introspection — were documented Config fields
-// (RevocationURL, OIDCEndSessionURL) or a brand-new one (IntrospectionURL)
-// that operators can set when their IdP omits an endpoint from discovery, or
-// to pin a non-standard one. RevocationURL and OIDCEndSessionURL were dead:
-// Config.Validate() checked them but nothing ever copied them onto the live
-// TraefikOidc fields consumers read, so setting them silently did nothing.
-// IntrospectionURL did not exist at all.
-//
-// The fix adds three unexported write-once fields on TraefikOidc
-// (configRevocationURL, configEndSessionURL, configIntrospectionURL),
-// populated from Config at construction (main.go NewWithContext). The same
-// three values also cold-start-seed the live fields (revocationURL,
-// endSessionURL, introspectionURL) so a discovery failure does not lose an
-// operator override. Inside updateMetadataEndpoints, after the SSRF sanitize
-// pass, the introspection same-host pin, and the issuer pin — but before the
-// metadataMu.Lock() that publishes the live fields — each non-empty config*
-// field overwrites the corresponding metadata.* value, so a manual override
-// wins over discovery on every refresh, not just at construction. An empty
-// override leaves the discovered value alone. Manual overrides deliberately
-// skip validateDiscoveredEndpoint and the introspection same-host pin: they
-// sit at the same trust tier as providerURL itself, already gated by
-// isValidSecureURL at config-validation time.
-//
-// These tests pin: default (no overrides) behavior is unchanged, overrides
-// win over both absent and present discovered values, a cross-host
-// introspection override survives the same-host pin that a discovered
-// cross-host endpoint does not, overrides survive repeated metadata
-// refreshes, NewWithContext wires the three config* fields and cold-start
-// seeds correctly (including when discovery fails outright), the override
-// is honored end-to-end by introspectToken and RevokeTokenWithProvider, the
-// logout URL builder emits the override, and Config.Validate / New enforce
-// the same "invalid configuration" + untyped-nil-handler contract (#151)
-// for a bad IntrospectionURL that the sibling fields already had.
-
-// issue152BaseConfig returns a complete, valid Config, following the
-// minimal-valid-config pattern used elsewhere in this package (e.g.
-// issue154BaseConfig in issue154_regression_test.go).
-func issue152BaseConfig() *Config {
-	return &Config{
-		ProviderURL:          "https://provider.example.com",
-		ClientID:             "test-client",
-		ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
-		CallbackURL:          "/callback",
-		SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-valid-session-key-32b!",
-		RateLimit:            100,
-	}
-}
-
-// issue152Endpoints reads the three metadataMu-guarded live endpoint fields
-// under lock, so callers stay race-clean regardless of whether a background
-// discovery goroutine may still touch them.
-func issue152Endpoints(oidc *TraefikOidc) (revocation, endSession, introspection string) {
-	oidc.metadataMu.RLock()
-	defer oidc.metadataMu.RUnlock()
-	return oidc.revocationURL, oidc.endSessionURL, oidc.introspectionURL
-}
-
-// TestIssue152DefaultPreservation proves the fix is additive: with no
-// operator overrides, updateMetadataEndpoints behaves exactly as before —
-// discovered values become the live fields and the published snapshot.
-func TestIssue152DefaultPreservation(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("discovered values populate live fields and snapshot", func(t *testing.T) {
-		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:      NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:    "test-client",
-		}
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:           "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:          "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL:         "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:          "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-			RevokeURL:        "https://provider.example.com/revoke",
-			EndSessionURL:    "https://provider.example.com/endsession",
-			IntrospectionURL: "https://provider.example.com/introspect",
-			RegistrationURL:  "https://provider.example.com/register",
-		}
-
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-		revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if revocation != metadata.RevokeURL {
-			t.Fatalf("revocationURL = %q, want discovered %q", revocation, metadata.RevokeURL)
-		}
-		if endSession != metadata.EndSessionURL {
-			t.Fatalf("endSessionURL = %q, want discovered %q", endSession, metadata.EndSessionURL)
-		}
-		if introspection != metadata.IntrospectionURL {
-			t.Fatalf("introspectionURL = %q, want discovered %q", introspection, metadata.IntrospectionURL)
-		}
-
-		snap := oidc.metadataSnap()
-		if snap == nil {
-			t.Fatal("metadataSnap() returned nil after updateMetadataEndpoints")
-		}
-		if snap.RevocationURL != metadata.RevokeURL || snap.EndSessionURL != metadata.EndSessionURL || snap.IntrospectionURL != metadata.IntrospectionURL {
-			t.Fatalf("metadataSnapshot = %+v, want it to match discovered metadata %+v", snap, metadata)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("discovery omits introspection and no override leaves it empty", func(t *testing.T) {
-		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:      NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:    "test-client",
-		}
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:   "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:  "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL: "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:  "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-			// IntrospectionURL intentionally omitted.
-		}
-
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-		_, _, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if introspection != "" {
-			t.Fatalf("introspectionURL = %q, want empty when discovery omits it and no override is set", introspection)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-// TestIssue152OverridesWin proves a non-empty config* override always wins
-// over discovery, whether discovery is silent on the endpoint (a) or
-// actively supplies a different value (b), and that a cross-host
-// introspection override survives the same-host pin that a discovered
-// cross-host introspection endpoint does not (c).
-func TestIssue152OverridesWin(t *testing.T) {
-	overrideRevocation := "https://override.example.com/revoke"
-	overrideEndSession := "https://override.example.com/endsession"
-	overrideIntrospection := "https://override.example.com/introspect"
-
-	newOverriddenOidc := func() *TraefikOidc {
-		return &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL:            "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:                 NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:               "test-client",
-			configRevocationURL:    overrideRevocation,
-			configEndSessionURL:    overrideEndSession,
-			configIntrospectionURL: overrideIntrospection,
-		}
-	}
-
-	t.Run("discovery omits endpoints, overrides fill them in", func(t *testing.T) {
-		oidc := newOverriddenOidc()
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:   "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:  "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL: "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:  "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-		}
-
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-		revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if revocation != overrideRevocation || endSession != overrideEndSession || introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-			t.Fatalf("got (%q, %q, %q), want overrides (%q, %q, %q)",
-				revocation, endSession, introspection, overrideRevocation, overrideEndSession, overrideIntrospection)
-		}
-		snap := oidc.metadataSnap()
-		if snap == nil || snap.RevocationURL != overrideRevocation || snap.EndSessionURL != overrideEndSession || snap.IntrospectionURL != overrideIntrospection {
-			t.Fatalf("metadataSnapshot = %+v, want overrides", snap)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("discovery supplies different values, overrides win anyway", func(t *testing.T) {
-		oidc := newOverriddenOidc()
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:           "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:          "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL:         "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:          "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-			RevokeURL:        "https://provider.example.com/discovered-revoke",
-			EndSessionURL:    "https://provider.example.com/discovered-endsession",
-			IntrospectionURL: "https://provider.example.com/discovered-introspect",
-		}
-
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-		revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if revocation != overrideRevocation || endSession != overrideEndSession || introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-			t.Fatalf("got (%q, %q, %q), want overrides (%q, %q, %q) to beat discovered values",
-				revocation, endSession, introspection, overrideRevocation, overrideEndSession, overrideIntrospection)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("cross-host introspection: discovered is zeroed, override survives", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// No override: a discovered introspection endpoint on a different host
-		// than providerURL must be zeroed by the same-host pin.
-		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL: "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:      NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:    "test-client",
-		}
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:           "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:          "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL:         "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:          "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-			IntrospectionURL: "https://attacker.example.com/introspect",
-		}
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-		if _, _, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc); introspection != "" {
-			t.Fatalf("introspectionURL = %q, want empty: discovered cross-host introspection must be zeroed by the same-host pin", introspection)
-		}
-
-		// Same cross-host discovered value, but now with a cross-host override:
-		// the override must survive because it skips the same-host pin.
-		oidcWithOverride := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL:            "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:                 NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:               "test-client",
-			configIntrospectionURL: overrideIntrospection,
-		}
-		oidcWithOverride.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-		if _, _, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidcWithOverride); introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-			t.Fatalf("introspectionURL = %q, want override %q to survive despite being cross-host", introspection, overrideIntrospection)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-// TestIssue152RefreshSurvival proves overrides are re-applied inside
-// updateMetadataEndpoints itself, so they survive every metadata refresh —
-// not just the first call after construction.
-func TestIssue152RefreshSurvival(t *testing.T) {
-	overrideRevocation := "https://override.example.com/revoke"
-	overrideEndSession := "https://override.example.com/endsession"
-	overrideIntrospection := "https://override.example.com/introspect"
-
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		providerURL:            "https://provider.example.com",
-		logger:                 NewLogger("error"),
-		clientID:               "test-client",
-		configRevocationURL:    overrideRevocation,
-		configEndSessionURL:    overrideEndSession,
-		configIntrospectionURL: overrideIntrospection,
-	}
-
-	firstRefresh := &ProviderMetadata{
-		Issuer:           "https://provider.example.com",
-		AuthURL:          "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-		TokenURL:         "https://provider.example.com/token",
-		JWKSURL:          "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-		RevokeURL:        "https://provider.example.com/refresh1-revoke",
-		EndSessionURL:    "https://provider.example.com/refresh1-endsession",
-		IntrospectionURL: "https://provider.example.com/refresh1-introspect",
-	}
-	oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(firstRefresh)
-	if revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc); revocation != overrideRevocation || endSession != overrideEndSession || introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-		t.Fatalf("after 1st refresh: got (%q, %q, %q), want overrides to hold", revocation, endSession, introspection)
-	}
-
-	secondRefresh := &ProviderMetadata{
-		Issuer:           "https://provider.example.com",
-		AuthURL:          "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-		TokenURL:         "https://provider.example.com/token",
-		JWKSURL:          "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-		RevokeURL:        "https://provider.example.com/refresh2-revoke",
-		EndSessionURL:    "https://provider.example.com/refresh2-endsession",
-		IntrospectionURL: "https://provider.example.com/refresh2-introspect",
-	}
-	oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(secondRefresh)
-	if revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc); revocation != overrideRevocation || endSession != overrideEndSession || introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-		t.Fatalf("after 2nd refresh: got (%q, %q, %q), want overrides to still hold", revocation, endSession, introspection)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue152NewWithContextWiring proves NewWithContext wires
-// Config.RevocationURL / OIDCEndSessionURL / IntrospectionURL onto the three
-// unexported config* fields and cold-start-seeds the live fields from them
-// (main.go, the configRevocationURL/configEndSessionURL/configIntrospectionURL
-// and revocationURL/endSessionURL/introspectionURL initializers), both when
-// discovery succeeds with different values (override must still win) and
-// when discovery fails outright (the cold-start seed must not be lost).
-func TestIssue152NewWithContextWiring(t *testing.T) {
-	overrideRevocation := "https://override.example.com/revoke"
-	overrideEndSession := "https://override.example.com/endsession"
-	overrideIntrospection := "https://override.example.com/introspect"
-
-	t.Run("discovery succeeds with different values, overrides still win", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var srv *httptest.Server
-		srv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/openid-configuration") {
-				w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-				_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ProviderMetadata{
-					Issuer:           srv.URL,
-					AuthURL:          srv.URL + "/auth",
-					TokenURL:         srv.URL + "/token",
-					JWKSURL:          srv.URL + "/jwks",
-					RevokeURL:        srv.URL + "/discovered-revoke",
-					EndSessionURL:    srv.URL + "/discovered-endsession",
-					IntrospectionURL: srv.URL + "/discovered-introspect",
-				})
-				return
-			}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
-		}))
-		defer srv.Close()
-
-		cfg := issue152BaseConfig()
-		cfg.ProviderURL = srv.URL
-		cfg.RevocationURL = overrideRevocation
-		cfg.OIDCEndSessionURL = overrideEndSession
-		cfg.IntrospectionURL = overrideIntrospection
-
-		oidc, err := NewWithContext(context.Background(), cfg, nil, "issue152-wiring-success")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("NewWithContext must accept a valid config with overrides, got: %v", err)
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = oidc.Close() }()
-
-		<-oidc.initComplete // wait for the discovery goroutine so field reads below are race-safe.
-
-		revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if revocation != overrideRevocation || endSession != overrideEndSession || introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-			t.Fatalf("got (%q, %q, %q), want overrides (%q, %q, %q) to win over successful discovery",
-				revocation, endSession, introspection, overrideRevocation, overrideEndSession, overrideIntrospection)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("discovery fails outright, cold-start seed holds", func(t *testing.T) {
-		srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		}))
-		defer srv.Close()
-
-		cfg := issue152BaseConfig()
-		cfg.ProviderURL = srv.URL
-		cfg.RevocationURL = overrideRevocation
-		cfg.OIDCEndSessionURL = overrideEndSession
-		cfg.IntrospectionURL = overrideIntrospection
-
-		oidc, err := NewWithContext(context.Background(), cfg, nil, "issue152-wiring-coldstart")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("NewWithContext must accept a valid config even though discovery will fail, got: %v", err)
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = oidc.Close() }()
-
-		<-oidc.initComplete // discovery has failed and returned by now.
-
-		revocation, endSession, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if revocation != overrideRevocation || endSession != overrideEndSession || introspection != overrideIntrospection {
-			t.Fatalf("got (%q, %q, %q), want the constructor's cold-start seed (%q, %q, %q) to survive a failed discovery",
-				revocation, endSession, introspection, overrideRevocation, overrideEndSession, overrideIntrospection)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-// TestIssue152EndToEndIntrospection proves the override is honored one layer
-// up from the field: with a discovery document that omits
-// introspection_endpoint entirely, introspectToken (token_introspection.go)
-// must still reach the manually-configured endpoint and return its result.
-func TestIssue152EndToEndIntrospection(t *testing.T) {
-	var hits int32
-	var gotToken string
-	introspectionSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1)
-		if err := r.ParseForm(); err == nil {
-			gotToken = r.PostFormValue("token")
-		}
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"active": true})
-	}))
-	defer introspectionSrv.Close()
-
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		providerURL:            "https://provider.example.com",
-		logger:                 NewLogger("error"),
-		clientID:               "test-client",
-		clientSecret:           "test-secret",
-		httpClient:             http.DefaultClient,
-		configIntrospectionURL: introspectionSrv.URL,
-	}
-	metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-		Issuer:   "https://provider.example.com",
-		AuthURL:  "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-		TokenURL: "https://provider.example.com/token",
-		JWKSURL:  "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-		// IntrospectionURL intentionally omitted: the override is the only
-		// source of the endpoint.
-	}
-	oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-	if _, _, introspection := issue152Endpoints(oidc); introspection != introspectionSrv.URL {
-		t.Fatalf("introspectionURL = %q, want override %q wired before calling introspectToken", introspection, introspectionSrv.URL)
-	}
-
-	resp, err := oidc.introspectToken("opaque-test-token")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("introspectToken must succeed against the manual override endpoint, got: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !resp.Active {
-		t.Fatal("introspectToken response Active = false, want true")
-	}
-	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&hits); got != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("introspection endpoint hit count = %d, want 1", got)
-	}
-	if gotToken != "opaque-test-token" {
-		t.Fatalf("introspection request token = %q, want %q", gotToken, "opaque-test-token")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue152SiblingRevocationAndLogout proves the two dead siblings this
-// issue repaired are wired end-to-end: RevokeTokenWithProvider
-// (token_manager.go) posts to a configRevocationURL override, and the
-// end-session URL BuildLogoutURL (helpers.go) builds from is the
-// configEndSessionURL override. The full handleLogout HTTP handler needs a
-// live SessionManager and an authenticated cookie to reach BuildLogoutURL,
-// which is disproportionate for this fix; instead this asserts the live
-// field wiring plus a direct BuildLogoutURL call with that wired value,
-// which is the same function handleLogout calls.
-func TestIssue152SiblingRevocationAndLogout(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("RevokeTokenWithProvider posts to the override", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var hits int32
-		var gotToken string
-		revocationSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1)
-			if err := r.ParseForm(); err == nil {
-				gotToken = r.PostFormValue("token")
-			}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		}))
-		defer revocationSrv.Close()
-
-		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL:         "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:              NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:            "test-client",
-			clientSecret:        "test-secret",
-			httpClient:          http.DefaultClient,
-			configRevocationURL: revocationSrv.URL,
-		}
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:   "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:  "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL: "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:  "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-			// RevokeURL intentionally omitted.
-		}
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-		if err := oidc.RevokeTokenWithProvider("opaque-test-token", "access_token"); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("RevokeTokenWithProvider must succeed against the manual override endpoint, got: %v", err)
-		}
-		if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&hits); got != 1 {
-			t.Fatalf("revocation endpoint hit count = %d, want 1", got)
-		}
-		if gotToken != "opaque-test-token" {
-			t.Fatalf("revocation request token = %q, want %q", gotToken, "opaque-test-token")
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("logout URL builder emits the override", func(t *testing.T) {
-		overrideEndSession := "https://override.example.com/endsession"
-		oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-			providerURL:         "https://provider.example.com",
-			logger:              NewLogger("error"),
-			clientID:            "test-client",
-			configEndSessionURL: overrideEndSession,
-		}
-		metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-			Issuer:   "https://provider.example.com",
-			AuthURL:  "https://provider.example.com/authorize",
-			TokenURL: "https://provider.example.com/token",
-			JWKSURL:  "https://provider.example.com/jwks",
-			// EndSessionURL intentionally omitted.
-		}
-		oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-		_, endSession, _ := issue152Endpoints(oidc)
-		if endSession != overrideEndSession {
-			t.Fatalf("endSessionURL = %q, want override %q wired before building the logout URL", endSession, overrideEndSession)
-		}
-
-		logoutURL, err := BuildLogoutURL(endSession, "idtok123", "https://myapp.example.com/")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("BuildLogoutURL must succeed with the wired override, got: %v", err)
-		}
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(logoutURL, overrideEndSession+"?") {
-			t.Fatalf("logoutURL = %q, want prefix %q", logoutURL, overrideEndSession+"?")
-		}
-		if !strings.Contains(logoutURL, "id_token_hint=idtok123") {
-			t.Fatalf("logoutURL = %q, want it to contain the id_token_hint", logoutURL)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-// TestIssue152ConfigValidation pins Config.Validate's IntrospectionURL check:
-// empty is fine (feature is opt-in), a valid HTTPS URL is fine, plaintext
-// HTTP is fine only for a loopback host (isValidSecureURL's RFC 8252-style
-// allowance, mirrored from the ProviderURL/RevocationURL/OIDCEndSessionURL
-// checks), and anything else — plaintext HTTP to a remote host, or a
-// malformed URL — is rejected with the introspectionURL-specific message.
-func TestIssue152ConfigValidation(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name        string
-		value       string
-		wantErr     bool
-		errContains string
-	}{
-		{"valid HTTPS URL", "https://idp.example.com/introspect", false, ""},
-		{"empty is valid (opt-in feature)", "", false, ""},
-		{"plaintext HTTP allowed for loopback", "http://localhost:8080/introspect", false, ""},
-		{"plaintext HTTP rejected for remote host", "http://evil.example.com/x", true, "introspectionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL"},
-		{"malformed URL rejected", "://garbage", true, "introspectionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL"},
-		{"URL with no host rejected", "https:///nohost", true, "introspectionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL"},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			cfg := issue152BaseConfig()
-			cfg.IntrospectionURL = tc.value
-
-			err := cfg.Validate()
-			if tc.wantErr {
-				if err == nil {
-					t.Fatalf("Validate() with IntrospectionURL=%q must fail", tc.value)
-				}
-				if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.errContains) {
-					t.Fatalf("Validate() error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), tc.errContains)
-				}
-				return
-			}
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("Validate() with IntrospectionURL=%q must succeed, got: %v", tc.value, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue152InvalidIntrospectionURLNewContract proves an invalid
-// IntrospectionURL is rejected by New() through the same fail-closed,
-// untyped-nil-handler contract issue #151 established for every other
-// Config.Validate failure: a concrete "invalid configuration" error, and h
-// itself must be an untyped nil (not a typed-nil *TraefikOidc boxed into a
-// non-nil http.Handler interface value).
-func TestIssue152InvalidIntrospectionURLNewContract(t *testing.T) {
-	cfg := issue152BaseConfig()
-	cfg.IntrospectionURL = "http://evil.example.com/x" // plaintext HTTP to a remote host: rejected.
-
-	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	h, err := New(context.Background(), next, cfg, "issue152-invalid-introspection")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("New() must reject an invalid IntrospectionURL")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid configuration") {
-		t.Fatalf("New() error = %q, want it to contain %q", err.Error(), "invalid configuration")
-	}
-	if h != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("New() must return an untyped nil handler on error, got %T", h)
-	}
-}

issue154_regression_test.go

@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
-package traefikoidc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// issue154_regression_test.go — regression tests for issue #154.
-//
-// A providerURL pointing at a localhost identity provider (local
-// development, sidecar OIDC providers) caused an infinite redirect loop.
-// validateHost unconditionally rejected loopback/localhost hosts, so
-// buildURLWithParams returned "" for the discovered authorization endpoint,
-// buildAuthURL returned "", and Traefik kept redirecting to an empty
-// Location header forever.
-//
-// The fix adds an unexported `allowLoopbackHosts bool` field to TraefikOidc,
-// derived at construction time from `isLoopbackProviderURL(config.ProviderURL)`
-// (settings.go). validateHost now gates loopback IPs and localhost/127.x/::1
-// literals on `!t.allowLoopbackHosts`, while link-local, multicast, and the
-// cloud-metadata hostnames stay unconditionally blocked (SSRF surface must
-// not widen). updateMetadataEndpoints recomputes the same derivation from
-// t.providerURL directly (not the struct field), so it stays correct for
-// TraefikOidc values test code builds as struct literals.
-//
-// These tests pin: the opt-in behaves correctly, the default (flag unset)
-// still blocks loopback exactly as before the fix, the SSRF-relevant hosts
-// stay blocked even with the opt-in active, allowPrivateIPAddresses remains
-// an independent gate, the derivation helper is correct in isolation, the
-// end-to-end buildAuthURL behavior for both flag states, that NewWithContext
-// derives the field correctly from config.ProviderURL, and that the
-// discovery layer (updateMetadataEndpoints) and the URL-validation layer
-// (validateHost/buildAuthURL) agree on a loopback provider.
-
-// issue154LoopbackHosts are host strings that represent localhost/loopback
-// under every literal form validateHost must recognize: bare hostname,
-// hostname:port, case variation, IPv4 loopback with and without port, an
-// IPv6 loopback literal with port, and a non-canonical loopback IP
-// (127.0.0.0/8 is entirely loopback, not just 127.0.0.1).
-var issue154LoopbackHosts = []string{
-	"localhost",
-	"localhost:8080",
-	"LOCALHOST",
-	"127.0.0.1",
-	"127.0.0.1:8080",
-	"[::1]:8080",
-	"127.0.0.2:9000",
-}
-
-// TestIssue154ValidateHostLoopbackAllowed pins the opt-in: once a middleware
-// instance has allowLoopbackHosts=true (as New/NewWithContext derive it from
-// a loopback providerURL), every loopback host form validates cleanly.
-func TestIssue154ValidateHostLoopbackAllowed(t *testing.T) {
-	middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-	middleware.allowLoopbackHosts = true
-
-	for _, host := range issue154LoopbackHosts {
-		t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if err := middleware.validateHost(host); err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("validateHost(%q) with allowLoopbackHosts=true must succeed, got: %v", host, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue154ValidateHostLoopbackDefaultBlocked pins the default-preserving
-// half of the fix: a middleware instance built without explicitly setting
-// allowLoopbackHosts (its zero value, matching every TraefikOidc a
-// non-loopback New()/NewWithContext call produces) must still reject every
-// loopback host form, exactly as before the fix. This is asserted as
-// "error present", not against exact error text: "[::1]:8080" alone
-// (without a bracket-less counterpart) does not hit the pre-existing
-// net.SplitHostPort quirk where a bare "[::1]" without a port fails with
-// "invalid host format" instead of the loopback-specific message — but
-// pinning only non-nil keeps this test robust to either error path.
-func TestIssue154ValidateHostLoopbackDefaultBlocked(t *testing.T) {
-	middleware := createMinimalMiddleware() // allowLoopbackHosts left at zero value (false)
-
-	for _, host := range issue154LoopbackHosts {
-		t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if err := middleware.validateHost(host); err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("validateHost(%q) with default allowLoopbackHosts must still be rejected", host)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue154SecurityEnvelopeWithLoopbackAllowed is the highest-value test
-// in this file: it proves that opting into loopback hosts does not widen the
-// SSRF surface. Cloud metadata addresses, link-local, multicast, and
-// unspecified addresses must stay blocked even with allowLoopbackHosts=true.
-func TestIssue154SecurityEnvelopeWithLoopbackAllowed(t *testing.T) {
-	middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-	middleware.allowLoopbackHosts = true
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name       string
-		host       string
-		wantSubstr string
-	}{
-		{"AWS/GCP metadata IP", "169.254.169.254", "loopback/link-local"},
-		{"AWS/GCP metadata IP with port", "169.254.169.254:80", "loopback/link-local"},
-		{"GCP metadata hostname", "metadata.google.internal", "dangerous hostname"},
-		{"GCP metadata hostname with port", "metadata.google.internal:80", "dangerous hostname"},
-		{"IPv6 link-local", "[fe80::1]:80", "loopback/link-local"},
-		{"IPv4 link-local multicast", "224.0.0.1", "loopback/link-local"},
-		{"unspecified IPv4", "0.0.0.0", "unspecified or multicast"},
-		{"unspecified IPv6 with port", "[::]:80", "unspecified or multicast"},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := middleware.validateHost(tc.host)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("validateHost(%q) must still be rejected with allowLoopbackHosts=true", tc.host)
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantSubstr) {
-				t.Fatalf("validateHost(%q) error = %q, want substring %q", tc.host, err.Error(), tc.wantSubstr)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue154PrivateIPIndependence proves allowLoopbackHosts and
-// allowPrivateIPAddresses are independent gates: opting a middleware into
-// loopback hosts must not also open up RFC 1918 private ranges.
-func TestIssue154PrivateIPIndependence(t *testing.T) {
-	middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-	middleware.allowLoopbackHosts = true
-	middleware.allowPrivateIPAddresses = false
-
-	privateHosts := []string{"10.0.0.5", "192.168.1.10", "172.16.0.1"}
-	for _, host := range privateHosts {
-		t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := middleware.validateHost(host)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("validateHost(%q) must be rejected when allowPrivateIPAddresses=false", host)
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private/internal") {
-				t.Fatalf("validateHost(%q) error = %q, want substring %q", host, err.Error(), "private/internal")
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue154IsLoopbackProviderURL exercises the construction-time
-// derivation helper in isolation, including malformed input that must not
-// panic.
-func TestIssue154IsLoopbackProviderURL(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name        string
-		providerURL string
-		want        bool
-	}{
-		{"http localhost with port", "http://localhost:8080", true},
-		{"http loopback IPv4 with port", "http://127.0.0.1:9000", true},
-		{"http loopback IPv6 with port", "http://[::1]:9000", true},
-		{"https localhost uppercase", "https://LOCALHOST:9000", true},
-		{"https real remote provider", "https://accounts.google.com", false},
-		{"https another remote provider", "https://idp.example.com", false},
-		{"empty string", "", false},
-		{"malformed URL must not panic", "://garbage", false},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := isLoopbackProviderURL(tc.providerURL)
-			if got != tc.want {
-				t.Fatalf("isLoopbackProviderURL(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.providerURL, got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue154BuildAuthURLLoopbackProvider is the issue scenario reproduced
-// at the unit level: a loopback authURL must produce a real redirect URL
-// when allowLoopbackHosts is set, and the pre-fix behavior (empty string,
-// the infinite-redirect-loop trigger) must be pinned as the default when it
-// is not.
-func TestIssue154BuildAuthURLLoopbackProvider(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("allowLoopbackHosts=true builds a real auth URL", func(t *testing.T) {
-		middleware := createMinimalMiddleware()
-		middleware.allowLoopbackHosts = true
-		middleware.authURL = "http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize"
-		middleware.issuerURL = "http://localhost:8080"
-
-		got := middleware.buildAuthURL("http://localhost:5555/callback", "state123", "nonce456", "")
-
-		if got == "" {
-			t.Fatal("buildAuthURL returned empty string for a loopback provider with allowLoopbackHosts=true")
-		}
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(got, "http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize?") {
-			t.Fatalf("buildAuthURL = %q, want prefix %q", got, "http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize?")
-		}
-		for _, want := range []string{"client_id=", "state=state123", "nonce=nonce456"} {
-			if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
-				t.Fatalf("buildAuthURL = %q, want it to contain %q", got, want)
-			}
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("default allowLoopbackHosts=false pins pre-fix empty-string behavior", func(t *testing.T) {
-		middleware := createMinimalMiddleware() // allowLoopbackHosts left at zero value (false)
-		middleware.authURL = "http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize"
-		middleware.issuerURL = "http://localhost:8080"
-
-		got := middleware.buildAuthURL("http://localhost:5555/callback", "state123", "nonce456", "")
-
-		if got != "" {
-			t.Fatalf("buildAuthURL = %q, want empty string when a loopback provider is not opted in", got)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-// issue154BaseConfig returns a complete, valid Config with the given
-// providerURL, following the minimal-valid-config pattern used elsewhere in
-// this package (e.g. TestRank2And6_InvalidConfigFailsClosed in
-// security_audit_fixes_test.go).
-func issue154BaseConfig(providerURL string) *Config {
-	return &Config{
-		ProviderURL:          providerURL,
-		ClientID:             "test-client",
-		ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
-		CallbackURL:          "/callback",
-		SessionEncryptionKey: "this-is-a-valid-session-key-32b!",
-		RateLimit:            100,
-	}
-}
-
-// TestIssue154NewWithContextDerivation proves NewWithContext derives
-// allowLoopbackHosts from config.ProviderURL at construction time (main.go,
-// the `allowLoopbackHosts: isLoopbackProviderURL(config.ProviderURL)` field
-// initializer). The field is set synchronously before the metadata-discovery
-// goroutine starts, so this needs no live discovery endpoint: the ports used
-// below (a loopback port nothing listens on, and an RFC 2606 .invalid host)
-// only need to fail fast once the background goroutine attempts discovery —
-// Close() cancels that goroutine's context regardless of outcome.
-func TestIssue154NewWithContextDerivation(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("loopback providerURL derives allowLoopbackHosts=true", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// A real httptest server (loopback by construction) so the
-		// background discovery goroutine NewWithContext starts completes
-		// quickly and Close() below does not have to wait out its 10s
-		// goroutine-shutdown timeout for an unreachable host. Mirrors
-		// TestInitializeMetadata's server setup in main_initialization_test.go.
-		var srv *httptest.Server
-		srv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/openid-configuration") {
-				w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-				_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ProviderMetadata{
-					Issuer:   srv.URL,
-					AuthURL:  srv.URL + "/auth",
-					TokenURL: srv.URL + "/token",
-					JWKSURL:  srv.URL + "/jwks",
-				})
-				return
-			}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
-		}))
-		defer srv.Close()
-
-		cfg := issue154BaseConfig(srv.URL)
-		oidc, err := NewWithContext(context.Background(), cfg, nil, "issue154-loopback")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("NewWithContext must accept a valid loopback config, got: %v", err)
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = oidc.Close() }()
-
-		if !oidc.allowLoopbackHosts {
-			t.Fatal("expected allowLoopbackHosts=true for a loopback providerURL")
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("non-loopback providerURL derives allowLoopbackHosts=false", func(t *testing.T) {
-		cfg := issue154BaseConfig("https://provider.invalid")
-		oidc, err := NewWithContext(context.Background(), cfg, nil, "issue154-remote")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("NewWithContext must accept a valid remote config, got: %v", err)
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = oidc.Close() }()
-
-		if oidc.allowLoopbackHosts {
-			t.Fatal("expected allowLoopbackHosts=false for a non-loopback providerURL")
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-// TestIssue154DiscoveryAndURLValidationAgree catches layer drift between the
-// discovery-endpoint sanitizer (updateMetadataEndpoints, which recomputes
-// isLoopbackProviderURL(t.providerURL) itself per its doc comment, since
-// test helpers build &TraefikOidc{} literals without going through
-// NewWithContext) and the outbound URL validator (validateHost, gated on the
-// allowLoopbackHosts field). Both layers must agree that a loopback provider
-// is usable end-to-end: discovery must accept the loopback authURL, and
-// buildAuthURL must build a real URL once allowLoopbackHosts is set to
-// mirror what NewWithContext would have derived.
-func TestIssue154DiscoveryAndURLValidationAgree(t *testing.T) {
-	oidc := &TraefikOidc{
-		providerURL: "http://localhost:8080",
-		logger:      NewLogger("debug"),
-		clientID:    "test-client",
-	}
-
-	metadata := &ProviderMetadata{
-		Issuer:   "http://localhost:8080",
-		AuthURL:  "http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize",
-		TokenURL: "http://localhost:8080/oauth/token",
-		JWKSURL:  "http://localhost:8080/jwks",
-	}
-	oidc.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
-
-	if oidc.authURL == "" {
-		t.Fatal("updateMetadataEndpoints rejected a loopback authURL for a loopback providerURL (discovery layer drift)")
-	}
-
-	// The URL-validation layer must independently agree once
-	// allowLoopbackHosts mirrors what NewWithContext would have derived from
-	// this same loopback providerURL.
-	oidc.allowLoopbackHosts = true
-	if got := oidc.buildAuthURL("http://localhost:5555/callback", "state", "nonce", ""); got == "" {
-		t.Fatal("buildAuthURL returned empty for the discovered loopback authURL with allowLoopbackHosts=true (validation layer drift)")
-	}
-}

main.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
@@ -271,21 +272,6 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 		allowOpaqueTokens:         config.AllowOpaqueTokens,
 		requireTokenIntrospection: config.RequireTokenIntrospection,
 		disableReplayDetection:    config.DisableReplayDetection,
-		// Operator-configured endpoint overrides (issue #152). Applied inside
-		// updateMetadataEndpoints so the override survives every metadata
-		// refresh, not just construction.
-		configRevocationURL:    config.RevocationURL,
-		configEndSessionURL:    config.OIDCEndSessionURL,
-		configIntrospectionURL: config.IntrospectionURL,
-		// Cold-start seed: discovery failure must not lose operator-configured
-		// endpoints; updateMetadataEndpoints re-applies these on every refresh.
-		// Seeding introspectionURL here does not populate metadataSnapshot
-		// (only updateMetadataEndpoints does); all three consumers
-		// (token_introspection.go, token_manager.go, helpers.go) read these
-		// metadataMu-guarded fields directly, not the snapshot.
-		revocationURL:    config.RevocationURL,
-		endSessionURL:    config.OIDCEndSessionURL,
-		introspectionURL: config.IntrospectionURL,
 		scopes: func() []string {
 			userProvidedScopes := deduplicateScopes(config.Scopes)
 
@@ -328,7 +314,6 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 		scopeFilter:               NewScopeFilter(logger), // NEW - for discovery-based scope filtering
 		dcrConfig:                 config.DynamicClientRegistration,
 		allowPrivateIPAddresses:   config.AllowPrivateIPAddresses,
-		allowLoopbackHosts:        isLoopbackProviderURL(config.ProviderURL),
 		minimalHeaders:            config.MinimalHeaders,
 		stripAuthCookies:          config.StripAuthCookies,
 		enableBackchannelLogout:   config.EnableBackchannelLogout,
@@ -419,10 +404,6 @@ func NewWithContext(ctx context.Context, config *Config, next http.Handler, name
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create session manager: %w", err)
 	}
 	t.sessionManager = sessionManager
-	if config.CookiePath != "" {
-		t.sessionManager.cookiePath = config.CookiePath
-		t.logger.Debugf("Using configured cookie path: %s", config.CookiePath)
-	}
 	t.errorRecoveryManager = NewErrorRecoveryManager(t.logger)
 
 	// Initialize token resilience manager with default configuration
@@ -581,11 +562,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata *ProviderMetadata) {
 	// discovered endpoint pointed at a blocked address before the plugin issues
 	// outbound requests to it, so it can never be used to reach the cloud
 	// metadata service or an internal host.
-	// Recomputed from t.providerURL (not the allowLoopbackHosts field) so this
+	allowLoopback := false
-	// stays correct for TraefikOidc values built outside New() (test helpers
+	if pu, err := url.Parse(t.providerURL); err == nil {
-	// construct &TraefikOidc{providerURL: ...} directly, leaving
+		allowLoopback = isLoopbackHost(pu.Hostname())
-	// allowLoopbackHosts at its zero value).
+	}
-	allowLoopback := isLoopbackProviderURL(t.providerURL)
 	sanitize := func(name, raw string) string {
 		if err := t.validateDiscoveredEndpoint(raw, allowLoopback); err != nil {
 			t.logger.Errorf("Ignoring discovered %s endpoint %q: %v", name, raw, err)
@@ -621,20 +601,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata *ProviderMetadata) {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Ignoring discovered issuer %q: host does not match configured providerURL", discoveredIssuer)
 		discoveredIssuer = ""
 	}
-	// Operator-configured endpoint overrides take precedence over discovered
-	// values. They deliberately skip validateDiscoveredEndpoint and the
-	// sameHost pin: those defend against a poisoned discovery document, while
-	// operator config sits at the same trust tier as providerURL itself and is
-	// already gated by isValidSecureURL at config time.
-	if t.configRevocationURL != "" {
-		metadata.RevokeURL = t.configRevocationURL
-	}
-	if t.configEndSessionURL != "" {
-		metadata.EndSessionURL = t.configEndSessionURL
-	}
-	if t.configIntrospectionURL != "" {
-		metadata.IntrospectionURL = t.configIntrospectionURL
-	}
 
 	t.metadataMu.Lock()
 

session.go

@@ -423,7 +423,6 @@ type SessionManager struct {
 	cancel         context.CancelFunc
 	cookieDomain   string
 	cookiePrefix   string
-	cookiePath     string
 	sessionMaxAge  time.Duration
 	activeSessions int64
 	poolHits       int64
@@ -906,12 +905,7 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) EnhanceSessionSecurity(options *sessions.Options, r *h
 	}
 
 	options.HttpOnly = true
-	// Use configured cookie path (default "/" for backward compatibility)
+	options.Path = "/" // Ensure cookies are available on all paths for OAuth flow
-	cookiePath := sm.cookiePath
-	if cookiePath == "" {
-		cookiePath = "/"
-	}
-	options.Path = cookiePath
 
 	if sm.cookieDomain != "" {
 		options.Domain = sm.cookieDomain

settings.go

@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	RoleClaimName             string                           `json:"roleClaimName,omitempty"`
 	CookieDomain              string                           `json:"cookieDomain"`
 	OIDCEndSessionURL         string                           `json:"oidcEndSessionURL"`
-	// IntrospectionURL overrides the RFC 7662 token introspection endpoint.
-	// Set it when the IdP omits introspection_endpoint from discovery. It
-	// takes precedence over the discovered value.
-	IntrospectionURL      string            `json:"introspectionURL"`
 	Scopes                    []string                         `json:"scopes"`
 	AllowedRolesAndGroups     []string                         `json:"allowedRolesAndGroups"`
 	ExcludedURLs              []string                         `json:"excludedURLs"`
@@ -88,13 +84,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	AllowPrivateIPAddresses   bool   `json:"allowPrivateIPAddresses,omitempty"`
 	MinimalHeaders            bool   `json:"minimalHeaders,omitempty"`
 	StripAuthCookies          bool   `json:"stripAuthCookies,omitempty"`
-	// CookiePath restricts session cookies to a specific path prefix instead of "/".
-	// When traefikoidc protects some but not all paths on a domain, set this to the
-	// middleware's path prefix (e.g. "/app-protegido") so the browser does not send
-	// the OIDC session cookies to unprotected paths — preventing "Request Header
-	// Or Cookie Too Large" (431) errors on those paths.
-	// Default "/" (all paths, current behaviour).
-	CookiePath                string                           `json:"cookiePath,omitempty"`
 	EnableBackchannelLogout   bool   `json:"enableBackchannelLogout,omitempty"`
 	EnableFrontchannelLogout  bool   `json:"enableFrontchannelLogout,omitempty"`
 	BackchannelLogoutURL      string `json:"backchannelLogoutURL,omitempty"`
@@ -494,10 +483,6 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 	if c.OIDCEndSessionURL != "" && !isValidSecureURL(c.OIDCEndSessionURL) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("oidcEndSessionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL")
 	}
-	// Validate introspection URL if set
-	if c.IntrospectionURL != "" && !isValidSecureURL(c.IntrospectionURL) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("introspectionURL must be a valid HTTPS URL")
-	}
 
 	// Validate post-logout redirect URI if set
 	if c.PostLogoutRedirectURI != "" && c.PostLogoutRedirectURI != "/" {
@@ -686,18 +671,6 @@ func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-// isLoopbackProviderURL reports whether providerURL's host is loopback
-// (localhost or a loopback IP literal). Used at construction time to derive
-// allowLoopbackHosts, so local-development providers are not blocked by
-// validateHost's outbound URL checks.
-func isLoopbackProviderURL(providerURL string) bool {
-	pu, err := url.Parse(providerURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return isLoopbackHost(pu.Hostname())
-}
-
 // isValidLogLevel checks if the provided log level string is one of the supported values ("debug", "info", "error").
 //
 // Parameters:

types.go

@@ -161,16 +161,6 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	clientAuthMethod           string
 	clientAssertion            *ClientAssertionSigner
 	registrationURL            string
-	// configRevocationURL, configEndSessionURL, and configIntrospectionURL
-	// hold operator-configured endpoint overrides (Config.RevocationURL,
-	// Config.OIDCEndSessionURL, Config.IntrospectionURL). They are set once at
-	// construction and never mutated afterwards, so they are read lock-free,
-	// the same contract as providerURL, which updateMetadataEndpoints already
-	// reads unlocked. A manual override always wins over discovery; an empty
-	// string means use the discovered value.
-	configRevocationURL       string
-	configEndSessionURL       string
-	configIntrospectionURL    string
 	backchannelLogoutPath      string
 	frontchannelLogoutPath     string
 	scopesSupported            []string
@@ -188,11 +178,6 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	enableFrontchannelLogout   bool
 	requireTokenIntrospection  bool
 	allowPrivateIPAddresses    bool
-	// allowLoopbackHosts permits loopback/localhost hosts in outbound URL
-	// validation (validateHost). Derived at construction time from a loopback
-	// providerURL (local development), never operator-set directly. Mirrors
-	// the allowLoopback derivation in updateMetadataEndpoints.
-	allowLoopbackHosts       bool
 	disableReplayDetection     bool
 	allowOpaqueTokens          bool
 	strictAudienceValidation   bool

url_helpers.go

@@ -390,15 +390,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
 
 	ip := net.ParseIP(hostname)
 	if ip != nil {
-		// Loopback addresses are blocked by default, but allowed when the
+		// Always block loopback, link-local, and multicast addresses
-		// plugin was constructed with a loopback providerURL (local
+		if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
-		// development) — see allowLoopbackHosts.
-		if ip.IsLoopback() && !t.allowLoopbackHosts {
-			return fmt.Errorf("access to loopback/link-local IP addresses is not allowed: %s", ip.String())
-		}
-
-		// Link-local and multicast addresses are always blocked.
-		if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
 			return fmt.Errorf("access to loopback/link-local IP addresses is not allowed: %s", ip.String())
 		}
 
@@ -412,22 +405,16 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Always blocked regardless of allowLoopbackHosts: these have no IP-branch
+	dangerousHosts := map[string]bool{
-	// backstop (net.ParseIP returns nil for hostnames), so bypassing them
+		"localhost":                true,
-	// would open an SSRF path to the cloud metadata service.
+		"127.0.0.1":                true,
-	alwaysDangerousHosts := map[string]bool{
+		"::1":                      true,
 		"0.0.0.0":                  true,
 		"169.254.169.254":          true,
 		"metadata.google.internal": true,
 	}
 
-	if alwaysDangerousHosts[strings.ToLower(hostname)] {
+	if dangerousHosts[strings.ToLower(hostname)] {
-		return fmt.Errorf("access to dangerous hostname is not allowed: %s", hostname)
-	}
-
-	// localhost/loopback literals are blocked unless allowLoopbackHosts
-	// permits them (see allowLoopbackHosts doc comment on TraefikOidc).
-	if !t.allowLoopbackHosts && isLoopbackHost(hostname) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("access to dangerous hostname is not allowed: %s", hostname)
 	}
 

utilities.go

@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) Close() error {
 				transport.CloseIdleConnections()
 				t.safeLogDebug("Token HTTP client idle connections closed")
 			}
-			if t.httpClient == nil || t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport != t.httpClient.Transport {
+			if t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport != t.httpClient.Transport {
 				if transport, ok := t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
 					transport.CloseIdleConnections()
 					t.safeLogDebug("Token HTTP client transport closed (separate from main)")

version.go

@@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ const devPluginVersion = "0.0.0-dev"
 // from build info at runtime (debug.ReadBuildInfo sees Traefik's build graph,
 // not the interpreted plugin). This build-stamped constant is therefore the
 // single source of truth for the version reported by anonymous usage telemetry.
-const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.34"
+const traefikoidcPluginVersion = "1.0.29"