Memory leak fixes and optimisations.

1. ✅ HTTPS Detection Fixed (session.go:723)
- Now uses X-Forwarded-Proto header instead of r.URL.Scheme
- Properly detects HTTPS in reverse proxy environments
2. ✅ SameSite Cookie Attribute Fixed
- Removed automatic SameSiteStrictMode for HTTPS (would break OAuth)
- Keeps SameSiteLaxMode to allow OAuth callbacks from external domains
- Only uses Strict for AJAX requests which don't involve OAuth redirects
3. ✅ Cookie Domain Handling Fixed
- Now respects X-Forwarded-Host header for cookie domain
- Ensures cookies are set for the public domain, not internal proxy domain
4. ✅ EnhanceSessionSecurity Properly Integrated
- Function is now actually called during session save
- Applies security enhancements without breaking OAuth flow

Why Issue #53 Failed Before:

1. Cookies were not marked Secure in HTTPS environments (browser wouldn't send them back)
2. If they had been Secure with SameSite=Strict, Azure callbacks would still fail
3. Cookie domain might have been wrong (internal vs public domain)

Why It Works Now:

1. Cookies are properly marked Secure for HTTPS
2. Uses SameSite=Lax to allow OAuth provider callbacks
3. Cookie domain uses public domain from X-Forwarded-Host
4. CSRF token persists through the entire OAuth flow

azure_oauth_callback_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestAzureOAuthCallbackScenario tests the exact scenario from issue #53
+// This test ensures that cookies set during OAuth initiation are available
+// during the callback from Azure AD
+func TestAzureOAuthCallbackScenario(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Azure_OAuth_Complete_Flow", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Step 1: User visits https://app.example.com/protected
+		// Traefik receives this as http://internal/protected with headers
+		initReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/protected", nil)
+		initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+		initReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)")
+		initReq.Host = "internal" // The actual host Traefik sees
+
+		// Get session and prepare for OAuth
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(initReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set OAuth flow data
+		csrfToken := "azure-csrf-state-token"
+		nonce := "azure-nonce-value"
+		codeVerifier := "pkce-code-verifier"
+
+		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session.SetNonce(nonce)
+		session.SetCodeVerifier(codeVerifier)
+		session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
+		session.MarkDirty()
+
+		// Save session
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(initReq, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Examine the cookies that would be sent to the browser
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "Cookies must be set for OAuth flow")
+
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie, "Main session cookie must be set")
+
+		// Verify cookie attributes for Azure OAuth
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie MUST be Secure for HTTPS")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite,
+			"MUST be Lax to allow Azure callback from different domain")
+		assert.Equal(t, "app.example.com", mainCookie.Domain,
+			"Domain must match X-Forwarded-Host for browser to send it back")
+		assert.Equal(t, "/", mainCookie.Path, "Path must be root")
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.HttpOnly, "HttpOnly for security")
+
+		// Step 2: User is redirected to Azure AD login
+		// Azure AD redirects back to https://app.example.com/oidc/callback?code=xxx&state=xxx
+		// Traefik receives this as http://internal/oidc/callback with headers
+
+		callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET",
+			"http://internal/oidc/callback?code=AzureAuthCode&state="+csrfToken, nil)
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)")
+		callbackReq.Host = "internal"
+
+		// Browser sends cookies because:
+		// 1. Request is to https://app.example.com (matches cookie domain)
+		// 2. Cookie has Secure flag and request is HTTPS
+		// 3. Cookie has SameSite=Lax which allows top-level navigation from Azure
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		// Get session in callback
+		callbackSession, err := sessionManager.GetSession(callbackReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify session data is available - THIS WAS FAILING IN ISSUE #53
+		retrievedCSRF := callbackSession.GetCSRF()
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, retrievedCSRF,
+			"CSRF token MUST be available in callback (was missing in issue #53)")
+
+		retrievedNonce := callbackSession.GetNonce()
+		assert.Equal(t, nonce, retrievedNonce,
+			"Nonce MUST be available for security validation")
+
+		retrievedCodeVerifier := callbackSession.GetCodeVerifier()
+		assert.Equal(t, codeVerifier, retrievedCodeVerifier,
+			"PKCE verifier MUST be available for token exchange")
+
+		retrievedPath := callbackSession.GetIncomingPath()
+		assert.Equal(t, "/protected", retrievedPath,
+			"Original path MUST be available for post-auth redirect")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Cookie_Not_Sent_With_Wrong_Domain", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test verifies that cookies with wrong domain won't be sent
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Initial request sets cookie for app.example.com
+		initReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/protected", nil)
+		initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+		initReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(initReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		session.SetCSRF("test-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(initReq, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Callback comes to different domain
+		callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/oidc/callback", nil)
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "different.example.com") // Different domain!
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		// Browser wouldn't send cookies because domain doesn't match
+		// So we simulate that by not adding cookies
+
+		callbackSession, err := sessionManager.GetSession(callbackReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Session should be empty
+		assert.Empty(t, callbackSession.GetCSRF(),
+			"CSRF should be empty when cookies aren't sent due to domain mismatch")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("SameSite_Strict_Would_Break_OAuth", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test demonstrates why we can't use SameSite=Strict for OAuth
+		// With Strict, cookies wouldn't be sent when redirecting from Azure to our app
+
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// If we had SameSite=Strict (which we don't anymore), the browser would:
+		// 1. Set cookie when user visits app.example.com
+		// 2. NOT send cookie when Azure redirects back to app.example.com/callback
+		// This is because the request originates from login.microsoftonline.com
+
+		// Our fix ensures we use SameSite=Lax which allows top-level navigation
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		session.SetCSRF("test")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, cookie.SameSite,
+					"Must use Lax, not Strict, for OAuth to work")
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}

csrf_session_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestCSRFTokenSessionManagement tests the session management changes that fix the login loop
+func TestCSRFTokenSessionManagement(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test that CSRF tokens persist through the authentication flow
+	t.Run("CSRF_Token_Persists_After_Selective_Clear", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Create a session manager
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Create initial request
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set initial values
+		csrfToken := "critical-csrf-token"
+		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session.SetNonce("test-nonce")
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.SetEmail("[email protected]")
+		session.SetAccessToken("old-access-token")
+		session.SetRefreshToken("old-refresh-token")
+		session.SetIDToken("old-id-token")
+
+		// Save session
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Get cookies
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+
+		// Create new request with cookies (simulating redirect back)
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test2", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		// Get session again
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify all values are there
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session2.GetCSRF())
+		assert.Equal(t, "test-nonce", session2.GetNonce())
+		assert.True(t, session2.GetAuthenticated())
+
+		// Now perform selective clearing (as done in the fix)
+		session2.SetAuthenticated(false)
+		session2.SetEmail("")
+		session2.SetAccessToken("")
+		session2.SetRefreshToken("")
+		session2.SetIDToken("")
+		// Clear OIDC flow values from previous attempts
+		session2.SetNonce("")
+		session2.SetCodeVerifier("")
+
+		// CRITICAL: CSRF token should still be there
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session2.GetCSRF(), "CSRF token must persist after selective clearing")
+
+		// Save again
+		rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session2.Save(req2, rec2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify CSRF token persists in new session
+		req3 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/callback", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range rec2.Result().Cookies() {
+			req3.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session3, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session3.GetCSRF(), "CSRF token must persist across saves")
+	})
+
+	// Test that marking session as dirty forces save
+	t.Run("Mark_Dirty_Forces_Session_Save", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set CSRF token
+		csrfToken := "test-csrf-token"
+		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+
+		// Mark as dirty explicitly
+		session.MarkDirty()
+
+		// Save should work even if no apparent changes
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookie was set
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		assert.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "Cookies should be set after save")
+
+		// Find main session cookie
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie, "Main session cookie should be set")
+	})
+
+	// Test Azure-specific session handling
+	t.Run("Azure_Session_Cookie_Configuration", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate Azure callback scenario
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/oidc/callback?code=test&state=test-csrf", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set values as would happen in auth flow
+		session.SetCSRF("test-csrf")
+		session.SetNonce("test-nonce")
+
+		// Save with proper cookie settings
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Check cookie attributes
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				// Azure requires SameSite=Lax for cross-site redirects
+				assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, cookie.SameSite, "SameSite should be Lax for Azure compatibility")
+				assert.Equal(t, "/", cookie.Path, "Path should be root")
+				assert.True(t, cookie.HttpOnly, "Cookie should be HttpOnly")
+				// In production, Secure would be true, but false in test
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	// Test session continuity through auth flow
+	t.Run("Session_Continuity_Through_Auth_Flow", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Step 1: Initial request
+		req1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
+		session1, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate auth initiation
+		csrfToken := "auth-flow-csrf-token"
+		nonce := "auth-flow-nonce"
+		session1.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session1.SetNonce(nonce)
+		session1.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
+
+		// Force save
+		session1.MarkDirty()
+		rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session1.Save(req1, rec1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec1.Result().Cookies()
+		require.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
+
+		// Step 2: Callback request with same cookies
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/oidc/callback?code=test&state="+csrfToken, nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify session continuity
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session2.GetCSRF(), "CSRF token should be maintained")
+		assert.Equal(t, nonce, session2.GetNonce(), "Nonce should be maintained")
+		assert.Equal(t, "/protected", session2.GetIncomingPath(), "Incoming path should be maintained")
+	})
+
+	// Test large token handling doesn't affect CSRF
+	t.Run("Large_Tokens_Dont_Affect_CSRF", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set CSRF first
+		csrfToken := "important-csrf"
+		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+
+		// Add large tokens that might cause chunking
+		largeToken := generateMockJWT(5000)
+		session.SetIDToken(largeToken)
+		session.SetAccessToken(largeToken)
+
+		// Save
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Count cookies
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		mainFound := false
+		chunkCount := 0
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainFound = true
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo_") && strings.Contains(cookie.Name, "_") {
+				chunkCount++
+			}
+		}
+
+		assert.True(t, mainFound, "Main session cookie must exist")
+		t.Logf("Total chunks created: %d", chunkCount)
+
+		// Verify CSRF is still accessible
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test2", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session2.GetCSRF(), "CSRF must be preserved with large tokens")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestAuthFlowWithoutExternalDependencies tests the auth flow without external dependencies
+func TestAuthFlowWithoutExternalDependencies(t *testing.T) {
+	plugin := CreateConfig()
+	plugin.ProviderURL = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/test-tenant/v2.0"
+	plugin.ClientID = "test-client-id"
+	plugin.ClientSecret = "test-client-secret"
+	plugin.CallbackURL = "http://example.com/oidc/callback"
+	plugin.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+	plugin.LogLevel = "debug"
+
+	// Variables removed as they're not used in this test
+
+	// We can't fully initialize TraefikOidc without network access,
+	// but we can test the session management directly
+	sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager(plugin.SessionEncryptionKey, plugin.ForceHTTPS, NewLogger(plugin.LogLevel))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	t.Run("Session_Created_On_Protected_Request", func(t *testing.T) {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Session should be new
+		assert.False(t, session.GetAuthenticated())
+
+		// Set auth flow values
+		session.SetCSRF("test-csrf-token")
+		session.SetNonce("test-nonce")
+		session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Should have set cookies
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		assert.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
+	})
+}
+
+// TestRegressionLoginLoop specifically tests the fix for issue #53
+func TestRegressionLoginLoop(t *testing.T) {
+	// This test verifies that the specific changes made to fix the login loop work correctly
+	sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Simulate the exact flow that was causing the login loop
+	t.Run("Fix_Session_Clear_Timing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Initial request
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set initial session data
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.SetEmail("[email protected]")
+		session.SetAccessToken("old-token")
+		session.SetCSRF("existing-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+
+		// New request with existing session (user hits protected resource again)
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// OLD BEHAVIOR: session.Clear() would have been called here, losing CSRF
+		// NEW BEHAVIOR: Selective clearing
+		session2.SetAuthenticated(false)
+		session2.SetEmail("")
+		session2.SetAccessToken("")
+		session2.SetRefreshToken("")
+		session2.SetIDToken("")
+		session2.SetNonce("")
+		session2.SetCodeVerifier("")
+
+		// CSRF should still exist
+		existingCSRF := session2.GetCSRF()
+		assert.Equal(t, "existing-csrf", existingCSRF, "CSRF should persist through selective clear")
+
+		// Set new auth flow values
+		newCSRF := "new-csrf-for-auth"
+		session2.SetCSRF(newCSRF)
+		session2.SetNonce("new-nonce")
+
+		// Force save
+		session2.MarkDirty()
+		rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session2.Save(req2, rec2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate callback
+		cookies2 := rec2.Result().Cookies()
+		req3 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/oidc/callback?code=test&state="+newCSRF, nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies2 {
+			req3.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session3, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// CSRF should match
+		assert.Equal(t, newCSRF, session3.GetCSRF(), "CSRF token should be available in callback")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Fix_Force_Session_Save", func(t *testing.T) {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set CSRF but don't change authenticated status
+		session.SetCSRF("important-csrf")
+
+		// Without MarkDirty(), the session might not save if the session manager
+		// doesn't detect the change. The fix ensures we call MarkDirty()
+		session.MarkDirty()
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookie was actually set
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		found := false
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				found = true
+				assert.NotEmpty(t, cookie.Value, "Cookie should have value")
+			}
+		}
+		assert.True(t, found, "Main session cookie must be set after MarkDirty")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestCSRFValidationTiming tests timing-sensitive CSRF validation scenarios
+func TestCSRFValidationTiming(t *testing.T) {
+	sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	t.Run("Rapid_Redirect_Maintains_CSRF", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Simulate rapid redirect (no delay between auth init and callback)
+		req1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/auth", nil)
+		session1, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		csrfToken := "rapid-redirect-csrf"
+		session1.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session1.MarkDirty()
+
+		rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session1.Save(req1, rec1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Immediate callback (no delay)
+		cookies := rec1.Result().Cookies()
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/callback", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session2.GetCSRF())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Delayed_Redirect_Maintains_CSRF", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Simulate delayed redirect (user takes time at provider)
+		req1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/auth", nil)
+		session1, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		csrfToken := "delayed-redirect-csrf"
+		session1.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session1.MarkDirty()
+
+		rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session1.Save(req1, rec1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate delay
+		time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		// Callback after delay
+		cookies := rec1.Result().Cookies()
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/callback", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, session2.GetCSRF(), "CSRF should persist even with delay")
+	})
+}
+
+// Helper function to generate a mock JWT of specified size
+func generateMockJWT(targetSize int) string {
+	header := "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9"
+	signature := "signature"
+
+	// Calculate payload size needed
+	overhead := len(header) + len(signature) + 2 // 2 dots
+	payloadSize := targetSize - overhead
+
+	// Create payload with padding
+	payload := map[string]interface{}{
+		"sub":     "1234567890",
+		"name":    "Test User",
+		"iat":     time.Now().Unix(),
+		"exp":     time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
+		"padding": strings.Repeat("x", payloadSize-100), // Leave room for JSON structure
+	}
+
+	payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
+	payloadB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadJSON)
+
+	return header + "." + payloadB64 + "." + signature
+}

error_recovery.go

@@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ type CircuitBreakerConfig struct {
 // DefaultCircuitBreakerConfig returns default circuit breaker configuration
 func DefaultCircuitBreakerConfig() CircuitBreakerConfig {
 	return CircuitBreakerConfig{
-		MaxFailures:  5,
+		MaxFailures:  2,                // Reduced from 5 to open circuit faster
-		Timeout:      30 * time.Second,
+		Timeout:      60 * time.Second, // Increased from 30s to reduce retry frequency
-		ResetTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
+		ResetTimeout: 30 * time.Second, // Increased from 10s to wait longer before retrying
 	}
 }
 

helpers.go

@@ -140,10 +140,16 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange tokens: %w", err)
 	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	defer func() {
+		// Always drain the body before closing to ensure connection can be reused
+		io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}()
 
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-		bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		// Limit body read to prevent memory issues
+		limitReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*10) // 10KB limit
+		bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(limitReader)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token endpoint returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
 	}
 

issue53_regression_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestIssue53Regression tests the specific issue reported in GitHub issue #53
+// where Azure OIDC authentication fails with "CSRF token missing in session"
+// This was caused by incorrect HTTPS detection in reverse proxy environments
+func TestIssue53Regression(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Issue53_CSRF_Missing_In_Session_Fix", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test reproduces the exact scenario from issue #53:
+		// 1. User accesses app via HTTPS through Traefik
+		// 2. Traefik terminates SSL and forwards HTTP internally
+		// 3. Session cookies must be properly configured for HTTPS
+		// 4. CSRF token must persist through the OAuth flow
+
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Step 1: Initial request to protected resource
+		// User accesses https://app.example.com/protected
+		// Traefik forwards as http://internal/protected with X-Forwarded-Proto: https
+		initReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/protected", nil)
+		initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		initReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+		initReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0") // Real browser
+
+		// Get session and set OAuth flow data
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(initReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set CSRF and other OAuth data
+		csrfToken := "csrf-token-for-azure"
+		nonce := "nonce-for-azure"
+		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session.SetNonce(nonce)
+		session.SetCodeVerifier("pkce-verifier")
+		session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
+		session.MarkDirty()
+
+		// Save session - this is where the bug was
+		// Previously: used r.URL.Scheme which is always "http" behind proxy
+		// Now: uses X-Forwarded-Proto header
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(initReq, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookies are secure
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		require.NotEmpty(t, cookies, "Cookies must be set")
+
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie, "Main session cookie must be set")
+
+		// Critical assertions for issue #53
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie MUST have Secure flag for HTTPS (was the bug)")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "MUST use Lax for OAuth callbacks to work")
+		assert.Equal(t, "/", mainCookie.Path, "Cookie path must be root")
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.HttpOnly, "Cookie must be HttpOnly")
+		assert.Equal(t, "app.example.com", mainCookie.Domain, "Domain should use X-Forwarded-Host")
+
+		// Step 2: OAuth provider redirects back to callback
+		// Azure redirects to https://app.example.com/oidc/callback?code=...&state=...
+		// Traefik forwards as http://internal/oidc/callback with headers
+		callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET",
+			"http://internal/oidc/callback?code=azure-auth-code&state="+csrfToken, nil)
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		// Add cookies from initial request
+		// Browser sends secure cookies because request is HTTPS
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		// Get session in callback
+		callbackSession, err := sessionManager.GetSession(callbackReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify CSRF token is present (was missing in issue #53)
+		retrievedCSRF := callbackSession.GetCSRF()
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, retrievedCSRF,
+			"CSRF token MUST persist (was missing in issue #53)")
+
+		// Verify other session data also persists
+		assert.Equal(t, nonce, callbackSession.GetNonce(),
+			"Nonce must persist for security")
+		assert.Equal(t, "pkce-verifier", callbackSession.GetCodeVerifier(),
+			"PKCE verifier must persist")
+		assert.Equal(t, "/protected", callbackSession.GetIncomingPath(),
+			"Original path must persist for redirect after auth")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Issue53_Signature_Verification_With_Secure_Session", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test ensures that once the session is properly maintained,
+		// token signature verification works correctly for Azure tokens
+
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Create authenticated session with Azure tokens
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/api/data", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate successful Azure authentication
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.SetEmail("[email protected]")
+		// Azure may use opaque access tokens
+		session.SetAccessToken("opaque-azure-access-token")
+		session.SetIDToken("eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiYWRtaW4iOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTUxNjIzOTAyMn0.NHVaYe26MbtOYhSKkoKYdFVomg4i8ZJd8_-RU8VNbftc4TSMb4bXP3l3YlNWACwyXPGffz5aXHc6lty1Y2t4SWRqGteragsVdZufDn5BlnJl9pdR_kdVFUsra2rWKEofkZeIC4yWytE58sMIihvo9H1ScmmVwBcQP6XETqYd0aSHp1gOa9RdUPDvoXQ5oqygTqVtxaDr6wUFKrKItgBMzWIdNZ6y7O9E0DhEPTbE9rfBo6KTFsHAZnMg4k68CDp2woYIaXbmYTWcvbzIuHO7_37GT79XdIwkm95QJ7hYC9RiwrV7mesbY4PAahERJawntho0my942XheVLmGwLMBkQ")
+		session.SetRefreshToken("azure-refresh-token")
+
+		// Save with proper security
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify session can be retrieved and tokens are intact
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/api/data", nil)
+		req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		assert.True(t, session2.GetAuthenticated(), "User should remain authenticated")
+		assert.Equal(t, "[email protected]", session2.GetEmail())
+		assert.NotEmpty(t, session2.GetAccessToken(), "Access token should persist")
+		assert.NotEmpty(t, session2.GetIDToken(), "ID token should persist")
+		assert.NotEmpty(t, session2.GetRefreshToken(), "Refresh token should persist")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Issue53_Redirect_Loop_Prevention", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test verifies the redirect loop prevention mechanism
+		// that was added to handle authentication failures gracefully
+
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/protected", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate multiple redirect attempts
+		for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+			session.IncrementRedirectCount()
+		}
+
+		// Verify redirect count is tracked
+		count := session.GetRedirectCount()
+		assert.Equal(t, 3, count, "Redirect count should be tracked")
+
+		// After successful auth, count should be reset
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.ResetRedirectCount()
+		assert.Equal(t, 0, session.GetRedirectCount(), "Count should reset after auth")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestReverseProxySameSiteHandling tests SameSite cookie attribute handling
+// in different reverse proxy scenarios
+func TestReverseProxySameSiteHandling(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("SameSite_Lax_For_HTTPS_OAuth", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// HTTPS request via proxy
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		session.SetCSRF("test")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// HTTPS should use Lax mode for OAuth compatibility
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, cookie.SameSite,
+					"HTTPS should use Lax SameSite for OAuth callbacks")
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("SameSite_Lax_For_HTTP", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Plain HTTP request (no proxy headers)
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		session.SetCSRF("test")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// HTTP should use Lax mode for compatibility
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, cookie.SameSite,
+					"HTTP should use Lax SameSite for compatibility")
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}

issue60_integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestIssue60Integration tests the complete fix for issue #60
+// This test verifies that the plugin can handle missing claim fields without panicking
+func TestIssue60Integration(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Config_With_Safe_Functions_Validates", func(t *testing.T) {
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// Templates using safe functions for missing fields
+		config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-Dept", Value: "{{default \"unknown\" .Claims.department}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-Groups", Value: "{{with .Claims.groups}}{{.}}{{end}}"},
+		}
+
+		// Configuration should validate successfully
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "Config with safe template functions should validate")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Direct_Template_Access_Works", func(t *testing.T) {
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// Direct claim access (will return <no value> if missing with missingkey=zero)
+		config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			{Name: "X-Internal-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
+		}
+
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "Direct claim access should validate")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Config_Rejects_Dangerous_Templates", func(t *testing.T) {
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// Dangerous template patterns should be rejected
+		dangerousTemplates := []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-Bad-1", Value: "{{call .SomeFunc}}"},
+			{Name: "X-Bad-2", Value: "{{range .Items}}{{.}}{{end}}"},
+			{Name: "X-Bad-3", Value: "{{index .Array 0}}"},
+			{Name: "X-Bad-4", Value: "{{printf \"%s\" .Data}}"},
+		}
+
+		for _, header := range dangerousTemplates {
+			config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{header}
+			err := config.Validate()
+			require.Error(t, err, "Dangerous template should be rejected: %s", header.Value)
+			assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "dangerous", "Error should mention dangerous pattern")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Verify_Template_Execution_Context", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test verifies that our template context matches what's actually used
+		// The context should have these fields (all capitalized):
+		// - AccessToken
+		// - IDToken (or IdToken)
+		// - RefreshToken
+		// - Claims (map[string]interface{})
+
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// These should all be valid based on the actual template context
+		validContextTemplates := []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-Access-Token", Value: "{{.AccessToken}}"},
+			{Name: "X-ID-Token", Value: "{{.IdToken}}"},
+			{Name: "X-Refresh-Token", Value: "{{.RefreshToken}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-Sub", Value: "{{.Claims.sub}}"},
+		}
+
+		config.Headers = validContextTemplates
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "All valid context fields should pass validation")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Common_Azure_AD_Claims", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test Azure AD specific claims mentioned in issue #60
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// Azure AD commonly uses these claim fields
+		config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-OID", Value: "{{.Claims.oid}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-TID", Value: "{{.Claims.tid}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-UPN", Value: "{{.Claims.upn}}"},
+			{Name: "X-Internal-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"}, // Custom claim from issue #60
+		}
+
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "Azure AD claims should validate")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestIssue60RealWorldScenarios tests real-world scenarios from issue #60
+func TestIssue60RealWorldScenarios(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Missing_Internal_Role_Field", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This is the exact scenario from issue #60
+		// User passes {{.Claims.internal_role}} but the field doesn't exist
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// The problematic template from issue #60
+		config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-Internal-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
+		}
+
+		// Should validate (internal_role is in the safe fields list)
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "Template with internal_role should validate")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Safe_Access_Patterns_From_Guide", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test all the safe patterns documented in TEMPLATE_HEADERS_GUIDE.md
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// All safe patterns from the guide
+		config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+			// Basic field access
+			{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
+
+			// Using the get function
+			{Name: "X-User-Role-Get", Value: "{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}"},
+
+			// Using the default function
+			{Name: "X-User-Role-Default", Value: "{{default \"guest\" .Claims.role}}"},
+
+			// Nested fields with 'with'
+			{Name: "X-User-Admin", Value: "{{with .Claims.groups}}{{.admin}}{{end}}"},
+		}
+
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "All safe patterns from guide should validate")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestIssue60DoubleProcessingConcern tests the user's specific concern about double processing
+func TestIssue60DoubleProcessingConcern(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Template_Not_Evaluated_During_Config_Parse", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// The user was concerned that templates might be processed twice:
+		// 1. Once when Traefik parses the config
+		// 2. Once when the plugin executes the template
+
+		// This test verifies that templates are stored as strings during config parsing
+		config := &Config{
+			Headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-Test", Value: "{{.Claims.test}}"},
+			},
+		}
+
+		// The template should still be a raw string after config creation
+		assert.Equal(t, "{{.Claims.test}}", config.Headers[0].Value,
+			"Template should remain as raw string in config")
+
+		// The template is only parsed/executed when the plugin initializes and processes requests
+		// Not during config unmarshaling
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Functions_Preserved_Through_Config_Marshaling", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test that our custom function syntax survives config marshaling/unmarshaling
+		originalValue := `{{get .Claims "internal_role"}}`
+		header := TemplatedHeader{
+			Name:  "X-Role",
+			Value: originalValue,
+		}
+
+		// Even after any marshaling/unmarshaling, the template string should be preserved
+		assert.Equal(t, originalValue, header.Value,
+			"Template with functions should be preserved exactly")
+	})
+}

jwk.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"sync"
@@ -43,8 +44,6 @@ type JWKSet struct {
 // network requests. The cache supports expiration and automatic
 // refresh when keys expire.
 type JWKCache struct {
-	expiresAt     time.Time
-	jwks          *JWKSet
 	internalCache *Cache
 	CacheLifetime time.Duration
 	maxSize       int
@@ -88,30 +87,22 @@ func NewJWKCache() *JWKCache {
 }
 
 func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*JWKSet, error) {
-	// First check if we already have cached JWKS for this URL
+	// Use only the internalCache for storage to avoid double storage
 	if c.internalCache != nil {
 		if cachedJwks, found := c.internalCache.Get(jwksURL); found {
 			return cachedJwks.(*JWKSet), nil
 		}
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Fix race condition in double-checked locking
-	// First read check with read lock
-	c.mutex.RLock()
-	if c.jwks != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
-		jwks := c.jwks // Copy reference while holding read lock
-		c.mutex.RUnlock()
-		return jwks, nil
-	}
-	c.mutex.RUnlock()
-
 	// Acquire write lock for potential update
 	c.mutex.Lock()
 	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	// Second check after acquiring write lock (double-checked locking)
+	// Double-check after acquiring write lock
-	if c.jwks != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expiresAt) {
+	if c.internalCache != nil {
-		return c.jwks, nil
+		if cachedJwks, found := c.internalCache.Get(jwksURL); found {
+			return cachedJwks.(*JWKSet), nil
+		}
 	}
 
 	// Fetch new JWKS
@@ -125,15 +116,12 @@ func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWKS response contains no keys")
 	}
 
-	// Update cache atomically
+	// Store in the internalCache only (avoid double storage)
-	c.jwks = jwks
 	lifetime := c.CacheLifetime
 	if lifetime == 0 {
 		lifetime = 1 * time.Hour
 	}
-	c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(lifetime)
 
-	// Also store in the internalCache
 	if c.internalCache != nil {
 		c.internalCache.Set(jwksURL, jwks, lifetime)
 	}
@@ -144,15 +132,10 @@ func (c *JWKCache) GetJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http
 // Cleanup removes the cached JWKS if it has expired.
 // This is intended to be called periodically to ensure stale JWKS data is cleared.
 // Cleanup removes expired entries from the cache.
-// It acquires a write lock and checks if the cached JWKS
+// It delegates to the internal cache's cleanup method.
-// has exceeded its expiration time.
 func (c *JWKCache) Cleanup() {
-	c.mutex.Lock()
+	if c.internalCache != nil {
-	defer c.mutex.Unlock()
+		c.internalCache.Cleanup()
-
-	now := time.Now()
-	if c.jwks != nil && now.After(c.expiresAt) {
-		c.jwks = nil
 	}
 }
 
@@ -194,7 +177,11 @@ func fetchJWKS(ctx context.Context, jwksURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*J
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: %w", err)
 	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	defer func() {
+		// Always drain the body before closing to ensure connection can be reused
+		io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}()
 
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: unexpected status code %d", resp.StatusCode)

jwt.go

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ func cleanupReplayCache() {
 	if replayCache != nil {
 		replayCache.Close()
 		replayCache = nil
+		// Reset the once to allow re-initialization
+		replayCacheOnce = sync.Once{}
 	}
 }
 

main.go

@@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ func createDefaultHTTPClient() *http.Client {
 		ForceAttemptHTTP2:     true,
 		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   3 * time.Second,  // TLS handshake timeout
 		ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,  // Timeout for 100-continue responses
-		MaxIdleConns:          20,               // Maximum idle connections across all hosts
+		MaxIdleConns:          10,               // Reduced from 20 to prevent memory buildup
-		MaxIdleConnsPerHost:   5,                // Maximum idle connections per host
+		MaxIdleConnsPerHost:   2,                // Reduced from 5 to limit per-host connections
-		IdleConnTimeout:       60 * time.Second, // Maximum idle time before connection close
+		IdleConnTimeout:       30 * time.Second, // Reduced from 60 to close idle connections faster
 		DisableKeepAlives:     false,            // Enable connection reuse
-		MaxConnsPerHost:       20,               // Maximum connections per host
+		MaxConnsPerHost:       10,               // Reduced from 20 to limit concurrent connections
 		ResponseHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,  // Timeout for reading response headers
 		DisableCompression:    false,            // Enable compression for bandwidth efficiency
 		WriteBufferSize:       4096,             // Write buffer size for connections
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ const (
 var (
 	globalCacheManager *CacheManager
 	cacheManagerOnce   sync.Once
+	cacheManagerMutex  sync.RWMutex
 )
 
 // CacheManager provides shared cache instances across middleware instances
@@ -198,6 +199,23 @@ func (cm *CacheManager) Close() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// CleanupGlobalCacheManager cleans up the global cache manager singleton.
+// This should be called during application shutdown to prevent memory leaks.
+// It's safe to call multiple times.
+func CleanupGlobalCacheManager() error {
+	cacheManagerMutex.Lock()
+	defer cacheManagerMutex.Unlock()
+
+	if globalCacheManager != nil {
+		err := globalCacheManager.Close()
+		globalCacheManager = nil
+		// Reset the once to allow re-initialization if needed
+		cacheManagerOnce = sync.Once{}
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // TokenVerifier defines the contract for token verification implementations.
 // Implementations should validate token format, signature, and claims.
 type TokenVerifier interface {
@@ -366,8 +384,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token too short to be valid JWT")
 	}
 
-	if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(token); exists && blacklisted != nil {
+	if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token is blacklisted (raw string) in cache")
+		if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(token); exists && blacklisted != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("token is blacklisted (raw string) in cache")
+		}
 	}
 
 	// Parse JWT to extract JTI for blacklist checking before cache lookup
@@ -391,8 +411,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
 
 	if jti, ok := parsedJWT.Claims["jti"].(string); ok && jti != "" {
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(token, "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6InRlc3Qta2V5LWlkIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0") {
-			if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(jti); exists && blacklisted != nil {
+			if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("token replay detected (jti: %s) in cache", jti)
+				if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(jti); exists && blacklisted != nil {
+					return fmt.Errorf("token replay detected (jti: %s) in cache", jti)
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -445,8 +467,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
 		}
 
 		// Always blacklist the JTI in the tokenBlacklist for replay detection
-		t.tokenBlacklist.Set(jti, true, time.Until(expiry))
+		if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-		t.logger.Debugf("Added JTI %s to blacklist cache", jti)
+			t.tokenBlacklist.Set(jti, true, time.Until(expiry))
+			t.logger.Debugf("Added JTI %s to blacklist cache", jti)
+		} else {
+			t.logger.Errorf("Token blacklist not available, skipping JTI %s blacklist", jti)
+		}
 
 		// Also update the global replayCache for backwards compatibility
 		replayCacheMu.Lock()
@@ -748,11 +774,33 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
 	t.startTokenCleanup()
 	t.tokenExchanger = t // Initialize the interface field to self
 
-	// Initialize and parse header templates
+	// Initialize and parse header templates with safe field access
 	t.headerTemplates = make(map[string]*template.Template)
+
+	// Create custom template functions for safe field access
+	funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+		// "default" returns a default value if the input is nil or empty
+		"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
+			if val == nil || val == "" {
+				return defaultVal
+			}
+			return val
+		},
+		// "get" safely gets a value from a map, returning empty string if not found
+		"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+			if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+				if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+					return val
+				}
+			}
+			return ""
+		},
+	}
+
 	for _, header := range config.Headers {
-		// Use a default empty template to set a proper name for error reporting
+		// Create template with custom functions and missingkey=zero option
-		tmpl := template.New(header.Name)
+		// This prevents panics when accessing non-existent fields
+		tmpl := template.New(header.Name).Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")
 
 		// Parse the template with proper error handling
 		parsedTmpl, err := tmpl.Parse(header.Value)
@@ -838,16 +886,28 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata *ProviderMetadata) {
 // Parameters:
 //   - providerURL: The base URL of bogged OIDC provider, used for subsequent refresh attempts.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) startMetadataRefresh(providerURL string) {
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Hour)
+	// Use longer interval to reduce memory pressure from refresh attempts
-	t.goroutineWG.Add(1) // Track this goroutine
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(2 * time.Hour) // Increased from 1 hour
+	t.goroutineWG.Add(1)                    // Track this goroutine
 
 	go func() {
 		defer t.goroutineWG.Done() // Signal completion when goroutine exits
 		defer ticker.Stop()        // Ensure ticker is always stopped
 
+		consecutiveFailures := 0
 		for {
 			select {
 			case <-ticker.C:
+				// Skip refresh if we've had too many consecutive failures
+				if consecutiveFailures >= 3 {
+					t.logger.Debug("Skipping metadata refresh due to consecutive failures")
+					consecutiveFailures++ // Still increment to track skips
+					if consecutiveFailures > 10 {
+						consecutiveFailures = 3 // Reset to prevent overflow but keep skipping
+					}
+					continue
+				}
+
 				t.logger.Debug("Refreshing OIDC metadata")
 				var metadata *ProviderMetadata
 				var err error
@@ -858,14 +918,17 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) startMetadataRefresh(providerURL string) {
 					metadata, err = t.metadataCache.GetMetadata(providerURL, t.httpClient, t.logger)
 				}
 				if err != nil {
-					t.logger.Errorf("Failed to refresh metadata: %v", err)
+					consecutiveFailures++
+					t.logger.Errorf("Failed to refresh metadata (attempt %d): %v", consecutiveFailures, err)
 					continue
 				}
 
 				if metadata != nil {
 					t.updateMetadataEndpoints(metadata)
 					t.logger.Debug("Successfully refreshed metadata")
+					consecutiveFailures = 0 // Reset on success
 				} else {
+					consecutiveFailures++
 					t.logger.Error("Received nil metadata during refresh")
 				}
 			case <-t.metadataRefreshStopChan:
@@ -896,11 +959,11 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) startMetadataRefresh(providerURL string) {
 func discoverProviderMetadata(providerURL string, httpClient *http.Client, l *Logger) (*ProviderMetadata, error) {
 	wellKnownURL := strings.TrimSuffix(providerURL, "/") + "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
 
-	// Create retry executor with configuration optimized for test and production environments
+	// Create retry executor with reduced attempts to prevent memory buildup
 	retryConfig := RetryConfig{
-		MaxAttempts:   4,
+		MaxAttempts:   2, // Reduced from 4 to fail faster when provider is down
 		InitialDelay:  10 * time.Millisecond,
-		MaxDelay:      100 * time.Millisecond,
+		MaxDelay:      50 * time.Millisecond, // Reduced from 100ms
 		BackoffFactor: 2.0,
 		EnableJitter:  true,
 		RetryableErrors: []string{
@@ -958,12 +1021,16 @@ func fetchMetadata(wellKnownURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*ProviderMetad
 
 	defer func() {
 		if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
+			// Drain the body before closing to ensure connection can be reused
+			io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
 			resp.Body.Close()
 		}
 	}()
 
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-		bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		// Limit body read to prevent memory issues with large error responses
+		limitReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*10) // 10KB limit
+		bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(limitReader)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch provider metadata from %s: status code %d, body: %s", wellKnownURL, resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
 	}
 
@@ -1028,6 +1095,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 		// Attempt to get a new session to store CSRF etc.
 		session, _ = t.sessionManager.GetSession(req) // Ignore error here, proceed with new session
 		if session != nil {
+			// Ensure session is returned to pool when done
+			defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
 			// Pass rw to ensure expiring cookies are sent if possible
 			if clearErr := session.Clear(req, rw); clearErr != nil {
 				t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing potentially corrupted session: %v", clearErr)
@@ -1045,6 +1114,9 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Ensure session is returned to pool when done
+	defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
+
 	// --- URL Handling (Callback, Logout) ---
 	scheme := t.determineScheme(req)
 	host := t.determineHost(req)
@@ -1398,6 +1470,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) handleCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request,
 		http.Error(rw, "Session error during callback", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
+	// Ensure session is returned to pool when done
+	defer session.returnToPoolSafely()
 
 	t.logger.Debugf("Handling callback, URL: %s", req.URL.String())
 
@@ -2038,16 +2112,20 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) RevokeToken(token string) {
 		if jti, ok := jwt.Claims["jti"].(string); ok && jti != "" {
 			// Add JTI to blacklist as well
 			expiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
-			t.tokenBlacklist.Set(jti, true, time.Until(expiry))
+			if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-			t.logger.Debugf("Locally revoked token JTI %s (added to blacklist)", jti)
+				t.tokenBlacklist.Set(jti, true, time.Until(expiry))
+				t.logger.Debugf("Locally revoked token JTI %s (added to blacklist)", jti)
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	// Add raw token to blacklist with default expiration
 	expiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour) // or other appropriate duration
 	// Use Set with a duration. Value 'true' is arbitrary, we only care about existence.
-	t.tokenBlacklist.Set(token, true, time.Until(expiry))
+	if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-	t.logger.Debugf("Locally revoked token (added to blacklist)")
+		t.tokenBlacklist.Set(token, true, time.Until(expiry))
+		t.logger.Debugf("Locally revoked token (added to blacklist)")
+	}
 }
 
 // RevokeTokenWithProvider attempts to revoke a token directly with the OIDC provider
@@ -2100,11 +2178,17 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) RevokeTokenWithProvider(token, tokenType string) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to send token revocation request: %w", err)
 	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	defer func() {
+		// Always drain the body before closing to ensure connection can be reused
+		io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}()
 
 	// Check the response
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-		body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		// Limit body read to prevent memory issues
+		limitReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*10) // 10KB limit
+		body, _ := io.ReadAll(limitReader)
 		// Log the failure details
 		t.logger.Errorf("Token revocation failed with status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
 		return fmt.Errorf("token revocation failed with status %d", resp.StatusCode)

memory_leak_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"runtime"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestMemoryLeakFixes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Cache cleanup stops properly", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Track goroutine count before starting
+		initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+
+		// Create multiple caches
+		caches := make([]*Cache, 10)
+		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+			caches[i] = NewCache()
+			caches[i].Set("key", "value", time.Hour)
+		}
+
+		// Wait for goroutines to start
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		// Check that goroutines were created
+		afterCreateGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+		if afterCreateGoroutines <= initialGoroutines {
+			t.Error("Expected goroutines to be created for cache cleanup")
+		}
+
+		// Close all caches
+		for _, cache := range caches {
+			cache.Close()
+		}
+
+		// Wait for goroutines to stop
+		time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
+
+		// Check that goroutines were cleaned up
+		finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+		if finalGoroutines > initialGoroutines+2 { // Allow some tolerance
+			t.Errorf("Goroutine leak detected: initial=%d, final=%d", initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Global cache manager cleanup", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Get the global cache manager
+		cm := GetGlobalCacheManager()
+		if cm == nil {
+			t.Fatal("Failed to get global cache manager")
+		}
+
+		// Use the caches
+		cm.GetSharedTokenBlacklist().Set("key", "value", time.Hour)
+		cm.GetSharedTokenCache().Set("key", map[string]interface{}{"test": "data"}, time.Hour)
+
+		// Clean up the global cache manager
+		err := CleanupGlobalCacheManager()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("Failed to cleanup global cache manager: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		// Verify it can be re-initialized
+		cm2 := GetGlobalCacheManager()
+		if cm2 == nil {
+			t.Fatal("Failed to re-initialize global cache manager")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Session pool returns properly", func(t *testing.T) {
+		logger := NewLogger("debug")
+		sm, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-that-is-long-enough-32bytes", false, logger)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		// Create multiple sessions
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+		for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func() {
+				defer wg.Done()
+
+				req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+				session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
+				if err != nil {
+					return
+				}
+
+				// Simulate some work
+				session.SetAccessToken("dummy-access-token")
+
+				// Properly return to pool
+				session.returnToPoolSafely()
+			}()
+		}
+
+		wg.Wait()
+
+		// Check that sessions can still be obtained
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
+		session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("Failed to get session after pool test: %v", err)
+		}
+		if session != nil {
+			session.returnToPoolSafely()
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("HTTP response bodies are drained", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Create a test server
+		server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			// Return a response with body
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			w.Write([]byte(`{"test": "data"}`))
+		}))
+		defer server.Close()
+
+		// Create HTTP client with our fixes
+		client := createDefaultHTTPClient()
+
+		// Make multiple requests
+		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+			resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+
+			// Our fix ensures body is drained
+			resp.Body.Close()
+		}
+
+		// Check that connections are reused (transport should have idle connections)
+		if transport, ok := client.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
+			transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+			// If connections were properly reused, we shouldn't have leaked connections
+			t.Log("HTTP connections properly managed")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Middleware cleanup releases all resources", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Track initial goroutines
+		initialGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+
+		// Create a middleware instance
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-that-is-long-enough-32bytes"
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		})
+
+		handler, err := New(ctx, next, config, "test-middleware")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+
+		// Cast to TraefikOidc to access Close method
+		if middleware, ok := handler.(*TraefikOidc); ok {
+			// Wait for initialization
+			time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+
+			// Close the middleware
+			err := middleware.Close()
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("Failed to close middleware: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			// Wait for cleanup
+			time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+			// Check goroutines
+			finalGoroutines := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+			if finalGoroutines > initialGoroutines+5 { // Allow some tolerance
+				t.Errorf("Possible goroutine leak: initial=%d, final=%d", initialGoroutines, finalGoroutines)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestJWKCacheNoDoubleStorage(t *testing.T) {
+	cache := NewJWKCache()
+	defer cache.Close()
+
+	// Create a test server
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"keys": [{"kty": "RSA", "kid": "test-key", "use": "sig", "n": "test", "e": "AQAB"}]}`))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
+
+	// Get JWKS multiple times
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		jwks, err := cache.GetJWKS(ctx, server.URL, client)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if jwks == nil || len(jwks.Keys) != 1 {
+			t.Error("Expected JWKS with one key")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Verify no double storage by checking cache internals
+	// The cache should only use internalCache, not the jwks field
+	if cache.internalCache == nil {
+		t.Error("Internal cache should be initialized")
+	}
+
+	// Run cleanup
+	cache.Cleanup()
+}
+
+func TestGlobalSingletonCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test memory pool cleanup
+	pools := GetGlobalMemoryPools()
+	if pools == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Failed to get global memory pools")
+	}
+
+	// Use the pools
+	buf := pools.GetHTTPResponseBuffer()
+	pools.PutHTTPResponseBuffer(buf)
+
+	// Clean up
+	CleanupGlobalMemoryPools()
+
+	// Verify it can be re-initialized
+	pools2 := GetGlobalMemoryPools()
+	if pools2 == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Failed to re-initialize global memory pools")
+	}
+}

memory_pools.go

@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ func (p *TokenCompressionPool) PutStringBuilder(sb *strings.Builder) {
 // Global memory pool manager instance
 var globalMemoryPools *MemoryPoolManager
 var memoryPoolOnce sync.Once
+var memoryPoolMutex sync.RWMutex
 
 // GetGlobalMemoryPools returns the singleton memory pool manager
 func GetGlobalMemoryPools() *MemoryPoolManager {
@@ -225,3 +226,18 @@ func GetGlobalMemoryPools() *MemoryPoolManager {
 	})
 	return globalMemoryPools
 }
+
+// CleanupGlobalMemoryPools cleans up the global memory pool manager singleton.
+// This should be called during application shutdown to prevent memory leaks.
+// It's safe to call multiple times.
+func CleanupGlobalMemoryPools() {
+	memoryPoolMutex.Lock()
+	defer memoryPoolMutex.Unlock()
+
+	if globalMemoryPools != nil {
+		// Clear the pools to release any pooled objects
+		globalMemoryPools = nil
+		// Reset the once to allow re-initialization if needed
+		memoryPoolOnce = sync.Once{}
+	}
+}

reverse_proxy_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestReverseProxyHTTPSDetection tests that HTTPS is properly detected in reverse proxy environments
+func TestReverseProxyHTTPSDetection(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("HTTPS_Detection_With_X_Forwarded_Proto", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate request from reverse proxy (Traefik/nginx)
+		// The reverse proxy terminates SSL and forwards HTTP internally
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set critical session data
+		session.SetCSRF("important-csrf-token")
+		session.SetNonce("test-nonce")
+
+		// Save session
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookies have Secure flag when X-Forwarded-Proto is https
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie, "Main session cookie should be set")
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie should have Secure flag when X-Forwarded-Proto is https")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "Should use Lax SameSite for OAuth compatibility")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("HTTPS_Detection_Without_Headers", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Request without reverse proxy headers (direct HTTP)
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("test-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookies don't have Secure flag for plain HTTP
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+		assert.False(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie should not have Secure flag for HTTP")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "Should use Lax SameSite in HTTP")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("HTTPS_Detection_With_ForceHTTPS", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test with forceHTTPS enabled
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", true, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Even without headers, forceHTTPS should make cookies secure
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("forced-secure-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie should have Secure flag with forceHTTPS")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestCSRFPersistenceInReverseProxy tests CSRF token persistence in reverse proxy setups
+func TestCSRFPersistenceInReverseProxy(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("CSRF_Persists_Through_OAuth_Flow_With_Proxy", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Step 1: Initial request to protected resource (HTTPS via proxy)
+		req1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
+		req1.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req1.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")
+
+		session1, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set CSRF and other auth flow data
+		csrfToken := "proxy-csrf-token-12345"
+		session1.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session1.SetNonce("proxy-nonce")
+		session1.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
+
+		// Save session (should set Secure cookie)
+		rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session1.Save(req1, rec1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec1.Result().Cookies()
+
+		// Step 2: Simulate OAuth callback (also HTTPS via proxy)
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/oidc/callback?code=auth-code&state="+csrfToken, nil)
+		req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "example.com")
+
+		// Add cookies from step 1
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		// Get session in callback
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// CSRF token should persist
+		retrievedCSRF := session2.GetCSRF()
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, retrievedCSRF, "CSRF token must persist through OAuth flow in reverse proxy")
+		assert.Equal(t, "proxy-nonce", session2.GetNonce(), "Nonce should also persist")
+		assert.Equal(t, "/protected", session2.GetIncomingPath(), "Incoming path should persist")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Session_Cookie_Domain_With_Proxy_Headers", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Test with X-Forwarded-Host header
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal.local/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "public.example.com")
+		req.Host = "internal.local" // Internal host
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("domain-test-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+
+		// Domain should be set based on X-Forwarded-Host when present
+		// This ensures cookies work correctly with the public domain
+		assert.Equal(t, "public.example.com", mainCookie.Domain, "Cookie domain should use forwarded host")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestAzureOIDCWithReverseProxy simulates Azure OIDC flow behind a reverse proxy
+func TestAzureOIDCWithReverseProxy(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Azure_Provider_Detection_And_Configuration", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// This test verifies Azure-specific provider detection and configuration
+		// without making actual network calls
+
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Step 1: Test session setup for Azure OAuth flow
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/protected", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate OAuth flow initialization
+		csrfToken := "azure-csrf-token"
+		nonce := "azure-nonce"
+		session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
+		session.SetNonce(nonce)
+		session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
+		session.MarkDirty()
+
+		// Save session with proper HTTPS detection
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookies have correct security attributes for Azure
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie, "Main session cookie must be set")
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Cookie must be secure for HTTPS reverse proxy")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "Should use Lax SameSite for OAuth compatibility")
+
+		// Step 2: Simulate callback and verify session persistence
+		callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/oidc/callback?code=azure-code&state="+csrfToken, nil)
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "app.example.com")
+
+		// Add cookies from initial request
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		// Get session in callback
+		callbackSession, err := sessionManager.GetSession(callbackReq)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify session data persisted correctly
+		assert.Equal(t, csrfToken, callbackSession.GetCSRF(), "CSRF token must persist in Azure flow")
+		assert.Equal(t, nonce, callbackSession.GetNonce(), "Nonce must persist")
+		assert.Equal(t, "/protected", callbackSession.GetIncomingPath(), "Original path must persist")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Mixed_HTTP_HTTPS_Requests", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Simulate a scenario where some requests come via HTTPS proxy and some don't
+		// This can happen in development or misconfigured environments
+
+		// Request 1: HTTPS via proxy
+		req1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost:8080/test", nil)
+		req1.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+
+		session1, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		session1.SetCSRF("mixed-csrf")
+
+		rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session1.Save(req1, rec1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies1 := rec1.Result().Cookies()
+
+		// Request 2: Direct HTTP (no proxy headers)
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost:8080/test", nil)
+		// No X-Forwarded-Proto header
+
+		// Try to use cookies from HTTPS request
+		for _, cookie := range cookies1 {
+			// Remove Secure flag to simulate browser behavior
+			// (browser wouldn't send secure cookie over HTTP)
+			if !cookie.Secure {
+				req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+			}
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Session should be empty because secure cookies weren't sent
+		csrf2 := session2.GetCSRF()
+		assert.Empty(t, csrf2, "CSRF should be empty when secure cookies can't be sent over HTTP")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestEnhanceSessionSecurity verifies the security enhancement function
+func TestEnhanceSessionSecurity(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Security_Enhancement_For_AJAX_Requests", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// AJAX request via HTTPS proxy
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal/api/data", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("ajax-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Check that AJAX requests get strict same-site
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteStrictMode, cookie.SameSite, "AJAX requests should use Strict SameSite")
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Security_Enhancement_Missing_User_Agent", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Request without User-Agent (potential bot/attack)
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		// No User-Agent header
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("no-ua-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify reduced session timeout for suspicious requests
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				// Should have reduced MaxAge (half of normal)
+				assert.Less(t, cookie.MaxAge, int(absoluteSessionTimeout.Seconds()), "Suspicious requests should have reduced timeout")
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}

robustness_test.go

@@ -327,12 +327,12 @@ func TestProviderFailureRecovery(t *testing.T) {
 	var requestCount int64
 	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		count := atomic.AddInt64(&requestCount, 1)
-		if count <= 3 {
+		if count <= 1 {
-			// Fail first 3 requests
+			// Fail first request only (we now retry max 2 times)
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
-		// Succeed after 3 failures
+		// Succeed on 2nd attempt
 		metadata := ProviderMetadata{
 			Issuer:        "https://test-issuer.com",
 			AuthURL:       "https://test-issuer.com/auth",
@@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ func TestProviderFailureRecovery(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Expected metadata to be returned after recovery")
 	}
 
-	// Should have taken some time due to retries (at least the sum of delays: 10ms + 20ms + 40ms = 70ms)
+	// Should have taken some time due to retries (with 2 max attempts: ~10ms delay)
-	expectedMinDuration := 70 * time.Millisecond
+	expectedMinDuration := 10 * time.Millisecond
 	if duration < expectedMinDuration {
 		t.Errorf("Expected discovery to take at least %v due to retries, but took %v", expectedMinDuration, duration)
 	}

session.go

@@ -497,13 +497,14 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) EnhanceSessionSecurity(options *sessions.Options, r *h
 		// Apply stricter security settings for production
 		if r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https" || r.TLS != nil || sm.forceHTTPS {
 			options.Secure = true
-			// Enable strict same-site policy for secure connections
+			// IMPORTANT: Keep SameSite as Lax for OAuth flows to work
-			options.SameSite = http.SameSiteStrictMode
+			// Strict mode would block cookies from OAuth provider callbacks
+			// Only use Strict for AJAX requests which don't involve redirects
 		}
 
 		// Additional security headers analysis
 		if r.Header.Get("X-Requested-With") == "XMLHttpRequest" {
-			// AJAX requests get stricter same-site policy
+			// AJAX requests get stricter same-site policy since they don't involve OAuth redirects
 			options.SameSite = http.SameSiteStrictMode
 		}
 	}
@@ -513,13 +514,24 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) EnhanceSessionSecurity(options *sessions.Options, r *h
 
 	// Set secure Domain attribute for production
 	if options.Domain == "" && r != nil {
-		// Extract domain from Host header for proper cookie scoping
+		// In reverse proxy setups, use the original host if available
+		// This ensures cookies work correctly with the public domain
 		host := r.Host
+
+		// Check for X-Forwarded-Host which indicates reverse proxy
+		if forwardedHost := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); forwardedHost != "" {
+			// Use the forwarded host for cookie domain
+			host = forwardedHost
+		}
+
 		if host != "" && !strings.Contains(host, "localhost") && !strings.Contains(host, "127.0.0.1") {
 			// Only set domain for non-local development
 			if colonIndex := strings.Index(host, ":"); colonIndex != -1 {
 				host = host[:colonIndex] // Remove port
 			}
+			// For cookie domain, we might want to use the base domain
+			// to allow cookies to work across subdomains
+			// But for now, use the exact host for security
 			options.Domain = host
 		}
 	}
@@ -719,10 +731,14 @@ func (sd *SessionData) MarkDirty() {
 // Returns:
 //   - An error if saving any of the session components fails.
 func (sd *SessionData) Save(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter) error {
-	isSecure := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Scheme, "https") || sd.manager.forceHTTPS
+	// Properly detect HTTPS in reverse proxy environments
+	isSecure := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https" || r.TLS != nil || sd.manager.forceHTTPS
 
-	// Set options for all sessions.
+	// Get base options and enhance with security settings
 	options := sd.manager.getSessionOptions(isSecure)
+	options = sd.manager.EnhanceSessionSecurity(options, r)
+
+	// Apply enhanced options to all sessions
 	sd.mainSession.Options = options
 	sd.accessSession.Options = options
 	sd.refreshSession.Options = options

session_compatibility_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestSessionCompatibilityAfterChanges ensures our session changes maintain backward compatibility
+func TestSessionCompatibilityAfterChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Plain_HTTP_Without_Proxy_Headers", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test that plain HTTP requests without proxy headers still work
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost:8080/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+		// No X-Forwarded-Proto header
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("plain-http-csrf")
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.SetEmail("[email protected]")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify cookies work for plain HTTP
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		require.NotEmpty(t, cookies)
+
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+
+		// Plain HTTP should NOT have Secure flag
+		assert.False(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Plain HTTP should not have Secure flag")
+		// Should use Lax for compatibility
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "Plain HTTP should use Lax SameSite")
+
+		// Verify session can be retrieved
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost:8080/test2", nil)
+		req2.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		session2, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, "plain-http-csrf", session2.GetCSRF())
+		assert.True(t, session2.GetAuthenticated())
+		assert.Equal(t, "[email protected]", session2.GetEmail())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("HTTPS_With_TLS_Field", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test direct HTTPS connection (not proxied)
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://example.com/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+		// Simulate TLS connection
+		req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("direct-https-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+
+		// Direct HTTPS should have Secure flag
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "Direct HTTPS should have Secure flag")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "HTTPS should use Lax for OAuth compatibility")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("ForceHTTPS_Setting", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test forceHTTPS setting works regardless of request
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", true, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Plain HTTP request
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("forced-https-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+
+		// With forceHTTPS, even HTTP requests get Secure cookies
+		assert.True(t, mainCookie.Secure, "ForceHTTPS should always set Secure flag")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("AJAX_Request_Gets_Strict_SameSite", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// AJAX request
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/api/data", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest")
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0")
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("ajax-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+
+		// AJAX requests always get Strict SameSite
+		assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteStrictMode, mainCookie.SameSite, "AJAX requests should use Strict SameSite")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Missing_UserAgent_Gets_Reduced_Timeout", func(t *testing.T) {
+		sessionManager, err := NewSessionManager("test-encryption-key-32-characters", false, NewLogger("debug"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Request without User-Agent (suspicious)
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+		// No User-Agent
+
+		session, err := sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		session.SetCSRF("no-ua-csrf")
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		var mainCookie *http.Cookie
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			if cookie.Name == "_oidc_raczylo_m" {
+				mainCookie = cookie
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotNil(t, mainCookie)
+
+		// Should have reduced MaxAge for suspicious requests
+		expectedMaxAge := int((absoluteSessionTimeout / 2).Seconds())
+		assert.Equal(t, expectedMaxAge, mainCookie.MaxAge, "Missing User-Agent should get reduced timeout")
+	})
+}

settings.go

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ type TemplatedHeader struct {
 // It provides all necessary settings to configure OpenID Connect authentication
 // with various providers like Auth0, Logto, or any standard OIDC provider.
 type Config struct {
-	HTTPClient                *http.Client
+	HTTPClient                *http.Client      `json:"-"` // Exclude from JSON marshaling
 	ProviderURL               string            `json:"providerURL"`
 	RevocationURL             string            `json:"revocationURL"`
 	CallbackURL               string            `json:"callbackURL"`
@@ -218,11 +218,27 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 
 // validateTemplateSecure validates template expressions for security vulnerabilities
 func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
+	// Allow our specific safe custom functions
+	// These are added specifically to handle missing fields safely (issue #60)
+	safeCustomFunctions := []string{
+		"{{get ",     // Safe map access function
+		"{{default ", // Safe default value function
+	}
+
+	// Check if template uses safe custom functions
+	usesSafeFunctions := false
+	for _, safeFn := range safeCustomFunctions {
+		if strings.Contains(templateStr, safeFn) {
+			usesSafeFunctions = true
+			// These functions are explicitly allowed for safe field access
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Check for dangerous template functions and patterns
+	// Skip certain checks if using our safe functions
 	dangerousPatterns := []string{
-		"{{call",     // Function calls
+		"{{call",     // Function calls (except our safe ones)
 		"{{range",    // Range over arbitrary data
-		"{{with",     // With statements that could access unexpected data
 		"{{define",   // Template definitions
 		"{{template", // Template inclusions
 		"{{block",    // Block definitions
@@ -230,7 +246,7 @@ func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
 		"{{-",        // Trim whitespace (could be used to obfuscate)
 		"-}}",        // Trim whitespace (could be used to obfuscate)
 		"{{printf",   // Printf functions
-		"{{print",    // Print functions
+		"{{print",    // Print functions (but not our safe ones)
 		"{{println",  // Println functions
 		"{{html",     // HTML functions
 		"{{js",       // JavaScript functions
@@ -249,9 +265,31 @@ func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
 		"{{not",      // Logical operations
 	}
 
+	// Allow 'with' for safe conditional access
+	if !strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{with .Claims") {
+		dangerousPatterns = append(dangerousPatterns, "{{with")
+	}
+
 	templateLower := strings.ToLower(templateStr)
 	for _, pattern := range dangerousPatterns {
-		if strings.Contains(templateLower, pattern) {
+		// Skip check if it's one of our safe functions
+		if usesSafeFunctions && (pattern == "{{call" || pattern == "{{print") {
+			// Allow these if we're using safe functions
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Special handling for comparison operators to avoid false positives with "get" and "default"
+		if pattern == "{{ge" && (strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{get ") || strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{default ")) {
+			// Skip {{ge check if we're using the safe {{get or {{default functions
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Skip {{de checks if using {{default
+		if pattern == "{{define" && strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{default ") {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if strings.Contains(templateLower, strings.ToLower(pattern)) {
 			return fmt.Errorf("dangerous template pattern detected: %s", pattern)
 		}
 	}
@@ -262,6 +300,9 @@ func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
 		"{{.IdToken}}",
 		"{{.RefreshToken}}",
 		"{{.Claims.",
+		"{{get ",     // Safe custom function
+		"{{default ", // Safe custom function
+		"{{with ",    // Safe conditional (when used with Claims)
 	}
 
 	// Check if template contains only allowed patterns
@@ -274,13 +315,15 @@ func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
 	}
 
 	if !hasAllowedPattern {
-		return fmt.Errorf("template must use only allowed variables: AccessToken, IdToken, RefreshToken, or Claims.*")
+		return fmt.Errorf("template must use only allowed variables: AccessToken, IdToken, RefreshToken, Claims.*, or safe functions (get, default, with)")
 	}
 
 	// Validate claims access patterns
 	if strings.Contains(templateStr, "{{.Claims.") {
 		// Simple validation - ensure claims access is to known safe fields
+		// This list includes standard OIDC claims and common provider-specific claims
 		safeClaimsFields := map[string]bool{
+			// Standard OIDC claims
 			"email":              true,
 			"name":               true,
 			"given_name":         true,
@@ -293,6 +336,25 @@ func validateTemplateSecure(templateStr string) error {
 			"iat":                true,
 			"groups":             true,
 			"roles":              true,
+			// Common custom claims
+			"internal_role": true, // Custom roles field (issue #60)
+			"role":          true, // Alternative role field
+			"department":    true, // Organization info
+			"organization":  true, // Organization info
+			// Provider-specific claims
+			"realm_access":    true, // Keycloak specific
+			"resource_access": true, // Keycloak specific
+			"oid":             true, // Azure AD object ID
+			"tid":             true, // Azure AD tenant ID
+			"upn":             true, // Azure AD User Principal Name
+			"hd":              true, // Google hosted domain
+			"picture":         true, // Profile picture
+			// Additional standard claims
+			"locale":         true, // User locale
+			"zoneinfo":       true, // Timezone
+			"phone_number":   true, // Contact info
+			"email_verified": true, // Email verification status
+			"updated_at":     true, // Last update time
 		}
 
 		// Extract field names from Claims access

template_processing_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestTemplateDoubleProcessing tests if template strings are being double-processed
+// This addresses the user's concern about potential double processing by the parser
+func TestTemplateDoubleProcessing(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Template_Strings_Not_Double_Processed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Simulate how Traefik passes config to the plugin
+		// Traefik uses YAML/TOML config which gets unmarshaled into the Config struct
+		// yamlConfig example:
+		// headers:
+		//   - name: "X-User-Email"
+		//     value: "{{.Claims.email}}"
+		//   - name: "X-User-Role"
+		//     value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"
+
+		// This simulates what Traefik does internally - it parses YAML/TOML and creates a Config struct
+		// The template strings are NOT processed at this stage, they're just strings
+		config := &Config{
+			Headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
+			},
+		}
+
+		// Verify that template strings are still raw (not processed)
+		assert.Equal(t, "{{.Claims.email}}", config.Headers[0].Value)
+		assert.Equal(t, "{{.Claims.internal_role}}", config.Headers[1].Value)
+
+		// Now simulate what happens when the plugin initializes
+		// The template strings should only be parsed once during initialization
+		headerTemplates := make(map[string]*template.Template)
+
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
+				if val == nil || val == "" || val == "<no value>" {
+					return defaultVal
+				}
+				return val
+			},
+			"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+				if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+						return val
+					}
+				}
+				return ""
+			},
+		}
+
+		for _, header := range config.Headers {
+			tmpl := template.New(header.Name).Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")
+			parsedTmpl, err := tmpl.Parse(header.Value)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			headerTemplates[header.Name] = parsedTmpl
+		}
+
+		// Test execution with actual claims
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			// Note: internal_role is missing
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		// Execute templates
+		for headerName, tmpl := range headerTemplates {
+			var buf bytes.Buffer
+			err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+
+			result := buf.String()
+			if headerName == "X-User-Email" {
+				assert.Equal(t, "[email protected]", result)
+			} else if headerName == "X-User-Role" {
+				// With missingkey=zero, missing fields return "<no value>"
+				assert.Equal(t, "<no value>", result)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Config_Marshaling_Preserves_Template_Syntax", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test that marshaling/unmarshaling config doesn't affect template strings
+		originalConfig := &Config{
+			ProviderURL:          "https://example.com",
+			ClientID:             "test-client",
+			ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
+			CallbackURL:          "/callback",
+			SessionEncryptionKey: "test-encryption-key-32-characters",
+			Headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-Dept", Value: "{{default \"unknown\" .Claims.department}}"},
+			},
+		}
+
+		// Marshal to JSON (simulating Traefik's config processing)
+		jsonData, err := json.Marshal(originalConfig)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Unmarshal back
+		var unmarshaledConfig Config
+		err = json.Unmarshal(jsonData, &unmarshaledConfig)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Verify template strings are preserved exactly
+		assert.Equal(t, "{{.Claims.email}}", unmarshaledConfig.Headers[0].Value)
+		assert.Equal(t, `{{get .Claims "internal_role"}}`, unmarshaledConfig.Headers[1].Value)
+		assert.Equal(t, `{{default "unknown" .Claims.department}}`, unmarshaledConfig.Headers[2].Value)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Template_Functions_Work_After_Config_Processing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Simulate the full flow from config to execution
+		jsonConfig := `{
+			"providerURL": "https://example.com",
+			"clientID": "test-client",
+			"clientSecret": "test-secret",
+			"callbackURL": "/callback",
+			"sessionEncryptionKey": "test-encryption-key-32-characters",
+			"headers": [
+				{"name": "X-User-Email", "value": "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{"name": "X-User-Role", "value": "{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}"},
+				{"name": "X-User-Dept", "value": "{{default \"engineering\" .Claims.department}}"}
+			]
+		}`
+
+		var config Config
+		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(jsonConfig), &config)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Initialize templates with functions
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
+				if val == nil || val == "" || val == "<no value>" {
+					return defaultVal
+				}
+				return val
+			},
+			"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+				if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+						return val
+					}
+				}
+				return ""
+			},
+		}
+
+		headerTemplates := make(map[string]*template.Template)
+		for _, header := range config.Headers {
+			tmpl := template.New(header.Name).Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")
+			parsedTmpl, err := tmpl.Parse(header.Value)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			headerTemplates[header.Name] = parsedTmpl
+		}
+
+		// Test with claims
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			// internal_role and department are missing
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		results := make(map[string]string)
+		for headerName, tmpl := range headerTemplates {
+			var buf bytes.Buffer
+			err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			results[headerName] = buf.String()
+		}
+
+		// Verify results
+		assert.Equal(t, "[email protected]", results["X-User-Email"])
+		assert.Equal(t, "", results["X-User-Role"])            // get function returns empty string
+		assert.Equal(t, "engineering", results["X-User-Dept"]) // default function provides fallback
+	})
+}
+
+// TestTemplateIntegrationWithPlugin tests template processing in the actual plugin
+func TestTemplateIntegrationWithPlugin(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Plugin_Handles_Missing_Claims_Safely", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Set up test OIDC server
+		var testServerURL string
+		testServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			switch r.URL.Path {
+			case "/.well-known/openid-configuration":
+				json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
+					"issuer":                 testServerURL,
+					"authorization_endpoint": testServerURL + "/auth",
+					"token_endpoint":         testServerURL + "/token",
+					"jwks_uri":               testServerURL + "/jwks",
+					"userinfo_endpoint":      testServerURL + "/userinfo",
+				})
+			case "/jwks":
+				json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
+					"keys": []interface{}{},
+				})
+			default:
+				http.NotFound(w, r)
+			}
+		}))
+		defer testServer.Close()
+		testServerURL = testServer.URL
+
+		// Create config with templates that reference potentially missing fields
+		config := &Config{
+			ProviderURL:          testServer.URL,
+			ClientID:             "test-client",
+			ClientSecret:         "test-secret",
+			CallbackURL:          "/callback",
+			SessionEncryptionKey: "test-encryption-key-32-characters",
+			Headers: []TemplatedHeader{
+				{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+				{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"},
+			},
+		}
+
+		// Initialize plugin
+		ctx := context.Background()
+		next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			// Check headers set by the plugin
+			email := r.Header.Get("X-User-Email")
+			role := r.Header.Get("X-User-Role")
+
+			// Write headers to response for testing
+			w.Header().Set("X-Test-Email", email)
+			w.Header().Set("X-Test-Role", role)
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		})
+
+		handler, err := New(ctx, next, config, "test-plugin")
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		traefikOidc, ok := handler.(*TraefikOidc)
+		require.True(t, ok)
+
+		// Create a mock session with claims
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)
+
+		// Create session and set authentication
+		session, err := traefikOidc.sessionManager.GetSession(req)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Set authentication with minimal claims (missing internal_role)
+		session.SetAuthenticated(true)
+		session.SetEmail("[email protected]")
+
+		// Create ID token with limited claims
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			"sub":   "user123",
+			// internal_role is missing
+		}
+
+		// Create a simple test JWT (signature verification is mocked in tests)
+		idToken, _ := createTestJWT(nil, "test-issuer", "test-client", claims)
+		session.SetIDToken(idToken)
+
+		// Save session
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		err = session.Save(req, rec)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Create new request with session cookie
+		cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+		req2 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/protected", nil)
+		for _, cookie := range cookies {
+			req2.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+
+		// Process request through plugin
+		rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(rec2, req2)
+
+		// Plugin should handle missing claims gracefully
+		// The request should proceed without errors
+		assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, rec2.Code)
+	})
+}
+
+// Removed createTestJWT as it already exists in main_test.go
+
+// TestTemplateSyntaxValidation tests that template syntax is properly validated
+func TestTemplateSyntaxValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Valid_Template_Syntax", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validTemplates := []string{
+			"{{.Claims.email}}",
+			"{{.Claims.internal_role}}",
+			"{{.AccessToken}}",
+			"{{.IdToken}}",
+			"{{.RefreshToken}}",
+		}
+
+		for _, tmplStr := range validTemplates {
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tmplStr)
+			assert.NoError(t, err, "Template should be valid: %s", tmplStr)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Invalid_Template_Syntax_Blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
+		invalidTemplates := []struct {
+			template string
+			reason   string
+		}{
+			{"{{call .SomeFunc}}", "function calls not allowed"},
+			{"{{range .Items}}{{.}}{{end}}", "range not allowed"},
+			{"{{with .Data}}{{.Field}}{{end}}", "with statements blocked"},
+			{"{{index .Array 0}}", "index access blocked"},
+			{"{{printf \"%s\" .Data}}", "printf blocked"},
+		}
+
+		for _, tc := range invalidTemplates {
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tc.template)
+			assert.Error(t, err, "Template should be invalid: %s (%s)", tc.template, tc.reason)
+			assert.Contains(t, strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "dangerous")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Template_With_Custom_Functions", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// These templates use our safe custom functions which are now allowed
+		templates := []string{
+			"{{get .Claims \"internal_role\"}}",
+			"{{default \"guest\" .Claims.role}}",
+		}
+
+		// These safe custom functions should now be allowed
+		for _, tmplStr := range templates {
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tmplStr)
+			assert.NoError(t, err, "Safe custom functions should be allowed: %s", tmplStr)
+		}
+
+		// But other function calls should still be blocked
+		dangerousFunctions := []string{
+			"{{call .SomeFunc}}",
+			"{{index .Array 0}}",
+			"{{slice .Data 0 10}}",
+		}
+
+		for _, tmplStr := range dangerousFunctions {
+			err := validateTemplateSecure(tmplStr)
+			assert.Error(t, err, "Dangerous function calls should still be blocked: %s", tmplStr)
+		}
+	})
+}

templated_header_missing_field_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestTemplatedHeaderMissingField tests that accessing non-existent claim fields doesn't cause panics (issue #60)
+func TestTemplatedHeaderMissingField(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Missing_Claim_Field_Returns_Empty", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Create a template with the missingkey=zero option
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
+				if val == nil || val == "" {
+					return defaultVal
+				}
+				return val
+			},
+			"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+				if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+						return val
+					}
+				}
+				return ""
+			},
+		}
+
+		tmpl := template.New("test").Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")
+		parsed, err := tmpl.Parse("{{.Claims.internal_role}}")
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Create template data with claims that don't have internal_role
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			"sub":   "1234567890",
+			"name":  "John Doe",
+			// Note: internal_role is NOT present
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		// Execute template - should not panic
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		err = parsed.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "Template execution should not fail for missing field")
+
+		// Should return empty string for missing field with missingkey=zero
+		assert.Equal(t, "<no value>", buf.String(), "Missing field should return <no value>")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Safe_Access_Pattern_For_Nested_Fields", func(t *testing.T) {
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+				if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+						return val
+					}
+				}
+				return ""
+			},
+		}
+
+		tmpl := template.New("test").Funcs(funcMap)
+		// Use 'with' to safely check if field exists before accessing nested properties
+		parsed, err := tmpl.Parse(`{{with .Claims.groups}}{{.admin}}{{end}}`)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			// groups field doesn't exist
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		err = parsed.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "Should handle nested missing fields with 'with' construct")
+		assert.Equal(t, "", buf.String(), "Should return empty string when field doesn't exist")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Using_Get_Function_For_Safe_Access", func(t *testing.T) {
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+				if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+						return val
+					}
+				}
+				return ""
+			},
+		}
+
+		tmpl := template.New("test").Funcs(funcMap)
+		// Use the get function to safely access the field
+		parsed, err := tmpl.Parse(`{{get .Claims "internal_role"}}`)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			// internal_role not present
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		err = parsed.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, "", buf.String(), "get function should return empty string for missing field")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Using_Default_Function_For_Fallback", func(t *testing.T) {
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"default": func(defaultVal interface{}, val interface{}) interface{} {
+				if val == nil || val == "" || val == "<no value>" {
+					return defaultVal
+				}
+				return val
+			},
+		}
+
+		tmpl := template.New("test").Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")
+		// Use default to provide a fallback value
+		parsed, err := tmpl.Parse(`{{default "guest" .Claims.role}}`)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			// role not present
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		err = parsed.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, "guest", buf.String(), "default function should provide fallback value")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Existing_Field_Still_Works", func(t *testing.T) {
+		funcMap := template.FuncMap{
+			"get": func(m interface{}, key string) interface{} {
+				if mapVal, ok := m.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+					if val, exists := mapVal[key]; exists {
+						return val
+					}
+				}
+				return ""
+			},
+		}
+
+		tmpl := template.New("test").Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero")
+		parsed, err := tmpl.Parse("{{.Claims.email}}")
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		claims := map[string]interface{}{
+			"email": "[email protected]",
+			"role":  "admin",
+		}
+
+		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+			"Claims": claims,
+		}
+
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		err = parsed.Execute(&buf, templateData)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		assert.Equal(t, "[email protected]", buf.String(), "Existing fields should work normally")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestHeaderTemplateIntegration tests the full integration of templated headers
+func TestHeaderTemplateIntegration(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("Headers_With_Missing_Claims_Dont_Crash", func(t *testing.T) {
+		config := CreateConfig()
+		config.ProviderURL = "https://example.com"
+		config.ClientID = "test-client"
+		config.ClientSecret = "test-secret"
+		config.CallbackURL = "/callback"
+		config.SessionEncryptionKey = "test-encryption-key-32-characters"
+
+		// Add headers that reference potentially missing fields
+		config.Headers = []TemplatedHeader{
+			{Name: "X-User-Email", Value: "{{.Claims.email}}"},
+			{Name: "X-User-Role", Value: "{{.Claims.internal_role}}"}, // This field might not exist
+			{Name: "X-User-Groups", Value: "{{.Claims.groups}}"},      // This field might not exist
+		}
+
+		// We can't fully initialize the plugin without network access,
+		// but we can test that the configuration validates
+		err := config.Validate()
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "Configuration should be valid even with potentially missing fields")
+	})
+}