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cd2226dc479163d47fe461ba5b682d7a78e0610a
9
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 lukaszraczylo
|
78b6f193b3 |
fix(security): allow loopback hosts for loopback providerURL (#154)
Issue #154: a providerURL that points at a localhost IdP caused an infinite redirect loop. validateHost rejected loopback hosts unconditionally, so buildAuthURL returned an empty string. Derive allowLoopbackHosts from a loopback providerURL at construction time. Discovery validation already used this derivation, so the two validation layers now agree. This adds no new config surface. Cloud metadata hosts (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal), link-local, and unspecified addresses stay blocked unconditionally. Non-loopback providers keep identical behaviour. Add issue154_regression_test.go: 8 tests pin the new allowance, the default block, and the security envelope. |
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 lukaszraczyloandGitHub
|
546ceb949c |
security: remediate audit findings (ranks 1–16 + 22 Lows) + yaegi load validation (#144)
* fix(security): encrypt session cookies + fail closed on invalid config
Batch 1 of security audit remediation (ranks 1, 2, 6).
- session.go: derive independent HMAC + AES-256 keys via stdlib HKDF-SHA256
and build the gorilla cookie store with both, so session cookies are now
encrypted, not merely signed. The single-key store previously left OIDC
access/refresh/ID tokens recoverable from raw cookie bytes. Cookie format
changes, so existing sessions are invalidated on deploy (one-time re-login).
- main.go: call config.Validate() at construction and error out on failure,
instead of silently substituting a public hardcoded encryption key for
empty/short keys (which allowed session forgery). The yaegi analyzer
passes via .traefik.yml testData.
- settings.go: isValidSecureURL permits plaintext HTTP for loopback hosts
only (RFC 8252); remote providers must still use HTTPS.
- tests: complete configs that did not satisfy Validate(); add regression
tests in security_audit_fixes_test.go.
Configs below documented minimums (rateLimit < 10, key < 32 chars) are now
rejected at startup (fail closed).
* fix(security): validate discovered OIDC endpoints + pin introspection host
Batch 2 of security audit remediation (ranks 3, 4).
- url_helpers.go: add validateDiscoveredEndpoint, an SSRF screen for endpoints
taken from the provider discovery document (jwks_uri, token, authorization,
revocation, end_session, introspection, registration). Blocks link-local
(cloud metadata 169.254.169.254), multicast, unspecified and private
addresses (unless allowPrivateIPAddresses); blocks loopback unless the
configured providerURL is itself loopback (dev/test). Cross-domain JWKS
hosts (e.g. Google) stay allowed. Add sameHost helper.
- main.go: updateMetadataEndpoints screens every discovered endpoint and
blanks any that fail (fail closed downstream). The introspection endpoint
carries the client secret via HTTP Basic, so it is additionally pinned to
the providerURL host to stop a poisoned discovery document exfiltrating the
secret to an attacker-controlled host.
- tests: regression tests for the SSRF guard and the host pin.
* fix(security): close open redirects + anchor excluded-URL matching
Batch 3 of security audit remediation (ranks 5, 14, 15).
- auth_flow.go: run the stored incoming path through normalizeLogoutPath
before using it as the post-login redirect, so //evil.com and /\evil.com
payloads become host-relative (open-redirect, rank 5).
- url_helpers.go: excluded-URL matching is anchored at a natural boundary
(exact, sub-path "/", or file extension "."), so excluding "/public" no
longer also bypasses auth on "/publicsecret"; "/favicon" still matches
"/favicon.ico" (rank 14).
- internal/utils: X-Forwarded-Host is sanitized (first value only; reject
CRLF/whitespace/multi-value) before building redirect URLs (rank 15).
- helpers.go: the logout redirect used when there is no provider end-session
endpoint is host-relative, never an absolute URL derived from the
client-controllable request host (logout open-redirect, rank 15).
- tests: update two logout cases that asserted the old absolute redirect;
add regression tests.
* fix(security): reject unverified Azure tokens; fix transport TLS reuse
Batch 4 of security audit remediation (ranks 7, 11).
- token_validation_rs.go: an Azure nonce-bearing access token that cannot be
cryptographically verified no longer returns "authenticated" when there is
no ID token to corroborate it; it refreshes (if possible) or forces
re-authentication instead of failing open (rank 7).
- http_client_pool.go: the at-limit transport-reuse path now takes the write
lock before mutating refCount (fixes a data race) and only reuses a
transport whose TLS settings (CA pool + InsecureSkipVerify) match the
caller's, never one with a different trust store; if none matches it returns
nil so the caller falls back to a verifying default transport (rank 11).
- tests: add a transport-pool TLS-isolation regression test.
* fix(security): stop logging templated header values (token leak)
Batch 5 of security audit remediation (rank 16).
middleware.go: templated downstream headers commonly carry the access token
(e.g. "Authorization: Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"). The debug log line printed
the full header value, leaking credentials into logs. Log the header name and
byte length instead.
* fix(security): cache-key collision, cache-config divergence, fleet cleanup
Batch 6 of security audit remediation (ranks 9, 10, 12).
- token_manager.go: detectTokenType keys its cache on a SHA-256 hash of the
full token instead of the first 32 chars (which are only the base64url JWT
header). Distinct tokens sharing alg+kid no longer collide and get
mis-classified (rank 10).
- cache_manager.go: the process-global cache manager is initialized once and
shared across plugin instances; it now logs a loud warning when a later
instance requests a different explicit Redis backend that is silently
ignored, surfacing the cross-instance state-isolation hazard (rank 9).
- singleton_resources.go / main.go / utilities.go: track a process-global live
instance count; the shared singleton-token-cleanup task is stopped only when
the LAST instance shuts down, so one instance's Close() (e.g. a config reload)
no longer kills cleanup for surviving instances (rank 12).
- tests: update TestDetectTokenTypeCaching for the new key; add regression tests.
* fix(security): bound introspection cache + cookie lifetime to config
Batch 7 of security audit remediation (ranks 8, 13).
- token_introspection.go: when requireTokenIntrospection is enabled, cap the
positive introspection-result cache at 30s (instead of 5m) so a token
revoked at the provider stops passing within ~30s, matching the operator's
near-real-time revocation expectation (rank 8).
- session.go: bind the cookie store's MaxAge to the configured sessionMaxAge,
so the cookie codec's cryptographic timestamp validity is no longer fixed at
gorilla's 30-day default; a stolen cookie is valid only for the configured
session lifetime (rank 13).
- tests: add a cookie-lifetime regression test.
* fix(security): low-severity hardening (cache, DoS caps, PKCE, throttle)
Batch 8 of security audit remediation — low severity
(ranks 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 36, 37, 41, 45, 46, 49).
- universal_cache.go: updateLocalCache updates an existing key in place instead
of orphaning its LRU element and double-counting currentSize/currentMemory
(rank 36 — the only production-reachable bug in this batch).
- jwk.go / metadata_cache.go / token_introspection.go: bound response bodies
with io.LimitReader (1 MiB) to prevent memory exhaustion from a hostile or
buggy provider (ranks 24, 25).
- jwk.go: skip JWKs not usable for signature verification (use != sig, or
key_ops without "verify") when building the key set (rank 49).
- auth_flow.go: fail closed at the callback when PKCE is enabled but the code
verifier is missing, instead of silently dropping it (rank 27).
- utilities.go / main.go: match allowedUserDomains case-insensitively (rank 31).
- bearer_auth.go: a single success no longer wipes an active per-IP penalty;
the counter resets only when no penalty is in effect (rank 29).
- main.go: handle (not discard) the NewSessionManager error (rank 37).
- error_recovery.go: take a write lock in isServiceDegraded (it deletes from a
map); compare retryable-error substrings case-insensitively (ranks 45, 46).
- singleton_resources.go: bind the generic-cache cleanup goroutine to the
resource-manager shutdown channel so it cannot outlive its owner (rank 41).
- tests: update the bearer throttle test to the corrected penalty semantics.
* fix(security): header sanitization, issuer pinning, fail-closed paths
Batch 9 of security audit remediation (ranks 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 33, 34).
- middleware.go / bearer_auth.go: sanitize claim-derived values on the cookie
auth path before injecting them into downstream headers. Drop group/role and
identifier values containing control chars, bidi-override runes, or the
, ; = delimiters (a comma would inject phantom entries into X-User-Groups);
reject control/bidi/over-length in rendered templated header output (but
permit , ; = in free-form values such as a bearer token). The bearer path
already sanitized; the cookie path did not (ranks 33, 34).
- main.go / metadata_cache.go: pin the discovered issuer to the configured
provider host (sameHost) and refuse/never-cache a mismatch, so a poisoned
discovery document cannot redefine the JWT trust anchor (ranks 21, 22).
- token_introspection.go: when a distinct API audience is configured, fail
closed on a missing or mismatched introspection audience; aud parsed as
string-or-array per RFC 7662 (rank 19).
- logout.go: front-channel logout requires a matching issuer; an empty iss is
rejected (blocks unauthenticated forced-logout via a known sid) (rank 30).
- token_validation_rs.go: an opaque access token with no ID token and no
successful introspection fails closed (re-auth) instead of authenticating
(ranks 18, 20).
- tests: realistic same-host provider mocks; regression tests for the header
sanitization distinction and the fail-closed paths.
* chore(security): remove unwired dead code with latent footguns
Batch 10 of security audit remediation — delete confirmed-dead, unwired
subsystems (ranks 26, 35, 50). None had a production caller (grep-verified);
removal eliminates the latent footguns and ~2.1k lines of dead code.
- token_validator.go (deleted): an unused *TokenValidator whose validateJWT set
Valid=true with NO signature verification — a severe footgun if ever wired
(rank 50). The wired RS-aware validators are unaffected.
- security_monitoring.go (deleted): an unused *SecurityMonitor / ExtractClientIP
that trusted spoofable X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP. The live bearer throttle
uses clientIPForBearer (RemoteAddr-only), unchanged (rank 35).
- dynamic_client_registration.go: removed the RFC 7592 management methods
(Update/Read/DeleteClientRegistration) that dereferenced an attacker-
influenced RegistrationClientURI with the registration token attached and no
HTTPS/SSRF gate, and had no callers. The wired RFC 7591 RegisterClient and
credential-store helpers are kept (rank 26).
- tests: removed the tests covering the deleted code.
* chore: add Makefile with yaegi load validation
No Makefile existed. The new `yaegi-validate` target interprets the plugin
under the yaegi interpreter the same way Traefik loads it, catching yaegi-only
incompatibilities (unsupported stdlib symbols, reflection edge cases) that the
native `go build` / `go test` toolchain does not. Importing the plugin forces
yaegi to interpret every file plus its vendored deps; CreateConfig + New
exercise the instantiation path.
- cmd/yaegicheck/main.go: the load driver, marked //go:build ignore so it is
excluded from `go build ./...` (avoids VCS-stamping a main binary, which
fails in git-worktree layouts) yet is run explicitly by yaegi.
- Makefile: build / fmt / vet / lint / test / vendor / yaegi-validate / check
targets; `make check` runs vet + tests + yaegi-validate.
Verified: `make yaegi-validate` passes on this branch — the HKDF cookie
encryption, net-based endpoint validation, and claim sanitizers all interpret
and instantiate cleanly under yaegi.
* ci: bump workflow Go toolchain to 1.25; pin yaegi-validate to v0.16.1
Traefik v3.7.1 (the deployed version) is built with `go 1.25.0`, so the PR and
release workflows now use Go 1.25.x to match the toolchain Traefik uses.
Important distinction: the CI Go version is the build TOOLCHAIN. The plugin's
actual interpreter-compatibility ceiling is the yaegi version Traefik bundles
(v0.16.1, which declares go 1.21 and ships a ~Go 1.22 stdlib symbol surface),
NOT the CI Go version. That ceiling is enforced by `make yaegi-validate` plus
the go.mod language directive — e.g. it is why HKDF is hand-rolled with
hmac+sha256 rather than Go 1.24's crypto/hkdf, which yaegi v0.16.1 lacks.
Also pin Makefile YAEGI_VERSION to v0.16.1 (what Traefik v3.7.1 vendors) so
yaegi-validate exercises the real deployed interpreter instead of @latest,
which could pass on a newer yaegi that supports symbols the deployed one does
not.
* docs: align README/CONFIGURATION with branch behavior changes
- excludedURLs: documented as segment/extension-boundary matching (was
"prefix-matched") — "/public" no longer also matches "/publicsecret" (rank 14).
- Front-channel logout now requires a matching `iss`; requests without one are
rejected with 400 (rank 30).
- Add an "Upgrading from an earlier release" note: session cookies are now
AES-256 encrypted with lifetime tracking sessionMaxAge (one-time re-login on
upgrade), and invalid configuration (rateLimit < 10, key < 32 bytes, missing
callbackURL, non-HTTPS remote providerURL) now fails closed at startup.
* fix: remove staticcheck-flagged unused functions; wire staticcheck into make check
CI Static Analysis (standalone staticcheck) failed with U1000 "unused":
- dynamic_client_registration.go: deleteCredentialsFromStore — its only caller
was the RFC 7592 DeleteClientRegistration removed in the dead-code batch.
- token_test.go: createTestJWTSimple — its only callers were the TokenValidator
tests removed in the same batch.
Both confirmed to have zero remaining callers and removed. build / vet /
go test ./... / staticcheck ./... all green.
The pre-commit hook runs golangci-lint, but CI runs standalone staticcheck
(which flags U1000). Add a `staticcheck` Makefile target and include it in
`make check` so this class of finding is caught locally before push.
* fix(test): stabilize flaky TestWorkerPool_TaskPanic
tasksFailed is incremented in the worker's deferred recover(), which runs after the panicking task's own defer wg.Done(). wg.Wait() could therefore return before the failure was recorded, so reading the counter immediately raced and flaked on slow CI runners. Poll until the failure lands (2s budget) instead. Verified 200x plain + 50x under -race/GOMAXPROCS=1.
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|
paiking1andGitHub
|
cf6ed1da55 |
feat: feat: add extraAuthParams (extra authorization request parameters) (#139)
Adds optional extraAuthParams map[string]string config. Extra params are appended to the authorization request but can never override plugin-managed params (client_id, state, nonce, etc.). |
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lukaszraczyloandGitHub
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c474bbafd6 |
Cleanup [dec2025] (#101)
* Cleanup excessive comments. * Remove leftovers hanging around from previous refactor * Improve test coverage |
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lukaszraczyloandGitHub
|
9126c74723 |
December 2025 Improvements - Azure AD, Internal Networks, Startup Race Condition (#100)
* Allow internal IPs for OIDC configuration via extra flag. Addresses issue #97 * Allow for internal IPs in OIDC configuration. Addresses issue #97. * feat: Add allowPrivateIPAddresses config option for internal networks Adds a new configuration option `allowPrivateIPAddresses` that allows OIDC provider URLs to use private IP addresses (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x). This is useful for internal deployments where Keycloak or other OIDC providers run on private networks without DNS resolution. Security considerations: - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1) remain blocked - Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x) remain blocked - Default is false (secure by default) Fixes #97 * feat: Support non-email user identifiers for Azure AD Add userIdentifierClaim configuration option to support Azure AD users without email addresses. This allows using alternative JWT claims like "sub", "oid", "upn", or "preferred_username" for user identification. - Default behavior uses "email" claim (backward compatible) - Falls back to "sub" claim if configured claim is missing - allowedUsers matches against the configured claim value - allowedUserDomains only applies when using email-based identification Fixes #95 * Race condition on traefik pod startup When the plugin initializes and calls GetMetadataWithRecovery(): 1. Checks cache first (if metadata is cached, returns immediately) 2. Creates a retry executor with startup-optimized settings (10 attempts, 1s delays) 3. Attempts to fetch metadata from the OIDC provider 4. If the fetch fails with a retryable error (connection refused, EOF, TLS/certificate errors, Traefik default cert), it waits and retries 5. After 10 attempts or on a non-retryable error, returns the error This allows the plugin to handle the race condition where: - Traefik initializes the plugin before routes are established - Traefik serves its default certificate before loading real ones - The OIDC provider pod isn't fully ready yet Fixes issue #90 * Race condition on traefik pod startup When the plugin initializes and calls GetMetadataWithRecovery(): 1. Checks cache first (if metadata is cached, returns immediately) 2. Creates a retry executor with startup-optimized settings (10 attempts, 1s delays) 3. Attempts to fetch metadata from the OIDC provider 4. If the fetch fails with a retryable error (connection refused, EOF, TLS/certificate errors, Traefik default cert), it waits and retries 5. After 10 attempts or on a non-retryable error, returns the error This allows the plugin to handle the race condition where: - Traefik initializes the plugin before routes are established - Traefik serves its default certificate before loading real ones - The OIDC provider pod isn't fully ready yet Fixes issue #90 * Headers too big and 431 responses Added new option `minimalHeaders` to reduce the size of forwarded headers from the auth middleware to backend services. - When minimalHeaders: false (default): All headers are forwarded as before - X-Forwarded-User (always set) - X-Auth-Request-Redirect - X-Auth-Request-User - X-Auth-Request-Token (the large ID token) - X-User-Groups, X-User-Roles (if configured) - When minimalHeaders: true: Reduces header overhead - X-Forwarded-User (always set) - X-User-Groups, X-User-Roles (still forwarded if configured) - Custom templated headers (still processed) - Skipped: X-Auth-Request-Token, X-Auth-Request-User, X-Auth-Request-Redirect Fixes issues #64 and #86 |
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lukaszraczyloandGitHub
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ae59a5e88a |
0.7.10 (#80)
* Add ability to disable replay protection. - This is useful for runs with multiple traefik replicas to avoid false positives and tokens re-creation. * Enhance the CI/CD pipelines * Increase test coverage. * Update vendored dependencies. * Update behaviour on forceHTTPS as per issue #82 |
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lukaszraczyloandGitHub
|
eff9bd7bd2 |
Multiple issues addressed (#76)
- Issue #74 - Issue #14 |
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lukaszraczyloandGitHub
|
bde1db1c3b |
traefik plugin 0.7.7 (#73)
* Automatic discovery of the scopes. Issue #61 raised very valid concerns about users configuring scopes that are not supported by the provider. This change introduces automatic discovery of supported scopes by fetching the provider's discovery document and filtering out unsupported scopes. Before: User configures: scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"] Self-hosted GitLab: "The requested scope is invalid, unknown, or malformed" Authentication: ❌ FAILS After: User configures: scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"] Middleware checks discovery doc → offline_access not supported Automatically filters to: ["openid", "profile", "email"] Authentication: ✅ SUCCEEDS * Resolves issue #74 by enabling user to specify expected audience in the configuration. * Fix flaky tests. |
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lukaszraczyloandGitHub
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c3f23cb99b |
Release 0.7.5 (#70)
* Resolve issue with opaque tokens not being parsed correctly * Increase test coverage * Further improvements to test coverage and code quality * Add new providers. * fixup! Add new providers. * Cleanup. * fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * Memory management optimisation 24 bytes per Put < 256-4096 bytes per buffer allocation avoided (10-170x difference) * Pooling cleanup. |