Commit Graph

16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
lukaszraczylo 1e33bb0a4d feat(auth): support private_key_jwt and client_secret_basic (#137)
revocation endpoints, joining the existing client_secret_post default.
Both are opt-in via the new clientAuthMethod config field. Closes #135.

private_key_jwt (RFC 7523 §2.2 / OpenID Connect Core §9)
========================================================
Plugin signs a short-lived JWT with a configured private key and presents
it as client_assertion. Use when the IdP enforces short secret TTLs or
requires secretless client auth (Microsoft Entra ID / Azure AD, Okta,
Auth0, Keycloak).

New Config fields:
  clientAuthMethod          (default: client_secret_post)
  clientAssertionPrivateKey (inline PEM)
  clientAssertionKeyPath    (PEM file path; mutually exclusive)
  clientAssertionKeyID      (JWS kid header — required)
  clientAssertionAlg        (default: RS256; RS/PS/ES 256–512 supported)

PEM forms accepted: PKCS#8, PKCS#1, SEC1.
Assertion claims: iss=sub=clientID, aud=tokenURL, iat=now, exp=now+60s,
random 16-byte hex jti per request. ECDSA signatures are raw r||s per
RFC 7515 (not ASN.1).

client_secret_basic (RFC 6749 §2.3.1)
=====================================
Sends credentials in the Authorization: Basic header instead of the
body. Both halves are form-urlencoded individually before base64 — that
encoding step is required by the spec and is NOT what stdlib's
http.Request.SetBasicAuth does, so the plugin uses its own helper. The
form body omits client_id and client_secret on this path.

Wire-up
=======
Both methods are dispatched at the same two call sites:
  helpers.go:exchangeTokens — auth_code + refresh_token grants
  token_manager.go:RevokeTokenWithProvider — RFC 7009 revocation

Existing clientSecret deployments are unaffected — empty
clientAuthMethod maps to the historical client_secret_post behavior, and
clientAssertion remains nil unless the new fields are set.

Yaegi compatibility
===================
All required crypto/rsa, crypto/ecdsa, crypto/x509, encoding/pem and
crypto/sha256/384/512 symbols are exposed by the traefik/yaegi stdlib
symbol tables (RSA SignPKCS1v15 + SignPSS, ECDSA Sign,
ParsePKCS8/1PrivateKey, ParseECPrivateKey).

Tests (16 new)
==============
Algorithm-family coverage:
  TestIssue135_SignerRSAFamily — RS256/384/512 + PS256/384/512
  TestIssue135_SignerECDSAFamily — ES256/384/512, raw r||s shape
  TestIssue135_SignerRejectsAlgKeyMismatch
  TestIssue135_SignerJTIUniqueness — 50 sigs, all jti distinct
  TestIssue135_SignerPEMVariants — PKCS#8, PKCS#1, SEC1

Config validation:
  TestIssue135_ConfigValidation — full Validate() matrix
  TestIssue135_ConfigKeyPathLoadsFile

Wire-up:
  TestIssue135_AuthCodeExchangeUsesAssertion
  TestIssue135_RefreshTokenUsesAssertion
  TestIssue135_BackcompatClientSecretPath
  TestIssue135_RevocationUsesAssertion
  TestIssue135_BuildSignerFromInlineConfig
  TestIssue135_BuildSignerDefaultsToRS256
  TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicAuth — Authorization header, no body creds
  TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicURLEncodesReservedChars — :, +, /, @, =, &
  TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicRevocation — revocation parity

Documentation
=============
  README.md — required-row note + 5 optional rows + dedicated section
  docs/CONFIGURATION.md — new Client Authentication section with three
    method subsections, OpenSSL keygen snippet, RFC links
  docs/index.html — 5 new config-table rows + Private Key JWT
    explainer card
  .traefik.yml + examples/complete-traefik-config.yaml — commented
    opt-in example

Out of scope (deferred)
=======================
mTLS / tls_client_auth (RFC 8705) — separate change; requires per-call
http.Client with tls.Config.Certificates and conflicts with the current
pooled HTTP client architecture.
2026-05-09 18:02:41 +01:00
lukaszraczylo 1b6c8616fd fix(refresh): coalesce refresh-token grants + bound goroutines + cache hot path (target v0.8.27) (#131)
* fix(refresh): wire RefreshCoordinator into the live refresh path

The RefreshCoordinator existed but was never instantiated. The actual
refresh path used only session.refreshMutex, which is per-SessionData
instance - and SessionData is pulled from a sync.Pool per request -
so concurrent requests sharing a refresh token had ZERO coordination.

Symptom: when access_token expired (e.g. 5min Zitadel default), every
in-flight request from a polling client (Grafana panels) entered the
refresh path simultaneously and POSTed the same refresh_token to the
IdP. With refresh-token rotation enabled (Zitadel/Authentik default),
only one grant succeeded; the rest got invalid_grant and each cleared
the entire session. Subsequent requests then thrashed in re-auth loops.

This commit:
- adds refreshCoordinator field on TraefikOidc
- instantiates it in NewWithContext with DefaultRefreshCoordinatorConfig
- shuts it down in Close() under shutdownOnce
- routes refreshToken() through the coordinator via coordinatedTokenRefresh,
  which collapses concurrent grants to a single upstream call per
  refresh_token hash
- exports refreshCoordinatorSessionID for both internal hashing and the
  middleware-level wireup so dedup keys stay aligned

Behavioural notes:
- nil-coordinator fallback preserves existing tests that build TraefikOidc
  literals without going through the constructor
- followers receive the same TokenResponse/error as the leader, so no
  per-instance code paths change
- existing TestGetNewTokenWithRefreshToken_Concurrency still passes
  because it hits GetNewTokenWithRefreshToken directly, below the
  coordinator boundary

Tests:
- refresh_coordinator_wireup_test.go: 50 concurrent refreshes coalesce
  to <=2 upstream calls; distinct tokens still run in parallel; nil
  coordinator falls back cleanly

* perf(cache): bound L1 backfill goroutines in HybridBackend

Get() and GetMany() previously spawned a goroutine per L2 hit to write
the value through to L1. Under sustained polling traffic (e.g. a Grafana
dashboard refreshing every 30s with N panels) this minted thousands of
goroutines, each running in Yaegi - directly contributing to the
~1000% CPU spike that pairs with the refresh-token herd.

Replace the per-hit goroutines with a single l1BackfillWorker fed by
l1BackfillBuffer, mirroring the existing asyncWriteBuffer/asyncWriteWorker
pattern for L2 writes. Buffer overflow drops the backfill (counted via
l1BackfillDrops) - a dropped backfill just means the next L2 hit for
that key re-queues it, which is safe.

Tests:
- TestHybridBackend_L1BackfillBounded: 1000 distinct L2 hits keep
  goroutine count within +20 of baseline (pre-fix it grew by ~1000)
- TestHybridBackend_L1BackfillFullDrops: drops are accounted for when
  the buffer is saturated and the worker is stopped

* feat(refresh): implement isRefreshTokenExpired heuristic

Replace the placeholder `return false` with a real check based on the
issued_at timestamp that SetRefreshToken already stamps into the session.
Gated by a new MaxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds config field (default 21600 =
6h, matching the existing comment). 0 disables the check.

This wires the previously-dead refreshTokenExpired branch in middleware.go,
which short-circuits AJAX requests with a 401 instead of letting them
hammer the IdP for a refresh token that's almost certainly stale - the
classic Grafana-after-long-pause failure mode.

Behaviour:
- maxRefreshTokenAge=0 disables the check (preserves prior behaviour)
- legacy sessions without issued_at still attempt one refresh; the IdP
  remains the source of truth on first try
- nil-receiver and nil-session guards keep test code that builds
  TraefikOidc literals safe

Tests:
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_DisabledWhenAgeZero
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_LegacySessionWithoutTimestamp
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_WithinWindow
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_BeyondWindow
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_NilGuards

* perf(token): skip parseJWT on cache hit in VerifyToken

The token cache fast-return existed but ran AFTER parseJWT, so every
validation paid for base64 + JSON unmarshal even on a hit. Under bursty
traffic (e.g. 10+ concurrent panel requests on every Grafana dashboard
refresh, each calling validateStandardTokens which verifies BOTH the
access token and the ID token), this is two redundant parses per
request multiplied by the panel count.

Move the cache lookup ahead of parseJWT. On a hit the function returns
nil immediately. On a miss the original flow runs unchanged.

Also nil-guard t.tokenCache to keep partial-literal test instances safe
(matches the same pattern we already use for tokenBlacklist).

Tests:
- TestVerifyToken_CacheHitSkipsParse: cache pre-populated with claims
  for a token whose body would fail parseJWT - returns nil iff the
  fast-path bypasses the parse
- TestVerifyToken_CacheMissStillParses: a syntactically valid but
  unsigned token still errors past parseJWT on cache miss

* feat(refresh): cross-replica refresh-grant dedup via shared cache

The in-process RefreshCoordinator added in 9f96d8c already collapses
concurrent refresh-token grants on a single Traefik replica. With the
plugin's existing Redis (Dragonfly) cache infrastructure available, we
can extend that dedup across replicas: if pod A refreshes a token at
T+0 and pod B receives a request for the same session at T+1, pod B
should reuse pod A's result rather than POSTing the now-rotated refresh
token to the IdP.

Implementation:
- Add a refreshResultCache to UniversalCacheManager (memory-only when
  Redis is disabled, Redis-backed in production via the existing
  hybrid/Redis-only mode selection)
- Expose it through CacheManager.GetSharedRefreshResultCache and on the
  TraefikOidc struct as refreshResultCache (CacheInterface)
- Inside the closure passed to RefreshCoordinator.CoordinateRefresh,
  consult the cache first; on hit return immediately, on miss exchange
  with the IdP and populate the cache for peers
- 5s TTL: long enough for siblings to observe, short enough that a
  rotated refresh token cannot be re-supplied after the IdP has moved on
- Errors are intentionally NOT cached - peers must always be able to
  retry on their own

Pragmatic choice: optimistic cache rather than a hard distributed lock.
- A hard lock (SET NX + poll) doubles Redis RTT and risks dead-locks
  if a Traefik pod dies mid-grant.
- The user's BGP+Local externalTrafficPolicy already pins ingress for
  a session to one node in steady state, so cross-pod racing is rare.
- This optimistic path catches the rare failover case without adding
  failure modes.

Tests:
- TestCoordinatedTokenRefresh_CrossReplicaCacheHit: pre-populated cache
  short-circuits the upstream call entirely (0 IdP calls)
- TestCoordinatedTokenRefresh_PopulatesCrossReplicaCache: leader stores
  a successful result for peers to find
- TestCoordinatedTokenRefresh_ErrorIsNotCached: invalid_grant must not
  poison the dedup cache - peers must retry independently
2026-04-30 18:52:39 +01:00
lukaszraczylo ccbb98b9dd fix-issue-122 (#128) 2026-03-04 00:23:30 +00:00
lukaszraczylo 7816e05c98 fix issue with logout url (#112)
* fix(logout): handle logout requests before OIDC initialization

- [x] Add debug logging to logout handler entry point
- [x] Move logout path check before OIDC initialization to enable logout when provider unavailable
- [x] Move excluded URL and SSE checks before initialization wait
- [x] Add debug logging for initialization wait to diagnose hanging requests
- [x] Add test for logout functionality without OIDC provider availability

* feat(logout): implement OIDC backchannel and front-channel logout

- [x] Add logout token validation and backchannel logout handler
- [x] Add front-channel logout handler with iframe support
- [x] Implement session invalidation cache for distributed deployments
- [x] Add comprehensive logout token claim verification (issuer, audience, events, iat, sid/sub)
- [x] Integrate session invalidation checks into authorization flow
- [x] Add configuration options for enabling backchannel/front-channel logout
- [x] Add extensive test coverage for logout flows and edge cases
- [x] Update documentation with logout configuration examples
- [x] Add middleware routing for logout endpoints
- [x] Extend cache manager with session invalidation cache support

Resolves #110

* fixup! feat(logout): implement OIDC backchannel and front-channel logout

* fixup! Merge branch 'main' into fix-issue-with-logout-url
2026-01-04 01:59:50 +00:00
lukaszraczylo 6efb78b7a8 Smarter approach to the cookies (#103)
* Smarter approach to the cookies

  - Single maxCookieSize = 1400 constant with clear documentation
  - Combined cookie storage for ~40-45% size reduction
  - Backward compatible migration from legacy cookies

* Tuneup the code.
2025-12-12 18:35:06 +00:00
lukaszraczylo d0b920c4f0 multiple realms fix (#102)
* Allow to use multiple realms

This change is a ressurection of PR #88 which can't be merged due to significant refactor of the codebase.

* Fix the autocleanup routine to handle multiple realms correctly, update tests.

* Metadata rediscovery when provider is unavailable for any reason during the start.

This one prevents the permanent 503 from the plugin when OIDC provider was for some reason unavailable during the start.
2025-12-10 13:07:22 +00:00
lukaszraczylo c474bbafd6 Cleanup [dec2025] (#101)
* Cleanup excessive comments.

* Remove leftovers hanging around from previous refactor

* Improve test coverage
2025-12-09 01:38:02 +00:00
lukaszraczylo 9126c74723 December 2025 Improvements - Azure AD, Internal Networks, Startup Race Condition (#100)
* Allow internal IPs for OIDC configuration via extra flag.

Addresses issue #97

* Allow for internal IPs in OIDC configuration.

Addresses issue #97.

* feat: Add allowPrivateIPAddresses config option for internal networks

Adds a new configuration option `allowPrivateIPAddresses` that allows
OIDC provider URLs to use private IP addresses (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x,
192.168.x.x). This is useful for internal deployments where Keycloak or
other OIDC providers run on private networks without DNS resolution.

Security considerations:
- Loopback addresses (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1) remain blocked
- Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x) remain blocked
- Default is false (secure by default)

Fixes #97

* feat: Support non-email user identifiers for Azure AD

Add userIdentifierClaim configuration option to support Azure AD users
without email addresses. This allows using alternative JWT claims like
"sub", "oid", "upn", or "preferred_username" for user identification.

- Default behavior uses "email" claim (backward compatible)
- Falls back to "sub" claim if configured claim is missing
- allowedUsers matches against the configured claim value
- allowedUserDomains only applies when using email-based identification

Fixes #95

* Race condition on traefik pod startup

When the plugin initializes and calls GetMetadataWithRecovery():

1. Checks cache first (if metadata is cached, returns immediately)
2. Creates a retry executor with startup-optimized settings (10 attempts, 1s delays)
3. Attempts to fetch metadata from the OIDC provider
4. If the fetch fails with a retryable error (connection refused, EOF, TLS/certificate errors, Traefik default cert), it waits and retries
5. After 10 attempts or on a non-retryable error, returns the error

This allows the plugin to handle the race condition where:
- Traefik initializes the plugin before routes are established
- Traefik serves its default certificate before loading real ones
- The OIDC provider pod isn't fully ready yet

Fixes issue #90

* Race condition on traefik pod startup

When the plugin initializes and calls GetMetadataWithRecovery():

1. Checks cache first (if metadata is cached, returns immediately)
2. Creates a retry executor with startup-optimized settings (10 attempts, 1s delays)
3. Attempts to fetch metadata from the OIDC provider
4. If the fetch fails with a retryable error (connection refused, EOF, TLS/certificate errors, Traefik default cert), it waits and retries
5. After 10 attempts or on a non-retryable error, returns the error

This allows the plugin to handle the race condition where:
- Traefik initializes the plugin before routes are established
- Traefik serves its default certificate before loading real ones
- The OIDC provider pod isn't fully ready yet

Fixes issue #90

* Headers too big and 431 responses

Added new option `minimalHeaders` to reduce the size of forwarded headers from the auth middleware to backend services.

  - When minimalHeaders: false (default): All headers are forwarded as before
    - X-Forwarded-User (always set)
    - X-Auth-Request-Redirect
    - X-Auth-Request-User
    - X-Auth-Request-Token (the large ID token)
    - X-User-Groups, X-User-Roles (if configured)
  - When minimalHeaders: true: Reduces header overhead
    - X-Forwarded-User (always set)
    - X-User-Groups, X-User-Roles (still forwarded if configured)
    - Custom templated headers (still processed)
    - Skipped: X-Auth-Request-Token, X-Auth-Request-User, X-Auth-Request-Redirect

Fixes issues #64 and #86
2025-12-08 14:21:17 +00:00
lukaszraczylo e64fc7f730 Add redis support for distributed caching (#83)
* Add redis support for distributed caching

* Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation.
Official redis client library won't work with yaegi.

* fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi.

* fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi.

* ... and another all nighter.

* fixup! ... and another all nighter.

* fixup! fixup! ... and another all nighter.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! ... and another all nighter.

* Resolve issue #85 by adding ability to set custom claims in JWT tokens

* Remove redundant validation in auth middleware ( issue #89 )

* Add ability to set cookie prefix for session cookies ( #87 )

* fixup! Add ability to set cookie prefix for session cookies ( #87 )

* Add ability to set cookie max age - issue #91

* Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 10: Size computation for allocation may overflow

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fixup! Merge main into 0.8.0-redis: resolve conflicts

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-11-30 02:18:46 +00:00
lukaszraczylo 5fcbd54955 Add sharded cache and prevention of CPU spikes / locks (#96)
* Add sharded cache and prevention of CPU spikes / locks

* Add dynamic client registration with oidc provider

* Fix race condition introduced during the sharded cache implementation.

* Add page for traefikoidc.
2025-11-30 01:41:12 +00:00
lukaszraczylo ae59a5e88a 0.7.10 (#80)
* Add ability to disable replay protection. - This is useful for runs with multiple traefik replicas to avoid false positives and tokens re-creation.
* Enhance the CI/CD pipelines
* Increase test coverage.
* Update vendored dependencies.
* Update behaviour on forceHTTPS as per issue #82
2025-10-16 10:56:28 +01:00
lukaszraczylo 79e9b164f9 release 0.7.9 (#78)
* Speed improvements.

After introduction of introspection the plugin became significantly slower.
This commit introduces several optimizations to bring the speed back up.

* Add relevant documentation and tests.
2025-10-13 10:43:35 +01:00
lukaszraczylo eff9bd7bd2 Multiple issues addressed (#76)
- Issue #74
- Issue #14
2025-10-09 00:44:03 +01:00
lukaszraczylo bde1db1c3b traefik plugin 0.7.7 (#73)
* Automatic discovery of the scopes.

Issue #61 raised very valid concerns about users configuring scopes that are not supported by the provider.
This change introduces automatic discovery of supported scopes by fetching the provider's discovery document and filtering out unsupported scopes.

Before:
User configures: scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"]
Self-hosted GitLab: "The requested scope is invalid, unknown, or malformed"
Authentication:  FAILS

After:
User configures: scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"]
Middleware checks discovery doc → offline_access not supported
Automatically filters to: ["openid", "profile", "email"]
Authentication:  SUCCEEDS

* Resolves issue #74 by enabling user to specify expected audience in the configuration.

* Fix flaky tests.
2025-10-08 11:44:00 +01:00
lukaszraczylo c3f23cb99b Release 0.7.5 (#70)
* Resolve issue with opaque tokens not being parsed correctly

* Increase test coverage

* Further improvements to test coverage and code quality

* Add new providers.

* fixup! Add new providers.

* Cleanup.

* fixup! Cleanup.

* fixup! fixup! Cleanup.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup.

* Memory management optimisation

24 bytes per Put < 256-4096 bytes per buffer allocation avoided (10-170x difference)

* Pooling cleanup.
2025-10-01 12:13:10 +01:00
lukaszraczylo 1b49e133da Complete rebuild of the plugin
* Fix bug affecting Azure OIDC authentication ( and most likely others )

* Fixes issue #51

* Ensure that appended roles are unique. Update the documentation.

* Improvements targetting possible memory usage spikes.

* Additional fixes and cleanup

* Refactoring code to fix the issues identified by the users.

* Modernize run

* Fieldalignment

* Multiple changes to improve performance and reduce complexity.
- Optimise the errors and recovery.
- Deduplicate code in metadata cache.
- Remove unused performance monitoring code.
- Simplify session management and settings handling.

* Fix claims issue.

* Add ability to overwrite the default scopes in the settings file

* Well.. that escalated quickly.

Completely forgot that Traefik uses outdated Yaegi and requires compatibility with 1.20 ( pre-generic Go code ).

* Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* fixup! fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work.

* Abstract the provider logic into a separate package.

* Additional micro fixes and cleanups.

* Simplify all the things.

* fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things.

* ...

* Cleanup tests.

* fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests.

* Issue #53: Fix CSRF token handling in reverse proxy

1.  HTTPS Detection Fixed (session.go:723)
- Now uses X-Forwarded-Proto header instead of r.URL.Scheme
- Properly detects HTTPS in reverse proxy environments
2.  SameSite Cookie Attribute Fixed
- Removed automatic SameSiteStrictMode for HTTPS (would break OAuth)
- Keeps SameSiteLaxMode to allow OAuth callbacks from external domains
- Only uses Strict for AJAX requests which don't involve OAuth redirects
3.  Cookie Domain Handling Fixed
- Now respects X-Forwarded-Host header for cookie domain
- Ensures cookies are set for the public domain, not internal proxy domain
4.  EnhanceSessionSecurity Properly Integrated
- Function is now actually called during session save
- Applies security enhancements without breaking OAuth flow

Why Issue #53 Failed Before:

1. Cookies were not marked Secure in HTTPS environments (browser wouldn't send them back)
2. If they had been Secure with SameSite=Strict, Azure callbacks would still fail
3. Cookie domain might have been wrong (internal vs public domain)

Why It Works Now:

1. Cookies are properly marked Secure for HTTPS
2. Uses SameSite=Lax to allow OAuth provider callbacks
3. Cookie domain uses public domain from X-Forwarded-Host
4. CSRF token persists through the entire OAuth flow

* Next set of enhancements together with memory usage improvements.

* Memory leak fixes and optimisations.

* CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes

* fixup! CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes

* Metadata cache leak fix + profiling

* fixup! Metadata cache leak fix + profiling

* Memory leaks hunting, part 1337.

* Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection.

* Clear race conditions

* fixup! Clear race conditions

* Weekend fun with memory leaks

* Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

```
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc    117.017s        coverage: 72.6% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/auth       0.505s  coverage: 87.1% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/circuit_breaker    0.283s  coverage: 99.0% of statements
        github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/config             coverage: 0.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/handlers   0.349s  coverage: 98.2% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/providers (cached)        coverage: 94.3% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/middleware 0.808s  coverage: 78.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/recovery   0.653s  coverage: 100.0% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/chunking   (cached)        coverage: 87.8% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/core       (cached)        coverage: 85.6% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/crypto     (cached)        coverage: 81.8% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/storage    (cached)        coverage: 93.5% of statements
ok      github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/validators (cached)        coverage: 98.8% of statements
````

* fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

* fixup! fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage.

* Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations.

* Pre-release cleanup.

* Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage.

* fixup! fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage.
2025-09-18 11:01:30 +01:00