7 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
lukaszraczylo	9cbca4c4fb	fix(refresh): honor userIdentifierClaim in token refresh path (#132) ... patch-release The refresh path in token_manager.go hardcoded the "email" claim when extracting the user identifier from a refreshed ID token, ignoring the configured userIdentifierClaim. Keycloak users without an email claim (using sub or another identifier) were kicked out on refresh even though their initial login worked. The callback path (auth_flow.go:226-239) already honored userIdentifierClaim with "sub" fallback; PR #100 (commit a316a98) added that support but missed the refresh path. Mirror the callback logic in refreshToken so both paths behave the same. Cleanup: rename Get/SetEmail to Get/SetUserIdentifier on SessionData to match the actual semantics. The slot already stored the configured identifier (email, sub, oid, upn, preferred_username), only the API name was misleading. Storage key "email" → "user_identifier" and combinedSessionPayload field E (json:"e") → Ui (json:"ui"). Compat note: existing user sessions invalidate on upgrade — every active user re-authenticates once after deploying this change.	2026-05-07 09:21:41 +01:00
lukaszraczylo	1b6c8616fd	fix(refresh): coalesce refresh-token grants + bound goroutines + cache hot path (target v0.8.27) (#131) ... * fix(refresh): wire RefreshCoordinator into the live refresh path The RefreshCoordinator existed but was never instantiated. The actual refresh path used only session.refreshMutex, which is per-SessionData instance - and SessionData is pulled from a sync.Pool per request - so concurrent requests sharing a refresh token had ZERO coordination. Symptom: when access_token expired (e.g. 5min Zitadel default), every in-flight request from a polling client (Grafana panels) entered the refresh path simultaneously and POSTed the same refresh_token to the IdP. With refresh-token rotation enabled (Zitadel/Authentik default), only one grant succeeded; the rest got invalid_grant and each cleared the entire session. Subsequent requests then thrashed in re-auth loops. This commit: - adds refreshCoordinator field on TraefikOidc - instantiates it in NewWithContext with DefaultRefreshCoordinatorConfig - shuts it down in Close() under shutdownOnce - routes refreshToken() through the coordinator via coordinatedTokenRefresh, which collapses concurrent grants to a single upstream call per refresh_token hash - exports refreshCoordinatorSessionID for both internal hashing and the middleware-level wireup so dedup keys stay aligned Behavioural notes: - nil-coordinator fallback preserves existing tests that build TraefikOidc literals without going through the constructor - followers receive the same TokenResponse/error as the leader, so no per-instance code paths change - existing TestGetNewTokenWithRefreshToken_Concurrency still passes because it hits GetNewTokenWithRefreshToken directly, below the coordinator boundary Tests: - refresh_coordinator_wireup_test.go: 50 concurrent refreshes coalesce to <=2 upstream calls; distinct tokens still run in parallel; nil coordinator falls back cleanly * perf(cache): bound L1 backfill goroutines in HybridBackend Get() and GetMany() previously spawned a goroutine per L2 hit to write the value through to L1. Under sustained polling traffic (e.g. a Grafana dashboard refreshing every 30s with N panels) this minted thousands of goroutines, each running in Yaegi - directly contributing to the ~1000% CPU spike that pairs with the refresh-token herd. Replace the per-hit goroutines with a single l1BackfillWorker fed by l1BackfillBuffer, mirroring the existing asyncWriteBuffer/asyncWriteWorker pattern for L2 writes. Buffer overflow drops the backfill (counted via l1BackfillDrops) - a dropped backfill just means the next L2 hit for that key re-queues it, which is safe. Tests: - TestHybridBackend_L1BackfillBounded: 1000 distinct L2 hits keep goroutine count within +20 of baseline (pre-fix it grew by ~1000) - TestHybridBackend_L1BackfillFullDrops: drops are accounted for when the buffer is saturated and the worker is stopped * feat(refresh): implement isRefreshTokenExpired heuristic Replace the placeholder `return false` with a real check based on the issued_at timestamp that SetRefreshToken already stamps into the session. Gated by a new MaxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds config field (default 21600 = 6h, matching the existing comment). 0 disables the check. This wires the previously-dead refreshTokenExpired branch in middleware.go, which short-circuits AJAX requests with a 401 instead of letting them hammer the IdP for a refresh token that's almost certainly stale - the classic Grafana-after-long-pause failure mode. Behaviour: - maxRefreshTokenAge=0 disables the check (preserves prior behaviour) - legacy sessions without issued_at still attempt one refresh; the IdP remains the source of truth on first try - nil-receiver and nil-session guards keep test code that builds TraefikOidc literals safe Tests: - TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_DisabledWhenAgeZero - TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_LegacySessionWithoutTimestamp - TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_WithinWindow - TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_BeyondWindow - TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_NilGuards * perf(token): skip parseJWT on cache hit in VerifyToken The token cache fast-return existed but ran AFTER parseJWT, so every validation paid for base64 + JSON unmarshal even on a hit. Under bursty traffic (e.g. 10+ concurrent panel requests on every Grafana dashboard refresh, each calling validateStandardTokens which verifies BOTH the access token and the ID token), this is two redundant parses per request multiplied by the panel count. Move the cache lookup ahead of parseJWT. On a hit the function returns nil immediately. On a miss the original flow runs unchanged. Also nil-guard t.tokenCache to keep partial-literal test instances safe (matches the same pattern we already use for tokenBlacklist). Tests: - TestVerifyToken_CacheHitSkipsParse: cache pre-populated with claims for a token whose body would fail parseJWT - returns nil iff the fast-path bypasses the parse - TestVerifyToken_CacheMissStillParses: a syntactically valid but unsigned token still errors past parseJWT on cache miss * feat(refresh): cross-replica refresh-grant dedup via shared cache The in-process RefreshCoordinator added in 9f96d8c already collapses concurrent refresh-token grants on a single Traefik replica. With the plugin's existing Redis (Dragonfly) cache infrastructure available, we can extend that dedup across replicas: if pod A refreshes a token at T+0 and pod B receives a request for the same session at T+1, pod B should reuse pod A's result rather than POSTing the now-rotated refresh token to the IdP. Implementation: - Add a refreshResultCache to UniversalCacheManager (memory-only when Redis is disabled, Redis-backed in production via the existing hybrid/Redis-only mode selection) - Expose it through CacheManager.GetSharedRefreshResultCache and on the TraefikOidc struct as refreshResultCache (CacheInterface) - Inside the closure passed to RefreshCoordinator.CoordinateRefresh, consult the cache first; on hit return immediately, on miss exchange with the IdP and populate the cache for peers - 5s TTL: long enough for siblings to observe, short enough that a rotated refresh token cannot be re-supplied after the IdP has moved on - Errors are intentionally NOT cached - peers must always be able to retry on their own Pragmatic choice: optimistic cache rather than a hard distributed lock. - A hard lock (SET NX + poll) doubles Redis RTT and risks dead-locks if a Traefik pod dies mid-grant. - The user's BGP+Local externalTrafficPolicy already pins ingress for a session to one node in steady state, so cross-pod racing is rare. - This optimistic path catches the rare failover case without adding failure modes. Tests: - TestCoordinatedTokenRefresh_CrossReplicaCacheHit: pre-populated cache short-circuits the upstream call entirely (0 IdP calls) - TestCoordinatedTokenRefresh_PopulatesCrossReplicaCache: leader stores a successful result for peers to find - TestCoordinatedTokenRefresh_ErrorIsNotCached: invalid_grant must not poison the dedup cache - peers must retry independently	2026-04-30 18:52:39 +01:00
lukaszraczylo	2d1b04c637	review fixes apr 2026 (#130) ... * Multiple fixes - refresh coordinator dedup + memory pressure wire - middleware sse consolidation + timer leak + claim cache - universal cache sync backfill + isDebug gate - lazy background task race - memory monitor stw cached + refresh() api * fix(auth): suppress OIDC redirects on non-navigation requests - [x] Add isNonNavigationRequest using Sec-Fetch-Mode and Accept headers - [x] Add comprehensive TestIsNonNavigationRequest - [x] Update ServeHTTP to 401 non-navigation and AJAX requests Fixes #129 * feat(config): add custom CA and insecure skip verify for OIDC TLS - [x] Add CACertPath, CACertPEM, InsecureSkipVerify to Config - [x] Implement loadCACertPool for CA bundle loading - [x] Update HTTPClientConfig with RootCAs and InsecureSkipVerify - [x] Apply CA pool and skip verify to pooled HTTP clients - [x] Enhance configKey to distinguish TLS configs - [x] Add comprehensive ca_cert_test.go Fixes #125 * feat(oidc): add custom CA certificate support for private OIDC providers - [x] Add caCertPath, caCertPEM, insecureSkipVerify config options - [x] Update traefik.yml with new OIDC client config fields - [x] Add configuration schema descriptions for new options - [x] Update README table and add Custom CA Certificates section * Fix the documentation. * test(redis): add oversized argument rejection test - [x] Add TestRedisConn_RejectOversizedArgumentBytes - [x] Import strings package * Dependencies cleanup	2026-04-19 10:12:00 +01:00
lukaszraczylo	c474bbafd6	Cleanup [dec2025] (#101) ... * Cleanup excessive comments. * Remove leftovers hanging around from previous refactor * Improve test coverage	2025-12-09 01:38:02 +00:00
lukaszraczylo	9126c74723	December 2025 Improvements - Azure AD, Internal Networks, Startup Race Condition (#100) ... * Allow internal IPs for OIDC configuration via extra flag. Addresses issue #97 * Allow for internal IPs in OIDC configuration. Addresses issue #97. * feat: Add allowPrivateIPAddresses config option for internal networks Adds a new configuration option `allowPrivateIPAddresses` that allows OIDC provider URLs to use private IP addresses (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x). This is useful for internal deployments where Keycloak or other OIDC providers run on private networks without DNS resolution. Security considerations: - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1) remain blocked - Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x) remain blocked - Default is false (secure by default) Fixes #97 * feat: Support non-email user identifiers for Azure AD Add userIdentifierClaim configuration option to support Azure AD users without email addresses. This allows using alternative JWT claims like "sub", "oid", "upn", or "preferred_username" for user identification. - Default behavior uses "email" claim (backward compatible) - Falls back to "sub" claim if configured claim is missing - allowedUsers matches against the configured claim value - allowedUserDomains only applies when using email-based identification Fixes #95 * Race condition on traefik pod startup When the plugin initializes and calls GetMetadataWithRecovery(): 1. Checks cache first (if metadata is cached, returns immediately) 2. Creates a retry executor with startup-optimized settings (10 attempts, 1s delays) 3. Attempts to fetch metadata from the OIDC provider 4. If the fetch fails with a retryable error (connection refused, EOF, TLS/certificate errors, Traefik default cert), it waits and retries 5. After 10 attempts or on a non-retryable error, returns the error This allows the plugin to handle the race condition where: - Traefik initializes the plugin before routes are established - Traefik serves its default certificate before loading real ones - The OIDC provider pod isn't fully ready yet Fixes issue #90 * Race condition on traefik pod startup When the plugin initializes and calls GetMetadataWithRecovery(): 1. Checks cache first (if metadata is cached, returns immediately) 2. Creates a retry executor with startup-optimized settings (10 attempts, 1s delays) 3. Attempts to fetch metadata from the OIDC provider 4. If the fetch fails with a retryable error (connection refused, EOF, TLS/certificate errors, Traefik default cert), it waits and retries 5. After 10 attempts or on a non-retryable error, returns the error This allows the plugin to handle the race condition where: - Traefik initializes the plugin before routes are established - Traefik serves its default certificate before loading real ones - The OIDC provider pod isn't fully ready yet Fixes issue #90 * Headers too big and 431 responses Added new option `minimalHeaders` to reduce the size of forwarded headers from the auth middleware to backend services. - When minimalHeaders: false (default): All headers are forwarded as before - X-Forwarded-User (always set) - X-Auth-Request-Redirect - X-Auth-Request-User - X-Auth-Request-Token (the large ID token) - X-User-Groups, X-User-Roles (if configured) - When minimalHeaders: true: Reduces header overhead - X-Forwarded-User (always set) - X-User-Groups, X-User-Roles (still forwarded if configured) - Custom templated headers (still processed) - Skipped: X-Auth-Request-Token, X-Auth-Request-User, X-Auth-Request-Redirect Fixes issues #64 and #86	2025-12-08 14:21:17 +00:00
lukaszraczylo	ae59a5e88a	0.7.10 (#80) ... * Add ability to disable replay protection. - This is useful for runs with multiple traefik replicas to avoid false positives and tokens re-creation. * Enhance the CI/CD pipelines * Increase test coverage. * Update vendored dependencies. * Update behaviour on forceHTTPS as per issue #82	2025-10-16 10:56:28 +01:00
lukaszraczylo	c3f23cb99b	Release 0.7.5 (#70) ... * Resolve issue with opaque tokens not being parsed correctly * Increase test coverage * Further improvements to test coverage and code quality * Add new providers. * fixup! Add new providers. * Cleanup. * fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * Memory management optimisation 24 bytes per Put < 256-4096 bytes per buffer allocation avoided (10-170x difference) * Pooling cleanup.	2025-10-01 12:13:10 +01:00