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72e2b682bbd15f5e082eb6e1f9fe9ae078fb9549
17 Commits
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a548665edb |
feat: opt-in M2M bearer-token authentication (supersedes #93) (#140)
* docs: bearer-token auth design spec * docs: harden bearer-auth spec with security review findings * feat(bearer): opt-in M2M bearer-token authentication Adds an opt-in Authorization: Bearer <jwt> path for machine-to-machine clients. Replaces and supersedes the broken approach in PR #93 (synthetic-session that omitted user_identifier and skipped ID-token rejection / replay-protection-semantics / kid-pinning / etc.). Design Two auth entrypoints feed one shared post-auth pipeline: cookie path ─┐ ├── forwardAuthorized(rw, req, *principal) bearer path ─┘ (roles/groups, header injection, security headers, cookie strip, forward) buildPrincipalFromSession and buildPrincipalFromBearerToken produce the same `principal` value type. forwardAuthorized is session-agnostic and runs the existing post-auth work; processAuthorizedRequest now wraps it with the session-specific concerns (backchannel-logout, dirty/Save). The cookie path's behaviour is byte-identical to before this PR; the existing test suite passes unmodified. Security hardening baked into the bearer path - Audience MANDATORY. Startup fails when EnableBearerAuth=true and Audience is empty. - BearerIdentifierClaim defaults to "sub"; "email" is rejected at startup to avoid the unverified-email spoofing footgun. Cookie path's UserIdentifierClaim is unaffected and still defaults to "email". - ID tokens explicitly rejected via the existing detectTokenType helper (nonce, typ=at+jwt, token_use, scope, aud-vs-clientID heuristics); belt-and-braces nonce/token_use=id rejection on top. - alg pinned to asymmetric allowlist (RS/PS/ES 256/384/512) BEFORE JWKS fetch, blocking alg=none and alg=HS* probes from amplifying into upstream calls. - kid length capped at 256 bytes and charset-restricted before JWKS fetch, blocking pathological-kid JWKS amplification. - Multi-audience tokens require azp == clientID. - iat upper-age bound (MaxTokenAgeSeconds, default 24h) bounds clock- manipulation and forever-token abuse. - Identifier sanitization: length cap, control-char + bidi-override + delimiter (, ; =) rejection. - Per-IP failure throttle: configurable threshold/window/penalty; returns 429 + Retry-After. Limits offline-guessing-style attacks and protects the shared rate-limiter / JWKS endpoint. - JTI replay marking suppressed via new internal verifyOpts {skipReplayMarking} so the same bearer can be reused until exp; the blacklist Get stays active so RevokeToken still terminates a bearer token immediately. The existing exported VerifyToken interface is unchanged so all mocks continue to work. - Cookie wins by default when both bearer and cookie are present (safer against browser/extension/proxy bearer injection). Operator can flip via BearerOverridesCookie. - Authorization header stripped on forward by default; also stripped on excluded URLs so the token can't leak into health/metrics downstream logs. - Optional RFC 7662 introspection via existing requireTokenIntrospection. Introspection-endpoint failure returns 503 (distinguishes infra from token rejection). - 401s use RFC 6750 WWW-Authenticate hints (toggleable). Failure reason is logged at debug; raw tokens are never logged. Implementation - principal.go: pure-data principal type and buildPrincipalFromSession. - bearer_auth.go: alg/kid pin, classifier, identifier sanitization, multi-aud azp gate, iat age check, per-IP failure tracker, handleBearerRequest, buildPrincipalFromBearerToken. - token_manager.go: VerifyToken now wraps a new verifyTokenWithOpts that accepts internal-only verifyOpts. Existing callers, the TokenVerifier interface, and all mocks unchanged. - middleware.go: extracted forwardAuthorized from processAuthorizedRequest; wired bearer detection after init wait + after bypass; excluded-URL Authorization strip when bearer enabled. - settings.go: ten new config fields with defaults applied in CreateConfig. - main.go: startup validation for audience + identifier-claim guard; bearer failure tracker init. Tests - bearer_auth_test.go: table-driven helper tests for every new component (parseBearerJOSEHeader, sanitizeBearerIdentifier, resolveBearerIdentifier, enforceMultiAudienceAzp, enforceIatAge, bearerFailureTracker, detectBearerToken). Integration tests through ServeHTTP covering happy path, ID-token rejection, alg=none rejection, oversized kid, multi-aud with/without azp, iat-too-old, bidi identifier, replay (100x reuse), 429 throttle trip, excluded-URL strip, roles gate, cookie-wins precedence, BearerOverridesCookie, oversized token, malformed JWT, feature-off pass-through. Startup validation for audience- required and email-identifier-rejected. - All existing tests pass unmodified (cookie-path regression). - go vet clean. golangci-lint clean (0 issues). Race detector clean on bearer tests. Documentation - README.md: bearer auth section with security highlights and config snippet; doc link in the index. - .traefik.yml: commented config block exposing every bearer knob. - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: new subsection with full parameter table. - docs/BEARER_AUTH.md: threat model, hardening matrix, failure response table, operational guidance, known follow-ups. - docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-bearer-token-auth-design.md: design spec + security-review hardening history. * fix(cache): redact raw cache keys in debug logs (CodeQL go/clear-text-logging) CodeQL flagged 9 high-severity alerts (go/clear-text-logging) where the in-memory cache and the hybrid L1+L2 backend printed `key=%s` at debug. Cache callers (token cache, blacklist, introspection cache) pass raw access / refresh / id tokens as cache keys, so any debug-enabled deployment would write them to log streams. Pre-existing issue. CodeQL started flagging it on this PR because the new bearer-auth path adds a data-flow source (req.Header.Get("Authorization")) that reaches the existing logging sinks via the same cache. The cookie path had the same risk but wasn't tracked as taint by CodeQL. Fix: hash the key (SHA-256[:8] hex) before printing. Same approach the bearer-auth logger uses for principal identifiers (spec §13). Doesn't change cache semantics — same key still produces the same hash, so debug correlation across log lines is preserved without exposing the raw value. Touches both affected packages: - internal/cache/cache.go (2 sites: Set + LRU eviction) - internal/cache/backends/hybrid.go (12 sites: L1/L2 read/write/fallback) New helper `redactKey` colocated with each package (unexported, package-local) keeps the change blast radius narrow. Tests green; lint clean. * docs(bearer): how to obtain bearer tokens from the OIDC provider Adds a section walking operators through the OAuth 2.0 client_credentials flow (RFC 6749 §4.4) and the JWT bearer assertion alternative (RFC 7523), with a worked Auth0-shape curl example, a per-provider quick reference (Auth0, Okta, Keycloak, Entra v2, Cognito, GitLab, Google), operational notes (token TTL, caching, JWKS rotation, revocation, scope vs audience, secret hygiene), and a three-line validation loop. Most common operator confusion: "I enabled the feature but tokens get 401'd" — almost always missing or wrong audience. The new section makes the audience-matching requirement loud, with per-provider parameter names so people don't have to dig through IdP docs. Locations: - docs/BEARER_AUTH.md — full section under "Quick start" - README.md — short snippet + deep link |
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68c150eba4 |
fix(cache/redis): honor enableTLS for Redis backend (#133)
The redis.enableTLS / redis.tlsSkipVerify settings were accepted by the config layer but silently dropped before reaching the connection pool, so the plugin always dialed Redis in plaintext. This blocked TLS-only Redis deployments such as AWS ElastiCache with in-transit encryption. - Add EnableTLS, TLSSkipVerify, TLSServerName to backends.Config and PoolConfig and forward them through universal_cache_singleton -> backends.Config -> PoolConfig. - In the connection pool, dial via tls.Dialer.DialContext (TLS 1.2 minimum) with SNI defaulting to the host part of the configured Address when TLSServerName is empty, so ElastiCache cluster endpoints validate out of the box. Plain dial path now also propagates ctx. - Add regression tests covering successful TLS negotiation with skip- verify, rejection of self-signed certs without skip-verify, rejection of plain TCP servers when EnableTLS=true, and unaffected plaintext behavior. - Document maxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds (added in |
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1b6c8616fd |
fix(refresh): coalesce refresh-token grants + bound goroutines + cache hot path (target v0.8.27) (#131)
* fix(refresh): wire RefreshCoordinator into the live refresh path
The RefreshCoordinator existed but was never instantiated. The actual
refresh path used only session.refreshMutex, which is per-SessionData
instance - and SessionData is pulled from a sync.Pool per request -
so concurrent requests sharing a refresh token had ZERO coordination.
Symptom: when access_token expired (e.g. 5min Zitadel default), every
in-flight request from a polling client (Grafana panels) entered the
refresh path simultaneously and POSTed the same refresh_token to the
IdP. With refresh-token rotation enabled (Zitadel/Authentik default),
only one grant succeeded; the rest got invalid_grant and each cleared
the entire session. Subsequent requests then thrashed in re-auth loops.
This commit:
- adds refreshCoordinator field on TraefikOidc
- instantiates it in NewWithContext with DefaultRefreshCoordinatorConfig
- shuts it down in Close() under shutdownOnce
- routes refreshToken() through the coordinator via coordinatedTokenRefresh,
which collapses concurrent grants to a single upstream call per
refresh_token hash
- exports refreshCoordinatorSessionID for both internal hashing and the
middleware-level wireup so dedup keys stay aligned
Behavioural notes:
- nil-coordinator fallback preserves existing tests that build TraefikOidc
literals without going through the constructor
- followers receive the same TokenResponse/error as the leader, so no
per-instance code paths change
- existing TestGetNewTokenWithRefreshToken_Concurrency still passes
because it hits GetNewTokenWithRefreshToken directly, below the
coordinator boundary
Tests:
- refresh_coordinator_wireup_test.go: 50 concurrent refreshes coalesce
to <=2 upstream calls; distinct tokens still run in parallel; nil
coordinator falls back cleanly
* perf(cache): bound L1 backfill goroutines in HybridBackend
Get() and GetMany() previously spawned a goroutine per L2 hit to write
the value through to L1. Under sustained polling traffic (e.g. a Grafana
dashboard refreshing every 30s with N panels) this minted thousands of
goroutines, each running in Yaegi - directly contributing to the
~1000% CPU spike that pairs with the refresh-token herd.
Replace the per-hit goroutines with a single l1BackfillWorker fed by
l1BackfillBuffer, mirroring the existing asyncWriteBuffer/asyncWriteWorker
pattern for L2 writes. Buffer overflow drops the backfill (counted via
l1BackfillDrops) - a dropped backfill just means the next L2 hit for
that key re-queues it, which is safe.
Tests:
- TestHybridBackend_L1BackfillBounded: 1000 distinct L2 hits keep
goroutine count within +20 of baseline (pre-fix it grew by ~1000)
- TestHybridBackend_L1BackfillFullDrops: drops are accounted for when
the buffer is saturated and the worker is stopped
* feat(refresh): implement isRefreshTokenExpired heuristic
Replace the placeholder `return false` with a real check based on the
issued_at timestamp that SetRefreshToken already stamps into the session.
Gated by a new MaxRefreshTokenAgeSeconds config field (default 21600 =
6h, matching the existing comment). 0 disables the check.
This wires the previously-dead refreshTokenExpired branch in middleware.go,
which short-circuits AJAX requests with a 401 instead of letting them
hammer the IdP for a refresh token that's almost certainly stale - the
classic Grafana-after-long-pause failure mode.
Behaviour:
- maxRefreshTokenAge=0 disables the check (preserves prior behaviour)
- legacy sessions without issued_at still attempt one refresh; the IdP
remains the source of truth on first try
- nil-receiver and nil-session guards keep test code that builds
TraefikOidc literals safe
Tests:
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_DisabledWhenAgeZero
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_LegacySessionWithoutTimestamp
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_WithinWindow
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_BeyondWindow
- TestIsRefreshTokenExpired_NilGuards
* perf(token): skip parseJWT on cache hit in VerifyToken
The token cache fast-return existed but ran AFTER parseJWT, so every
validation paid for base64 + JSON unmarshal even on a hit. Under bursty
traffic (e.g. 10+ concurrent panel requests on every Grafana dashboard
refresh, each calling validateStandardTokens which verifies BOTH the
access token and the ID token), this is two redundant parses per
request multiplied by the panel count.
Move the cache lookup ahead of parseJWT. On a hit the function returns
nil immediately. On a miss the original flow runs unchanged.
Also nil-guard t.tokenCache to keep partial-literal test instances safe
(matches the same pattern we already use for tokenBlacklist).
Tests:
- TestVerifyToken_CacheHitSkipsParse: cache pre-populated with claims
for a token whose body would fail parseJWT - returns nil iff the
fast-path bypasses the parse
- TestVerifyToken_CacheMissStillParses: a syntactically valid but
unsigned token still errors past parseJWT on cache miss
* feat(refresh): cross-replica refresh-grant dedup via shared cache
The in-process RefreshCoordinator added in
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2d1b04c637 |
review fixes apr 2026 (#130)
* Multiple fixes - refresh coordinator dedup + memory pressure wire - middleware sse consolidation + timer leak + claim cache - universal cache sync backfill + isDebug gate - lazy background task race - memory monitor stw cached + refresh() api * fix(auth): suppress OIDC redirects on non-navigation requests - [x] Add isNonNavigationRequest using Sec-Fetch-Mode and Accept headers - [x] Add comprehensive TestIsNonNavigationRequest - [x] Update ServeHTTP to 401 non-navigation and AJAX requests Fixes #129 * feat(config): add custom CA and insecure skip verify for OIDC TLS - [x] Add CACertPath, CACertPEM, InsecureSkipVerify to Config - [x] Implement loadCACertPool for CA bundle loading - [x] Update HTTPClientConfig with RootCAs and InsecureSkipVerify - [x] Apply CA pool and skip verify to pooled HTTP clients - [x] Enhance configKey to distinguish TLS configs - [x] Add comprehensive ca_cert_test.go Fixes #125 * feat(oidc): add custom CA certificate support for private OIDC providers - [x] Add caCertPath, caCertPEM, insecureSkipVerify config options - [x] Update traefik.yml with new OIDC client config fields - [x] Add configuration schema descriptions for new options - [x] Update README table and add Custom CA Certificates section * Fix the documentation. * test(redis): add oversized argument rejection test - [x] Add TestRedisConn_RejectOversizedArgumentBytes - [x] Import strings package * Dependencies cleanup |
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de4b4d7258 |
fix(cache): remove sync.Pool for Yaegi compatibility (#121)
- [x] Remove sync.Pool implementation that causes reflection panics - [x] Replace pool-based NewRESPWriter with direct instantiation - [x] Replace pool-based NewRESPReader with direct instantiation - [x] Convert Release() methods to no-ops for API compatibility - [x] Add documentation explaining sync.Pool removal for Yaegi - [x] Remove "sync" import Resolves #120 |
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9d52f1b018 |
feat(core): refactor linters config and improve code quality (#119)
- [x] Reorganize golangci-lint configuration with documented disable reasons - [x] Simplify errcheck and revive linter rules with targeted exclusions - [x] Pre-compile regex patterns in input_validation.go for performance - [x] Fix type assertions in memory_shard.go and resp.go with safety checks - [x] Replace string comparison with EqualFold for case-insensitive matching - [x] Fix loop variable captures in jwk.go and logout.go - [x] Change high goroutine log level from Info to Debug in autocleanup.go - [x] Replace deprecated "cancelled" spelling with "canceled" throughout - [x] Add nolint annotations for intentional unused parameters - [x] Improve comment formatting for deprecated functions - [x] Fix comment spelling: "marshalling" → "marshaling" - [x] Refactor provider warnings formatting in internal/providers/warnings.go - [x] Simplify metrics summary building in internal/recovery/metrics.go - [x] Pre-allocate slice in error_recovery.go GetDegradedServices - [x] Refactor context cancellation checks in redis.go |
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06b219d1f8 |
feat(dcr): Add Redis storage support for multi-replica deployments (#109)
- [x] Add file and Redis storage backends for DCR credentials - [x] Implement storage abstraction with FileStore and RedisStore - [x] Add factory function for automatic backend selection (auto/file/redis) - [x] Integrate DCR credentials cache into UniversalCacheManager - [x] Add comprehensive tests for storage backends and factory - [x] Update configuration schema with storage backend options - [x] Update documentation with multi-replica deployment guidance - [x] Add Redis key prefix configuration for credential isolation |
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413e4a1b7d |
LRU + cache conflicts prevention. (#104)
* LRU + cache conflicts prevention. * Bugfix universalCache flooding ( issue #105 ) 1. Traefik cancels the context for old plugin instances 2. Each plugin's Close() method is called 3. The CacheInterfaceWrapper.Close() was calling cache.Close() on the shared singleton caches 4. Each Close() triggered Clear() which logged "Cleared all items" at INFO level |
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6efb78b7a8 |
Smarter approach to the cookies (#103)
* Smarter approach to the cookies - Single maxCookieSize = 1400 constant with clear documentation - Combined cookie storage for ~40-45% size reduction - Backward compatible migration from legacy cookies * Tuneup the code. |
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c474bbafd6 |
Cleanup [dec2025] (#101)
* Cleanup excessive comments. * Remove leftovers hanging around from previous refactor * Improve test coverage |
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a750c4f5b9 |
Size computation for allocation may overflow (#99)
* Size computation for allocation may overflow Performing calculations involving the size of potentially large strings or slices can result in an overflow (for signed integer types) or a wraparound (for unsigned types). An overflow causes the result of the calculation to become negative, while a wraparound results in a small (positive) number. |
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66b9ed0861 |
Reauthentication + redis fix
When introspection explicitly returns that a token is inactive/revoked/expired, the plugin now properly triggers re-authentication or refresh instead of falling back to ID token validation. This fixes the functional issue where users weren't being redirected to re-authenticate. Redis change ensures that when the caller's context is cancelled (e.g., the 200ms timeout in UniversalCache.Get()), the operation aborts quickly instead of continuing with retries. |
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e64fc7f730 |
Add redis support for distributed caching (#83)
* Add redis support for distributed caching * Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi. * fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi. * fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Move towards the self-provided Redis connection pool and RESP protocol implementation. Official redis client library won't work with yaegi. * ... and another all nighter. * fixup! ... and another all nighter. * fixup! fixup! ... and another all nighter. * fixup! fixup! fixup! ... and another all nighter. * Resolve issue #85 by adding ability to set custom claims in JWT tokens * Remove redundant validation in auth middleware ( issue #89 ) * Add ability to set cookie prefix for session cookies ( #87 ) * fixup! Add ability to set cookie prefix for session cookies ( #87 ) * Add ability to set cookie max age - issue #91 * Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 10: Size computation for allocation may overflow Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fixup! Merge main into 0.8.0-redis: resolve conflicts --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ae59a5e88a |
0.7.10 (#80)
* Add ability to disable replay protection. - This is useful for runs with multiple traefik replicas to avoid false positives and tokens re-creation. * Enhance the CI/CD pipelines * Increase test coverage. * Update vendored dependencies. * Update behaviour on forceHTTPS as per issue #82 |
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bde1db1c3b |
traefik plugin 0.7.7 (#73)
* Automatic discovery of the scopes. Issue #61 raised very valid concerns about users configuring scopes that are not supported by the provider. This change introduces automatic discovery of supported scopes by fetching the provider's discovery document and filtering out unsupported scopes. Before: User configures: scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"] Self-hosted GitLab: "The requested scope is invalid, unknown, or malformed" Authentication: ❌ FAILS After: User configures: scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "offline_access"] Middleware checks discovery doc → offline_access not supported Automatically filters to: ["openid", "profile", "email"] Authentication: ✅ SUCCEEDS * Resolves issue #74 by enabling user to specify expected audience in the configuration. * Fix flaky tests. |
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c3f23cb99b |
Release 0.7.5 (#70)
* Resolve issue with opaque tokens not being parsed correctly * Increase test coverage * Further improvements to test coverage and code quality * Add new providers. * fixup! Add new providers. * Cleanup. * fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup. * Memory management optimisation 24 bytes per Put < 256-4096 bytes per buffer allocation avoided (10-170x difference) * Pooling cleanup. |
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1b49e133da |
Complete rebuild of the plugin
* Fix bug affecting Azure OIDC authentication ( and most likely others ) * Fixes issue #51 * Ensure that appended roles are unique. Update the documentation. * Improvements targetting possible memory usage spikes. * Additional fixes and cleanup * Refactoring code to fix the issues identified by the users. * Modernize run * Fieldalignment * Multiple changes to improve performance and reduce complexity. - Optimise the errors and recovery. - Deduplicate code in metadata cache. - Remove unused performance monitoring code. - Simplify session management and settings handling. * Fix claims issue. * Add ability to overwrite the default scopes in the settings file * Well.. that escalated quickly. Completely forgot that Traefik uses outdated Yaegi and requires compatibility with 1.20 ( pre-generic Go code ). * Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work. * fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work. * fixup! fixup! Bugfix #51: Ensures that user provided scopes overrides work. * Abstract the provider logic into a separate package. * Additional micro fixes and cleanups. * Simplify all the things. * fixup! Simplify all the things. * fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Simplify all the things. * ... * Cleanup tests. * fixup! Cleanup tests. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Cleanup tests. * Issue #53: Fix CSRF token handling in reverse proxy 1. ✅ HTTPS Detection Fixed (session.go:723) - Now uses X-Forwarded-Proto header instead of r.URL.Scheme - Properly detects HTTPS in reverse proxy environments 2. ✅ SameSite Cookie Attribute Fixed - Removed automatic SameSiteStrictMode for HTTPS (would break OAuth) - Keeps SameSiteLaxMode to allow OAuth callbacks from external domains - Only uses Strict for AJAX requests which don't involve OAuth redirects 3. ✅ Cookie Domain Handling Fixed - Now respects X-Forwarded-Host header for cookie domain - Ensures cookies are set for the public domain, not internal proxy domain 4. ✅ EnhanceSessionSecurity Properly Integrated - Function is now actually called during session save - Applies security enhancements without breaking OAuth flow Why Issue #53 Failed Before: 1. Cookies were not marked Secure in HTTPS environments (browser wouldn't send them back) 2. If they had been Secure with SameSite=Strict, Azure callbacks would still fail 3. Cookie domain might have been wrong (internal vs public domain) Why It Works Now: 1. Cookies are properly marked Secure for HTTPS 2. Uses SameSite=Lax to allow OAuth provider callbacks 3. Cookie domain uses public domain from X-Forwarded-Host 4. CSRF token persists through the entire OAuth flow * Next set of enhancements together with memory usage improvements. * Memory leak fixes and optimisations. * CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes * fixup! CSRF and Cookie Domain fixes * Metadata cache leak fix + profiling * fixup! Metadata cache leak fix + profiling * Memory leaks hunting, part 1337. * Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Further pursue of perfection. * Clear race conditions * fixup! Clear race conditions * Weekend fun with memory leaks * Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage. ``` ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc 117.017s coverage: 72.6% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/auth 0.505s coverage: 87.1% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/circuit_breaker 0.283s coverage: 99.0% of statements github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/config coverage: 0.0% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/handlers 0.349s coverage: 98.2% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/internal/providers (cached) coverage: 94.3% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/middleware 0.808s coverage: 78.0% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/recovery 0.653s coverage: 100.0% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/chunking (cached) coverage: 87.8% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/core (cached) coverage: 85.6% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/crypto (cached) coverage: 81.8% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/storage (cached) coverage: 93.5% of statements ok github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc/session/validators (cached) coverage: 98.8% of statements ```` * fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage. * fixup! fixup! Splitting code into multiple files with reasonable testing coverage. * Weekend fun with further optimisations. * fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations. * fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations. * fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Weekend fun with further optimisations. * Pre-release cleanup. * Enhance test coverage. * fixup! Enhance test coverage. * fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage. * fixup! fixup! fixup! Enhance test coverage. |