fix(middleware): forward configured headers on SSE/WebSocket bypass (#162)

The SSE and WebSocket bypass forwarded only X-Forwarded-User. It did not
apply the configured headers. Backends that authenticate the proxy with a
shared-secret header returned 401 on WebSocket upgrades. Version 0.8.x sent
WebSocket upgrades through the normal flow, so this is a regression.

The bypass now renders the header templates through applyHeaderTemplates,
which forwardAuthorized also uses. Templates use the ID-token claims from
the session cookie. If the session has no ID token, they use the
access-token claims.

The bypass now also rejects a session that the IdP logged out through
back-channel or front-channel logout. Without this check, a logged-out
cookie can open streams with the proxy secret attached.

Add a yaegi check for the WebSocket case. Move tokenWithGroups to the
shared JWT test helpers, as FIX-41 requires.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G1d1n1BrHHHw8dBUkbiBPC

README.md

@@ -304,9 +304,11 @@ WebSocket upgrade. The middleware handles this automatically:
 - They are **not** unauthenticated — a valid encrypted session cookie is
   required, otherwise the request is rejected. The session must already exist
   (i.e. the user logged in via a normal HTTP page first).
-- `X-Forwarded-User` is forwarded from the session.
+- `X-Forwarded-User` and the configured `headers` are forwarded from the
+  session. Header templates render from the claims in the session cookie.
 - Validation is cookie-only (no JWK fetch), so streaming keeps working during
-  brief IdP outages.
+  brief IdP outages. Back-channel and front-channel logout still apply: a
+  session that the IdP logged out is rejected.
 
 No configuration needed — this is implicit behavior.
 

cmd/yaegicheck/main.go

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ package main
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ func main() {
 	runCheck("fix06-sse-flush-reaches-next", checkSSEFlushReachesNext)
 	runCheck("middleware-erraborthandler-aborts-under-yaegi", checkErrAbortHandlerAbortsUnderYaegi)
 	runCheck("fix17-setifabsent-claims-once", checkSetIfAbsentUnderYaegi)
+	runCheck("issue162-websocket-forwards-header-templates", checkIssue162WebSocketHeaderTemplates)
 	fmt.Println("OK: all yaegi regression checks passed")
 }
 
@@ -723,6 +725,87 @@ func checkSSEFlushReachesNext() (string, error) {
 	return "", nil
 }
 
+// checkIssue162WebSocketHeaderTemplates pins #162 under the interpreter: an
+// authenticated WebSocket upgrade takes the streaming bypass, which must
+// still render the configured headers (static and claim-derived) for next.
+func checkIssue162WebSocketHeaderTemplates() (string, error) {
+	discovery := servers.NewOIDCServer(nil)
+	defer discovery.Close()
+
+	cfg := oidc.CreateConfig()
+	cfg.ProviderURL = discovery.URL
+	cfg.ClientID = "yaegi-check-162-client"
+	cfg.ClientSecret = "yaegi-check-162-secret"
+	cfg.CallbackURL = "/oauth2/callback"
+	cfg.SessionEncryptionKey = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+	cfg.Headers = []oidc.TemplatedHeader{
+		{Name: "X-Proxy-Secret", Value: "s3cret"},
+		{Name: "X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username", Value: "{{.Claims.preferred_username}}"},
+	}
+
+	var seen http.Header
+	next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		seen = r.Header.Clone()
+	})
+	h, err := oidc.New(context.Background(), next, cfg, "yaegi-check-162")
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("New: %w", err)
+	}
+	if closer, ok := h.(interface{ Close() error }); ok {
+		defer closer.Close()
+	}
+
+	sm, err := oidc.NewSessionManager(cfg.SessionEncryptionKey, cfg.ForceHTTPS, cfg.CookieDomain, cfg.CookiePrefix, time.Duration(cfg.SessionMaxAge)*time.Second, oidc.NewLogger("error"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("NewSessionManager: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer sm.Shutdown()
+
+	setupReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/ws", nil)
+	session, err := sm.GetSession(setupReq)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("GetSession: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := session.SetAuthenticated(true); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("SetAuthenticated: %w", err)
+	}
+	session.SetUserIdentifier("[email protected]")
+	// Unsigned JWT: the bypass reads cookie-sealed claims without signature
+	// verification. Built at runtime because a JWT literal trips the
+	// pre-commit secret scanner.
+	b64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString
+	sig := make([]byte, 32)
+	for i := range sig {
+		sig[i] = byte(i + 1)
+	}
+	session.SetIDToken(b64([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`)) + "." + b64([]byte(`{"preferred_username":"alice"}`)) + "." + b64(sig))
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	if err := session.Save(setupReq, rec); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("session.Save: %w", err)
+	}
+	session.ReturnToPool()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/ws", nil)
+	for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
+	req.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
+	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
+
+	if seen == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("next was not reached (status %d)", rw.Code)
+	}
+	if got := seen.Get("X-Proxy-Secret"); got != "s3cret" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("X-Proxy-Secret = %q, want %q", got, "s3cret")
+	}
+	if got := seen.Get("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username"); got != "alice" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username = %q, want %q", got, "alice")
+	}
+	return "", nil
+}
+
 // checkErrAbortHandlerAbortsUnderYaegi guards the re-review finding on
 // ServeHTTP's ErrAbortHandler branch (middleware.go): under yaegi v0.16.1,
 // `r == http.ErrAbortHandler` only ever matches a panic raised by COMPILED

issue162_regression_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+package traefikoidc
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"text/template"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Issue #162: the SSE/WebSocket bypass forwarded only X-Forwarded-User, not
+// the operator-configured `headers`. Backends that authenticate the proxy
+// with a shared-secret header (Frigate proxy auth) answered 401 on /ws while
+// normal requests, which go through forwardAuthorized, kept working.
+
+func issue162Templates(t *testing.T, headers map[string]string) map[string]*template.Template {
+	t.Helper()
+	funcMap := headerTemplateFuncMap(claimsWhitelist(nil))
+	out := make(map[string]*template.Template, len(headers))
+	for name, value := range headers {
+		tmpl, err := template.New(name).Funcs(funcMap).Option("missingkey=zero").Parse(value)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("parse template %s: %v", name, err)
+		}
+		out[name] = tmpl
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// issue162Request builds a request carrying a saved authenticated session.
+// idClaims and accessClaims are optional; nil leaves that token unset.
+func issue162Request(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager, idClaims, accessClaims map[string]interface{}) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+	setupReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.example.com/ws", nil)
+	session, err := sm.GetSession(setupReq)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetSession: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := session.SetAuthenticated(true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SetAuthenticated: %v", err)
+	}
+	session.SetUserIdentifier("[email protected]")
+	if idClaims != nil {
+		session.SetIDToken(tokenWithGroups(t, idClaims))
+	}
+	if accessClaims != nil {
+		session.SetAccessToken(tokenWithGroups(t, accessClaims))
+	}
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	if err := session.Save(setupReq, rr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err)
+	}
+	session.returnToPoolSafely()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.example.com/ws", nil)
+	for _, c := range rr.Result().Cookies() {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+	return req
+}
+
+func issue162Middleware(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager, templates map[string]*template.Template, seen *http.Header) *TraefikOidc {
+	t.Helper()
+	initComplete := make(chan struct{})
+	close(initComplete)
+	return &TraefikOidc{
+		logger:            GetSingletonNoOpLogger(),
+		name:              "test",
+		sessionManager:    sm,
+		initComplete:      initComplete,
+		extractClaimsFunc: extractClaims,
+		groupClaimName:    "groups",
+		headerTemplates:   templates,
+		next: http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			*seen = r.Header.Clone()
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		}),
+	}
+}
+
+func issue162SessionManager(t *testing.T) *SessionManager {
+	t.Helper()
+	sm, err := NewSessionManager(strings.Repeat("k", 32), false, "", "", time.Hour, NewLogger("error"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewSessionManager: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if err := sm.Shutdown(); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("Shutdown: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+	return sm
+}
+
+func TestIssue162_StreamingBypassForwardsHeaderTemplates(t *testing.T) {
+	templates := map[string]string{
+		"X-Proxy-Secret":                 "s3cret",
+		"X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username": "{{.Claims.preferred_username}}",
+		"X-Forwarded-Groups":             "{{range $i, $e := .Claims.groups}}{{if $i}},{{end}}{{$e}}{{end}}",
+	}
+	idClaims := map[string]interface{}{
+		"preferred_username": "alice",
+		"groups":             []string{"admins", "viewers"},
+	}
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		prepare func(*http.Request)
+	}{
+		{"websocket", func(r *http.Request) {
+			r.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
+			r.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
+		}},
+		{"sse", func(r *http.Request) {
+			r.Header.Set("Accept", "text/event-stream")
+		}},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			sm := issue162SessionManager(t)
+			var seen http.Header
+			m := issue162Middleware(t, sm, issue162Templates(t, templates), &seen)
+
+			req := issue162Request(t, sm, idClaims, nil)
+			tc.prepare(req)
+			rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			m.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
+
+			if seen == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("next not invoked (status=%d body=%q)", rw.Code, rw.Body.String())
+			}
+			want := map[string]string{
+				"X-Forwarded-User":               "[email protected]",
+				"X-Proxy-Secret":                 "s3cret",
+				"X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username": "alice",
+				"X-Forwarded-Groups":             "admins,viewers",
+			}
+			for h, v := range want {
+				if got := seen.Get(h); got != v {
+					t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", h, got, v)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// Opaque-ID-token providers: normal requests render templates from
+// access-token claims when the session has no ID token, so the bypass must too.
+func TestIssue162_StreamingBypassTemplatesFallBackToAccessTokenClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	sm := issue162SessionManager(t)
+	var seen http.Header
+	m := issue162Middleware(t, sm, issue162Templates(t, map[string]string{
+		"X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username": "{{.Claims.preferred_username}}",
+	}), &seen)
+
+	req := issue162Request(t, sm, nil, map[string]interface{}{"preferred_username": "bob"})
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "text/event-stream")
+	m.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
+
+	if seen == nil {
+		t.Fatal("next not invoked")
+	}
+	if got := seen.Get("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username"); got != "bob" {
+		t.Fatalf("X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username = %q, want %q", got, "bob")
+	}
+}
+
+// An unauthenticated upgrade must still be rejected before any template
+// (which can carry a shared secret) is rendered onto the request.
+func TestIssue162_StreamingBypassRejectsUnauthenticatedWithoutTemplates(t *testing.T) {
+	sm := issue162SessionManager(t)
+	var seen http.Header
+	m := issue162Middleware(t, sm, issue162Templates(t, map[string]string{"X-Proxy-Secret": "s3cret"}), &seen)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://app.example.com/ws", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
+	req.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
+	rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	m.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
+
+	if seen != nil {
+		t.Fatal("next invoked for unauthenticated upgrade")
+	}
+	if rw.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rw.Code)
+	}
+	if req.Header.Get("X-Proxy-Secret") != "" {
+		t.Fatal("shared-secret template rendered onto a rejected request")
+	}
+}
+
+// Now that the bypass forwards proxy credentials (#162), it must honor
+// IdP-initiated logout like the normal path does; otherwise a logged-out
+// cookie keeps opening WebSocket/SSE with the shared secret attached.
+func TestIssue162_StreamingBypassRejectsIdPLoggedOutSession(t *testing.T) {
+	idClaims := map[string]interface{}{
+		"sid": "sess-162",
+		"sub": "alice",
+		"iat": float64(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute).Unix()),
+	}
+	cases := []struct {
+		name       string
+		invalidate bool
+		wantStatus int
+	}{
+		{"active session forwards", false, http.StatusOK},
+		{"logged-out session rejected", true, http.StatusUnauthorized},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			sm := issue162SessionManager(t)
+			cache := NewCache()
+			defer cache.Close()
+
+			var seen http.Header
+			m := issue162Middleware(t, sm, issue162Templates(t, map[string]string{"X-Proxy-Secret": "s3cret"}), &seen)
+			m.enableBackchannelLogout = true
+			m.sessionInvalidationCache = cache
+			if tc.invalidate {
+				if err := m.invalidateSession("sess-162", ""); err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("invalidateSession: %v", err)
+				}
+			}
+
+			req := issue162Request(t, sm, idClaims, nil)
+			req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
+			req.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
+			rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			m.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
+
+			if rw.Code != tc.wantStatus {
+				t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rw.Code, tc.wantStatus)
+			}
+			if forwarded := seen != nil; forwarded != (tc.wantStatus == http.StatusOK) {
+				t.Fatalf("next invoked = %v, want %v", forwarded, tc.wantStatus == http.StatusOK)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

jwt_test_helpers_test.go

@@ -80,3 +80,21 @@ func makeTestJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
 	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hdr) + "." +
 		base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pl) + ".c2ln"
 }
+
+// tokenWithGroups builds a JWT whose signature segment is long enough to pass
+// the session chunk manager's format validation (>=10 chars) so the access
+// token round-trips through Set/GetAccessToken.
+func tokenWithGroups(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	hdr, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"alg": "RS256", "typ": "JWT"})
+	pl, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
+	// Varied (non-repeating) signature bytes so the session chunk manager's
+	// repeated-character heuristic does not reject it.
+	sigBytes := make([]byte, 32)
+	for i := range sigBytes {
+		sigBytes[i] = byte(i + 1)
+	}
+	sig := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sigBytes)
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hdr) + "." +
+		base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pl) + "." + sig
+}

middleware.go

@@ -296,6 +296,19 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) applyBypassUserHeaders(req *http.Request, reason string) (
 		return false, http.StatusUnauthorized
 	}
 
+	// Mirror the normal path's IdP-initiated logout check: this path forwards
+	// configured headers (often a shared proxy secret), so a logged-out cookie
+	// must not keep opening streams until the absolute session timeout.
+	if t.enableBackchannelLogout || t.enableFrontchannelLogout {
+		if idToken := session.GetIDToken(); idToken != "" {
+			sid, sub, _ := t.extractSessionInfo(idToken)
+			if t.isSessionInvalidated(sid, sub, t.sessionCreatedAtForInvalidation(idToken, session)) {
+				t.logger.Infof("User %s session invalidated via IdP-initiated logout (bypass)", userIdentifier)
+				return false, http.StatusUnauthorized
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Enforce the user allowlist, mirroring the normal path's authorization
 	// check (isAllowedUser). Without this, an authenticated user not in
 	// allowedUsers (or whose domain is not in allowedUserDomains) could
@@ -314,19 +327,18 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) applyBypassUserHeaders(req *http.Request, reason string) (
 	// fallback, opaque-ID-token providers (groups only in the access token)
 	// were granted on normal requests but 403'd on the streaming bypass
 	// (R118).
+	var claims map[string]interface{}
+	var claimsErr error
+	if len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 || len(t.headerTemplates) > 0 {
+		claims, claimsErr = t.bypassSessionClaims(session)
+	}
+
 	if len(t.allowedRolesAndGroups) > 0 {
-		var groupClaims map[string]interface{}
+		if claimsErr != nil || claims == nil {
-		var claimsErr error
-		if idToken := session.GetIDToken(); idToken != "" {
-			groupClaims, claimsErr = session.GetIDTokenClaims(t.extractClaimsFunc)
-		} else if accessToken := session.GetAccessToken(); accessToken != "" {
-			groupClaims, claimsErr = t.extractClaimsFunc(accessToken)
-		}
-		if claimsErr != nil || groupClaims == nil {
 			t.logger.Debugf("%s bypass: cannot read claims for role check (err=%v): %s", reason, claimsErr, userIdentifier)
 			return false, http.StatusForbidden
 		}
-		groups, roles, extErr := t.extractGroupsAndRolesFromClaims(groupClaims)
+		groups, roles, extErr := t.extractGroupsAndRolesFromClaims(claims)
 		if extErr != nil {
 			t.logger.Debugf("%s bypass: role extraction failed for %s: %v", reason, userIdentifier, extErr)
 			return false, http.StatusForbidden
@@ -351,8 +363,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) applyBypassUserHeaders(req *http.Request, reason string) (
 	// only sets X-Forwarded-User / X-Auth-Request-User (never groups/roles),
 	// forged group/role headers would otherwise survive to the backend,
 	// which commonly trusts them for downstream authorization. Must precede
-	// the sanitize gate so even the drop-on-unsafe early return has already
+	// the sanitize gate so forged values are cleared even when the
-	// cleared forged values (R100).
+	// identifier is dropped as unsafe (R100).
 	stripIdentityHeaders(req)
 
 	// Sanitize the claim-derived identifier before it is injected as a
@@ -361,20 +373,54 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) applyBypassUserHeaders(req *http.Request, reason string) (
 	// or delimiter characters that would otherwise inject or confuse
 	// downstream header parsing. On failure, drop the header but still
 	// honor the bypass (the identity headers are decoration here).
-	safeIdentifier, ok := sanitizeHeaderClaimValue(userIdentifier, t.headerClaimMaxLen())
+	if safeIdentifier, ok := sanitizeHeaderClaimValue(userIdentifier, t.headerClaimMaxLen()); ok {
-	if !ok {
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", safeIdentifier)
+		if !t.minimalHeaders {
+			req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", safeIdentifier)
+		}
+		t.logger.Debugf("%s bypass: forwarded user %s from session", reason, safeIdentifier)
+	} else {
 		t.logger.Debugf("%s bypass: dropping unsafe user-identifier header: %s", reason, headerClaimValueReason(userIdentifier, t.headerClaimMaxLen()))
-		return true, 0
 	}
 
-	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", safeIdentifier)
+	// Backends that authenticate the proxy via configured headers (shared
-	if !t.minimalHeaders {
+	// secret, user/groups) need them on the upgrade too (#162). Claims are
-		req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", safeIdentifier)
+	// cookie-sealed but not re-verified here; see the doc comment above.
+	if len(t.headerTemplates) > 0 {
+		if claimsErr != nil {
+			t.logger.Debugf("%s bypass: rendering header templates without claims: %v", reason, claimsErr)
+		}
+		t.applyHeaderTemplates(req, &principal{
+			Source:       sourceSession,
+			Identifier:   userIdentifier,
+			AccessToken:  session.GetAccessToken(),
+			IDToken:      session.GetIDToken(),
+			RefreshToken: session.GetRefreshToken(),
+			Claims:       claims,
+		})
 	}
-	t.logger.Debugf("%s bypass: forwarded user %s from session", reason, safeIdentifier)
 	return true, 0
 }
 
+// bypassSessionClaims returns the session's ID-token claims, falling back to
+// access-token claims when there is no ID token, matching the source the
+// normal authorization path uses (R118).
+func (t *TraefikOidc) bypassSessionClaims(session *SessionData) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
+	if t.extractClaimsFunc == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	// Explicit assignments, not tail-call returns: yaegi can zero
+	// multi-value tail-call results (see issue151_regression_test.go).
+	var claims map[string]interface{}
+	var err error
+	if session.GetIDToken() != "" {
+		claims, err = session.GetIDTokenClaims(t.extractClaimsFunc)
+	} else if accessToken := session.GetAccessToken(); accessToken != "" {
+		claims, err = t.extractClaimsFunc(accessToken)
+	}
+	return claims, err
+}
+
 // ServeHTTP implements the main middleware logic for processing HTTP requests.
 // It handles the complete OIDC authentication flow including:
 //   - Excluded URL bypass
@@ -1248,6 +1294,64 @@ func joinBoundedClaimHeader(values []string) string {
 	return b.String()
 }
 
+// applyHeaderTemplates renders the configured header templates for p onto req.
+func (t *TraefikOidc) applyHeaderTemplates(req *http.Request, p *principal) {
+	if len(t.headerTemplates) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	// p.Claims may be nil (e.g. session without an ID token). Templates
+	// referencing .Claims.* will simply produce empty values — matches
+	// the prior behavior. Bearer-source principals always carry access-
+	// token claims (post-verifyToken).
+	templateData := map[string]interface{}{
+		"AccessToken":  p.AccessToken,
+		"IDToken":      p.IDToken,
+		"IdToken":      p.IDToken, // documented spelling (README/CONFIGURATION); alias so {{.IdToken}} renders (issue #149 review)
+		"RefreshToken": p.RefreshToken,
+		"Claims":       p.Claims,
+	}
+
+	for headerName, tmpl := range t.headerTemplates {
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		if err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, templateData); err != nil {
+			t.logger.Errorf("Failed to execute template for header %s: %v", headerName, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		headerValue := buf.String()
+		// Go's text/template renders a missing key in an interface-valued
+		// map as the literal "<no value>" even with missingkey=zero
+		// (zero only applies to typed keys). Replace that sentinel so an
+		// optional claim the provider did not emit (e.g. email) does not
+		// leak "<no value>" into the downstream header.
+		if strings.Contains(headerValue, noValueSentinel) {
+			headerValue = stripNoValueSentinels(headerValue)
+		}
+		// Skip an empty render: Setting "" would clobber an identity
+		// header (X-Forwarded-User / X-Auth-Request-*) the caller already
+		// injected with the authenticated value, silently
+		// dropping the user identity at the backend.
+		if headerValue == "" {
+			t.logger.Debugf("Skipping templated header %s: rendered value is empty", headerName)
+			continue
+		}
+		// Sanitize the rendered output: template inputs are claim-derived
+		// and attacker-influenceable, so reject control chars (header
+		// injection), bidi-override runes, the , ; = delimiters, and an
+		// over-long value. Fail closed by dropping the header rather than
+		// forwarding a tainted value. Do not log the value (it commonly
+		// carries the access token); log only name + reason.
+		if reason := headerValueReason(headerValue, headerTemplateMaxLen); reason != "" {
+			t.logger.Debugf("Dropping templated header %s: value failed sanitization (%s)", headerName, reason)
+			continue
+		}
+		req.Header.Set(headerName, headerValue)
+		// Do not log the value: templated headers commonly carry the access
+		// token (e.g. "Authorization: Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"), and logging
+		// it — even at debug — leaks credentials into logs.
+		t.logger.Debugf("Set templated header %s (%d bytes)", headerName, len(headerValue))
+	}
+}
+
 func (t *TraefikOidc) forwardAuthorized(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, p *principal) {
 	// This middleware fully owns the identity headers it injects upstream.
 	// Unconditionally remove any inbound values with the same names first:
@@ -1383,59 +1487,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) forwardAuthorized(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Reques
 		req.Header.Del("Authorization")
 	}
 
-	if len(t.headerTemplates) > 0 {
+	t.applyHeaderTemplates(req, p)
-		// p.Claims may be nil (e.g. session without an ID token). Templates
-		// referencing .Claims.* will simply produce empty values — matches
-		// the prior behavior. Bearer-source principals always carry access-
-		// token claims (post-verifyToken).
-		templateData := map[string]interface{}{
-			"AccessToken":  p.AccessToken,
-			"IDToken":      p.IDToken,
-			"IdToken":      p.IDToken, // documented spelling (README/CONFIGURATION); alias so {{.IdToken}} renders (issue #149 review)
-			"RefreshToken": p.RefreshToken,
-			"Claims":       p.Claims,
-		}
-
-		for headerName, tmpl := range t.headerTemplates {
-			var buf bytes.Buffer
-			if err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, templateData); err != nil {
-				t.logger.Errorf("Failed to execute template for header %s: %v", headerName, err)
-				continue
-			}
-			headerValue := buf.String()
-			// Go's text/template renders a missing key in an interface-valued
-			// map as the literal "<no value>" even with missingkey=zero
-			// (zero only applies to typed keys). Replace that sentinel so an
-			// optional claim the provider did not emit (e.g. email) does not
-			// leak "<no value>" into the downstream header.
-			if strings.Contains(headerValue, noValueSentinel) {
-				headerValue = stripNoValueSentinels(headerValue)
-			}
-			// Skip an empty render: Setting "" would clobber an identity
-			// header (X-Forwarded-User / X-Auth-Request-*) already injected
-			// earlier in this function with the authenticated value, silently
-			// dropping the user identity at the backend.
-			if headerValue == "" {
-				t.logger.Debugf("Skipping templated header %s: rendered value is empty", headerName)
-				continue
-			}
-			// Sanitize the rendered output: template inputs are claim-derived
-			// and attacker-influenceable, so reject control chars (header
-			// injection), bidi-override runes, the , ; = delimiters, and an
-			// over-long value. Fail closed by dropping the header rather than
-			// forwarding a tainted value. Do not log the value (it commonly
-			// carries the access token); log only name + reason.
-			if reason := headerValueReason(headerValue, headerTemplateMaxLen); reason != "" {
-				t.logger.Debugf("Dropping templated header %s: value failed sanitization (%s)", headerName, reason)
-				continue
-			}
-			req.Header.Set(headerName, headerValue)
-			// Do not log the value: templated headers commonly carry the access
-			// token (e.g. "Authorization: Bearer {{.AccessToken}}"), and logging
-			// it — even at debug — leaks credentials into logs.
-			t.logger.Debugf("Set templated header %s (%d bytes)", headerName, len(headerValue))
-		}
-	}
 
 	// Strip OIDC session cookies before forwarding to the backend to prevent
 	// HTTP 431 "Request Header Fields Too Large" errors (GitHub issue #122).

review_r118_test.go

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package traefikoidc
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
@@ -64,24 +62,6 @@ func TestIsRetryableError_HTTPErrorStatus(t *testing.T) {
 
 // --- R118 fix C: bypass role gate must fall back to access-token claims ---
 
-// tokenWithGroups builds a JWT whose signature segment is long enough to pass
-// the session chunk manager's format validation (>=10 chars) so the access
-// token round-trips through Set/GetAccessToken.
-func tokenWithGroups(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	hdr, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"alg": "RS256", "typ": "JWT"})
-	pl, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
-	// Varied (non-repeating) signature bytes so the session chunk manager's
-	// repeated-character heuristic does not reject it.
-	sigBytes := make([]byte, 32)
-	for i := range sigBytes {
-		sigBytes[i] = byte(i + 1)
-	}
-	sig := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sigBytes)
-	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hdr) + "." +
-		base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pl) + "." + sig
-}
-
 // TestApplyBypassUserHeaders_AccessTokenGroupFallback regresses R118: the
 // SSE/WebSocket bypass role gate read only the session's ID token, while the
 // main authorization path falls back to access-token claims when no ID token