refactor: delete dead non-RS validators; tests use RS variants

After v1.0.20 the non-RS validation chain had no production callers —
middleware.ServeHTTP dispatched exclusively through isUserAuthenticatedRS.
The orphaned functions stayed reachable only from a handful of test
files and risked silent logic drift against their RS counterparts.

Deleted from production code (~440 LOC):
  - auth_flow.go:        isUserAuthenticated
  - token_manager.go:    validateAzureTokens
  - token_manager.go:    validateGoogleTokens
  - token_manager.go:    validateStandardTokens
  - token_manager.go:    validateTokenExpiry
  - removed now-unused encoding/base64 and encoding/json imports
    from token_manager.go (only the deleted validateStandardTokens
    needed them; the RS variant in token_validation_rs.go keeps its
    own imports).

Added (3 LOC):
  - token_validation_rs.go: validateGoogleTokensRS (trivial delegator,
    parity with the deleted non-RS variant so isUserAuthenticatedRS
    can dispatch cleanly).

Tests ported (10 call sites across 3 files):
  - audience_test.go:                ts.tOidc.validateStandardTokens
  - azure_oidc_test.go:              tOidc.validateAzureTokens,
                                     ts.tOidc.validateGoogleTokens,
                                     ts.tOidc.validateAzureTokens,
                                     ts.tOidc.isUserAuthenticated
  - issue134_followup_graph_test.go: oidc.validateAzureTokens (4x)

Each ported site now constructs a *requestState from its existing
*SessionData via (&requestState{}).captureSession(session) and calls
the *RS variant. Same data, different read source.

Net diff: -440 LOC production, ~+25 LOC tests, +3 LOC stub.
Production now has a single source of truth for token validation;
no parallel implementations to keep in sync.

All tests pass with -race; golangci-lint clean.
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-23 13:04:26 +01:00
parent 7c6f09fb20
commit 5f9c574f95
6 changed files with 28 additions and 466 deletions
+8 -4
View File
@@ -234,7 +234,8 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_ValidateAzureTokensSkipsGraphAccessToken(t *testing.T
oidc, errBuf := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, graphAccessToken, idToken)
authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
output := errBuf.String()
assert.NotContains(t, output, "crypto/rsa: verification error",
@@ -344,7 +345,8 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_StandardAzureAccessTokenStillVerifies(t *testing.T) {
oidc, errBuf := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, accessToken, idToken)
authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
assert.True(t, authenticated, "standard Azure access token must verify and authenticate")
assert.False(t, needsRefresh)
@@ -381,7 +383,8 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_GraphAccessTokenWithoutIDToken(t *testing.T) {
oidc, errBuf := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, graphAccessToken, "")
authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
authenticated, needsRefresh, expired := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
assert.True(t, authenticated, "Graph token without ID token must remain authenticated (matches existing opaque-token semantics)")
assert.False(t, needsRefresh)
@@ -443,7 +446,8 @@ func TestIssue134_Followup_ConfusedDeputyAttackDoesNotBypassVerification(t *test
oidc, _ := newAzureFollowupOIDC(t, jwks)
session := authedSessionWithTokens(t, forgedAccessToken, forgedIDToken)
authenticated, _, _ := oidc.validateAzureTokens(session)
rs := (&requestState{}).captureSession(session)
authenticated, _, _ := oidc.validateAzureTokensRS(rs)
assert.False(t, authenticated,
"attacker's forged tokens must not authenticate even when the access token has a nonce header — ID token verification rejects the wrong-key signature")
}