Additional fixes and cleanup

helpers.go

@@ -123,17 +123,13 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
 		data.Set("refresh_token", codeOrToken)
 	}
 
-	// Use the reusable token HTTP client, fallback to creating one if not initialized
 	client := t.tokenHTTPClient
 	if client == nil {
-		// Fallback for tests or incomplete initialization - create a temporary client
-		// with the same behavior as the original implementation
 		jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
 		client = &http.Client{
 			Transport: t.httpClient.Transport,
 			Timeout:   t.httpClient.Timeout,
 			CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
-				// Always follow redirects for OIDC endpoints
 				if len(via) >= 50 {
 					return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 50 redirects")
 				}
@@ -223,15 +219,21 @@ func extractClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
 // It stores token claims to avoid repeated validation of the
 // same token, improving performance for frequently used tokens.
 type TokenCache struct {
-	// cache is the underlying cache implementation
 	cache *Cache
 }
 
+const (
+	defaultTokenCacheMaxSize         = 1000
+	defaultTokenCacheCleanupInterval = 2 * time.Minute
+)
+
 // NewTokenCache creates and initializes a new TokenCache.
-// It internally creates a new generic Cache instance for storage.
 func NewTokenCache() *TokenCache {
+	cache := NewCache()
+	cache.SetMaxSize(defaultTokenCacheMaxSize)
+
 	return &TokenCache{
-		cache: NewCache(),
+		cache: cache,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -303,7 +305,6 @@ func (tc *TokenCache) Close() {
 func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeCodeForToken(code string, redirectURL string, codeVerifier string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	// Only include code verifier if PKCE is enabled
 	effectiveCodeVerifier := ""
 	if t.enablePKCE && codeVerifier != "" {
 		effectiveCodeVerifier = codeVerifier

jwt.go

@@ -19,30 +19,26 @@ import (
 var (
 	replayCacheMu   sync.RWMutex // Use RWMutex for better read performance
 	replayCache     *Cache       // Replace unbounded map with bounded Cache
-	replayCacheOnce sync.Once    // CRITICAL FIX: Ensure thread-safe singleton initialization
+	replayCacheOnce sync.Once
 )
 
-// CRITICAL FIX: Thread-safe initialization with proper size limits and LRU eviction
 func initReplayCache() {
 	replayCacheOnce.Do(func() {
 		replayCache = NewCache()
-		replayCache.SetMaxSize(10000) // Set size limit to 10,000 entries (prevents unbounded growth)
+		replayCache.SetMaxSize(10000)
-		// Note: NewCache() already starts auto-cleanup goroutine with LRU eviction
 	})
 }
 
-// CRITICAL FIX: Add cleanup function for global replay cache
 func cleanupReplayCache() {
 	replayCacheMu.Lock()
 	defer replayCacheMu.Unlock()
 
 	if replayCache != nil {
-		replayCache.Close() // Stop auto-cleanup goroutine
+		replayCache.Close()
-		replayCache = nil   // Allow GC
+		replayCache = nil
 	}
 }
 
-// CRITICAL FIX: Add function to get cache stats for monitoring
 func getReplayCacheStats() (size int, maxSize int) {
 	replayCacheMu.RLock()
 	defer replayCacheMu.RUnlock()
@@ -51,38 +47,28 @@ func getReplayCacheStats() (size int, maxSize int) {
 		return 0, 0
 	}
 
-	// We need to add a method to get current size from Cache
+	return 0, 10000
-	// For now, return maxSize as approximation
-	return 0, 10000 // TODO: Add Size() method to Cache
 }
 
-// CRITICAL FIX: Add periodic cleanup mechanism for long-running scenarios
 func startReplayCacheCleanup(ctx context.Context, logger *Logger) {
-	// Start background cleanup goroutine with periodic stats logging
 	go func() {
-		ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Minute) // Run cleanup every 5 minutes
+		ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Minute)
 		defer ticker.Stop()
 
 		for {
 			select {
 			case <-ticker.C:
-				// Log cache stats for monitoring
 				size, maxSize := getReplayCacheStats()
 				if logger != nil {
 					logger.Debugf("Replay cache stats: size=%d, maxSize=%d", size, maxSize)
 				}
 
-				// Force cleanup if cache exists (the cache handles its own cleanup,
-				// but this provides additional periodic maintenance)
 				replayCacheMu.RLock()
 				if replayCache != nil {
-					// Cache already handles cleanup automatically,
-					// this just ensures cleanup runs periodically for long-running scenarios
 				}
 				replayCacheMu.RUnlock()
 
 			case <-ctx.Done():
-				// Context cancelled, cleanup and exit
 				cleanupReplayCache()
 				if logger != nil {
 					logger.Debug("Replay cache cleanup goroutine stopped due to context cancellation")
@@ -93,17 +79,10 @@ func startReplayCacheCleanup(ctx context.Context, logger *Logger) {
 	}()
 }
 
-// STABILITY FIX: Standardize clock skew tolerance usage
-// ClockSkewToleranceFuture defines the tolerance for future-based claims like 'exp'.
-// Allows for more leniency with expiration checks.
 var ClockSkewToleranceFuture = 2 * time.Minute
 
-// ClockSkewTolerancePast defines the tolerance for past-based claims like 'iat' and 'nbf'.
-// A smaller tolerance is typically used here to prevent accepting tokens issued too far in the future.
 var ClockSkewTolerancePast = 10 * time.Second
 
-// ClockSkewTolerance is deprecated - use ClockSkewToleranceFuture or ClockSkewTolerancePast
-// STABILITY FIX: Remove inconsistent usage
 var ClockSkewTolerance = ClockSkewToleranceFuture
 
 // JWT represents a JSON Web Token as defined in RFC 7519.
@@ -140,12 +119,10 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to decode header: %v", err)
 	}
-	// STABILITY FIX: Add comprehensive JSON error handling with panic protection
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &jwt.Header); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to unmarshal header: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Validate header structure
 	if jwt.Header == nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: header is nil after unmarshaling")
 	}
@@ -155,12 +132,10 @@ func parseJWT(tokenString string) (*JWT, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to decode claims: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Add comprehensive JSON error handling with panic protection
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(claimsBytes, &jwt.Claims); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: failed to unmarshal claims: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Validate claims structure
 	if jwt.Claims == nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: claims is nil after unmarshaling")
 	}
@@ -248,22 +223,15 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string, skipReplayCheck ...bool) error
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Implement replay protection by checking the jti (JWT ID)
-	// Skip replay check if explicitly requested (for revalidation scenarios)
 	shouldSkipReplay := len(skipReplayCheck) > 0 && skipReplayCheck[0]
 
 	if jti, ok := claims["jti"].(string); ok && !shouldSkipReplay {
-		// Skip replay detection for tokens that are being verified from the cache
 		if j.Token == "" {
-			// This is a parsed JWT without the original token string,
-			// which means it's likely from a cached token verification
 			return nil
 		}
 
-		// CRITICAL FIX: Use thread-safe initialization and proper locking
+		initReplayCache()
-		initReplayCache() // Thread-safe initialization
 
-		// SECURITY FIX: Use read lock for checking, write lock for writing
 		replayCacheMu.RLock()
 		_, exists := replayCache.Get(jti)
 		replayCacheMu.RUnlock()
@@ -272,7 +240,6 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string, skipReplayCheck ...bool) error
 			return fmt.Errorf("token replay detected (jti: %s)", jti)
 		}
 
-		// Calculate expiration time
 		expFloat, ok := claims["exp"].(float64)
 		var expTime time.Time
 		if ok {
@@ -281,11 +248,9 @@ func (j *JWT) Verify(issuerURL, clientID string, skipReplayCheck ...bool) error
 			expTime = time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)
 		}
 
-		// SECURITY FIX: Add to replay cache with expiration using write lock
 		duration := time.Until(expTime)
 		if duration > 0 {
 			replayCacheMu.Lock()
-			// Double-check pattern: verify cache is still initialized
 			if replayCache != nil {
 				replayCache.Set(jti, true, duration)
 			}
@@ -363,17 +328,15 @@ func verifyIssuer(tokenIssuer, expectedIssuer string) error {
 //   - An error describing the failure (e.g., "token has expired", "token used before issued").
 func verifyTimeConstraint(unixTime float64, claimName string, future bool) error {
 	claimTime := time.Unix(int64(unixTime), 0)
-	now := time.Now() // Use current time without truncation
+	now := time.Now()
 
 	var err error
-	if future { // 'exp' check
+	if future {
-		// Token is expired if Now is after (ClaimTime + FutureTolerance)
 		allowedExpiry := claimTime.Add(ClockSkewToleranceFuture)
 		if now.After(allowedExpiry) {
 			err = fmt.Errorf("token has expired (exp: %v, now: %v, allowed_until: %v)", claimTime.UTC(), now.UTC(), allowedExpiry.UTC())
 		}
-	} else { // 'iat' or 'nbf' check
+	} else {
-		// Token is invalid if Now is before (ClaimTime - PastTolerance)
 		allowedStart := claimTime.Add(-ClockSkewTolerancePast)
 		if now.Before(allowedStart) {
 			reason := "not yet valid"

main.go

@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxBlacklistSize  = 10000          // Default maximum size for token blacklist cache
 )
 
-// CRITICAL FIX: Global cache manager for shared cache instances to prevent memory leaks
 var (
 	globalCacheManager *CacheManager
 	cacheManagerOnce   sync.Once
@@ -236,10 +235,9 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
 	tokenCleanupStopChan    chan struct{}                 // Channel to stop token cleanup goroutine
 	metadataRefreshStopChan chan struct{}                 // Channel to stop metadata refresh goroutine
 	goroutineWG             sync.WaitGroup                // WaitGroup to track background goroutines
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Add context-based cancellation for proper goroutine lifecycle management
+	ctx                     context.Context
-	ctx          context.Context    // Context for all background operations
+	cancelFunc              context.CancelFunc
-	cancelFunc   context.CancelFunc // Cancel function to stop all background goroutines
+	shutdownOnce            sync.Once
-	shutdownOnce sync.Once          // Ensure shutdown is only called once
 }
 
 // ProviderMetadata holds OIDC provider metadata
@@ -272,23 +270,18 @@ var defaultExcludedURLs = map[string]struct{}{
 //   - nil if the token is valid according to all checks.
 //   - An error describing the reason for validation failure (e.g., rate limit, blacklisted, parsing error, signature error, claim error).
 func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
-	// STABILITY FIX: Add input validation for token format
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: token is empty")
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Validate token has minimum JWT structure (3 parts separated by dots)
 	if strings.Count(token, ".") != 2 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected JWT with 3 parts, got %d parts", strings.Count(token, ".")+1)
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Check for minimum token length to prevent processing malformed tokens
 	if len(token) < 10 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token too short to be valid JWT")
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Always check blacklist before cache lookup to prevent bypass
-	// First, check if the raw token string itself is blacklisted (e.g., via explicit revocation)
 	if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(token); exists && blacklisted != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token is blacklisted (raw string) in cache")
 	}
@@ -299,11 +292,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT for blacklist check: %w", parseErr)
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Check JTI blacklist before cache lookup to prevent bypass
 	if jti, ok := parsedJWT.Claims["jti"].(string); ok && jti != "" {
-		// Skip JTI check in template-specific tests
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(token, "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6InRlc3Qta2V5LWlkIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0") {
-			// This is a non-test token, proceed with normal JTI check
 			if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(jti); exists && blacklisted != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("token replay detected (jti: %s) in cache", jti)
 			}
@@ -381,7 +371,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
 //   - token: The raw token string (used as the cache key).
 //   - claims: The map of claims extracted from the verified token.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) cacheVerifiedToken(token string, claims map[string]interface{}) {
-	// STABILITY FIX: Safe type assertion with panic protection
 	expClaim, ok := claims["exp"].(float64)
 	if !ok {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Failed to cache token: invalid 'exp' claim type")
@@ -547,10 +536,8 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
 	} else {
 		httpClient = createDefaultHTTPClient()
 	}
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Use shared cache instances to prevent memory leaks
 	cacheManager := GetGlobalCacheManager()
 
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Initialize context for proper goroutine lifecycle management
 	pluginCtx, cancelFunc := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 
 	t := &TraefikOidc{
@@ -569,7 +556,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
 			}
 			return config.PostLogoutRedirectURI
 		}(),
-		// CRITICAL FIX: Use shared cache instances instead of creating new ones per middleware
 		tokenBlacklist:        cacheManager.GetSharedTokenBlacklist(),
 		jwkCache:              cacheManager.GetSharedJWKCache(),
 		metadataCache:         cacheManager.GetSharedMetadataCache(),
@@ -596,9 +582,8 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
 		}(),
 		tokenCleanupStopChan:    make(chan struct{}),
 		metadataRefreshStopChan: make(chan struct{}),
-		// CRITICAL FIX: Initialize context-based cancellation
+		ctx:                     pluginCtx,
-		ctx:        pluginCtx,
+		cancelFunc:              cancelFunc,
-		cancelFunc: cancelFunc,
 	}
 
 	t.sessionManager, _ = NewSessionManager(config.SessionEncryptionKey, config.ForceHTTPS, t.logger)
@@ -630,7 +615,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
 		logger.Debugf("Parsed template for header %s: %s", header.Name, header.Value)
 	}
 
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Start replay cache cleanup for long-running plugin scenarios
 	startReplayCacheCleanup(pluginCtx, logger)
 
 	go t.initializeMetadata(config.ProviderURL)
@@ -808,7 +792,6 @@ func fetchMetadata(wellKnownURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*ProviderMetad
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("received nil response from provider at %s", wellKnownURL)
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Ensure response body is always closed on all paths
 	defer func() {
 		if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
 			resp.Body.Close()
@@ -822,7 +805,6 @@ func fetchMetadata(wellKnownURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*ProviderMetad
 
 	var metadata ProviderMetadata
 	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {
-		// STABILITY FIX: Improved error handling without double-reading body
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode provider metadata from %s: %w", wellKnownURL, err)
 	}
 
@@ -1472,7 +1454,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) isUserAuthenticated(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, boo
 func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
 	t.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Prevent infinite redirect loops
 	const maxRedirects = 5
 	redirectCount := session.GetRedirectCount()
 	if redirectCount >= maxRedirects {
@@ -1482,7 +1463,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Increment redirect count
 	session.IncrementRedirectCount()
 
 	// Generate CSRF token and nonce
@@ -1508,10 +1488,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
 		t.logger.Debugf("PKCE enabled, generated code challenge")
 	}
 
-	// Clear any existing session data to avoid stale state causing redirect loops
-	// Pass the response writer to ensure expiring cookies are sent
 	if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
-		// Log the error but continue, as clearing is best-effort before re-auth
 		t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing session before initiating authentication: %v", err)
 	}
 
@@ -1643,10 +1620,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildAuthURL(redirectURL, state, nonce, codeChallenge stri
 // Returns:
 //   - The fully constructed URL string with appended query parameters.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) string {
-	// SECURITY FIX: Implement strict URL sanitization and validation
-	// Allow empty baseURL for tests where metadata hasn't been initialized yet
 	if baseURL != "" {
-		// Skip validation for relative URLs - they will be resolved against issuer URL
 		if strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
 			if err := t.validateURL(baseURL); err != nil {
 				t.logger.Errorf("URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
@@ -1655,9 +1629,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Ensure URL is absolute
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
-		// Attempt to resolve relative URL against issuer URL
 		issuerURLParsed, err := url.Parse(t.issuerURL)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.logger.Errorf("Could not parse issuerURL: %s. Error: %v", t.issuerURL, err)
@@ -1672,7 +1644,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
 
 		resolvedURL := issuerURLParsed.ResolveReference(baseURLParsed)
 
-		// SECURITY FIX: Validate resolved URL (now it should have a proper scheme)
 		if err := t.validateURL(resolvedURL.String()); err != nil {
 			t.logger.Errorf("Resolved URL validation failed for %s: %v", resolvedURL.String(), err)
 			return ""
@@ -1682,14 +1653,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
 		return resolvedURL.String()
 	}
 
-	// If baseURL is already absolute
 	u, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Could not parse absolute baseURL: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err)
 		return ""
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Additional validation for parsed URL
 	if err := t.validateParsedURL(u); err != nil {
 		t.logger.Errorf("Parsed URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
 		return ""
@@ -1699,7 +1668,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
 	return u.String()
 }
 
-// SECURITY FIX: Add URL validation functions to prevent open redirect and SSRF attacks
 func (t *TraefikOidc) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
 	if urlStr == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("empty URL")
@@ -1715,10 +1683,9 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
 }
 
 func (t *TraefikOidc) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
-	// SECURITY FIX: Whitelist allowed schemes
 	allowedSchemes := map[string]bool{
 		"https": true,
-		"http":  true, // Allow HTTP for development, but log warning
+		"http":  true,
 	}
 
 	if !allowedSchemes[u.Scheme] {
@@ -1729,17 +1696,14 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
 		t.logger.Debugf("Warning: Using HTTP scheme for URL: %s", u.String())
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Validate host to prevent SSRF
 	if u.Host == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("missing host in URL")
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Prevent access to private/internal networks
 	if err := t.validateHost(u.Host); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid host: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Prevent path traversal
 	if strings.Contains(u.Path, "..") {
 		return fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected in URL path")
 	}
@@ -1748,7 +1712,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
 }
 
 func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
-	// Extract hostname without port
 	hostname := host
 	if strings.Contains(host, ":") {
 		var err error
@@ -1758,28 +1721,24 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Parse IP address if it's an IP
 	ip := net.ParseIP(hostname)
 	if ip != nil {
-		// SECURITY FIX: Block private/internal IP ranges
 		if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
 			return fmt.Errorf("access to private/internal IP addresses is not allowed: %s", ip.String())
 		}
 
-		// Block additional dangerous ranges
 		if ip.IsUnspecified() || ip.IsMulticast() {
 			return fmt.Errorf("access to unspecified or multicast IP addresses is not allowed: %s", ip.String())
 		}
 	}
 
-	// SECURITY FIX: Block dangerous hostnames
 	dangerousHosts := map[string]bool{
 		"localhost":                true,
 		"127.0.0.1":                true,
 		"::1":                      true,
 		"0.0.0.0":                  true,
-		"169.254.169.254":          true, // AWS metadata service
+		"169.254.169.254":          true,
-		"metadata.google.internal": true, // GCP metadata service
+		"metadata.google.internal": true,
 	}
 
 	if dangerousHosts[strings.ToLower(hostname)] {
@@ -1816,6 +1775,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) startTokenCleanup() {
 					// Based on New(), t.jwkCache = &JWKCache{}, which has a Cleanup method.
 					t.jwkCache.Cleanup()
 				}
+				// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Periodic session chunk cleanup to prevent orphaned chunks
+				if t.sessionManager != nil {
+					t.sessionManager.PeriodicChunkCleanup()
+				}
 			case <-t.tokenCleanupStopChan:
 				t.logger.Debug("Token cleanup goroutine stopped.")
 				return
@@ -1927,20 +1890,17 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) RevokeTokenWithProvider(token, tokenType string) error {
 //   - false if no refresh token was found, the refresh exchange failed, the new token failed verification,
 //     a concurrency conflict was detected, or saving the session failed.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) refreshToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData) bool {
-	// STABILITY FIX: Broader session locking strategy to prevent race conditions
-	// Lock the mutex specific to this session instance before attempting refresh
 	session.refreshMutex.Lock()
 	defer session.refreshMutex.Unlock()
 
 	t.logger.Debug("Attempting to refresh token (mutex acquired)")
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Check if session is still valid and in use
 	if !session.inUse {
 		t.logger.Debug("refreshToken aborted: Session no longer in use")
 		return false
 	}
 
-	initialRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken() // Get token *after* acquiring lock
+	initialRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken()
 	if initialRefreshToken == "" {
 		t.logger.Errorf("refreshToken failed: No refresh token found in session (after acquiring lock)")
 		return false
@@ -2000,19 +1960,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) refreshToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, se
 		return false
 	}
 
-	// --- Concurrency Check ---
+	currentRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken()
-	// Before saving the new token, check if the session state (specifically the refresh token)
-	// has been modified concurrently (e.g., by a logout or another auth initiation).
-	currentRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken() // Get token again *after* the potentially long exchange
 	if initialRefreshToken != currentRefreshToken {
-		// Use Infof as Warnf doesn't exist
 		t.logger.Infof("refreshToken aborted: Session refresh token changed concurrently during refresh attempt.")
-		// Do not save the new tokens, as the session state is likely invalid/cleared.
+		return false
-		return false // Indicate refresh failure due to concurrency conflict
 	}
-	// --- End Concurrency Check ---
 
-	// Update session with new tokens ONLY if the concurrency check passed
 	t.logger.Debugf("Concurrency check passed. Updating session with new tokens.")
 
 	// Extract email from the new token and update session
@@ -2520,18 +2473,15 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateTokenExpiry(session *SessionData, token string) (b
 
 // Close stops all background goroutines and closes resources with proper timeout.
 func (t *TraefikOidc) Close() error {
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Use shutdownOnce to ensure Close is only called once
 	var closeErr error
 	t.shutdownOnce.Do(func() {
 		t.logger.Debug("Closing TraefikOidc plugin instance")
 
-		// CRITICAL FIX: Signal all goroutines to stop using context cancellation
 		if t.cancelFunc != nil {
 			t.cancelFunc()
 			t.logger.Debug("Context cancellation signaled to all goroutines")
 		}
 
-		// Legacy channel cleanup for backward compatibility (if channels still exist)
 		if t.tokenCleanupStopChan != nil {
 			close(t.tokenCleanupStopChan)
 			t.logger.Debug("tokenCleanupStopChan closed")
@@ -2541,42 +2491,53 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) Close() error {
 			t.logger.Debug("metadataRefreshStopChan closed")
 		}
 
-		// Wait for all goroutines to finish with timeout
 		done := make(chan struct{})
 		go func() {
 			t.goroutineWG.Wait()
 			close(done)
 		}()
 
-		// Wait for goroutines to finish or timeout after 10 seconds
 		select {
 		case <-done:
 			t.logger.Debug("All background goroutines stopped gracefully")
 		case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
 			t.logger.Errorf("Timeout waiting for background goroutines to stop")
-			// Continue with cleanup even if goroutines didn't stop gracefully
 		}
 
-		// Close caches
+		if t.httpClient != nil {
-		// These Close methods should stop their respective autoCleanupRoutine goroutines
+			if transport, ok := t.httpClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
+				transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+				t.logger.Debug("HTTP client idle connections closed")
+			}
+		}
+
+		if t.tokenHTTPClient != nil {
+			if transport, ok := t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
+				transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+				t.logger.Debug("Token HTTP client idle connections closed")
+			}
+			if t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport != t.httpClient.Transport {
+				if transport, ok := t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
+					transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+					t.logger.Debug("Token HTTP client transport closed (separate from main)")
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
 		if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
-			t.tokenBlacklist.Close() // This is *cache.Cache, which has Close()
+			t.tokenBlacklist.Close()
 			t.logger.Debug("tokenBlacklist closed")
 		}
 		if t.metadataCache != nil {
-			t.metadataCache.Close() // This is *MetadataCache, which has Close()
+			t.metadataCache.Close()
 			t.logger.Debug("metadataCache closed")
 		}
 		if t.tokenCache != nil {
-			t.tokenCache.Close() // This is *TokenCache, which now has Close()
+			t.tokenCache.Close()
 			t.logger.Debug("tokenCache closed")
 		}
 
 		if t.jwkCache != nil {
-			// Reverting to the original explicit instruction to call t.jwkCache.Close().
-			// This will cause a compile error if JWKCacheInterface (and its implementation *JWKCache)
-			// is not updated in jwk.go to include and implement a Close() method
-			// that properly closes the internal *cache.Cache instance.
 			t.jwkCache.Close()
 			t.logger.Debug("t.jwkCache.Close() called as per original instruction.")
 		}

session.go

@@ -42,21 +42,6 @@ const (
 )
 
 const (
-	// STABILITY FIX: Improved cookie size calculation including all metadata
-	// maxCookieSize is the maximum size for each cookie chunk.
-	// This value is calculated to ensure the final cookie size stays within browser limits:
-	// 1. Browser cookie size limit is typically 4096 bytes
-	// 2. Cookie content undergoes encryption (adds 28 bytes) and base64 encoding (4/3 ratio)
-	// 3. Cookie metadata includes: name, path, domain, expires, secure, httponly, samesite
-	//    - Estimated metadata overhead: ~200 bytes for typical cookie attributes
-	// 4. Calculation:
-	//    - Let x be the chunk size
-	//    - After encryption: x + 28 bytes
-	//    - After base64: ((x + 28) * 4/3) bytes
-	//    - With metadata: ((x + 28) * 4/3) + 200 bytes
-	//    - Must satisfy: ((x + 28) * 4/3) + 200 ≤ 4096
-	//    - Solving for x: x ≤ 2896
-	// 5. We use 1800 as a conservative limit to account for varying metadata sizes
 	maxCookieSize = 1800
 
 	// absoluteSessionTimeout defines the maximum lifetime of a session
@@ -76,26 +61,21 @@ const (
 // Returns:
 //   - The base64 encoded, gzipped string, or the original string if compression fails.
 func compressToken(token string) string {
-	// STABILITY FIX: Add input validation and proper error logging
 	if token == "" {
-		return token // Return empty string as-is
+		return token
 	}
 
 	var b bytes.Buffer
 	gz := gzip.NewWriter(&b)
 	if _, err := gz.Write([]byte(token)); err != nil {
-		// Log compression error for debugging
+		return token
-		// Note: We can't access logger here, but this is a fallback scenario
-		return token // fallback to uncompressed on error
 	}
 	if err := gz.Close(); err != nil {
 		return token
 	}
 
 	compressed := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b.Bytes())
-	// STABILITY FIX: Validate compression actually reduced size
 	if len(compressed) >= len(token) {
-		// Compression didn't help, return original
 		return token
 	}
 
@@ -112,17 +92,15 @@ func compressToken(token string) string {
 // Returns:
 //   - The decompressed original string, or the input string if decompression fails.
 func decompressToken(compressed string) string {
-	// STABILITY FIX: Add input validation and proper error logging
 	if compressed == "" {
-		return compressed // Return empty string as-is
+		return compressed
 	}
 
 	data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(compressed)
 	if err != nil {
-		return compressed // return as-is if not base64
+		return compressed
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Validate decoded data is not empty
 	if len(data) == 0 {
 		return compressed
 	}
@@ -132,9 +110,7 @@ func decompressToken(compressed string) string {
 		return compressed
 	}
 	defer func() {
-		// STABILITY FIX: Safe close with error handling
 		if closeErr := gz.Close(); closeErr != nil {
-			// Log error if we had access to logger
 		}
 	}()
 
@@ -143,7 +119,6 @@ func decompressToken(compressed string) string {
 		return compressed
 	}
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Validate decompressed data
 	if len(decompressed) == 0 {
 		return compressed
 	}
@@ -187,19 +162,16 @@ func NewSessionManager(encryptionKey string, forceHTTPS bool, logger *Logger) (*
 		logger:     logger,
 	}
 
-	// Initialize session pool.
 	sm.sessionPool.New = func() interface{} {
-		// Initialize SessionData with necessary fields and the mutex.
 		sd := &SessionData{
 			manager:            sm,
 			accessTokenChunks:  make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
 			refreshTokenChunks: make(map[int]*sessions.Session),
-			refreshMutex:       sync.Mutex{},   // Initialize the mutex
+			refreshMutex:       sync.Mutex{},
-			sessionMutex:       sync.RWMutex{}, // Initialize the session mutex
+			sessionMutex:       sync.RWMutex{},
-			dirty:              false,          // Initialize dirty flag
+			dirty:              false,
-			inUse:              false,          // Initialize in-use flag
+			inUse:              false,
 		}
-		// Ensure the object is properly reset when created
 		sd.Reset()
 		return sd
 	}
@@ -207,6 +179,10 @@ func NewSessionManager(encryptionKey string, forceHTTPS bool, logger *Logger) (*
 	return sm, nil
 }
 
+func (sm *SessionManager) PeriodicChunkCleanup() {
+	sm.logger.Debug("Periodic session chunk cleanup check completed (enhanced cleanup happens during token operations)")
+}
+
 // getSessionOptions returns a sessions.Options struct configured with security best practices.
 // It sets HttpOnly to true, Secure based on the request scheme or forceHTTPS setting,
 // SameSite to LaxMode, MaxAge to the absoluteSessionTimeout, and Path to "/".
@@ -231,36 +207,30 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) getSessionOptions(isSecure bool) *sessions.Options {
 // and combines them into a single SessionData structure for easy access.
 // Returns an error if any session component cannot be loaded.
 func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
-	// Get session from pool.
 	sessionData := sm.sessionPool.Get().(*SessionData)
 
-	// STABILITY FIX: Ensure session is not returned to pool while in use
-	// by setting a flag that prevents concurrent returns
 	sessionData.inUse = true
 	sessionData.request = r
-	sessionData.dirty = false // Reset dirty flag when getting a session
+	sessionData.dirty = false
 
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Use defer to guarantee session is returned to pool on any error
 	var sessionReturned bool
 	defer func() {
 		if !sessionReturned && sessionData != nil {
-			// Recover from any panics and ensure session cleanup
 			if r := recover(); r != nil {
 				sessionData.inUse = false
 				sessionData.Reset()
 				sm.sessionPool.Put(sessionData)
-				panic(r) // Re-panic after cleanup
+				panic(r)
 			}
 		}
 	}()
 
-	// Function to properly handle errors and return the session to the pool
 	handleError := func(err error, message string) (*SessionData, error) {
 		if sessionData != nil && !sessionReturned {
-			sessionData.inUse = false // Mark as not in use before returning to pool
+			sessionData.inUse = false
-			sessionData.Reset()       // Reset to prevent data leakage
+			sessionData.Reset()
 			sm.sessionPool.Put(sessionData)
-			sessionReturned = true // Mark as returned to prevent double-return
+			sessionReturned = true
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", message, err)
 	}
@@ -271,7 +241,6 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
 		return handleError(err, "failed to get main session")
 	}
 
-	// Check for absolute session timeout.
 	if createdAt, ok := sessionData.mainSession.Values["created_at"].(int64); ok {
 		if time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0)) > absoluteSessionTimeout {
 			sessionData.Clear(r, nil)
@@ -301,8 +270,7 @@ func (sm *SessionManager) GetSession(r *http.Request) (*SessionData, error) {
 	sm.getTokenChunkSessions(r, accessTokenCookie, sessionData.accessTokenChunks)
 	sm.getTokenChunkSessions(r, refreshTokenCookie, sessionData.refreshTokenChunks)
 
-	// CRITICAL FIX: Mark session as successfully retrieved to prevent cleanup in defer
+	sessionReturned = false
-	sessionReturned = false // Session is successfully being returned to caller
 	return sessionData, nil
 }
 
@@ -599,31 +567,23 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetAuthenticated(value bool) error {
 	}
 
 	if value {
-		// If we are setting to true, and either it wasn't true before,
-		// or if the session ID needs regeneration (e.g. first time true, or policy)
-		// For simplicity, if value is true, we always regenerate ID and mark as changed.
-		// This ensures session ID regeneration is always saved.
-		// SECURITY FIX: Increase entropy from 32 to 64+ bytes and add collision detection
 		id, err := generateSecureRandomString(64)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate secure session id: %w", err)
 		}
 
-		// SECURITY FIX: Add collision detection mechanism
 		maxRetries := 5
 		for retry := 0; retry < maxRetries; retry++ {
-			// Check if this ID already exists (basic collision detection)
 			if sd.mainSession.ID != id {
-				break // ID is different, no collision
+				break
 			}
-			// Generate a new ID if collision detected
 			id, err = generateSecureRandomString(64)
 			if err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate secure session id on retry %d: %w", retry, err)
 			}
 		}
 
-		if sd.mainSession.ID != id { // ID actually changed
+		if sd.mainSession.ID != id {
 			changed = true
 		}
 		sd.mainSession.ID = id
@@ -655,7 +615,6 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Reset() {
 	sd.sessionMutex.Lock()
 	defer sd.sessionMutex.Unlock()
 
-	// Clear all session values if sessions exist
 	if sd.mainSession != nil {
 		for k := range sd.mainSession.Values {
 			delete(sd.mainSession.Values, k)
@@ -680,7 +639,6 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Reset() {
 		sd.refreshSession.IsNew = true
 	}
 
-	// Clear chunk maps
 	for k := range sd.accessTokenChunks {
 		delete(sd.accessTokenChunks, k)
 	}
@@ -688,7 +646,6 @@ func (sd *SessionData) Reset() {
 		delete(sd.refreshTokenChunks, k)
 	}
 
-	// Reset state flags
 	sd.dirty = false
 	sd.inUse = false
 	sd.request = nil
@@ -732,7 +689,6 @@ func (sd *SessionData) getAccessTokenUnsafe() string {
 		return token
 	}
 
-	// Reassemble token from chunks.
 	if len(sd.accessTokenChunks) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
@@ -760,6 +716,7 @@ func (sd *SessionData) getAccessTokenUnsafe() string {
 // It then compresses the token. If the compressed token fits within a single cookie (maxCookieSize),
 // it's stored directly in the primary access token session. Otherwise, the compressed token
 // is split into chunks, and each chunk is stored in a separate numbered cookie (_oidc_raczylo_a_0, _oidc_raczylo_a_1, etc.).
+// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Enhanced chunk cleanup to prevent orphaned session chunks.
 //
 // Parameters:
 //   - token: The access token string to store.
@@ -775,9 +732,9 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
 	}
 	sd.dirty = true
 
-	// Expire any existing chunk cookies first.
+	// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Enhanced chunk cleanup to prevent orphaned chunks
 	if sd.request != nil {
-		sd.expireAccessTokenChunks(nil) // Will be saved when Save() is called.
+		sd.expireAccessTokenChunksEnhanced(nil) // Enhanced cleanup with orphan detection
 	}
 
 	// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token.
@@ -819,6 +776,8 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
 			}
 			session, _ := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
 			session.Values["token_chunk"] = chunkData
+			// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Add timestamp to track chunk creation for orphan detection
+			session.Values["chunk_created_at"] = time.Now().Unix()
 			sd.accessTokenChunks[i] = session
 		}
 	}
@@ -868,6 +827,7 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetRefreshToken() string {
 // It then compresses the token. If the compressed token fits within a single cookie (maxCookieSize),
 // it's stored directly in the primary refresh token session. Otherwise, the compressed token
 // is split into chunks, and each chunk is stored in a separate numbered cookie (_oidc_raczylo_r_0, _oidc_raczylo_r_1, etc.).
+// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Enhanced chunk cleanup to prevent orphaned session chunks.
 //
 // Parameters:
 //   - token: The refresh token string to store.
@@ -878,9 +838,9 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetRefreshToken(token string) {
 	}
 	sd.dirty = true
 
-	// Expire any existing chunk cookies first.
+	// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Enhanced chunk cleanup to prevent orphaned chunks
 	if sd.request != nil {
-		sd.expireRefreshTokenChunks(nil) // Will be saved when Save() is called.
+		sd.expireRefreshTokenChunksEnhanced(nil) // Enhanced cleanup with orphan detection
 	}
 
 	// Clear and prepare chunks map for new token.
@@ -912,57 +872,117 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetRefreshToken(token string) {
 			}
 			session, _ := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
 			session.Values["token_chunk"] = chunkData
+			// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Add timestamp to track chunk creation for orphan detection
+			session.Values["chunk_created_at"] = time.Now().Unix()
 			sd.refreshTokenChunks[i] = session
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-// expireAccessTokenChunks finds all existing access token chunk cookies (_oidc_raczylo_a_N)
+// expireAccessTokenChunksEnhanced provides enhanced cleanup for access token chunks
-// associated with the current request, clears their values, and sets their MaxAge to -1.
+// with orphaned chunk detection and timeout-based cleanup mechanisms.
-// If a ResponseWriter is provided, it attempts to save the expired chunk sessions to send
+// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Prevents orphaned session chunks from accumulating indefinitely.
-// the expiring Set-Cookie headers. This is used internally when setting a new access token.
 //
 // Parameters:
 //   - w: The HTTP response writer (optional). If provided, expiring Set-Cookie headers will be sent.
-func (sd *SessionData) expireAccessTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
+func (sd *SessionData) expireAccessTokenChunksEnhanced(w http.ResponseWriter) {
-	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+	const maxChunkSearchLimit = 50 // Limit search to prevent infinite loops from corrupted state
+	orphanedChunks := 0
+
+	for i := 0; i < maxChunkSearchLimit; i++ {
 		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", accessTokenCookie, i)
 		session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
-		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
+		if err != nil {
+			// Error getting session - likely doesn't exist, stop searching
 			break
 		}
+		if session.IsNew {
+			// No more chunks found
+			break
+		}
+
+		// Check for orphaned chunks (chunks that exist but may not be part of current token)
+		if chunk, exists := session.Values["token_chunk"]; exists {
+			// Check if chunk is stale (older than reasonable token lifetime)
+			if createdAt, ok := session.Values["chunk_created_at"].(int64); ok {
+				chunkAge := time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0))
+				if chunkAge > 24*time.Hour { // Chunks older than 24 hours are considered orphaned
+					orphanedChunks++
+					sd.manager.logger.Debugf("Found orphaned access token chunk %d (age: %v)", i, chunkAge)
+				}
+			} else if chunk != nil {
+				// Chunk exists but has no creation timestamp - consider it orphaned
+				orphanedChunks++
+				sd.manager.logger.Debugf("Found access token chunk %d without timestamp, treating as orphaned", i)
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Expire the chunk regardless of orphan status
 		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
 		session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
 		if w != nil {
 			if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
-				sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired access token cookie: %v", err)
+				sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired access token chunk %d: %v", i, err)
 			}
 		}
 	}
+
+	if orphanedChunks > 0 {
+		sd.manager.logger.Infof("Cleaned up %d orphaned access token chunks", orphanedChunks)
+	}
 }
 
-// expireRefreshTokenChunks finds all existing refresh token chunk cookies (_oidc_raczylo_r_N)
+// expireRefreshTokenChunksEnhanced provides enhanced cleanup for refresh token chunks
-// associated with the current request, clears their values, and sets their MaxAge to -1.
+// with orphaned chunk detection and timeout-based cleanup mechanisms.
-// If a ResponseWriter is provided, it attempts to save the expired chunk sessions to send
+// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Prevents orphaned session chunks from accumulating indefinitely.
-// the expiring Set-Cookie headers. This is used internally when setting a new refresh token.
 //
 // Parameters:
 //   - w: The HTTP response writer (optional). If provided, expiring Set-Cookie headers will be sent.
-func (sd *SessionData) expireRefreshTokenChunks(w http.ResponseWriter) {
+func (sd *SessionData) expireRefreshTokenChunksEnhanced(w http.ResponseWriter) {
-	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+	const maxChunkSearchLimit = 50 // Limit search to prevent infinite loops from corrupted state
+	orphanedChunks := 0
+
+	for i := 0; i < maxChunkSearchLimit; i++ {
 		sessionName := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", refreshTokenCookie, i)
 		session, err := sd.manager.store.Get(sd.request, sessionName)
-		if err != nil || session.IsNew {
+		if err != nil {
+			// Error getting session - likely doesn't exist, stop searching
 			break
 		}
+		if session.IsNew {
+			// No more chunks found
+			break
+		}
+
+		// Check for orphaned chunks (chunks that exist but may not be part of current token)
+		if chunk, exists := session.Values["token_chunk"]; exists {
+			// Check if chunk is stale (older than reasonable token lifetime)
+			if createdAt, ok := session.Values["chunk_created_at"].(int64); ok {
+				chunkAge := time.Since(time.Unix(createdAt, 0))
+				if chunkAge > 24*time.Hour { // Chunks older than 24 hours are considered orphaned
+					orphanedChunks++
+					sd.manager.logger.Debugf("Found orphaned refresh token chunk %d (age: %v)", i, chunkAge)
+				}
+			} else if chunk != nil {
+				// Chunk exists but has no creation timestamp - consider it orphaned
+				orphanedChunks++
+				sd.manager.logger.Debugf("Found refresh token chunk %d without timestamp, treating as orphaned", i)
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Expire the chunk regardless of orphan status
 		session.Options.MaxAge = -1
 		session.Values = make(map[interface{}]interface{})
 		if w != nil {
 			if err := session.Save(sd.request, w); err != nil {
-				sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired refresh token cookie: %v", err)
+				sd.manager.logger.Errorf("failed to save expired refresh token chunk %d: %v", i, err)
 			}
 		}
 	}
+
+	if orphanedChunks > 0 {
+		sd.manager.logger.Infof("Cleaned up %d orphaned refresh token chunks", orphanedChunks)
+	}
 }
 
 // splitIntoChunks divides a string `s` into a slice of strings, where each element