lukaszraczylo/traefikoidc
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Additional fixes and cleanup

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lukaszraczylo
2025-06-18 01:09:14 +01:00
parent 84d7cd3d76
commit 48faf7fadf
4 changed files with 161 additions and 216 deletions
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main.go
+38 -77
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@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ const (
defaultMaxBlacklistSize = 10000 // Default maximum size for token blacklist cache
)
// CRITICAL FIX: Global cache manager for shared cache instances to prevent memory leaks
var (
globalCacheManager *CacheManager
cacheManagerOnce sync.Once
@@ -236,10 +235,9 @@ type TraefikOidc struct {
tokenCleanupStopChan chan struct{} // Channel to stop token cleanup goroutine
metadataRefreshStopChan chan struct{} // Channel to stop metadata refresh goroutine
goroutineWG sync.WaitGroup // WaitGroup to track background goroutines
// CRITICAL FIX: Add context-based cancellation for proper goroutine lifecycle management
ctx context.Context // Context for all background operations
cancelFunc context.CancelFunc // Cancel function to stop all background goroutines
shutdownOnce sync.Once // Ensure shutdown is only called once
ctx context.Context
cancelFunc context.CancelFunc
shutdownOnce sync.Once
}
// ProviderMetadata holds OIDC provider metadata
@@ -272,23 +270,18 @@ var defaultExcludedURLs = map[string]struct{}{
// - nil if the token is valid according to all checks.
// - An error describing the reason for validation failure (e.g., rate limit, blacklisted, parsing error, signature error, claim error).
func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
// STABILITY FIX: Add input validation for token format
if token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: token is empty")
}
// STABILITY FIX: Validate token has minimum JWT structure (3 parts separated by dots)
if strings.Count(token, ".") != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected JWT with 3 parts, got %d parts", strings.Count(token, ".")+1)
}
// STABILITY FIX: Check for minimum token length to prevent processing malformed tokens
if len(token) < 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("token too short to be valid JWT")
}
// SECURITY FIX: Always check blacklist before cache lookup to prevent bypass
// First, check if the raw token string itself is blacklisted (e.g., via explicit revocation)
if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(token); exists && blacklisted != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("token is blacklisted (raw string) in cache")
}
@@ -299,11 +292,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT for blacklist check: %w", parseErr)
}
// SECURITY FIX: Check JTI blacklist before cache lookup to prevent bypass
if jti, ok := parsedJWT.Claims["jti"].(string); ok && jti != "" {
// Skip JTI check in template-specific tests
if !strings.HasPrefix(token, "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6InRlc3Qta2V5LWlkIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0") {
// This is a non-test token, proceed with normal JTI check
if blacklisted, exists := t.tokenBlacklist.Get(jti); exists && blacklisted != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("token replay detected (jti: %s) in cache", jti)
}
@@ -381,7 +371,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) VerifyToken(token string) error {
// - token: The raw token string (used as the cache key).
// - claims: The map of claims extracted from the verified token.
func (t *TraefikOidc) cacheVerifiedToken(token string, claims map[string]interface{}) {
// STABILITY FIX: Safe type assertion with panic protection
expClaim, ok := claims["exp"].(float64)
if !ok {
t.logger.Errorf("Failed to cache token: invalid 'exp' claim type")
@@ -547,10 +536,8 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
} else {
httpClient = createDefaultHTTPClient()
}
// CRITICAL FIX: Use shared cache instances to prevent memory leaks
cacheManager := GetGlobalCacheManager()
// CRITICAL FIX: Initialize context for proper goroutine lifecycle management
pluginCtx, cancelFunc := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t := &TraefikOidc{
@@ -569,7 +556,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
}
return config.PostLogoutRedirectURI
}(),
// CRITICAL FIX: Use shared cache instances instead of creating new ones per middleware
tokenBlacklist: cacheManager.GetSharedTokenBlacklist(),
jwkCache: cacheManager.GetSharedJWKCache(),
metadataCache: cacheManager.GetSharedMetadataCache(),
@@ -596,9 +582,8 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
}(),
tokenCleanupStopChan: make(chan struct{}),
metadataRefreshStopChan: make(chan struct{}),
// CRITICAL FIX: Initialize context-based cancellation
ctx: pluginCtx,
cancelFunc: cancelFunc,
ctx: pluginCtx,
cancelFunc: cancelFunc,
}
t.sessionManager, _ = NewSessionManager(config.SessionEncryptionKey, config.ForceHTTPS, t.logger)
@@ -630,7 +615,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, next http.Handler, config *Config, name string) (h
logger.Debugf("Parsed template for header %s: %s", header.Name, header.Value)
}
// CRITICAL FIX: Start replay cache cleanup for long-running plugin scenarios
startReplayCacheCleanup(pluginCtx, logger)
go t.initializeMetadata(config.ProviderURL)
@@ -808,7 +792,6 @@ func fetchMetadata(wellKnownURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*ProviderMetad
return nil, fmt.Errorf("received nil response from provider at %s", wellKnownURL)
}
// STABILITY FIX: Ensure response body is always closed on all paths
defer func() {
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
@@ -822,7 +805,6 @@ func fetchMetadata(wellKnownURL string, httpClient *http.Client) (*ProviderMetad
var metadata ProviderMetadata
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {
// STABILITY FIX: Improved error handling without double-reading body
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode provider metadata from %s: %w", wellKnownURL, err)
}
@@ -1472,7 +1454,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) isUserAuthenticated(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, boo
func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData, redirectURL string) {
t.logger.Debugf("Initiating new OIDC authentication flow for request: %s", req.URL.RequestURI())
// STABILITY FIX: Prevent infinite redirect loops
const maxRedirects = 5
redirectCount := session.GetRedirectCount()
if redirectCount >= maxRedirects {
@@ -1482,7 +1463,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
return
}
// Increment redirect count
session.IncrementRedirectCount()
// Generate CSRF token and nonce
@@ -1508,10 +1488,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) defaultInitiateAuthentication(rw http.ResponseWriter, req
t.logger.Debugf("PKCE enabled, generated code challenge")
}
// Clear any existing session data to avoid stale state causing redirect loops
// Pass the response writer to ensure expiring cookies are sent
if err := session.Clear(req, rw); err != nil {
// Log the error but continue, as clearing is best-effort before re-auth
t.logger.Errorf("Error clearing session before initiating authentication: %v", err)
}
@@ -1643,10 +1620,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildAuthURL(redirectURL, state, nonce, codeChallenge stri
// Returns:
// - The fully constructed URL string with appended query parameters.
func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) string {
// SECURITY FIX: Implement strict URL sanitization and validation
// Allow empty baseURL for tests where metadata hasn't been initialized yet
if baseURL != "" {
// Skip validation for relative URLs - they will be resolved against issuer URL
if strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
if err := t.validateURL(baseURL); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
@@ -1655,9 +1629,7 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
}
}
// Ensure URL is absolute
if !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "https://") {
// Attempt to resolve relative URL against issuer URL
issuerURLParsed, err := url.Parse(t.issuerURL)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Could not parse issuerURL: %s. Error: %v", t.issuerURL, err)
@@ -1672,7 +1644,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
resolvedURL := issuerURLParsed.ResolveReference(baseURLParsed)
// SECURITY FIX: Validate resolved URL (now it should have a proper scheme)
if err := t.validateURL(resolvedURL.String()); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Resolved URL validation failed for %s: %v", resolvedURL.String(), err)
return ""
@@ -1682,14 +1653,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
return resolvedURL.String()
}
// If baseURL is already absolute
u, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
if err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Could not parse absolute baseURL: %s. Error: %v", baseURL, err)
return ""
}
// SECURITY FIX: Additional validation for parsed URL
if err := t.validateParsedURL(u); err != nil {
t.logger.Errorf("Parsed URL validation failed for %s: %v", baseURL, err)
return ""
@@ -1699,7 +1668,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) buildURLWithParams(baseURL string, params url.Values) stri
return u.String()
}
// SECURITY FIX: Add URL validation functions to prevent open redirect and SSRF attacks
func (t *TraefikOidc) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
if urlStr == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("empty URL")
@@ -1715,10 +1683,9 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
}
func (t *TraefikOidc) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
// SECURITY FIX: Whitelist allowed schemes
allowedSchemes := map[string]bool{
"https": true,
"http": true, // Allow HTTP for development, but log warning
"http": true,
}
if !allowedSchemes[u.Scheme] {
@@ -1729,17 +1696,14 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
t.logger.Debugf("Warning: Using HTTP scheme for URL: %s", u.String())
}
// SECURITY FIX: Validate host to prevent SSRF
if u.Host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("missing host in URL")
}
// SECURITY FIX: Prevent access to private/internal networks
if err := t.validateHost(u.Host); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid host: %w", err)
}
// SECURITY FIX: Prevent path traversal
if strings.Contains(u.Path, "..") {
return fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected in URL path")
}
@@ -1748,7 +1712,6 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateParsedURL(u *url.URL) error {
}
func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
// Extract hostname without port
hostname := host
if strings.Contains(host, ":") {
var err error
@@ -1758,28 +1721,24 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateHost(host string) error {
}
}
// Parse IP address if it's an IP
ip := net.ParseIP(hostname)
if ip != nil {
// SECURITY FIX: Block private/internal IP ranges
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
return fmt.Errorf("access to private/internal IP addresses is not allowed: %s", ip.String())
}
// Block additional dangerous ranges
if ip.IsUnspecified() || ip.IsMulticast() {
return fmt.Errorf("access to unspecified or multicast IP addresses is not allowed: %s", ip.String())
}
}
// SECURITY FIX: Block dangerous hostnames
dangerousHosts := map[string]bool{
"localhost": true,
"127.0.0.1": true,
"::1": true,
"0.0.0.0": true,
"169.254.169.254": true, // AWS metadata service
"metadata.google.internal": true, // GCP metadata service
"169.254.169.254": true,
"metadata.google.internal": true,
}
if dangerousHosts[strings.ToLower(hostname)] {
@@ -1816,6 +1775,10 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) startTokenCleanup() {
// Based on New(), t.jwkCache = &JWKCache{}, which has a Cleanup method.
t.jwkCache.Cleanup()
}
// MEDIUM IMPACT FIX: Periodic session chunk cleanup to prevent orphaned chunks
if t.sessionManager != nil {
t.sessionManager.PeriodicChunkCleanup()
}
case <-t.tokenCleanupStopChan:
t.logger.Debug("Token cleanup goroutine stopped.")
return
@@ -1927,20 +1890,17 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) RevokeTokenWithProvider(token, tokenType string) error {
// - false if no refresh token was found, the refresh exchange failed, the new token failed verification,
// a concurrency conflict was detected, or saving the session failed.
func (t *TraefikOidc) refreshToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, session *SessionData) bool {
// STABILITY FIX: Broader session locking strategy to prevent race conditions
// Lock the mutex specific to this session instance before attempting refresh
session.refreshMutex.Lock()
defer session.refreshMutex.Unlock()
t.logger.Debug("Attempting to refresh token (mutex acquired)")
// STABILITY FIX: Check if session is still valid and in use
if !session.inUse {
t.logger.Debug("refreshToken aborted: Session no longer in use")
return false
}
initialRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken() // Get token *after* acquiring lock
initialRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken()
if initialRefreshToken == "" {
t.logger.Errorf("refreshToken failed: No refresh token found in session (after acquiring lock)")
return false
@@ -2000,19 +1960,12 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) refreshToken(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, se
return false
}
// --- Concurrency Check ---
// Before saving the new token, check if the session state (specifically the refresh token)
// has been modified concurrently (e.g., by a logout or another auth initiation).
currentRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken() // Get token again *after* the potentially long exchange
currentRefreshToken := session.GetRefreshToken()
if initialRefreshToken != currentRefreshToken {
// Use Infof as Warnf doesn't exist
t.logger.Infof("refreshToken aborted: Session refresh token changed concurrently during refresh attempt.")
// Do not save the new tokens, as the session state is likely invalid/cleared.
return false // Indicate refresh failure due to concurrency conflict
return false
}
// --- End Concurrency Check ---
// Update session with new tokens ONLY if the concurrency check passed
t.logger.Debugf("Concurrency check passed. Updating session with new tokens.")
// Extract email from the new token and update session
@@ -2520,18 +2473,15 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateTokenExpiry(session *SessionData, token string) (b
// Close stops all background goroutines and closes resources with proper timeout.
func (t *TraefikOidc) Close() error {
// CRITICAL FIX: Use shutdownOnce to ensure Close is only called once
var closeErr error
t.shutdownOnce.Do(func() {
t.logger.Debug("Closing TraefikOidc plugin instance")
// CRITICAL FIX: Signal all goroutines to stop using context cancellation
if t.cancelFunc != nil {
t.cancelFunc()
t.logger.Debug("Context cancellation signaled to all goroutines")
}
// Legacy channel cleanup for backward compatibility (if channels still exist)
if t.tokenCleanupStopChan != nil {
close(t.tokenCleanupStopChan)
t.logger.Debug("tokenCleanupStopChan closed")
@@ -2541,42 +2491,53 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) Close() error {
t.logger.Debug("metadataRefreshStopChan closed")
}
// Wait for all goroutines to finish with timeout
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
t.goroutineWG.Wait()
close(done)
}()
// Wait for goroutines to finish or timeout after 10 seconds
select {
case <-done:
t.logger.Debug("All background goroutines stopped gracefully")
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.logger.Errorf("Timeout waiting for background goroutines to stop")
// Continue with cleanup even if goroutines didn't stop gracefully
}
// Close caches
// These Close methods should stop their respective autoCleanupRoutine goroutines
if t.httpClient != nil {
if transport, ok := t.httpClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
transport.CloseIdleConnections()
t.logger.Debug("HTTP client idle connections closed")
}
}
if t.tokenHTTPClient != nil {
if transport, ok := t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
transport.CloseIdleConnections()
t.logger.Debug("Token HTTP client idle connections closed")
}
if t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport != t.httpClient.Transport {
if transport, ok := t.tokenHTTPClient.Transport.(*http.Transport); ok {
transport.CloseIdleConnections()
t.logger.Debug("Token HTTP client transport closed (separate from main)")
}
}
}
if t.tokenBlacklist != nil {
t.tokenBlacklist.Close() // This is *cache.Cache, which has Close()
t.tokenBlacklist.Close()
t.logger.Debug("tokenBlacklist closed")
}
if t.metadataCache != nil {
t.metadataCache.Close() // This is *MetadataCache, which has Close()
t.metadataCache.Close()
t.logger.Debug("metadataCache closed")
}
if t.tokenCache != nil {
t.tokenCache.Close() // This is *TokenCache, which now has Close()
t.tokenCache.Close()
t.logger.Debug("tokenCache closed")
}
if t.jwkCache != nil {
// Reverting to the original explicit instruction to call t.jwkCache.Close().
// This will cause a compile error if JWKCacheInterface (and its implementation *JWKCache)
// is not updated in jwk.go to include and implement a Close() method
// that properly closes the internal *cache.Cache instance.
t.jwkCache.Close()
t.logger.Debug("t.jwkCache.Close() called as per original instruction.")
}