Resolve issue with opaque tokens not being parsed correctly (#69)

This commit is contained in:
2025-09-25 17:00:24 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent b07247f674
commit 3bbc6a1608
5 changed files with 292 additions and 923 deletions
-920
View File
@@ -1,920 +0,0 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/gorilla/sessions"
)
// generateLargeRealisticToken creates a realistic JWT token with a large payload
// that mimics real-world OAuth tokens but with enough data to test chunking
func generateLargeRealisticToken() string {
// Create a realistic JWT header
header := map[string]interface{}{
"alg": "RS256",
"typ": "JWT",
"kid": "test-key-id",
}
headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
headerB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
// Create a large but realistic payload with many claims
claims := map[string]interface{}{
"iss": "https://auth.example.com/",
"sub": "auth0|507f1f77bcf86cd799439011",
"aud": []string{"https://api.example.com", "https://app.example.com"},
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 1516325422,
"azp": "my_client_id",
"scope": "openid profile email read:users write:users admin",
"gty": "client-credentials",
}
// Add many custom claims to make the token large
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
claimName := fmt.Sprintf("custom_claim_%d", i)
claimValue := fmt.Sprintf("This is a test value for claim %d with some additional data to make it larger", i)
claims[claimName] = claimValue
}
// Add some array claims with multiple values
claims["permissions"] = []string{
"read:users", "write:users", "delete:users", "create:users",
"read:posts", "write:posts", "delete:posts", "create:posts",
"admin:all", "super:admin", "system:manage", "audit:view",
}
claims["groups"] = []string{
"administrators", "developers", "qa_team", "devops",
"product_managers", "support_team", "security_team",
}
payloadJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
payloadB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadJSON)
// Create a mock signature (in real scenario this would be cryptographic)
signature := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(
[]byte("mock_signature_with_some_additional_bytes_for_testing_purposes"))
return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s", headerB64, payloadB64, signature)
}
// TestAuth0RedirectLoopFix tests the fixes applied to prevent Auth0 redirect loops
// specifically focusing on:
// 1. Consistent cookie configuration (Path="/", SameSite=Lax)
// 2. CSRF token accessibility during OAuth callbacks
// 3. Session cookie persistence across OAuth flow
// 4. Redirect loop prevention
func TestAuth0RedirectLoopFix(t *testing.T) {
logger := NewLogger("debug")
encryptionKey := "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
sm, err := NewSessionManager(encryptionKey, false, "", logger)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create session manager: %v", err)
}
defer sm.Shutdown()
t.Run("CookieConfigurationConsistency", func(t *testing.T) {
testCookieConfigurationConsistency(t, sm)
})
t.Run("CSRFTokenAccessibility", func(t *testing.T) {
testCSRFTokenAccessibility(t, sm)
})
t.Run("SessionPersistenceAcrossOAuth", func(t *testing.T) {
testSessionPersistenceAcrossOAuth(t, sm)
})
t.Run("RedirectLoopPrevention", func(t *testing.T) {
testRedirectLoopPrevention(t, sm)
})
t.Run("CallbackCSRFValidation", func(t *testing.T) {
testCallbackCSRFValidation(t, sm)
})
t.Run("EdgeCases", func(t *testing.T) {
testEdgeCases(t, sm)
})
}
// testCookieConfigurationConsistency verifies that cookies are configured
// consistently with Path="/" and SameSite=Lax regardless of request headers
func testCookieConfigurationConsistency(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager) {
tests := []struct {
name string
headers map[string]string
expectPath string
expectSame http.SameSite
description string
}{
{
name: "StandardRequest",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
},
expectPath: "/",
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "Standard HTTP request should get consistent cookie config",
},
{
name: "XMLHttpRequest",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
},
expectPath: "/",
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "XMLHttpRequest should still use SameSite=Lax (fix for redirect loop)",
},
{
name: "HTTPSRequest",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
},
expectPath: "/",
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "HTTPS requests should have consistent cookie config",
},
{
name: "CustomDomainRequest",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "auth.example.com",
"X-Forwarded-Host": "auth.example.com",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
},
expectPath: "/",
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "Custom domain requests should maintain consistent config",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/callback", nil)
// Set headers
for key, value := range tt.headers {
req.Header.Set(key, value)
}
rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
// Get session and save it to trigger cookie setting
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
// Set some session data to ensure it gets saved
session.SetCSRF("test-csrf-token")
session.SetAuthenticated(false)
err = session.Save(req, rw)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
}
// Verify cookie configuration
cookies := rw.Result().Cookies()
if len(cookies) == 0 {
t.Fatal("No cookies set in response")
}
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if strings.HasPrefix(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo") {
if cookie.Path != tt.expectPath {
t.Errorf("Expected Path=%s, got Path=%s for cookie %s",
tt.expectPath, cookie.Path, cookie.Name)
}
if cookie.SameSite != tt.expectSame {
t.Errorf("Expected SameSite=%v, got SameSite=%v for cookie %s",
tt.expectSame, cookie.SameSite, cookie.Name)
}
t.Logf("Cookie %s: Path=%s, SameSite=%v, Secure=%v, HttpOnly=%v",
cookie.Name, cookie.Path, cookie.SameSite, cookie.Secure, cookie.HttpOnly)
}
}
session.Clear(req, nil)
})
}
}
// testCSRFTokenAccessibility verifies that CSRF tokens remain accessible
// during OAuth callbacks regardless of request type
func testCSRFTokenAccessibility(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager) {
csrfToken := uuid.New().String()
tests := []struct {
name string
headers map[string]string
description string
}{
{
name: "StandardCallback",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
},
description: "Standard OAuth callback should access CSRF token",
},
{
name: "AjaxCallback",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest",
},
description: "AJAX OAuth callback should access CSRF token",
},
{
name: "HTTPSCallback",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
},
description: "HTTPS OAuth callback should access CSRF token",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Phase 1: Store CSRF token in session (auth initiation)
initReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
for key, value := range tt.headers {
initReq.Header.Set(key, value)
}
initRw := httptest.NewRecorder()
session, err := sm.GetSession(initReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
session.SetNonce("test-nonce")
session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
err = session.Save(initReq, initRw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save session: %v", err)
}
// Get cookies from response to simulate browser behavior
storedCookies := initRw.Result().Cookies()
// Phase 2: OAuth callback with same cookies
callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET",
"http://example.com/callback?state="+csrfToken+"&code=auth_code", nil)
for key, value := range tt.headers {
callbackReq.Header.Set(key, value)
}
// Add cookies to callback request
for _, cookie := range storedCookies {
callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
// Get session in callback
callbackSession, err := sm.GetSession(callbackReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get callback session: %v", err)
}
defer callbackSession.Clear(callbackReq, nil)
// Verify CSRF token is accessible
retrievedCSRF := callbackSession.GetCSRF()
if retrievedCSRF == "" {
t.Error("CSRF token not accessible in callback session")
}
if retrievedCSRF != csrfToken {
t.Errorf("CSRF token mismatch: expected %s, got %s", csrfToken, retrievedCSRF)
}
// Verify other session data is accessible
if callbackSession.GetNonce() != "test-nonce" {
t.Error("Nonce not accessible in callback session")
}
if callbackSession.GetIncomingPath() != "/protected" {
t.Error("Incoming path not accessible in callback session")
}
t.Logf("CSRF token successfully retrieved in %s: %s", tt.name, retrievedCSRF)
})
}
}
// testSessionPersistenceAcrossOAuth verifies that session data persists
// correctly across the OAuth flow without being lost due to cookie issues
func testSessionPersistenceAcrossOAuth(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager) {
// Simulate complete OAuth flow
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
req.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
// Phase 1: Initial authentication request
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get initial session: %v", err)
}
csrfToken := uuid.New().String()
nonce := "test-nonce-" + uuid.New().String()
session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
session.SetNonce(nonce)
session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
session.SetCodeVerifier("test-code-verifier")
err = session.Save(req, rw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save initial session: %v", err)
}
initialCookies := rw.Result().Cookies()
if len(initialCookies) == 0 {
t.Fatal("No cookies set in initial response")
}
// Phase 2: OAuth provider redirect (user authenticates)
redirectReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://auth0.example.com/authorize", nil)
// Add cookies as browser would
for _, cookie := range initialCookies {
redirectReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
// Phase 3: OAuth callback
callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET",
"http://example.com/callback?state="+csrfToken+"&code=auth_code_12345", nil)
callbackReq.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
callbackReq.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
// Add all cookies from initial response
for _, cookie := range initialCookies {
callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
callbackRw := httptest.NewRecorder()
callbackSession, err := sm.GetSession(callbackReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get callback session: %v", err)
}
defer callbackSession.Clear(callbackReq, nil)
// Verify all session data persisted
if callbackSession.GetCSRF() != csrfToken {
t.Errorf("CSRF token not persisted: expected %s, got %s",
csrfToken, callbackSession.GetCSRF())
}
if callbackSession.GetNonce() != nonce {
t.Errorf("Nonce not persisted: expected %s, got %s",
nonce, callbackSession.GetNonce())
}
if callbackSession.GetIncomingPath() != "/protected" {
t.Errorf("Incoming path not persisted: expected /protected, got %s",
callbackSession.GetIncomingPath())
}
if callbackSession.GetCodeVerifier() != "test-code-verifier" {
t.Errorf("Code verifier not persisted: expected test-code-verifier, got %s",
callbackSession.GetCodeVerifier())
}
// Simulate successful authentication
callbackSession.SetAuthenticated(true)
callbackSession.SetEmail("[email protected]")
callbackSession.SetAccessToken("access_token_12345")
callbackSession.SetRefreshToken("refresh_token_12345")
callbackSession.SetIDToken("id_token_12345")
// Clear OAuth-specific data
callbackSession.SetCSRF("")
callbackSession.SetNonce("")
callbackSession.SetCodeVerifier("")
callbackSession.ResetRedirectCount()
err = callbackSession.Save(callbackReq, callbackRw)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Failed to save callback session: %v", err)
}
t.Log("OAuth flow simulation completed successfully - session data persisted")
}
// testRedirectLoopPrevention verifies that the redirect loop prevention
// mechanisms work correctly
func testRedirectLoopPrevention(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
req.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
defer session.Clear(req, nil)
// Test redirect count tracking
initialCount := session.GetRedirectCount()
if initialCount != 0 {
t.Errorf("Initial redirect count should be 0, got %d", initialCount)
}
// Simulate multiple redirect attempts
for i := 1; i <= 6; i++ {
session.IncrementRedirectCount()
count := session.GetRedirectCount()
if count != i {
t.Errorf("Expected redirect count %d, got %d", i, count)
}
// Test that redirect loop detection kicks in at 5 redirects
if i >= 5 {
t.Logf("Redirect count at %d - should trigger loop detection", count)
}
}
// Test reset functionality
session.ResetRedirectCount()
if session.GetRedirectCount() != 0 {
t.Errorf("Redirect count should be 0 after reset, got %d", session.GetRedirectCount())
}
t.Log("Redirect loop prevention tests passed")
}
// testCallbackCSRFValidation tests CSRF token validation in OAuth callbacks
func testCallbackCSRFValidation(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager) {
tests := []struct {
name string
storedCSRF string
callbackState string
shouldSucceed bool
description string
}{
{
name: "ValidCSRF",
storedCSRF: "valid-csrf-token-123",
callbackState: "valid-csrf-token-123",
shouldSucceed: true,
description: "Valid CSRF token should pass validation",
},
{
name: "InvalidCSRF",
storedCSRF: "valid-csrf-token-123",
callbackState: "different-csrf-token-456",
shouldSucceed: false,
description: "Invalid CSRF token should fail validation",
},
{
name: "EmptyStoredCSRF",
storedCSRF: "",
callbackState: "some-csrf-token",
shouldSucceed: false,
description: "Empty stored CSRF should fail validation",
},
{
name: "EmptyCallbackState",
storedCSRF: "valid-csrf-token-123",
callbackState: "",
shouldSucceed: false,
description: "Empty callback state should fail validation",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Setup phase - store CSRF token
setupReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/auth", nil)
setupReq.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
session, err := sm.GetSession(setupReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get setup session: %v", err)
}
if tt.storedCSRF != "" {
session.SetCSRF(tt.storedCSRF)
}
setupRw := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(setupReq, setupRw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save setup session: %v", err)
}
setupCookies := setupRw.Result().Cookies()
// Callback phase - validate CSRF
callbackURL := "http://example.com/callback"
if tt.callbackState != "" {
callbackURL += "?state=" + tt.callbackState + "&code=test_code"
} else {
callbackURL += "?code=test_code"
}
callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", callbackURL, nil)
callbackReq.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
// Add cookies
for _, cookie := range setupCookies {
callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
callbackSession, err := sm.GetSession(callbackReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get callback session: %v", err)
}
defer callbackSession.Clear(callbackReq, nil)
// Perform CSRF validation
storedCSRF := callbackSession.GetCSRF()
stateParam := callbackReq.URL.Query().Get("state")
csrfValid := (storedCSRF != "" && stateParam != "" && storedCSRF == stateParam)
if tt.shouldSucceed && !csrfValid {
t.Errorf("CSRF validation should have succeeded but failed. Stored: '%s', State: '%s'",
storedCSRF, stateParam)
}
if !tt.shouldSucceed && csrfValid {
t.Errorf("CSRF validation should have failed but succeeded. Stored: '%s', State: '%s'",
storedCSRF, stateParam)
}
t.Logf("CSRF validation test '%s': stored='%s', state='%s', valid=%v",
tt.name, storedCSRF, stateParam, csrfValid)
})
}
}
// testEdgeCases tests various edge cases that could cause redirect loops
func testEdgeCases(t *testing.T, sm *SessionManager) {
t.Run("MissingHeaders", func(t *testing.T) {
// Test with minimal headers
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://localhost/callback", nil)
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session with minimal headers: %v", err)
}
defer session.Clear(req, nil)
session.SetCSRF("test-csrf")
rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(req, rw)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Failed to save session with minimal headers: %v", err)
}
// Verify cookies still have consistent configuration
cookies := rw.Result().Cookies()
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if strings.HasPrefix(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo") {
if cookie.Path != "/" {
t.Errorf("Cookie path inconsistent with minimal headers: got %s", cookie.Path)
}
if cookie.SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode {
t.Errorf("Cookie SameSite inconsistent with minimal headers: got %v", cookie.SameSite)
}
}
}
})
t.Run("DifferentDomains", func(t *testing.T) {
domains := []string{"example.com", "auth.example.com", "sub.auth.example.com"}
for _, domain := range domains {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://"+domain+"/callback", nil)
req.Header.Set("Host", domain)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", domain)
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session for domain %s: %v", domain, err)
}
session.SetCSRF("test-csrf-" + domain)
rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(req, rw)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Failed to save session for domain %s: %v", domain, err)
}
// Verify consistent cookie configuration across domains
cookies := rw.Result().Cookies()
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if strings.HasPrefix(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo") {
if cookie.Path != "/" {
t.Errorf("Domain %s: Cookie path inconsistent: got %s", domain, cookie.Path)
}
if cookie.SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode {
t.Errorf("Domain %s: Cookie SameSite inconsistent: got %v", domain, cookie.SameSite)
}
}
}
session.Clear(req, nil)
t.Logf("Domain %s: Cookie configuration consistent", domain)
}
})
t.Run("ConcurrentSessions", func(t *testing.T) {
// Test that multiple concurrent sessions don't interfere
const numSessions = 5
sessions := make([]*SessionData, numSessions)
for i := 0; i < numSessions; i++ {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session %d: %v", i, err)
}
sessions[i] = session
// Set unique data for each session
session.SetCSRF("csrf-" + string(rune('A'+i)))
session.SetNonce("nonce-" + string(rune('A'+i)))
}
// Verify each session has its own data
for i, session := range sessions {
expectedCSRF := "csrf-" + string(rune('A'+i))
expectedNonce := "nonce-" + string(rune('A'+i))
if session.GetCSRF() != expectedCSRF {
t.Errorf("Session %d CSRF mismatch: expected %s, got %s",
i, expectedCSRF, session.GetCSRF())
}
if session.GetNonce() != expectedNonce {
t.Errorf("Session %d nonce mismatch: expected %s, got %s",
i, expectedNonce, session.GetNonce())
}
session.Clear(nil, nil)
}
t.Log("Concurrent sessions test passed")
})
t.Run("LargeCookieHandling", func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("Host", "example.com")
session, err := sm.GetSession(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get session: %v", err)
}
defer session.Clear(req, nil)
// Test with large realistic JWT token that might require chunking
largeToken := generateLargeRealisticToken()
session.SetAccessToken(largeToken)
session.SetCSRF("test-csrf")
rw := httptest.NewRecorder()
err = session.Save(req, rw)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Failed to save session with large token: %v", err)
}
// Verify cookies are still consistent even with chunking
cookies := rw.Result().Cookies()
for _, cookie := range cookies {
if strings.HasPrefix(cookie.Name, "_oidc_raczylo") {
if cookie.Path != "/" {
t.Errorf("Large cookie path inconsistent: got %s", cookie.Path)
}
if cookie.SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode {
t.Errorf("Large cookie SameSite inconsistent: got %v", cookie.SameSite)
}
}
}
// Verify token can be retrieved correctly
if session.GetAccessToken() != largeToken {
t.Error("Large access token not retrieved correctly")
}
t.Log("Large cookie handling test passed")
})
}
// TestSessionManagerEnhanceSessionSecurity tests the enhanced session security
// to ensure SameSite is consistently Lax and not dynamically switched
func TestSessionManagerEnhanceSessionSecurity(t *testing.T) {
logger := NewLogger("debug")
encryptionKey := "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
sm, err := NewSessionManager(encryptionKey, false, "", logger)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create session manager: %v", err)
}
defer sm.Shutdown()
tests := []struct {
name string
headers map[string]string
expectSame http.SameSite
description string
}{
{
name: "StandardRequest",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
},
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "Standard request should use SameSite=Lax",
},
{
name: "XMLHttpRequestHeader",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest",
},
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "XMLHttpRequest should still use SameSite=Lax (no dynamic switching)",
},
{
name: "AjaxWithForwardedProto",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
},
expectSame: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
description: "AJAX HTTPS request should use SameSite=Lax (no dynamic switching)",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/test", nil)
for key, value := range tt.headers {
req.Header.Set(key, value)
}
// Test the EnhanceSessionSecurity method directly
options := &sessions.Options{}
enhanced := sm.EnhanceSessionSecurity(options, req)
if enhanced.SameSite != tt.expectSame {
t.Errorf("Expected SameSite=%v, got SameSite=%v for %s",
tt.expectSame, enhanced.SameSite, tt.description)
}
// Verify Path is always "/"
if enhanced.Path != "/" {
t.Errorf("Expected Path='/', got Path='%s' for %s",
enhanced.Path, tt.description)
}
// Verify HttpOnly is always true
if !enhanced.HttpOnly {
t.Errorf("Expected HttpOnly=true, got HttpOnly=false for %s", tt.description)
}
t.Logf("%s: SameSite=%v, Path=%s, HttpOnly=%v, Secure=%v",
tt.name, enhanced.SameSite, enhanced.Path, enhanced.HttpOnly, enhanced.Secure)
})
}
}
// TestCallbackHandlerIntegration tests the full callback handler integration
// to ensure CSRF tokens work correctly with the fixed cookie configuration
func TestCallbackHandlerIntegration(t *testing.T) {
logger := NewLogger("debug")
encryptionKey := "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
sm, err := NewSessionManager(encryptionKey, false, "", logger)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create session manager: %v", err)
}
defer sm.Shutdown()
// Simulate a complete OAuth flow with various request types
scenarios := []struct {
name string
headers map[string]string
}{
{
name: "StandardBrowser",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Browser)",
},
},
{
name: "AjaxRequest",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Browser)",
"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest",
},
},
{
name: "HTTPSProxy",
headers: map[string]string{
"Host": "example.com",
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Browser)",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
"X-Forwarded-Host": "example.com",
},
},
}
for _, scenario := range scenarios {
t.Run(scenario.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Phase 1: Auth initiation - store CSRF token
initReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.com/protected", nil)
for key, value := range scenario.headers {
initReq.Header.Set(key, value)
}
initRw := httptest.NewRecorder()
session, err := sm.GetSession(initReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get init session: %v", err)
}
csrfToken := uuid.New().String()
session.SetCSRF(csrfToken)
session.SetNonce("test-nonce")
session.SetIncomingPath("/protected")
err = session.Save(initReq, initRw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to save init session: %v", err)
}
initCookies := initRw.Result().Cookies()
// Phase 2: OAuth callback - validate CSRF token access
callbackReq := httptest.NewRequest("GET",
"http://example.com/callback?state="+csrfToken+"&code=test_code", nil)
for key, value := range scenario.headers {
callbackReq.Header.Set(key, value)
}
// Add cookies from init phase
for _, cookie := range initCookies {
callbackReq.AddCookie(cookie)
}
callbackSession, err := sm.GetSession(callbackReq)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to get callback session: %v", err)
}
defer callbackSession.Clear(callbackReq, nil)
// This is the critical test - CSRF token must be accessible
retrievedCSRF := callbackSession.GetCSRF()
if retrievedCSRF == "" {
t.Errorf("Scenario %s: CSRF token not accessible in callback", scenario.name)
}
if retrievedCSRF != csrfToken {
t.Errorf("Scenario %s: CSRF token mismatch - expected %s, got %s",
scenario.name, csrfToken, retrievedCSRF)
}
// Validate state parameter matches CSRF token
stateParam := callbackReq.URL.Query().Get("state")
if stateParam != csrfToken {
t.Errorf("Scenario %s: State parameter mismatch - expected %s, got %s",
scenario.name, csrfToken, stateParam)
}
// Simulate successful CSRF validation
if retrievedCSRF != "" && retrievedCSRF == stateParam {
t.Logf("Scenario %s: CSRF validation successful", scenario.name)
} else {
t.Errorf("Scenario %s: CSRF validation failed", scenario.name)
}
// Verify other session data persisted
if callbackSession.GetNonce() != "test-nonce" {
t.Errorf("Scenario %s: Nonce not persisted", scenario.name)
}
if callbackSession.GetIncomingPath() != "/protected" {
t.Errorf("Scenario %s: Incoming path not persisted", scenario.name)
}
})
}
}
+45
View File
@@ -1250,6 +1250,8 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) isUserAuthenticated(session *SessionData) (bool, bool, boo
} else if t.isGoogleProvider() { } else if t.isGoogleProvider() {
return t.validateGoogleTokens(session) return t.validateGoogleTokens(session)
} }
// Auth0 and other providers can now use standard validation
// which handles opaque tokens generically
return t.validateStandardTokens(session) return t.validateStandardTokens(session)
} }
@@ -2295,6 +2297,49 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) validateStandardTokens(session *SessionData) (bool, bool,
return false, false, true return false, false, true
} }
// Check if access token is opaque (doesn't have JWT structure)
dotCount := strings.Count(accessToken, ".")
isOpaqueToken := dotCount != 2
// For opaque access tokens, rely on ID token for session validation
if isOpaqueToken {
t.logger.Debugf("Access token appears to be opaque (dots: %d), validating session via ID token", dotCount)
// For opaque access tokens, check ID token for authentication status
idToken := session.GetIDToken()
if idToken == "" {
t.logger.Debug("Opaque access token present but no ID token found")
if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
t.logger.Debug("ID token missing but refresh token exists. Signaling need for refresh.")
return false, true, false
}
// Accept session with opaque access token even without ID token
// The OAuth provider validated it when issued
t.logger.Debug("Accepting session with opaque access token")
return true, false, false
}
// Validate ID token if present
if err := t.verifyToken(idToken); err != nil {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token has expired") {
t.logger.Debugf("ID token expired with opaque access token, needs refresh")
if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
return false, true, false
}
return false, false, true
}
t.logger.Errorf("ID token verification failed with opaque access token: %v", err)
if session.GetRefreshToken() != "" {
return false, true, false
}
return false, false, true
}
// Use ID token for expiry validation
return t.validateTokenExpiry(session, idToken)
}
idToken := session.GetIDToken() idToken := session.GetIDToken()
if idToken == "" { if idToken == "" {
t.logger.Debug("Authenticated flag set with access token, but no ID token found in session (possibly opaque token)") t.logger.Debug("Authenticated flag set with access token, but no ID token found in session (possibly opaque token)")
+194
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
package traefikoidc
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestOpaqueTokenDetection tests the detection of opaque tokens vs JWT tokens
func TestOpaqueTokenDetection(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
isOpaque bool
description string
}{
{
name: "JWT token with 3 parts",
token: "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c",
isOpaque: false,
description: "Standard JWT with header.payload.signature",
},
{
name: "Auth0 opaque token",
token: "8n3d84nd92nf92nf92nf92nf923nf923nf923nf9",
isOpaque: true,
description: "Auth0 opaque access token",
},
{
name: "Okta opaque token",
token: "00Otkjhgt5Rfasde12345678901234567890",
isOpaque: true,
description: "Okta opaque access token",
},
{
name: "AWS Cognito opaque token",
token: "AGPAYJhZmU3NzI5YTQtNGQ0Yy00YTU5LWJjYTQtYzdlMzQ0MmQ3ZDJl",
isOpaque: true,
description: "AWS Cognito opaque access token",
},
{
name: "Invalid single dot token",
token: "invalid.token",
isOpaque: true, // Treated as opaque since it's not a valid JWT
description: "Invalid format with single dot",
},
{
name: "Token with no dots",
token: "opaquetoken1234567890abcdefghijklmnop",
isOpaque: true,
description: "Pure opaque token with no dots",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Check dot count to determine if token is opaque
dotCount := strings.Count(tt.token, ".")
isOpaqueToken := dotCount != 2
if isOpaqueToken != tt.isOpaque {
t.Errorf("Token detection failed for %s: expected opaque=%v, got opaque=%v (dots=%d)",
tt.name, tt.isOpaque, isOpaqueToken, dotCount)
}
})
}
}
// TestOpaqueTokenValidation tests the validation logic for opaque tokens
func TestOpaqueTokenValidation(t *testing.T) {
logger := GetSingletonNoOpLogger()
cm := NewChunkManager(logger)
defer cm.Shutdown()
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
wantError bool
}{
{
name: "Valid opaque token",
token: "opaquetoken1234567890abcdefghijklmnop",
wantError: false,
},
{
name: "Too short opaque token",
token: "short",
wantError: true, // Less than 20 characters
},
{
name: "Opaque token with spaces",
token: "opaque token with spaces 1234567890",
wantError: true, // Contains spaces
},
{
name: "Valid JWT token",
token: "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c",
wantError: false,
},
}
config := TokenConfig{
Type: "access",
MinLength: 5,
MaxLength: 100 * 1024,
MaxChunks: 25,
MaxChunkSize: maxCookieSize,
AllowOpaqueTokens: true,
RequireJWTFormat: false,
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := cm.validateToken(tt.token, config)
hasError := result.Error != nil
if hasError != tt.wantError {
if tt.wantError {
t.Errorf("Expected error for %s but got none", tt.name)
} else {
t.Errorf("Unexpected error for %s: %v", tt.name, result.Error)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestOpaqueTokenStorage tests that opaque tokens are properly detected and stored
func TestOpaqueTokenStorage(t *testing.T) {
// Test the token format detection logic
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
shouldStore bool
description string
}{
{
name: "Valid opaque token",
token: "auth0_opaque_token_1234567890abcdefghijklmnop",
shouldStore: true,
description: "Opaque token with sufficient length and no dots",
},
{
name: "Valid JWT token",
token: "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c",
shouldStore: true,
description: "Standard JWT with three parts",
},
{
name: "Invalid single-dot token",
token: "invalid.token",
shouldStore: false,
description: "Token with single dot - invalid format",
},
{
name: "Too short opaque token",
token: "short",
shouldStore: false,
description: "Opaque token too short (less than 20 chars)",
},
{
name: "Multi-dot invalid token",
token: "too.many.dots.here",
shouldStore: false,
description: "Token with more than 2 dots - invalid format",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Simulate the validation logic from SetAccessToken
shouldStore := true
if tt.token != "" {
dotCount := strings.Count(tt.token, ".")
// Reject tokens with exactly 1 dot (invalid format)
if dotCount == 1 {
shouldStore = false
}
// For opaque tokens (no dots), ensure minimum length
if dotCount == 0 && len(tt.token) < 20 {
shouldStore = false
}
// Tokens with more than 2 dots are also invalid
if dotCount > 2 {
shouldStore = false
}
}
if shouldStore != tt.shouldStore {
t.Errorf("Token storage decision failed for %s: expected store=%v, got store=%v",
tt.name, tt.shouldStore, shouldStore)
}
})
}
}
+40
View File
@@ -1275,6 +1275,23 @@ func (sd *SessionData) getAccessTokenUnsafe() string {
) )
if result.Error != nil { if result.Error != nil {
// Check if we have a raw token available
// This handles cases where the token exists but doesn't validate as JWT
if token != "" && !compressed && len(sd.accessTokenChunks) == 0 {
// We have a non-chunked, non-compressed token that failed validation
// Check if it's an opaque token (doesn't have JWT structure)
dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".")
if dotCount != 2 {
// This is likely an opaque token that failed JWT validation
// Return the raw token as-is since opaque tokens are valid
if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Debugf("Returning opaque access token (dots: %d) despite validation error: %v", dotCount, result.Error)
}
return token
}
}
// For JWT validation errors or other issues, log and return empty
if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil { if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Debugf("ChunkManager.GetToken error: %v", result.Error) sd.manager.logger.Debugf("ChunkManager.GetToken error: %v", result.Error)
} }
@@ -1295,18 +1312,22 @@ func (sd *SessionData) SetAccessToken(token string) {
if token != "" { if token != "" {
dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".") dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".")
// Reject tokens with exactly 1 dot (invalid format - neither JWT nor opaque)
if dotCount == 1 { if dotCount == 1 {
if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil { if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Debug("Invalid token format during storage (dots: %d) - rejecting", dotCount) sd.manager.logger.Debug("Invalid token format during storage (dots: %d) - rejecting", dotCount)
} }
return return
} }
// For opaque tokens (no dots), ensure minimum length for security
if dotCount == 0 && len(token) < 20 { if dotCount == 0 && len(token) < 20 {
if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil { if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Debug("Token too short for opaque token (length: %d) - rejecting", len(token)) sd.manager.logger.Debug("Token too short for opaque token (length: %d) - rejecting", len(token))
} }
return return
} }
// Tokens with 2 dots are JWTs, tokens with 0 dots are opaque
// Both are valid formats
} }
currentAccessToken := sd.getAccessTokenUnsafe() currentAccessToken := sd.getAccessTokenUnsafe()
@@ -1456,6 +1477,25 @@ func (sd *SessionData) GetRefreshToken() string {
) )
if result.Error != nil { if result.Error != nil {
// Check if we have a raw token available
// This handles cases where the token exists but doesn't validate as JWT
if token != "" && !compressed && len(sd.refreshTokenChunks) == 0 {
// We have a non-chunked, non-compressed token that failed validation
// Check if it's an opaque token (doesn't have JWT structure)
dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".")
if dotCount != 2 {
// This is likely an opaque token that failed JWT validation
// Return the raw token as-is since opaque tokens are valid
if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Debugf("Returning opaque refresh token (dots: %d) despite validation error: %v", dotCount, result.Error)
}
return token
}
}
// For JWT validation errors or other issues, log and return empty
if sd.manager != nil && sd.manager.logger != nil {
sd.manager.logger.Debugf("ChunkManager.GetToken error for refresh token: %v", result.Error)
}
return "" return ""
} }
+13 -3
View File
@@ -313,17 +313,27 @@ func (cm *ChunkManager) validateToken(token string, config TokenConfig) TokenRet
return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: freshnessErr} return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: freshnessErr}
} }
// Determine if token is opaque or JWT based on format
// JWT tokens have exactly 2 dots (3 parts: header.payload.signature)
dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".")
isJWT := dotCount == 2
if config.RequireJWTFormat && !config.AllowOpaqueTokens { if config.RequireJWTFormat && !config.AllowOpaqueTokens {
// Only accept JWT format tokens
if validationErr := cm.validateJWTFormat(token, config.Type); validationErr != nil { if validationErr := cm.validateJWTFormat(token, config.Type); validationErr != nil {
return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: validationErr} return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: validationErr}
} }
} else if config.RequireJWTFormat && config.AllowOpaqueTokens { } else if config.AllowOpaqueTokens {
dotCount := strings.Count(token, ".") // Accept both JWT and opaque tokens
if dotCount > 0 { if isJWT {
// Token looks like JWT, validate as JWT
if validationErr := cm.validateJWTFormat(token, config.Type); validationErr != nil { if validationErr := cm.validateJWTFormat(token, config.Type); validationErr != nil {
// If JWT validation fails but opaque tokens are allowed,
// still return an error as the token claims to be JWT but is malformed
return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: validationErr} return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: validationErr}
} }
} else { } else {
// Token is opaque, validate as opaque
if validationErr := cm.validateOpaqueToken(token, config.Type); validationErr != nil { if validationErr := cm.validateOpaqueToken(token, config.Type); validationErr != nil {
return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: validationErr} return TokenRetrievalResult{Token: "", Error: validationErr}
} }