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feat(auth): support private_key_jwt and client_secret_basic (#137)
revocation endpoints, joining the existing client_secret_post default. Both are opt-in via the new clientAuthMethod config field. Closes #135. private_key_jwt (RFC 7523 §2.2 / OpenID Connect Core §9) ======================================================== Plugin signs a short-lived JWT with a configured private key and presents it as client_assertion. Use when the IdP enforces short secret TTLs or requires secretless client auth (Microsoft Entra ID / Azure AD, Okta, Auth0, Keycloak). New Config fields: clientAuthMethod (default: client_secret_post) clientAssertionPrivateKey (inline PEM) clientAssertionKeyPath (PEM file path; mutually exclusive) clientAssertionKeyID (JWS kid header — required) clientAssertionAlg (default: RS256; RS/PS/ES 256–512 supported) PEM forms accepted: PKCS#8, PKCS#1, SEC1. Assertion claims: iss=sub=clientID, aud=tokenURL, iat=now, exp=now+60s, random 16-byte hex jti per request. ECDSA signatures are raw r||s per RFC 7515 (not ASN.1). client_secret_basic (RFC 6749 §2.3.1) ===================================== Sends credentials in the Authorization: Basic header instead of the body. Both halves are form-urlencoded individually before base64 — that encoding step is required by the spec and is NOT what stdlib's http.Request.SetBasicAuth does, so the plugin uses its own helper. The form body omits client_id and client_secret on this path. Wire-up ======= Both methods are dispatched at the same two call sites: helpers.go:exchangeTokens — auth_code + refresh_token grants token_manager.go:RevokeTokenWithProvider — RFC 7009 revocation Existing clientSecret deployments are unaffected — empty clientAuthMethod maps to the historical client_secret_post behavior, and clientAssertion remains nil unless the new fields are set. Yaegi compatibility =================== All required crypto/rsa, crypto/ecdsa, crypto/x509, encoding/pem and crypto/sha256/384/512 symbols are exposed by the traefik/yaegi stdlib symbol tables (RSA SignPKCS1v15 + SignPSS, ECDSA Sign, ParsePKCS8/1PrivateKey, ParseECPrivateKey). Tests (16 new) ============== Algorithm-family coverage: TestIssue135_SignerRSAFamily — RS256/384/512 + PS256/384/512 TestIssue135_SignerECDSAFamily — ES256/384/512, raw r||s shape TestIssue135_SignerRejectsAlgKeyMismatch TestIssue135_SignerJTIUniqueness — 50 sigs, all jti distinct TestIssue135_SignerPEMVariants — PKCS#8, PKCS#1, SEC1 Config validation: TestIssue135_ConfigValidation — full Validate() matrix TestIssue135_ConfigKeyPathLoadsFile Wire-up: TestIssue135_AuthCodeExchangeUsesAssertion TestIssue135_RefreshTokenUsesAssertion TestIssue135_BackcompatClientSecretPath TestIssue135_RevocationUsesAssertion TestIssue135_BuildSignerFromInlineConfig TestIssue135_BuildSignerDefaultsToRS256 TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicAuth — Authorization header, no body creds TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicURLEncodesReservedChars — :, +, /, @, =, & TestIssue135_ClientSecretBasicRevocation — revocation parity Documentation ============= README.md — required-row note + 5 optional rows + dedicated section docs/CONFIGURATION.md — new Client Authentication section with three method subsections, OpenSSL keygen snippet, RFC links docs/index.html — 5 new config-table rows + Private Key JWT explainer card .traefik.yml + examples/complete-traefik-config.yaml — commented opt-in example Out of scope (deferred) ======================= mTLS / tls_client_auth (RFC 8705) — separate change; requires per-call http.Client with tls.Config.Certificates and conflicts with the current pooled HTTP client architecture.
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@@ -107,9 +107,12 @@ type TokenResponse struct {
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// - An error if the token exchange fails (e.g., network error, provider error, invalid grant)
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func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, codeOrToken string, redirectURL string, codeVerifier string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
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data := url.Values{
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"grant_type": {grantType},
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"client_id": {t.clientID},
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"client_secret": {t.clientSecret},
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"grant_type": {grantType},
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}
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// client_id is sent in the body for every method except client_secret_basic,
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// where it is carried in the Authorization header per RFC 6749 §2.3.1.
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if t.clientAuthMethod != "client_secret_basic" || t.clientAssertion != nil {
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data.Set("client_id", t.clientID)
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}
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if grantType == "authorization_code" {
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@@ -141,16 +144,33 @@ func (t *TraefikOidc) exchangeTokens(ctx context.Context, grantType string, code
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}
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}
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// Read tokenURL with RLock
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// Read tokenURL with RLock — needed as audience for private_key_jwt (RFC 7523 §3).
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t.metadataMu.RLock()
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tokenURL := t.tokenURL
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t.metadataMu.RUnlock()
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useBasicAuth := false
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if t.clientAssertion != nil {
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assertion, err := t.clientAssertion.Sign(tokenURL, t.clientID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign client assertion: %w", err)
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}
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data.Set("client_assertion_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer")
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data.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
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} else if t.clientAuthMethod == "client_secret_basic" {
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useBasicAuth = true
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} else {
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data.Set("client_secret", t.clientSecret)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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if useBasicAuth {
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setOAuthBasicAuth(req, t.clientID, t.clientSecret)
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -423,6 +443,19 @@ func BuildLogoutURL(endSessionURL, idToken, postLogoutRedirectURI string) (strin
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return u.String(), nil
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}
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// setOAuthBasicAuth sets the Authorization header per RFC 6749 §2.3.1: the
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// client_id and client_secret are form-urlencoded individually, joined with a
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// colon, then base64-encoded. This differs from http.Request.SetBasicAuth,
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// which skips the form-urlencode step — that matters for credentials with
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// reserved characters (`:`, `@`, `+`, `%`, etc.) where the wire format would
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// otherwise diverge from what the spec mandates.
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func setOAuthBasicAuth(req *http.Request, clientID, clientSecret string) {
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user := url.QueryEscape(clientID)
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pass := url.QueryEscape(clientSecret)
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auth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + pass))
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+auth)
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}
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// deduplicateScopes removes duplicate scopes from a slice while preserving order.
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// This ensures that OAuth scope parameters don't contain duplicates which could
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// cause issues with some authorization servers.
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