mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway.git
synced 2026-10-14 05:18:54 +00:00
Bound respClient's worst-case latency to one respCallTimeout per do/pipeline call instead of per read/write/handshake step. Compute a single absolute deadline at call entry, apply it once via conn.SetDeadline after connecting (covering the AUTH/SELECT handshake and the call's own command I/O), and skip the reconnect-retry when the failing attempt was a timeout (errors.As -> net.Error, Timeout()) — a peer that accepted the connection and went silent must not be asked the same non-question twice. Previously each read, write, and dial got its own fresh 2s budget and every caller queued behind the client's single mutex, so a hung (not merely refused) Redis-compatible server could stall one checkAndCount call for 16-32s+. Cap decodeBulk/decodeArray's wire-declared lengths (respMaxBulkLen 64MiB, respMaxArrayLen 1<<20) before allocating: an unguarded "$9223372036854775807\r\n" overflows n+2 into a negative slice length and panics make([]byte, n+2); a merely huge-but-valid length forces an outsized allocation either way. decodeBulk also now verifies its two trailing bytes are CRLF. Bound readLine to respMaxLineLen (64KiB), reading byte-by-byte so it can bail before ever buffering an unbounded line from a peer that never sends '\n'. Fix TestLimiter_FailClosed_BudgetReadReturnsStoreDownViolation: the erroringStore it used fails incrBy too, so checkAndCount's own increment loop already returned a storeDown violation before evaluateScope (and therefore budgetViolation) ever ran, leaving budgetViolation's storeDown branch uncovered. Replace it with a stub that only fails get, so the test's TokensPerDay limit actually drives evaluateScope into budgetViolation's fail-closed path. Document redis_store.go's incrBy as deliberately at-least-once: the reconnect-retry can re-send INCRBY after a lost reply (possible over-count), and fail-open can additionally count in the fallback — both fail-safe (more restrictive), never fail-open in the unsafe direction. Validate Redis.DB >= 0 in newConfiguredLimiter alongside Address, so a negative db is a constructor error rather than a SELECT -1 on the wire. New tests: a hung (accepts, never replies) fake RESP server proving a respClient call and a failOpen limiter call both stay bounded rather than stacking timeouts; decodeReply subtests for an oversized bulk length, a length just over the cap, a huge array length, a bad bulk trailer, and an oversized line; a negative-DB constructor-rejection test.
366 lines
12 KiB
Go
366 lines
12 KiB
Go
package traefikllmgateway
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import (
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"bufio"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// respDialTimeout bounds connecting to the server when no connection
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// exists yet. respCallTimeout bounds everything that happens on the
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// connection during one do/pipeline call: the AUTH/SELECT handshake (on a
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// freshly dialled connection) and the call's own command write and reply
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// reads. It is computed ONCE per call and applied via a single
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// conn.SetDeadline, not reset before each individual read or write — a
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// server that accepts the connection and then never answers must cost
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// this one call ~respCallTimeout, not respCallTimeout multiplied by every
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// handshake and command step it happens to perform (which, with the
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// mutex serializing every caller behind one connection, previously turned
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// one hung server into a many-times-respCallTimeout stall per request).
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const (
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respDialTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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respCallTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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)
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// respMaxBulkLen caps a RESP2 bulk string's declared length. Without a
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// cap, a malformed or malicious reply — "$9223372036854775807\r\n" — makes
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// n+2 overflow into a negative slice length and panic in make([]byte,
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// n+2); a reply merely claiming a huge-but-valid length would otherwise
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// force a huge allocation. 64MiB is generous for anything this client
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// actually reads (integer counter values and short simple/error strings).
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const respMaxBulkLen = 64 << 20
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// respMaxArrayLen caps a RESP2 array's declared element count, for the
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// same reason as respMaxBulkLen: this client only ever pipelines a
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// handful of commands, so a reply claiming millions of elements is
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// malformed or hostile, not legitimate.
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const respMaxArrayLen = 1 << 20
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// respMaxLineLen caps a single RESP2 header line (the "+", "-", ":", "$",
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// or "*" line preceding any body) read by readLine. Without a cap, a peer
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// that never sends '\n' makes readLine buffer an unbounded number of
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// bytes before erroring.
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const respMaxLineLen = 64 << 10
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// respErr is a RESP2 error reply ("-message\r\n"). It implements error so a
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// caller inspecting a decoded reply can type-assert for it the same way as
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// any other error.
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type respErr string
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// Error implements the error interface.
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func (e respErr) Error() string { return string(e) }
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// respClient is a minimal stdlib-only RESP2 client for a single Redis-
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// compatible server: one mutex-guarded TCP connection, lazily dialled on
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// first use and reconnected at most once when a command round trip fails
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// for a reason other than a timeout (see pipeline). It exists because the
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// plugin runs interpreted under Yaegi with only the Go standard library
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// available, so a full Redis client library is not an option.
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//
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// mu serializes every operation — do and pipeline hold it for their whole
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// round trip, including any reconnect — since RESP is not multiplexed:
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// interleaving two callers' writes on one connection would corrupt both
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// replies.
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type respClient struct {
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conn net.Conn
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r *bufio.Reader
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addr string
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password string
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mu sync.Mutex
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db int
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}
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// newRESPClient returns a respClient for addr. It does not connect until
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// the first do or pipeline call. password, if non-empty, is sent via AUTH
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// on every new connection; db is always sent via SELECT on every new
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// connection (including db 0), since a Redis-compatible proxy is not
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// guaranteed to default a fresh connection to database 0.
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func newRESPClient(addr, password string, db int) *respClient {
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return &respClient{addr: addr, password: password, db: db}
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}
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// do sends one command and returns its decoded reply. It is equivalent to
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// pipeline with a single command.
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func (c *respClient) do(args ...string) (any, error) {
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replies, err := c.pipeline([][]string{args})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return replies[0], nil
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}
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// pipeline sends every command in cmds on one round trip and returns their
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// decoded replies in the same order.
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//
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// One absolute deadline is computed here, at call entry, and shared by
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// both the first attempt and (if it happens) the one retry — not a fresh
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// respCallTimeout for each. On a non-timeout I/O error (connection reset,
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// EOF from a peer that closed mid-command) it closes the connection and
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// retries the whole pipeline once against the same deadline. On a timeout
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// specifically, it does not retry: a server that accepted the connection
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// and then went silent would just be given the same non-answer a second
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// time, doubling the caller's wait for nothing. Either way, a failure
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// leaves the connection closed so the next call lazily reconnects fresh
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// rather than retrying against a connection already known bad.
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func (c *respClient) pipeline(cmds [][]string) ([]any, error) {
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deadline := time.Now().Add(respCallTimeout)
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c.mu.Lock()
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defer c.mu.Unlock()
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replies, err := c.attemptPipelineLocked(cmds, deadline)
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if err == nil {
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return replies, nil
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}
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c.closeLocked()
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if isTimeout(err) {
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return nil, err
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}
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replies, err = c.attemptPipelineLocked(cmds, deadline)
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if err != nil {
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c.closeLocked()
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return nil, err
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}
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return replies, nil
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}
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// isTimeout reports whether err is (or wraps) a net.Error that timed out.
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func isTimeout(err error) bool {
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var netErr net.Error
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return errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout()
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}
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// attemptPipelineLocked runs one full attempt of cmds over c's connection,
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// connecting first if needed, with every read and write bound by
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// deadline. Callers must hold c.mu.
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func (c *respClient) attemptPipelineLocked(cmds [][]string, deadline time.Time) ([]any, error) {
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if err := c.ensureConnLocked(deadline); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var buf strings.Builder
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for _, args := range cmds {
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buf.WriteString(encodeCommand(args))
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}
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if _, err := io.WriteString(c.conn, buf.String()); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: write: %w", err)
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}
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replies := make([]any, len(cmds))
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for i := range cmds {
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v, err := decodeReply(c.r)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: read reply %d/%d: %w", i+1, len(cmds), err)
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}
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replies[i] = v
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}
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return replies, nil
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}
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// ensureConnLocked dials, authenticates, and selects the database if c has
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// no live connection, then (whether freshly dialled or reused) sets
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// deadline as the connection's single read/write deadline for the
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// remainder of this call — including the handshake, when one runs.
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// Callers must hold c.mu.
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func (c *respClient) ensureConnLocked(deadline time.Time) error {
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if c.conn != nil {
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if err := c.conn.SetDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resp: set deadline: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", c.addr, respDialTimeout)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resp: dial %q: %w", c.addr, err)
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}
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c.conn = conn
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c.r = bufio.NewReader(conn)
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if err := c.conn.SetDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
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c.closeLocked()
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return fmt.Errorf("resp: set deadline: %w", err)
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}
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if c.password != "" {
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if err := c.handshakeLocked("AUTH", c.password); err != nil {
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c.closeLocked()
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := c.handshakeLocked("SELECT", strconv.Itoa(c.db)); err != nil {
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c.closeLocked()
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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// handshakeLocked sends one connection-setup command (AUTH or SELECT) and
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// requires a non-error reply. Callers must hold c.mu, have a live c.conn,
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// and have already set its deadline.
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func (c *respClient) handshakeLocked(cmd, arg string) error {
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if _, err := io.WriteString(c.conn, encodeCommand([]string{cmd, arg})); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resp: %s: write: %w", cmd, err)
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}
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v, err := decodeReply(c.r)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resp: %s: read reply: %w", cmd, err)
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}
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if e, ok := v.(respErr); ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("resp: %s failed: %w", cmd, e)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// closeLocked closes and clears c's connection, if any. Callers must hold
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// c.mu.
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func (c *respClient) closeLocked() {
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if c.conn == nil {
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return
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}
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_ = c.conn.Close()
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c.conn = nil
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c.r = nil
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}
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// encodeCommand renders args as a RESP2 command array:
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// "*N\r\n$len\r\narg\r\n..." for each arg.
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func encodeCommand(args []string) string {
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var b strings.Builder
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fmt.Fprintf(&b, "*%d\r\n", len(args))
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for _, a := range args {
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fmt.Fprintf(&b, "$%d\r\n%s\r\n", len(a), a)
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}
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return b.String()
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}
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// decodeReply reads and decodes one RESP2 reply from r:
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//
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// - "+simple\r\n" -> string
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// - "-error\r\n" -> respErr (implements error; not returned as err)
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// - ":123\r\n" -> int64
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// - "$len\r\n...\r\n" -> []byte, or nil for a null bulk ("$-1\r\n")
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// - "*n\r\n..." -> []any of n decoded elements, or nil for a null
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// array ("*-1\r\n")
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//
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// The returned error is non-nil only for a transport or protocol failure
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// (short read, malformed line, unknown type byte, an out-of-range or
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// mistrailed bulk/array) — a well-formed RESP error reply decodes
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// successfully to a respErr value, not to a non-nil error, so a caller
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// pipelining several commands can still read every reply after one of
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// them fails server-side.
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func decodeReply(r *bufio.Reader) (any, error) {
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line, err := readLine(r)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if line == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: empty reply line")
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}
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prefix, rest := line[0], line[1:]
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switch prefix {
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case '+':
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return rest, nil
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case '-':
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return respErr(rest), nil
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case ':':
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n, err := strconv.ParseInt(rest, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: malformed integer reply %q: %w", rest, err)
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}
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return n, nil
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case '$':
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return decodeBulk(r, rest)
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case '*':
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return decodeArray(r, rest)
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: unknown reply type %q", prefix)
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}
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}
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// decodeBulk reads a bulk string body given its already-parsed "$" length
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// field lenField, returning nil for a null bulk ("$-1"). It rejects a
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// negative length other than -1 and a length exceeding respMaxBulkLen
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// before allocating — n+2 would otherwise be able to overflow into a
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// negative slice length for a maliciously huge declared length, panicking
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// make([]byte, n+2) — and verifies the two bytes following the payload
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// are the expected CRLF trailer.
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func decodeBulk(r *bufio.Reader, lenField string) (any, error) {
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n, err := strconv.Atoi(lenField)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: malformed bulk length %q: %w", lenField, err)
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}
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if n == -1 {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if n < -1 || n > respMaxBulkLen {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: bulk length %d out of range (max %d)", n, respMaxBulkLen)
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}
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buf := make([]byte, n+2) // payload plus trailing CRLF; n is bounded above, so n+2 cannot overflow
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: read bulk body: %w", err)
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}
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if buf[n] != '\r' || buf[n+1] != '\n' {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: bulk reply missing CRLF trailer")
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}
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return buf[:n], nil
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}
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// decodeArray reads n elements given the already-parsed "*" length field
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// lenField, returning nil for a null array ("*-1"). It rejects a negative
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// length other than -1 and a length exceeding respMaxArrayLen before
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// allocating, for the same reason as decodeBulk's cap.
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func decodeArray(r *bufio.Reader, lenField string) (any, error) {
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n, err := strconv.Atoi(lenField)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: malformed array length %q: %w", lenField, err)
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}
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if n == -1 {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if n < -1 || n > respMaxArrayLen {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: array length %d out of range (max %d)", n, respMaxArrayLen)
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}
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arr := make([]any, n)
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for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
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v, err := decodeReply(r)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: array element %d/%d: %w", i+1, n, err)
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}
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arr[i] = v
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}
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return arr, nil
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}
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// readLine reads one CRLF-terminated line from r, with the trailing CRLF
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// (or bare LF) stripped. It reads a byte at a time so it can bail out
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// after respMaxLineLen bytes without ever finding '\n' — a peer that
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// never terminates a line must not make this buffer an unbounded number
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// of bytes first and only reject the result afterward.
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func readLine(r *bufio.Reader) (string, error) {
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buf := make([]byte, 0, 64)
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for {
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b, err := r.ReadByte()
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("resp: read line: %w", err)
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}
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if b == '\n' {
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return strings.TrimSuffix(string(buf), "\r"), nil
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}
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if len(buf) >= respMaxLineLen {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("resp: reply line exceeds %d bytes", respMaxLineLen)
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}
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buf = append(buf, b)
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}
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}
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