mirror of
https://github.com/lukaszraczylo/traefik-llmgateway.git
synced 2026-10-12 04:54:45 +00:00
handlePassthrough checked only the provider allowlist, never the model or the path. A tenant scoped to one cheap model could reach a provider's entire native API (files, batches, fine-tuning) on the operator's key, and client identity headers reached keyless in-cluster MCP/A2A targets unfiltered. This change closes both gaps, additively: every new field defaults to reproducing prior behavior exactly. Model enforcement: when a passthrough JSON body carries a top-level "model" field, handlePassthrough checks it against the group's model glob, in both the bare and provider-prefixed form (the same dual-candidate matcher the unified route's resolveAgainst already applies). A body with no inspectable model (Gemini's URL-embedded model, a multipart upload, a non-JSON body) falls back to provider-only authorization, unchanged from before this round. Per-provider toggle: ProviderConfig.Passthrough, nil or true by default, lets an operator disable a provider's native passthrough route. A disabled provider now reports the ordinary unknown-route 404, checked in ServeHTTP's own route gate, before auth even runs. Per-group path allowlist: GroupConfig.PassthroughPaths, empty by default (matching every other allow-list field's empty-means-all semantics), restricts which native rest path a group may address. Dangerous-header stripping: proxyUpstream now additionally strips Forwarded, X-Forwarded-*, X-Auth-*, X-Remote-User, X-Remote-Groups, and Cookie on both the native-passthrough and MCP/A2A target-proxy paths, plus OpenAI-Organization, OpenAI-Project, and anthropic-beta on native passthrough only. This is an additive denylist expansion, not an allowlist inversion; ordinary headers still pass through. A dedicated test asserts a config with none of the new fields set behaves identically to before this change. The operator's home group (providers/models/mcpServers/agents/passthroughPaths all empty) stays fully unrestricted, and macstudio-rerank/parakeet-mlx/piper-tts stay reachable through native passthrough by default.
410 lines
16 KiB
Go
410 lines
16 KiB
Go
package traefikllmgateway
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"path"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// user is an authenticated API-key holder resolved by authStore.identify.
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type user struct {
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limits *LimitsConfig
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name, groupName string
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// admin grants access to the read-only admin dashboard (spec §4,
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// v0.2) — an admin user is otherwise ordinary: their own limits and
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// group authorization still apply, including to the admin routes.
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admin bool
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}
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// group describes a group's access rules and default limits. Empty
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// providers, models, mcpServers, or agents means all are allowed.
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type group struct {
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limits *LimitsConfig
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cache *bool
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name string
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providers []string
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models []string
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mcpServers []string
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agents []string
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passthroughPaths []string
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cacheTTL time.Duration
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}
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// allowsProvider reports whether name matches one of the group's provider
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// glob patterns. An empty pattern list allows every provider.
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func (grp *group) allowsProvider(name string) bool {
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return matchesGlob(grp.providers, name)
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}
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// allowsModel reports whether id matches one of the group's model glob
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// patterns, exactly as given. An empty pattern list allows every model.
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//
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// allowsModel does no "provider/model" prefix-splitting of its own — a
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// pattern like "deepseek-*" must not spuriously match a bare model id that
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// merely happens to contain a slash (e.g. an upstream's own
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// "uni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731" naming, where "uni" is not a configured
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// provider: there is no legitimate prefix to strip there at all). A caller
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// that genuinely knows an id's leading segment names a configured provider
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// (modelRegistry.resolveAgainst, modelRegistry.listFor) generates both the
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// full and bare-suffix candidate strings itself and calls allowsModel once
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// per candidate.
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func (grp *group) allowsModel(id string) bool {
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return matchesGlob(grp.models, id)
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}
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// allowsMCP reports whether name matches one of the group's MCP-server glob
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// patterns. An empty pattern list allows every server.
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func (grp *group) allowsMCP(name string) bool {
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return matchesGlob(grp.mcpServers, name)
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}
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// allowsAgent reports whether name matches one of the group's agent glob
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// patterns. An empty pattern list allows every agent.
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func (grp *group) allowsAgent(name string) bool {
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return matchesGlob(grp.agents, name)
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}
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// allowsPassthroughPath reports whether rest — the path segment after the
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// provider name in a native passthrough request (passthroughRoute's own
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// "rest", routes_passthrough.go) — matches one of the group's
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// PassthroughPaths glob patterns (security+performance audit,
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// 2026-08-22). An empty pattern list allows every path, the same
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// fail-open default every other allowsX method on group already applies
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// (matchesGlob's own empty-means-all contract) — do not invert it.
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func (grp *group) allowsPassthroughPath(rest string) bool {
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return matchesGlob(grp.passthroughPaths, rest)
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}
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// cloneStringSlice returns an independent copy of s, preserving nil (a nil
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// s returns nil, never an empty non-nil slice — groupSummary's own
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// providers/models/mcpServers/agents fields rely on that nil-ness to stay
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// "omitempty" all the way to the JSON response, admin.go's
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// adminUsageEntryView). Plain builtins only (make/copy, no generics, no
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// non-stdlib package): the plugin runs interpreted under Yaegi (see
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// tools/yaegi-check), whose stdlib symbol table does not resolve the
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// generic "slices" package's type parameters — this is why a
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// slices.Clone call is not used here.
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func cloneStringSlice(s []string) []string {
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if s == nil {
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return nil
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}
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out := make([]string, len(s))
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copy(out, s)
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return out
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}
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// matchesGlob reports whether candidate matches any shell-style pattern in
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// patterns (path.Match semantics). An empty pattern list matches anything.
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// A malformed pattern (path.ErrBadPattern) is treated as a non-match rather
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// than a panic or a silent allow.
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func matchesGlob(patterns []string, candidate string) bool {
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if len(patterns) == 0 {
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return true
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}
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for _, p := range patterns {
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if ok, err := path.Match(p, candidate); ok && err == nil {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// authEntry is the internal record stored per API-key digest.
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type authEntry struct {
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user *user
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group *group
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digest [32]byte
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}
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// authStore identifies requests by API key and resolves them to a user and
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// their group. Raw API keys are never retained after construction — only
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// their SHA-256 digests.
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//
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// mu guards byDigest and fileUserCount for readers (identify) and the final
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// swap in replaceFileUsers. buildMu serializes the whole body of
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// replaceFileUsers — including buildEntry's potentially slow file-backed
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// secret resolution — so concurrent reload attempts never interleave or
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// overwrite each other. buildMu is never held at the same time as mu, so a
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// rebuild in progress never blocks identify's readers. reloadMu (Task 4)
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// serializes maybeReload's throttle check and the reload it may trigger.
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type authStore struct {
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groups map[string]*group
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inline map[[32]byte]*authEntry // built once by newAuthStore; never mutated afterward
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byDigest map[[32]byte]*authEntry // inline entries plus the current file-sourced set; guarded by mu
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usersFile *usersFile // nil when Users.File is not configured; maybeReload no-ops
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log gatewayLogger // set alongside usersFile; unused when usersFile is nil
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nowFn func() time.Time // injected for tests; defaults to time.Now
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lastCheck time.Time // guarded by reloadMu
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lastModTime time.Time // guarded by reloadMu
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fileUserCount int // guarded by mu; size of the current file-sourced user set
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mu sync.RWMutex
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buildMu sync.Mutex
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reloadMu sync.Mutex
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}
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// newAuthStore builds an authStore from cfg's groups and inline users. It
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// errors if a user references an unknown group, if a user's resolved API
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// key is empty, or if two users resolve to the same API key.
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func newAuthStore(cfg *Config) (*authStore, error) {
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a := &authStore{
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groups: make(map[string]*group, len(cfg.Groups)),
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inline: make(map[[32]byte]*authEntry),
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byDigest: make(map[[32]byte]*authEntry),
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nowFn: time.Now,
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}
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for name, gc := range cfg.Groups {
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if gc == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: group %q: config must not be nil", name)
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}
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if err := gc.Limits.validate(); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: group %q: %w", name, err)
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}
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// A group cannot opt into caching (Cache: true) when the global
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// cache block itself is not configured (cfg.Cache.Enabled false)
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// — there is no ttl/maxBodyBytes to inherit, and nothing for
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// newGateway to wire g.cache from either way (spec §2). Cache:
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// false or nil never hits this check: a group can always opt out
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// of, or inherit, caching regardless of the global setting.
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if gc.Cache != nil && *gc.Cache && !cfg.Cache.Enabled {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: group %q enables cache but global cache is not configured", name)
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}
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// CacheTTL follows the identical "nothing to inherit from" reasoning
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// as Cache:true above: overriding a TTL only means something when
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// there is a global cache.ttl to override, so CacheTTL set while
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// the global cache block itself is not configured is a constructor
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// error, independent of this group's own Cache setting (a group
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// may set CacheTTL for when caching later becomes enabled globally
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// is NOT supported — cfg.Cache.Enabled is checked here, not
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// per-group, matching Cache:true's own check above).
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cacheTTL, err := groupCacheTTL(name, gc.CacheTTL, cfg.Cache.Enabled)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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a.groups[name] = &group{
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limits: gc.Limits,
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cache: gc.Cache,
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cacheTTL: cacheTTL,
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name: name,
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providers: gc.Providers,
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models: gc.Models,
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mcpServers: gc.MCPServers,
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agents: gc.Agents,
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passthroughPaths: gc.PassthroughPaths,
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}
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}
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if cfg.Users != nil {
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for _, uc := range cfg.Users.Inline {
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entry, err := a.buildEntry(uc)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if _, exists := a.inline[entry.digest]; exists {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: duplicate API key for user %q", uc.Name)
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}
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a.inline[entry.digest] = entry
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a.byDigest[entry.digest] = entry
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}
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}
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return a, nil
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}
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// buildEntry resolves uc's group and API key into an authEntry. The API key
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// goes through resolveSecret before digesting, so env:/file: references
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// work the same as for provider keys.
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func (a *authStore) buildEntry(uc *UserConfig) (*authEntry, error) {
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if uc == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user config entry must not be nil")
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}
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grp, ok := a.groups[uc.Group]
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q references unknown group %q", uc.Name, uc.Group)
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}
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if err := uc.Limits.validate(); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q: %w", uc.Name, err)
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}
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key, err := resolveSecret(uc.APIKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q: %w", uc.Name, err)
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}
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if key == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q has an empty API key", uc.Name)
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}
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digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
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return &authEntry{
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digest: digest,
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user: &user{limits: uc.Limits, name: uc.Name, groupName: uc.Group, admin: uc.Admin},
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group: grp,
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}, nil
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}
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// replaceFileUsers rebuilds the file-sourced portion of the store from us. A
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// file user overrides an inline user of the same name — the inline entry is
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// dropped from the rebuilt set, even if its API key differs from the file
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// user's — so an operator can promote or rotate a statically-configured user
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// through the hot-reloadable file. Inline users with no same-named file
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// counterpart are carried forward unchanged. This is used by the
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// config-reload path (Task 4) to pick up changes to Users.File without
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// restarting the plugin. On error the store is left exactly as it was before
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// the call — the new set is validated and built in full before it replaces
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// the old one.
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//
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// buildMu is held for the whole rebuild, not just the final swap — that
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// serializes concurrent callers (a reload timer must never race itself), so
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// one call's result can never be partially overwritten or interleaved with
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// another's. mu, which identify's reads use (RLock), is locked only for the
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// final map swap below: a slow rebuild (buildEntry's resolveSecret can do
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// blocking file I/O for "file:"-prefixed API keys) no longer stalls every
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// identify call for its whole duration.
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func (a *authStore) replaceFileUsers(us []*UserConfig) error {
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a.buildMu.Lock()
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defer a.buildMu.Unlock()
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fileNames := make(map[string]bool, len(us))
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for _, uc := range us {
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if uc != nil {
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fileNames[uc.Name] = true
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}
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}
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next := make(map[[32]byte]*authEntry, len(a.inline)+len(us))
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for digest, entry := range a.inline {
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if fileNames[entry.user.name] {
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continue // a file user of the same name overrides this inline user
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}
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next[digest] = entry
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}
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for _, uc := range us {
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entry, err := a.buildEntry(uc)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, exists := next[entry.digest]; exists {
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return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: duplicate API key for user %q", uc.Name)
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}
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next[entry.digest] = entry
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}
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a.mu.Lock()
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a.byDigest = next
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a.fileUserCount = len(us)
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a.mu.Unlock()
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return nil
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}
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// identify resolves r's presented API key to a user and their group. It
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// reads "Authorization: Bearer <key>" (case-insensitive "bearer" prefix) or
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// "x-api-key: <key>"; Bearer wins when both are present. The presented key
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// is looked up by SHA-256 digest, then verified with a constant-time
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// compare — the key itself is never retained.
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func (a *authStore) identify(r *http.Request) (*user, *group, bool) {
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key, ok := presentedKey(r)
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if !ok {
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return nil, nil, false
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}
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digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
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a.mu.RLock()
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entry, ok := a.byDigest[digest]
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a.mu.RUnlock()
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if !ok {
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return nil, nil, false
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}
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(digest[:], entry.digest[:]) != 1 {
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return nil, nil, false
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}
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return entry.user, entry.group, true
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}
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// presentedKey extracts the API key from r's Authorization Bearer header or
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// its x-api-key header. Bearer takes priority when both are set.
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func presentedKey(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
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if authz := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); authz != "" {
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if scheme, rest, found := strings.Cut(authz, " "); found && strings.EqualFold(scheme, "bearer") {
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if key := strings.TrimSpace(rest); key != "" {
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return key, true
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}
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}
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}
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if key := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("x-api-key")); key != "" {
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return key, true
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}
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return "", false
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}
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// userSummary and groupSummary are the read-only, redaction-safe listing
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// authStore.snapshot returns for the admin dashboard (spec §4, v0.2):
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// names, group membership, and limits only — never an API key or its
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// digest, matching the package-wide "raw keys are never retained past
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// construction" rule this file's own doc comment already states for
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// byDigest itself.
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type userSummary struct {
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limits *LimitsConfig
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name string
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groupName string
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}
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// groupSummary mirrors userSummary for one configured group, plus its
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// current member count (how many active users, inline or file-sourced,
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// currently reference it) and its configured access lists — providers,
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// models, mcpServers, agents — carried through exactly as group.allowsX
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// itself reads them (group-access-display task): nil/empty means every
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// provider/model/MCP server/agent is allowed (matchesGlob's own contract,
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// auth.go), never expanded to the full catalog here — the admin dashboard
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// echoes the configured glob list, not a resolved membership set.
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//
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// snapshot (below) clones all four slices rather than aliasing group's own
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// — group.providers/models/mcpServers/agents are the live authorization
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// data every allowsX call reads on the request path; groupSummary is a
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// read-only, dashboard-facing COPY, so a future caller that sorts or
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// otherwise mutates a groupSummary's list in place can never reorder or
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// corrupt the slice authorization itself still relies on.
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type groupSummary struct {
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limits *LimitsConfig
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name string
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providers []string
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models []string
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mcpServers []string
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agents []string
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memberCount int
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}
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// snapshot returns a sorted, redaction-safe listing of every currently
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// active user and every configured group. a.mu is read-locked only for
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// the byDigest walk, mirroring identify's own RLock usage; a.groups is
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// built once by newAuthStore and never mutated afterward (see this
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// file's authStore doc comment), so reading it needs no lock.
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func (a *authStore) snapshot() ([]userSummary, []groupSummary) {
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a.mu.RLock()
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users := make([]userSummary, 0, len(a.byDigest))
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memberCounts := make(map[string]int, len(a.groups))
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for _, entry := range a.byDigest {
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users = append(users, userSummary{limits: entry.user.limits, name: entry.user.name, groupName: entry.user.groupName})
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memberCounts[entry.user.groupName]++
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}
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a.mu.RUnlock()
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sort.Slice(users, func(i, j int) bool { return users[i].name < users[j].name })
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groups := make([]groupSummary, 0, len(a.groups))
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for name, grp := range a.groups {
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groups = append(groups, groupSummary{
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limits: grp.limits,
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name: name,
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providers: cloneStringSlice(grp.providers),
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models: cloneStringSlice(grp.models),
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mcpServers: cloneStringSlice(grp.mcpServers),
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agents: cloneStringSlice(grp.agents),
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memberCount: memberCounts[name],
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})
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}
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sort.Slice(groups, func(i, j int) bool { return groups[i].name < groups[j].name })
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return users, groups
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}
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