Files
traefik-llmgateway/auth.go
T
lukaszraczylo e3ef4084d2 feat(passthrough): add model, path, and header authorization hardening
handlePassthrough checked only the provider allowlist, never the model
or the path. A tenant scoped to one cheap model could reach a
provider's entire native API (files, batches, fine-tuning) on the
operator's key, and client identity headers reached keyless in-cluster
MCP/A2A targets unfiltered. This change closes both gaps, additively:
every new field defaults to reproducing prior behavior exactly.

Model enforcement: when a passthrough JSON body carries a top-level
"model" field, handlePassthrough checks it against the group's model
glob, in both the bare and provider-prefixed form (the same
dual-candidate matcher the unified route's resolveAgainst already
applies). A body with no inspectable model (Gemini's URL-embedded
model, a multipart upload, a non-JSON body) falls back to
provider-only authorization, unchanged from before this round.

Per-provider toggle: ProviderConfig.Passthrough, nil or true by
default, lets an operator disable a provider's native passthrough
route. A disabled provider now reports the ordinary unknown-route 404,
checked in ServeHTTP's own route gate, before auth even runs.

Per-group path allowlist: GroupConfig.PassthroughPaths, empty by
default (matching every other allow-list field's empty-means-all
semantics), restricts which native rest path a group may address.

Dangerous-header stripping: proxyUpstream now additionally strips
Forwarded, X-Forwarded-*, X-Auth-*, X-Remote-User, X-Remote-Groups, and
Cookie on both the native-passthrough and MCP/A2A target-proxy paths,
plus OpenAI-Organization, OpenAI-Project, and anthropic-beta on native
passthrough only. This is an additive denylist expansion, not an
allowlist inversion; ordinary headers still pass through.

A dedicated test asserts a config with none of the new fields set
behaves identically to before this change. The operator's home group
(providers/models/mcpServers/agents/passthroughPaths all empty) stays
fully unrestricted, and macstudio-rerank/parakeet-mlx/piper-tts stay
reachable through native passthrough by default.
2026-08-22 11:40:27 +01:00

410 lines
16 KiB
Go

package traefikllmgateway
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"path"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// user is an authenticated API-key holder resolved by authStore.identify.
type user struct {
limits *LimitsConfig
name, groupName string
// admin grants access to the read-only admin dashboard (spec §4,
// v0.2) — an admin user is otherwise ordinary: their own limits and
// group authorization still apply, including to the admin routes.
admin bool
}
// group describes a group's access rules and default limits. Empty
// providers, models, mcpServers, or agents means all are allowed.
type group struct {
limits *LimitsConfig
cache *bool
name string
providers []string
models []string
mcpServers []string
agents []string
passthroughPaths []string
cacheTTL time.Duration
}
// allowsProvider reports whether name matches one of the group's provider
// glob patterns. An empty pattern list allows every provider.
func (grp *group) allowsProvider(name string) bool {
return matchesGlob(grp.providers, name)
}
// allowsModel reports whether id matches one of the group's model glob
// patterns, exactly as given. An empty pattern list allows every model.
//
// allowsModel does no "provider/model" prefix-splitting of its own — a
// pattern like "deepseek-*" must not spuriously match a bare model id that
// merely happens to contain a slash (e.g. an upstream's own
// "uni/deepseek-v4-flash-0731" naming, where "uni" is not a configured
// provider: there is no legitimate prefix to strip there at all). A caller
// that genuinely knows an id's leading segment names a configured provider
// (modelRegistry.resolveAgainst, modelRegistry.listFor) generates both the
// full and bare-suffix candidate strings itself and calls allowsModel once
// per candidate.
func (grp *group) allowsModel(id string) bool {
return matchesGlob(grp.models, id)
}
// allowsMCP reports whether name matches one of the group's MCP-server glob
// patterns. An empty pattern list allows every server.
func (grp *group) allowsMCP(name string) bool {
return matchesGlob(grp.mcpServers, name)
}
// allowsAgent reports whether name matches one of the group's agent glob
// patterns. An empty pattern list allows every agent.
func (grp *group) allowsAgent(name string) bool {
return matchesGlob(grp.agents, name)
}
// allowsPassthroughPath reports whether rest — the path segment after the
// provider name in a native passthrough request (passthroughRoute's own
// "rest", routes_passthrough.go) — matches one of the group's
// PassthroughPaths glob patterns (security+performance audit,
// 2026-08-22). An empty pattern list allows every path, the same
// fail-open default every other allowsX method on group already applies
// (matchesGlob's own empty-means-all contract) — do not invert it.
func (grp *group) allowsPassthroughPath(rest string) bool {
return matchesGlob(grp.passthroughPaths, rest)
}
// cloneStringSlice returns an independent copy of s, preserving nil (a nil
// s returns nil, never an empty non-nil slice — groupSummary's own
// providers/models/mcpServers/agents fields rely on that nil-ness to stay
// "omitempty" all the way to the JSON response, admin.go's
// adminUsageEntryView). Plain builtins only (make/copy, no generics, no
// non-stdlib package): the plugin runs interpreted under Yaegi (see
// tools/yaegi-check), whose stdlib symbol table does not resolve the
// generic "slices" package's type parameters — this is why a
// slices.Clone call is not used here.
func cloneStringSlice(s []string) []string {
if s == nil {
return nil
}
out := make([]string, len(s))
copy(out, s)
return out
}
// matchesGlob reports whether candidate matches any shell-style pattern in
// patterns (path.Match semantics). An empty pattern list matches anything.
// A malformed pattern (path.ErrBadPattern) is treated as a non-match rather
// than a panic or a silent allow.
func matchesGlob(patterns []string, candidate string) bool {
if len(patterns) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, p := range patterns {
if ok, err := path.Match(p, candidate); ok && err == nil {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// authEntry is the internal record stored per API-key digest.
type authEntry struct {
user *user
group *group
digest [32]byte
}
// authStore identifies requests by API key and resolves them to a user and
// their group. Raw API keys are never retained after construction — only
// their SHA-256 digests.
//
// mu guards byDigest and fileUserCount for readers (identify) and the final
// swap in replaceFileUsers. buildMu serializes the whole body of
// replaceFileUsers — including buildEntry's potentially slow file-backed
// secret resolution — so concurrent reload attempts never interleave or
// overwrite each other. buildMu is never held at the same time as mu, so a
// rebuild in progress never blocks identify's readers. reloadMu (Task 4)
// serializes maybeReload's throttle check and the reload it may trigger.
type authStore struct {
groups map[string]*group
inline map[[32]byte]*authEntry // built once by newAuthStore; never mutated afterward
byDigest map[[32]byte]*authEntry // inline entries plus the current file-sourced set; guarded by mu
usersFile *usersFile // nil when Users.File is not configured; maybeReload no-ops
log gatewayLogger // set alongside usersFile; unused when usersFile is nil
nowFn func() time.Time // injected for tests; defaults to time.Now
lastCheck time.Time // guarded by reloadMu
lastModTime time.Time // guarded by reloadMu
fileUserCount int // guarded by mu; size of the current file-sourced user set
mu sync.RWMutex
buildMu sync.Mutex
reloadMu sync.Mutex
}
// newAuthStore builds an authStore from cfg's groups and inline users. It
// errors if a user references an unknown group, if a user's resolved API
// key is empty, or if two users resolve to the same API key.
func newAuthStore(cfg *Config) (*authStore, error) {
a := &authStore{
groups: make(map[string]*group, len(cfg.Groups)),
inline: make(map[[32]byte]*authEntry),
byDigest: make(map[[32]byte]*authEntry),
nowFn: time.Now,
}
for name, gc := range cfg.Groups {
if gc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: group %q: config must not be nil", name)
}
if err := gc.Limits.validate(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: group %q: %w", name, err)
}
// A group cannot opt into caching (Cache: true) when the global
// cache block itself is not configured (cfg.Cache.Enabled false)
// — there is no ttl/maxBodyBytes to inherit, and nothing for
// newGateway to wire g.cache from either way (spec §2). Cache:
// false or nil never hits this check: a group can always opt out
// of, or inherit, caching regardless of the global setting.
if gc.Cache != nil && *gc.Cache && !cfg.Cache.Enabled {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: group %q enables cache but global cache is not configured", name)
}
// CacheTTL follows the identical "nothing to inherit from" reasoning
// as Cache:true above: overriding a TTL only means something when
// there is a global cache.ttl to override, so CacheTTL set while
// the global cache block itself is not configured is a constructor
// error, independent of this group's own Cache setting (a group
// may set CacheTTL for when caching later becomes enabled globally
// is NOT supported — cfg.Cache.Enabled is checked here, not
// per-group, matching Cache:true's own check above).
cacheTTL, err := groupCacheTTL(name, gc.CacheTTL, cfg.Cache.Enabled)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
a.groups[name] = &group{
limits: gc.Limits,
cache: gc.Cache,
cacheTTL: cacheTTL,
name: name,
providers: gc.Providers,
models: gc.Models,
mcpServers: gc.MCPServers,
agents: gc.Agents,
passthroughPaths: gc.PassthroughPaths,
}
}
if cfg.Users != nil {
for _, uc := range cfg.Users.Inline {
entry, err := a.buildEntry(uc)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if _, exists := a.inline[entry.digest]; exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: duplicate API key for user %q", uc.Name)
}
a.inline[entry.digest] = entry
a.byDigest[entry.digest] = entry
}
}
return a, nil
}
// buildEntry resolves uc's group and API key into an authEntry. The API key
// goes through resolveSecret before digesting, so env:/file: references
// work the same as for provider keys.
func (a *authStore) buildEntry(uc *UserConfig) (*authEntry, error) {
if uc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user config entry must not be nil")
}
grp, ok := a.groups[uc.Group]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q references unknown group %q", uc.Name, uc.Group)
}
if err := uc.Limits.validate(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q: %w", uc.Name, err)
}
key, err := resolveSecret(uc.APIKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q: %w", uc.Name, err)
}
if key == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: user %q has an empty API key", uc.Name)
}
digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
return &authEntry{
digest: digest,
user: &user{limits: uc.Limits, name: uc.Name, groupName: uc.Group, admin: uc.Admin},
group: grp,
}, nil
}
// replaceFileUsers rebuilds the file-sourced portion of the store from us. A
// file user overrides an inline user of the same name — the inline entry is
// dropped from the rebuilt set, even if its API key differs from the file
// user's — so an operator can promote or rotate a statically-configured user
// through the hot-reloadable file. Inline users with no same-named file
// counterpart are carried forward unchanged. This is used by the
// config-reload path (Task 4) to pick up changes to Users.File without
// restarting the plugin. On error the store is left exactly as it was before
// the call — the new set is validated and built in full before it replaces
// the old one.
//
// buildMu is held for the whole rebuild, not just the final swap — that
// serializes concurrent callers (a reload timer must never race itself), so
// one call's result can never be partially overwritten or interleaved with
// another's. mu, which identify's reads use (RLock), is locked only for the
// final map swap below: a slow rebuild (buildEntry's resolveSecret can do
// blocking file I/O for "file:"-prefixed API keys) no longer stalls every
// identify call for its whole duration.
func (a *authStore) replaceFileUsers(us []*UserConfig) error {
a.buildMu.Lock()
defer a.buildMu.Unlock()
fileNames := make(map[string]bool, len(us))
for _, uc := range us {
if uc != nil {
fileNames[uc.Name] = true
}
}
next := make(map[[32]byte]*authEntry, len(a.inline)+len(us))
for digest, entry := range a.inline {
if fileNames[entry.user.name] {
continue // a file user of the same name overrides this inline user
}
next[digest] = entry
}
for _, uc := range us {
entry, err := a.buildEntry(uc)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, exists := next[entry.digest]; exists {
return fmt.Errorf("llmgateway: duplicate API key for user %q", uc.Name)
}
next[entry.digest] = entry
}
a.mu.Lock()
a.byDigest = next
a.fileUserCount = len(us)
a.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
// identify resolves r's presented API key to a user and their group. It
// reads "Authorization: Bearer <key>" (case-insensitive "bearer" prefix) or
// "x-api-key: <key>"; Bearer wins when both are present. The presented key
// is looked up by SHA-256 digest, then verified with a constant-time
// compare — the key itself is never retained.
func (a *authStore) identify(r *http.Request) (*user, *group, bool) {
key, ok := presentedKey(r)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, false
}
digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
a.mu.RLock()
entry, ok := a.byDigest[digest]
a.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return nil, nil, false
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(digest[:], entry.digest[:]) != 1 {
return nil, nil, false
}
return entry.user, entry.group, true
}
// presentedKey extracts the API key from r's Authorization Bearer header or
// its x-api-key header. Bearer takes priority when both are set.
func presentedKey(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
if authz := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); authz != "" {
if scheme, rest, found := strings.Cut(authz, " "); found && strings.EqualFold(scheme, "bearer") {
if key := strings.TrimSpace(rest); key != "" {
return key, true
}
}
}
if key := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("x-api-key")); key != "" {
return key, true
}
return "", false
}
// userSummary and groupSummary are the read-only, redaction-safe listing
// authStore.snapshot returns for the admin dashboard (spec §4, v0.2):
// names, group membership, and limits only — never an API key or its
// digest, matching the package-wide "raw keys are never retained past
// construction" rule this file's own doc comment already states for
// byDigest itself.
type userSummary struct {
limits *LimitsConfig
name string
groupName string
}
// groupSummary mirrors userSummary for one configured group, plus its
// current member count (how many active users, inline or file-sourced,
// currently reference it) and its configured access lists — providers,
// models, mcpServers, agents — carried through exactly as group.allowsX
// itself reads them (group-access-display task): nil/empty means every
// provider/model/MCP server/agent is allowed (matchesGlob's own contract,
// auth.go), never expanded to the full catalog here — the admin dashboard
// echoes the configured glob list, not a resolved membership set.
//
// snapshot (below) clones all four slices rather than aliasing group's own
// — group.providers/models/mcpServers/agents are the live authorization
// data every allowsX call reads on the request path; groupSummary is a
// read-only, dashboard-facing COPY, so a future caller that sorts or
// otherwise mutates a groupSummary's list in place can never reorder or
// corrupt the slice authorization itself still relies on.
type groupSummary struct {
limits *LimitsConfig
name string
providers []string
models []string
mcpServers []string
agents []string
memberCount int
}
// snapshot returns a sorted, redaction-safe listing of every currently
// active user and every configured group. a.mu is read-locked only for
// the byDigest walk, mirroring identify's own RLock usage; a.groups is
// built once by newAuthStore and never mutated afterward (see this
// file's authStore doc comment), so reading it needs no lock.
func (a *authStore) snapshot() ([]userSummary, []groupSummary) {
a.mu.RLock()
users := make([]userSummary, 0, len(a.byDigest))
memberCounts := make(map[string]int, len(a.groups))
for _, entry := range a.byDigest {
users = append(users, userSummary{limits: entry.user.limits, name: entry.user.name, groupName: entry.user.groupName})
memberCounts[entry.user.groupName]++
}
a.mu.RUnlock()
sort.Slice(users, func(i, j int) bool { return users[i].name < users[j].name })
groups := make([]groupSummary, 0, len(a.groups))
for name, grp := range a.groups {
groups = append(groups, groupSummary{
limits: grp.limits,
name: name,
providers: cloneStringSlice(grp.providers),
models: cloneStringSlice(grp.models),
mcpServers: cloneStringSlice(grp.mcpServers),
agents: cloneStringSlice(grp.agents),
memberCount: memberCounts[name],
})
}
sort.Slice(groups, func(i, j int) bool { return groups[i].name < groups[j].name })
return users, groups
}